Learning Without Representation:

A Critique of Representational Thought in Philosophies of Arts Education and Curriculum

by

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ABSTRACT

In this study, I offer a critique of representational thought and the related concept of intentionality in the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education. I use the philosophies of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze alongside new materialist and posthumanist theory to interrogate three figures of representational thought in arts education: the art object, the curriculum as enclosure, and the transmission-acquisition theory of learning. My analysis of these figures reveals how the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education uses privileged forms of interiority—the work of art, human subjectivity, and intentional consciousness—to pre-judge difference(s) according to recognizable subject-object determinations and established values. I argue that in the guise of representational thought, such determinations often (re)produce divisions and hierarchies of the human and nonhuman that, while making differences visible and knowable, also encloses them in fixed images. In arts education, such representational enclosures produce exclusionary boundaries for participation and learning which subordinate difference to identity, matter to form, and creativity to already-given determinations of subject and object in the mind of the intending human subject. I suggest that thinking about curriculum and learning in terms of inclosure rather than enclosure may allow arts educators to create living curricular forms that respond to and affirm differences rather contain them under representational identities.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: LEARNING WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

In this study, I offer a critique of representational thought and the related concept of intentionality in the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education. I use the philosophies of Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze alongside new materialist and posthumanist theory to interrogate three figures of representational thought in arts education: the art object, the curriculum as enclosure, and the transmission-acquisition theory of learning. My analysis of these figures reveals how the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education uses privileged forms of interiority—the work of art, human subjectivity, and intentional consciousness—to pre-judge difference(s) according to recognizable subject-object determinations and established values.

I argue that in the guise of representational thought, such determinations often (re)produce divisions and hierarchies of the human and nonhuman that, while making differences visible and knowable, also encloses them in fixed images. In arts education, such representational enclosures produce exclusionary boundaries for participation and learning which subordinate difference to identity, matter to form, and creativity to already-given determinations of subject and object in the mind of the intending human subject. I suggest that thinking about curriculum and learning in terms of inclosure rather than enclosure may allow arts educators to create living curricular forms that respond to and affirm differences rather contain them under representational identities.

The problems I explore here concerning the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education came about when I began questioning the ways I had been taught to plan for and implement a music curriculum in my life as an elementary music teacher in West Virginia.

Having been prepared to teach for music literacy in terms of the "elements" of music—which amounted to a pre-arranged sequence of melodic and rhythmic patterns as found in a restricted body of "folk songs"—I quickly encountered dissonance between what I thought mattered most about music and how music actually mattered to students in their lives. Through rituals of perfect curriculum design, I had been taught to make endless plans where every bit of knowledge would have its proper place in learning's perpetual development machine. The ideal music learner, I thought, would surely progress in her understanding of musical concepts in a rational, methodical manner that matched the sequence and scope I had devised for each grade level.

Yet even when students successfully "learned" the musical concepts in sequential curriculum, I found that the most interesting and vibrant moments of learning seemed to happen when we were engaged in activities that departed from the narrow confines of "music literacy" and the ideal music learner. Such moments—when students were able to experiment, play with, and discover their own musical ideas and follow diverse paths of inquiry they selected—felt to me to be the most valuable as "music education." Yet they hardly resembled anything I had been prepared to teach in the limited image of "music education" with which I was familiar. The students I taught did not match the representational certainties in which I had come to believe.

The Problem of Representational Thought

Epistemologically, representation has been used to describe the way humans come to know the world by re-presenting it mentally and symbolically in the form of categories, ideas,

rules, schema, and concepts.[1] As such, representation has been considered the natural mode of thinking for all humans.[2] Additionally, under the concept of intentionality, philosophers (and later psychologists and cognitive scientists) have posited that mental representations actively orient thought toward objects in conscious perception and that representations guide all intelligent action in the world.[3]

With the concepts of representation and intentionality, cognitive scientists, philosophers, and educators presuppose that all thought is equivalent to conscious propositional and conceptual knowledge and the capacity to recognize the world as a pre-given reality for the rational human subject. By taking representation and intentionality as the essential components of thought, they also decide in advance what can be represented and intended and by whom. As Gilles Deleuze argues, representational thought tends to lead us to conceive things in terms of identity, sameness, and continuity for a human subject such that difference(s) are pre-judged according to recognizable forms and established values.[4] Although representation and intentionality might seem like benign epistemological issues, systems of reason established upon such foundations have been used to justify colonialism and racist, heterosexist, and ableist ideologies that continue to have profound material consequences and perpetuate injustices.

In the history of Western philosophy, psychology, the arts, and education, the "human subject" has meant a decidedly white (European), male, heterosexual, cisgender, able-bodied, narrowly cognitive ("neurotypical") subject whose view of the world is

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[1] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 1968/1994); Jérôme Dokic "Représentation," in *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*, edited by Barbara Cassin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 891-893.
[2] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition.*
[3] Alain de Libera, "Intention" in *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, 500-510.
[4] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* 135-138.

supposedly rational and naturally truthful in opposition to that of its Others who are bound to their bodies—the animal, the woman, the slave, the disabled, and the child.[5] Because they fall outside the narrow boundaries of the human, they are not considered full subjects in this human(ist) image of the world and are consequently put on the side of the unthinking object.[6] With this subject/object, mind/body split, the notions of representation and intentionality as the twin constituents of thought end up being used to insist upon the rigid separation of the ideal from the material—Descartes' *res cogitans* and *res extensa*—while at the same time being used to make the ideal the truth of the material because it is "naturally" correlated to it in the mind of the thinking subject.[7]

As Gloria Anzaldúa writes, "in trying to become 'objective,' Western culture made 'objects' of things and people when it distanced itself from them, thereby losing 'touch' with them. This dichotomy is the root of all violence."[8] The longstanding notion that representations are things in our heads (*res cogitans*) or immaterial abstractions (symbols and language) denies the material reality and consequences of practices of representation—on objects and bodies—while it also gives rises to the illusion that representations fully coincide with or contain the being of the "objects" they represent, including the illusion of the unified subject or consciousness.[9]

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[5] See Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994); Claudia Castañeda, *Figurations: Child, Bodies, Worlds* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); and Petra Kuppers, *Disability and Contemporary Performance: Bodies on Edge* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

[6] Grosz, *Volatile Bodies*; and Donna Haraway, "Ecce Homo, Ain't (Ar'n't) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post-Humanist Landscape" in *Feminists Theorize the Political*, edited by Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 86-100.

[7] See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, especially passages where he critiques "good" and "common" sense and the "dogmatic image of thought."

[8] Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), 37.

[9] Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, translated by David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); and Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*.

At the same time that representational thought makes things visible and knowable, it also confines and encloses them in fixed images.[10] In representational thought, the Other becomes "the good object of knowledge, the docile body of difference," through a "…desire to see, to fix cultural difference in a containable, visible object…[and] the epistemological, visual demand for a knowledge of the Other."[11] According to Homi Bhabha, representational thought as intimately linked to colonialism "produces the colonized as a social reality which is at once an 'other' and yet entirely knowable and visible…It employs a system of representation, a regime of truth, that is *structurally similar to realism*."[12] In other words, the system of representational thought establishes itself as the "real" reality through which the human and its Others are oriented in the world. This worldview, Sara Ahmed writes, "acquires its direction only by taking a certain point of view as given"[13] and per Deleuze, "forms a model of pre-established truth, which necessarily expresses the dominant ideas or point of view of the colonizer."[14]

Beyond epistemology, representational thought orients the arts and aesthetics as well. Through notions of representation and intentionality in the art object, philosophers, critics, and educators have supposed that art gives us a glimpse into the condition of a culture, ideal formal relationships, subjective interiority, and the consciousness of its creators. As such,

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[10] Rey Chow, "Postcolonial Visibilities: Questions Inspired by Deleuze's Method" in *Deleuze and the Postcolonial,* edited by Simone Bignall and Paul Patton (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 62-77.

[11] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 46, 72. Bhabha is of course referencing Foucault here (docile bodies), but also Derrida and Lacan (good object, desire of the Other).

[12] Ibid., 101, italics added.

[13] Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 14.

[14] Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 150. While Deleuze is not often read as a postcolonial thinker, he discusses the problem of colonialism and the struggle for decolonization in film and literature at length in *Cinema 2* and, with Félix Guattari, in *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature,* translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

they repeat the illusion of representation in which representations are perceived as fully coinciding with or containing the being of the represented. This can be seen, for example, in the notion that Georgia O'Keeffe's work gives us special insight into the "feminine" or that Fritz Scholder's work allows us to view the "Native American experience." The same could be said of artists with physical and mental disabilities, such as Beethoven, Sylvia Plath, or Frida Kahlo, whose works have been read as expressions of their struggles with illness or physical limitation. Petra Kuppers argues that "the diagnostic gaze"—to which one could add the colonial interpretive gaze—"reduces the presence of bodies to texts that need to be read and categorized."[15] When bodies are marked in this way—as Other, representing their difference from the white, male, able-bodied standard—they are, in Nirmal Puwar's words, "known and made visible in a limited sense…racially stereotyped so that they are visible as 'black' bodies, while simultaneously being deemed invisible outside restricted ethnicised confines."[16]

While representational thought enables differences to be judged by what is made externally visible on the surface of the body and objects, it also provides a template for privileged forms of interiority: the human mind and subjective consciousness.[17] Privileged forms of interiority are articulated in theories of mind that guide how educators think about learning and cognition. In these theories, cognitive scientists and psychologists have largely assumed that mental representations and intentionality are foundational to all properly

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15 Kuppers, *Disability and Contemporary Performance*, 130.
16 Nirmal Puwar, *Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies Out of Place* (New York: Berg, 2004), 142.
17 See Thomas S. Popkewitz, "Styles of Reason: Historicism, Historicizing, and the History of Education" in *Rethinking the History of Education: Transnational Perspectives on Its Questions, Methods, and Knowledge* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).

human cognition and intelligent action.[18] This is accomplished by taking a certain array of cognitive abilities as natural, necessary, and sufficient and by showing how those with neural, psychological, and intellectual differences supposedly lack such abilities. Cognitive science thus establishes a normative baseline for all human intelligence through the disqualification of cognitive differences that are seen as failing to meet its foundational criteria. Erin Manning and Brian Massumi point out in reference to neurodiversity and how those with autism describe their own thought processes, that "when we say 'human'…we [habitually] mean 'neurotypical'…expressing oneself predominantly in spoken language, and most of all…immediately focused on humans" or meanings *for* humans, "to the detriment of other elements in the environment."[19]

Representational Thought in The Theory and Practice of Curriculum

Taking the above discussion into consideration, arts education could be read as the site *par excellence* where the strands of representational thought from epistemology, aesthetics, and psychology come together. The central figure that binds them is the human subject. As I have sketched above, the definition and constitution of "the human" comes with a host of divisions and exclusions. In defining the human upon a decidedly European model, systems of reason linked to representational thought have consistently marginalized those who fail to meet its human-qualifying criteria. As Lisa Lowe writes, "in the very claim to define humanity, as a species or as a condition, its gestures of definition divide the human and the nonhuman, *to classify the normative and pathologize deviance*."[20] Gestures of definition and division

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[18] See Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
[19] Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 3.
[20] Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 6.

of the human and nonhuman are reproduced in the ways that arts education has been reasoned and practiced, including in contemporary arts curricula. In music education, Ruth Gustafson argues, "The language of the music curriculum continues to draw boundaries for participation through protocols that regulate musical response" in terms of cognitive processes, bodily comportment, and aesthetic dispositions that, while articulated in the language of cultural diversity, often tacitly assume a White standard by which "others" are judged.[21] For example, the self-reflective student who can actively represent her own artistic-cognitive processes (verbally, symbolically) and demonstrate intentional artistic consciousness (deliberate reasoning) is valued over the student who is seen as responding superficially—passively, emotionally, or through the body. Such valuations often (re)produce divisions and hierarchies of students in terms of race, gender, and ability.[22]

Although divisions and hierarchies of the human and nonhuman may be said to operate as a "hidden curriculum,"[23] they are quite visible in the history of the geographical and cultural dispossession of Indigenous peoples in North America wherein Indigenous children were sent forcibly to residential schools for assimilative reeducation. As I write this sentence, I live a few blocks away from Indian School Road in Phoenix, Arizona—a major urban thoroughfare named for the Phoenix Indian School that operated from 1891-1935 under the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and then as a more-or-less conventional high school until 1990.[24] It is an everyday reminder of the violence of an American educational system

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21 Ruth Gustafson, "Drifters and the Dancing Mad: The Public School Music Curriculum and the Fabrication of Boundaries for Participation," *Curriculum Inquiry* 38, no. 3 (2008): 267-297. For an extended version, see Ruth Gustafson, *Race and Curriculum: Music in Childhood Education* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).
22 Ibid.
23 For the concept of the "hidden curriculum," see Philip W. Jackson, *Life in Classrooms* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968/1990).
24 Robert A. Trennert, *The Phoenix Indian School: Forced Assimilation in Arizona, 1891-1935* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

that once explicitly sought to "rid the Indian of [his] culture" and to "'civilize' the 'savage'" through a White supremacist curriculum.[25] The Indian school curriculum featured the arts prominently as a vehicle for "civilizing" and "Americanizing" the Indian, using marching bands, studio arts, and sport to eradicate Native cultural practices and replace them with Euro-American (White) ones.[26] As a poster displayed in one school proclaimed, Indian students were to learn to "become controlled and civilized" and "to be strong and not cry or show emotion."[27] The entire Indian school endeavor was premised on the assumption that, as Anzaldúa writes, "…Indians have 'primitive' and therefore deficient minds, that we cannot think in the higher mode of consciousness—rationality."[28] Therefore, the Indian—habituated to "magical" thinking, ritual, and "superstitions" supposedly beneath and separate from rational thought and Science—must be taught "…the 'official' reality of the rational, reasoning mode which is connected with external reality, the upper world…considered the most developed consciousness—the consciousness of duality."[29]

According to Isabelle Stengers, "the idea of a hegemonic scientific rationality" that Anzaldúa describes "can be understood as itself the product of a colonization process," "a general conquest bent on translating everything that exists into objective, rational knowledge."[30] In other words, it is part of the general procedure of representational thought set out by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant in which all things and beings must become

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[25] Quotes from wall text, *Away From Home: American Indian Boarding School Stories,* Heard Museum, Phoenix, Arizona. This powerful permanent exhibition on BIA Indian schools (in Arizona and the Southwest) features first-hand accounts and artifacts from Indigenous perspectives.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Anzaldúa, *Borderlands*, 36.
[29] Ibid., 36-37.
[30] Isabelle Stengers, "Reclaiming Animism," *e-flux journal* 36 (2012): 1-10. Stengers is among the most well-regarded continental philosophers of science alongside Bruno Latour. She has also engaged deeply with the work Alfred North Whitehead and Deleuze and Guattari.

knowable—made visible and categorized—for the rational human subject. In Kant's words, "If there is any science man really needs, *it is the one I teach*, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn *what one must be in order to be a man*."[31] But Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze notes that "what Kant settled upon as the 'essence' of humanity, that which one ought to become in order to deserve human dignity, sounds very much like Kant himself: 'white,' European, and male."[32]

While it is rarely pointed out in mainstream commentaries on his philosophy, Kant developed a precise theory of race—what he called "anthropology" and "natural geography"—where he claimed that "Humanity exists in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow Indians have a smaller amount of Talent. The Negroes are lower and *the lowest are a part of the American peoples*."[33] The point is not that such racist logic is a past injustice that must be faced now that we "know better," but that such injustice continues to be played out in the ways education in the arts, sciences, and humanities are practiced and reasoned in the present. Lowe reveals that "the modern distinction between definitions of the human and those to whom such definitions do not extend is the condition of possibility for Western liberalism, and not its particular exception."[34]

Although racial segregation and cultural assimilation are no longer officially sanctioned practices in the U.S. educational system, studies continue to reveal the persistence

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[31] Kant quoted in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, "The Color of Reason: The Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology" in *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 130, italics added.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid., 118, italics added. Kant believed that the Indigenous peoples of the Americas (the "American peoples") were not capable of learning or becoming "civilized," and are thus to be excluded from human subjectivity.
[34] Lowe, *Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

of ranking, division, and exclusion based on race and ability in schools.[35] Beth Ferri and David Connor write that "overt racially segregating schooling practices have given way to largely under-acknowledged and more covert forms of racial segregation, including some special-education practices…permitting forms of racial segregation under the guise of 'disability.'"[36]

True to the legacy of representational thought, practices of labeling, tracking, ranking, and dividing students decide in advance what it is to know, what it is to learn, and who is capable of knowing and learning. In this image of educational thought, the student considered most capable of knowing and learning is one who visibly, symbolically, and linguistically represents the "real" reality to "himself" and intentionally follows the path of learning laid down before "him" in the curriculum.[37] This ideal student embodies what Kant said "one must be in order to be a [hu]man:" White, European, and male—to which one could add the contemporary categories cisgender, heterosexual, neurotypical, and able-bodied.

The logic of representation and intentionality demands an identifiable source or ground that would authorize correct representations and allow one to trace intentions to an authentic origin: the sense-giving rational human subject. Systems of reason founded in representational thought tend toward (re)appropriating all difference into the image of the same—the rational subject—and into already-given/already-known patterns of reason and

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[35] Beth A. Ferri and David J. Connor, "Tools of Exclusion: Race, Disability, and (Re)Segregated Education" *Teachers College Record* 17, no. 3 (2005): 453-474. For a quantitative study of racial disparity in music education, see Kenneth Elpus and Carlos R. Abril, "High School Music Students in the United States: A Demographic Profile," *Journal of Research in Music Education* 59, no. 2 (2011): 128-145.
[36] Ferri and Connor, "Tools of Exclusion," 454.
[37] On the construction of ideal types of learners/students in curriculum discourse, see Thomas Popkewitz, "Dewey, Vygotsky, and the Social Administration of the Individual: Constructivist Pedagogy as Systems of Ideas in Historical Spaces," *American Educational Research Journal* 35, no. 4 (1998): 535-570.

activity. Educational practices founded on the logic of representation and intentionality continue, Thomas Popkewitz writes, to "generate principles which classify and divide those who have and do not have the appropriate dispositions, sensitivities, and capabilities to act and participate" in learning.[38] They "inscribe norms that disqualify certain children at the level of their being" where "it is thus implied that the best thing that can happen to [them] is to become like the normal person."[39]

In the ways, representational thought often coincides with racism, ableism, and colonialism to secure identities and to make perceived Others knowable, containable, and manageable. Therefore, I undertake this study in the spirit of doing justice to representational thought's Others, to those whom the light of reason makes all too visible while it also shrouds them in humanism's categorical certainties. This study also gives voice to my commitment to education as an ethical imperative—education as, in Hannah Arendt's words, "the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to take responsibility for it…"[40] While issues of colonialism, racism, and ableism may not be mentioned explicitly throughout the study, my arguments should be read against the background of decolonial, antiracist, and anti-ableist struggles that daily contest the deleterious effects of representational thought.

Methodology: On Philosophical Inquiry

Methodologically, I approach the problem of representational thought in the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education through philosophical inquiry. While Western

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[38] Popkewitz, "Dewey, Vygotsky," 557.
[39] Ibid., p 560, 558.
[40] Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), 196.

philosophers have long engaged questions regarding education, going back at least to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, dedicated work focused specifically on philosophy of education as a subdiscipline did not emerge until the nineteenth century, and only began to find a secure foothold as a separate scholarly field in the mid-twentieth century.[41] Certainly, John Dewey, William James, and Alfred North Whitehead's philosophical works on education provided invaluable foundations for education in the United States and Britain in the early twentieth century; however, Dewey, James, and Whitehead belong more to the *fin-de-siècle* philosophical milieu that preceded and precipitated the analytic-continental split in Western philosophy rather than the later Anglo-American philosophy of education that grew out of the British linguistic and analytical traditions (of Russell, Wittgenstein, Moore, etc.).[42]

As Nigel Blake et al. claim, the analytic philosophy of education from the 1960s onward that dominated philosophical thought in education in the United States, Australia, and Britain concerned itself with developing "a coherent and systematic rationalization of educational beliefs and practices… by importing the rigor and the supposed ideological neutrality of linguistic and analytic methods in philosophy proper."[43] Analytic philosophy of education has typically focused on matters regarding formal schooling, which meant "[examining] the language educationists use, whether everyday or technical, so as to explore the concepts underlying this for their coherence and applicability, and thus their significance in educational argument."[44]

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41 Nigel Blake et al., eds. *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), xv-17.
42 Ibid. See also Constantin V. Boundas, ed. *The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) for a thorough discussion of the differences between analytic and continental philosophies, especially the kinds of questions they entertain and assumptions they harbor.
43 Blake et al., *Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education,* 2.
44 Paul H. Hirst and Patricia White, eds. *Philosophy of Education: Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. I: Philosophy and Education* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 7.

In contrast, continental European philosophy of education has been articulated more broadly in terms of child-rearing, enculturation, and the intellectual growth and "emancipation" of the child, often understood alongside the concept of *Bildung*.[45] Although analytic and continental orientations in philosophy of education maintain distinct styles of argument and divergent notions of the nature of language and its relation to truth, both have had to come to terms with postmodern critiques of Kantian rationalism, the autonomous subject, and the search for foundations. Paul Hirst and Patricia White concede that the foundational work in analytic philosophy of education is now "widely understood as justifying a particular view of the relationship between theory and practice and a particular conception of the educated person as a rationally autonomous individual" without critical examination of Enlightenment notions of the subject and the nature of knowledge.[46]

Philosophy of education has since broadened and diversified to include many different approaches to philosophical inquiry drawn from poststructuralism, feminist and queer theory, Critical Theory, and postcolonial theory. The discipline has also slowly recognized and engaged with philosophical work undertaken on the margins of philosophy of education, including that of curriculum reconceptualists, critical pedagogues, critical race theorists, and feminists who have challenged long-held assumptions and beliefs about educational practice justified through appeal to universal reason. The strict disciplinary boundaries that had once sequestered philosophy of education away from other domains of research "under the cold hand of analytic philosophy"[47] have now become much more

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[45] "Bildung" means, roughly, self-formation or self-cultivation in German. See Blake et al., *Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education*.

[46] Hirst and White, *Philosophy of Education,* 11.

[47] Maxine Greene and Morwenna Griffiths, "Feminism, Philosophy, and Education: Imagining Public Spaces," in Nigel Black et al., eds. *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 78.

permeable and flexible. Blake et al. argue that contemporary philosophy of education now "generally requires not narrow concentration but a flexible and imaginative drawing from different aspects of the 'parent' discipline in relation to specific but typically highly complex problems of practice."[48] Thus, while many other fields of educational research have sought to clarify and codify their methods in recent years, philosophy of education has in many ways become less clearly defined and less systematic than in the past. This makes questions of method in philosophy difficult to articulate precisely.

How does one do philosophy? It depends largely upon who you ask. While Spinoza was fond of organizing his treatises like mathematical proofs, Nietzsche famously wrote in an aphoristic, literary style. Many analytic philosophers claim that all properly philosophical problems can be solved through conceptual analysis such that vagaries in everyday language can be clarified and submitted to criteria of truth or falsity under the rules of logic. Continental philosophers often approach philosophical problems through examining how the given is possible and pursue conclusions beyond given conceptual identities and antagonisms.[49] While analytic and continental philosophies are often systematic in that they define their concepts, develop organizational schemes, and justify their arguments through examples, there are no agreed-upon methodological models that philosophers adopt considered separately from the demands of their particular sets of problems.

Claudia Ruitenberg notes that unlike graduate programs in education, "research methods courses are uncommon in departments of philosophy where it is assumed that

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[48] Blake et al., *Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education*, 15-16.

[49] See Boundas, *Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies*; and James Garvey and Jeremy Strangroom, *The Story of Philosophy: A History of Western Thought* (London: Quercus Editions, 2013) for clear explanations of how analytic and continental philosophers approach their work.

students learn to read and write philosophy by, well, reading and writing philosophy."[50] In contrast, qualitative and quantitative researchers in education are often at pains to justify their work through appeal to the scientificity of what they do. As a result, "education is commonly seen *as* a social science, rather than as a field of theories, policies and practices" and thus "philosophers of education are expected to be able to answer questions about their methods just as their social science colleagues do," even though philosophical work does not share the same aims or functions as social science research.[51]

In music education scholarship, little has been written on philosophical method in contrast with the many handbooks in the field that have focused specifically on questions of method in qualitative and quantitative research.[52] While the recent *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Music Education* addresses some questions of method, none of the chapters are dedicated solely to the "how" of philosophical inquiry.[53] Many of the authors in the handbook note, however, that philosophy in music education has not been approached with the rigor and respect it deserves. Too frequently, Estelle Jorgensen argues, philosophy in music education "has often been confused with… advocacy," attempting to "implement,

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[50] Claudia Ruitenberg, "Introduction: The Question of Method in Philosophy of Education," in *What Do Philosophers of Education Do?: (And How Do They Do It?)* (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 2.
[51] Ibid.
[52] See Richard Colwell and Carol Richardson, eds., *The New Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning: A Project of the Music Educators National Conference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Colleen M. Conway, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research in American Music Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Margaret S. Barrett and Sandra L. Stauffer, eds., *Narrative Inquiry in Music Education: Troubling Certainty* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2009); and Peter Miksza and Kenneth Elpus, *Design and Analysis for Quantitative Research in Music Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
[53] For those familiar with philosophical work in music education, one cannot help but notice the conspicuous absence of several important women scholars in the volume. See Wayne D. Bowman and Ana Lucía Frega, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Music Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

preserve, or defend a particular set of assumptions or practices" rather than engage in critical examination of those assumptions or practices.[54]

In one of the few pieces on philosophical method in music education, Jorgensen writes that philosophical work is marked by four "symptoms:" it "(a) clarifies its terms, (b) exposes and evaluates underlying assumptions, (c) relates its parts as a systematized theory that connects with other ideas and systems of thought, and (d) addresses questions that are characteristically philosophical [i.e. questions of epistemology, ontology, ethics, etc.]."[55] Jorgensen also distinguishes between two types of philosophical work: the "synoptic," which aims at comprehensive theory-building toward "verification," and the "analytic," which aims at clarifying and examining concepts toward "refutation."[56] While the symptoms Jorgensen identifies may be evident in most philosophical work to a greater or lesser extent, the concepts and examples she uses to explain the "how" of philosophy come from a specifically Anglo-Australian-American analytic orientation, which is frequently at odds epistemologically with the continental philosophies I draw from in this study.

While analytic philosophers tend to bracket the "theoretical" from the "phenomenal" and take the meaning of notions like truth and being for granted in their microscopic conceptual analysis, continental philosophers often trouble the foundations of received notions through macroscopic examination of how problems manifest themselves in the world at large, thereby refusing firm demarcation between the theoretical and the phenomenal. As Constantin Boundas writes, "the continental philosopher—unlike the

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[54] Estelle R. Jorgensen, "What are the roles of philosophy in music education?" *Research Studies in Music Education*, no. 17 (2001): 19.
[55] Estelle R. Jorgensen, "On Philosophical Method," in *Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning,* ed. Richard Colwell (New York: Schirmer Books, 1992), 91.
[56] Ibid., 98.

analytic colleague—will have the tendency to embed the 'problem of the other' in a wider story about communities, consciousness, development, ethics or politics—a tendency that alarms the analytic philosopher, who prefers to move about his business with his usual microscope."[57]

Continental philosophers often seek to complicate rather than clarify, and attempt to think through difference and heterology rather than identity and homology (consider Heidegger's ontological difference, Marx's alienation, and Freud's unconscious as cases in point). This can be disconcerting to those accustomed to research that aims for straightforward conclusions and clarity. For Deleuze in particular, philosophy is "the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts" not as explanatory universals, but as a fragmentary collection of intensities that take universals as that which must be explained.[58] Following Deleuze, Elizabeth Gould explains that "philosophical concepts created in response to lived problems produce perspectives and catalysts for thinking that are consequently interrelated with other concepts—both those that precede them and those that follow. Evaluated in terms of what happens as a result of their implementation, concepts continually change."[59]

I situate my study alongside this continental approach to philosophy as the creation of concepts that complicate and transform the given rather than submit it to fixed conceptual identities. Throughout the study, I primarily follow three sources of philosophical

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[57] Constantin V. Boundas, "How to Recognize Continental European Philosophy," in *The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophies* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 373.
[58] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 2, 7.
[59] Elizabeth Gould, "Feminist Imperative(s) in Music and Education: Philosophy, Theory, or What Matters Most" *Educational Philosophy and Theory 43*, no. 2 (2011): 139.

thinking for their sustained critiques of representational thought and intentionality: Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and new materialist and posthumanist philosophers. The concepts and lines of thought put forth by these philosophers provide tools for me to challenge the ways in which arts education and curriculum theory perpetuate limited understandings of learning and art through representation and intentionality.

Derrida and Deleuze both insist that the reality of things (in their Being) cannot be conceived in terms of essential identities and simple presence, but must be thought according to difference and the non-chronological temporality of the event. Tasmin Lorraine writes that "both Derrida and Deleuze advocate a shift to a way of thinking that refuses the comfortable illusions of captured sense" in terms of identities and representations "and instead pursue[s] the force of time in the becoming of meaning" and/or sense.[60] Conceived as philosophies of *difference*, the work of Deleuze and Derrida contests systems of reason "in which identities are metaphysically primary and differences are seen within a horizon of identity."[61] However, both Derrida and Deleuze concede that one cannot simply disavow metaphysics, categories, dualisms, and representations as if they could be replaced with a better system: such has been the entire history of Western philosophy that believes it can master being.

The problem for Deleuze and Derrida, then, is not metaphysics, categories, dualisms, and representations *as such* but claims to essence and truth made in their names. Derrida and Deleuze expose "the ways in which the dichotomies draw on, but disavow, ineradicable differentiation processes operating prior to the oppositions, including the

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[60] Tasmin Lorraine, "Living a Time Out of Joint," in *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, edited by Paul Patton and John Protevi (New York: Continuum, 2003), 45.
[61] John Protevi, *Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 4.

nature-culture divide."[62] Their philosophies of difference thus seek out the problems, contradictions, and paradoxes that play out in systems of thought that attempt to order proper and/or common sense, striving "not to assume that the meanings of our words are fully present," but "to pursue the differentiating force of sense in light of a living present that is never a plenitude, but always bears traces of another time."[63] I bring Derrida and Deleuze together in this study because they illuminate aspects of each other's thought that remain implicit or tacit on their own and which prove useful for challenging the logic of representation and intentionality. Derrida's attentive ear toward undecidabilities, delays, and disseminations at the heart of thought give pause to positivistic and naturalized interpretations of Deleuze, while Deleuze's attention to intensive difference, sensation, and living systems allows Derrida's thought to speak more forcefully about the workings of matter.

Building upon thinkers such as Derrida and Deleuze, contemporary philosophers under the labels "posthumanism" and "new materialism" argue that rational thought's anthropocentrism and neat demarcations between nature and culture conceals the complex, entangled nature of reality and thereby ignore the rich array of nonhumans who participate actively in the construction of our world. The word "posthuman" signals both a decentering of the human as the locus of theoretical concern and a continued critique of humanism(s), extending those critiques undertaken by the poststructuralists.[64] The phrase "new materialist" connotes a renewed interest among philosophers in matter, scientific practices,

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[62] Fritsch, Lynes, and Wood, "Introduction" to *Eco-Deconstruction: Derrida and Environmental Philosophy*, 6.
[63] Lorraine, "Living a Time Out of Joint," 43.
[64] See Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013); Claire Colebrook, "The Context of Humanism" *New Literary History* 42, no. 4 (2011): 701-718; Vicki Kirby, *Quantum Anthropologies: Life at Large* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011).

and empirical description while it also implies a critique of poststructuralists' narrow focus on language and text.[65] While posthumanist and new materialist philosophers often engage with the sciences, they certainly do not do so from within a positivist, realist, nor even a simply constructivist perspective. Rather, they continue the poststructural tradition of calling into question the assumptions of all such epistemologies and aim to inquire into how such things as scientific facts and disciplines are possible and what claims they make on, and on behalf of, being. With Derrida and Deleuze, new materialist/posthumanist philosophers allow me to challenge the humanist tendencies of representational thought that continuously fall back into the desire to ground Being in a particular being, to secure the conditions and limits of thought within an identifiable and reliable center—the human (or humanity) conceived as a unitary and knowable source.

Throughout the study, I also rely upon a large body of work in curriculum studies in which scholars have used poststructuralist, posthumanism, and new materialist philosophies to critique and reconceptualize curriculum. In particular, "Deleuzian" curriculum studies has grown into its own sub-field through the work of Jacques Daignault and Jason Wallin, among others. While their work has been influential for me, my approach contrasts with theirs several ways.

Deleuzian curriculum studies tend to focus on the curricular exegesis of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts, mostly from *A Thousand Plateaus*, in ways that sometimes efface or obscure the philosophical and political stakes of Deleuze's arguments as they concern actual political struggles and the history of Western philosophy. Such uses of Deleuze often emphasize the virtual, becoming-other, the nomadic, and the rhizomatic over the actual—

[65] See Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

and certainly if one uses *A Thousand Plateaus* and *Anti-Oedipus* as one's primary references, this image of Deleuzian thought does seem to come to the fore. However, as many feminist and postcolonial philosophers have noted, such theorizing risks erasing the specificity and particularity of embodied differences and may end up reinforcing the (white, male) human subject as a colonizing force who is free to dominate and use the bodies of others through its unlimited "becomings." It also tends toward a one-dimensional portrayal of Deleuze's philosophy as militant avant-gardism deterritorializing everything in its path rather than a systematic philosophy of difference that addresses complex ontological and epistemological problems.

In contrast, my use of Deleuze "leaves the 'nomadic war-machine' in the garage," to borrow Catherine Keller's description,[66] and conspicuously avoids the familiar litany of Deleuzian concepts (rhizome, nomad, becoming-other, etc.) in order to provide clarity to Deleuze's arguments concerning representational thought that my get lost in the unusual terminology of *A Thousand Plateaus*. Admittedly, my version of Deleuze skips over much of his work with Guattari (except for *What is Philosophy?*) and sides with feminist interpretations of his work by Elizabeth Grosz and Claire Colebrook, and, in the philosophy of education, Elizabeth Gould. Overall, my approach could be characterized as a combination of a deconstructive Deleuze with a vitalist Derrida through new materialism and posthumanism.

Outline of the Study

I approach the problem of representation and intentionality in the theory and practice of curriculum in arts through an interrogation of three figures of representational

[66] Catherine Keller, *Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary Entanglement* (New York: Columbia University, 2015), 185.

thought: the art object, the curriculum as enclosure, and the transmission-acquisition theory of learning. I use these figures to reveal how the theory and practice of curriculum in arts education uses privileged forms of interiority—human subjectivity and consciousness—to pre-judge difference(s) according to recognizable subject-object determinations and established values that simultaneously makes things visible and knowable by containing and enclosing them in fixed images.

In chapter two, I argue that the idea of the art object and the idea of curriculum imply a set of interrelated ontological and epistemological assumptions concerning the nature of art, cognition, and learning that have mutually reinforced one another historically and continue to define the contours of arts education today—all bound to the idea of representation. I explore how the notions of representation and intentionality are played out in aesthetic philosophies and philosophies of arts education under the figure of the art object, providing the basis of how arts education has traditionally understood the nature of art and thus conditioning how the field approaches curriculum and pedagogy. I then pursue accounts of art from Derrida, Deleuze, and new materialism that provide possibilites for thinking about art non-representationally.

In chapter three, I use the metaphor of curriculum as architecture for learning to characterize how the idea and practice of curriculum in arts education tends to function similarly to the design of built environments: providing conditions for living and attempting to condition living. In this way, the curriculum "represents" an ideal design for human development and learning based on an already-given body of knowledge in which the learner is directed toward particular ways of knowing and acting through the structures the pedagogue has set in place. I then use three moments in twentieth century architecture (modernism, postmodernism, and deconstructivism) in connection with moments in

curriculum theory (scientific curriculum, reconceptualization, and postmodernism) to show how various approaches to designing built environments for living or learning support and/or contest the ideas of representation and intentionality at the heart of the curricular and architectural projects of enclosure. Incorporating the ideas of deconstructivist architecture with those of Derrida, Deleuze, and posthumanist philosophy, I then propose how one might conceive—or perhaps contest—the idea of curriculum in music and arts education with the concept of *inclosure*: that which provides a provisional structure but which is also radically open to difference.

In chapter four, I examine how the transmission-acquisition theory of learning figures into and constrains how learning is conceived in music and arts education by making all learning, knowing, and skillful activity a matter of mental representation processes to which the body and everything else in one's environment are subservient. I argue that such focus on knowledge and skill acquisition reduces learning to *learning to*—the prepositional form that pre-positions learning in advance—rather than *to learn* in the infinitive form that situates learning as an opening onto what is yet to come, welcoming difference. I consider the philosophical foundations of intentionality and representational thought in cognitive science as they figure into the image of learning as *learning to,* and explore cognitive science's assumptions concerning the nature of cognition (thought) that support such an image of learning. I then follow Derrida and Deleuze's critiques of representational-intentional thought and their accounts of learning to challenge the foundations and assumptions of cognitive science. Lastly, I connect Derrida and Deleuze's arguments to recent developments in biology, neuroscience, and new materialist/posthumanist theory to illustrate how one might conceive learning in music and arts education beyond the confines of representation and intentionality toward welcoming the arrival of difference and new ways of relating.

Finally in chapter five, I return to the concept of *inclosure* as a way to think beyond the representational and intentional boundaries of curricular thought in music and arts education. I elaborate the idea of inclosure further in connection with musical metaphors, concepts, and illustrations of (musical) learning in practice. Specifically, I explore how learning in music and the arts might be thought of in terms of *rhythmic inclosure(s)* and what Deleuze calls "relations without measure."[67] I begin the discussion of inclosure and rhythm by exploring philosophical, ethnomusicological, and anthropological accounts of the production of space as intimately bound to experiences of rhythm, sound, and affect. I then explore contemporary sites of musical-artistic participation—both familiar and little known in arts education—with philosophical insights to illustrate possible pathways for learning-and-making in music and the arts that may lead beyond the enclosures of representation, intentionality, and curricular thought. In conclusion, I suggest that thinking about curriculum, pedagogy, and learning in terms of inclosure rather than enclosure may allow arts educators, together with the people they teach, to create living curricular forms that respond to and affirm difference(s) rather than enclose them.

[67] Gilles Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time: 'Occupying without Counting,'" *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 3(2): 1998, 70.

CHAPTER 2

THE CURRICULUM OF THE ART OBJECT

Philosophers of music and arts education have tended to view aesthetic experience and learning in the arts as a primarily cognitive endeavor culminating in *the art object*. The art object as I use it here is a figure for the ways in which music and arts educators often try to contain things done and made under the name of art into object-like vessels. These vessels are often thought of in terms of "works" of art (compositions, paintings, photographs), but attempts are also made to contain art within the performance, the situation, or the immediate context in which a work of art is put to use. Any of these can function as an art object in that they tend to reduce art to a determinate, self-contained thing. As such, art objects are thought to convey—to re-present—the creator's intentions, abstract ideas, ideal relationships, social norms, and symbolic/cultural meanings *intrinsically*. However, philosophers of aesthetics and arts education have claimed that these components cannot be apprehended superficially but require the guided cultivation of an aesthetic attitude, artistic intelligence, social consciousness, or procedural domain knowledge to achieve full understanding of the art object as the truth of art. Therefore, it is assumed that people need to follow a specialized program of study or course of action—a *curriculum*—to be able to understand and participate in the arts properly.

The idea of the art object and the idea of curriculum imply a set of interrelated ontological and epistemological assumptions concerning the nature of art, cognition, and learning that have mutually reinforced one another historically and continue to define the contours of arts education today. The central notion that binds them together is *representation*. In rationalist philosophy and cognitivism, the idea of representation means that when we act in or perceive the external world, we make internal mental models of the world, our actions,

and sense data which are then stored and made available for retrieval in memory.[68] Representations are said to be sets of formal rules of causation, models for action, ideal forms, and classifications of objects.[69] People can preserve representations externally through language, symbols, images, and so on, to enable others to know the contents of our minds and thus contribute to collective knowledge of the world. Representation, which can be internal (mental content) or external (words, symbols), is thus considered the necessary condition for thought and knowledge, if not the very constitution of thought and knowledge.

Because we are not born with all the skills and knowledge necessary for survival, and because environmental conditions change, our internal representations must be continuously refined and updated to guide actions; cognitive science calls this *learning*.[70] According to cognitive science, we learn by following sets of rules that have enabled others to acquire necessary skills and knowledge, or by forming hypotheses in the mind and testing them in the world. We are thus continuously representing and acting purposively (not randomly or automatically) toward a goal or object in conscious perception. Psychology, phenomenology, and cognitive science call this feature of mental activity *intentionality*.[71] While the concept of intentionality is most commonly associated with phenomenology (Brentano, Husserl), it has roots in scholasticism and has been taken up in analytic philosophy as well.[72] Broadly, it can be defined as "the *aboutness* or *directedness* or *reference* of mind (or states of mind) to things,

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[68] Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Hubert Dreyfus, "The Socratic and Platonic Basis of Cognitivism" *Artificial Intelligence & Society* 2 (1988): 99-112.
[69] Gardner, *The Mind's New Science*, 383.
[70] Howard Gardner, *The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach* (New York: Basic Books, 1995/2011).
[71] See Walter J. Freeman, *How Brains Make Up Their Minds* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
[72] Ibid.

objects, states of affairs."[73] In any of its iterations, intentionality presupposes the idea of conscious mental content in the form of representations. Together, representation and intentionality are considered necessary conditions for learning. And because representations and intentions are claimed to reside in the human subject's mind, they presuppose the human subject as the center of all action and meaning in the world.

Gilles Deleuze argues that the idea of representation makes the human subject the "legislator" of nature which "already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and the subject as well as that of Being and Beings" in terms of identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance.[74] In the representational "image" of thought, every difference encountered in the world is made to fit with what is already given in terms of determinate subjects and objects, rather than considering how such distinctions are possible in the first place, or how such determinations might be otherwise. The idea of representation assumes "the nature of the being[s] it investigates in advance" by submitting them to ready-made ontological categories.[75] Representational thought also assumes that the mind is prior to and separate from "exterior" reality and that the task of human knowledge is to discover what "really" exists through intentional propositions of consciousness in mental representations. In the Kantian view, the mind does this by filtering sensations and material things through *a priori* categories of the understanding, such that they do not interrupt or confuse the concepts of cognition. "[T]he object itself must therefore be subjected to the synthesis of representation:

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[73] Charles Siewert, "Consciousness and Intentionality," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* edited by Edward N. Zalta (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/consciousness-intentionality/

[74] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 1968/1994), 131.

[75] Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 18.

it must be governed by our faculty of knowledge."[76] As such, matter, sensation, and nonhuman things are excluded from having any real stake in the game, relegated to the lesser ontological realm of the object that is there to serve the needs of the subject: "the final relationship between Nature and man [sic] is the result of a *human* practical activity."[77]

Jacques Derrida also calls attention to the ways in which representation is always articulated as the repetition of simple presence, "an ideal 'ob-ject' which stands in front of, which is pre-sent before the act of repetition" by the subject.[78] What the mind represents—that which stands visible before it—maintains constant and available presence, an "infinite repeatability of the same."[79] In this metaphysical interpretation that Derrida critiques, the representation is thought to be internally consistent and present, and can thus be rigorously distinguished and set apart from what is external to it. In the same way, the consciousness that intends the represented object is considered immediately present to itself. As such, any intentional act necessarily arrives at or coincides with its intended destination, and always returns to its origin in the subject's consciousness.[80]

Representational thought assumes that the mind knows *a priori* where it is going (toward the object it intends) and only goes where it knows that what it will find there can be recognized. What is most problematic for Derrida about the notions of representation and intentionality is that they are founded on the belief that Being means presence and self-

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[76] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1963/1984), 5.
[77] Ibid., 69.
[78] Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, translated by David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 53. Derrida writes "ob-ject" to signal the etymology of the word as that which is thrown in front of us. He relates it to the German word for representation, *Vorstellung*, which means "to stand in front of."
[79] Ibid.
[80] Derrida, *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 444.

identity, which leaves difference resigned to the marginal and accidental (i.e. matter, emotion, mere "life").[81] Derrida explains, "the dominance of the now [i.e. presence] not only is integral to the system of the founding contrast established by metaphysics, that between *form* (or *eidos* or idea) and *matter*...[but] carries over...into the 'modern' metaphysics of presence understood as self-consciousness, [and] the metaphysics of the idea as representation..."[82] In this way, difference is always subordinated to identity, matter subordinated to form, and creativity limited to already-given determinations of subject and object.

Philosophical discourse in arts education—whether critical, praxial, or aesthetic—has been consistently focused on representation and intentionality (which are deemed central in cognition) and thus rarely considers anything to do with materiality, affect, or sensation—that which the very notion of *aesthesis* (sense/sensation) would suggest is primary in art. When philosophers in arts education have written of "feeling," which one might intuitively think of in terms of affect as subjectively experienced, they typically write about how abstract ideas of feeling are represented as "*forms* of feeling" or "affective content" in works of art which are not ultimately dependent on what you (the listener, viewer, performer) feel subjectively.[83] Although much methodological and philosophical diversity exists in arts and music education, representation and intentionality provide a common if diffuse thread through which the field is reasoned. In Chapter 3 I explore how representation and intentionality function in the idea of curriculum. In this chapter, I explore how the notions of representation and intentionality are played out in aesthetic philosophies and philosophies

[81] See Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974/2016).
[82] Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 63.
[83] See Elliot W. Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); and Leonard B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956).

of arts education under the figure of the art object, providing the basis of how arts education has traditionally understood the nature of art and thus conditioning how the field approaches curriculum and pedagogy.

The Art Object, Representation, and Intentionality

Derrida asks, "What is the origin of the *meaning* of 'art'?" He answers that, in the history of philosophy, it "will always have been the existence of 'works,' of 'works of art.'"[84] What Derrida is suggesting is that the idea of art *qua* works of art "installs us in a fundamental presupposition" that art is intrinsically meaningful and that the meaning of art can be apprehended through the mediation of "signifier, signified, and referent" *in* art objects (works).[85] The art object refers to—re-presents—an intentional state of affairs that it contains in "standing reserve," "immediately at hand."[86] The truth of art—given in works of art—is thus said to lie in its essence as *representation*. Through the concept of representation, the history of aesthetics, philosophy, and pedagogy of art hinges on the ability to determine the internal/intrinsic from the external/extrinsic: a "delimitation of the center and the integrity of the representation" in the art object.[87] Representation thus implies a necessary correlation between the representation and what it represents—as an immediately available presence—and the separability of what is internal to the representation and what is external to it.

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[84] Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 20.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Heidegger quoted in Hubert L. Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault" *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28 (1989): 84.
[87] Derrida, *Truth in Painting*, 57.

Secondarily, the art object as representation presupposes that its meaning consists of and is constituted by conscious intentionality. In other words, it presupposes that artists are "saying" something in or through their art. "[B]y asking what art means (to say)," Derrida argues, "one submits the mark 'art' to a very determined regime of interpretation which has supervened in history: it consists…in interrogating the *vouloir-dire* [meaning/wanting-to-say] of every work of so-called art, even if its form is not that of saying."[88] When art is conceived in this way, it is submitted to the intentionality and authority of "the voice and *logos*," and thus an implied teleology and hierarchy wherein communicable conscious intentions, what one says in or about art (in the form of judgment), is the highest form of meaning. Revealingly, Kant states explicitly that "everything turns on *the meaning which I can give* to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the [art] object."[89] For Hegel, as Derrida explains, the art object supposedly reveals "the mind [that] presupposes itself, anticipates itself, precipitates itself [in the art object]. *Head first*. Everything with which it commences is already a result, a work, an effect of *a projection of the mind*."[90]

Deleuze similarly criticizes the representational and intentional view of art in which the artist stands before a blank canvas to "reproduce on it an external object functioning as a model," and thus "impose a form (of expression) on the matter of lived experience."[91] Art in the representational image of thought centers on the powers of the subject (Man), "who

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[88] Ibid., 22.
[89] Kant quoted in Derrida, *Truth in Painting*, 45, italics added.
[90] Ibid., 26.
[91] Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, translated by Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum, 1981/2003), 86; Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 1.

presents himself as a dominant form of expression"[92] over against any real object or sensation: "the essential thing is the design, the composition, which are precisely the manifestations of formal reflection."[93] Everything is thus a matter of what the subject consciously intends through the legislative and judicial powers of thought, which are themselves representations. Deleuze writes, "The 'I think' is the most general principle of representation—in other words, the source of these elements and of the unity of all these faculties: I conceive, I judge, I imagine, I remember and I perceive—as though these were the four branches of the Cogito. On precisely these branches, difference is crucified."[94] Because the meaning of the art object as representation is determined entirely by and emanates from the intending human subject—in the form of the recognizable and the identifiable—newness and difference are covered over in advance.

While the discussion above illustrates the basic contours of how representation and intentionality function in the idea of the art object, arts education—and especially music education—have taken up many assumptions about art from Kant and Hume's theories of aesthetic judgment and taste that place judgment (an intentional act) at the center of aesthetic experience. As Georgina Born et. al explain:

> the dominant academic discourse on art and aesthetics for a long time has been, and in some quarters continues to be, an expression of neo-Kantian and neo-Humean philosophies …[which] have neglected the ways in which one's location and embeddedness in a particular culture and social milieu affect one's aesthetic judgments, the role that such social location might play in aesthetics, and questions of whether and how social experience might itself be immanent in aesthetic experience.[95]

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[92] Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, 1.
[93] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 47.
[94] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 138.
[95] Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw, "What is Social Aesthetics?" in *Improvisation and Social Aesthetics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 1.

One source of these tendencies in the discourse of aesthetics philosophers' historical preoccupation with the problem inherent in the commonly held belief that "everyone has their own taste." Embedded in the notion of taste is the fact that people respond in different ways to sensory experiences, which in turn leads people to develop different ideas about what they consider pleasurable or beautiful. This is of particular concern to philosophers, such as Kant and Hume, because it raises the question of how it is possible for people to have different responses to the "same" phenomena: how can one make a valid taste claim (i.e. *judgment*) about an experience when no common standard of experience is to be found? This is precisely the problem Kant and Hume hoped to resolve in their respective *Critique of Judgment* and "On the Standard of Taste."

Both philosophers begin with what Kant calls the "antinomy of taste"—a situation in which two contradictory propositions appear to make valid claims: 1) everyone has their own taste or subjective responses to aesthetic qualities which cannot be disputed, and 2) judgments of taste claim universal validity regardless of individual pleasure or displeasure, i.e. the fact that "some artistic endeavors are [judged to be] better than others."[96] Attempting to resolve or neutralize this antinomy, Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and Hume's "On the Standard of Taste" examine the following: is it possible, and how is it possible, for subjective feelings of pleasure or displeasure to inform universally valid judgments of taste, and on what grounds can such judgments be made? The thrust of Kant's problematic is that judgements

[96] Timothy M. Costelloe, "Hume, Kant, and the 'Antinomy of Taste,'" *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41, no. 2 (2003): 174; Jens Kulenkampff, "The Objectivity of Taste: Hume and Kant," *Noûs* 24, no. 1 (1990): 93-110.

of taste cannot be made according to concepts but "must rest upon mere sensation…of both the imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness."[97]

While Kant affirms the primacy of sensation in judgments of taste, he insists that the pleasure arising from such sensations "must be a *pleasure of reflection* rather than one of enjoyment arising from mere sensation."[98] For Kant, then, the antinomy of taste can be overcome through appeal to "aesthetic ideas," which harmonize the "free play" of the imagination with "a given concept" of the understanding.[99] Kant grants that such aesthetic ideas secure the validity of aesthetic judgments because they rest on the basis of "the supersensible substrate of humanity."[100] In Kant's philosophy, then, the aesthetic finds its ultimate meaning in the human subject: he argues that "a subject who feels such a pleasure, and thus judges the object to be beautiful, is entitled to demand that everyone else feel a corresponding pleasure and thus agree with her judgment of taste...*the free play of the faculties manifests the subjective condition of cognition in general*."[101]

For Hume, beauty and the empirical standards of taste are given by nature through *form* and *order*. Taste is a matter of sentiment (the felt rightness of fit) that indicates objective matters of fact in terms of form. For both Kant and Hume, although judgments of taste are undoubtedly grounded in the subject, they nevertheless attest to objective validity through appeal to nature, common sense, and universal human faculties. The harmonious integration

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[97] Immanuel Kant, "Extracts from 'Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment' and 'Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment,' Critique of Judgment," in *The Continental Aesthetics Reader 2nd edition*, edited by Clive Cazeaux (London: Routledge, 2011), 3-39.
[98]Ibid., 23.
[99] Ibid., 27.
[100] Ibid., 29.
[101] Hannah Ginsborg, "Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* edited by Edward N. Zalta (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2019) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/kant-aesthetics/

of parts into a unified whole is also central to both philosophers' aesthetic theories. Kulenkampff explains that for both Kant and Hume, "whether or not something is beautiful depends on *qualities in the object itself*, namely its *composition or design*. It is the *formal property of integration of parts*, or its lack, that beauty, or deformity, objectively consist in."[102] Despite their differences, Kant and Hume both elevate form over matter, treating all instances of composition and creation as the imposition of a transcendent, ideal order on passive or chaotic matter.[103] Because it is ultimately the mind that forms matter, it is the intending human subject who provides the ground for all aesthetic meaning and judgment.

Perhaps the most difficult and misunderstood aspects of Kant and Hume's aesthetics are their characterizations of our feelings of pleasure or displeasure as "disinterested" and "non-reflective." Arts educators and philosophers of arts education have largely taken Kantian "disinterestedness" to mean intellectual reflection and tend to grant too much normative weight to Hume's non-conceptual empiricism that seems to find the meaning of the art object in analyzing its formal organization. For Kant, interestedness means the possibility of acting in accordance with a concept, the representation of an end, or the fulfillment of a need.[104] But aesthetic judgements, Kant claims, are necessarily *disinterested*: they do not correspond with a concept or reason and are not concerned with fulfilling a need.[105] Similarly, Hume claims that our aesthetic "sentiments" are something "occurring to us, not something we arrive at through operations of our understanding," and thus do not

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[102] Kulenkampff, "The Objectivity of Taste," 98, italics added.
[103] For an in-depth discussion of the matter/from distinction from Aristotle onward, see John Protevi, *Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida, and the Body Politic* (London: The Athlone Press, 2001).
[104] Miles Rind, "The Concept of Interest and Kant's Distinction between the Beautiful and the Agreeable," *Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics* 2 (2010): 427-442.
[105] See Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 1-15.

depend upon reflective judgement.[106] In some ways, what Kant and Hume mean is nearly the opposite of how they have been interpreted. While Kant and Hume grant that aesthetic judgement depends upon the object's qualities, they also maintain that the beautiful itself is not a quality of the object and cannot be given any reason nor conceptual ground in the object as an end. Arts education's misreading of Kant and Hume comes down, then, to the reification of the art object (and its "internal" expressive or formal qualities) as the truth of the beautiful.

Arts education has taken bits and pieces of Hume and Kant to cobble together an aesthetic philosophy that consistently privileges the values of professional artists over those of amateurs. From Kant, arts education takes the notions of artistic universality (grounded in psychological faculties) and the centrality of human cognition in aesthetic experience. From Hume, it takes the notions that great works of art can provide objective "rules of composition" and that the professional class or critics should define what counts as good taste.[107] Alongside the genius concept—seen in the rhetoric surrounding great works of art and master composers—arts educators continue to adhere to the Humean belief that "experience and education affect the degree of delicacy of mental taste" and that "different individuals show various individual profiles of aesthetic sensitivity, so that not anyone is as good at recognizing aesthetic qualities as anyone else."[108] Therefore, arts education has assumed that students and amateurs need professional expertise to inform and develop their artistic taste and sensibilities properly.

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[106] Kulenkampff, "The Objectivity of Taste," 95.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid., 96.

While Kant and Hume form important pieces of many philosophies of arts education, philosophers of arts education have also taken a great deal of inspiration from Dewey's theory of art and experience that departs significantly from Kantian and Humean aesthetic philosophy. However, Dewey's theory retains a profoundly Hegelian core that conceives aesthetic experience as the ideal arrangement of diverse qualities into consummate human experiences: works of art.[109] This idea can be traced to Hegel's dialectical theory of the aesthetic that elevates subjective synthesis of experience in the art object as the telos of art. Hegel writes, "in music in general, song is this joy and pleasure in *self-awareness*, like the lark's singing in the freedom of the air…Even in suffering, the sweet tone of lament must sound through the griefs and alleviate them, so that it seems to us worthwhile so to suffer as to understand this lament."[110] In his *Art as Experience*, Dewey claims in a Hegelian manner that "a work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live…We are, as it were, introduced into a world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in which we live our ordinary experiences."[111] Hearkening to the dialectical movement of spirit toward new synthesis in Hegel, Dewey argues that, in aesthetic experience, "we are carried out *beyond ourselves to find ourselves*…felt as an expansion of ourselves."[112]

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[109] See Stephen Houlgate, "Hegel's Aesthetics," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2016) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/hegel-aesthetics/; and Jim Garrison, "The 'Permanent Deposit' of Hegelian Thought in Dewey's Theory of Inquiry," *Educational Theory* 56, no. 1 (2006): 1-37.

[110] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*, translated by T.M. Knox (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1975), 159.

[111] John Dewey, *Art As Experience* (New York: Perigee Books, 1934/1980), 195.

[112] Ibid.

The legacies of Kant, Hume, Hegel, and Dewey have figured prominently in how philosophers of arts education understand the nature of art and the creation of art. Taking Dewey's Hegelianism into consideration, even when the aims of music and arts education are articulated in pragmatist or constructivist terms of the reconstruction of experience or meaning-making, they participate in a lineage of aesthetic philosophy that remains all too tied to the art object and the idea that the arts give us special insight or privileged access into what it means to be human. While I am critiquing the ways in which the ideas of representation and intentionality (inherited from Kant, Hume, Hegel, and Dewey) condition how we understand and practice arts education through philosophies of arts education, I do not intend to dismiss them nor suggest that one philosophy or another is simply wrong. The philosophers I draw from make compelling cases for their theories which are more nuanced than a sampling of quotations might suggest. It is not a question of judgment, then, but one of showing how representation and intentionality crop up in and structure supposedly conflicting accounts of the nature of art and arts practices.

Representation and Intentionality in Philosophies of Arts Education

Formalist and expressionist philosophies of art claim that musical meaning is intrinsic to the work of art, which in turn represents the conscious intentions of its creator(s). Bennett Reimer and Elliot Eisner have given perhaps the most extensive theorizations of this position in arts education. Discussing what he believes is foundational to what artists do, Eisner claims that "forms of representation are means through which the *contents of consciousness* are made public."[113] These contents ("intentions or purposes") "are

[113] Elliot W. Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 8, italics added.

realized through the use of materials…[which become] a medium when it *conveys what the artist or student intended* or discovered and chose to leave."[114] Therefore, Eisner writes, "artistry requires, in part, the ability to conceive of the emotional quality desired and the technical ability to compose form capable of evoking the feeling or emotion desired."[115] The work of art is thus a conduit for communicating what the artist literally had "in mind."

In music education, Reimer argues that "music manifests selfness for the sheer sake of the human need to *demonstrate selfness*, and it does this with materials, sounds, that exist entirely and are employed sheerly for the sake of *self-manifestation*—self as instance of the universal human condition, as instance of the culturally determined human condition, as instance of the individuality of each human's condition."[116] Much like Hegel and Dewey's aesthetic philosophies, Reimer conceives music teleologically as a medium of and means for the realization of humanity—as a practice that emanates from and returns to the human self. Music manifests selfness, Reimer suggests, through the creation of "intrinsically meaningful structures" which are essentially "self-determined and self-contained."[117] Musical works may utilize conventional symbols or "associative content," but in the end must "transform" them into purely artistic material.[118] But because it is ultimately a human subject giving form to sonic materials, the musical art object "incarnate[s] the dynamics of consciousness" and "its culture's affective consciousness."[119]

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[114] Ibid., 8, 80, italics added.
[115] Ibid., 18.
[116] Bennett Reimer, "The Experience of Profundity in Music," in *Seeking the Significance of Music Education: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2009), 43.
[117] Reimer, "Essential and Nonessential Characteristics of Aesthetic Education," *Seeking the Significance of Music Education: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2009)
[118] Ibid., 26.
[119] Reimer, "Should There Be a Universal Philosophy of Music?" *Seeking the Significance of Music Education: Essays and Reflections* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2009), 86-87.

Both Reimer and Eisner discuss the necessity of creating and experiencing works of art that display "rightness of fit" (a Humean notion) through "intrinsically meaningful structures" capable of "generating, capturing, and sharing cognitions."[120] For both Reimer and Eisner, there are certain characteristics that illustrate "essential" features of artistic work and that define what is proper to aesthetic experience. While often discussed in vague terms, they agree that art involves "significant" or "aesthetic form" and "distinctive forms of meaning…that only artistically crafted forms can convey."[121] Such forms are significant or meaningful because they are consciously intended by the human subject who has cultivated "aesthetic knowing" or an "aesthetic frame of reference" and thus can represent her intentions in works of art.[122] Eisner writes, "virtually every form that can be experienced, from sound, to sight, to taste and touch, can yield aesthetic forms of experience if we learn how to attend to them through an aesthetic frame of reference," for, "if the arts are about anything, they are about how they make you feel in their presence—*when you know how to read their form.*"[123]

Apart from the obvious Kantian, Hegelian, and Humean influences, much of this kind of thinking about the nature of art comes from twentieth century analytic philosophy, and in particular, the aesthetic philosophy of Nelson Goodman who claims that art is about "the discovering and devising of fit" through modeling "forms, feelings, affinities, contrasts, to be sought in or built into a world" (i.e. manner of organization) to which the work of art refers.[124] Eisner borrows this idea when he writes of "aesthetic knowing" as performing "a

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[120] Ibid., 27
[121] Eisner, xii.
[122] Eisner, passim; Reimer, *Significance of Music* passim.
[123] Eisner, 84-85, 231, italics added.
[124] Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), 137-139.

referential function; it points to some aspect of the world and helps us experience it" through "the qualities of form."[125] This view is also expressed by Roger Scruton, who asserts that "musical communication is possible only because certain sounds are heard as music—are heard, in other words, as exhibiting a certain *'intentional order,'* the order of rhythm, melody and harmony. This order is not a material property of the physical world. It resides in the perceptual experience of those *who hear with understanding.*"[126] Such notions are infused with the assumptions of representation and intentionality: that art refers to or displays a "fit" to a world, that it exhibits the contents of consciousness, and that artists put their conscious intentions into the materials of art. In doing so they attempt, as Derrida writes, "to distinguish between the *internal* or *proper sense* and the circumstance of the object being talked about," and thus to establish "the limit between the *inside* and *outside* of the art object."[127] While the formalist/expressionist position (often called "arts education as aesthetic education") has suffered numerous assaults from praxis-oriented, critical, and sociological perspectives on arts education, I show below that such perspectives in arts education still maintain many of the same assumptions about representation and intentionality.

Philosophers of music and arts education who follow critical theories of praxis, cultural theory, sociology, and anthropology often contend that artistic meaning does not depend at all on the art object as a thing in itself, but depends upon how art is put to use in human contexts.[128] Although praxis-oriented and sociological philosophies of music and arts education are more diffuse than formalist and expressionist philosophies, they largely agree

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[125] Eisner, "Aesthetic Ways of Knowing," 99.
[126] Roger Scruton, quoted in Reimer, "Should There Be a Universal Philosophy of Music?" 83.
[127] Derrida, *Truth in Painting*, 45, italics added.
[128] See, for example, Lucy Green, *Music Education as Critical Theory and Practice: Selected Essays* (New York: Routledge, 2016); David J. Elliott (ed.), *Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

that the meaning of art lies in the doing, creating, making, and using of art rather than being located primarily in the products that may result from such processes. Art objects (compositions, paintings, films, etc.) may be meaningful components of experience, but they do not "have" meaning apart from how they function for people in social and cultural situations.[129] Educators and philosophers committed to this view of art reject much of traditional aesthetic philosophy for its reification of the art object and neglect of the role of performers, viewers, and listeners.

While critical theory, sociology, and anthropology have rightly pointed out the problematic features of aesthetics and brought much needed attention to what people actually do when they engage in art, they do not, for all that, depart from representation and intentionality as conceptual tools that explain the nature of art. Intentionality and representation do not disappear from the scene but, in a kind of reversal, are transposed from individual creators and art objects to individual users, collectivities, and contexts. This shift toward the artistic context/situation as the re-presentation of the socio-cultural milieu it "belongs" to—where meaning would be immediately available via conscious intentions, beliefs, or desires of participants—risks becoming an art object in itself, reifying musical experience as presence and personal meaning.

In praxial accounts of music education, it is often assumed that "music's worth can be gauged only in reference to specific human needs and interests" in "real music cultures."[130] For David Elliott, the meaning of music lies in performances and processes that

[129] See Tia DeNora, *Music in Everyday Life* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
[130] Wayne Bowman, "The Limits and Grounds of Musical Praxialism," in *Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues*, edited by David J. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71; David J. Elliott, *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 206.

are "the outcome of a particular kind of *intentional human activity*."[131] Likewise, for Christopher Small the meaning of "musicking" resides in "sets of relationships" that people establish in performances that "*stand for, or model,* ideal relationships in the wider world outside the performance space as they are imagined to be by those taking part."[132] Meaning therefore is determined only in the *present* by those involved *in* the "total event which is the performance," separate from the "wider world."[133] Small insists that all musical events, in every society, are literally re-presentations of the values and "feelings about what are right and proper relationships" of the society in which they take place.[134] He writes, "whoever engages in a musical performance, of whatever kind, is saying to themselves and to anyone who may be taking notice, *This is who we are*, and that is a serious affirmation indeed."[135] These statements do not retreat from representational thought and the primacy of the conscious intentional subject, but in fact reinforce them through the notions of representative context and socially-constructed (personal) meaning.

Another dimension of praxial, critical, and sociological/anthropological philosophies of music and arts education is the belief that art's "meaning and value are in and for *personal agency*" and the related notion that "musical meaning lies in negotiating *identities*" and the affirmation of "cultural and social *identities*."[136] Music would thus be, as Wayne Bowman

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[131] Elliott, *Music Matters*, 39, italics added.
[132] Christopher Small, "Musicking—The Meanings of Performing and Listening" *Music Education Research* 1, no. 1 (1999): 13.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).
[135] Ibid.
[136] Thomas Regelski, "Curriculum: Implications of Aesthetic Versus Praxial Philosophies," in *Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues*, edited by David J. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 235; Patricia O'Toole, "Why Don't I Feel Included in These Musics, or Matters?" in *Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues*, edited by David J. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 300; Barton,

suggests, "*an extension of oneself*, engaged with others."[137] Small makes the point even more forcefully, stating "the real power of art lies, not in listening to or looking at the finished work; it lies in the act of creation itself. In the process of artistic creation the creator engages his [sic] whole self; his reason and intuition, together...he is working to the extent of *his* own powers."[138] Each of these characterizations of music makes music's meaning and nature determined solely by the human subject who either creates or uses it.

Although thinkers in the praxial and sociological realm take pride in their distance from aesthetic philosophy, some of their positions on the nature of music echo arguments made by Kant and Hegel. For instance, the idea of musical meaning being determined by the human subject rather than the art object comes directly from Kant's view that "everything turns on *the meaning which I can give* to this representation, and not on any factor which makes me dependent on the real existence of the object."[139] Similarly, the idea that music is an extension of the self or an affirmation of identity corresponds directly to Hegel's idea that art is a projection of the self in which the mind puts "itself into its own product, produce[s] a discourse on what it produces, introduce[s] itself of itself into itself."[140] Even though the art object is thoroughly rejected as the sole locus of meaning, representation and intentionality remain—perhaps affirming the Kantian tradition even more forcefully than aesthetic education because everything is made to revolve around, as Deleuze writes, "the form of the I and the matter of the self," the very foundation of representational thought.[141]

Music Learning and Teaching in Culturally and Socially Diverse Contexts: Implications for Classroom Practice. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 204.

[137] Bowman, "Limits and Grounds," 61.

[138] Christopher Small, *Music, Society, Education* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1977/1996), 218.

[139] Kant quoted in Derrida, *Truth in Painting,* 45, italics added.

[140] Derrida, *Truth in Painting*, 26

[141] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 276.

Educational Consequences of Representation and Intentionality

Despite our temporal distance from eighteenth and nineteenth century aesthetics, they remain formidable in the ways we conceive of and teach music and the arts. Bruno Nettl's *Heartland Excursions*, documenting the near-religious devotion of schools of music to the "great" composers, makes this quite clear. The fact that notions of musical authenticity, identity, autonomy, and the musical work continue to orient our thinking about music attest to the staying power of these ideas even if we no longer believe in the grand narrative of eighteenth and nineteenth century classical music. At the same time that the very notion of music as conceived in Western European traditions has become an open question among academic musicians and musicologists, several studies have indicated that the nature of music instruction in American public schools is still based predominantly on Western European art music, diagnostic teaching in large ensembles, and narrow curricular offerings in music.[142]

Even supposedly opposed curricular positions in music education—such as aesthetic versus praxial—continue to assume an elitist position regarding music performance and maintain dualistic active/passive, performer/listener, practitioner/consumer categories for framing musical experience that derive from professional understandings of music. Although some claim that praxial philosophies of music education offered important correctives to aesthetic philosophies that tended to give too much weight to product over process, the result has arguably been a renewed focus on music performance—and further exclusivity

[142] Barton, *Music Learning and Teaching.*

among performing groups in schools—that continues to be justified in real classrooms on aesthetic or formalist grounds.[143]

Fixation on the art object in aesthetic views of arts education and fixation on context and personal use and meaning in praxial and sociological approaches restricts the nature of artistic experiences to pre-formed understandings, representation, and intentionality. By default, both perspectives end up being normative in their approaches to curriculum and pedagogy because they assume (implicitly or explicitly) that arts education should largely resemble given artistic practices and values rather than invent new practices and values. Even among curriculum scholars in arts education who do not explicitly subscribe to such ideologies also conceive of art as fundamentally human and fundamentally good: "Music is an expressive form of human experience; through music and the arts, we intensify and deepen thoughts and feelings. Through the arts, the achievements and aspirations of individuals and groups are represented through culture and history."[144]

Focus on the art object, representation, and intentionality in music and arts education perpetuates a humanist conception of art most publicly visible in what Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández calls the "rhetoric of effects."[145] He details the ways in which discourse on "the arts" in education is mobilized to make claims about what the arts do: improve cognitive skills, improve test performance, contribute to well-being, and in general "evoke the arts as a substance with the power to influence any number of educational outcomes and individual experiences, or even to transform the consciousness of

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[143] See Bowman and Barton.

[144] Janet R. Barrett, Claire W. McCoy, Kari K. Veblen, *Sound Ways of Knowing: Music in the Interdisciplinary Curriculum* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1997), 320.

[145] Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernández, "Why the Arts Don't *Do* Anything: Toward a New Vision for Cultural Production in Education," *Harvard Educational Review* 83, no. 1 (2013): 211-236.

individuals."[146] The problem with such rhetoric is that it tends to "obscure both the complexities and the possibilities that lurk within experiences with the arts in education …[and] requires that we curtail such complexity, demanding instead a flattened perspective."[147] Concomitantly, the concept of the arts mobilized in the rhetoric of effects "allows the justification of curricular exclusion through notions of talent and artistic ability that typically ignore or downplay the role of social context in determining who is included and, by extension, excluded" in fine and performing arts classrooms.[148] Arts education's aesthetic philosophy also coincides with the idea that education should serve the proper development of humanity; in other words, the idea that one becomes fully human through consummate experiences in works of art. Gaztambide-Fernández characterizes this as a "liberal humanist discourse of the arts for the arts' sake…[that] reanimates a particular conception of what it means to be a "good" and "moral" human being…precisely [with] the aim of civilizing Others into the likeness of European conceptions of the human…"[149]

Despite the diversity of curricular approaches to music and arts education, the field continues to be bound to the notions derived from aesthetic philosophy that art (music) makes us human, improves humanity, or fulfills human destiny, that, understood "on its own terms," music and "the arts" possess an "inside" from which they can be properly experienced in opposition to an "outside" superficial or spectator view (as Elliot Eisner, Bennett Reimer, Maxine Greene, and David Elliott have claimed in various ways), and that music and other works of art must *mean* (something) or give meaning *to* (something) in order to have proper value.

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[146] Ibid., 212.
[147] Ibid., 214.
[148] Ibid., 223.
[149] Ibid., 221.

Philosophical Consequences of Representation and Intentionality

What are the philosophical consequences of representation and intentionality and how might arts education conceive art other than through representation and intentionality? In music and arts education things are often judged under formal categories, such as the "elements" of sound (duration, pitch, intensity, and timbre) or the "elements" of design (unity, variety, contrast, balance, hierarchy). These categories are typically grounded in oppositions that attempt to secure the proper limits of art and aesthetic experience: music/noise, listening/hearing (Adorno, Heidegger), seeing/recognizing (Dewey), drawing/scribbling, form/matter (Plato, Aristotle), and art/real life, among others. Such dualisms are never symmetrical but always end up privileging one term over the other: music, listening, seeing, drawing, form, art.[150] These sets of dualisms also presuppose other series of ontological dualisms that aim to order life and knowledge into proper categories: internal/external, intentional/random, mental/physical, presence/absence, mind/body, and cognitive/affective. When Being is approached in this manner—defining interior-exterior boundaries and ontological privilege—one assumes that all of Being can be judged in the image of a particular being who gives it form: the human. This gesture determines the limits of thought within an identifiable and reliable center always, as Derrida writes, "ordered around being present" in terms of "identity to self, positionality, property, ego, consciousness, will, intentionality, freedom, humanity, etc."[151]

In the beginning of the chapter, I outlined Derrida and Deleuze's arguments about representation and intentionality where their principal concerns were with how

[150] See Elizabeth Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 5, who offers a feminist reading of Deleuze.
[151] Ibid.

representation and intentionality always attempt to ground thought in identity (of the subject and the concept) and presence (of the subject and the ideal object). The idea of representation thus rests on the conviction that the mind can acquire knowledge about the world because things are grounded in the constant presence of Being to itself which is infinitely *repeatable* in the form of propositions, texts, and works of art. In other words, representational thought assumes there is an essential Nature underneath everything that, despite apparent differences, remains the same, present, and iterable in knowledge. As Deleuze writes, representation means "to represent the present," a *repetition* "of all the presents of which the world is composed."[152] Representation understood as re-presentation—repetition of what is present—presupposes that there must be an "original" (a model) of which the representation would be a copy, reproduction, or reflection. Thus, repetition only means "repetition *of* the same."[153] This is the claim that Deleuze and Derrida challenge most severely.

However, Derrida and Deleuze do not simply dismiss or reject representation and repetition. They both insist that repetition and iterability are necessary conditions of any and all forms of inscription, communication, and language including works of art. In fact, Derrida claims that every work (of art) in music, painting, dance, theatre, literature, or cinema is necessarily repeatable and iterable because every work (of art) is originally a repetition—but with a crucial caveat.[154] Repetition is never repetition of the *same* (identity), but a repetition of—an affirmation of—*difference*.[155] Instead of signaling a ground of identity

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[152] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 273.
[153] Ibid., 271.
[154] Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon: Limited Ink (2)" in *Without Alibi*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
[155] Practically all of Derrida's works emphasize this point, but especially *Of Grammatology*. This is also one of the central arguments in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*.

that would sanction it, repetition signals an essential *ungrounding* in fluctuations of energies (intensity), spacing, and delays. That I can arrange sounds and words together to write a song means I am "repeating" those sounds and words from the moment I begin composing. However, it is not that the individual sounds and words stay the same when repeated; rather, it is that they *differ* from themselves each time they are repeated, from the very first time I perceive them. I "repeat" these sounds and words—or those in any song for that matter—by participating in their becoming, by becoming with them as they differ from what they were. As both Derrida and Deleuze argue, it is precisely this *difference* that makes repetition, and therefore any work of art, writing, or "representation," possible.[156] It is not the infinite repetition of the same, but the eternal return of difference.

To make this point clearer, take the example of a reproduction of a painting, say Van Gogh's *Starry Night*. While the reproduction appears identical to the "original" (which is already a repetition), it is only able to appear as such through a process of differentiation: perhaps scanned into a computer, translated into binary code, and then printed onto a canvas. In no way is this production process the same as the one that produced the original *Starry Night*. Yet the fact that *Starry Night* can be reproduced into something that appears identical to the original through an entirely different process than Van Gogh's means that this potential for differentiation is there at the origin, and in fact, makes any painting possible in the first place. The "original" *Starry Night* was possible only through the repetition of the intensive forces, sensations, and differential elements that Van Gogh encountered in the process of creation.

[156] See Derrida, "Différance" in *Speech and Phenomena*; and Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*.

The nature of repetition and the possibility of representation has consequences for intentionality as well. Derrida argues that "given this structure of iteration, the *intention* which animates utterance," in works of art, or any kind of text, "will never be completely present in itself and its content. The iteration which structures [the intention] a priori introduces an essential *dehiscence*," that is, an unbinding or rupture within the intention and within the work.[157] However, this "does not suppose that [the work] is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring."[158] What this means is that the words one speaks, the notes one plays, or the steps one dances are never identical to the intentions that accompany them, nor are the intentions fully (consciously) present to themselves. Derrida is suggesting that there is an essential delay, spacing, and *différance* (deferring/differing) internal to every present which both makes representation and intentionality possible *and* destabilizes them at every turn.[159] This condition thus precludes the full preservation of intentional meaning and the full saturation of context in a work of art.

Art Beyond Representation and Intentionality

If representation and intentionality do not provide a solid ground for all that takes place under the name of art, how might art be conceived otherwise? Among posthumanist and poststructural thinkers, Deleuze offers perhaps the most dedicated and thorough philosophy of art that follows directly from the critique of representational thought. First of all, Deleuze dismisses theories "that reduce the work of art to the interpretation of its creator

[157] Derrida, *Limited Inc*, translated by Samuel Weber (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 326, italics added.
[158] Ibid., 320.
[159] See Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*.

or receiver" as well as "the entire formalist theory that reduces art's effects to its internal structure."[160] Deleuze also positions his philosophy of art "against hermeneutics, which pins the work of art onto the subject, and against structural or sociological interpretation, which locates the effectiveness of objective structures in the work of art."[161] Instead, Deleuze conceptualizes art in terms of force and sensation rather than representation and intentionality. He writes, "in art, and in painting as in music, it is not a question of reproducing or inventing forms, but of capturing forces,"[162] where art is defined "as an impersonal process in which the work is composed somewhat like a *cairn*, with stones carried in by different voyagers and beings in becoming…that may or may not depend on a single author."[163] For Deleuze, "the work of art has nothing to do with communication," but with creating "sensory aggregates."[164] Therefore, art is not about recognizing or representing the world, but experimenting with the powers of "*a* life" through sensation: "we paint, sculpt, compose, and write with sensations. We paint, sculpt, compose, and write sensations."[165]

In giving primacy to sensation, the impersonal, and difference Deleuze's philosophy of art breaks decisively with representational thought and transforms the notion of intentionality because sensation does not in the first place belong to a subject or an object. Sensations are felt directly, impinging on the body: a color, a timbre, a taste, a scent, a touch, a weight, a pull or push. But they also "live on independently of whoever experiences them"

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[160] Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art,* translated by Samantha Bankston (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), 71.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, 56.
[163] Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical,* translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 66.
[164] Deleuze, *Negotiations: 1972-1990*, translated by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 18, 123.
[165] Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 166.

and induce "becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else)."[166] Sensations in Deleuze's account are not the rationalized perceptions of Kant nor the sense-data of analytic philosophy, but sense-events: no longer something a subject *has* but something a subject undergoes in a *becoming*. Erwin Straus, whose theory of sensory experience Deleuze relies upon, explains: "sensory experience in general—is the experiencing of a being-with (*Mit-Sein*) which unfolds into a subject and an object…it belongs fully neither to the 'inner' nor to the 'outer.'"[167] This is also akin to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of sensation as the "intertwining" of sensing and the sensible, passing into one another in an open field of relation.[168] But "in this primary sensory experience," Ronald Bogue explains, "there can be no Husserlian intentionality, for there is no fully delineated subject to bear that intention" nor is there a fully determined object to be intended.[169]

Because sensations happen in an indeterminate zone between fully differentiated subject-and-objects, they can be thought of in terms of what Karen Barad calls "intra-actions" (acting within rather than between), the way matter touches, senses, and responds to 'other' matter (which is nonseparable from it) prior to the constitution of individual things.[170] In language quite close to that of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, Barad writes "touching, sensing, is what matter does, or rather, what matter is: matter is condensations of

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[166] Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 137.
[167] Erwin Straus, quoted in Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts,* 116-117.
[168] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible,* translated by Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968) 138, 185. Although Deleuze departs from Merleau-Ponty on some points, Merleau-Ponty's writings on Cézanne were particularly influential for Deleuze in developing his philosophy of art.
[169] Ibid.
[170] See Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and The Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

response-ability. Touching is a matter of response. Each of 'us' is constituted in response-ability. Each of 'us' is constituted as responsible for the other, as the other" enfolded within.[171] Deleuze, via Henri Bergson, suggests similarly that matter is already imbued with creative potentialities, fields of intensive differences that murmur within and through what is perceived as formed matter. As such, "art does not consist in subjecting passive matter to a form, nor of producing a subjective effect on sensibility, but only in 'following the flux of matter.'"[172]

However, the flux of matter is not a present thing that I, the intentional subject, could take hold of and form into something. As Bergson writes, "everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think of *things* which are created and a *thing* which creates, as we habitually do…"[173] Rather, following the flux of matter requires that I become with matter, that I participate in the continual differentiations of matter from itself, that "I" (not a simple unity) enter into that zone of indeterminate becoming.[174] The idea that the intentional subject *gives* form to matter or *gives* meaning to art implies that there is something already present for the subject to give or that what the subject gives comes purely from the subject's consciousness, a pure form or idea. "If there is 'will' in art," John Rajchman claims, "it does not belong to a known or identifiable 'agency.'"[175] Instead, art might be thought in Derrida's terms where "invention is an event…a matter of finding, of bringing out, of making what is *not yet here* come to be…"[176] Again, it is not the subject who invents, but a becoming of

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171 Karen Barad, "On Touching—The Inhuman that Therefore I Am," *d i f f e r e n c e s: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 206-223.
172 Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 69.
173 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1911/1944), 270.
174 See Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*
175 John Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 121.
176 Derrida, "A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event," *Critical Inquiry* 33 (2007): 450.

matter differentiating itself from itself: "it is the same body," Deleuze says, "which, being both subject and object, gives and receives the sensation."[177] Rather than thinking of meaning as something that pre-exists the act of creation in subjective consciousness that is then represented in materials, "meaning must await being said or written in order to inhabit itself, and in order to become, *by differing from itself*, what it is."[178] As Derrida is fond of saying, "there is/it gives" creation and meaning not from a subject to an object but within the "force" of matter's intensive, differentiating movement.[179]

Deleuze, Derrida, and Barad suggest a different image of thought through which art could be conceived not as an intentional *creatio ex nihilo* (creation from nothing, giving form to matter) but as what Catherine Keller calls a participatory *creatio ex profundis*—creation from/with the chaotic, intensive depths of matter in its becoming.[180] This suggests that the assumptions of the representational-intentional image with the human subject at its center—the image of art that predominates in music and arts education—need to be rethought. Instead of conceiving creation as the imposition of the artist's will onto passive matter, artistic creation might be thought of as intra-activity, following the flux of matter. In music, the composer who writes the symphony or produces the beat would herself be "written" by the sounds she works with—calling to her and composing her as much as she composes them. One might consider with Merleau-Ponty how "the writer's thought does not control his language from without" but that "the writer is himself a kind of new idiom, constructing itself…" where "my own words take me by surprise and teach me what I think."[181] In this

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177 Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 35.
178 Derrida, "Force and Signification," in *Writing and Difference,* translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 11.
179 Ibid.
180 Catherine Keller, *The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (New York: Routledge, 2003)
181 Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Derrida, "Force and Signification," 11.

view, as Deleuze imagines, "writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience."[182]

For arts educators, moving away from a representational-intentional model of art—where the focus is on meaning and interpretation, conceptual understanding, and formal structure—might entail a shift toward creative practices and experiences that invite new ways of relating, sensing, and assembling (with) flows of matter in their becoming where given determinations of subject and object, human and nonhuman, are unsettled and reconfigured. Instead of using established musical forms to represent the world as it is, educators might collaborate with students to push the accepted limits of musical sense in familiar forms to inquire into the ways in which worlds, bodies, and matter(s) come into being through sensation. Not in order to interpret the world, but to transform it.

[182] Deleuze, "Literature and Life," in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, 1.

CHAPTER 3

ARCHITECTURES FOR LEARNING: CURRICULUM FROM ENCLOSURE TO INCLOSURE

In the foreword to Laura Sindberg's music performance curriculum book, *Just Good Teaching: Comprehensive Musicianship Through Performance (CMP) in Theory and Practice,* Janet Barrett writes, "good music teachers are like architects. They seek out the best raw materials (sound) incorporated into beautifully crafted designs and forms (musical works). Within a work, they highlight these intersecting relationships of sound so that the artistry of the design can be apprehended and appreciated by others. Each carefully chosen work contributes to the realization of the overall master plan (the repertoire as curriculum), which is constructed to enhance students' experiences with a variety of meaningful musical examples."[183] Barrett's description encapsulates essential features of the prevailing model of music and arts education I highlighted in the previous chapter—a representational and cognitive view of art concerned with intentional meaning in art objects—while it also points toward the quasi-architectural nature of curriculum that I explore throughout this chapter.

Like the art object or the design of a building, the idea of curriculum is deployed to determine the inside of a particular field of study from what is supposedly outside of that field. Like a realist painting or an architect's ideal city, the curriculum is thought to be a representation of life in the "real world:" curriculum is a mirror image of how the world works through which students acquire skills and knowledge in order to prepare for "real life." Like the representational view in which artists or architects *give form* to matter in their work, curriculum is said to *give form* to the content—knowledge and skills—that students will

183 Janet R. Barrett, "Foreword" in Laura K. Sindberg, *Just Good Teaching: Comprehensive Musicianship Through Performance (CMP) in Theory and Practice* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2012), ix.

learn. It fixes the limits in which learning will take place and directs learning *intentionally* toward given ends.[184] Although curriculum developers and theorists typically define learning in vague terms (focusing more on the *content* of learning than the nature of learning), the idea of curriculum presupposes a theory of learning as acquisition and/or construction of knowledge whereby learning must be *directed toward* particular ends and *contained* within pre-defined limits. Because the idea of curriculum has often been put to use by theorists who conceive the process of education in representational and intentional terms, it has been aligned historically with the assumptions of cognitive learning theory.

In the previous chapter, I characterized cognitive learning theory as the belief that learning is the updating and refining of internal representations ("schema" or "models") that guide action and thought in the world.[185] Although the nature of mental representations is debated, most cognitive theorists agree that learning, in basic terms, means the acquisition of knowledge and skills in the form of mental representations that guide intelligent activity in the world.[186] Cognitive theory maintains that learning *happens* by following sets of rules that have enabled others to acquire necessary skills and knowledge, or by forming hypotheses or working theories in our minds and testing them in the world.[187] Learning is thus a series of intentional acts in which we are continuously representing and acting purposively (not randomly or automatically) toward something that is already given—present and immediately

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184 Clearly the actual work of architects and curriculum developers is much more complex than I am suggesting here. While I recognize the nuance and differences in approach in architecture and curriculum development in practice, I use them figuratively in order to highlight a common logic of containment and directedness that has historically undergirded the discourse of architecture and curriculum.

185 Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

186 Myint Swe Khine and Issa M. Saleh (eds.), *New Science of Learning: Cognition, Computers and Collaboration in Education* (New York: Springer, 2010). Curiously, only one chapter in this edited volume offers any definition of learning.

187 Howard Gardner, *The Unschooled Mind: How Children Think and How Schools Should Teach* (New York: Basic Books, 1995/2011).

available—to the mind. In the next chapter, I discuss cognitivism in detail as it contributes to how learning is conceived in music and arts education. Here, I focus on how general features of cognitive theory figure into curriculum in arts education and curriculum theory historically.

Cognitive learning theory, curriculum theory, and arts education each share representational and intentional assumptions about learning that have become mutually reinforcing. For example, the idea in cognitive theory that learning has to be guided by models, theories, and rules coincides with the curricular notion that learning must follow a particular course of study laid out in advance. The curricular notion that learning must be directed toward a pre-given end is supported by the cognitivist notion that learning is an intentional act. Curriculum finds its methods confirmed by cognitive theory while cognitive theory finds its empirical discoveries confirmed in the idea of curriculum. Because arts education has reasoned itself and its ideas about the nature of art through representation and intentionality, it finds its intuitions confirmed by both cognitive learning theory and the idea of curriculum. It is as if, in some harmony of the spheres, the arts, cognitive learning theory, and the idea of curriculum resonate in ideal ratio to one other for the proper development of the human subject.

Throughout this chapter, I use the metaphor of curriculum as architecture for learning to characterize how the idea and practice of curriculum in arts education tends to function similarly to the design of built environments: providing conditions for living and attempting to condition living. Curriculum and architecture traditionally rely upon the logic of representation: both curriculum developers and architects construct models that are intended to represent what one ought to know or how one ought to live in the image of the world as it is given to the rational human subject. The architect's built environment

represents an ideal design for human life based on pre-conceived patterns of habitation in which the inhabitant is directed toward particular ways of living through the structures the architect has set in place. Likewise, the curriculum represents an ideal design for human development and learning based on an already-given body of knowledge in which the learner is directed toward particular ways of knowing and acting through the structures the pedagogue has set in place. The spatial metaphor that unites these images of curriculum and architecture is *enclosure*: a bounded territory that defines everything according to already-given subject-object and interior-exterior determinations. It is this model of curriculum as enclosure—founded in representation and intentionality—that I challenge in this chapter.

I begin with a discussion of curriculum theory and development in music and arts education, as they reveal tendencies to conceive curriculum through the logic of representation and intentionality. Following this exposition, I chart the history of the idea of curriculum in connection with the idea of method as it provides the foundations for the modern notion of curriculum. I then use three moments in twentieth century architecture (modernism, postmodernism, and deconstructivism) in connection with moments in curriculum theory (scientific curriculum, reconceptualization, and postmodernism) to show how various approaches to designing built environments for living or learning support and/or contest the ideas of representation and intentionality at the heart of the curricular and architectural projects of enclosure. Incorporating the ideas of deconstructivist architecture with those of Derrida, Deleuze, and posthumanist philosophy, I then propose how one might conceive—or perhaps contest—the idea of curriculum in music and arts

education with the concept of *inclosure*: that which provides a provisional structure but which is also radically open to difference.[188]

Curriculum in Music and Arts Education

Approaches to curriculum in music and arts education reveal a tendency to think the curriculum should represent and be modeled after artistic practices, conventions, expert knowledge, and symbol systems as they currently exist and as they existed historically.[189] In the dominant standards-based, backward-designed model, the arts curriculum becomes like a house of mirrors that transmits culture and knowledge to students: a grand museum building or archive containing all the important artifacts, interpretations, concepts, and skills an artist needs to develop properly.[190] The student simply follows the path laid out before her in order to learn. In the constructivist version, it is the student herself who becomes an artistic *Bildung* constructing her own mental enclosures of knowledge in the image of more knowledgeable others.[191] Interacting with experts and peers, she learns the rules of the game, its structures, and concepts, and then uses them to intentionally guide her own artistic endeavors. In varying degrees of building and *Bildung* across curriculum frameworks, the curriculum is thought to give proper form and direction to that which would otherwise—

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188 See Paul Livingston, "Derrida and Formal Logic: Formalising the Undecidable," *Derrida Today* 3, no. 2 (2010): 221–239.

189 See Elliot Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); and Janet R. Barrett, "Currents of Change in the Music Curriculum" in *International Handbook of Research in Arts Education*, edited by Liora Bresler (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2007), 147-161.

190 I am hinting at Derrida's argument that the archive and the dwelling/the home are intimately connected concepts. See Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

191 The German word *Bildung* is roughly translated as development (in the psychological sense). Frede Nielsen describes Bildung as the development of "man's self-determination and autonomy based on reason" and "represents the spiritual structures and values that are necessary for the individual's complete development." See Frede V. Nielsen, "Music (and Arts) Education form the Point of View of *Didaktik* and *Bildung*" in *International Handbook of Research in Arts Education*, 269.

presumably—be haphazard, random, or ill-structured and thus not conducive to learning. In these ways, the curriculum functions as a representational and intentionally designed enclosure for learning that establishes the categories, rules, and schema through which knowledge and skills can be properly constructed and acquired.

Arguably, the dominant approach to curriculum in arts education today is the "discipline-based arts education" framework.[192] In this model, the focus of the curriculum is the "[assimilation] of knowledge, skills, and traditions of the master craftsmen [sic] who in effect define the field…[which] reveal[s] the 'structure' of the discipline, including its basic organization and principles, challenging issues, characteristic tools, and technical vocabulary."[193] Modeled on Jerome Bruner and Howard Gardner's work on domain-specific symbol systems and expert knowledge bases, discipline-based arts education also supplies the framework for the National Core Arts Standards—further cementing its dominance in curriculum development. Stephen Dobbs writes that "the studio artist, the art critic, the art historian, and the aesthetician are the paradigm practitioners of the four art disciplines" in discipline-based arts education,[194] which roughly correspond to the National Core Arts Standards' four "artistic processes" that structure learning objectives: creating, performing/producing/presenting, responding, and connecting.[195] As Elliot Eisner remarks, discipline-based arts education "is intended to help students acquire the skills and develop the imagination needed for high-quality art[s] performance. Such performance requires, it is

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192 Stephen Mark Dobbs, "Discipline-Based Art Education" in *Handbook of Research and Policy in Art Education*, edited by Elliot W. Eisner and Michael D. Day (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 701-724.
193 Ibid., 703.
194 Ibid.
195 "National Core Arts Standards," National Coalition for Core Arts Standards, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.nationalartsstandards.org/

argued, sophisticated forms of thinking. In this vision, art educators should design curricula that develop such skills. To acquire them, students need to learn to think like artists. This means they will need to develop their sensibilities, foster the growth of their imagination, and acquire the technical skills needed to work well with materials."[196]

Discipline-based arts education largely coheres with "traditional conceptions of the music curriculum," which Janet Barrett notes, "have privileged the skillful performance of music, repertoire drawn primarily from the classical Western tradition, and academic study of common elements and structural properties of music."[197] At the elementary school level, students learn the "fundamental" musical elements—often through a sequence of pitch and rhythm concepts ordered by their presumed simplicity and complexity—while the secondary music curriculum is often focused on the preparation and performance of composed music for large instrumental or vocal ensembles where the "repertoire is the curriculum."[198] Lois Choksy's *Kodály Method* books even provide a detailed curriculum map for getting from elementary school music experiences—following the prescribed sequence of musical elements—to the performance of "masterworks" of classical music in secondary music ensembles.[199] In this spirit, the 2019 Organization of American Kodály Educators "Establishing Musical Roots" curriculum benchmark document states "the language of music is communicated through the elements of sound—duration, pitch, intensity, and timbre. Fluency in this language allows students to perform music and process both written

196 Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind*, 26.
197 Barrett, "Currents of Change in the Music Curriculum," 149
198 Laura K. Sindberg, *Just Good Teaching: Comprehensive Musicianship Through Performance (CMP) in Theory and Practice* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2012)
199 Lois Choksy, *The Kodály Method II: From Folksong to Masterwork* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999).

and heard music with deep understanding that leads to the highest plateau of human communication and aesthetics—artistic expression."[200]

The Comprehensive Musicianship through Performance (CMP) model also places performance of composed music at the center of learning in the secondary ensemble classroom. Laura Sindberg describes CMP as a model "grounded in the repertoire selected by the teacher as a foundation for development of musical understanding through performance in the ensemble."[201] The CMP curriculum model is comprised of five dimensions—music selection, analysis, objectives, teaching strategies, and assessment—that order learning in an efficient, sequential manner which is thought to enable students to acquire necessary knowledge, skills, and dispositions for musical mastery. This model is closely mirrored in the popular *Teaching Music through Performance* series, which also promotes the notion that the music curriculum should be based on performance repertoire, primarily from a limited range of classical and "school music" standards widely circulated through festival and workshop literature lists, through which students become literate musicians.[202] In discipline-based arts education curricula, the art object (painting, musical work, etc.) is thought to reveal the tools, rules, and knowledge of the craft. The curriculum then represents these tools, rules, and expert knowledge revealed in art object for students to acquire through the study, creation, and performance of works of art.

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[200] Sandra Mathias, Klára Nemes, Constance Price, and Paul Baumann, "Establishing Musical Roots: Benchmarks and Suggested Repertoire for Kindergarten through Grade Five" (Organization of American Kodály Educators, 2019), 2.
[201] Laura K. Sindberg, *Just Good Teaching: Comprehensive Musicianship through Performance (CMP) in Theory and Practice* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2012), 18.
[202] Richard B. Miles and Larry Blocher, *Teaching Music through Performance in Band* (Chicago: GIA Publications, 1997).

Outside of discipline-based arts education, approaches to curriculum remain focused on the transmission and acquisition of conceptual knowledge, technical skills, and the construction of personal, social, and cultural meanings. As seen in various approaches across arts education, the curriculum still functions as a representation of "real world" in which students learn to consciously and intentionally re-cognize the world as an already-given reality. In her informal music curriculum based on studies of how popular musicians learn, Lucy Green advocates setting up learning environments that "emulate as closely as possible the real-life learning practices of young, beginner popular musicians."[203] Similarly, David Elliott argues music curricula should "engage learners in musical actions, transactions, and interactions that closely parallel real music cultures…a close representation of viable music-practice situations, or music cultures."[204]

In Arthur Efland's cognitive approach to arts education, "the purpose for teaching the arts is to contribute to the understanding of the social and cultural landscape that each individual inhabits…since the work of art mirrors this world through metaphoric elaboration. The ability to interpret this world is learned through the interpretation of the arts, providing a foundation for intelligent, morally responsive actions."[205] Likewise, Janet Barrett notes that constructivist curricula in music education "[have] focused on the making of meaning and the cultivation of musical understanding as a central aim of the curriculum, building on cognitive and constructivist perspectives widened through sociocultural lenses… [where] musical understanding is variously construed as the mental representations and

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[203] Lucy Green, *Music, Informal Learning and the School: A New Classroom Pedagogy* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008), 230.
[204] David Elliott, *Music Matters: A New Philosophy of Music Education* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 206.
[205] Arthur D. Efland, *Art and Cognition: Integrating the Visual Arts in the Curriculum* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002), 171.

schemes for organizing the musical knowledge students possess, their abilities to act on knowledge or apply what they know to solve new problems or create new products, the meanings students derive from music, the interactions of knowing and feeling stemming from cognition and emotion, and the meanings derived from the social context and interaction."[206]

Despite their apparent diversity, these approaches to arts curricula are bound to a conception of curriculum as representational and intentionally designed enclosure for artistic development and learning based on an already-given body of expert knowledge in which the learner is directed toward particular ways of knowing and acting. Eisner affirms this image, writing "the teacher's task is to design environments that promote the educational development of the young."[207] Specifically, such environments should "…enable students to secure aesthetic forms of experience in everyday life…help students recognize what is personal, distinctive, and even unique about themselves and their wok…help students learn how to create and experience the aesthetic features of images and understand their relationship to the culture of which they are a part…[and] foster the growth of artistic intelligence."[208] "The important outcomes" of the curriculum as designed environment "include not only the acquisition of new conceptual tools, refined sensibilities, a developed imagination, and new routines and techniques, but also new attitudes and dispositions."[209] Eisner's conception of curriculum, like that of many others in arts education I discuss above, accedes to the cognitivist definition of learning as the acquisition of knowledge and skills in the form of mental representations that guide intelligent activity in the world. Because

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[206] Barrett, "Currents of Change in the Music Curriculum," 151.
[207] Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind,* 233.
[208] Ibid., 43-45.
[209] Ibid., 240.

curriculum in arts education has been developed in the image of cognitivism, it carries the assumption that learning happens by being directed toward a pre-determined end and by following sets of rules that have enabled others to acquire skills and knowledge deemed necessary for artistic engagement. Curriculum as representation of the "real world" thus sets up artistic enclosures of expert knowledge intended to direct learners toward particular ways of knowing and acting as determined by the artistic domain as an already-given reality.

Philosophical Problems of Representation and Intentionality

Following Deleuze, Levi Bryant argues that when based on the model of representation and recognition of an already-given reality—such as that found in dominant approaches to curriculum in the arts—"thought is led to denounce difference and divergence as aberrant or perverted departures from what is recognizable, normal, and therefore true."[210] Because everything is judged relative to a single image—the world as seen by the rational human subject, or the world as seen by the expert practitioner—"it becomes impossible to affirm the other…as anything but aberration."[211] Representational thought assumes that how the thing appears to the expert, human mind or how the thing is made available for use by the rational subject constitutes the full being of the thing—a transcendental illusion of presence in which the mind judges "the nature of the being it investigates in advance."[212] As the pinnacle of representational thought, cognitivism claims that "all mental activity…[is] to be understood on the model of fact gathering, hypothesis

[210] Levi R. Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 17
[211] Ibid.
[212] Ibid., 18.

information, inference making and problem solving."[213] Historically, as Hubert Dreyfus explains, "Descartes already assumed that all understanding consists in forming and manipulating appropriate representations, that these representations can be analyzed into primitive elements, and that all phenomena can be understood as complex combinations of these simple elements," while "at the same time, Hobbes implicitly assumed that the elements are formal elements related by purely syntactic operations, so that *reasoning can be reduced to calculation*."[214] These foundational assumptions subtend the cognitivist belief that the mind devises rules for all intelligent (as opposed to automatic) activity, and that the mind follows a rational *method* for what it perceives, understandings, learns, and does based on representations.

The Enlightenment era notion of method—which closely aligns with that of curriculum—follows directly from these assumptions, but has its roots in ancient Greece. For example, as Dreyfus relays, "[Socrates] saw that experts can often explain why they do what they do, and that these explanations reveal principles from which the behavior in question can be seen to follow rationally," and thus "Socrates claims in the *Gorgias* that an art must have 'principles of action and reason.'"[215] According to Dreyfus, "the claim that a craft or *techné* must be based on principles which can be articulated by the practitioners leads Socrates" to conclude that "all forms of intuitive expertise which do not seem to be based on any principles at all…" are "not skills at all but mere knacks based on trial and error."[216] From this conclusion, "Socrates shares with modern knowledge engineers the assumption

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213 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Socratic and Platonic Basis of Cognitivism," *Artificial Intelligence & Society* 2 (1988): 100.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid., 106.
216 Ibid.

that experts in a craft know principles of action and reason and that what they know they must be able to tell."[217] It would seem to follow from Socrates' arguments that learning a skill cannot come from trial and error (in a haphazard or semi-random manner) but must proceed from explicit rules and intentional activity—a conclusion that in itself provides much of the basis for the notion of curriculum. Like present-day cognitive scientists, artificial intelligence researchers, and curriculum developers, "[Socrates] seems to want to elicit rules or principles from experts in each craft domain that would enable anyone to acquire expertise in that domain."[218]

In addition to the supposed primacy of representation, the curricular-methodological assumption that intelligent action, learning, and thinking require formally explicable rules and rationally guided procedures is closely allied with the idea of intentionality. Here, I focus on the historical philosophical understandings of intentionality as "direction toward an object" and the active orientation of thought toward something in consciousness that have also been crucial for cognitivism.[219] In her queer feminist postcolonial reworking of phenomenology, Sara Ahmed calls attention the idea of orientations and directedness at the heart of the such understandings of intentionality that can help clarify how curriculum directs and orients learners. She writes, "directions are instructions about 'where,' but they are also about 'how' and 'what:' directions take us somewhere by the very requirement that we follow *a line that is drawn in advance*."[220] Such "lines are both created by being followed and are followed by being

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[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid., 107.
[219] See Alain de Libera, "Intention" in *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon,* edited by Barbara Cassin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p 500-511; and Hubert L. Dreyfus (ed.), *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982).
[220] Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 16, italics added.

created. The lines that direct us, as lines of thought as well as lines of motion, are in this way performative: they depend on the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created as an effect of this repetition."[221]

The curriculum as representation of the world as an already-given reality provides direction and orientations through such repetitions of paths already taken (the paths of experts) aimed at keeping learners "in line." This directive function makes certain ways of acting and knowing available while it forecloses others. As Ahmed writes, "…certain objects are available to us because of lines that we have already taken: our 'life courses' follow a certain sequence, which is also a matter of following a direction or of 'being directed' in a certain way…[L]ife gets directed in some ways rather than others, through the very requirement that we follow what is already given to us."[222] Through the directions and paths laid down before them, "bodies as well as objects take shape through being orientated toward each other, as an orientation that may be experienced as the co-habitation or sharing of space."[223] Such spaces can become enclosures, producing "surfaces and boundaries" that mark out the "limits" of what can be done, wherein particular ways of living come to dwell.[224] Ahmed claims, "inhabiting spaces 'decides' what comes into view" such that what is "'in front' of us, also make[s] certain things, and not others, available…When we follow specific lines, some things become reachable and others remain or even become out of reach…[but] we do not have to consciously exclude those things that are not 'on line.' The direction we take excludes things for us, before we even get there."[225]

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[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid., 21.
[223] Ibid., 54.
[224] Ibid., 55.
[225] Ibid., 14-15.

Following Derrida, Ahmed also calls attention to the close connection between intentionality, dwelling, and archive—all of which are "ways of gathering material, around which worlds gather…[that] are not neutral but directive."[226] Through identification and classification, Derrida writes, the archive "aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration…[a] gathering together" that establishes a privative interiority.[227] This archival enclosure puts things in their proper place through sedimented "tendencies:" "bodies tend toward some objects more than others given their tendencies. These tendencies are not originary but instead are effects of the repetition of the 'tending toward,'" concealing histories of arrival that cannot be retrieved in presence.[228] As Ahmed writes, "an arrival has not simply happened; an arrival points toward a future that might or 'perhaps' will happen, given that we don't always know in advance 'what' we will come into contact with when we follow this or that line. At the same time, the arrival only becomes an arrival insofar as it has happened; and the object may 'appear' only as an effect of work that has already taken place."[229] What arrives in the curriculum through following "lines" (rules, representations, schema, etc.) is always subject to a certain undecidability that Derrida calls the "perhaps" of the encounter or the event:[230] Does learning happen through following the rules or do the rules get produced through learning? The difference that engenders the repetition of tendencies—following lines—both secures and undermines the stability of enclosures. Therefore, Ahmed suggests

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226 Ibid., 118.
227 Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, translated by Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.
228 Ibid., 58.
229 Ibid., 40
230 See Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994).

that "we could rephrase Deleuze's formulation by suggesting that we do not know what things can do when they get near to other things, which might include bodies and minds."[231]

Ahmed and Derrida show how the repetition of tendencies, directions, and orientations establishes enclosures that make certain ways of acting and knowing available while also foreclosing others. But at the same time, Ahmed and Derrida significantly complicate the picture of intentionality as a straightforward, conscious process that guarantees the grasp of an object or a linear thought process that unproblematically arrives at its (pre)destination. Intentionality is always—and for Derrida, essentially—marked by the irreducible openness and difference of the event of arrival that makes intentionality possible. While the paths a curriculum sets out for learners to follow make certain ways of knowing and acting available, they do not fully determine what will come of the learning encounter of objects, bodies, and minds gathered together in shared space. This condition prevents "the possibility of a fulfillment, realization, and actualization [of intentionality] in a plenitude that would be present to and identical with itself."[232] The cognitivist and curricular dream of clarifying and formalizing universal sets of rules that would direct anyone toward mastery of a skill or body of knowledge is compromised from the origin by this irreducible difference and undecidability.

This predicament is evident in the curious phenomenon of trying to get people to elaborate the implicit "theories" and "rules" that supposedly guide their everyday activities and expert practices. Recent cognitive science suggests that so-called "working theories" turn out to be "only locally coherent, often ill-defined, but surprisingly effective in dealing with a

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231 Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 186.
232 Derrida, *Limited Inc,* translated by Samuel Weber (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 56.

complex and ever-changing world. In short, knowledge has the form of a loosely interlinked history of reusable fragments, each building on the last, rather than being organized into anything resembling a scientific theory."[233] Similarly, Dreyfus points out that studies of "expert" knowledge often reveal that an "expert's knowledge" is "ill-specified or incomplete because the expert himself [sic] doesn't always know exactly what it is he knows about his domain."[234] Taking Ahmed and Derrida's arguments into account, this would not be due to forgetting, but due to the fact that what experts "know" is not reducible to a closed set of representations and rules that could be stored (and forgotten) in the mind. Rather "the rules a craftsman [sic] can articulate are not sufficiently explicit and complete to convey the craft to an outsider" because the craftsperson is not simply applying rules when she practices her craft but "discriminating thousands of special cases" for which a set of formal rules cannot account.[235] This is related to what Kurt Gödel discovered in mathematics: any consistent set of axioms is necessarily incomplete—not because of our ignorance of some higher unity but because of the ontological impossibility of a completely self-contained *and* consistent system.[236] Derrida explicitly uses Gödel's finding to argue that a fundamental undecidability is at the heart of all such decision-making and discrimination among cases. As I have

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233 Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford, "Theories or Fragments?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 40 (2017): e258.
234 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "From Socrates to Expert Systems: The Limits of Calculative Rationality," in *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action,* edited by Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 28. In his phenomenological perspective on learning (informed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), Dreyfus makes arguments similar to those of Michael Polanyi in his theory of tacit knowledge but departs from Polanyi on the role of rules. See Evan M. Selinger and Robert P. Crease, "Dreyfus on expertise: the limits of phenomenological analysis," *Continental Philosophy Review* 35 (2002): 245–279.
235 Ibid., 110.
236 Paul Livingston, "Derrida and Formal Logic: Formalising the Undecidable" *Derrida Today* 3, no. 2 (2010): 221–239. Gödel proved that any consistent set of axioms can generate at least one proposition that cannot be proved by those axioms. Furthermore, even if one adds another axiom to the set to account for the unprovable proposition, the new set will also generate at least one unprovable proposition.

sketched above with intentionality, this suggests that any set of rules or program designed to produce learning in a particular skill domain—such as playing the piano—will be necessarily incomplete, unable to fully account for how someone becomes skilled in that domain. Again, this is not due to ignorance but to an essential ontological resistance to closure. Therefore, the cognitivist and curricular assumption that "strict rules are sufficient to generate expertise"[237] or mastery learning is continually (and necessarily) undermined by the non-totalizable nature of the processes cognitivism and curriculum seek to contain, explain, and produce.

Nevertheless, the curricular and cognitivist notion that learning must be intentionally guided by representations, theories, and rules organized in a particular course of study laid out in advance persists in the ways that arts educators theorize and develop curriculum. Part of the reason for this may be that it has become something of an unquestionable given that the education of children must follow a curriculum—as Ahmed says, "the requirement that we follow what is already given to us."[238] Certainly there *are* other ways of going about education that do not rely upon a curriculum or curricular logic, as can be seen in Reggio Emilia schools or the Summerhill school.[239] However, "the curriculum" operates as a nearly universal logic of how education is (or ought to be) carried out in schools: it is practically

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[237] Dreyfus, "Basis of Cognitivism," 109.
[238] Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 21.
[239] Reggio Emilia is perhaps the closest existing model of a-curricular schooling in that practically none of the Reggio practices resemble anything like a curriculum, lesson plans, objectives, or sequential learning. Summerhill is also an interesting model in that its students are not required nor expected to follow any particular path of study. While Montessori schools sometimes get lumped in with Reggio Emilia, it is arguably still a quite curricular approach in that the teacher sets up all of the things the child will encounter in advance (objects, Great Lessons), only without specifying the timeframe in which they will be encountered. See Carla Rinaldi, *In Dialogue with Reggio Emilia: Listening, Researching and Learning* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Jason J. Wallin, *A Deleuzian Approach to Curriculum: Essays on A Pedagogical Life* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) and Maria Montessori, *My System of Education* (National Education Association, 1915).

inconceivable that a school music program, for example, would not have or would not follow a curriculum laid out in advance. Yet, as Foucault might remind us, those words or ideas that seem the most natural or ordinary are those that require the closest examination—prompting us to ask, for example, how the seemingly neutral idea of "curriculum" belies specific, political arrangements of ideas and practices that have coalesced over time and which could have turned out otherwise.[240] I now look to the history of the idea of curriculum to recover its "intertwining histories of arrival" that are "not necessarily [available] in how that thing presents itself to consciousness."[241]

Curriculum Before Curriculum

Although the educational meaning of curriculum came about in the sixteenth century CE, one can see precursors of curricular thought in the educational prescriptions of the Ancient Greeks. Plato, for example, outlined the ideal education of guardians (also known as "philosopher kings") in which young men "[would] spend the years from twenty to thirty on the four Pythagorean studies: arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy, and harmony."[242] From early on, proto-curricular thought was preoccupied with *imposing order* on chaos and ensuring that knowledge of reality was *properly organized*. Plato introduced two such visions of education in the *Republic,* "education as moulding or shaping of soul, and education as harmonizing of chaotic motion," with "the more profound notion of education…[being] the harmonizing of chaotic motion, which falls under the generic

240 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); and David Garland, "What is a 'history of the present'? On Foucault's genealogies and their preconditions," *Punishment & Society* 16, no. 4 (2014): 365-384.
241 Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 38.
242 Bertrand Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy,* (New York: Touchstone, 1945), 119-132.

Platonic sense of production as the rendering determinate of indeterminacy."[243] Plato's curriculum *avant la lettre* reveals a deep concern with order, determinacy, and organization that prefigures curriculum's preoccupation with linear directedness and fixed boundaries as the conditions of learning.

Plato also introduces a representational theory of learning in his dialogue, *Meno*, where he dramatizes Socrates' demonstration to Meno that all learning is recollection, or *anamnesis* (un-forgetting). In the dialogue, the incredulous Meno asks Socrates to show him how this is the case. Accepting the challenge, Socrates sets out to show how even a slave boy can "recollect" a proof of the Pythagorean theorem simply by *asking him the right questions*. Plato the puppet-master makes Socrates merely "ask" the slave questions rather than "teach" him anything to prove to Meno (and the reader) that all learning is recollection. Yet the form of the questions Socrates asks more often than not simply require the slave to respond "yes" to propositions Socrates has derived from his carefully designed geometric puzzle: "tell me, boy, do you know that this is what a square looks like?"[244] Socrates has provided all of the answers in advance which the slave boy must simply acknowledge as true. But in order for the slave boy's learning to appear as his own recollection, Socrates' carefully structured pedagogic design must be disguised as simply asking questions: "do you see, Meno, that I'm not teaching him anything, but just asking him questions?" "it won't be as a result of any teaching that he'll have become knowledgeable: he'll just have been asked questions, and he'll recover the knowledge by himself, from within himself."[245] This example show how the

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[243] John Protevi, *Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic*, (London: The Athlone Press, 2001), 127.
[244] Plato, *Meno and Other Dialogues: Charmides, Laches, Lysis, Meno*. Translated by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115.
[245] Ibid., 116, 123.

Ancient Greeks set the stage for curricular thought by insisting on the proper organization of knowledge (asking the right questions) and by conceiving learning as recollection—already a kind of re-presentation.

Although Plato (via Socrates) insists that all learning is recollection, he suggests, in *Meno* as well as the *Republic,* that one's soul and body must be properly harmonized and mastered *before* it can receive *logos*—before one can go about recollecting true knowledge. As John Protevi remarks, for the Greeks "[civil] order is only possible on the basis of a well-ordered soul, in which reason rules spirit and appetite and is thus capable of logos and techne, that is, planning that subordinates parts to their function in a whole."[246] Not only must learning qua recollection depend upon asking the right questions, then, but so must the body and soul be harmonized through proper training before one can truly recollect what one already knows. This is where Plato prescribes musical and gymnastic training as necessary means of "[harmonizing] the soul before it is capable of logos so that it is prepared in such a way that it can receive logos."[247] As Plato describes, "[the child] will rightly object to what is ugly and hate it while still young before he can grasp the reason, and when reason comes he who has been reared thus will welcome it and easily recognize it because of its kinship with himself."[248]

It is important to recall here that Plato's philosophy was concerned primarily with "the distinction between reality and appearance."[249] Plato distrusted sense perception and the body, relegating them to the world of appearance and opinion; the only real things for Plato were ideas and forms. All particular things only "partake" of their ideal reality and are thus

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[246] Protevi, *Political Physics,* 118.
[247] Ibid., 128.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy,* 119.

not "suitable" objects of knowledge. In Plato's own words, only "those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know…"[250] His educational ideas were thus a translation of his strict demarcations between reality and appearance into practical means through which citizens could be taught to properly organize knowledge and rule over their own opinions and bodily contingencies. This is the quintessential proto-curricular gesture: to make education a matter of the correct arrangement of knowledge and proper training of body and soul such that one can distinguish reality from appearance. This Platonic educational ideal feeds forward into the curricular idea that learning depends upon linear directedness and fixed boundaries.

Although Plato arguably provided crucial philosophical support for the idea of curriculum as it was developed in the sixteenth century, formal education in ancient Greece lacked at least two components necessary for the idea of curriculum to gain its moral and rational weight in modernity: the notion of schooling as a social and spiritual necessity, and the notion that one must be formally educated to become fully human and "saved" from immorality. For the Ancient Greeks, education or *scholē* was a leisure practice undertaken by citizens in order to master themselves so that they could better attend to household and political life—not under an ethical demand or obligation, but as a matter of personal choice through which one could fashion oneself.[251] Foucault describes the Greek situation, including formal education, as part of an "aesthetics of existence" where the concern was with "which *techne* do I have to use to in order to live as well as I ought to live?" rather than

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[250] Ibid., 121.

[251] See Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: History of Sexuality, vol. 2*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); and Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," in *The Foucault Reader* edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 340-372.

an "attempt to normalize the population."[252] In a parallel manner to how Foucault describes the transition in the relation to self from "the problem of an aesthetics of existence" in the Ancient Greek world to "the problem of purity" in the Christian world, the transition from *scholē* in the Classical world to schooling in the modern world via the introduction of "the curriculum" reveals a shift from a concern with the pursuit of knowledge as a pragmatic means of mastery of self and aesthetic self-fashioning in order to go about social and political life to a concern with the pursuit of knowledge as necessary for personal salvation or, in secular terms, proper intellectual development toward becoming a rational human being.

The Birth of The Curriculum

In a Foucauldian vein, scholars such as Thomas Popkewitz, David Hamilton, and Ivor Goodson have shown that the idea of school curriculum is anything but a natural or universal feature of schooling historically and in fact emerges specifically with sixteenth century Calvinist pedagogical reforms in Post-Reformation Europe.[253] Their work suggests that there is no grand European educational tradition running unbroken from the Ancient Greek *scholē* to the modern school, but rather a series of discontinuities, ruptures, and shifts that continue to resonate problematically in how schooling—and curriculum in particular—is practiced and theorized today.

Educationists have frequently noted that the word curriculum comes from the Latin word for a race course and from the verb *currere* meaning "to run" in a chariot race.

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[252] Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," 348, 341.
[253] See Thomas Popkewitz, "Curriculum History, Schooling, and the History of the Present," *History of Education* 40, no. 1 (2011): 1-19; Ivor Goodson, *The Making of Curriculum* (New York: The Falmer Press, 1988); and David Hamilton, *Towards a Theory of Schooling* (New York: The Falmer Press, 1987).

However, as Hamilton cautions, it would be something of a historical fallacy to speak of the modern idea of a school curriculum in the Classical or Early Medieval world—curriculum in the educational sense simply did not exist. Rather, one could point to the Latin word *schola* (from which we get the world "school") as the nearest analogue, which itself translates the earlier Greek term *scholē* meaning "leisure" and which often referred to ways of life devoted to a pursuit of "the beautiful" and philosophical contemplation rather than work or mere survival.[254] Early Medieval schools, after Classical models, were loose arrangements between a teacher and groups of individual students of varying "levels of competence" where "teaching was organized on an individual basis" toward interpretation of biblical and theological texts.[255] In contrast with modern school curricula, there was "no presumption that every student was learning the same passage…no pedagogical necessity that all students should remain in the teacher's presence throughout the hours of teaching," and "no expectation that students would stay at school after their specific educational goals had been reached."[256] The studies that "disciples" undertook were not organized systematically or sequentially, as in modern curricula, but varied depending on the needs and interests of individuals.

The idea of curriculum, then, marks a decisive rupture with earlier Classical and Medieval models of schooling. Broadly, the idea of a school curriculum coincides with an increasing concern on the part of the church and the state in the late Middle Ages through the Renaissance and Reformation with the administration and regulation of populations; or

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[254] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 12-13; and Hamilton, *Towards a Theory of Schooling*, 12.
[255] Hamilton, *Towards a Theory of Schooling*, 36-37.
[256] Ibid.

in other words, with the making of the citizen and "the soul."[257] Foucault dates what he calls an "explosion of interest in the art of government," motivated by the perceived need to govern oneself, the soul, and children, to the sixteenth century that coincides with the rise of the idea of the school curriculum.[258] Similarly, Hamilton has chronicled the co-emergence of the ideas of school "classes" and "curriculum" as visible signs of Renaissance and Post-Reformation concern with "pedagogic order and administrative control."[259] Scientific, philosophical, and theological thinking of the era reveal an increasing fixation on "orderliness" in matters of science, soul, and state: both Newton and Descartes were committed to a mechanistic and deterministic account of Nature while both Luther and Calvin emphasized the importance of catechism and personal discipline in church affairs. The notion of school "classes" in parochial and municipal schools gave crucial support to the idea of curriculum by introducing the division and distribution of students into different levels or paths of study based upon merit and social status (here one could read a close structural similarity between school "class" and economic "class"). The idea of curriculum, then, came to embody this sense of "order," as it provided a sequence and structure for teaching and learning.

The Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment introduced two related ideas that can be seen as granting coherence to the educational reforms that gave rise to the idea of curriculum: the notion of the rational subject devoted to the pursuit of scientific knowledge, and the notion of personal salvation (concern for "the soul"). These two figures

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[257] Thomas Popkewitz, ed., *The Formation of School Subjects: The Struggle for Creating an American Institution* (New York: The Falmer Press, 1987); and Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135-195.
[258] Tina Besley and Michael A. Peters, *Subjectivity & Truth: Foucault, Education, and the Culture of the Self*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 136.
[259] Hamilton, *Towards a Theory of Schooling*, 8.

of "the self" were not opposed, but reciprocal schemas for self-regulation and administration. When Calvin resurrected the term "*vitae curriculum*" from Cicero as a metaphor for one's life journey toward salvation, he did not use it in an educational sense.[260] Rather, Calvin's followers adopted the term in an effort to reform schools in the mold of Calvinism, thereby furthering the mission of universal education as both Christian evangelism and endeavor toward the pursuit of scientific knowledge.[261] As Hamilton describes, any curriculum "worthy of the name" in the Calvinist model "was to embody both 'disciplina' (a sense of structural coherence), and 'ordo' (a sense of internal sequencing)" such that it should exhibit "structural wholeness and sequential completeness" and thus should "not only be 'followed'" but "completed" as well.[262] The Calvinist introduction of "curriculum" diverged from the Medieval course—where the "length and completeness" of a student's studies were open to negotiation—in that it brought a heretofore unknown "order and control" to teaching and learning in terms of the content and structure of schooling.

In addition to Calvinist educational reforms, Hamilton suggests that the idea of curriculum was supported and paralleled by a transformation in the meaning of "method" in the sixteenth century. Earlier Greek and Medieval usage of "method" denoted "procedures of investigation or analysis" but "conveyed no sense" of structured guidelines to be "applied" to a task; rather, "it existed as a leisurely intellectual art [*scholē*], not a purposive science of technique."[263] Various sixteenth century reforms in pedagogy made "method" come to be associated with order, sequence, and efficiency as a kind of universal science to

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[260] Ibid., 48.
[261] Ibid., 49 and passim.
[262] Hamilton, *Towards a Theory of Schooling*, 45.
[263] Ibid.

be applied to any field of knowledge. The rise of the modern meaning of the term "method" gave additional coherence to the idea of curriculum: "both [curriculum and method] came to denote a formalized set of operations: the 'method' of science provided a recipe for extracting knowledge from nature; while the 'curriculum' of schooling provided an analogous recipe for the promulgation of such knowledge."[264]

With the concomitant introduction of "method," "classes," and most importantly "curriculum," the idea of classed, ordered, and sequential learning became essential components of modern schooling. Administration and regulation of the citizen and of the soul (under the Calvinist mandate for schools to evangelize) became central to the project of schooling in Post-Reformation Europe, effecting a decisive break with previous Medieval models that, being closer to the Classical and Ancient Greek idea of *schola/scholē,* did not prioritize linear sequence and methodological efficiency. Although the sixteenth century rise of method differs substantially from Classical and Ancient Greek pedagogy, Plato's *Meno* already established the idea that knowledge should be well-ordered and properly organized such that one could distinguish reality from appearance, the idea that all learning is recollection, and the notion that one must properly train one's body and soul to become capable of achieving logos. These three ideas surface in curricular thought proper as the idea that learning should be directed linearly and contained within fixed boundaries, the idea that learning means correct recognition and representation of reality, and the notion that schooling is necessary for becoming a rational human being.

Heidegger explains this genealogy as a shift from Greek *paideia* to Roman *humanitas* where the examined life became not so much an inquiry into being but rather training in

[264] Ibid., 23.

"scholarship and good conduct" under the metaphysical interpretation of the human as rational animal; that is, a creature who approaches other beings in a calculative manner such that they become objects for the human subject.[265] Heidegger connects this explicitly to Renaissance thought that attempted to resuscitate Roman *humanitas* against Medieval scholasticism, further developed in the notion of method. Heidegger's problem with humanism is that it understands thinking in terms of a rationality predicated upon an already-formed interpretation of beings as *zoe* (life) and *physis* (nature). Reinforcing the contrast between *paideia* on the one hand and *humanitas* and method on the other, Deleuze writes that "the Greeks did not speak of method but of *paideia*; they knew that thought does not think on the basis of a good will, but by virtue of the forces that are exercised on it in order to constrain it to think…method in general is a means by which we avoid going to a particular place, or by which we maintain the option of escaping from it (the thread of the labyrinth)."[266] In this humanist manner, method "(1) presupposes an affinity with the truth or good will on the part of the thinker, (2) presupposes the nature of what it sets out to know or understand, and (3) supposes a strict difference between the knowing subject and the object known. It presupposes that it *can* know, *what it is* to know, and that what it knows *is independent* of its own subjective peculiarities and such."[267]

Allied with method, curriculum tends to reduce learning to recognition and identification that presumes a terminus of and for learning always from the view of the

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[265] Martin Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" in *Pathmarks,* edited by William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 239-276; see also Claire Colebrook, "What is This Thing Called Education?" *Qualitative Inquiry* 23, no. 9 (2017): 649-655.
[266] Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 108-110.
[267] Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 76.

human as rational, autonomous subject who represents other beings to itself as objects of knowledge. In this fashion, curriculum conceals the event of learning with knowledge, denying or cancel out difference(s) that engender and are engendered in learning so as to assure the continuity of knowledge. Curricular thought, method, and the idea of the work of art—all under the banner of *humanitas*—emerge from and reinforce a general pedagogy of human subjectivity bound to the world as an already-given reality. In Deleuze's words, "knowledge gives life laws that separate it from what it can do, that keep if from acting, that forbid it to acting, maintaining it in the narrow framework of scientifically observable reaction: almost like an animal in a zoo."[268] Again, the figure of enclosure comes into view as that which determines the path of inquiry in advance based on an already-given body of knowledge and a predetermined image of reality. Below, I use architecture to further elaborate how curriculum functions as enclosure before considering how the idea of curriculum might be contested through the concept of inclosure.

Architecture and Curriculum Theory

In the introduction to this chapter, I claimed that the architect's built environment represents an ideal design for human life based on pre-conceived patterns of habitation in which the inhabitant is intentionally directed toward particular ways of living through the structures the architect has set in place. Likewise, I argued that the curriculum represents an ideal design for human development and learning based on an already-given body of knowledge in which the learner is intentionally directed toward particular ways of knowing and acting through the structures the pedagogue has set in place. Both curriculum and architecture accomplish these aims through enclosure: idealized built environments that

[268] Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 100.

define everything according to already-given subject-object and interior-exterior determinations. In this section, I discuss three moments in twentieth century architecture (modernism, postmodernism, and deconstructivism) in connection with curriculum theory to show how various approaches to designing built environments for living or learning both support and contest the ideas of representation and intentionality at the heart of the curricular and architectural projects of enclosure. Through these discussions, I hope to show that the very idea of curriculum as the defining logic of schooling makes it difficult to get beyond representational thought and enclosure. Finally, I incorporate ideas from deconstructivist architecture with those of Derrida, Deleuze, and posthumanist philosophy to propose how one might conceive—or perhaps contest—(the idea of) curriculum in music and arts education with the concept of *inclosure*: that which provides a provisional structure but which is also radically open to difference.

Modernist (European) architecture came about in the early years of the twentieth century through a regenerative and iconoclastic impulse that sought the total design of built environments aimed toward both optimum functionality and minimalist elegance (clean lines, geometric forms, simple color schemes).[269] Architects such as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and Mies van der Rohe pioneered unique but formally similar approaches to architectural design that took cues from the machine age (mass production, mass transit, and factories), scientific rationality, and an avant-garde attitude toward architectural history.[270] In addition to "unity and continuity of all spaces," modern architecture advocated the consistency of a building from the inside out, adhering often to Mies's dictum "less is more"

[269] See Peter Gay, *Modernism: The Lure of Heresy from Baudelaire to Beckett* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 281-334.
[270] Ibid.

and the idea taken from Gropius' Bauhaus that form should follow function.[271] For the modernists, every detail of a building should be designed intentionally with a view toward efficiency and optimization of space that they supposed would inevitably lead to better living for inhabitants. Modernist architects thus tasked themselves with designing environments "according to the functional needs of a complete human being" as defined by scientific rationality, the teleology of human evolution, and the elemental forms and materials as given in Nature.[272] In the modernist image, architects thought design should establish the continuity of human existence through consistent order and the absence of ambiguity in built environments. Like a well-designed animal enclosure in a zoo, buildings for humans would provide functional habitats "according to people's environmental, rational, emotional, and social needs" and would liberate them from their uncultivated habits and strife.[273]

Following Heidegger, Arendt, and Foucault, one might see modernist architecture as another actualization of the idea that "Man" (humanity in general) could find redemption and perfectibility through technical mastery of life.[274] Modernist architecture can be seen as an attempt at a "total interpretation"—a complete and universally valid logic of habitable space—into which all of life and work could be made to fit regardless of economic, cultural, or ecological particularities.[275] According to Peter Galison, the modernist architects, aligned with the logical positivists, dreamt of "a world where a rational engineer could fashion not

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[271] Robert Venturi, *Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1977), 70.
[272] Peder Anker, *From Bauhaus to Ecohouse: A History of Ecological Design* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 127.
[273] Ibid. Anker provides a fascinating discussion of modernist architects engaged in the design of zoo enclosures which they saw as working models for the design of human enclosures. Both the modern building and the modern zoo were seen as providing optimal conditions for animal and human life.
[274] See Kathrin Braun, "Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault," *Time & Society* 16, no. 1 (2007): 5-23.
[275] See Hubert L. Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28, no. 5 (1990): 83-96.

only the basis of philosophy and architecture but of the way of life that went with them."[276] Modernist architects fashioned their vision of an orderly, rational, and consistent universe through enclosures that displayed these very qualities. As Le Corbusier famously quipped, "a house is a machine for living in."[277] The modernist enclosure gives form to the life of the universal human subject by containing and optimizing all the basic functions of human life within it.

It is easy to see modernist architectural logic at work metaphorically in the avowedly "scientific" curriculum movements initiated by Franklin Bobbitt, W.W. Charters, Herbert Spencer, and their followers. As Herbert Kleibard describes, the dream of the scientific curriculum is one in which "teaching would be the application of standardized means by which predictable results would be achieved, and curriculum development the specification of the end-products and the rules for their efficient manufacture."[278] However, John Dewey provides perhaps the clearest analogue to the modernist architectural project of enclosure in curriculum theory. Dewey writes, "the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel."[279] For Dewey the school and its curriculum are "environments framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of their members" "to insure adequate transmission" of a community's ways of life.[280] The curriculum provides "a simplified environment" which "selects the features which are fairly

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276 Peter Galison, "Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism," *Critical Inquiry* 16, no. 4 (1990): 751.
277 Gay, *Modernism*, 291.
278 Herbert Kleibard, "The Rise of Scientific Curriculum-Making and Its Aftermath," in *The Curriculum Studies Reader*, 2nd edition, edited by David J. Flinders and Stephen J. Thornton (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), 44.
279 John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1916), 45.
280 Ibid., 22, 23.

fundamental and capable of being responded to by the young."[281] The curriculum "establishes a progressive order, using the factors first acquired as means of gaining insight into what is more complicated… [eliminating], so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes. It establishes a purified medium of action [aimed] not only at simplifying but at weeding out what is undesirable."[282]

Like the modernist architect, the curriculum developer in the Deweyan mode constructs enclosures designed to direct the child toward proper development where she can acquire only that which is "desirable" for functioning within the community—the community which, through the school, transmits its values and knowledge to her. For Dewey, the school environment must be intentionally directive such that "…the active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continuous course, instead of dispersing aimlessly."[283] Dewey explains, "the natural or native impulses of the young do not agree with the life-customs of the group into which they are born. Consequently they have to be directed or guided…centering the impulses acting at any one time upon some specific end and [introducing] an order of continuity into the sequence of acts."[284] In the Deweyan curriculum, "direction involves a focusing and fixating of action in order that it may be truly a response, and this requires an elimination of unnecessary and confusing movement;" thus, "intentional education signifies…a specially selected environment, the selection being made on the basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction."[285]

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281 Ibid., 24.
282 Ibid.
283 Ibid., 28.
284 Ibid., 47.
285 Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 45.

Dewey's philosophy of education and his approach to curriculum are grounded in his belief that the aim of humanity "is to subordinate the materials and forces of the natural environment so that they shall be rendered tributary to [human] life functions."[286] Dewey also believed that "all cultures and races progressed naturally and organically through stages along a single, linear, hierarchical, evolutionary path toward a more socialized, integrated, and efficient future."[287] Therefore, Dewey thought that the curriculum should represent and repeat humanity's evolutionary telos from "savagery to civilization."[288] Combining Peirce and James's pragmatism with his own positivistic Hegelian Darwinism, Dewey insists that pedagogical methods should align with scientific method and his own instrumentalist logic: education should promote the progressive "ability to make ever-subtler functional discriminations and appropriate responses to ever expanding domains of unified experience" guided by universal "rules for carrying out operations…[and] norms of action" discovered in humanity's path toward greater civilization.[289] Such general rules, Dewey claims, enable the learner to become "master of the methods which the experience of others has shown to be the most efficient in like cases of getting knowledge."[290]

For Dewey, everything the student learns in the curriculum should contribute to securing the continuity of experience as seen in evolutionary human history in an internally consistent and unified whole, normatively guided by Peirce's definition of truth: "the opinion which is *fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate…"[291] In a Hegelian

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286 Thomas Fallace, "Repeating the Race Experience: John Dewey and the History Curriculum at the University of Chicago Laboratory School," *Curriculum Inquiry* 39, no. 3 (2009): 386.
287 Ibid., 384.
288 Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, passim; and Fallace "Repeating the Race Experience."
289 Jim Garrison, "The 'Permanent Deposit' Of Hegelian Thought In Dewey's Theory Of Inquiry," *Educational Theory* 56, no. 1 (2006): 5, 27.
290 Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 201.
291 Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935), 139, italics added.

manner, everything the child experiences in education is subsumed and sublated into the totality of human knowledge of how to "extend a common dominion over [nature]."[292] As Dewey remarks, "the diversity of names [given to aspects of experience] tends to conceal the identity of meaning" revealed "when nature is treated as whole…[and] its phenomena fall into their natural relations of sympathy and association with human life."[293]

Dewey, like his fellow modernists, was drawn in by the seductive lure of instrumental holism, faith in human progress, and the assumption that "there is *one system* into which *all* of physical reality must be made to fit."[294] Modernist architecture and curriculum development attest to a sincere belief in human progress and in the promise of scientific rationality, common sense, and historical teleology. As expressed in Dewey's philosophy of education, the curricular built environment would help secure humanity's future through intentional direction of children's development in an internally consistent—that is, an *enclosed*—system of representation and reconstruction of human experience.

Postmodernist architecture and curriculum development, on the other hand, attest to a loss of faith in the modernist narrative of continuous human progress and in the instrumental, scientific rationality that would supposedly secure it. In noting that "part of the problem, undoubtedly, with the era of the scientific curriculum makers and with ours is the failure to recognize the complexity of the phenomena with which we deal," Kleibard echoes the concerns of architects in the mid-to-late twentieth century who found the modernist styles fatally reductive, dismissive of the concerns of ordinary people, incapable of dealing

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[292] Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, 253.
[293] Ibid., 250.
[294] Hubert L. Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault," 88. See also G. M. Brodsky, "Absolute Idealism and John Dewey's Instrumentalism," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 5, no. 1 (1969): 44-62.

with social and historical complexity, and, most of all, boring.[295] However, while postmodernism in architecture and curriculum theory complicate the traditional narratives and conventional wisdom of modernism, they often remain within the logic of representation, intentionality, and the built environment as enclosure.

Postmodernist architecture foregrounds complexity, historicism, allusion, and symbolism in what could be seen as an effort to represent the history and problems of architecture to itself—all undertaken as a corrective to modernism's tendency to see every place as a blank slate and its totalizing, ahistorical ideology.[296] Postmodernism departs from modernism by making architecture acknowledge its history, complexity, and context but does not fundamentally challenge the logic of built environments: a postmodernist hospital building, for example, might play with historical allusions to hospital construction or include overt symbols and icons that mark the site as a hospital, such as the giant blue "H" in front of Venturi and Scott Brown's Lehigh Valley Hospital—but overall, the postmodern hospital remains formally and functionally identical to the modern one.[297] The postmodernist architectural project accommodates contradiction and complexity, parody, and irony into its enclosures while retaining the idea that the built environment represents the human condition (postmodernity) and intentionally directs inhabitants toward particular ways of living through the structures the architect has set in place.

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[295] Kleibard, "The Rise of Scientific Curriculum-Making," 45; see Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, *Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977).
[296] See Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 97-129.
[297] Venturi, Scott Brown, and Associates, "Lehigh Valley Hospital – Muhlenberg," https://www.vsba.com /projects/lehigh-valley-hospital-muhlenberg/>

Postmodernist architecture has its educational equivalent in the curriculum reconceptualization movement of the early 1970s through the early 2000s. Peter Hlebowitsch claims that "the call for a reconceptualization derives from the belief that curriculum study has historically been associated with an atheoretical management agenda that compresses the school experience into low level group procedures"[298] and, as Patrick Slattery notes, is driven by "opposition to the managerial and prescriptive nature of curriculum studies aligned with Frederick Taylor's scientific management and Ralph Tyler's principles of curriculum and instruction."[299] Taken up by many in the curriculum reconceptualization movement, William Pinar's notion of *currere* shifts focus away from static knowledge acquisition toward a model of curriculum focused on "autobiographical and phenomenological experience"[300] "the interpretation of lived experiences," and "social process[es] whereby individuals come to greater understanding of themselves, others, and the world through mutual reconceptualization" of experience.[301] Yet this description of *currere* is remarkably similar to Dewey's theory of inquiry as the synthetic reconstruction of experience. As Pinar and Madeleine Grumet describe it, *currere* is a process of autobiographical reflection in four stages, "regressive, progressive, analytical, and synthetical" where, "mind in its place, I conceptualize the present situation. I am placed together. Synthesis."[302]

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298 Peter Hlebowitsch, *Radical Curriculum Theory Reconsidered: An Historical Approach* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 19.
299 Patrick Slattery, *Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era,* 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 57.
300 Ibid., 62.
301 William H. Schubert, *Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 33.
302 William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1976), 61.

Similarly for Maxine Greene, curriculum should promote learning as a process of disclosure, generating structures, engendering meanings, and achieving mastery—a matter of "ordering the materials of [one's] own life-world when dislocations occur."[303] Likewise in his *Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum*, William Doll argues that the curriculum should include the "right amount" of indeterminacy and interpretation "to be provocatively generative *without losing form or shape*" such that one can foster "meaningful and transformative" dialogue toward the development of "cosmic consciousness."[304] Consistent with much of Dewey's philosophy of education, Pinar, Grumet, Greene, and Doll presuppose the primacy of dialogue conditioned by self-reflection in learning toward some kind of normative, regulative meaning and or order. *Currere*, like postmodern architecture, calls curriculum and educational experience to reflect back on itself, to acknowledge its historicity, cultural specificity, and complexity while at the same time continues the modernist ideology of the construction of intentional human subjectivity, maintained in its unity, as the locus and telos of learning.

Although postmodernist architecture and curriculum theory challenges modernist simplifications and reductions of human history and social life, the purpose and structure of the postmodernist curriculum is still reasoned in terms of the construction (i.e. representation) of knowledge—meaning, interpretation, disclosure of the world—by and for the rational human subject.[305] In his *Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era*, Slattery advocates for a curriculum centered on interpretation and meaning construction through hermeneutics, which he claims "can lead not only to understanding but also personal growth

303 Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness" in *The Curriculum Studies Reader*, 140, 145.
304 William E. Doll, Jr. *A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 174-183, italics added.
305 Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness."

and social progress."[306] In the hermeneutic process, "apparent opposites must be reintegrated into a creative tension of complementary and multifaceted dimensions of the whole," "uncovering layers of meaning," resulting in "greater clarification, deeper understanding, and ecumenical acceptance."[307] While Slattery challenges modernist, scientific curriculum theory and development through a host of postmodern and poststructural perspectives, his conception of curriculum still encloses everything in the house of representation, interpretation, and communicative-linguistic meaning. Even though the postmodernist curriculum may not prescribe a linear path to knowledge for the learner, it is still concerned with establishing the continuity of experience, intentionally "reconstructed" toward an "experience of solidarity of the intellect, the body, the spirit, and the cosmos, as well as an intrinsic coherence of time, place, and meaning."[308] The shadow of Dewey still looms large. Despite their apparent dissimilarities, modernism and postmodernism in architecture and curriculum theory both elevate the intentional human subject as the ground of Being and representation as the ground of learning and knowledge.

In sharp contrast, deconstructivist architects challenge the human and representational foundations of built environments and the notion of enclosure. While postmodernists often sought a synthesis of old and new, quotidian and sublime, deconstructivists tend to avoid formal, aesthetic, and interpretive closure. Deconstructivist buildings foreground fragmentation and discontinuity and "intentionally" lack the formal harmony of modernist and postmodernist buildings. Interrogating form from the inside, they dissolve "the classical laws of support and load, the enclosure of walls and space, [and]

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306 Patrick Slattery, *Curriculum Development in the Postmodern Era*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 129.
307 Ibid., 129, 292.
308 Slattery, *Curriculum Development*, 242.

proportion and regularity."[309] Deconstructivists address the problems of architecture through building problematic structures rather than representing or interpreting them in recognizable forms.

If postmodernist architecture was preoccupied with the building as a complex yet coherent image, deconstructivism could be said to be preoccupied with fracturing the singular Euclidean point of view into multiple irreconcilable images. Not easily comprehended from any one vantage point, deconstructivist buildings often confound perceptual totalization and resist narrative closure and interpretation. Frank Gehry's Santa Monica house, often considered an exemplar of deconstructivism, showcases these features well. Instead of beginning with an "empty" lot on which he could construct an ideal enclosure, Gehry built into and around an existing structure.[310] Gehry used corrugated metal, chain-link fence, plywood, and glass to build up several masses that literally wrap around and cut into the site's original pink Dutch colonial bungalow. Gehry explains, "I decided to get into a dialogue with the old house…I got fascinated with the idea that the old house should appear to remain totally intact from the outside, and that you could look through the new house, and see the old house as though it was now packaged in this new skin."[311]

Elsewhere Gehry recalls, "I was trying to use the strength of the original house, so that when the house was finished, its real artistic value was that you didn't know what was intentional and what wasn't."[312] In this way, Gehry's house stages the undecidability of

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309 Aurelia and Balthazar Taschen (eds.), *Modern Architecture A-Z* (Köln: Taschen Bibliotheca Universalis, 2016), 148.
310 Here, I refer to the first house Gehry built in a middle-class residential neighborhood of Santa Monica, California. He has since built another home a few blocks away from the first one. I made a pilgrimage to Santa Monica to see the house for myself while writing this chapter in October 2019.
311 Frank Gehry quoted in Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 109.
312 Frank Gehry quoted in Barbara Isenberg, *Conversations with Frank Gehry* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 109.

original and copy, authentic and inauthentic, inside and outside. The structure's incongruities and dislocations preclude straightforward interpretation of what was there before and what Gehry built. Even the sections of the house that appear to be in the original style may or may not have been altered in the design process. Again, as Gehry admits, this interpretive stumbling block concerning authenticity and intentionality constitutes the house's primary "artistic value."

Gehry does not presuppose that the structure is meaningful in itself, nor that it has any particular meaning for a subject in terms of representation or use. As Gavin Macrae-Gibson writes, "For Gehry the world vanishes to a multitude of points, and he does not presuppose that any are related to the standing human being. The human eye is still of critical importance in Gehry's world, but the sense of center no longer has its traditional symbolic value."[313] Similarly, Frederic Jameson remarks that Gehry's Santa Monica house perpetually confounds "the choice of photographic point of view, evading the image imperialism of photography" such that "no photograph of this house will ever be quite right."[314] Unlike the phenomenological account of perception where one intends the whole table in consciousness even though one cannot perceive all its sides at once, deconstructivist architecture often eludes such intentional totalization through "distorted perspective planes," "perspective illusion and perspective contradiction," and "illusionistic use of framing."[315] In these ways, deconstructivism poses serious challenges to the centrality of the intentional human subject and the logic of representation that may be useful in rethinking and contesting the logic of curriculum.

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[313] Gavin Macrae Gibson, cited in Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 116.
[314] Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 125.
[315] Gavin Macrae-Gibson, cited in Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 116, 121.

Deconstructivism and Inclosure

Following Derrida, a crucial deconstructivist point is that any attempt to formally "represent" what is repressed, silent, absent, deferred simply repeats the metaphysics of presence that always tries to render meanings *present* to a particular context or tries to synthesize and enclose conflicting meanings within a larger whole.[316] This mistake is evident in postmodern curriculum theory fixated on interpretation, hermeneutics, and autobiography. Contemporary curriculum theorists have tended read poststructuralism and deconstruction metaphorically as a project of recovering multiple meanings in "texts," conceived narrowly as human discursive artifacts. Contemporary curriculum theorists still cling to the belief that curriculum should be "about" or should represent the world as given through human interpretations, meanings, and symbols: a "text to be read."[317] Curriculum theory thus often remains stuck at the level of representation rather than submerging to the level of the problems that give rise to representations. In devoting so much energy to reinterpreting curriculum and to multiplying the ways curriculum represents and is represented, curriculum theorists risk reifying the concept of curriculum rather than considering how the concept itself might be the problem.

As Derrida argues, the problem with "texts"—in curriculum or architecture—is not necessarily with the meanings represented in them but with how meanings get articulated and produced through effects of spacing, displacement, and deferral.[318] What makes a built

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316 See Derrida and Peter Eisenman, *Choral Works*, edited by Jeffrey Kipnis and Thomas Leeser (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1997). This book documents Derrida's collaboration with architect Peter Eisenman on a public park project in Paris and also includes their respective theoretical musings on architecture and deconstruction.
317 See William F. Pinar, William M. Reynolds, Patrick Slattery, and Peter M. Taubman, "Understanding Curriculum as Poststructuralist, Deconstructed, Postmodern Text" *Counterpoints* 17 (1995): 450-514.
318 See Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

environment livable or what enables learning to happen in a curriculum is the interplay of its structured and unstructured spaces and the ways that such spaces are displayed, dispersed, and deployed in them. As both Derrida and Deleuze argue, any kind of built environment (architecture or curriculum) is intentionally directive in that it sets up a program to be followed, but also only becomes livable when its intended paths break down, allow for deviations, digressions, and mutations that at the same time continue to make the environment, qua "machine for living in," function.[319] Built environments establish programs for living while they also disclose the impossibility of an ideal fit between designed place and occupant. In modernism, architects and curriculum developers tended to obscure these conditions by attempting the total control of habitation and educational experience through unambiguous design and the belief in universality. Postmodern architects and curriculum theorists, on the other hand, seek the inclusion of contradictory elements and "complicated conversations" into their built environments but without fundamentally questioning the formation of spaces or the logics of representation and intentionality.[320]

Departing from both modernism and postmodernism, deconstructivist architects use structures to question the formation of spaces in terms of fully determinate interiority versus exteriority, representation, and intentionality. As such, I characterize deconstructivism as being primarily concerned with *inclosures* (to borrow a term from philosophers Graham Priest and Paul Livingston) rather than enclosures.[321] Following Derrida, Livingston argues that the

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[319] See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 1994); and Derrida, "Différance" in *Speech and Phenomena*.
[320] For the idea of "complicated conversation" in curriculum theory, see William F. Pinar, *What is Curriculum Theory?* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004).
[321] See Paul Livingston, "Derrida and Formal Logic: Formalizing the Undecidable" *Derrida Today* 3, no. 2 (2010): 221-239; and Graham Priest, *Beyond the Limits of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

term *inclosure* refers "not [to] the limit of a fixed and determinate line between 'inside' and 'outside,' but rather the threshold…that, in being closed, opens to the exterior, and in being open, encloses itself."[322] Gehry's architectural projects demonstrate inclosure materially by holding open the point of articulation of traditional oppositions such as object and frame, figure and ground, and form and content. He plays with the limits of these traditional oppositions in "a kind of essential crossing or confusion between the internal, rule-governed structure of a system and its external 'meaning' or semantics."[323] Gehry also contests the notion that rationality, representation, and intentionality are or should be central to the formation of built environments by including the aleatory, the contingent, and the accidental as design elements. For example, he uses "slippery paper" when sketching designs for a new project so that he is not entirely in control of where the pen goes. As Gehry tells it, "I'm sketching with information. I start to free-associate on this slippery paper with my pen, and it's kind of like a dance."[324] Almost like surrealist automatic drawing or a Jackson Pollock painting, Gehry's process is one "neither of intention nor of chance but of their in-between," "not deliberate, not random."[325]

Curriculum conceived through the concept of inclosure rather than enclosure—contesting the authority of representation and intentionality—might look toward structures that, as Elizabeth Grosz proposes, would "[permit] the passage from one space and position to another, rather than the containment of objects and functions in which each thing finds

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322 Ibid., 234.
323 Ibid., 227.
324 Gehry in Isenberg, *Conversations with Frank Gehry*, 91.
325 Catherine Malabou, *Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains*, translated by Carolyn Shread (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 120.

its rightful place."[326] In this way a "building would not function as finished object but rather as spatial process, open to whatever use it may be put to in an indeterminate future, not as a container of solids but as a facilitator of flows."[327] Consequently, "…space itself needs to be reconsidered in terms of multiplicity, heterogeneity, activity, and force…not simply an ether, a medium through which other forces, like gravity, produce their effects" but a process of spacing and inscription.[328] Similarly, Ahmed ponders how the notion of "desire lines" in landscape architecture might prove useful in contesting how built environments direct and orient life toward particular ways of living. She writes that concept of desire lines is "used to describe unofficial paths, those marks left on the ground that show everyday comings and goings, where people deviate from the paths they are supposed to follow."[329] Such deviation, Ahmed notes, "leaves its own marks on the ground, which can even help generate alternative lines, which cross the ground in unexpected ways. Such lines are indeed traces of desire; where people have taken different routes to get to this point or to that point."[330] As Deleuze describes, such desire lines and heterogeneous spacings reveal an "ungrounding" or "groundlessness" at the foundation of grounding, an indeterminacy at the heart of all attempts at the full determination of Being.[331] Such processes can be seen as attempts to release difference from the "requirements of representation"[332] and the "requirement that we follow what is already given to us."[333]

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326 Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 164.
327 Ibid.
328 Ibid., 162-163.
329 Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 19.
330 Ibid., 20.
331 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 275.
332 Ibid., 262.
333 Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 21.

Rather than focus on intentionally directing learners toward ways of knowing and acting enclosed within "beautifully crafted designs and forms" toward "the realization of the overall master plan"[334] based on the world conceived as an already-given reality, curriculum in arts education might focus instead on utilizing unfinished, incomplete, and repurposed structures—in the spirit of Gehry's Santa Monica house—that may allow learners to pursue desire lines and heterogeneous spacings that deviate from already-given representations and intended paths. Like a DJ's sampling and remixing of found musical objects, learners might engage in "repeating, cutting, splicing, allowing the musical object itself to deform and reform," taking on variations and transformations that cannot be given in advance or subjected to *a priori* subject-object determinations.[335] Instead of an enclosed world that contains all possible forms of action and knowledge for the learner to acquire, the curriculum—if the term is still worth using—might become an inclosed world "kept half open as if by a pair of pliers," which "opens on a trajectory or a spiral in expansion that moves further and further away from a center" "folding, unfolding, [and] refolding" in infinite combinations.[336] Following Deleuze, arts educators might consider ways of moving "from harmonic closure to an opening onto a polytonality or, as Boulez will say, a 'polyphony of polyphonies.'"[337]

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334 Barrett, "Foreword" to Sindberg, *Just Good Teaching*, ix.
335 Claire Colebrook, "Escaping Music, Escaping Meaning," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 18, no. 2 (2018): 9-34.
336 Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by Tom Conley (London: The Athlone Press, 1993), 137.
337 Ibid., 82.

CHAPTER 4

WHAT IS LEARNING? FROM REPRESENTATION TO PARTICIPATION

Learning is defined in the edited volume *The Child as Musician: A Handbook of Musical Development* as "the acquisition of knowledge or skill based on experience or training."[338] However, such straightforward definitions are often hard to come by in much of the research that studies learning. Rather than spell out explicitly what learning means, much cognitive and neuroscientific research in education—arts-related or otherwise—relies upon the tacit assumption that learning just *is* the acquisition of knowledge and skills.[339] In the previous chapters, I explored how representation and intentionality provide the common threads through which literature in music and arts education conceptualizes the nature of art and learning and the supposed necessity of curriculum. Representation and intentionality provide the basis for theories of learning and pedagogy in arts education I examine in this chapter, but often show up in the guise of transmission and acquisition of skills and knowledge.

As I hope to make clear below, notions of transmission and acquisition presuppose and are closely intertwined with representation and intentionality as explanatory frameworks for learning and the workings of the mind. By this I mean basically that the idea of transmission only makes sense if one assumes there is a pre-existing object (skill or element of knowledge) that can be intentionally given (re-presented) to another person. Consequently, acquisition only makes sense if one assumes that this represented object can

338 Richard Parncutt, "Prenatal Development" in *The Child as Musician: A Handbook of Musical Development*, 2nd Edition, edited by Gary McPherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 10.
339 See Sergio Della Sala and Mike Anderson, *Neuroscience in Education: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Denis Mareschal, Brian Butterworth, Andy Tolmie, eds., *Educational Neuroscience* (Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2013).

be directly grasped (intended) and then internalized by the receiving person. With this giving-and-receiving image, representation and intentionality take on an economical dimension: circulation and the exchange of knowledge. Supporting this acquisition-transmission framework, learning is often studied and conceptualized from the perspective of expert knowledge and mastery, which sets up a hierarchy between the "novice" learner and the more knowledgeable other who "gives" or transmits knowledge and skill to the learner.[340] What is to be learned is defined in advance by the expert, the domain, or the community of practice that determines what mastery looks like.[341]

Whether conceived in traditional cognitive-psychological terms or those of social constructivism, the transmission-acquisition framework has its foundation in the cognitivist information processing-computational paradigm and is perpetuated through particular interpretations of neuroscience.[342] The operative assumption is that knowledge, in the form of representations, can be unproblematically transmitted by a more knowledgeable other (or community of practice) and intentionally acquired by a learner. Cultural knowledge is the input, received and processed by the learner, stored as a representation, and then used to inform the development of a new capacity, the output. In the transmission-acquisition framework, it is thought that people "receive instructions" in the form of "representations or prototypical schemata" and "convert them into bodily behavior."[343] This assumes that

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340 See Lave and Wenger, *Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Gary McPherson, ed., *The Child As Musician*; and Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception and Action*, edited by Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

341 See Lave and Wenger, *Situated Learning.*

342 See Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Della Sala and Anderson, *Neuroscience in Education*; and Mareschal, Butterworth, and Tolmie, *Educational Neuroscience.*

343 Tim Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning" *Educação em Revista*: *Belo Horizonte* 29, no. 3 (2013): 302, 303.

learning involves intentional states of mind whereby "humans deliberate before they act…" and through which "the mind commands and the body submits."[344]

While transmission and acquisition may, on the surface, seem far removed from social constructivist notions of active knowledge construction and the social nature of skill development, educational philosopher Anna Sfard contends that the idea of knowledge construction relies upon a logic similar to that of acquisition. Both metaphors of construction and acquisition support the idea that learning involves the internalization—i.e., the mental re-presentation of—an external concept or skill.[345] Both accounts explain "learning as a process by which a learner internalizes knowledge, whether 'discovered,' 'transmitted' from others, or 'experienced in interaction' with others."[346] Learning is thus thought to involve intentionally grasping an object and giving it form in the mind; or per Derrida, achieving mastery over "a thing whose presence is *encountered* by *rendering* it present, by bringing it to the subject of representation, to the knowing self."[347] Such claims have been reinforced, rather than challenged, by educational interpretations of neuroscience, which remain within transmission-acquisition and representational-intentional framework.[348] In all of the variations on the representational theme, the image of learning as mental internalization "establishes a sharp dichotomy between inside and outside, suggests that

344 Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 138-139.
345 Anna Sfard, "On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of Choosing Just One" *Educational Researcher* 27, no. 2 (1998): 4-13.
346 Lave and Wenger, *Situated Learning,* 47.
347 Derrida, "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils" *Diacritics,* Fall (1983): 10.
348 See Tracey Tokuhama-Espinosa, *Mind, Brain, and Education Science: A Comprehensive Guide to The New Brain-Based Teaching* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2011); and Myint Swe Khine and Issa M. Saleh, eds., *New Science of Learning: Cognition, Computers, and Collaboration in Education* (New York: Springer, 2010).

knowledge is largely cerebral, and takes the individual as the nonproblematic unit of analysis."[349]

In this chapter, I examine how the transmission-acquisition framework, and the more basic representational-intentional model of cognition that supports it, figures into and constrains how learning is conceived in music and arts education by making all learning, knowing, and skillful activity a matter of mental representation processes to which the body and everything else in one's environment are subservient. Such focus on knowledge and skill acquisition, or refinement of internal mental representations, tends to make all learning serve pre-defined ends and conform to the order of the world as given. In this way, learning is reduced to *learning to*—the prepositional form that pre-positions learning in advance—rather than *to learn* in the infinitive form that situates learning as an opening onto what is yet to come, welcoming difference. I argue that when learning is reduced to *learning to*, it functions to re-appropriate learning into an economy of exchange and acquisition of knowledge that arrests and annuls the possibility for learning to open onto new horizons. If one tries to anticipate or predetermine the arrival of learning in the form of recognizable *learning to*, one may foreclose learning's transformative potential, and in effect refuse to welcome the different, the unexpected, or the unforeseeable.

I consider the philosophical foundations of intentionality and representational thought in cognitive science as they figure into the image of learning as *learning to,* and explore cognitive science's assumptions concerning the nature of cognition (thought) that support such an image of learning. I then follow Derrida and Deleuze's critiques of representational-intentional thought and their accounts of learning to challenge the

[349] Lave and Wenger, *Situated Learning*, 47.

foundations and assumptions of cognitive science. Finally, I connect Derrida and Deleuze's arguments to recent developments in biology, neuroscience, and posthumanist theory to illustrate how one might conceive learning in music and arts education beyond the confines of representation and intentionality toward welcoming the arrival of difference, new connections, and new ways of relating.

Theories of Learning in Arts Education

A familiar learning scenario for many music educators is a student learning a new song, whether on a solo instrument/voice or in an ensemble. As a guitar teacher and guitar player, this task has occupied much of my own lesson planning and classroom teaching. In the cognitivist transmission-acquisition framework, learning a new song on the guitar would be explained in terms of mental representations, schema, and concepts that guide the motor functions needed to play the guitar properly. The guitar player begins learning the new song by receiving instructions—from the teacher, method book, or sheet music—that she mentally processes as representations and then translates into guitar-playing behavior. When she encounters unfamiliar ideas and techniques in the new song, the guitar player constructs new mental representations that inform her how to perform the appropriate corresponding behaviors. Each step of the process involves intentional action on the part of the guitar player, continually using internal mental representations to guide external action in the world. When the guitar player has successfully learned the song—meaning she can now play it correctly according to the notation—what has changed is all in her mind. She has updated her representations to match what was already there for her to learn in world of guitar playing and guitar songs. Her learning is all on the inside, having no essential effect on what exists beyond her representations.

In music and arts education, there is a wealth of pedagogical diversity in terms of methodology. Yet, the intertwined notions of transmission-acquisition and representation-intentionality used to describe and account for learning seem to find their way into almost any discussion of learning in arts education, whether concerned with arts education as praxis, cultural responsivity, informal learning, visual culture, aesthetic education, communities of practice, or inquiry-based learning. In visual arts education, Arthur Efland states that "learning is generally a form of enculturation, with knowledge conceived both as the acquisition of tools and mastery of their use" and that "learners acquire new knowledge and skills by constructive processes (assimilation and accommodation) or enculturation into knowledge communities."[350] In music education, Jackie Wiggins contends that "learning is constructing understanding," wherein "we learn first by interacting with others in social contexts and then by internalizing what we learn from others to the point that we are eventually able to function on our own."[351] Elliot Eisner comments similarly on how curriculum in the arts enables learners to internalize (represent and construct) "frames for reading the world."[352] He claims that "becoming socialized within a culture" and thus learning, "means acquiring these frames, for they allow you to join and participate in a discourse community, where discourse refers to the sharing of any form in which meaning is encoded and can be decoded."[353]

In Howard Gardner's symbol processing approach to learning in the arts, learning means acquiring symbol systems specific to particular artistic domains (music, dance, visual

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350 Arthur D. Efland, *Art and Cognition: Integrating the Visual Arts in the Curriculum* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002), 36, 78.
351 Jackie Wiggins, *Teaching for Musical Understanding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13, 16.
352 Elliot Eisner, *The Arts and the Creation of Mind* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 85.
353 Ibid.

art) and the development of symbolic cognition. He writes, "to the extent that an individual becomes literate with a given symbol system in the arts, to the extent that he or she can productively perceive, create, or reflect within that system, one may assume that arts education has achieved some success."[354] Gardner claims these cognitive achievements can be seen in "steps through which children pass as they master various components of different artistic symbol systems: how they learn to appreciate style in different art forms; how they come to apprehend metaphor and other forms of figurative language; how they incorporate into their own fledgling works those expressive components which confer power and significance upon artistic symbolization."[355] Although Gardner does not use the term acquisition, his conception of learning in the arts still relies upon the same logic of subjective internalization of objective cultural content into mental representations that guide the learner to mastery.

While Gardner and others in arts education have focused on the acquisition of symbolic and formal systems of meaning in the individual learner relatively detached from social context, more recent scholarship has focused on social interaction as the medium and means for knowledge construction. This shift in focus nevertheless often retains the language of acquisition and representation. Lucy Green, for example, emphasizes the value of popular musicians' informal learning processes but still describes learning as the "acquisition and exchange of skills" and characterizes musical listening and copying as "skill and knowledge acquisition processes."[356] She also talks about teaching as "the transmission

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354 Howard Gardner, "Toward More Effective Arts Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 22, no. 1 (1988): 158.
355 Ibid., 159.
356 Lucy Green, *Music, Informal Learning, and the School: A New Classroom Pedagogy* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008).

of tastes, values, practices, skills, or knowledge from one person to another."[357] Similarly, Georgina Barton claims that "music knowledge is both transmitted and acquired multi-modally and often encourages learners to actively participate in music knowledge processes."[358] Although Green and Barton no doubt intend transmission and acquisition processes to be conceived as complex interactions that may not be linear, the terms still imply that there exists an external, objective content that the learner must represent to herself and internalize.

Within the transmission-acquisition framework—because it presupposes the pre-existence of an objective content that can be transmitted from one person and acquired by another—scholars in arts education tend to assume that what is to be learned must be decided in advance of the learning process and must take the form of an already-given set of skills, practices, or conceptual knowledge. In visual arts education, Anna Kindler advocates a pedagogical approach in which students develop and construct "multiple pictorial repertoires" that lead toward the "mastery of systems of pictorial representation" in the socio-cultural contexts (i.e., visual cultures) in which such systems are put to work.[359] In music education, Wiggins proposes that "learners need to engage in real-life situations—problem-solving situations in which they work side by side with the teacher to develop their own expertise" and that learners need to be "fully cognizant of what they are supposed to be doing and learning."[360] Furthermore, she contends, "both learners and teachers need to

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[357] Lucy Green, *Learning, Teaching, and Musical Identity: Voices Across Cultures* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011), 1.
[358] Georgina Barton, *Music Learning and Teaching in Culturally and Socially Diverse Contexts: Implications for Classroom* Practice (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 7.
[359] Anna M. Kindler, "'From Endpoints to Repertoires:' A Challenge to Art Education" *Studies in Art Education* 40, no. 4 (1999): 344.
[360] Wiggins, *Teaching for Musical Understanding*, 20, 22.

enter a learning situation understanding what is about to take place" and "share an understanding of what is being learned and of how it is being learned."[361] Other scholars in music education echo Wiggins' call for learning environments to be modeled on "real-life" musical practices and modes of "transmission and acquisition"[362] where "certain general musicianship traits and skills can be promoted that are eventually transferable…to similar and common musical practices."[363] The outcome of such learning experiences, Wiggins writes, "is understanding—conceptual understanding and the ability to apply those concepts to a variety of situations."[364]

All of the arts education perspectives on learning sketched above rely upon the assumption that learning is the acquisition of knowledge and skills transmitted from a socio-cultural source. Although scholars use various terminology to talk about learning, they generally promote the idea that learners internalize pre-existing knowledge, skills, and practices as concepts (mental representations) that guide their activity and thought processes in a particular artistic domain or community of practice. Successful learning is thus determined by the learner's fluency and facility with the tools and concepts of the artistic domain in the image of what expert practitioners define as mastery.[365] In these ways, learning in arts education is defined on the basis of an already-given system of values, skills, and knowledge—*learning to* be an artist based on what is already recognized as properly artistic skill and knowledge.

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361 Ibid., 22.
362 Lucy Green, *Hear, Listen, Play! How to Free Your Students' Aural, Improvisation, and Performance Skills* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
363 Thomas A. Regelski, "Curriculum: Implications of Aesthetic Versus Praxial Philosophies" in *Praxial Music Education: Perspectives and Dialogues*, edited by David J. Elliott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 237.
364 Wiggins, *Teaching for Musical Understanding*, 24.
365 See Lave and Wenger, *Situated Learning.*

Notions of learning as transmission and acquisition are based in developmental psychology and cognitive science which, in turn, are based on a complex philosophical lineage beginning with Plato, extending through rationalism, and culminating in Husserlian phenomenology before taking wildly divergent paths in twentieth century analytic and continental philosophy. Below I highlight the theories of Kant on representation and Husserl on intentionality as they contribute to the prevailing cognitive theories of mind and learning reproduced in music and arts education.

Philosophical Foundations of Cognitivism from Kant to Husserl

As I discussed in chapter 2 and the introduction, representational thought has gone hand in hand with the development of cognitivism. That there exists a world outside immediate individual (i.e. subjective) control or calculation is presupposed in almost any theory of learning. Learning cannot happen absent a relation to a context, world, or milieu beyond the learning subject. That we learn through experience with this "outside" is also foundational in accounts of learning from Hume and Kant to Dewey and Piaget. Early philosophical accounts of how we can arrive at true knowledge claim a pre-ordained harmony of the understanding—what nowadays is called "intelligence" or "thought" taken from Latin *intellectus* which translates the Greek concept *noûs*—with essential and eternal forms or Ideas. This notion is sometimes called "correlationism" because it presupposes that what is "internal" to thought is necessarily correlated to, though separate from, the "external" world that it perceives.[366] Throughout the history of philosophy, thought has typically been conceived as representational in nature. Representational theories of mind,

[366] The debate over correlationism is in some ways foundational to contemporary posthumanist and new materialist philosophy. See Steven Shaviro, *The Universe of Things: On Speculative Realism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

such as cognitivism but which also include those of Plato, Leibniz, and Kant, suppose that knowledge must be represented internally in the form of concepts and have a self-contained existence in subjective consciousness independent of the reality which it represents.[367]

While Plato and the idealists posited pure Ideas outside the physical realm as the ground of knowledge, and Aristotle and the empiricists posited sensory experience of the physical realm as the ground of knowledge, Kant approached the problem through a critical synthesis of Platonic idealism and Aristotelian empiricism that he called *transcendental idealism*.[368] Kant rejected the notion that thought requires a *transcendent* source beyond what can be experienced (the infinite, God, the soul); yet, at the same time Kant denied that sensory experience and the empirical world alone could grant legitimate conceptual knowledge because humans cannot know things in themselves apart from the finitude of human consciousness. As Melissa McMahon explains, Kant argued that "one cannot…arrive at any truths about sensible experience or what actually exists by analyzing concepts [alone], nor can one…'derive' any necessary truths from experience [alone]."[369] Instead, Kant claimed that thought requires a *synthesis* of the sensible and the intelligible according to pure concepts of the understanding (quantity, quality, relation, modality) and pure forms of intuition (space and time) in the mind.[370]

Although Kant maintained that the "pure" concepts of the understanding and the "pure" forms of intuition are in some ways preformed in us, he also maintained that thought

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[367] See Hubert L. Dreyfus, "The Socratic and Platonic Basis of Cognitivism" *Artificial Intelligence & Society* 2, (1988): 99-112.
[368] Catherine Malabou, *Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains*, translated by Carolyn Shread (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 3. See also Catherine Malabou, *Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).
[369] Melissa McMahon, "Immanuel Kant," in *Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage*, edited by Graham Jones and Jon Roffe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 89-90.
[370] McMahon, "Immanuel Kant," 87-102.

does not come to us already made in what we encounter in the world but must be actively constructed out of what is given into concepts. For Kant, our empirical concepts (such as the concept of a tree) "regulate the [combination] of perceptually acquired information into a single representation, or information-bearing state."[371] Concepts contain schema, or rules, which allow the subject to combine perceptions under a representation and which allow the concept to be applied to other perceived instances of it.[372] Thought is thus determin*able* in experience according to the intelligible and the sensible but not determin*ed* by it. In these ways, Kant provides the philosophical basis for cognitivism in that he elaborates an entirely representational account of thought, and provides the basis for constructivism in that he claims the mind has to actively synthesize (i.e. construct) information it receives into concepts.

Piaget's theory of child development, as well as most constructivist accounts of learning and development, are essentially Kantian. Piaget's famous concepts "accommodation" and "assimilation" that describe what happens in the process of learning qua development are analogous to Kant's theory of how people construct experience: the child encounters things in the world to which it must adapt through constructing concepts according to what is available but not determined in experience, but which nevertheless correspond to the categories given by Nature. Piaget explains, "all behavior is an assimilation of reality into prior schemata (schemata which, to varying degrees, are due to heredity) and all behavior is at the same time an accommodation [i.e. transformation] of these schemata to the actual situation."[373] In Kantian terms, assimilation and accommodation are

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[371] Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Dedicated Cognitivist System" in *Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science*, edited by J-C. Smith (London: Kulwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 195.
[372] Ibid., 195, 196.
[373] Jean Piaget, quoted in Malabou, *Morphing Intelligence*, 74.

transcendental because the mental activity they describe is not entirely determined in advance by genetics, instinct, or programming but must be synthesized via "acts of intelligence."[374] Piaget's account of learning, as well as those of thinkers like Dewey, Vygotsky, Bruner, and Gardner, describe "how intelligence constitutes itself *by adapting to logic*, which means that [intelligence] can be defined as all of the synthesizing operations of the postures of the body in space and the siting of ideas in the mind."[375] The central idea that cognitivism takes from Kant is that knowledge is synthesized (constructed) as internal mental representations that guide the subject's intelligent activity in the world.

The representational theory of mind provides the bulk of the cognitivist perspective, but is also typically accompanied by the notion of intentionality. While Thomas Aquinas introduced the term "intentionality" to refer to development and growth, Franz Brentano resurrected the term to describe how the mind is directed toward things.[376] After Husserl's reformulation of Brentano's thesis, philosophers began using intentionality "to denote the relation that a thought or a belief has to whatever it signifies in the world," requiring the notion of representation as mental content.[377] Because "representations are states of mind, and we are conscious of them," philosophers and cognitive scientists assume that "consciousness precedes intentionality," and in fact requires it *a priori*.[378] In Husserl's phenomenology, intentionality explains the relationship between the representations that the mind creates and the rules that govern the creation and application of concepts, much as Kant explained with his theory of the synthesis of empirical concepts. For Husserl, "the

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374 Ibid., 70.
375 Ibid., 72 italics added.
376 Walter J. Freeman, *How Brains Make Up Their Minds* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 118.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.

representational content of an act," which *is* its intentionality, "has two components: (1) the 'matter' of the act which represents an object under a particular aspect, and (2) the 'quality' of the act which represents the relation of the subject to the represented object."[379] John Searle interprets this to mean that "every Intentional state consists of a representative content in a certain psychological mode."[380] While Husserl claimed phenomenology might get to the "things themselves" through the analysis of what thoughts are about (objects), he approached this task by reducing everything (in the phenomenological *epochè*) to the contents of subjective consciousness and intentional mental states that supposedly direct all action in the world.

With the idea of intentionality in its Husserlian form, cognitive science has assumed that all intelligent activity (i.e. activity that is not random or unconscious) must be guided by internal beliefs, schema, or intentional states of mind. In short, cognitive science assumes that for any action or idea to come about in the subject, there must be an underlying mental schema (rule, theory, abstract principle) in the mind that governs such action or thought process. As Fred Keijzer explains, the cognitivist representational-intentional view posits that "there has to be a kind of motor program [as a mental state] which represents the behavior to be executed…and which instructs the agent's motor system" in order for any intelligent behavior to take place.[381] In this interpretation, intentionality "always amounts to *my taking* something *as* something, taking it under some aspect," concept or schema, where "…there must always be an ego doing the taking. I must represent to myself that my bodily

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379 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Introduction" in *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), 4.
380 John Searle, "What is an Intentional State?" in *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*, edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus, 264-265.
381 Fred Keijzer, *Representation and Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 2.

movement is meant to bring about a specific state of affairs."[382] In these ways, the mind is thought to always account for everything it does through representations, much like a computer: a "representation of the goal of the action must exist throughout the motion and must play a continuing causal role in shaping the action."[383]

Deleuze and Derrida's Critique of Representation and Intentionality

Deleuze challenges the idea of representation because it tends to measure all things against the image of a particular being—the human—and tends to make all cognition a re-cognition that confirms what is already given in experience (identities), and accedes to the common sense of "everybody knows" assumed from the position of expert knowledge.[384] For Derrida, representation and intentionality are problematic because they always assume "the privilege of the present-now" where what the subject re-presents to herself is thought to be a constantly available presence open to infinite repeatability and in which her acts of consciousness are thought to maintain full presence and consistency in themselves.[385] Additionally, from the perspectives of Deleuze and Derrida, cognitivist theories of mind and learning are suspect because they assume the *necessity* of representation and intentionality for thought and because they consider representation and intentionality as unproblematic features of *all* thought and learning.

Derrida challenges Searle's account of intentionality (mentioned above in passing) because of Searle's argument that "the subject must experience the causal connection

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382 Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality" in *Skillful Coping*, 88.
383 Ibid., 79.
384 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 1968/1994).
385 Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs,* translated by David B. Allison (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 57, 48.

between the *intention* in action and the bodily movement *continuously*."[386] Derrida also questions Searle's claim that the subject's intention—both the object it is about and the subject's conscious awareness—is fully present in the act.[387] In other words, Searle maintains that the subject's intention is unified and fully present through her actions and that she must experience her actions as being caused by her intentions.[388] Derrida challenges Searle here because, he claims, if the intentional act is directed toward others it must already have a relation to the other from the origin that is not one of full presence. This means that the act would not be entirely caused by the conscious intention of the subject and that the intentional act could not completely coincide with itself if it is to be carried out and recognized as an intentional act by another person. If the intentional act were fully present in itself, it could not reach out toward anything other than itself. Derrida writes, "[I]ntention is a priori (at once) *différante*: differing and deferring, in its inception…In no case will it be fulfilled, actualized, totally present to its object and to itself. It is divided and deported in advance, by its iterability, towards others, *removed in advance* from itself. This re-move makes its movement possible …What is limited by iterability is not intentionality in general, but its character of being conscious or present to itself (actualized, fulfilled, and adequate)…"[389]

Deleuze similarly questions the privilege and primacy given to fully conscious and unified acts of thinking in the cognitivist image of thought. Like Derrida, Deleuze argues that a subject who would be continuously present and in full command of her actions would merely confirm "established values" and already-given knowledge, and thus could not really think or learn anything new or different. Deleuze comments, "[W]ho can believe that the

386 Dreyfus, "Heidegger's Critique of the Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality," 79, italics added.
387 Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988)
388 See Searle, "What is an Intentional State?"
389 Derrida, *Limited Inc*, 56, 105.

destiny of thought is at stake in these acts, and that when we recognise, we are thinking?"[390] So for Deleuze, as Levi Bryant explains, "It is not the immanent and self-conscious ego possessing sovereign power over its ability to think which exercises the power to think, but rather the unconscious thinking under the constraint of the encounter…That which brings me to think is not the recognized, not what I'm accustomed to, not the habitual, but that which differs and is uncanny."[391] Likewise in Claire Colebrook's interpretation of Deleuze, "it is not the case that the subject precedes and grounds statements or experiences at a distance from the actual world; rather, life produces differences and it is the feeling of that variation that allows something like an orientation or sense of the world to emerge."[392] Together, Deleuze and Derrida show how the assumptions of representation and intentionality in cognitive learning theories install one in a series of ontological and epistemological dualisms, hierarchies, and oppositions based on the *a priori* determination of subjects and objects, the supposed primacy of consciousness in cognition, and the separation of the internal contents of mind from the external physical reality they "represent." Deleuze and Derrida challenge the legitimacy of these assumptions and suggest ways of conceiving learning and cognition without representation and intentionality—at least without them in any conventional understanding of the terms. Both Deleuze and Derrida agree that cognition and learning are not originally nor primarily intentional and conscious endeavors that would begin with the fully-formed, unified subject over against the objects it intends. Rather, Deleuze and Derrida insist that thought begins before consciousness and before the full determination of subjects and objects in the space of an event-encounter of learning.

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390 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 135.
391 Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 78, 81.
392 Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life* (London: Continuum, 2010), 178.

Deleuze and the Sensation of Learning

Deleuze defines learning as being drawn into problems, experimenting with them, and then appropriating and assimilating their singular features into new bodily capacities. Appropriation and assimilation as used here do not mean internal mental representations, but rather a kind of coupling of the body with its environment that enables new possibilities for action and relation. In Deleuze's account of learning, we encounter "problems" posed by sensations, or what he sometimes calls signs. Such signs are not necessarily symbolic or linguistic but more like sensory aggregates: colors, scents, images, timbres, weights, and pressures. When encountering sensations and signs, we are *questioned* by them, like the Caterpillar who asks Alice "Who *are* you?" Through sensations, the problem *calls* to us and compels-propels us to respond.[393] Deleuze describes a problem as a "colored thickness" in which we are included, not an "out there" which we observe from a distance. For Deleuze, the ways in which we think and respond to problems are not guided by mental representations nor intentional activity, but by movement and sensation in a field of differences and unlimited qualitative becomings that "force us to think."[394]

To learn, Deleuze states, is "to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea [problem] in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold of consciousness at which our *real acts* are adjusted to our perceptions of the *real relations*, thereby providing a solution to the problem."[395] We

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[393] "Problems are acts that open a horizon of sense, and which subtend the creation of concepts: the appearance of a new questioning opening up an uncommon perspective on that which is most familiar, or creating interest in something that had been up till then regarded as insignificant." François Zourabichvili, *The Vocabulary of Deleuze,* translated by Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003/2012), 202. See also Claire Colebrook, *Deleuze and the Meaning of Life* (London: Continuum, 2010) and *Understanding Deleuze* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002).
[394] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 1968/2001), 139.
[395] Ibid., 165.

are entered into the problem, and in acts of experimentation and composition between our bodies and the elements of the problem, create a new problematic field: a condensation and appropriation of relatings that enable new patterns of relation and action to emerge. In Deleuze's account of learning, the problem a learner encounters "is not a signified entity of which we can make sense, but a signifying (or proto-signifying), sense-making *process*" in which the learner participates.[396] Deleuze writes, "learning evolves entirely in the comprehension of problems as such, in the apprehension and condensation of singularities and in the composition of ideal events [problems] and bodies."[397] Comprehension and apprehension in Deleuze's theory are not meant as primarily mental activities, but as sub-conscious processes that involve the whole body in conjunction with its environment.

Throughout his discussions of learning, Deleuze opposes learning to knowledge, claiming "it is from 'learning,' not from knowledge, that the transcendental conditions of thought must be drawn."[398] For Deleuze, "knowledge gives life laws that separate it from what it can do, that keep if from acting, that forbid it to acting, maintaining it in the narrow framework of scientifically observable reaction: almost like an animal in a zoo."[399] Deleuze, Jack Reynolds explains, "stridently distances himself from rule-following understandings of learning that depend upon calculative reflection and knowledge."[400] As Deleuze argues in his critique of representation, learning in the form of knowledge acquisition tends to reduce learning to recognition and restricts action to the realm of already-given subject-object

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396 Michael Marder, *The Event of the Thing: Derrida's Post-Deconstructive Realism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 44.
397 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 192.
398 Ibid.
399 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962/1983), 100.
400 Jack Reynolds, "Dreyfus and Deleuze on *L'habitude*, Coping, and Trauma in Skill Acquisition" *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 14, no. 4 (2006): 551.

determinations. Throughout his philosophical oeuvre, Deleuze reiterates his disdain for common sense, expert or "majoritarian" thought, and ready-made concepts because they illegitimately decide what a body and thought are capable of in advance of the body's movement and thinking. Thus in his writings on learning, "Deleuze focuses on apprenticeship rather than mastery, and frequently talks of what he calls an 'essential apprenticeship.'"[401] Reynolds comments that "on [Deleuze's] view, the apprentice is someone who is not preoccupied with knowledge, which is said to create generalities in the form of rule-following or rule-enabling solutions, but is instead envisaged as someone who occupies and inhabits problems in a more practical and experiential way."[402] Deleuze writes, "[W]e never know how someone learns; but whatever the way, it is always by the intermediary of signs, by wasting time, and *not by the assimilation of some objective content*…we never learn by doing *like* someone, but by doing *with* someone, who bears no resemblance to what we are learning."[403]

Derrida and The Gift of Learning

Like Deleuze, Derrida is critical of the idea that learning is merely the internal acquisition and assimilation of some external objective content given in advance of the learning process. Derrida's writings on the gift provide intriguing avenues for challenging the logic of learning as transmission and acquisition in ways that Deleuze's philosophy does not approach, at least on the surface. While I cannot claim that all of what Derrida wrote on the

401 Reynolds, "Dreyfus and Deleuze" 552.
402 Reynolds, "Dreyfus and Deleuze," 552.
403 Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text*, translated by Richard Howard (London: The Athlone Press, 1964/2000), 22, italics added.

gift can be extended to a concept of learning, I am arguing that what he says about exchange, acquisition, and giving can be logically extended to what happens in the event of learning.

Take the example of an unexpected gift. A friend has sent me something in the mail, but I have not regularly exchanged gifts with this friend, so I am surprised and delighted by its arrival. I did not see it coming. It is a particularly thoughtful gift, handmade, along with a postcard. For me, this gift elicits feelings of joy, fond memories, and warmth. But in this event of giving, something happens to me and to all the component parts of this event that is not reducible to reciprocity or exchange. The gift-event is not *a priori* calculable (my friend cannot foresee how I will receive the gift) nor is it assignable in terms of intentionality (my friend cannot have willed every contingency of what will happen in giving me this gift). So, while my friend clearly gave me the gift object (she made it and mailed it to me), she did not clearly nor properly give me the event of its being-giving, understood as what I undergo in the event of its arrival as gift. Even if she had handed me the gift in person, this would still be the case. The gift-event initiates something in me and in the world I inhabit that is not simply the effect of a causal chain of events reducible to the gift-object or my friend's intentions: the intentional act of giving cannot guarantee what I will have experienced in the gift-event.

The gift-event is not reducible to the gift-object, to the "what" of gift-giving; I can neither intend nor will the event of giving to happen to another. The gift exchange—transmission and acquisition—would be an attempt to efface the irreducibly excessive nature of the gift-event. For example, if I try to return the favor by sending my friend a gift, because I might now feel indebted or obligated to give back, this would in effect annul or cancel out the event of the gift I received from her by placing the gift back into an economy of exchange. But when I give someone a gift there remains a cultural if not personal

expectation that this gift will be returned in kind by another gift, perpetuating the economy of gift exchange. Thus, Derrida points out that a pure gift outside of all exchange and reciprocity is impossible. Nevertheless, there is giving: a kind of gift-event that sets in motion all forms of donation, giving-and-receiving. It is this sense of the gift-event not being reducible to the gift-object that I extend to learning: the learning-event is never reducible to a pre-existing content to be learned, nor to the "outcome" of learning measured after the fact. The learning-event exceeds any simple intentionality or causal chain that would give rise to it. The "results" or effects of learning are not learning in themselves, but only the apparent traces of the effacement of the traces of learning, to borrow Derrida's terminology. Said another way, trying to trace learning back to an identifiable source, cause, or origin amounts to erasing learning, canceling out the event of its arrival.

Looking to Derrida's words now, I have altered the text by replacing the word "gift" with the word "learning." My modified version of Derrida reads, "if there is [learning], it cannot take place between two subjects *exchanging* objects, things, or symbols. The question of [learning] should therefore seek its place before any relation to the subject, before any conscious or unconscious relation to self or the subject…A subject will never give [learning] to another subject…" but rather, "the subject and the object are arrested effects of [learning]"[404] Continuing the same modified line of argument, Derrida's text reads "[learning], if there is any, must go against nature or occur without nature…"[405] and therefore involves "responding where there is no reason to be asked for or to be given."[406] This kind of response implies, as gathered from Deleuze, experimentation and a kind of

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404 Derrida, *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 13.
405 Ibid., 162.
406 Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, translated by David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 72.

decision that determines subject and object as the *effect* rather than the *cause* of learning. But, as Derrida writes, "the paradoxical condition of every decision" is that "it cannot be deduced from a form of knowledge of which it would simply be the effect, conclusion, or explicitation."[407] The experimental decision that constitutes learning takes place *before* knowledge.

For learning to bring about something new in the learner, it must exceed the material and temporal limits of the determinate entities that undergo learning—such as the human or the individual self, understood as a unity—and thus, by definition, must also exceed the intended outcomes of learning established *a priori* upon determinate entities. Learning necessarily passes through the immeasurable, the incalculable, and the unforeseeable; insofar as this passage constitutes learning, it is in itself immeasurable, incalculable, and unforeseeable. As such an encounter, learning "interrupts experience, does it a violence, calls its assumptions into question [and thus] must be opposed to habit and association, both of which strive to establish the continuity of experience."[408] Deleuze writes, "A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, without mediating between them; and introduces time into thought…"[409] Taking Deleuze and Derrida together, this time of learning would be the time of experimentation and decision that necessarily transgresses reason and given determinations of subject and object. It would

[407] Ibid., 77.
[408] Bryant, *Difference and Givenness*, 77.
[409] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 166-167.

be a "given time" that arrests the mundane temporality of habitual experience, that forces experience out of joint onto the horizon of something new.

Deleuze and Derrida with Contemporary Science and Posthumanism

Both Derrida and Deleuze depart from the idea that learning is a fully conscious, mental process guided by intentional action in an individual human subject. Their non-intentional accounts of learning and their challenges to representational thought suggest the need to look beyond the transmission-acquisition explanatory framework posited by cognitivism and educational psychology. Deleuze, for example, relies heavily upon biological concepts and ethology (the study of animal behavior) both in his discussion of learning and his theory of art. Likewise, Derrida employs ideas from cybernetics and neuroscience in several important essays that address intentionality and cognition. Furthermore, Deleuze explains learning in terms of movement and sensation in a field of differences that does not necessarily require mental activity or cognition—at least not in the ways they are typically understood—while Derrida's deconstructive reading of intentionality denies the possibility of a subject's intentions fully coinciding with her actions. Following these cues, I look to contemporary scientific research in the fields Deleuze and Derrida relied upon (biology, neuroscience, and cybernetics) alongside posthumanist philosophy to provide alternative ways of describing and defining learning to those of the cognitive paradigm. The research I highlight below provides empirical explanation and definitional clarity to Deleuze and Derrida's speculative accounts of learning.

Biologist and philosopher of science Pamela Lyon defines learning in broad biological terms as both the "capacity to adapt behavior according to past experience" and

"experience-modulated behavior change."[410] Anthropologist Tim Ingold contends similarly that "all animals learn…in the sense of adjusting their ways of doing things in response to prevailing environmental conditions."[411] Lyon expands on these definitions by explaining that "the experience, in *sensation*, of the continual transformation of shifting energies constitutes the seedbed of all biological behaviour, including all forms of higher cognition."[412] Lyon's description here is close to Deleuze's account of learning, where he gives centrality to sensation, and to his contention that thinking begins prior to consciousness in a field of intensive differences that forces thought into action.

Similarly, behavioral systems theorist Fred Keijzer conceives cognition as the process through which a neural or electro-chemical network, body, and environment become structurally coupled, mutually influencing one another to coordinate action: "every action itself is *literally* a developmental process …assembled from dynamical, self-organizing interactions between multiple scales of organizations."[413] And in strains that echo Derrida's complication of intentionality, neuroscientist Walter Freeman offers much empirical evidence from his own laboratory work and that of other researchers which suggests that conscious "awareness of a stimulus is not simultaneous with the onset of the stimulus, nor does it precede the genesis of an action…neural activity involved in the planning and organization of the movement *precedes* the awareness of an intention to act"[414] In Freeman's account, the feeling of intentional action arises as the capacity to modulate and smooth

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410 Pamela Lyon, "The cognitive cell: bacterial behavior reconsidered" *Frontiers in Microbiology* 6 (2015): 3-4.
411 Tim Ingold, *Anthropology In/As Education* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 2.
412 Lyon, "The biogenic approach to cognition," *Cognitive Process* 7 (2006): 21.
413 Keijzer, *Representation*, 203, 221, 226.
414 Freeman, *How Brains Make Up Their Minds,* 122, 124, italics added. Freeman (and Brian Massumi) reference Benjamin Libet's famous experiments on the temporal delay between neural activity and awareness of sensation as well as experiments that measured preparatory neural activity occurring before the subject's awareness of an intention to act.

"chaotic fluctuations" of neural activity which enables the selection or repression of incipient tendencies.[415] As such, "experience, normal or clinical, is never fully intentional. No matter how practiced the act, the result remains at least as involuntary as it is elicited."[416]

Posthumanist philosopher Brian Massumi borrows from many of these scientific findings in proposing that cognition "is already a complex duration before it is a discrete perception or [thought]…a duration whose end loops back to its beginning. It is a recursive duration."[417] This is supported by Freeman who writes, "each of us is a source of meaning, a wellspring for the flow of fresh constructions within our brains and bodies…" which come about through "exuberant growth of patterns of neural activity from the chaotic dynamics of populations containing myriads of neurons" and which produce actions that "continually flow into the world, changing the world and the relations of our bodies to it."[418] He submits it is "this dynamic system," the couplings of body, brain, and world, which "is the agency in charge, not our awareness, which is constantly trying to catch up with what we do."[419] Likewise, Lyon and Keijzer admit "neurobiological evidence strongly suggests no locus," such as the ego, or a unitary consciousness "exists where 'it all comes together.'"[420] Rather, "we become conscious," Massumi claims, "of a situation in its midst, already actively engaged in it. Our awareness is always of an already ongoing participation in an unfolding relation."[421] It is "participation [which] precedes recognition: being [which] precedes

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415 Freeman, *How Brain Make Up Their Minds,* 136; Brian Massumi, *Parables,* 195.
416 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Matter, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 191.
417 Ibid., 195.
418 Freeman, *How Brain Make Up Their Minds*, 139.
419 Ibid.
420 Pamela Lyon and Fred Keijzer, "The Human Stain: Why Cognitivism Can't Tell Us What Cognition Is & What It Does," in *The Mind, The Body and The World: Psychology After Cognitivism?* edited by Brendan Wallace, Alastair Ross, John Davies, and Tony Anderson (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2007), 153.
421 Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual,* 231.

cognition. The separately recognizable, speakable identities of the objects and subjects involved in the unfolding event come into definition only retrospectively. In the event, they are inseparable from the immediacy of the relation…Subject and object are embedded in the situational relation in a way that cannot be fully determined in advance."[422]

Furthermore, posthumanist philosophy and contemporary biological research trouble the separability of life processes, such as metabolism or respiration, from supposedly "mental" processes, such as learning and cognition. Keijzer points out how cognitivism has typically presumed that there are (or should be) "deep distinctions between automatic, reflex-like behavior on the one hand, and intentional, cognitively guided behavior on the other."[423] It turns out, however, that what is commonly thought of as reflexive behavior cannot be adequately explained in terms of stimulus-response chains, and that "principled distinctions between 'metabolic' and 'cognitive' function…[are] increasingly difficult to defend even in human beings, given increasing understanding of immune system involvement in *normal* memory and learning…and the surprising effects of psychological stressors on metabolic physiology"[424]

Taking an expansive view of "mind and nature" that does not distinguish between the mental, physical, and metabolic, Gregory Bateson writes that learning is "that wider knowing which is the glue holding together the starfishes and sea anemones and redwood forests and human committees…a single knowing which characterizes evolution as well as aggregates of humans."[425] While Bateson conflates the terms learning and knowing, he does not mean "knowledge" in the doxic sense that Deleuze critiques. In Bateson's theory,

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[422] Ibid.
[423] Keijzer, *Behavior and Representation*, 21.
[424] Ibid., and Lyon, "The cognitive cell," 5.
[425] Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity* (New York: E. Dutton, 1979), 5.

learning works through the creation of "the pattern which connects:" a pattern, Bateson says, that depends upon "an aesthetic question: How are you related to this creature? What pattern connects you to it?"[426] Explaining how he conceives pattern in this sense, Bateson writes, "we have been trained to think of patterns, with the exception of music, as fixed affairs…In truth, the right way to begin to think about the pattern which connects is to think of it as *primarily* (whatever that means) a dance of interacting parts and only secondarily pegged down by various sorts of physical limits and by those limits which organisms characteristically impose."[427]

The scientists and philosophers featured above point toward a view of learning that gives primacy to the body, sensation, and the body's changing patterns of relation to its environment rather than mental representations and conscious, intentional action. Against the view of learning as the transmission and acquisition of knowledge between already-formed subjects, learning can be viewed as the emergence of new ways of relating between a subject-in-the-making and a world-in-the-making. In this definition, learning would not begin with a fully-formed, unified subject over against the object of knowledge it intends, but as movement and sensation in a field of differences that invite new ways of relating to emerge; where, as Derrida argues, "the subject and the object are arrested effects of [learning],"[428] rather than origin of it. Instead of something that happens in the mind of an individual, learning can be seen as something that happens in complex relation among things, bodies, and world. Because it does not depend upon the narrow field of intentional human action and mental representation, learning as defined here might encompass a much

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426 Ibid., 9.
427 Ibid., 13.
428 Derrida, *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 13.

broader array of activity than previously recognized. One may be able to see learning happening in ways that would otherwise be ignored or dismissed for not having the proper cognitive or representational traits.

Learning in Music Beyond Representation and Intentionality

Having discussed an alternative view of learning from that of cognitivism following Deleuze, Derrida, posthumanist theory, and contemporary scientific perspectives, I now return to the scenario of learning a new song on the guitar that I offered at the beginning of the chapter in order to show how one might interpret learning it through the ideas I have presented above. In the earlier scenario, I described learning a new song on the guitar impersonally from the perspective of the teacher. Here, I describe the process in a first person narrative to better illustrate learning in terms of movement and sensation and as a process of relation among things, body, and world.

Suppose I have been listening to Tracy Chapman's "Fast Car" and would like to learn to play it on my guitar. While I imagine that this desire to learn the song is the unproblematic origin of my learning, that I can entertain such a goal is a sign (in Deleuze's sense) that I am already in the midst of a problem that has posed itself to *me* rather than a problem I have determined fully on my own. If I tried to track down precisely the moment when I started listening to the song or when I had the first inclination to learn the song, I would likely find that I could not determine with any degree of certainty when I first heard the song nor when it first occurred to me that I might learn the song. Before I am aware of them, pre-conscious thought processes and tendencies toward action are already underway in the world of my guitar-playing and song-listening. My intentions are, as Derrida says,

"removed in advance" from my conscious control and awareness.[429] Something has already called me into a field of inquiry where it would be possible for me to want to learn a new song. Guitar, song, and body are already involved in a problematic event of learning before I have the conscious feeling that I intend to learn the song. *A* learning is already going on before I know it. I am not in control this learning; rather, I *participate* in it.

Furthermore, what becomes in the conjugation body-guitar-song is not identical to nor identifiable as what I, my guitar, or the song are prior to our collective encounter in learning. As the condition of the song's iterability and learnability by anyone in particular, it must from its origin tend toward differentiation and transformation.[430] Recall the argument made in Chapter 2 about the repetition of a work of art: its repetition is never a repetition of the same (identity), but a repetition of difference, of the work itself undergoing a becoming, a differing from itself. Therefore, when I set out to learn a particular song, it does not simply stay the same song it was: the song participates with me in the process of learning, taking on a different existence along the way. Likewise, my guitar is continuously undergoing changes in its material composition: expanding and contracting with changes in humidity, bending and shaping itself in contact with my body, developing ever-richer timbral qualities as its wood ages. It perhaps goes without saying that my body, too, is never exactly the same, always in a dynamic "state" of variation.

Always already a multiplicity of shifting forces, my body, guitar, and song create a problematic field (to use Deleuze's term) wherein what becomes in and of our learning—*a* learning, not belonging fully to body, guitar, or song—happens outside of *present* subject-object determinations of body, guitar, and song. Yet this non-present "outside" of

[429] Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 57.
[430] This is Derrida's argument about the nature of any kind of text or inscription.

determinate subject-and-objects is a kind of difference and alterity that dwells intimately *within* the being of self, guitar, and song. This is how body, guitar, and song are able to open onto a problematic event through which new patterns of activity, participation, and relation between body, guitar, and song emerge: where "I" learn "the" song on "my" guitar. As Barbara Rogoff explains, "the process of appropriation from shared activity, in contrast to the process of internalization of external activity, can be likened to the utilization of air and water in the functioning of an organism…The air and water are filtered and transformed to fit the needs of the body. The exchange is constant, does not require attention, and is already in place when a human being is still only one cell."[431]

So, while music and arts education have remained within conceptions of learning that rely upon the logic of representation, intentionality, and acquisition, such notions need not be the only way in which learning can be understood and studied. Thinking about learning as the emergence of new patterns of activity, relation, and participation between subjects-in-the-making and worlds-in-the-making may allow arts educators to notice and attend to learnings going around them in ways that an acquisitive and representational framework would pass over. Such a perspective might enable arts educators to see, as Rogoff suggests, that "far from being a copy of what is already invented or available…[learning] involves a creative process…where information and skills are not transmitted but are transformed in the process of appropriation."[432] Learning might be seen as "active transformation of understanding and engagement in dynamic activities," but one in which an individual human mind is not the only nor the central agent in control of the process.[433]

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[431] Barbara Rogoff, *Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in Social Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 195.
[432] Ibid., 197.
[433] Rogoff, *The Cultural Nature of Human Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 254.

Rather, it might be, as Tim Ingold suggests, "an aspirant imagination" untethered from any one determinate entity "that feels its way forward, improvising a passage through an as yet unformed world."[434]

[434] Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 140.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION: LEARNING IN THE ARTS AND RHYTHMIC INCLOSURE(S)

As I discussed in previously, the spatial metaphor that unites curriculum and architecture is that of enclosure: a bounded territory that defines everything according to already-given subject-object and interior-exterior determinations. In contrast, I offered the concept of *inclosure*—that which provides a provisional structure or structuring while remaining radically open to difference—as a way to think beyond the representational and intentional boundaries of curricular thought in music and arts education. In this chapter, I elaborate the idea of inclosure further in connection with musical metaphors, concepts, and illustrations of (musical) learning in practice. Specifically, I explore how learning in music and the arts might be thought of in terms of *rhythmic inclosure(s)* and what Deleuze calls "relations without measure."[435] I explore how the concept of rhythmic inclosure(s) might be employed to contest the contained and measured enclosures of representation, intentionality, and curricular thought. While a discussion of rhythm might seem out of place in thinking about space and built environments, many theorists (including Derrida and Deleuze) have articulated the close connection between rhythm, difference, and spacing in the production of inhabited spaces and built environments. Rhythm also serves to temporalize and introduce movement into often static conceptions of space found in architectural discourse.

Thinking about inclosures as places of musical-artistic learning also necessitates going beyond conceptual apparatuses attached to "score-based lineages of twentieth-century Western art music that conceive of musical materials primarily in the terms of [Western staff

[435] Gilles Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time: 'Occupying without Counting,'" *Angelaki: journal of the theoretical humanities* 3, no. 2 (1998): 70.

notation]."[436] Contemporary forms of musical-artistic creation, production, and participation—such as electroacoustic music, festivals, sound art, and hip hop—present a reality "in which musical thought and practice are irreducible to a score, where the ontological distinction between music and sound is disturbed, and which [foreground] the creative possibilities…of the mutable boundaries between music, sound and space."[437] Therefore, I begin the discussion of inclosure and rhythm by exploring philosophical, ethnomusicological, and anthropological accounts of the production of space as intimately bound to experiences of rhythm, sound, and affect. I then explore contemporary sites of musical-artistic participation—both familiar and little known in arts education—in rhythmic counterpoint with philosophical insights to illustrate possible pathways for learning-and-making in music and the arts that may lead beyond the enclosures of representation, intentionality, and curricular thought.

Rhythm: Sensation, Spacing, Movement, and Difference

Both Derrida and Deleuze articulate the irreducibly rhythmic nature of the production of space that happens before determinations of subjects-and-objects and interiors-and-exteriors. As they claim, the creation of space, extensity, territories, or boundaries—whether haphazard or planned—always arises from temporal, intensive movement among bodies in their becoming that is best characterized as rhythmic. In this sense, space can be thought as an ongoing *event* rather than a fixed container: spac*ing* rather than space. Yet in the metaphysics of Western tonal music, rhythmic relations are often

436 Georgina Born, "Introduction—music, sound and space: transformations of public and private experience," in *Music, Sound and Space: Transformations of Public and Private Experience* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5
437 Ibid.

contained in a grid-like space which pre-establishes the ratio of rhythmic values to one another against the central pulse unit. Rhythmic units are thus placed in measures, arrangement in accordance with "weak" or "strong" beats, and abide by rules for how rhythms may be combined with one another hierarchically. Both Derrida and Deleuze critique this "measured" time because it determines relations and differences among things under the image of a pre-given identity or map that fixes centers and margins and precludes movement beyond an already-given hierarchy.[438] As Timothy Taylor argues, such "cartographic means of representation not only permitted new conceptions of otherness, but also allowed them to flourish…Maps were thus a mode of containment as well as a mode of representation, a way of putting Others and their Elsewheres in view while keeping them safely at a distance."[439]

In concert with colonialism, tonal music historically "facilitated a concept of spatialization in music that provided for centers and margins, both geographically and psychologically."[440] With regard to harmony "tonality works by establishing a main key, from which the composer can move to other, subordinate keys, and move back in a kind of exploratory, cartographic mode."[441] As theorized in the eighteenth century by Jean-Philippe Rameau, the tonic "must be seen as the center of the mode, towards which is drawn all our desires. It is effectively the middle term of the proportion to which the extremes are so tied that they cannot stray from it for a moment….The harmonic sound of one, whose harmonic

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[438] See Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time;" and Derrida, "Tympan" in *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), ix-xxix. Coincidentally, Deleuze uses the phrase "relations without measure" while Derrida uses the phrase "rhythm without measure" in their respective essays.
[439] Timothy D. Taylor, *Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 25.
[440] Ibid.
[441] Ibid., 26-27.

succession it has already determined, obliges the Other to submit to it, and consequently to return to the principal sound."[442] As Taylor explains, "tonality and its ability to create centers and margins were construed as natural, inevitable, stable, just as Europeans naturalized their selfhood vis-à-vis non-European Others."[443]

While rhythm as conceptualized in the metaphysics of Western tonal music has functioned through enclosure—the fixing of identities and difference—rhythm as conceptualized by Deleuze and Derrida is generative and resists closure(s). Although Deleuze and Derrida recognize the inevitability, and even the necessity of, boundaries and defined territories, they emphasize how the play of *différance* and "lines of flight" both precede and continually interrupt fixed determinations of place, subject, and object.[444] While the repetition of a motif, a melody, or a rhythm may be used to establish a (musical) territory, the force of affect and sensation that sustains such demarcations always eludes determinate capture.

For Deleuze, the body and its environmental milieu are involved in a rhythmic counterpoint of differential forces, acting and being acted upon, that both expands outwardly and contracts inwardly to (re)form territories, membranes, or boundaries.[445] As he explains, rhythm is a "'logic of the senses'…diastole-systole: the world that seizes me by closing in around me, the self that opens to the world and opens the world itself."[446] In Deleuze's philosophy of art, rhythm produces the time of sensation: not captured sense,

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442 Jean-Philippe Rameau quoted in Taylor, *Beyond Exoticism*, 28.
443 Ibid.
444 See Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); and Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*.
445 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze's musical theory of territory borrows heavily from Jakob von Uexküll and Raymond Ruyer's discussions of the biological *Umwelt*. See Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 55-76.
446 Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, translated by Daniel W. Smith (New York: Continuum, 2003), 42-43.

clear perception, or defined emotions, but the passage of feeling—the opening and closing, folding and unfolding of affective relation.[447] Commenting on Deleuze, Elizabeth Grosz explains "rhythm is the force of differentiation of the different calibers of vibration that constitute chaos, the body and sensation, and their interlinkage" which must be understood "as another name for difference."[448]

In many of these ways, Deleuze's conception of rhythm comes quite close to that of Susanne Langer who conceives rhythm in terms of "the passage of life…a dense fabric of concurrent tensions."[449] Like Deleuze, Langer argues that the true nature of rhythm lies not in the measurable, periodic tick of the clock, but in the building up and relaxation of tensions that we hear *in* the audible tick: rhythm is thus "a relation between tensions rather than…equal divisions of time (i.e. meter)."[450] For Langer, rhythm is at the heart of "vital processes," a "dynamic pattern of events" that "immediately engender[s] a structure"—much as Deleuze claims about the rhythmic construction of territories.[451] Although Langer's

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447 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* 163-201; Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, 34-44.
448 Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 83-84.
449 Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p 109, 113. In some corners of music education scholarship, it has been fashionable to dismiss/disparage Langer's philosophy. While I cannot give a detailed argument here, I believe Langer has been woefully misunderstood and mischaracterized by philosophers of music education—both by those who cherish and disdain her. This is due, in part, to the difficulty philosophers have in putting Langer in (her) place: she disturbs the boundaries of analytic, continental, pragmatist, and process traditions (see Iris van der Tuin, "Bergson before Bergsonism: Traversing 'Bergson's Failing' in Susanne K. Langer's Philosophy of Art," *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy* 24, no. 2 (2016): p 176-202). Regardless of this difficulty, when Langer is read alongside her major influences—Bergson, Whitehead, and Cassirer—it becomes clear that her insights into art, music, and mind go well beyond the limits of petty arguments about aesthetic contemplation versus praxis. In fact, Langer anticipated many findings in dynamical systems theory and consciousness studies, and shares much in common with recent new materialist thought (see Erin Manning and Brian Massumi in particular). Likewise, the relation to Deleuze is far from superficial: both were profoundly influenced by Bergson, Whitehead, and naturalist philosophers Jakob von Uexküll and Raymond Ruyer.
450 Langer, *Feeling and Form*, 129.
451 Susanne K. Langer, *Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, volume I* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p 323, 158. Like Deleuze, Langer develops her notion of "living form" directly from Uexküll and Ruyer (alongside Whitehead).

writings on "feeling" and "living form" have been coopted by accounts of art where form is equated with representation—such as in Elliott Eisner and Bennett Reimer's discussions of "significant form"—Langer insists that "to feel is to do something, not to have something" and that "elements in art have not the character of things, but of acts."[452]

While Deleuze explores rhythm in terms of sensation, Derrida does so in terms of spacing. For Derrida, spacing is a concept for how things are drawn into relation, how they are placed/positioned alongside one another, but also how things escape fixed determinations and proper places. Derrida writes, "spacing is a concept which also, but not exclusively, carries the meaning of a productive, positive, generative force…not only the interval, the space constituted between two things (which is the usual sense of spacing), but also spacing…the movement of setting aside. This movement is inseparable from temporization-temporalization…and from *différance*, from the conflicts of force at work in them. It marks what is set aside from itself, what interrupts every self-identity."[453] Derrida also calls attention to the pre-Socratic meaning of rhythm—in Greek, *rythmós* (*ρυθμός*)—which, rather than signifying a regular pattern or ordered sequence (per Plato), refers to a "manner of flowing" and "form as improvised, momentary, changeable," "mobile and fluid."[454] As Julia Ponzio explains, rhythm in this sense suggests "a form that is always about to change or to break up," not grounded in advance by a calculated or "proper" relation to a central term.[455] In terms of inclosure, the rhythmic movement of spacing that Derrida

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[452] Ibid., 20, 202.
[453] Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 106-107.
[454] Julia Ponzio, "The Rhythm of Laughter: Derrida's Contribution to a Syntactic Model of Interpretation," *Derrida Today* 2, no. 2 (2011): 234-244.
[455] Ibid., 235.

describes operates like a mobile threshold that "in being closed, opens to the exterior, and in being open, encloses itself."[456]

Again, there are fruitful connections here to Langer's philosophy of art—especially to her concept of "living form."[457] For Langer, the seeming "permanence of form is 'always, at every moment, an achievement, because it depends entirely on the activity of 'living,' which 'is itself a process of continuous change.' Hence, '*the permanence is a pattern of changes*.'"[458] Langer connects all instances of form—whether in nature or art—to the "indefinite potentiality" of life.[459] She writes, "life is the progressive realization of potential acts; and as every realized act changes the pattern and range of what is possible…"[460] Therefore, "every boundary of a form is also a conjunction of forms…an ever-new constellation of possibilities."[461] In these ways, form is not a static container but a mobile inclosure of differential acts "not wholly determined, but still open to modification by internal or external conditions."[462]

In addition to spacing and sensation, rhythm can be thought in terms of lines, traces, and pathways of moving bodies. As Sara Ahmed notes, "lines are both created by being followed and are followed by being created. The lines that direct us, as lines of thought as well as lines of motion, are in this way performative: they depend on the repetition of norms and conventions, of routes and paths taken, but they are also created as an effect of this

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456 Paul Livingston, "Derrida and Formal Logic: Formalising the Undecidable," *Derrida Today* 3, no. 2 (2010): 234.
457 Langer, *Mind.*
458 Donald Dryden, "Whitehead's Influence on Susanne Langer's Conception of Living Form," *Process Studies* 26, no. 1 (1997): 71.
459 Langer, *Mind*, 206.
460 Ibid., 205, 206.
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.

repetition."[463] Taking up a similarly performative line of thought, Derrida points to the undecidability of "*je suis*" in French, which can mean either "I am" (from the verb *être*) or "I follow" (from the verb *suivre*). For Derrida, the invertibility of I am/I follow signals an "unending overlap of noun and verb:" both the self that leads movement and the self that follows from movement—undecidably.[464] He writes, "I am accessible, legible, visible only in a rearview mirror," both following behind and travelling beyond what has gone before.[465]

While repetitions of paths already taken may keep bodies "in line," lines that deviate from given paths can emerge, Ahmed writes, "when what is behind us, our background, does not simply ground us or keep us in place, but allows us to move and allows us to follow something other than the lines we have already taken."[466] Both Ahmed and anthropologist Tim Ingold suggest that we come to inhabit space and create a sense of place through rhythmic movement. Ingold writes that "places are delineated *by* movement, not by the outer *limits* to movement" and that "things are instantiated in the world *as* their paths of movement, not as objects located in space."[467] Places are created from "a tangled mesh of paths of coming and going, laid down by people as they make their way from place to place."[468] In Ingold and Ahmed's senses, bodies and spaces become through and as

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463 Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 16

464 Derrida, *Glas*, translated by John Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 5.

465 Ibid., 84

466 Ibid., 62-63.

467 Tim Ingold, *Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge, and Description* (London: Routledge, 2011), 149, 162.

468 Ibid., 160. Although the conflation of the terms "space" and "place" is considered problematic by some geographers, anthropologists, and philosophers (e.g. Yi-Fu Tuan), the theorists I follow are more concerned with the production of place as material-affective-bodily processes of spacing rather than representational or narrative ones. Thus the distinction between space and place is not often deemed important.

movement while they "negotiate a path through the world."[469] The emergent entity "je suis" (I am/I follow) has no essential existence apart from rhythmic movement, intra-actively feeling a way into being.

In this way, rhythm can be thought of as folding(s) of matter and spatio-temporal assemblages rather than separations between already-formed bodies and spaces—much as Karen Barad suggests with her notions of intra-action and "spacetimemattering."[470] Indeed, Barad writes that "the very materiality of our being, indeed all beings, participates in this *rhythm* of eternal transience" that perpetually interrupts the linear "flow of progress."[471] Along similar lines, Georgina Born explains that "at the core of our embodied experience of sound and music lies the interrelation between, and mutual modulation of, space and time" where, according to Michelle Duffy et al., "bodies and the spaces they inhabit are inseparable."[472] As Duffy writes elsewhere, "musicking is a visceral process, producing a range of responses—emotional, affective, spatial and bodily—that are significant to constituting a sense of being in place."[473] Such visceral processes and responses to music/sound "provide opportunities to make and remake individual subjectivities [and places] that may dis/connect to notions of community through embodied responses to movement, rhythm and music."[474]

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469 Tim Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning" *Educação em Revista: Belo Horizonte* 29, no. 3 (2013): 306
470 See Karen Barad, "On Touching—The Inhuman that Therefore I Am," *d i f f e r e n c e s: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 25, no. 3 (2012): 206-223.
471 Karen Barad, "What Flashes Up: Theological-Political-Scientific Fragments" in *Entangled Worlds: Religion, Science, and New Materialisms* edited by Catherine Keller and Mary-Jane Rubenstein (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 73, italics added.
472 Born, "Introduction—music, sound and space," 8; and Michelle Duffy, et al., "Bodily rhythms: Corporeal capacities to engage with festival spaces," *Emotion, Space, and Society* 4 (2011): 17-24.
473 Michelle Duffy, "Listening Assemblages: Re-sounding Place and Mapping the Affects of Sound" in *Musical Encounters with Deleuze and Guattari*, edited by Pirkko Moisala, Taru Leppänen, Milla Tiainen, and Hanna Väätäinen (London: Bloomsbury, 2017).
474 Duffy, et al., "Bodily rhythms," 23.

As conceptualized above, rhythm can be thought generatively as the differential play of sensation, spacing, and movement that creates rhythmic inclosures rather than measured enclosures. Because they are mobile, fluid, and continually becoming (non-teleologically), rhythmic inclosures can be felt as going "against the grain of chronology" dictated by the universal, homogeneous time of representation.[475] Whereas the representational time of neoliberalism, capitalism, and colonialism makes all moments reducible and exchangeable for one another, the time of rhythmic inclosure "undoes" the homogeneous and appropriable timeline of progress into a heterogeneous spacetimemattering (as Barad likes to say) where multiple temporalities are able to be reworked into novel configurations.[476] Through various combinations and tunings of sensations and tensions, rhythmic inclosures may allow for the production of temporal interference or "diffraction" patterns that interrupt enclosed spaces.[477]

Rhythmic Inclosure(s) and Learning

Critically, the qualities of rhythm sketched above can help contest the representational and curricular logics in which learning and music are conceived as processes of transmission-acquisition and/or transmission-reception. In Western music theory and acoustics, the typical image of musical interaction is that of the vibrating body transmitting sonic information through a "neutral" medium (air) to a recipient (the listener) who then processes that information as music. In this image, the participants in the musical event are already-constituted, constantly present entities who communicate with one another by

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[475] Karen Barad, "Troubling time/s and ecologies of nothingness: re-turning, re-membering, and facing the incalculable," *new formations: a journal of culture/theory/politics* 92 (2018): 56-86
[476] Ibid.
[477] Ibid.

transmitting and receiving information. Each part is detachable from, and retains its essential identity outside of, the event—neatly "packaged" and transportable, as Ingold writes.[478] In a similar fashion, as I have discussed in the preceding chapters, learning is often conceived as the intentional acquisition of knowledge and skills transmitted from a fixed source (the teacher or curriculum) to a fixed destination (the learner). Knowledge is the input, received and processed by the learner, stored as a representation, and then used to develop a new capacity, the output.

Understood rhythmically, learning takes place as differential movement-and-spacing rather than transmission: "both moving and moved, in ongoing response,"[479] and as "intra-action[s] through which 'this' and 'that,' 'here' and 'there,' 'now' and 'then' are formed."[480] Following Elizabeth Ellsworth, learning occurs through the felt experience of transition and passage between self and other, subject and object, and identity and difference. What she calls "learning selves in-the-making" emerge through an undecidable state of suspension and animation where pedagogy is understood as "an *event* in which the *materiality* of a time and place of learning impinges on the *materiality* of the learning self."[481] Instead of packaged things transmitting and receiving information in pre-formed enclosures, there are bodies-and-places-in-the-making entangled in rhythmic inclosure(s). As such, learning can be examined in terms of intra-action, passage, and "wayfaring" wherein the learner "grows into" ways of living.[482] These ways of living are not transmitted from person to person

478 Tim Ingold, *The Life of Lines* (London: Routledge, 2015); Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning," 311.
479 Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning," 311.
480 Barad, "What Flashes Up," 36. Ingold notes that his discussions of movement and lines have much in common with Barad's "intra-action" (see *The Life of Lines*, 153).
481 Elizabeth Ellsworth, *Places of Learning: Media, Architecture, and Pedagogy* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 24
482 Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning."

through representations, but grow rhythmically in and through the learner as creative, improvisatory processes.[483]

As it supports this image of learning, the concept of rhythmic inclosure looks toward structures that, as Elizabeth Grosz proposes, would "[permit] the passage from one space and position to another, rather than the containment of objects and functions in which each thing finds its rightful place."[484] In this way a "building would not function as finished object but rather as spatial process, open to whatever use it may be put to in an indeterminate future, not as a container of solids but as a facilitator of flows."[485] In contrast with the representational enclosures of curriculum, rhythmic inclosures involve "correspondences between relationships…people [and materials] working, living, and breathing together to create a structure."[486] In the same way that Craig Wilkins conceives hip hop architecture, rhythmic inclosures might be conceived as "the emergence—in form—of the base and beat, the flow and the rupture, the call and response" creating "spaces that are constructed by the intersections of mobile elements—people (bodies)—but [which] often [include] objects of material culture…as well."[487] "Hip hop space," Wilkins contends, "flows, ruptures, and intersects with bodies."[488] As "naturally deconstructivist structures" their "'accidents' are designed and expected …considered not only as continuous, but as invitations to

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483 Tim Ingold and Elizabeth Hallam, "Creativity and Cultural Improvisation: An Introduction" in *Creativity and Cultural Improvisation* (Oxford, UK: Berg, 2007), 1-24.
484 Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 164.
485 Ibid.
486 Paul D. Miller (aka DJ Spooky That Subliminal Kid), "In Through the Out Door: Sampling and the Creative Act" in *Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 6.
487 Craig L. Wilkins, "(W)rapped Space: The Architecture of Hip Hop," *Journal of Architectural Education* 54, no. 1 (2000): 11-12.
488 Ibid., 11.

perform."[489] As performed and living, rhythmic inclosures do not place solid "matter against matter…" but "effect against effect, *relation against relation*…[in] a conglomerate economy of movement."[490] Rather than representation or intentionality, rhythmic inclosures are about "differential participation"[491] and the capacity to materially reconfigure ways of living that are not given in advance of performative intra-activity.[492]

Many contemporary participatory musical-artistic practices showcase elements of rhythmic inclosure(s) that I describe above. Yet the fact remains that so much of the pedagogical, social, and material conditions of music and arts education remain tied to curricular thought and the ideology of the art object—as representation and enclosure—making it nearly impossible to locate or propose practices within school music classrooms that would depart sufficiently from such logics. Therefore, I look instead to environments outside of schools and institutional settings where people are able to imagine ways of doing music and creative cultural work in ways that go beyond the enclosures of representational and curricular thought. As such, I highlight connections with public pedagogy scholarship that explores how "learning occurs in diverse sites and modalities, in ways that we may not consider 'pedagogy,'"[493] and that contests "school-based metaphors and meanings of education."[494]

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489 Ibid.
490 Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 204.
491 Ibid., 205.
492 Karen Barad, "Nature's Queer Performativity," *Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences* 19, no. 2 (2011): 121-158. Barad writes, "all bodies, not merely human bodies, come to matter through the world's performativity—its iterative intra-activity" (125). She argues that "what we commonly take to be individual entities are not separate determinately bounded and propertied objects, but rather are (entangled "parts of") phenomena (material-discursive intra-actions) that extend across (what we commonly take to be separate places and moments in) space and time" (125).
493 Jennifer A. Sandlin, Brian D. Schultz, and Jake Burdick (eds.), *Handbook of Public Pedagogy: Education and Learning Beyond Schooling* (New York: Routledge, 2010), xxiii.
494 Jake Burdick and Jennifer A. Sandlin, "Learning, Becoming, and the Unknowable: Conceptualizations,

The sites, groups, and artists I profile below are not meant as models to which music education should be molded—nor could they be practically. Rather, they suggest potential trajectories for doing artistic work in music and arts education otherwise than in default mode. In Deleuze's philosophy, events—such as the Festival au Désert or an art installation by Postcommodity—are never reducible to their fleeting existence in the actual moment, but enfold virtual potentialities for further becoming. The rhythmic inclosures actualized in the improvisation orchestra or street choir imbed the potential for further openings in as-yet unformed musical configurations at the same time as they undo previously given notions about what an orchestra or choir might be. The rhythmic inclosures played out at the international music gathering or the in protest songs sung at the sit-in allow people to explore the powers of collective music-making that amplify desires and dreams while opening up potentialities for previously unthought modes of social and political organization. The rhythmic inclosures enacted in the sound sculpture park or the multi-media art installation invite further experimentation with materials and processes beyond the initial experience of participation while also challenging received expectations about what an artistic body can do.

Rhythmic Inclosure in Song: Living Form

To begin, I focus on four organizations—Choir! Choir! Choir!, Justice Choir, HipHopForChange and Beat Making Lab—that present complementary actualizations of rhythmic inclosure in song and rhyme. While these organizations are each formed around performing specific musical repertoire, the material, affective, and temporal organization of each is continually (re)configured through varying rhythms of participation and the shifting

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spatial arrangements of the places in which they create music. Each performance of Choir! Choir! Choir! or Justice Choir, each beat making workshop by HipHopForChange or Beat Making Lab is, in Langer's words, "an ever-new constellation of possibilities"[495] forged through differential movement, sensation, and spacing.

Choir! Choir! Choir! (CCC) was founded by musicians Daveed Goldman and Nobu Adilman in 2011 as a regular "drop-in" singing event at a tavern in Toronto, Ontario.[496] At CCC events, singers show up, pay a five dollar cover, receive a lyric sheet, and spend an evening learning Goldman and Adilman's three-or-more-part arrangement of a familiar pop song, folk song, or even television theme song. Singers self-select the part they wish to sing: high, mid, or low rather than the traditional soprano, alto, tenor, and bass. At the end of the evening, the CCC team records a video of the gathered singers performing the song they learned. Their "home" events, judging by their YouTube videos, usually feature around one hundred singers while their special engagements at larger venues and concert halls can number in the thousands. CCC events seem to lay somewhere in between concert, cocktail party, choir rehearsal, campfire sing-along, and open-mic night. Their performances are lively, passionate, and fun—you can see the joy on the faces of the singers in their many videos. And because singers can choose a level of participation in which they are comfortable—as well as a part with which they are comfortable—the barriers to and risks of engaging are low. More experienced singers might choose to sing the harmony or counter-melody parts while less experienced ones may choose to stick with the melody. Additionally, because the arrangements are written for broad participation, there is no presumption that

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[495] Langer, *Mind*, 205.

[496] The information I share about Choir! Choir! Choir! was gathered from their website and YouTube channel: https://choirchoirchoir.com/> and <https://www.youtube.com/user/CHOIRx3

any song performed will be "authentic" to the original or the artists' "intention;" each arrangement is adaptable and changeable based on the assembled group.

This manner of choral singing departs significantly from traditional models in several ways. Firstly, because CCC was designed with an open-access, inclusive ethic it does not depend upon the values of artistic autonomy/individuality or composer intentionality. Secondly, the fluid nature of the group's membership and organizational structure (participants come and go as they please, sing whichever part they please) renders the notion of the choir as an exclusive and insular unit inoperative. Lastly, while traditional choral groups perform in spaces where the division between spectator and participant and performer and listener are rigidly maintained, the CCC model dissolves such neat distinctions. Especially in their "concert" tours, where Goldman and Adilman host events in standard concert venues across the North America and Europe, the audience-performer distinction is rendered null: the success of the performance depends crucially on the participation of the "audience."

Taking a different approach, but with a similar ethic of inclusivity and open access to that of CCC, Justice Choir was formed in 2017 by composer Abbie Betinis, music educator Tesfa Wondemagegnehu, and choral conductor Ahmed Fernando Anzaldúa as a result of social media conversations around their felt need to mobilize people for social and environmental justice through collective singing.[497] Additionally, Betinis, Wondemagegnehu, and Anzaldúa felt that contemporary civil rights and social justice struggles needed a shareable body of protest songs that, due to highly individualized and compartmentalized musical habits, was lacking. As such, the group began developing an open-access, Creative

[497] The information I share about Justice Choir was gathered from their website: https://www.justicechoir.org/

Commons-licensed songbook "of new and re-purposed protest songs for the issues of our time."[498] The Justice Choir songbook is a growing and changing collection "accessible freely to people everywhere, including families, congregations, classrooms, and other organizations working for change."[499] "More like a civic organization than a typical musical ensemble," the founders describe, "a Justice Choir chapter's programming and messaging revolve primarily around local issues and the urgency of current events," with a mission "to further social and environmental justice movements by engaging communities in singing together."[500]

Justice Choir's founders state that their organization is centered on the songbook as a "springboard for empathetic community conversation" where chapters might "partner with other local organizations to bring singing into the movement, or mobilize 'pop-up' style to lead group singing at marches, rallies, state buildings, vigils, or anywhere a marginalized sector might need a bigger voice."[501] While this might seem, at first glance, like another repertoire-centered choral enterprise, the editors explicitly state that users should freely adapt the materials to suit the particularities of their situations, circumstances, and needs. Anzaldúa writes, "it is important for us that this songbook be singable for people of any age, of any voice type, and from every possible background. We want this songbook to be inclusive. For it to be inclusive, it has to be flexible. We want you to feel free to adapt it to different situations. Our hope is that you can take these songs into a classroom, a march, or a church choir…sing them around a campfire, teach them to your kids during a road trip, sing them with a large group, or a small group, or maybe just sing them to yourself."[502] Like CCC,

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498 Ibid.
499 Ibid.
500 Abbie Betinis, Tesfa Wondemagegnehu, and Ahmed Fernando Anzaldúa (eds.), *Justice Choir Songbook, vol. I* (Minneapolis: Westminster Presbyterian Church), and https://www.justicechoir.org/
501 Ibid.
502 Betinis, Wondemagegnehu, and Anzaldúa, *Justice Choir Songbook*, 5.

Justice Choir does not presume that the songs in their book have a singular authentic or intended version. In each situation, the music is adapted to fit the circumstances, needs, and desires of those who wish to perform it, whether for activism, community solidarity, or simply the joy of making music communally. Music from the Justice Choir Songbook has been used at community singing events, pubs, courtrooms, protest marches, by university and public school choirs, and circulated on Justice Choir's YouTube channel. Rather than being used to promote universal values or transcendent aesthetic experiences, Justice Choir's music is used contextually, particularly, and relationally to respond to concrete struggles for justice in local situations.

Similarly to CCC and Justice Choir, community music organizations HipHopForChange (HH4C) and Beat Making Lab (BML) provide opportunities for artistic creation with varying rhythms of participation and fluid spatial arrangements. These organizations employ professional hip-hop musicians, songwriters, and producers to work with communities to engage in creative cultural production, providing artistic tools and education to respond directly to the needs and desires of those communities. HH4C is a San Francisco Bay Area non-profit organization founded to reclaim corporate media-driven narratives of hip-hop culture through workshops that provide spaces for people to explore the creative media of hip-hop for social justice as well as learn first-hand knowledge of hip-hop's grassroots history from local artists.[503] BML began through a collaboration between University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Professors Mark Katz and Pierce Freelon and DJ/Producer Stephen Levitin. The BML team developed pedagogical processes, software,

[503] HipHopForChange, https://www.hiphopforchange.org/aboutus

and a portable beat making studio to teach "the techniques of beat making through composition, sampling, and songwriting" in communities around the world.[504]

Rather than set up a universal standard for music making, the highly malleable tools, techniques, and processes HH4C and BML have developed allow them to adapt and respond to local particularities whereas more traditional approaches might require the local to conform to the universal. Instead of simply learning "about" hip-hop, HH4C's school-based workshops invite students to actively use graffiti art, break dancing, emceeing, rapping, and beat making to rhyme rhythmically about problems that affect their schools and communities. Similarly, BML's portable "backpack studios" enable people to use local materials, languages, culture, and experiences (through sampling and songwriting) in the art they produce rather than pre-packaged content that one might find in mass-produced software such as GarageBand or iMaschine. Furthermore, because HH4C and BML are deeply rooted in the stylistic variations and nuances of hip-hop, they are able to showcase hip-hop art forms in a non-reductive and complex manner to contest "corporate representations" of hip-hop culture (as criminal, homophobic, sexist, and materialistic) that, as HH4C argues, "are part of the historical legacy of oppression of black and brown people."[505]

HH4C and BML also work strategically to support local artists and provide economic opportunity for people in the communities they serve. HH4C broadcasts radio programs featuring exclusively "local progressive" hip-hop artists on the Bay Area station KPOO (Poor People's Radio) while BML has partnered with the Public Broadcasting Service to produce short digital films and music videos featuring songs created by BML

[504] Beat Making Lab, http://www.beatmakinglab.com/learn-more/
[505] HipHopForChange, https://www.hiphopforchange.org/aboutus

participants and local musicians. BML also works to provide community centers and villages with music production equipment that may enable people to market their music while HH4C provides living-wage jobs for Bay Area residents through their organizational office. Taken together, HH4C and BML can be seen as deeply engaged with the materiality of the world(s) in which they work, providing opportunities for people to rhythmically reimagine everyday life. In their artistic work, people in these organizations do not seek to merely represent the world as it is, but to actively (re)configure the aesthetic, disciplinary, social, cultural, individual, and material boundaries of the world in novel inclosures.

Using varying rhythms of participation and fluid spatial arrangements as their primary artistic values, CCC, Justice Choir, HH4C, and BML enact Langer's concept of living form and the pre-Socratic notion of *rythmós*: "form as improvised, momentary, changeable." They provide provisional, mobile structures through which people can grow into different ways of living. In other words, they allow for what Ellsworth calls "the experience of the learning self…in the making."[506] As Ellsworth writes, "thinking and feeling our selves as they make sense is more than merely the sensation of knowledge in the making. It is a sensing of our selves in the making…the root of what we call learning[.]"[507] In CCC, Justice Choir, HH4C, and BML, learning emerges alongside and within the shifting, mutable space of rhythmic inclosure(s). To learn in the space of rhythmic inclosure(s) is, per Ingold, "to join with and follow the forces and flows of material that bring the form of the work into being."[508] Here, the "work" is not an already given object (enclosure), but a living form that must be continually (re)worked: it requires learners "to enter into a world-in-formation,

506 Ellsworth, *Places of Learning*, passim.
507 Ibid., 1.
508 Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning," 317

in which things appear not as bounded objects but as confluences of materials that have momentarily melded into recognisable forms."[509]

Rhythmic Inclosure at the Festival: Lines and Wayfaring

In the previous section, I used Langer's concept of "living form" to illustrate the construction of rhythmic inclosures in hip hop and choral singing organizations. In this section, I use Ahmed and Ingold's meditations on lines in connection with Derrida and Deleuze to show how rhythmic inclosures are enacted in music festivals. In these examples, acts of gathering, singing, and reveling together can be seen as transcending the boundaries of the given—in terms of what is thinkable or foreseeable—and do not conform to pre-established forms of the possible. Here, rhythmic inclosure takes on the quality of an event or "line of flight" that interrupts the flow of ordinary time and measured relations. Such events, Derrida might say, are uncontainable and incommensurable from within the fixed, spatial coordinates of the present. Rather, they spring forth from the rhythm of the *arrivant*—that which arrives, haunts, or visits unpredictably in a manner that cannot have been prepared or arranged in advance of its arrival and which disturbs given determinations of the proper.[510] Hinting toward decolonial possibility, Ahmed calls it an "unsettling arrival."[511]

The annual Concierto Sin Fronteras/Concert Without Borders organized by the Border Arts Collaborative in twin cities of Douglas, Arizona and Agua Prieta, Sonora is one such example. The premise of the festival is quite simple: invite artists, musicians, and the

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509 Ibid., 318.
510 Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, translated by Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994); Derrida, "A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event" *Critical Inquiry* 33 (2007): 441-461.
511 Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 10.

border community to come together to play with and for each other across the physical divide that separates the two cities. The Concierto Sin Fronteras stages a number of "impossible" partnerships and transgressions that, outside of the time of the festival, would not be permitted under law: citizens of both the U.S. and Mexico are able to temporarily suspend political and physical division by literally, metaphorically, and musically reaching across the border to one another with the participation of the U.S. Border Patrol and the Agua Prieta and Douglas city governments. Musicians and dancers are positioned on stages parallel to one another on either side of the border fence, often performing with each other simultaneously. In these ways, the Concierto Sin Fronteras enacts the impossible event of co-habitation without borders which lingers spectrally over the festival and the life of the two cities. While Douglas and Agua Prieta residents live a bi-national reality every day, the festival promises the suspension of this reality through a virtual reality where national boundaries have melted away. The rhythms of everyday borderlands reality are modulated temporarily into new "relations without measure" that do not correspond to "pre-existing coordinates" of state powers.[512]

In a contrasting and complementary manner, the Festival Au Désert/Caravan de la Paix (Festival in the Desert/Caravan of Peace) enacts the promise of a community-to-come that literally has no place. While the Concierto Sin Fronteras works to transform a divided place into a united one, the Festival Au Désert works to enact place where there is none to call home. The festival began as a celebration of traditional and contemporary West African musics in the desert outside of Timbuktu, Mali where musicians from the region could come to perform, jam, and connect. However, the festival was forced into exile when militant

[512] Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time," 70.

Islamist groups seized control of large section of Mali and enforced bans on most forms of music. Thus the festival became the Caravan de la Paix, a touring group of Malian and other West African musicians who act as a "cultural caravan for peace." Since the festival cannot take place where and as it used to, the musicians enact temporary and transitory places of refuge in locales throughout Africa to promote a message of free expression and peace. The organization, also known as Caravane Culturelle pour la Paix, provides "the people of the Sahara and the Sahel region a platform to meet, exchange ideas in order to promote and preserve their cultural heritage" while it also promotes "cultural diversity, peace, tolerance and social cohesion among the peoples of the Sahel and Sahara."[513]

The Festival/Caravan enacts "an alternation and superposition of two space-times:"[514] the reality of diasporic displacement and the messianic time of cultural cohesion. Within the "striated" time of colonialism and theocracy, the Festival/Caravan weaves a contrapuntal "smooth" time of rhythmic coexistence among cultural differences.[515] Although the peaceful and tolerant community the Caravan envisions may not yet exist and may not be possible under current conditions, they nevertheless act *as if* such a community had already arrived. Instead of waiting in anticipation of such an impossible society, the Caravan makes it a here-now reality through music. It is perhaps (uncertainly, maybe) an event in Derrida's sense that "there can be an event only when it's not expected, when one can no longer wait for it, when the coming of what happens interrupts the waiting."[516]

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513 Caravane Culturelle de la Paix, http://www.culturalcaravanforpeace.org/about-us/?lang=en
514 Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time," 71. Deleuze borrows the concept of smooth and striated from Boulez to characterize temporalities that are measured and hierarchical (striated) versus those that are organizationally open (smooth). Deleuze develops the concept further with Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*, 474-500.
515 Ibid.
516 Derrida, "A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event," 443.

In the spirit of what Derrida calls "speaking the event," the United Kingdom's annual Street Choir Festival celebrates the ongoing tradition of protest songs and communal singing as a tool and tactic for political change. Unlike traditional community choirs, street choirs were born from workers unions and political parties who used singing to communicate demands, pleas, and desires for change. Since 1984, the Street Choir Festival has brought such groups together to affirm and support each other and has now expanded to include other community choirs not necessarily tied to unions or political parties but who also sing for social justice causes. The Festival's website notes that all participating choirs are "non-auditioned, open access choirs who sing unaccompanied, and part of their singing during the year takes place out on the street, supporting causes that are important to them."[517] At the festival, choirs sing a wide variety of tunes—protest songs, pop songs, English and American folk songs, songs from Palestine, Brazil, New Zealand, and South Africa, and newly composed songs—that speak to contemporary political and social issues both in concert hall and street performances.[518] At the center of the festival is a "mass sing" where the nearly 1000 participants gather in the town square to sing a set of tunes. At the end of the set, the gathered choirs "raise their fists" for a singing of the socialist anthem the "Internationale" (with English lyrics).[519]

Tuning their bodies and voices to one another in song, movement, dance, and synchronous activity, the collective rhythms sounding forth in these festival inclosures "produce an affective experience, a feeling of being together, an *eros* or *ecstasis*…the

[517] Street Choir Festival website, https://streetchoirs.org/
[518] Caroline Bithell, *A Different Voice, A Different Song: Reclaiming Community through the Natural Voice and World Song* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 206-209.
[519] Ibid.

characteristic joy of being together felt in collective action."[520] Forging new lines of relation through rhythmic activity, the participants in these festivals create deviations from official paths of movement within the enclosures of state borders and mundane city life. Ahmed contends that such deviations "…generate alternative lines, which cross the ground in unexpected ways."[521] Echoing Derrida, Ahmed characterizes deviant lines as "an arrival [that] points toward a future that might or 'perhaps' will happen, given that we don't always know in advance 'what' we will come into contact with when we follow this or that line."[522] As enacted in the Concierto sin Fronteras, the Caravan of Peace, and the Street Choir Festival, deviant rhythmic lines produce an "'out of place' or 'out of line' effect of unsettling arrivals" which "involves what we could call a migrant orientation…the lived experience of facing at least two directions: toward a home that has been lost, and to a place that is not yet home."[523] Rhythmic festival lines allow participants to move beyond the ordinary limits of place, interrupting the measured time of state powers and static representations to trace new paths of belonging. As such, learning in the rhythmic inclosure of the festival might appear as what Ingold calls "wayfaring," which means "participat[ing] from within in the very process of the world's continual coming into being…laying a trail of life, [that] contributes to its weave and texture."[524] As a wayfarer, the learner does not pre-exist her movement in the world but becomes *as* her movement "along a way of life."[525] To learn in the rhythmic inclosure of the festival means "to negotiate a path through the world."[526]

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[520] John Protevi, *Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 123.
[521] Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology*, 20.
[522] Ibid., 40.
[523] Ibid., 10.
[524] Tim Ingold, *Lines: A Brief History* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 83.
[525] Ibid., 79.
[526] Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning," 306.

Rhythmic Inclosure(s) at Play: Differential Participation and Intra-Action

Traveling beyond the wayfaring event of the festival, I now look to rhythmic inclosures at play: sites of artistic creation, play, and participation where artists, spectators, and participants pursue "opportunities and capacities to encounter the *limits* of thinking and knowing and to engage with what cannot, solely through cognition, be known."[527] Musical playgrounds, sound sculpture parks, and sound art installations offer participants ways to play with rhythmic inclosure(s) through sensuous encounters. These sites invite actors—both human and nonhuman—to play and improvise with sound in ways that are often intimately tied to materiality and place. In deconstructive manner, they often trouble distinctions between noise and music, form and matter, figure and ground, and play with the undecidability of the intentional versus the random or accidental. Although many of these sites employ stationary objects, they can be seen to function not "as finished object but rather as spatial process, open to whatever use it may be put to in an indeterminate future, not as a container of solids but as a facilitator of flows."[528] I use Barad's concept of intra-action to show how the creation of rhythmic inclosure(s) in play enact "a deeply interfused encounter *with* and at the same time [a] 'differential emergence' *from* the materiality of the world."[529] Additionally, the work of improvising, experimenting, and creating "enacts an alternative to, and embodies a critique and rejection of, the social relations—the particular musical division of labor—constructed by the Western art music tradition, and is in this critical respect an act not only of social commentary but, potentially, of social

[527] Ellsworth, *Places of Learning*, 25.
[528] Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside*, 164.
[529] Ibid., 34.

experimentation."[530] In other words, the sites I explore here engage actively in (re)configuring aesthetic, disciplinary, social, cultural, individual, and material boundaries where the working of/with matter affects how matter matters.

Using conventional instrument designs, outdoor musical instrument manufacturers Percussion Play and Freenotes Harmony Park create sculptural percussion instruments (pitched and unpitched) intended for universal access, durability, and adaptability in outdoor spaces.[531] Their instruments have been installed in school playgrounds, city squares, community parks, gardens, alleyways, and street corners around the world. While these instruments are often utilized to simply function alongside standard playground equipment or add playful touches to bus stops and thoroughfares—uses that do not necessarily invite sustained musical engagement—a few organizations have used these instruments to design musical playgrounds that actively encourage improvisation, musical play, and experimentation. One such project is the "Play Me a Tune Music Garden," developed by community arts organization GoArt! in Batavia, New York, that features eighteen Percussion Play instruments installed in a formerly empty city alleyway.[532] The garden's painted yellow-brick path guides participants through the instrument array, and, decorated with a colorful mural and hanging lights, entices people to linger and play in a stimulating, safe, and accessible environment. Another example is the City of Moab, Utah's Rotary Park that features a remarkable variety of Freenotes' pitched and unpitched percussion instruments (in terms of timbre, size, and type) placed thoughtfully in the park's riverside forest landscape.

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[530] Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw, "What is Social Aesthetics?" in *Improvisation and Social Aesthetics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 9.
[531] Percussion Play, https://www.percussionplay.com/ and Freenotes Harmony Park, https://freenotesharmonypark.com/
[532] See https://www.percussionplay.com/go-art-musical-alleyway/

Initially a prototype park for Freenotes, the instrument design, layout, and arrangement in the park (their proximity and orientation to one another) invites visitors to make music spontaneously and collaboratively.[533] Literally and metaphorically, these playgrounds offers participants passage through musical space. Even as they are bound to a fixed site, musical playgrounds remain open to temporal reconfiguration through the transience of their use by players moving in them.

Taking the idea of musical playground to another level, sound sculptures and sound installations are built to be activated by human and environmental forces in an aleatory manner. One striking example is the *Singing Ringing Tree* in East Lancashire, England: a massive tree-like sculpture made of curved steel pipes of varying lengths and thickness.[534] Placed on a hilltop with a panoramic view of the countryside, the *Singing Ringing Tree* was designed to transform the site's persistent winds into aleatory musical sound with its harmonies, pitch, and intensity varying with the strength and direction of the wind. While the sculpture attracts tourists to the site, it is the nonhuman environment itself that "plays" the music. Another sound sculpture piece that blurs the boundaries between conventional instrument, participatory art installation, and sound sculpture is David Byrne's *Playing the Building* where a pump organ keyboard was connected by wires and small motors to structural features (pipes, concrete columns, steel beams, etc.) of the Battery Maritime Building in New York City.[535] A message painted on the floor in front of the organ reads simply, "Please play." The organ is placed in the center of the large warehouse space where a

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[533] See "Freenotes Harmony Park: Outdoor Musical Instruments in Moab, Utah," https://www.youtube.com /watch?v=2hd55fP-v_o.
[534] "Singing Ringing Tree," Visit Lancashire, Accessed November 15, 2020, https://www.visitlancashire.com/things-to-do/singing-ringing-tree-panopticon-p66560
[535] David Byrne, "Playing the Building" (2005), http://davidbyrne.com/explore/playing-the-building/about

few people at a time can play while others can move through the space around the organ freely to encounter the novel sounds emanating from the building itself. Byrne's installation invites visitors to explore how "nonmusical" spaces and objects might become musical through attuning to and playing with the sonic potentialities of solid matter. The installation also allows the building to take on a new relation to itself and its environment by what Deleuze calls "becoming-music."[536] This becoming-music of architecture (concrete, steel, piping, space) is not in a particular form of "a composed and semiotically shaped music" but of "a pure sonorous material."[537]

Sound sculpture provides an entry point for me to explore the work of multimedia and sound artists whose work pushes familiar boundaries of and categories for music, creativity, and play even further. Their work also probes deeper into place and materiality than the examples I've illustrated above. Postcommodity is one such example: an "interdisciplinary arts collective" whose work offers "constructive discourse that challenges the social, political and economic processes that are destabilizing communities and geographies" and works to "connect Indigenous narratives of cultural self-determination with the broader public sphere."[538] Their site-specific and gallery pieces use unconventional materials to create immersive and challenging aesthetic experiences. Their installation, "The Night is Filled With the Harmonics of Suburban Dreams," uses mass-produced backyard pools, pool pumps, PVC piping, and amplifiers to create "meditative harmonic oscillations" through interwoven feedback loops. This piece simultaneously plays with and troubles the

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536 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 309.
537 Deleuze and Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 5.
538 See Postcommodity, http://postcommodity.com/About.html

sonic environment of suburban neighborhoods in the U.S. desert southwest. The ingenious set-up allows Postcommodity to activate everyday objects' potential as musical agents, allowing them to transcend their typical boundaries.

Sound artist Jenn Grossman takes the idea of objects and nonhuman forces as potentially creative, musical agents even further. She works in sound sculpture, installations, site-specific "interventions," and compositions to amplify, project, relay, and transform everyday materials and soundscapes into productive relation where materials "transcend themselves" and "heighten emotional, social, and sensory awareness."[539] Grossman's 4-channel sound installation "Tonal Landscapes" captures ambient sound from the New York city streets outsides, digitally manipulates, and then amplifies them in a dark warehouse space in order to create electro-acoustic music from the "drone layers" of the surrounding soundscape. In other works, Grossman installs PVC pipes and amplifiers in public spaces, such as Central Park pedestrian tunnels, to allow ambient sounds to be experienced and heard in novel configurations that respond to changes in the environment. Perhaps most intriguingly, her piece "LUCID" uses acrylic spheres to amplify and preserve ambient "sonic memories," and then uses "interactive optical Theremin circuits" to let the preserved sound memories be altered by listener and site perturbations (proximity and light) in real-time.[540] In video featuring her "Lucid Spheres" Grossman invokes Barad's notion that "memory is not a matter of past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked."[541]

The pedagogy of these musical playgrounds, sound sculptures, and sound art installations works through setting up sensory encounters for humans, nonhumans,

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[539] Jenn Grossman's website, https://www.jenngrossman.net/>
[540] See Grossman's websites, https://jenngrossmansound.wordpress.com/ and <https://www.jenngrossman.net/
[541] Grossman, "Lucid Spheres," https://www.jenngrossman.net/lucid-spheres

inorganic materials, and immaterial forces to become other in relation *with* each other. As Ellsworth suggests, such sites may be viewed as "anomalous" places of learning because they "emphasize noncognitive, nonrepresentational processes and events such as movement, sensation, intensity, rhythm, passage, and self-augmenting change… involving their users in ways that exceed psychical mechanisms such as memory, recognition, or cognition."[542] Learning happens here through sense-making that allows various actors to make differential sense of each other. Such learning is neither intentional nor cognitive (learning to/about), but happens in situations of heightened sensory potential that lets matter *matter to* matter in ways that actively (re)configure given boundaries of subject and object, form and content, figure and ground, and human and nonhuman. Through rhythmic sensation—vibrations, pulsations, oscillations, and intensities—humans, objects, buildings, and local environments undergo changes where they are compelled to respond, interpret, decipher, and relate to the others of their worlds in novel ways. Said another way, one "part" of the universe makes sense of/to another "part" of the universe through sense-making: *intra-action.*

Conclusion

None of the situations, sites, and experiences I discuss above are straightforwardly pedagogical or educational in the ways that teaching and learning are conceived in school-based discourse and representational theories of learning. Even when organizations, such as HH4C and BML, produce educational programming, it is presented and framed in language quite removed from that of curriculum, learning objectives, and outcomes. The images of learning I have shown here "challenge us to move away from understanding the learning self merely through notions of cognition, psychology, or phenomenology or as being subjected

[542] Ellsworth, *Places of Learning,* 6.

to ideology," especially when considering learning happening as something that does not necessarily require a brain nor a concept of self. Grossman's and Postcommodity's installations, the gathered masses of the Street Choir Festival, and the ever-changing configuration of Choir! Choir! Choir! point to the need to rethink the locus of learning. They point toward conceiving learning as a distributed, nonlocal event that cannot be accounted for solely in the body of an individual human. As Barad writes, "the very practices of differentiating the 'human' from the 'nonhuman,' the 'animate' from the 'inanimate,' and the 'cultural' from the 'natural' produce crucial materializing effects that are unaccounted for by starting an analysis after these boundaries are in place."[543]

Thinking about aesthetic experience in terms broader than the individual human, the art object, and intentional meaning, social aesthetics theorists argue "that aesthetics matters in ways far beyond those previously assumed,"[544] involving not only the ways aesthetic experiences structure and condition social relations, but also as a means of transforming and producing consciousness (in the neurological, psychological, and phenomenological senses).[545] As DeNora writes, "music is, often and insidiously, part of how, for better or for worse, we are drawn into social relations and made ready, in an aesthetic and *pre-cognitive* way, for courses of action about which we may be otherwise (verbally) unaware."[546] Yet granting, even accepting, that aesthetic experiences matter in these ways still leaves us with an all-too-human framework for understanding aesthetics. What Derrida, Deleuze, and posthumanist theorists suggest is that all aesthetic experiences and works of art—from landscape painting

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[543] Karen Barad, "Nature's Queer Performativity," *Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences* 19, no. 2 (2011): 124.
[544] Born, "Social Aesthetics," 4
[545] Tia DeNora, *Music Asylums: Wellbeing Through Music in Everyday Life* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 114.
[546] Ibid., 120, italics added.

to free jazz—are constituted in a pre-subject-and-object-ive transitional space through which determinate subjects and object emerge. As Barad notes, "in an important sense, in a breathtakingly intimate sense, touching, sensing, is what matter does, or rather, what matter is: matter is condensations of response-ability. Touching is a matter of response. Each of 'us' is constituted in response-ability. Each of 'us' is constituted as responsible for the other, as the other."[547]

In the scenarios I have illustrated here, no one teaches anyone anything *about* music, nor does anyone make anyone else learn any*thing* in particular. As I discussed in the previous chapter via Derrida, learning cannot be given from one subject to another. Rather, the sites I've highlighted *welcome* learning to happen unconditionally in rhythmic inclosure(s) that are perpetually opening onto difference. Learning means "to join with and follow the forces and flows of material…to negotiate a path through the world."[548] As Derrida says of the event, learning is not about what we can expect, anticipate, or prepare for but precisely the opposite: what we cannot have expected, anticipated, or prepared for. If there is learning, this is where, when, and how it happens. As such, the pedagogical task for music and arts education might be seen as the construction of rhythmic inclosures that allow for and welcome the passage of learning. Doing so means suspending received notions about who or what belongs in established curricular enclosures and the dissolution of epistemological boundaries that would decide *a priori* what is thinkable and doable within them. Thinking about curriculum, pedagogy, and learning in terms of inclosure rather than enclosure may allow arts educators, together with the people they teach, to create living curricular forms

[547] Karen Barad, "On Touching—The Inhuman That Therefore I Am," *d i f f e r e n c e s: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 25 (5), 2012 : 215.
[548] Ingold, "Making, Growing, Learning," 306, 317.

that respond to and affirm difference(s). In this spirit, pushing against curricular thought and the Tyler rationale, Ellsworth writes, "the questions of pedagogy, therefore, are not "What knowledge is of most worth?" or "Whose knowledge should be taught?" or "Which practices will be the most efficient in teaching these knowledges?"…[but] how to use what has already been thought as a provocation and a call to invention."[549] Pedagogy would then be an act of saying "yes" to the "unfathomable multitude" of potentiality at the very heart of matter.[550]

[549] Ellsworth, *Places of Learning*, 165.
[550] Karen Barad, "On Touching," 214.

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