Machiavellian Solutions Concerning Contemporary U.S. Civil-Military Relations

by

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ABSTRACT

This qualitative study examined one perennial research question: What lessons from the works of Machiavelli can be taken into consideration to improve U.S. civil-military relations? A case for looking at Machiavelli's works for solutions to improve military relations off the battlefield is established. This research found two primary themes within the realm of civil-military relations: civilian control of the military and the military doctrine and practices. The researcher examined and analyzed multiple forms of data, including the writings of Machiavelli, military policies, articles, reports from the department of defense, video recordings of interviews, legislation, and historical documents. The researcher analyzed Machiavelli's *The Prince, Discourses on Livy, Art of War,* and secondary resources *for La Cagione dell'Ordinanza* to make conclusions. This research identified lessons from the works of Machiavelli to improve U.S. civil-military relations. The Machiavellian lessons included finding a balance of objective and subjective control of the military, ensuring the president is knowledgeable on military matters, placing an emphasis on conditioning our youth, funding weapons systems and equipment, and continuing to invest in the standing army. Limitations and Future research topics were suggested in the conclusion.

Keywords: Machiavelli, civil-military relations, civilian control, military doctrine, task-organization

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Commander-in-Chief, Secretary of Defense, every

member of Congress, every governor of every state.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> Of all the problems facing the nation, a crisis in civil-military relations is not one
> of them and things are not out of control… I can assure your readers that
> Presidents Bush and Clinton, and Secretaries Cheney and Aspin, exercised solid,
> unmistakable civilian control over the Armed Forces and especially me (Powell et
> al., n.d., p. 23).

Sources of Tension

Colin Powell made the statement above during a time when 236 members of

Congress, roughly 44%, and nine of the previous 10 Presidents had military experience.

In the current 117th Congress, only 17% of its members are veterans (Shane, 2020). With

the election of Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential election cycle, the American public

witnessed three consecutive presidents hold the office of Commander-in-Chief while

possessing zero prior military experience. Although there are no requirements for the

Commander-in-Chief to have ever served in the military prior to taking office, the fact

that a streak of this kind has not occurred in nearly a century is something noteworthy in

the current state of relations between military leadership, civilian leadership, and broader

society (Shane, 2020).

The balance of the relationship between the military leadership, civilian

leadership, and broader society of a country is debated in every empire and nation since

the beginning of time. Although the main actors of civil-military relations may differ, the

focus of political science experts is centered on the relations between the political elites

and the senior military leadership of a country (Brooks, 2019). The complexity and depth

of a country's civil-military leadership may differ based on multiple factors (Brooks,

2019). Brooks (2019) explored four themes that make up most of the research on civil-

military relations: military coups d'etat, military leaders' refusal of orders from their political and civilian leaders, the proper application of civilian control of the military, and the relationship between the military and rest of society. Existing research on United States civil-military relations focused on the topics of civilian control and the relationship between the military and the rest of society. Brooks (2019) concluded that the various fields of study on civil-military relations needed to be integrated more with one another to improve and maintain balance of control in a democracy (Brooks, 2019).

The United States faced a significant crisis when an imbalance between civilian leaders, military leaders and a divided society occurred. DeBruin (2020) identified cultural differences and a lack of civilian control as contributing factors to the Civil War, which could be considered America's largest attempted coup. The quick turnaround of Jefferson Davis as former Secretary of War of the United States of America to becoming the first president of the Confederate States of America provided experts something to look at when considering the future threat of a coup in the United States.

When it comes to the topic of civilian control of the military, two different theories of control and balance of power emerge in the literature. Christopher Gelpi defined objective civilian control as the case in which the civilian leadership has control of the military and the military reports to civilian leadership to obtain their orders (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences et al., 2021) Gelpi further defined subjective control as the case when military and civilian leadership are drawn from overlapping belief systems and social groups and as a result, share common values and beliefs about military objectives. (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences et al., 2021).

As the size, population, and capabilities of the United States military and government has grown over the past 244 years of its existence, so has the complexity of its civil-military relations. To put this into perspective, the Department of Defense (1997) noted only 7,108 soldiers made up the active-duty military during the year 1801, which increased to 458,365 in 1940, and has not fell below 1,000,000 personnel since 1941. Although the size and strength of the U.S. military has grown since its beginnings, the overall percentage of servicemembers and military veterans in the population has continuously dropped since the transition to the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 (Schaeffer, 2021).

The discontinuation of the use of conscription has resulted in a gap based on race, culture, and socioeconomic status. While minorities, the working-class, and the adult children of officers make up the majority of those who serve, the majority of America's elite social class excused itself from military service (Bacevich, 2013). The disconnect between the upper classes of American society and those who serve in the military remains a critical issue in civil-military relations. The Harvard University Institute of Politics (2015) found 60% of young Americans between ages 18-29 supported the United States sending ground troops to combat against the Islamic state. This survey further revealed 85% percent of respondents indicated that they would either 'probably not' or 'definitely not' join if the United States needed additional troops in the fight against the Islamic state, and 62% of respondents stated that they would 'definitely not' join (Harvard University Institute of Politics, 2015).

Despite a gap between those who choose to serve in the military and those who choose to opt out for a variety of reasons, public trust in the military remained

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consistently high as recently as 2016 (Dillon, Hall, & Balsamo-Galina, 2016). However, the Reagan Institute (2021) found that trust and confidence has dropped 25 points over the past 36 months to just 45%. Adults under the age of 30 reported the lowest confidence out of all demographic subgroups surveyed and identified political leadership and scandal for reasons behind their lack of confidence. Military leadership, costly defense systems, and misguided priorities contributed to a decline in the public's confidence (Ronald Reagan Institute, 2021). The recent drop in public trust in the military was equally met from servicemembers who felt isolated from broader society over this same time period (Ronald Reagan Institute, 2021).

Although the idea of having a class of warriors living separately from the rest of the population can be traced back to Plato's *Republic,* the United States shied away from the use of possessing a large standing army during peace time for much of its existence. The founders of the United States, notably Alexander Hamilton and James Madison had concerns with the use of a standing army due to the potential dangers that it could present to its citizens and the democratic process (Hamilton & Madison, 1787, Federalist No. 8). In Federalist No. 8, Hamilton (1787) stated that by possessing a strong navy to protect the coastlines there would be no need for a standing army. He further theorized that maintaining a large military force outside of the Navy would be too expensive and had the potential of creating division within the United States (Hamilton, 1787). James Madison (1787) theorized that a large standing military force paired with a disordered executive could present a threat to the liberty of its citizens (records from the Federal Convention of 1787). In Federalist Nos. 47 and 48, Hamilton (1787) placed an emphasis on how the distribution of powers across the three branches of government could prevent

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one group from holding too much power over the military. However, Hamilton (1787) warned that the three departments should not be too separated from each other, which suggested that he believed in the need for subject control.

Bell (2016) found that coups are twice as likely to be successful in democratically governments than in non-democratic governments. Although a coup d'état may represent the worst possible example in civil-military relations, it is only possible when tension emerges in the relationship between the military and its civilian counterparts. Bell (2016) noted that the study and debates on the topics of what leads to tension in civil-military relations has been prominent since the writings of Machiavelli. However, looking at the works of Machiavelli can be controversial due to his reputation.

Why Do We Study Machiavelli?

Machiavellianism is generally defined as the political theory of Machiavelli. However, a secondary definition includes a political view that is amoral and an unscrupulous achievement of political power (Brown, 2020). In essence, the mention of "Machiavelli" can often possess a negative connotation. However, there are circumstances in the body of literature where researchers employed the writings of Machiavelli in discussions of military strategy. This section examined why we study Machiavelli at all, despite the consensus that he can be considered an amoral and unscrupulous political force.

The amoral reputation of Machiavelli, the vast differences in his time and that of the contemporary United States, and the failure of his militia could all be disqualifiers regarding looking to him for advice. Taking away ideas from leaders and units who have lost battles is not foreign to the United States. Erwin Rommel, a general on the side of

Nazi Germany during WWII, is quoted several times regarding mission command in U.S. military doctrine although he was defeated by British and American forces on several fronts during World War II. Genghis Khan, who was born several centuries before Machiavelli, was quoted, and referenced to in U.S. military doctrine.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dragged on throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, many Americans questioned the strategy and purpose of these wars. Many researchers referred to words of Machiavelli for advice on how to explain why the United States could not achieve the mission in those two wars. At the conclusion of President Barrack Obama's first term in office, Coletta and Carrese (2013) argued that the blatant neglect as well as the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of Machiavellian principles negatively influenced America's political class and blamed this neglect for recent policy failures. Pillai (2021) criticized the strategy implemented by the United States in the Middle East as deviating from what Machiavelli advised in chapter five of *The Prince*. Pillai (2021) further noted the United States succeeded in implementing this Machiavellian strategy in Germany and Japan during WWII, as well as South Korea. Savitz (2021) pointed to Machiavelli's advice in *Discourses* on the danger of taking advice from enemy exiles, his emphasis on using overwhelming force, and the challenges of creating a free state out of one steeped in corruption to demonstrate that the United States should look to historians such as Machiavelli for guidance on strategy.

Although the sources listed represent a proper use of comparing the advice given by Machiavelli to the decisions made by the U.S. government concerning foreign policy, the topic of this thesis focused on the issues currently facing the military outside of the strategy on the battlefield. This research focused on the themes that encompass civil-

military relations. The problem found while conducting this research is experts and researchers tend to neglect Machiavelli's actions while acting as the secretary of the Dieci and rely solely on his three most famous works for advice. This thesis takes heed to the cautions from Coletta and Carrese (2015) to avoid the misinterpretation of Machiavelli, while at the same time confronting the issues and literature that Brooks (2019) identified that concern U.S. civil-military relations. Thus, this thesis rejected any notions of whether Machiavelli was a 'good' or 'bad' guy in nature and instead analyzed what he advocated for in his works and actions he took with his militia.

Thesis Research Question and Themes

The intent of this essay was to provide Machiavellian solutions to the dilemmas found within the civil-military relationship of the contemporary United States. These 'Machiavellian' solutions may not match with the definition of the word that is provided by the Webster dictionary. This thesis leaned on the works and deeds of Machiavelli and the analysis from researchers to provide a more thorough understanding of civil-military relations. This essay attempted to find balance between Machiavelli's translated works and the conclusions from contemporary researchers to glean any lessons to improve the gap between the civilian and military populations. This research employed a qualitative approach in the exploration of one overarching question, two themes and several essential topics that emerge when discussing civil-military relations. Each theme is composed of these essential topics.

The primary research question of this essay is: What lessons from the works of Machiavelli can we take into consideration to improve American civil-military relations? Under this perennial question there are two themes emerging within the body of

literature. These themes provided guiding questions to analyze. First, this research examined which theory of civilian control would Machiavelli endorse? The second theme examined what lessons from the works of Machiavelli are relevant to the U.S. military doctrine and practices? The themes identified under the overarching subject of civil-military relations bring essential topics that impact the findings and conclusions for this research. The civilian control topics were identified as the military experience of leaders, educating the public, the defense budget, and professionalism in the military. The U.S. military doctrine topics included military structure, the standing army, and recruitment strategies. The conclusion of this thesis provided both limitations and suggested future research. The following chapter examined the body of knowledge on civil-military relations, including the civilian control of the military and the U.S. military doctrine and practices.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Civil-military relations is the relationship between the military organizations and their civilian counterparts. The body of literature that examined civil-military relations placed a large focus on two primary areas: civilian control of the military and the development of the military doctrine and practices. Although other essential topics emerged under these two themes, the primary focus in the body of knowledge on civil-military relations is to understand their purpose and certain essential topics. Further, it is important to discuss how issues within the identified themes relate and how they interact to stabilize a complex state of co-existence between military and civilian leaders.

The continued use of the military draft gave birth to new concepts of what the United States would require out of its 'professional soldier' and the officer corps (Gelpi & Feaver, 2004). Two theories concerning the management of this 'professional soldier' developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s to preserve democracy and ensure better civil-military relations. (Huntington, 1957; Gelpi & Feaver, 2004). Theories concerning the appropriate control and role of the 'professional soldier' in the U.S. military initiated a 20th century discussion and recurring theme within the subject of civil-military relations. In addition, as the military modernized and restructured after the Civil War, the literature discussed the development of the U.S. military doctrine and practices. The military doctrine described how the military forces operate during peacetime and wartime. This chapter examined the body of literature for two identified themes that impact civil-military relations. When appropriate, this chapter identified essential topics that fall within these themes.

Owens (2011) stated that the end of the Cold War birthed a period of confusion in civil-military relations on the question of what was expected out of the U.S. military, which proved to have a large impact on civil-military relations to this day. Kohn (2008) noted that friction between military and civilian leadership on the topics of strategy and policy is normal if the arguments involve a high level of trust and honesty. Kohn (2008) identified the relationship between Franklin D. Roosevelt and his secretaries of war and navy, as well as the heads of the two-armed services, as a perfect example of a successful relationship between civilian and military leadership. On the other hand, Kohn (2008) pointed to the relationship between President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and his senior military advisors as one that demonstrated a complete breakdown in trust and honesty.

Literature also focused on the military becoming isolated from its civilian counterparts. Military leaders' reluctance to go to war during the Clinton administration is just one example of the civil-military disputes that occurred before the U.S. decided to use force (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, et al., 2021). Gelpi and Feaver (2004) noted elite military officers are more inclined toward a realpolitik view of the use of force and are willing to use force for traditional national security threats like defense of allies and of geostrategic access to vital markets. However, military leaders are more hesitant about using force for humanitarian missions and the "less-than-vital interest" scenarios of intervening in foreign civil wars that have dominated the global agenda in the last decade of the 20th century (Gelpi & Feaver, 2004, p. 184).

Brooks (2021) noted that the much larger problem in the military is that the officer corps ignores politics altogether. This undermines the military's ability to ensure that the United States is successfully performing its warfighting function without interference from civilian leadership (Brooks, 2021). Brooks (2021) stated that the culture of the military soldier reflects the strict separation of spheres that Huntington (1957) called for in his theory of civilian control. Further, Brooks (2021) noted the officer corps should be encouraged to be political.

Stanley (2018) brought Machiavelli to the debate on contemporary American civil-military relations. In his essay, Stanley (2018) cited the growing cultural divide between the professional military, the politicization of the military, and the recent uptick of generals gaining notoriety in the media as problems that Machiavelli addressed in his three most famous works. Stanley (2018) cited a soldier's love of country as something that tends to create issues in civil-military relations (Pg. 62). In contrast, the question that the present thesis addressed is what lessons from the works of Machiavelli can be taken into consideration to improve civil-military relations? First, the issue of civilian control of the military was examined.

Civilian Control of the Military

The first theme discussed in this subsection is civilian control of the military. Huntington gained the most traction in the body of literature concerning American civil-military relations with a discussion of civilian control (Golby & Liebert, 2021). Huntington (1957) found the use of objective civilian control of the military is more effective than subjective control in controlling a class of citizens whose specialty is the 'management of violence.'

Objective civilian control not only reduces the power of the military to the lowest possible level vis-à-vis all civilian groups, it also maximizes the likelihood of achieving military security… Subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of specialists in the management of violence (Huntington, 1957, pp. 1602–1609)

Huntington (1957) admitted that effective objective civilian control of the military was difficult to achieve because civilian groups that take control of the government often demand that the officer corps bow to the civilian groups' own political agenda.

Janowitz (1966) stated that although the professional military officer believes that his job responsibilities are carried out during war, the growth of skill specialization in the military requires soldiers to possess leadership skills like their civilian-leader counterparts. Janowitz (1966) noted that purely military occupations dropped from 93 percent to 28 percent in the time from the American Civil War to Army following the Korean War. Janowitz listed engineers, machine maintenance specialists, health service experts, and logistic and personnel technicians as examples of military occupations that have direct civilian equivalents (Janowitz, 1966, p. 9). The changes that the military made in the 1960's regarding issues of discipline and ethnocentrism has had the result of producing a military that is now indoctrinated with new political, social, and economic opinions that the soldier did not previously possess (Janowitz, 1966, p. 13). Although Janowitz stated that religion and education are largely considered to be two values that Americans are recognized for, the limitation placed on applying those educational and religious values in America eliminated all sense of toxic nationalism (Janowitz, 1966, p. 412).

However, Gelpi and Feaver (2004) noted the dilemma of non-prior service civilian leadership differed in their motivations for going to war. While non-prior service leadership are motivated to go to war over humanitarian issues, military leadership have more practical motivations for war based on moral or ideological ideas (The Ohio State University, 2021). Although the founders exercised objective form of control of the military via the powers invested into Congress, Gelpi noted that the founding generation was also able to achieve subjective civilian control over the military because a large majority of them had served in the military. Gelpi stated that over the past 40-50 years, both objective and subjective forms of civilian control of the military have eroded. The decision to abstain from its oversight duties of the military by many Congress members since the politically charged Vietnam War led to a breakdown in objective civilian control, while the transition from conscription to the AVF has eroded the subjective form of civilian control of the military.

Radin and Szayna (2021) examined how civilian control impacts military effectiveness. The issue of civilian control over the military, when civilians lack the specific knowledge and expertise of military matters contributes to the crisis within American civil-military relations (Radin & Szayna, 2021). Radin and Szayna (2021) concluded that reforming the Department of Defense in the decision-making process could help military effectiveness, by taking into consideration these four issues: understanding the contributions of policy civilians, the role of policy civilians and the top military leadership, improving the quality of policy inputs, and considering the tradeoffs on secrecy. Brooks (2012) suggested making it mandatory for senior civilian officials who work in the national security and foreign policy sectors of the government to take a

"Military 101" course. Brooks (2012) noted this would create more opportunities for military careerist to work in civilian institutions for a year or a few years at a time and vice-a-versa for civilians at any level to work with the military.

Brooks (2021) suggested a major source of contention in civil-military relations is the apolitical nature of the officer corps. Brooks (2021) called for an end to the drama concerning President Joe Biden's nomination of General Lloyd Austin as Secretary of Defense, which required a congressional waiver on the basis that he had not been retired from active-duty military for at least seven years. Instead, Brooks (2021) stressed the need for America to look to the deeper challenge facing civilian control of the military which involved the pervasive apolitical nature in the officer corps.

Owens (2012) found that four questions have encompassed the discussions around civil-military relations since 1990: 1) What degree of military influence is appropriate in a liberal society? 2) What is the appropriate role of the military? 3) What pattern of civil-military relations can best ensure the effectiveness of the military instrument? 4) Who serves? Owens (2012) emphasized that military officers must recognize that they have two civilian masters, the Executive branch as well as Congress. Owens (2012) noted the military's purpose is to support the decisions made by the president on the use of force. In addition, military leaders need to contribute to decisions on the defense budget, advise Congress, who may hold the wants of the military lower than the political considerations of its members (Owens 2012).

Essential Topics for Civilian Control of the Military

Essential topics related to civilian control of the military can provide additional insight into the tensions within civil-military relations. In this case, the body of literature

revealed the military experience of leaders, educating the public, the defense budget, and professionalism as contributing factors under the theme of civilian control of the military. The essential topics and their relationship to the hierarchy of issues that fall under civil-military relations explain the complexity when solving a problem as large as a widening gap between military service members and the civilian community.

The military experience of civilian leaders is an essential topic with the theme of civilian control of the military. Christopher Gelpi stated in an interview with Ohio State University that a decrease in military veteran leadership in politics has led to a development in a gap in the relationship between the government and the military (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021). This gap can either lead to excessive military input into civilian policy or reckless use of the military by civilian leadership, "the more veterans there are in congress, the less likely they are to use military force, and a 90% reduction in the risk that the United States will military force" (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021).

Gelpi & Feaver (2004) found that much of the civilian leadership in the United States with no prior military service have been the strongest proponents of going to war, while the strongest opponents to going to war were the senior military leaders and other prominent veterans. Although Gelpi & Feaver (2004) mentioned that there are exceptions to these two camps, such as John McCain's pro-war stance on the invasion of Iraq, this is a trend that is present throughout the entire history of the United States. Gelpi & Feaver (2004) noted the interaction between then-General Colin Powell and then-ambassador to the U.N. and future Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as a perfect example of the

divide between civilians and military. Albright commented to Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"

Nine of the previous 10 presidents before the Clinton administration served in the military in some capacity. The ongoing streak of Commanders-in-Chief with zero previous military experience mentioned in the Introductory chapter may seem odd. However, the longest streak of this kind spanned 36 years and six presidential terms between the years 1909-1945 (Department of Defense, 1997). Prior to the William Howard Taft administration in 1909, only five of the first 26 presidential terms were served by a president with zero military experience (Department of Defense, 1997). History revealed the United States Continental and regular armies and the individual states' militias experienced success on the battlefield from the American Revolution through 1909 (Gelpi & Feaver, 2004). Further success was achieved in both World War I & II. The rise of the United States as a 'Superpower' may justify less of an emphasis on the need for military experience than military knowledge within the civilian leadership (Gelpi & Feaver, 2004).

Although President Trump's demeaner has been characterized as 'Machiavellian,' his childhood brings insight into the controversial nature of his leadership style (Frontline PBS Official, 2020). Although Trump never formally served in the United States military prior to becoming Commander-in-Chief, he attended the New York Military Academy between the ages of 13-17 where he became one of the student cadet leaders (Frontline PBS Official, 2020). Many pundits in the media, such as Stephen Colbert, poked fun at Trump for assuming that his time at the military academy as a teenager could be seen as placeholder for his lack of actual military service (Donald Trump Talks, 2015). During

his time at the NYMA, Mr. Trump was able to develop a 'killer instinct', which would stay with him into his adulthood (Frontline PBS Official, 2020). Donald Trump (2020) stated that he loved his time at the military academy and credited the choice to go to the academy as one of the greatest decisions he ever made in terms of success (NYMA Videos, 2012).

Another essential topic contributing to civilian control included the need to educate the public on military issues. Radin and Szayna (2021) listed four issues that are addressed in literature regarding civil-military relations. In listing those four debates, Radin and Szayna (2021) focused on the fourth issue: solving the puzzle of how civilians can control the military and ensure military effectiveness even as they lack the specific knowledge and expertise of military officers. Brooks (2021) suggested more bridgeways of work between civilians and military from all fields of work. Willetts (2022) described how pictures taken from the gymnasium of a Wyoming elementary school showing fifth graders practicing rifle marksmanship gained a lot of traction on social media from people all over the nation. While some from the public showed support for the classes, others jeered the action (Willets, 2022). In recent years, social media is a vehicle for improving civil-military relations by the pure use of controlling public relations on the military. Prior to social media, each branch of the military established a public affairs office to educate and advertise to the civilian population matters concerning the military. The U.S. Army organized the Army Public Affairs office to establish community outreach with both internal and external interests (U.S. Army Public Relations, 2022). The Army Office of Public Affairs assigns a public affairs officer (PAO) to every installation across the globe. The sole purpose of this officer is to tell the Army story and

facilitate media engagements and mitigate misinformation (U.S. Army Public Relations, 2022).

Defense spending is another essential topic related to civilian control of the military. Defense spending connects to the need to further educate the public with more specific information than the billions and trillions of dollars reported in the media (Harper, 2022). When American citizens, who live in communities that are not impacted by the military, learn that Defense spending is expected to increase and that 'The United States spends more on defense than the next 10 or 11 countries combined,' it can be argued that the government is spending too much on the military (Harper, 2022). Those who feel this way often cite health care, border security, education, and infrastructure as bigger issues than defense (Harper, 2022). Others may find the fact that the United States is the highest spender of defense as something that makes America bulletproof and thus unbeatable in the long run (Peterson, 2021). As of the Fiscal Year 2020, the United States spent approximately 60% of its defense budget on the Operations, Maintenance, and procurement of weapons and systems (Peterson, 2021). The rest of the budget was allocated to military personnel, veteran's benefits and services, and humanitarian assistance and international development (Peterson 2021). Although defense spending is inevitable and many may scrutinize the budget, it is necessary and expensive. It comes down to the civilian and military leaders uniting to justify the spending and educating the public with a rationale of such spending.

Another essential topic related to civilian control is professionalism among the ranks of the military. Lord (2015) noted then-Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey expressed great concern with professionalism within the military in the

aftermath of scandals in Abu Ghraib, Iraq, and the desecration of corpses in Afghanistan. Although many blamed the demands of continuous deployments and a psychological toll on the military, others blamed it on the erosion of traditional values and discipline within the Armed Forces (Lord, 2015). Evetts (2003) noted the erosion of professionalism is mirrored in many civilian professions as well as the military. Although Lord (2015) noted the top Joint Chiefs of Staff called for additional training within the many branches of the military, Evetts (2003) noted this model of top-down required training has inherent flaws in its effectiveness. Alfredo (2019) noted military professionalism is made up of discipline, commitment, and skill. Without all three components, professionalism is lost. First, discipline is the basis of all professionalism. According to Alfredo (2019), discipline is where all other virtues and skills are built. Next, a soldier must have a strong sense of commitment to the country, the branch of service, the unit, and fellow soldiers (Alfredo, 2019). Finally, a soldier must develop all necessary skills required in their job (Alfredo, 2019). The process for building a military that is effective and professional is outlined in the U.S. military doctrine and practices. In the following section, the body of knowledge on a second theme within civil-military relations, the military doctrine and practices, are examined as it revealed the distinct culture of the American military in its structure, recruitment, and other pertinent factors in developing an all-volunteer force.

The Military Doctrine and Practices

A second theme in the review of the literature on civil-military relations is the military doctrine and practices. Military doctrine is not unique to the U.S. military. In fact, just like music, food, and languages, there are large differences in military doctrines across the globe. According to the Rand Corporation (n.d.), The U.S. military doctrine is

defined as the "fundamental set of principles that guides military forces as they pursue national security objectives" (Rand Corporation, n.d., introduction). For the purposes of this essay, literature relating to military structure, the use of a standing army, and recruitment contributed to the body of knowledge on military doctrine as essential topics.

In the past 30 years, the U.S. military doctrine experienced significant and controversial changes. For example, Kohn (2008) noted Bill Clinton's change of policy to give homosexuals the right to serve in uniform shocked many within the ranks of the military because of the fact his generals were so opposed to this change. Owens (2011) provided a similar analysis when the Clinton Administration allowed women to be appointed to positions within the combat arms branches of the military. In response to the progressive changes in the military doctrine, Kohn (2008) noted a widening of the gap in civil-military relations as generals showed growing contempt against the Democratic party. Owens (2011) added that the Clinton Administration received some resistance from the military leadership when preparing for peacekeeping and humanitarian deployments to Bosnia and Kosovo.

Connable et al. (2018) discussed 'the will to fight' as a potential cause of gaps in the U.S. military doctrine. "The will to fight is the single most important factor in war" (Connable et al., 2018). When there is a breakdown between the leadership between civilian and military leadership, the military doctrine is also threatened because of the human factor associated with those who carry out the tasks on the battlefield (Connable et al., 2018). A failure to fully assess the 'will to fight' in conflicts, battles, and wars can have surprising consequences. For example, the initial assessment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was that they would break by 1967 (Connable et al., 2018).

However, the DRV persisted and won in 1975 resulting in a strategic defeat for the United States (Connable et al., 2018). The following section explores the essential topics related to the military doctrine and how these impact civil-military relations.

Essential Topics for the Military Doctrine

Essential topics related to the military doctrine can provide additional insight into the tensions within civil-military relations. In this case, the body of literature revealed the structure of the military, the use of a standing army, and recruiting strategies as contributing factors under the theme of military doctrine. The essential topics and their relationship to the overarching question about resolving the strife in civil-military relations demonstrate this issue is complex. First, we examine the structure of the military.

Shortly after his successful presidential run in 1968, President Richard Nixon established a commission to develop a plan with the intention of ending conscription and transitioning to an all-volunteer force (Rostker, n.d.). Milton Friedman, a leading voice within the committee advocated for an All-Voluntary Force (AVF). The points made by Friedman (1967) had a large influence on the Gates Commission's decision to support the end of a draft and thus the need for a transition to an all-volunteer military.

The concept of moving to the AVF brought up a major concern about staffing a permanent military. Friedman (1967) found that to staff this AVF, the military would have to offer higher pay as well as improved housing for its enlisted soldiers to make the military more marketable to compete with the civilian job market. Friedman (1967) also argued against the notion that an AVF would not present any more of a threat to democracy than a military made up of conscripts would. "It is hard to find any relation

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historically between the method of recruiting enlisted men and the political threat from the armed forces" (Friedman, 1967, p.16). Friedman (1967) stated that moving forward, the military would need to promote alleyways of "lateral recruitment" from the civilian sector to the officer corps. Friedman (1967) recognized the potential dangers of a large military paired with a strong industrial complex toward a democracy. He stated that it cannot be avoided altogether and noted the draft was causing a drop in morale in the Army (Friedman, 1967). According to Friedman (1967), morale in the U.S. Army plummeted due to an increase in disciplinary issues from conscripts and the draft essentially restricted the freedom of the individual.

As the U.S. transitioned to an AVF and strengthened a standing army, discussion of the draft emerged over the past 50 years. Ackerman (2019) believed that the only way for the United States to avoid finding itself unexpectedly involved in another decades-long war, the United States needed to consider the reinstitution of the draft. Ackerman (2019) stated that throughout the history of the United States, the blend of taxation and conscription has made it difficult for the U.S. government to continue even "good wars" for longer than a few years without facing backlash from the public. Ackerman (2019) noted that the downfalls of the previous use of conscription, which largely called on individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds, called for a reverse-engineered draft. Ackerman (2019) argued with great concern for a lack of equity prior to the establishment of the AVF. Ackerman (2019) compared the amount of Harvard alumni killed in Vietnam War to that of a high school in lower-income northern Philadelphia to demonstrate that the inequity that occurred during the use of conscription in the past. "Despite being approximately one-quarter the size of Harvard, Edison high school

suffered 64 alumni killed in action. Of the Harvard alumni killed, only one was a draftee"

(Ackerman, 2019, The Concern). The reverse-engineered draft that Ackerman (2019)

called for included a mandatory number of draftees from families from the top income

tax bracket on an annual basis. These draftees would only be eligible for jobs within the

combat arms portion of the military (Ackerman, 2019, The Concern). Still the question of

a standing army within the structure of the military brought a solution and became a part

of the military doctrine.

The beliefs of two of the Founding Fathers on the topic of possessing a standing

army indicated some initial concerns. While Hamilton (1787) believed that a standing

army could be too costly and had the potential of creating division within the country,

Madison (1787) found that a large standing military forced paired with a disordered

executive could be a threat to the liberty of its citizens. Bovée (2018) noted the initial

distrust of a professional army by Hamilton and Madison has origins in England.

Traditionally, the English had a general distrust of military toward soldiers and military

policies since the 1600's. Due to his political aspirations, Hamilton changed his opinion

and found the fear of a standing army was irrational and opted to continue with the work

of establishing a new democracy (Bovée, 2018). Bacevich (2013) found that having a

permanent warrior caste in American society has taken a toll on soldiers and its relation

to the civilian population, and that a return to the citizen-soldier tradition could eliminate

a perversion of militarism in America.

As veteran presence has decreased over the years in congress and the public as a

whole, a large portion of literature on civil-military relations has focused on answering

Owens (2012) question: Who serves? Bacevich (2013) identified the abandonment of the

citizen-soldier tradition, which linked military service to citizenship during the years

prior to the establishment of the AVF. Bacevich described this as a cause for a perversion

of militarism in contemporary American society. Bacevich (2013) went on to note that

the transition from the use of conscription to the AVF has led to a permanent warrior

caste in society that is increasingly seen as separate from the civilian population.

Bacevich (2013) argued that the use of the word 'volunteer' is misleading in describing

today's military, and that the military of today is like the French Foreign Legion than that

of the military that fought on the battlefields of the Revolutionary war. Thus, recruitment

strategies became a large focus to sustain a standing army and maintain a unique

organizational structure for the U.S. military doctrine.

After the establishment of the AVF, a large amount of literature in civil-military

relations focused on the task of recruitment. Many were skeptical of the sustainability of

the structure under an AVF and debated the need for the possible future need for

conscription. Therefore, the United States government chose to bring back the Selective

Service System in 1980, which made all male U.S. citizens and immigrant non-citizens

between the ages of 18-25 eligible for the draft, the United States government has yet to

apply it (Department of Defense, 1999).

In the United States, the Secretary of Defense oversees recruiting campaigns for

enlistments in all military branches, which is a constantly evolving venture that involves

a combination of advertisements and market research to effectively target potential

recruits (Enlistments, 10 U.S. Code § 503). Two contemporary theories on the issue of

recruitment emerged in the literature. Both theories focused on how to recruit individuals

from higher socioeconomic backgrounds to join the military (Ackerman, 2019; Bacevich,

2013). Bacevich (2013) stressed for a need for the military to recruit more soldiers from the privileged class to ensure that the burden of military service is spread out evenly across all demographics. Bacevich (2013) suggested shorter enlistments, an increase in signing bonuses, retirement flexibility, college loan forgiveness, and a new GI bill as potential selling points to make the military more marketable to those from the highest classes of society to join military service. In contrast, Ackerman (2019) advocated for forcing the upper economic classes of the United States to serve via a reengineered draft that would prioritize putting upper class draftees into combat arms. The current concern involved equity in recruitment

Altman (1969) found that high unemployment rates of a region generally result to a higher-than-average enlistment rate for that region. More recent studies have found this to not be the case in the AVF military of today. Goldberg et al. (2018) found that youth unemployment rate in the south had little significance in its recruiting successes, but instead found that the higher military presence in the South has helped it generate greater acceptance and support. Goldberg et al. (2018) discovered a report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) in 1987 that there were concerns that a large military footprint in the southern states could isolate the culture of the military to that region with the highest military presence. This was something that the defenders of conscription feared (Goldberg et al., 2018).

Goldberg et al. (2018) noted that concerns about diversity, in a variety of different areas in the AVF started before its implementation. Goldberg et al. (2018) detailed how the Defense Manpower Commission, chartered by Congress in 1973, found that geographical diversity was one of the draft's successes. Goldberg et al. (2018) stated that

within the first 12 years following the establishment of the AVF, concerns about geographical diversity had begun to surface due to a higher recruiting success in rural areas as well as in the southern and southwestern regions of the country.

The body of literature for this thesis examined two major themes to explore the perennial question, what lessons from the works of Machiavelli can be taken into consideration to improve civil military relations in the U.S.? Civilian control of the military and the ongoing updates to the U.S. military doctrine and practices are significant factors to understand when addressing civil military relations. The next section of this thesis discussed and justified the methodology and design for answering the research question.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter described the methodology utilized to address the research questions

revealed in in the Introduction. This thesis employed a qualitative methodology with

descriptive and exploratory designs. Qualitative research was an appropriate approach to

determine how Machiavelli would solve the issues and debates currently facing U.S.

civil-military relations. Qualitative research requires the scholar to assess and interpret

data that are not reduced to numbers (Anderson, 2010). Qualitative research involves a

complex process of understanding phenomena in educational situations (Anderson,

2010). This research extended understanding of current military practices in the context

of Machiavelli's works from the 16th century. Anderson (2010) noted complex situations

demand complex analysis of many forms of data. The analysis of data utilized to answer

the questions presented in this thesis included multiple forms of data.

Qualitative data collection goes beyond the collection and manipulation of

numbers, as in quantitative research (Anderson, 2010). Qualitative methodology may

involve the examination and analysis of audio recordings, videos, transcripts, structured

interview questionnaires, field notes, case studies, images, documents, reports,

observation notes, press clippings, and photographs (Anderson 2010). In this research,

data from the works of Machiavelli as well as his actions while in charge of the

Florentine militia were examined and compared to the evidence of actions of the U.S.

Government, the doctrine of the U.S. military, and the theories and articles that were

presented in the literature review section. Evidence cited in the Findings and the

Conclusion included an analysis of the works of Machiavelli, military policies, articles,

reports from the department of defense, video recordings of interviews, legislation, and historical documents available to the public.

The findings in this thesis relied on a descriptive and exploratory designs. Vishnevsky and Beanlands (2004) noted the importance of qualitative approaches when learning about the perspective of the individual. This research intended to identify the perspective of Machiavelli if he faced the current challenges of the U.S. military and civilian leadership. Allwright (2005) noted the importance of exploratory designs by gaining understanding of a problem and passing it to others that can make use of the information. This research aimed to apply an understanding of Machiavelli in the context of contemporary military issues. To accomplish a modern Machiavellian perspective, a thorough review of his writings is compared to multiple artifacts throughout America's military history.

This research involved a descriptive design by noting the relationship of a non-prior service commander-in-chief and the question of subject control vs objective control. Another descriptive approach in the examination of the structure of the military. Yet, other findings, such as the recruitment and discipline of the military involved an exploratory design. The use of exploratory research was employed due to the vast advances in military technology and the subsequent diversification of the military since the time of Machiavelli's works. When using this exploratory form of research, the question of how much of Machiavelli's advice and deeds can be applied to the modern-day was presented. The following chapter revealed a review of the evidence and findings related to questions presented in the Introduction.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

The introduction of this thesis presented the many challenges associated with American civil-military relations over the course of history. The complex nature of the building of a democratic nation with a balance of power in our government brings many concerns in defending our principles and preserving our nation. Many issues related to the nation's defense are continuously debated to ensure the country's democratic principles sustain the course of time. With some concerns about the state of the military off the battlefield as much as on the battlefield, this thesis proposed to look toward Machiavelli for solutions. If experts can look to Machiavelli for lessons in military strategy on the battlefield, is it possible to glean some advice on contemporary challenges between the military and civilian leaders off the battlefield? This chapter revealed the findings to answer the overarching research question: What lessons from the works of Machiavelli can we take into consideration to improve civil-military relations? Since the review of the literature found two primary themes, the findings and analysis are presented within the same context. The complexity of the term 'civil-military' relations revealed two themes: civilian control of the military and the U.S. military doctrine and practices. Each theme was dissected to include a few essential topics to explore within the body of literature and the works of Machiavelli.

This chapter provided a unique structure. First, the context of the themes and essential topics are summarized. Next, each topic is analyzed in the context of the works of Machiavelli. The researcher identified actual text from the works and deeds of Machiavelli and applied the relevance to each topic, theme, and research question. In

most cases, the analysis is based on Machiavelli's own works. However, in two separate instances, secondary resources were relied upon due to challenges with a lack of availability of a translated version of *La Cagione dell'Ordinanza* by Machiavelli.

Machiavelli and Civilian Control

The body of literature suggested two theories for civilian control of the military in from the mid-20th century (Huntington, 1959; Janowitz, 1960). Huntington (1959) supported the use of objective control of the military with an emphasis on maintaining separate spheres of control and the need of an apolitical officer corps. Janowitz (1960) suggested a convergence between military and civilian spheres, which advocated more subjective control. Christopher Gelpi addressed the erosion of both subjective and objective forms of civilian control of the military over the past 50 years (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021). Gelpi emphasized that most of the founding generation of this country had some military experience, which made subjective civilian control easier to achieve (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021). He further noted the founding generations also placed mechanisms of control over the military to preserve objective control over the military by the powers vested in Congress (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021). While the loss of subjective control of the military has been a consequence of the transition to an AVF, the loss of objective control is a result of Congress opting out of its oversight duties of the military due to the politically charged topics of war (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021). With all of this in mind, would Machiavelli endorse civilian control of the military? If so, what kind of control would he endorse?

Analysis

Although Machiavelli does not refer to these two theories of civilian control (objective or subjective) in his writings, the advice that he gave to the prince in how he should handle the military can be perceived as Machiavelli advocating for both objective and subjective forms of civilian control of the military. Machiavelli's assessment there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms and where there are good arms there must be good laws, is a call for the prince to control his military via the use of laws (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p.48). The use of laws and codes to keep the military in line is something modern experts on civil-military relations would define as objective civilian control of the military. Machiavelli's assessment that a prince who does not understand the military cannot be esteemed by his soldiers, and that he should have the same warfighting knowledge as a captain in the army is something that would represent the modern conception of subjective control of the military (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, pp. 58-59). This also brings to light how many essential topics from the literature review blend and build upon the primary themes.

The trend of our Congress opting out of its oversight duties of the military out of fear of political backlash is something that leaders faced regardless of occupation or duty. Although Machiavelli stated that a soldier's confidence in their decision-making abilities comes from years of training, he pointed to the Roman policy of not overly punishing a captain for making a wrong decision through ignorance or even malice as another road that led to the Roman captain possessing confidence.

> This mode or proceeding was well considered for them; for they judged that it
> was of such importance to those who governed their armies that they have a free
> and ready spirit, without other extrinsic hesitations in making policies, that they

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did not wish to add new difficulties and dangers to a thing in itself difficult and
dangerous, since they thought that if they added them, no one could ever work
virtuously. (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 69)

In carrying out the duties of being a congress member, which many could say is 'in itself
difficult and dangerous,' an argument that can be made is that criticizing congress
members for their decisions on the military is adding difficulties and dangers to their job.
Machiavelli would encourage those running for congress to not chastise the other
candidate for voting on military matters, as it has led to the development of a fear in
civilian leadership to do their basic duties.

Machiavelli's Opinion of the Military Experience of Presidents

Within the topic of civilian control of the military is the trend of presidents with
no prior military service. Of the 46 presidents of the United States, only 15 have assumed
the role of commander-in-chief with no prior military service (Wallace, n.d.). Four out of
the last five commander-in-chief's have had no prior service is an anomaly taking in the
fact that almost 33% of all presidents had prior military service before 1992 (Wallace,
n.d.). Although prior military service isn't a prerequisite in becoming commander-in-
chief, it has seemed to be a good indicator for future success in the pursuit of the office in
the past. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the last president prior to Bill Clinton to have no prior
military service, served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy during WWI and even
tried to resign from this position so that he could enter uniformed service, but his
redesignation was not accepted (Wallace, n.d.). Bill Clinton, in contrast, avoided the draft
during the Vietnam War and even wrote a letter to a Colonel in 1969 stating that he
loathed the military (Frontline PBS Nightline, 1992). Whether a president has military

experience on the battlefield or previous work with the military in a civilian role, it is unknown if this experience impacts leadership abilities. What did Machiavelli believe about the military experience of a leader?

Analysis

Not only did Machiavelli state that it is important for a prince to understand military matters, but he stated that military matters and the art of war should be the only thing that concerns the prince (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p.58). Furthermore, being unsavvy in this art makes the prince contemptible and he loses the esteem and trust of his soldiers (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p.58). If one cannot demonstrate his military understanding by actual service, he should be a student of history and imitate great men by understanding the causes of their victories as well as their losses (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p.60). The success in both World War I & II and the rise of the United States as a 'Superpower' may justify the belief held by Machiavelli that a prince can understand the military through deeds as well as his mind (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p.59).

Machiavelli and Educating the Public

In the Literature Review, researchers found a need to educate the public on military matters. For example, Radin and Szayna (2021) found a need to balance civilian control of the military with effectiveness, especially when the military takes orders from leaders with limited military experience. Brooks (2021) suggested more bridgeways of work between civilians and military from all fields of work. Willetts (2022) brought attention to the idea of training young children about the military. Although this idea came with controversy, it can be linked to Machiavelli's works. This section answers the

question of how Machiavelli would carry out the task educating the public on military matters.

Analysis

Machiavelli reaches back to the modes of ancient Rome when providing an explanation to Cosimo that it was customary and lawful to train the children in running, jumping, wrestling, carrying great weights, using the bow and arrow, and all matters related to the Infantry (Machiavelli 1521/2003, pp. 43-44). When Cosimo asked Fabrizio which of these training methods he would keep for his own militia, Fabrizio answered all the above and then proceeded to add more of his own:

> To this I would add the aquebus, a new instrument, as you know, and a necessary one. And I would accustom all the youths of my state to these drills, but with greater industry and more solitude for that part I had designated as military. And they would always be trained on holidays. (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 45)

This task of educating the public on military matters is thus achieved by educating children. Machiavelli, speaking through Fabrizio, believed that youth are more friendly to military issues and listen and learn quicker than older people who have already made up their mind that war is bad (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 13). A child growing up to be an adult with no understanding of military matters would nevertheless never be achieved in a state under the jurisdiction of Machiavelli. Machiavelli would encourage the practices of the school in Montana and therefore use these methods to educate the public about the military. Machiavelli stated that the reason why the citizens of Ancient Rome were greater lovers of freedom in comparison to the Florentines of Machiavelli's time was because of their education, which Machiavelli found to be a result of the changes in the religion of Ancient Rome and the religion of Italy during Machiavelli's time:

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> Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative more than active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human; the other placed it in greatness of spirit, strength of body, and all other things capable of making men very strong (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 131).

In comparing the two religions, Machiavelli stated that the ceremonies and rituals of the ancients were bloodier and gorier than that of his time.

Machiavelli and Defense Spending

This subsection addressed the problem identified by (Harper, 2022) as well as Hamilton (1787) of a military that is too costly. As noted in the literature review, many Americans question the defense spending, particularly when other social issues appear to take priority to the masses. There is no question, the weapons systems and large standing army are expensive for the U.S. taxpayers. However, other viewpoints presented in the body of literature included the notion that the U.S. military is unbeatable due to the investment in the defense budget. This section answered the question of how Machiavelli would handle the task of defense spending?

Analysis

Although Machiavelli placed money as the second highest necessity for a captain to be successful in war, he warned against the belief that the amount of money spent on the military, or even the amount of money a country has, equated to a stronger army (Machiavelli 1531/1996, pp.147-149). Money, the strength of your country, the terrain of your country, and even the faith and goodness of your troops will not survive if the prince is not able to properly defend them (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 147). Machiavelli shared a tale of a Spartan king that made the decision to go to war out of desperation. This decision was caused by his fear that his soldiers would abandon him due to his lack of

money and result in his own death (Machiavelli 1531/1996, p. 149). Machiavelli further stated that if the king would have just waited a few more days, the news of Alexander's death would have arrived, and he would have been crowned the victor without ever having to fight (Machiavelli, 1531/1996. p.149).

Machiavelli concluded that leaders failed when they esteemed money over good soldiers and commended the Romans for choosing to fight their wars with steel instead of money (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p.147). Although it can be argued that the United States is a leader in defense spending and is heading the advice of Machiavelli, it is a prince's expertise in military matters that trumps everything. It is not the payments going to the soldiers that Machiavelli would fret about, but the training and equipment capabilities that the soldiers have that equates to what he would define as the 'steel' of today.

As of the Fiscal Year 2020, the United States spent approximately 60% of its defense budget on the Operation, Maintenance, and Procurement of Weapons and systems (Peterson, 2021). The rest of the budget goes to military personnel, veteran's benefits and services, and then lastly humanitarian assistance and international development (Peterson 2021). To answer the question of what Machiavelli would do concerning current United States defense spending, the answer is to maintain where it is at right now and not let the budget allocated to the operation, maintenance, and procurement of weapons and systems drop below the budget allocated to military personnel.

Machiavelli and Professionalism

This subsection explored the concept of a professional soldier. The professional soldier is something Huntington (1959) believed to be an integral part of maintaining the

separate spheres of power. Although Huntington has had a huge impact on how the

military views professionalism, criticism of what he defined as a professional soldier

were identified in the literature review. Professionalizing the military by de-civilianizing

it and ensuring that it is politically neutral is how Huntington (1959) believed objective

civilian control could be achieved. Brooks (2021) believed that this de-civilianizing of

the military, as well as the apolitical nature of the officer corps, can hinder civilian

control of the military as well as the military's relationship with the civilian populace,

and the military's ability to achieve success in combat.

Janowitz (1966) theorized that a change in the use of force led to the military to

be more like constabulary forces instead of military forces, which has produced a change

in requirements expected out of the military officer. Janowitz (1966) clarifies that

although constabulary force keeps past military traditions, the constabulary force changes

its posture and use of force:

> The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously
> prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable
> international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective
> military posture. The constabulary outlook is grounded in, and extends, pragmatic
> doctrine (Janowitz, 1966, p. 418).

Janowitz (1966) argued that the political changes that occurred during the 1960s made

indoctrinated the military with political and social views that it was previously

unacquainted with. The growth of skill specified jobs in the military increased the need

for military leaders to acquire more skills that were previously common to only civilians

(Janowitz, 1966).

Although Merriam-Webster provided several definitions of what can be defined as a 'Professional,' the Army Doctrine References Publications (ADRP 1, 2015) defined the Army profession as one that adheres to trust, honorable service, military expertise, stewardship, and *esprit de corps*. The army maintained that remaining apolitical is important in establishing external trust with the leaders in government as well as the American people (ADRP 1, 2015). The U.S. Army expects its professionals to adhere to a strict ethic of political nonpartisanship when executing their duties (ADRP 1, 2015). Although the Army prioritized certain characteristics in its professionals, the Army also links themselves back to more 'traditional' professions using training, education, and experience.

> Traditional professions share essential characteristics and provide a vital service to society, requiring expertise and skill developed through years of training, education, and experience. Professions establish standards of practice and certify that their members are qualified to serve the needs of society... Traditional professions include medicine and law, engineering, architecture, higher education, ordained religious practice, and the military (Department of the Army, 2019, pp. 1-1, 1-2).

Analysis

By linking itself back to more 'traditional' professions, the Army demonstrated that it views itself no different than civilian professions in many ways. This way of thinking is like Machiavelli's defense of the use of a militia in his preface of *Art of War*:

> Many have held and hold this opinion, Lorenzo: that there are no things less in agreement with one another or so dissimilar as the civilian and military lives. Hence it is often seen that if someone plans to succeed in the soldier's career, he not only changes dress immediately, but also departs from every civilian practice in his customs, usages, voice and bearing… In these times, this makes such an - opinion very true. But if ancient orders were considered, nothing would be sound more united, more in conformity, and of necessity, as much inclined, toward one another as these. For all the arts that are ordered in a city for the sake of the common good of men, all the orders made there for living in fear of the laws and

of God, would be in vain if their defenses were not prepared (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p.3-4)

Although this quote is essentially just another example of Machiavelli defending the use of his militia, the fact that the United States military of the mid-to-late 20th century and early 21st century has been confronted with a debate on what is defined as a 'professional' begs for further research into Machiavelli. The effects resulting from the transition to a constabulary force, as Janowitz called it, Machiavelli would advocate for this force.

Machiavelli and Military Doctrine & Practice

The U.S. military doctrine has endured multiple changes to keep up with the pace of the social norms in the civilian population. For example, changes to the doctrine in the previous 30 years included allowing all persons to serve regardless of sexual orientation and placing women in combat roles (Kohn, 2008; Owens, 2011). Radin and Szayna (2021) discussed the changes that have occurred in the roles of certain offices and positions found within the Department of Defense (DOD). They suggested that certain policies and parts of the structure of the DOD may need to be reorganized for the military to be more effective. A brief history of the United States military departments and the establishment of the Department of Defense is important to this narrative.

Before 1947, the separate but equal Department of War and Department of the Navy was signed into law by George Washington on August 07, 1789, (United States House of Representatives, n.d.) These two departments were responsible for carrying out the country's warfighting duties. The National Military Establishment, which was a result of the National Security Act of 1947, and the establishment of the Central Intelligence

Agency (C.I.A.) consolidated the powers invested into the War Department, Navy Department, and the new Department of the Air Force under control of the new Secretary of Defense (Office of the Historian, n.d.). Although all three branches were able to keep their own service secretaries under this new Department, the act was further amended in 1949 to give more power to the Secretary of Defense (Office of the Historian, n.d.). The question of whether Machiavelli would reorganize the military is based on what he did with his Florentine militia is answered in this section. The analysis of the military doctrine is found by analyzing the essential topics of military structure, the use of a standing army, and recruiting.

Machiavelli and the Structure of the Military

This subsection examined and analyzed the structure of the military from the perspective of Machiavelli. In 1973, key changes to the structure of the military forces in America involved the end of conscription and the concept of an all-volunteer force (Friedman, 1967). This shift in the U.S. defense policies involved the concepts of reorganizing the Department of Defense and a constant debate on the need for future conscription (Department of Defense, 1999). Considering the current structure involves a blend of both civilian and military leaders controlling the policies and missions of the U.S. military, is there a better solution in the works of Machiavelli?

Secondary Sources

After taking control of the Florentine militia, one of the first things Machiavelli changed was who was in charge (Lee, 2020). He placed overall control of the militia in the hands of the *Dieci* during war time, while tasking out the job of renumerations and provisions into the hands of the priors, the *Dieci*, the colleges, and a new magistrate

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called the Nine officials of the Florentine ordnance and militia (Lee, 2020). Although the role of the *Dieci* being the leaders in the main war fighting effort was something that had been established in Florence for years, the establishment of a new magistrate that is voted on with very short terms is something new.

The *Dieci di Balia*, Ten of the Balia, was made of members of the main parts of government and were authorized to debate the most controversial financial and military matters. (DeAngelis, 2014) By placing the *Dieci* in charge during war time, which was predominantly dominated by the Aristocratic class (*ottamati*), Machiavelli was making sure the high classes were still happy. Although the Dieci came from the established class, the new magistrate would be elected and restricted to short terms of approximately 8 months (Tommasini, 1883).

To answer the question of how and if Machiavelli would reorganize the military, this research encountered an obstacle that made analyzing the Machiavellian text difficult. The English translation of Machiavelli's *La Cagione dell'Ordinanza* was not obtainable. Therefore, analysis on the essential topic of organization of the military relied on secondary resources. Although these sources are referenced and cited in this section, a proper and thorough analysis is limited without the English translation of *La Cagione dell'Ordinanza*. When looking at secondary sources of Machiavelli's intentions and actions with his Florentine militia compelling answers to the research question of how Machiavelli would reorganize the United States military come from Lee (2020), Guidi (2020) Tommasini (1883), and DeAngelis (2014).

Analysis

The decision by the United States government to transition from the use of two separate departments to hold the responsibility of fighting its war to one department runs parallel to a story described by Machiavelli in *Discourses on Livy*. The story described how Rome transitioned from the use of four separate tribunes with consular power, to one dictator to oversee everything. Machiavelli argued the decision to leave one tribune behind to guard Rome and send the other three tribunes to Fidenae brought great dishonor to Rome due to a lack of unity among the tribunes and commended the soldiers for not mitigating any greater harm to Rome (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 253). Machiavelli concluded this story with a direct quote from Titus Livy that reiterates the danger of placing several commanders over a military can produce, "Three tribunes with consular power documented how useless plural command is for war; since each insisted on his own counsel while to the others it seemed otherwise, they made room for opportunity to the enemy" (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 253). The parallels between Machiavelli's assessment and the decision of the United States government to create the develop the Department of Defense further validate the need to look at Machiavelli in the handling of civil-military issues related to the structure of the military.

Machiavelli and the Standing Army

In the Introduction, the beliefs of two of the Founding Fathers on the topic of possessing a standing army were presented. While Hamilton (1787) believed that a standing army could be too costly and had the potential of creating division within the country was presented by, Madison (1787) found that a large standing military forced paired with a disordered executive could be a threat to the liberty of its citizens. Years

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after the federalist papers, Madison and Hamilton changed their positions regarding the need for a standing army in preserving the newly formed democracy (Bovée, 2018). Bacevich (2013) emphasized that having a permanent warrior caste in American society has taken a toll on soldiers when it comes to its relation to the civilian population. Further, Bacevich (2013) noted that a return to the citizen soldier tradition could eliminate a perversion of militarism in America. The question asked by Albright, "What is the point of having this great military if we can't use it?" to then-General Powell, mentioned by Gelpi & Feaver (2004), is noteworthy in exploring this research question. These four issues have invited this thesis to determine whether Machiavelli would abandon the use of a standing army?

Analysis

Machiavelli shared the belief of Hamilton in Federalist no. 8 on the costliness of a standing army. He possessed some of the same fears that James Madison had in the dangers that a standing army could present to a public. Machiavelli prioritized a soldier's ability to fight during war time, and then go home when the war is over. Due to the number of great inconveniences that it causes if war is a soldier's only job:

> For you are forced wirther to make war always or to pay them always or to bear the danger that they may take the kingdom from you. To make war always is not possible and to pay them always one cannot do; thus, of necessity one incurs that danger of losing one's state (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 17).

Although Machiavelli recognized the dangers that a standing army can present to a kingdom, he went on to clarify that there are exceptions to this rule in the case of the Turks and the Sultan (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, pp.81-82). Machiavelli stated that the tens of thousands of Infantrymen and Cavalry that the sultan of the Ottoman Turks kept

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around him were needed for the strength and security of the country (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p.81). It is easy to find similarities when comparing the state of Sultan, as described by Machiavelli. The similarities included both the United States and the State of Sultan are neither hereditary nor new principalities (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p.82). Those similarities paired with the fact that money and treasure do not seem to be an issue in America's ability to pay its troops due to the transition from the gold standard to a fiat standard, suggested that Machiavelli would support the use of a standing army in the United States.

Machiavelli and Recruitment

The review of the literature noted two theories on the issue of recruitment. Both theories focused on how to recruit individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds to join the military (Ackerman, 2019; Bacevich, 2013). While Bacevich (2013) advocated for the government to pander to them with better benefits to compete better with the job market of the upper class, Ackerman (2019) advocated for forcing the upper economic classes of the United States to serve via a reengineered draft that would prioritize putting upper-class draftees into combat arms roles. Thus, this subsection addresses the question of whether Machiavelli would agree with the ideas of either Bacevich or Ackerman, as well as the recruiting strategies of the United States military in the past as well as the present.

Although the United States government chose to bring back the Selective Service System in 1980, which made all male U.S. citizens and immigrant non-citizens between the ages of 18-25 eligible for the draft, the United States government has yet to apply it (Department of Defense, 1997). In the United States, the Secretary of Defense oversees

recruiting campaigns for enlistments in all military branches, which is a constantly

evolving venture that involves a combination of advertisements and market research to

effectively target potential recruits. (Enlistments, 2015, 10 U.S. Code § 503)

Secondary Sources

Machiavelli experienced similar issues in his short time in government in

Florence when dealing with the peasants of the Tuscan villages that were subjected to

Florence. "As peasants of Tuscan villages were subject to Florence, but were not

Florentine citizens, they had no incentive to take part in the city's defense". (Guidi, 2020,

p. 64) Machiavelli placed more of a focus on the recruitment and armament of the

peasant and rural districts of the Florentine Republic due to fears of a revolt from those

living within the city (Guidi 2020).

In his attempts to expand his militia, Guidi (2020) explained how Machiavelli was

able to create something that the ruling class in the city would accept while also

accounting for the justice reforms needed to encourage peasants to both fight for and

remain loyal to Florence. Guidi (2020) noted that Machiavelli was aware that to

encourage these non-citizen peasants to participate in this militia and thus be loyal to

Florence, steps were needed to provide fairer conditions for these individuals.

Machiavelli enacted reforms to the administration of justice as well as to the councils in

charge of administering the army:

> The heart of this reform was the effort to remove the conscripts from a system of
> patronage and power that both the city aristocracy and the Medici exerted in the
> territories. It helped the conscripts become a sort of new social group, with
> institutions specifically dedicated to them and a better defined and more clearly
> denoted role within the state through the military (Guidi, 2020, p. 70).

His reforms to the administration of justice included amnesty for petty offenses and offering tax relief and exemptions to the peasant from the Tuscany region (Guidi, 2020)

Machiavelli was also careful in the timing and placement of individuals in his levy based on the district that they were from. Lee (2020) reiterated Machiavelli's suspicion of the possibility of those from the outlying districts revolting, which made it impossible for him to initially institute a levy in the outlying districts. Lee (2020) noted that most Florentine citizens living in the city were cavalrymen and had grown accustomed to only giving orders and not receiving them, Machiavelli was left with instituting a levy in the *contado*.

These intentions and reasoning for Machiavelli's actions taken with his own Florentine militia described by Paret et al. (2010), Guidi (2020), Lee (2020), Tommasini (1883) are very relative to geographical diversity dilemma presented by Goldberg (2018) that the United States has faced since the move to the AVF. Machiavelli's justice reforms targeted at promoting the social status of the Pisan peasants suggests that Machiavelli's scheming tendencies may have resulted in progress for those from the lower classes.

Analysis

Speaking through Fabrizio, Machiavelli discouraged soldiers to be inducted by the prince either entirely forced or entirely on the will of their own (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 23). Fabrizio stated that if the prince relied strictly on those who are willing, his military will end up being too small, and if he relied on force, it would also have adverse effects of its own (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 23). Fabrizio concluded that it should be a mix of both force and willingness to avoid the adverse effects of both forms of recruitment, "Rather, they must be drawn through the respect that they have for the

prince, where they fear his disdain more than present pain. And it will always happen that

it is a force mixed with willingness, so that such discontent as to have bad effects will not

be able to arise from it" (Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 23).

When comparing Machiavelli's suggestions on the task of recruitment in

comparison to that of the current form of recruitment used by the United States, the

blaring difference is the lack of force used by the United States. The resulting low

percentage of the population that is in the military confirms Machiavelli's assessment that

the use of draft can make up for the deficiencies that an all-volunteer army can be made

(Machiavelli, 1521/2003, p. 23). Machiavelli would agree with the assessment of

Friedman (1967) that the use of an all-volunteer force presented no more of a threat than

the use of a draft or levy. There is a possibility that Machiavelli would reject the

insistence made by Ackerman (2019) of putting those from the upper classes on the front

lines. This research cannot definitively say he would reject it solely because the

reputation that Machiavelli gives the 'Cavalry' is much different that the reputation that

the Cavalry has in America today. Machiavelli regarded the Cavalry as something solely

for those who are not able to take orders well, while the Cavalry in the American military

is very much a part of the Combat Arms. Although Machiavelli would agree with the

recruitment of those from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds as well as the military

utilized as a route in climbing the socioeconomic ladder, he would incorporate the use of

amnesty for smaller crimes and advocate for the use of force more often to fill the rank of

the United States military.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this thesis presented a discussion of the data and evidence from the findings regarding Machiavelli's works and how they may contribute to the solving contemporary challenges with civil-military relations in the United States. The two primary themes noted in this research involve the conflict of approach to the civilian control of the military and the ongoing revisions to the U.S. military doctrine. Within these themes, essential topics that contribute and impact military relations were discussed within the literature and used as directional clues when reviewing the works of Machiavelli. The findings revealed an analysis of the actual text as much as possible. When appropriate, the analysis was compared to that of other scholars of Machiavelli.

Conclusions on Machiavelli's Solutions to Contemporary Civil-Military relations

Machiavelli's suggestions in increasing subjective civilian control of the military are addressed in the recruitment and education of the public sections of this research. Machiavelli's response to the cause of the erosion identified by Gelpi (The Ohio State University College of Arts and Sciences, 2021) is found in his *Discourses on Livy*. Criticizing congress members based on their voting record on military matters are counterproductive to achieving a healthy amount of objective control. Machiavelli commends the Romans for not punishing their commanders for making incorrect decisions on the battlefield (Machiavelli, 1531/1996, p. 69). Congress members, who also live dangerous lives and are required to make difficult decisions, could reclaim objective civilian control of the military that is vested in them by choosing to opt out of critiquing their political opponents based on mistakes made from ignorance.

Although the current streak of non-prior service commanders-in-chief is not something that encompassed a lot of literature regarding civil-military relations, and just because a commander-in-chief has prior military service does not mean civil-military relations would improve. Machiavelli has views on the importance of not having a streak of weak leaders forming. The reputation gained by the preceding president of the United States may harm or give fortune and may determine the tenacity of a sitting president, Therefore, the problem of whether a president needs prior military service is not an issue to Machiavelli. It would be the president's ability to recognize when he or she would need to go back to the ways of his predecessors.

The task of educating the public on military matters should start in childhood according to Machiavelli. The task of educating a public that values freedom and is willing to fight is also a religious matter to Machiavelli. This reliance on a religion, that values the greatness of human spirit and human strength, would need to be taught in school which is prohibited in public schools in the United States of America. While America has placed a large focus on encouraging students to study subjects found in S.T.E.M. and the trades, Machiavelli focused much more on developing a youth that is physically fit and prepared to defend itself on the battlefield. With the skyrocketing rates of obesity and other weight-related issues in the youth of the United States, Machiavelli could be seen as someone to look to in the task for combatting childhood obesity.

Machiavelli's suspicions and exceptions to the use of a standing army agree with the writings of both American founding fathers Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. The similarities between the State of the Sultan as described in *The Prince*, particularly

the fact the both nations are neither new or hereditary (Machiavelli, 1532/1998, p. 82),

and the United States is an interesting development when applying Machiavelli to the

civil-military relations of the United States. Machiavelli and Hamilton (Federalist no. 25)

agree with each other in both recognizing the dangers that a standing army brings as well

as the need that republic or kingdom constantly could have in possessing a standing army

if it was to remain constantly at war. The fact that the many of the founding fathers'

views on civil-military matters seem to agree with those of Machiavelli validate the need

to further research Machiavelli on the topic. Although Fabrizio's statement in the first

paragraph of *Art of War* can be considered another example of Machiavelli advocating

for his militia, it is still a noteworthy quote when looking at U.S. civil-military relations

and its pursuit of creating a professional officer over the past century. The requirements

out of the officer in the new constabulary force, as Janowitz defines it, align with

Machiavelli wanted out of citizen-soldiers.

A clear answer to the reorganization of the military was not achieved in this

research outside of Machiavelli condemning the use of multiple commanders. His

opinion of the use of multiple commanders coincides with the establishment of a

Department of Defense in the actual text of Machiavelli, while the strategy of separating

war-time leadership was identified by secondary literature. On the task of recruitment, the

lack of 'force' used in the recruitment of American soldiers is something that Machiavelli

suggested in *Art of War*. In drafting soldiers into its military, the United States could look

to give amnesty to adults being jailed for low-level crimes as Machiavelli did in his

militia.

Although a definitive number was not found in how much Machiavelli would advocate the government to spend on defense spending, some conclusions can be made on how the United States can conduct itself moving forward. Machiavelli would take no exception to the United States being the world's leader in defense spending or the way that defense spending is currently being handled. In commending the Romans for fighting its wars with steel instead of money, the United States should always ensure that the primary focus of defense spending is being spent on weapons and equipment.

Limitations

Although the parallels between the contemporary United States and the topics and situations found in Machiavelli's writings can seem endless, there are several distinct differences between the United States of the 21st Century and the time periods mentioned in Machiavelli's works. Machiavelli writes to Lorenzo de Medici pleading for the prince to lead a relatively weak Florence and Italy back to its glory days of the great Roman Empire. In contrast, authors like Bacevich wrote about a country that currently outspends the following eleven countries combined in military spending (Peterson, 2021). Machiavelli wrote to an almost entirely Christian audience, and most of his works were published before Martin Luther wrote his Ninety-Five Theses. In contrast, the contemporary United States is a country with no official religion but has populations of several different faiths.

Although the secondary sources found during this research process presented compelling information concerning Machiavelli's intentions in the formation of his Florentine militia, the fact that there is no English translation of Machiavelli's *La Cagione dell'Ordinanza* leaves some of the research questions and answers incomplete.

The essential topic regarding recruitment encountered the same dilemma in answering the research question of 'what recruiting strategies would Machiavelli employ?' that it did in the section dedicated to the reorganization of the military. Although Machiavelli demonstrated his disdain for the use of foreign auxiliary and mercenary troops in protecting the lives and interests of his homeland in *The Prince* and *Art of War*, some of the intentions and reasons behind his actions with his own Florentine militia cannot be considered in the analysis unless an English translation of *La Cagione dell'Ordinanza* is published.

America's dependence on persons from lower socioeconomic backgrounds to make up its military, whether by design or just circumstance, is in alignment with what Machiavelli did with his militia. The military used this as a route in climbing the socio-economic ladder in America. This is also something that Machiavelli believed in while pushing for the rights and privileges of the Pisan subjects in the Florentine Republic. In reorganizing the military to that of Machiavelli's Florentine militia, a shared understanding of what is a 'war' must be achieved to avoid breakdowns in civil-military relations from all sides. The 'wars' on poverty, drugs, terror are all examples of the overused of the word 'war.' The fact that Congress has not approved a formal declaration of war since World War II is very concerning considering the number of lives lost in the conflicts in the second half of the 20th century through the present day.

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Future Research

On the topic of defense spending, further research could be conducted on the economic impact that servicemembers and their family members have on the economy of their local communities. Although the sacrifices made military servicemembers and their family members are often recognized by their civilian counterparts, the amount of economic output these military bases have on the nearby communities and the number of citizens that depend on these military bases for employment needs consideration. If civil-military relations are nothing more than just the interactions between the civilians of a state or country and the military members and institutions of a state or country, what greater thing to research than the 750 U.S. military bases around the globe and the impact that they have on the nearby communities? Each military base varies in size and population, therefore each community may or may not be as positively or negatively impacted by the presence of the U.S. military. Therefore, further research could focus on the doctrine and economic output from the other departments of the U.S. Armed Forces. A study could explore certain military branches that are separate from the civilian population. An argument could be made that it is the job of the U.S. Army, as the military's largest branch leader in all land operations, to pick up most of the slack in coordinating efforts to make stronger bonds with the civilian population within the interior part of the United States.

This research also failed to research how Machiavelli might change the way training is conducted in the military. With the current changes to the Army Combat Fitness Test, further research could be conducted to determine whether Machiavelli would support age and job standards in scoring soldiers. Due to Machiavelli not mentioning the use of women in his militia or throughout his works, this research could be limited, but still useful in the long run.

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