I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons.
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- Executives--United States--States--Psychology.
- Executives--Rating of--United States--States.
- Executives--Salaries, etc.--United States--States.
- Executives--Supply and demand--United States--States.
- Employee competitive behavior--United States--States.
- Employee competitive behavior
- Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017Note typethesis
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 53-56)Note typebibliography
- Field of study: Business administration