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This Thesis contends that if the designer of a non-biological machine (android) can establish that the machine exhibits certain specified behaviors or characteristics, then there is no principled reason to

This Thesis contends that if the designer of a non-biological machine (android) can establish that the machine exhibits certain specified behaviors or characteristics, then there is no principled reason to deny that the machine can be considered a legal person. The thesis also states that given a related but not necessarily identical set of characteristics, there is no principled reason to deny that the non-biological machine can make a claim to a level of moral personhood.

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    Date Created
    • 2011
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Note
    • Partial requirement for: M.S., Arizona State University, 2011
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-100)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Biology

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    Statement of Responsibility

    David J. Calverley

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