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This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period.

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    Date Created
    • 2012
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  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2012
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 68-71)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

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    by Qingqing Wu

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