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ABSTRACT In this work, I provide two novel pieces of evidence in favor of the view that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. First, I present an empirical case via

ABSTRACT In this work, I provide two novel pieces of evidence in favor of the view that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. First, I present an empirical case via the results of a series of recent experiments to show that folk-knowledge attributions may be sensitive to time constraints even when the latter are construed in a non-truth relevant manner. Along the way, I consider some comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) as it pertains to interpreting time constraints-sensitivity in a manner that supports contextualism, before offering reasons to resist such a treatment.

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    Date Created
    • 2013
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  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: M.A., Arizona State University, 2013
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibilographical references (p. 71-73)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Philosophy

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    by Joseph Ellis Shin

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