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Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No.

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    Date Created
    • 2012
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph. D., Arizona State University, 2012
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-87)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration (Finance)

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    by Zhichuan (Frank) Li

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