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In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014).

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    • 2017-03-01
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    • Multilab direct replication of: Study 7 from Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature, 489, 427–430. Protocol vetted by: David Rand Protocol and manuscript edited by: Daniel Simons
    • Thanks to the American Psychological Society (APS) and the Arnold Foundation who provided funding to participating laboratories to defray the costs of running the study. Thanks to David Rand for providing materials and helping to ensure the accuracy of the protocol. Thanks to Edison Choe for coding the analysis scripts and to Courtney Soderberg at the Center for Open Science for verifying their accuracy.
    • Full protocol, dataset, analysis scripts, materials from participating labs, and preregistration materials are available on the Open Science Framework - https://osf.io/scu2f/, opens in a new window

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    S. Bouwmeester, P. P. J. L. Verkoeijen, B. Aczel, F. Barbosa, L. Bègue, P. Brañas-Garza, T. G. H. Chmura, G. Cornelissen, F. S. Døssing, A. M. Espín, A. M. Evans, F. Ferreira-Santos, S. Fiedler, J. Flegr, M. Ghaffari, A. Glöckner, T. Goeschl, L. Guo, O. P. Hauser, R. Hernan-Gonzalez, A. Herrero, Z. Horne, P. Houdek, M. Johannesson, L. Koppel, P. Kujal, T. Laine, J. Lohse, E. C. Martins, C. Mauro, D. Mischkowski, S. Mukherjee, K. O. R. Myrseth, D. Navarro-Martínez, T. M. S. Neal, J. Novakova, R. Pagà, T. O. Paiva, B. Palfi, M. Piovesan, R.-M. Rahal, E. Salomon, N. Srinivasan, A. Srivastava, B. Szaszi, A. Szollosi, K. Ø. Thor, G. Tinghög, J. S. Trueblood, J. J. Van Bavel, A. E. van ‘t Veer, D. Västfjäll, M. Warner, E. Wengström, J. Wills, C. E. Wollbrant. (2017). Registered replication report: Rand, Greene, & Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12, 527-542. doi: 10.1177/1745691617693624

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