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I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized

I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to

evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.

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    • 2017
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    • Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017

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