Description

Two-sided online platforms are typically plagued by hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard), limiting market efficiency. Under the context of the increasingly popular online labor contracting platforms,

Two-sided online platforms are typically plagued by hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden actions (moral hazard), limiting market efficiency. Under the context of the increasingly popular online labor contracting platforms, this dissertation investigates whether and how IT-enabled monitoring systems can mitigate moral hazard and reshape the labor demand and supply by providing detailed information about workers’ effort.

2.19 MB application/pdf

Download count: 0

Details

Contributors
Date Created
  • 2019
Resource Type
  • Text
  • Collections this item is in
    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2019
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

    Citation and reuse

    Statement of Responsibility

    by Chen Liang

    Machine-readable links