Description

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and

I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons.

Reuse Permissions
  • 390.15 KB application/pdf

    Download count: 0

    Details

    Contributors
    Date Created
    • 2017
    Resource Type
  • Text
  • Collections this item is in
    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (pages 53-56)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

    Citation and reuse

    Statement of Responsibility

    by Hong Zhao

    Machine-readable links