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This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a

This thesis is concerned with the methodological role of intuitions in metaphysics. It is divided into two main parts. Part I argues that an academic field can only employ a method of gathering evidence if it has established some agreed-upon standards regarding how to evaluate uses of this method. Existing meta-philosophical disputes take the nature of intuitions to be their starting point. This is a mistake. My concern is not the epistemic status of intuitions, but rather how metaphysicians appeal to intuitions as a form of evidence.

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    Date Created
    • 2014
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  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: M.A., Arizona State University, 2014
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 264-284)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Philosophy

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    by Shea Musgrave

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