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Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a

Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA).

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    Date Created
    • 2014
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2014
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 40-42)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Economics

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    by Mian Wang

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