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This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms.

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    Date Created
    • 2014
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2014
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-25)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Accountancy

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    by Ji Li

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