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This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is impermissive or not: For

This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is impermissive or not: For any total evidence E, is there a unique doxastic state that any possible agent with that total evidence E should take (Uniqueness), or not (Permissivism)?

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    Date Created
    • 2016
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2016
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (pages 88-91)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Philosophy

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    Statement of Responsibility

    by Jaemin Jung

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