Framing National Identity in Reflexive Modernity

A Content Analysis Examination of Global Online News Channels Framing of the Saudi
Political, Economic, and Cultural Identity

by

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ABSTRACT

Modernity has become a goal for every nation in this time of a globalized and connected world. Nevertheless, in the 21st century, modernity is inherently reflexive as nations have the sources and technologies to adopt their own identity and act upon it. Global media is a mirror of their national identity and social structure. Thus, this dissertation sets the scope to explore how global news media frames national identity in the context of reflexive modernity.

This study examines the ways that global online news channels frame the Saudi transition to modernization, epitomizing Saudi Vision 2030. Guided by framing theory, this study explores how global online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, RT, BBC, and CNN) have positioned the Saudi identity (i.e., avowal and ascription) and framed the structure of the Saudi identity (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance). The study utilized a mixed-method content analysis of news articles (N = 584) that include paragraphs (N = 7846) from three years, April 25, 2016, to April 25, 2019.

The study results indicated that global online news channels framed the Saudi cultural identity and political identity heterogeneously, but the Saudi economic identity was framed homogenously. The study's findings revealed that the English online news channels positioned the Saudi cultural identity different from the Arabic online news channels. The Study also found that Al Jazeera-Arabic framed the Saudi national identity across all contexts differently compared to Al Arabiya-Arabic. The study also showed that uncertainty and restraint were used to frame the Saudi cultural and political identity, while human rights issues were the central theme for the framing process. The study

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concluded that, in reflexive modernity, global online news channels frame the national identity through three cues: Deviation (glocalization), Domination (interpretive community), and Hybridization (humanization).

This study contributes to the literature on framing by providing a new measurable and replicable model—the national identity frame model. The study advances the literature on media framing by providing conceptual and operational definitions to bridge the gap between the micro and macro levels in the context of modernization and global identities.

DEDICATION

THIS DISSERTATION IS LOVINGLY DEDICATED TO MY

Mom (Fatima)
Dad (Hadi)
Wife (Ebtesam)
Daughter (Joanna)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"A Social Revolution in Saudi Arabia," "Ultra-conservatism takes backseat?,"
"The end of the Saudi era," "Reform and repression go hand in hand in Saudi Arabia,"
and "Saudi Arabia has changed beyond recognition" (Bishara, 2020; Robertson, 2020;
RT, 2017; Trofimov, 2019; Usher, 2019). These headlines and others spotlight a
significant coverage in the global news media of Saudi Arabia. The kingdom is currently
undergoing an important transition, and its consequences have been a hot spot in global
news media coverage. This study focuses on how global news channels report this
transition which has been fast and ambitious for some but also controversial and
disappointing for others.

With reform and modernization, global openness, conflicts, and news coverage of
the genesis of this new era, the Saudi Vision 2030 campaign, there unfolds a new,
potentially powerful national identity narrative. A narrative that is written and framed in
the wake of reflexive modernity and an increasingly globalized world that has no
boundaries, yet it also has clear global identities. The global discourse around
globalization as well as the identity helps propel a new national identity frame. As
Silcock (2001) stated, "In the newsroom, the news artist [journalist] shapes images of the
day's events with pictures and sound and in the process creates this cultural icon – a
television newscast framed by the identity of the journalist in the image of the nation" (p.
3). What happens when reporters working in the global newsroom from cities as diverse
as New York, London, Moscow, Doha, Dubai, and Riyadh; for organizations as distinctly

different as CNN, BBC, Russia Today, Al Jazeera, or Al Arabiya? A study of just such a deliberate political, economic, and cultural transition captured by global news channels could reveal much about how the identity of a nation is transformed.

The following study explores how global online news channels framed the Saudi political, economic, and cultural identity, providing a new measurable and replicable frame: the national identity frame. To collect the puzzle pieces, this study explores news media framing of the Saudi transition (*Saudi Vision 2030*), the global context in which the phenomenon accrues (*reflexive modernity and global identities*), the theoretical models that shape the investigation (*framing theory and national identity frame*), the medium that carries out the national identity narrative (*global online news channels*), and the scientific approaches employed to investigate the phenomenon (*mixed-methods*). Following is an introduction to these elements.

Saudi Vison 2030

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a triumphant story of uniting Saudi Arabian society and developing education, healthcare, and security after establishing Saudi Arabia, 1932 (Al-Ghathami, 2005; Lacroix & Holoch, 2011). However, the Kingdom has suffered from slow development despite being one of the wealthiest nations in the world (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011; Zuhur, 2012). The ongoing conflicts and wars in the Middle East, as well as the internal sociopolitical conflicts between groups (e.g., Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, liberals, and terrorist groups) and between these groups and the government, have contributed to the country's slow modernization (M. Al Saud, 1982; Lacroix & Holoch, 2011).

On April 25, 2016, Saudi Arabia declared an important modernization transition designed to diversify and develop its economy, modernize its society, and promote its national identity, internally and externally. The Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed Ibn Salman announced a new roadmap for Saudi Arabia, Saudi Vision 2030, that put a national strategic plan for transforming the Kingdom. Saudi Vision 2030 calls for strengthening the country's economy through diversifying the sources of revenues away from oil, such as creating a reliable and competitive environment for investments, being a logistical hub for global trade, building megacities for tourism and technologies, and issuing new laws and legislations that enable the private sector to grow and contribute to the country's economy ("Saudi Vision 2030," n.d.).

The vision also recognizes the importance of government institutions to reconstruction, transparency, and regulations that support the modernization project's efforts to fight corruption; empower women and youths in the workforce; and improve government services, plans, education, and training that contribute to the citizens' welfare and production. Additionally, Saudi Vision 2030 focuses on creating an identity that supports a balanced lifestyle, promoting openness and convergence locally and globally, and overcoming the previous challenges of extremism by becoming a moderate nation and society that rejects Islamic and liberal extremism ("Saudi Vision 2030," n.d.).

Reflexive Modernity and Global Identities

The word "modern" developed in the medieval late fifth century as an antonym to antiquity and "ancient." It comes from the Latin word *modrenus*, "an adjective and noun, [which] was coined from the adverb *modo* (meaning 'recently, just now')" (Călinescu,

1987, p. 13). Therborn (1995) linked modernity to the discovery of the future in the sense that modernity is the present that detects or discovers the "new epoch." Thus, modernity is the end of the present and the beginning of a new future. Modernity, as the discovery of the future, is also related to the "reform" or "revolution" that distinguishes between "two ways of bringing about a change resulting in something novel." The recognition of the future was clear in the period of social changes that accrued in the 18th century, such as the industrial revolution, the development of the notion of nation state, and "the Revolution in France and its international repercussions" (pp. 126-127).

However, in the present time, modernity has mutated into a new form: reflexive modernity (Beck et al., 1994, 2003; Giddens, 1990, 1991). That is, reflexive modernity is a transitional phenomenon that reflects the side effects of modernity but does not replace it. It is a further modernization that dissolves industrial societies from within (Beck et al., 1994). Reflexive modernity implies globalization. In reflexive modernity, globalization is a dialectical process in which "social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Although globalization is a dialectical process that connects social relations on a global level (with a connection between the local and global), it is also a fragmented process that produces different identities. Globalization feeds the need for the autonomy of national identity (Castells, 2013). "Today we can not only speak about Europeanization and Americanization, but also of Japanization and even Brazilianization" as a reference to global modernity and identities (Featherstone & Lash, 1995, p. 3). The global identities may be inherent in the global media narrative. One way

to study how media constructs the meaning of national identity is by employing framing theory.

Framing Theory

Framing theory examines how the news media represents issues and creates certain narratives through the selection and omitting process (Entman, 1993; Reese, 2001b). Framing theory involves selecting certain aspects of reality and making them more salient to the public consciousness (Entman, 1993). Aspects that influence selection include linguistic attributes, symbols, icons and photos, and journalistic routines and practices (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Iyengar, 1996; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Moreover, although the media plays an essential role in signifying the frame, cultural hegemony, political and social elites, and ideological positions also contribute to frame production (D'Angelo, 2002; Entman, 2003; Van Gorp, 2007).

Framing Research Problems and Gaps

Framing theory has recently flourished in a wide range of research and studies. However, framing scholars have criticized the theory's lack of advancement. Some studies limit framing research on the coding and comparison and neglect the interpretation process that helps us understand the embedded meaning in news stories and their production sources (D'Angelo et al., 2019;Reese, 2001b). Reese (2001b) and D'Angelo et al. (2019) suggested employing both qualitative and quantitative methods (mixed methods) to overcome the limitations of each. Recognizing this gap, this study employed both quantitative and qualitative content analysis.

Equally important, Entman (1993) indicated that framing is a *fractured paradigm*. The framing process can exist everywhere, in the "communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture" (p. 52). Thus, Entman (1993) called for amending framing research as a coherent research paradigm, bringing in social science theories that inform and provide a comprehensive understanding of the framing process. Responding to Entman's call, D'Angelo (2002) rejected this argument, stating: "I argue that there is not, nor should there, a single paradigm of framing" (p. 871). D'Angelo believed that framing research should be examined through distinct multi-paradigmatic views embracing cognitive, constructionist, and critical paradigms. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) provided the hierarchal model of media research: social system, social institutions, media organization, routine practices, and individuals. Entman (2003) provided the cascading model, addressing the relationship between the journalists and power structure in the frame production.

However, some scholars provided a rich conceptualization, yet, ill or no operationalization. Previous framing research and models have not adequately addressed a conceptual and operational framework that accounts for the micro, meso, and macro levels into a holistic model. Additionally, previous research has not thoroughly studied the national identity framing in the context of reflexive modernity and global identities phenomenon.

Considering these gaps and building on Shoemaker and Reese's (2014) hierarchal model, the concept of interpretive communities (Zelizer, 1997), and Entman's (2003) cascading model, this study attempts to address a new conceptual and operational framing model, calling it the national identity frame model. The study integrates several

social science theories and models into framing theory to bridge the gap between the micro, meso, and macro levels. Giddens (1990, 1991) provided a helpful direction that connects the micro (agency) and macro (social structure) levels without giving primacy to either. Moreover, the study conceptualizes the national identity frame by adopting a theory of cultural identity (Collier & Thomas, 1988) and cross-cultural models: the six dimensions of national culture (Hofstede et al., 2010), the nine dimensions of the GLOBAL study (House et al., 2002), the three bipolar dimensions of cultural values (Schwartz, 1999), and the two dimensions of cultural change values (Inglehart, 2008, 2000).

National Identity Frame

Identity in reflexive modernity involves a duality of structure, in which identity is shaped by the interconnections between agents (e.g., journalists, editors, editors, reporters, sources, elites, sponsors, or other social actors) and social structure (e.g., rules, beliefs, values, traditions, and norms) (Y. W. Chen & Collier, 2012; Giddens, 1991; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).

National identity frame, then, can be detected in the news narrative through two properties, which are identity positioning (Y. W. Chen & Collier, 2012; Golden & Jessica, 2019) and identity structure (G Hofstede et al., 2010; House et al., 2004; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 1999). The two properties are the identity frame kits that detect the embedded meaning in a news story. News producers working in global newsrooms use both identity positioning and identity structure to create online news content about global events.

Global Online News Channels

Global online news channels refer to news organizations that broadcast or publish content on their online websites that may be of interest to international audiences. Some global online news channels broadcast or publish content in various languages to reach specific international audiences. Global news organizations affect and are affected by the sociopolitical system they are based on (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Silcock, 2001). Moreover, global news media constructs meaning for foreign events based on whether it is acceptable or deviant locally (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Global media also promote a foreign agenda (for states in which they are based or represent), build cultural ties, advance public diplomacy, and open communication channels between the local and global (Leonard et al., 2002; Reese, 2008; Robertson, 2013; Yablokov, 2015).

This study selected five global online news channels because they represent various sociopolitical systems, models, and geographic diversity in news production in multiple languages aimed at both local and global audiences. All selected online news channels publish online news in Arabic and English on their websites; target local, regional, and international audiences in their coverage; and enjoy a leading, recognizable, or popular role on the global level.

Al Arabiya is a pro-Saudi government channel based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Al Jazeera is a Qatari, state-owned news channel headquartered in Doha, Qatar. Both Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera are influential news channels in the Arab world. Russia Today (RT) is Russia state-owned and is gaining considerable growth in the Arab region and worldwide. British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is a British public service media outlet. Cable News Network (CNN) is a private television channel headquartered

in New York City, United States. BBC and CNN are leading TV networks on the international stage. This study collected Arabic and English news published online about Saudi Vision 2030 in these media outlets.

Mixed Methods

Media framing refers to the construction of meaning in news text through selection and omission to make a certain reality more salient (Reese, 2001b). The constructed meaning of a news story was either manifested or latent. Quantitative content analysis is interested in manifested meaning in a message; by contrast, qualitative content analysis helps us understand latent meanings in the message. Thus, framing scholars have indicated that mixed methods can comprehensively help interpret and understand the phenomenon under investigation (D'Angelo et al., 2019; Gimbal, 2018; Reese, 2001b).

This study employed mixed methods approach. An exploratory sequential design, two-phase analysis, was used first to explore the data qualitatively to develop a codebook that provided measurable variables for the national identity frame and its contexts. In the second phase, quantitative and qualitative content analysis was used to investigate the constructed national identity frame in the news content.

Research Purpose and Contributions

The purpose of this study is to examine how global online news channels framed the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts. The study examines the national identity framing through two framing devices, identity positioning, and identity structure. Ultimately, the study aims to develop a national identity frame model.

This study contributes to framing research by providing a new measurable and replicable frame: the national identity frame. Moreover, this study attempts to reconcile the fractured paradigms and provide a direction toward examining media framing of identity holistically by integrating the micro and macro levels into a cohesive model. Additionally, the current study aims to connect global media framing to the context of reflexive modernity and the phenomenon of global identities. Finally, the study explores the profession of global media and provides recommendations and solutions for improving the coverage of foreign affairs, objectively and professionally, and moving toward a better understanding of global identities in the age of reflexive modernity and globalization.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter introduced and highlighted the case of the study (Saudi Vision 2030), the global context of the events (reflexive modernity and global identities), the conceptual framework (framing theory), the medium signifying the frame (global online news channels), the scientific methods used in this study (mixed methods), and, finally, the study's purpose and contributions. This chapter, divided into four main sections, will expand upon these elements in-depth with a review of significant scholarly studies that will help inform and enrich the research questions. Those questions will be articulated at the end of this chapter.

The first section reviews the history of Saudi Arabia, including the circumstances that helped established the First and Second Saudi State and contemporary Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the section presents the sociopolitical actors in contemporary Saudi Arabia and their ideologies as they related to modernization (Salafi Ulama, The Awaking movement, and the liberal groups). Additionally, the section addresses Saudi Arabia's ongoing modernization (Saudi Vision 2030). Lastly, modernity in the context of Saudi Arabia will be institutionally and intellectually discussed.

The second section concerns the study's conceptual framework of modernity. First, a glimpse of the concept of modernity and civilization in pre-modern history is reviewed. Second, modernity will be explored in relation to the Western Renaissance and the emergence of the Industrial Revolution. Third, the definitions and characterizations of

reflexive modernity are discussed, followed by the presentation of the concept of global identities.

The third section involves the study's theoretical framework. First, a review of framing theory (which guided this study) and its scholarly conceptual framework is highlighted (frame building, frame setting, and frame effects research). Second, research gaps within the framing and the current study's standpoint are introduced. Finally, the section will provide the national identity frame definitions and concepts (identity positioning and identity structure).

The final section concerns the global media system. First, a review of the global new media networks and their operational goals on the global level. Second, five global online news channels that represent different sociopolitical systems are introduced, pan-Arab (Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera), Russia (RT), and Anglo (BBC and CNN), reviewing their social and ideological stances that shape their philosophy and practices, professionalism (including freedom of expression and objectivity), and news media market systems.

Saudi Arabia's Journey to Modernity

The history of the Arabian Peninsula can be traced back to ancient times, in which several civilizations, such as Kingdom of Saba (the 12th century BCE), Thamud (the 8th century BCE), the Kingdom of Hadhramaut (the 8th century BCE), Dilmun (the late 4th century BCE), and Kindah (the 2nd century BCE) were believed to have settled the region.

In the Middle East, spirituality and religiosity are deeply rooted in the culture and history, possibly due to the most prominent three monotheistic Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) having originated in the region. Jerusalem is sacred for the three religions. Mecca is the holiest site for Islam where, each year, Muslims from around the world visit the city for the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages. Muslims believe Abraham and his son Ishmael built the Kaaba (The Cube) at God's behest.

Islam originated in the early 7th century, where Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad began receiving revelations from God (Allah) in Mecca. After Islam's spread in the Arabian Peninsula during the reign of Muhammad, several caliphates continued (and expanded) Islamic rules in the Middle East and beyond. These include the Rāshidun Caliphate (632–661), the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1517), and the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171). The last caliphate before the emergence of Saudi Arabia was the Ottoman Caliphate (1517–1924).

The formation of Saudi Arabia occurred centuries ago. The Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century was divided into several emirates. In the western part of the Arabian Peninsula, Al Ashraf dynasty (families whose ancestries belong to the house of the prophet Muhammad) ruled Hijaz (Hijaz is the Western region of Saudi Arabia that contain large cities like Jeddah, Meccah, Madinah, and Taif) under the protection of and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. The rule of Hijaz during this time was unstable due to continuous conflict among the tribes in Hijaz, conflict among the rulers of Hijaz, and Ottoman interventions and domination. In the central part of the Arabian Peninsula, Al Saud dynasty ruled a small area called the Emirate of Dariya in Najd. A turning point was when Imam Mohammed Ibn Saud, the ruler of the Emirate of Dariya in Najd, offered

support to and alliance with the preacher Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahhab to establish the

first Saudi state (1745–1818) (M. Al Saud, 1982; Zuhur, 2012). Imam Mohammed Ibn

Saud was a political leader who inherited the rule of Al Dariya as a successor to Al Saud

dynasty. Mohammed Ibn Abdulwahhab was from a Hanbali[1] religious family. His father

was the judge of Uyyaynah, a small village near Al Dariya (Metz, 1993). Zuhur (2012)

indicated that Abdulwahhab's preaching focused on what he called polytheistic practices:

> He denounced sexual immorality and held that syncretic practices such as tomb or
>
> grave visitation, occasions when Muslims prayed for their holy men or women to
>
> intercede on their behalf with Allah, and also the traditions of other Islamic sects
>
> were innovations, or *bid'a*. (p. 39)

This alliance came into being at a time when the Arabian Peninsula was in a state

of spiritual chaos. The year 1745 was the birthdate of the first Saudi state, whose political

leadership was entrusted to Ibn Saud and whose Islamic identity preaching was entrusted

to Ibn Wahhab; the military forces consisted of Al Saud house and loyal tribes of the

Arabian Peninsula. The sons of Ibn Saud continued the expansion of the state's

boundaries to include the southern borders of Iraq and Syria (the northern border of Saudi

Arabia); the western border of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the Emirates (the eastern border

of Saudi Arabia); and the northern border of Yemen (the southern border of Saudi

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[1] According to the Oxford Islamic Studies Online website, Hanbali is the Islamic school of legal thought (madhhab) whose origins are attributed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal in ninth-century Baghdad. Recognizes as sources of law: the *Quran*, hadith, fatwas of Muhammad 's Companions, sayings of a single Companion, traditions with weaker chains of transmission or lacking the name of a transmitter in the chain, and reasoning by analogy (qiyas) when absolutely necessary. Encourages the practice of independent reasoning (ijtihad) through study of the *Quran* and hadith. Rejects taqlid, or blind adherence to the opinions of other scholars, and advocates a literal interpretation of textual sources. Ritualistically, the Hanbali school is the most conservative of the Sunni law schools, but it is the most liberal in most commercial matters. (http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799)

Arabia). The first Saudi state also fought major wars against the Ottoman Empire until Hijaz was successfully under the rule of the first Saudi state. This period of the Saudi dynasty rule came to an end after Ottoman troops sent from Egypt defeated the first state of Al Saud in 1818 (F. M. Al Saud, 2000; M. Al Saud, 1982; Zuhur, 2012).

In a continuation of the first state, the second state, which was ruled by Al Saud house from 1824–1843, occupied a much smaller territory in Najd. The second state witnessed internal conflicts between Al Saud and Al Rasheed houses. This "period of unrest characterized by the seizure of Riyadh by Ibn Rasheed, who took this opportunity to establish the House of Rasheed and practically put an end to the second Saudi state in 1891"(F. M. Al Saud, 2000, p. 24).

The father founder of the third state, King Abdulaziz Ibn Abdulrahman Al Saud, was able to unify the tribes of Najd after a daring raid to liberate it from the house of Al Rasheed in 1902 (F. M. Al Saud, 2000). According to Helms (1981), Abdulaziz "succeed[ed] in establishing his authority and ultimately that of Al Saud more effectively than any Shaikh or amir in Arabia, primarily because of his understanding of three factors: tribal networks, Islam, and foreign intervention" (p. 58). The current Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the third state, was announced as a sovereign state in 1932. King Abdulaziz's sons took the lead and are still in charge of the government today.

Table 1.

Al Saud Rulers of Contemporary Saudi Arabia, 1932–Present.

The King	Period
Abdulaziz Ibn Abdulrahman Al Saud (the father)	1932–1953
Saud Ibn Abdulaziz	1953–1964
Faysal Ibn Abdulaziz	1964–1975
Khalid Ibn Abdulaziz	1975–1982

Fahad Ibn Abdulaziz	1982–2005
Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz	2005–2015
Salman Ibn Abdulaziz	2015–present

The historical review above illustrates that politics and culture were essential elements that contributed to the establishment of Saudi Arabia. Through its political and military powers, Al Saud dynasty was able to unify scattered tribes into one nation. This alliance between Al Saud house and the religious establishment, Ulama, has been in existence since 1745. This alliance has succeeded in promoting one Islamic identity, Salafi (some scholars call it Wahhabism), which legitimized the unification of the Arabian tribes. Moreover, tribal values were preserved by maintaining a good relationship between Al Saudi rulers and tribal leaders across the nation. Hence, Al Saud rulers, the religious establishment or Ulama, and the tribes were the key powers contributing to the legitimacy and formation of the Kingdom during the three phases of its formation. However, with the modernization and development of the third state of Saudi Arabia, particularly after oil became a source of wealth, more sociopolitical actors have emerged in the Saudi arena. The following section presents the key sociopolitical groups in Saudi Arabia.

The Sociopolitical Actors in Contemporary Saudi Arabia

Before discussing the key sociopolitical actors in Saudi Arabia, it is essential to note that official political parties in Saudi Arabia are banned. However, social, political, and religious groups have never been absent from the Saudi arena. The banning of such institutions makes it difficult to label these groups or actors. Moreover, scholars and authors who have written about Saudi Arabian history, politics, and culture have applied

inconsistent labels to these groups. Thus, this section provides common terms that characterize these sociopolitical groups (Sahly, 2016).

Salafi Scholars (Ulama)

The Saudi rulers (Al Saud house) and religious scholars, sometimes called Wahhabi, have an informal agreement whereby power and authority belong to the royal family. However, "religious scholars and leaders, or Ulama, are the second important power in the country providing religious legitimacy for Al Saud family rule" (Al-Anzi, 2002). Metz (1993) confirmed that:

> The close association between the ulama, advocating the strict Islamic interpretations of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, and Al Saud originated in the eighteenth century and provided the dynasty with its primary source of legitimacy. The ulama acted as a conservative force in maintaining the traditional social and political values that characterized Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. (p. 191)

Currently, Salafi scholars dominate the official religious institutions. For example, the Council of Senior Scholars (Hay'at Kibar al-'Ulama) is the official religious establishment in the country and enjoys the respect of society and the royal family. The Council is also able to talk directly to the rulers regarding political and social issues. It advises the government on controversial policies but does not apply significant pressure on the government to address violations and abuses (Alhargan, 2012). For example, in 1991, the Saudi government needed the Council's support to allow foreign coalition troops to help the Saudi government liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's military control (Teitelbaum, 2000). Under the reform of King Abdullah, the council includes

several scholars from other Sunni schools (i.e., Shafai, Maliki, and Hanafi) alongside scholars from the Hanbali school (Zuhur, 2012).

Al Sahwa Movement (The Awaking)

After pan-Arabism (Arab nationalist) regimes came to power in Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Syria, the tension between nationalists and the Muslim Brotherhood increased. Saudi Arabia became a refuge for many belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. However, during this time, they were inactive in the Kingdom. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to take high positions in the education system by the 1970s. The Brotherhood's members affected the Saudi educational system as teachers and professors and as a major force in reconfiguring it and redefining the curricula in public schools and universities. In this way, they introduced into the system the essential elements underlying their ideology and view of the world(Lacroix & Holoch, 2011).

During this time, the Brothers were not only found in the regular education system, such as schools and universities, but they also started programs outside the education system in mosques (*halaqat tahfeeth*) and summer camps (*al-mukhymmat al-saifyah*). This was the beginning of Al Sahwa movement. The ideology of Al Sahwa is located at the juncture of two distinct schools of thought with different views of the world: the Salafi tradition and the Muslim Brotherhood tradition. The Muslim Brotherhood ideology was political, which stood in opposition to the "imperialist West" and the "godless regimes" of the Middle East. The Salafi tradition, in contrast, is primarily religious and was constructed to promote the Islamic creed according to the

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Hanbali school: "the impurities that were supposed to have grown up around the original dogma of the pious ancestors" (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011, p. 52).

Liberalism

   Liberalism in the Saudi Arabian mainstream is ill-defined. Indeed, this is evident in the various terminologies used, such as liberals (Dekmejian, 2003), technocrats (F. M. Al Saud, 2000), Islamo-liberals (Lacroix, 2004), or intelligentsia(Dekmejian, 2003; Lacroix & Holoch, 2011). Dekmejian (2003) indicated that *liberal* in the Saudi context can be described "as a relative term to denote a reformist ideology derived from the practice of Western liberalism, although without reference to its foundational philosophical principles" (p. 401). According to M. Al Saud (1982), technocrats have Western educational backgrounds and perceptions of governmental decisions that are religiously lax. Lacroix (2004) observed that there is also a growing body of "activists and thinkers began reformulating their calls for political reform in an Islamo-democratic fashion" (p. 346), consisting of Sunni and Shiite intellectuals, former Islamists, and liberals. This study includes all of these entities under one cohort, the liberals, because they place themselves outside the traditional Islamist mainstream.

   The emergence of this mainstream is connected to two factors: development and turmoil. In the late 1960s, many Saudi students who studied in foreign countries returned home, establishing a new sociopolitical class called the intelligentsia. Students sent to study abroad, first at Arab universities (e.g., in Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq) and then at Western universities, were facilitated and supported by the royal family to help drive development in the country. Many of these students came under the influence of diverse variants of Arab nationalism (Arabism) and liberalism once they started studying abroad.

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Upon their return, they were appointed to high state offices as technocrats (e.g., minsters), elites (e.g., professors and engineers), or intelligentsia (*muthaqqafeen*; e.g., journalists, writers, and novelists) (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011). Dekmejian (2003) noted that the development of liberalism in Saudi Arabia is usually cyclical, particularly when the country is subjected to external pressure, such as Nasirist Pan-Arabism (1955–1967), Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and Operation Desert Storm (1990–1991), or the aftermath of 9/11. The appearance of liberalism is noticeable in the media and journalism, intellectual clubs (*andiya adabiyya*), and governmental offices.

Sociopolitical Actors and the Government

 liberals (intelligentsia), Al Sahwa figures, and small groups of Salafi exclusivists increased their activism between the late 1970s and the 1990s. Mass lectures and heated debate in newspapers, mass lectures, magazines, and cassette tapes were disseminated among these groups, and polarization and exclusion was evident in their discourse. This period was characterized by religious extremism, and Al Sahwa controlled most social and lifestyle arenas. Moreover, these sociopolitical groups challenged the government at various times (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011).

For example, a group of a few hundred Salafi students, led by Juhyman Alotaibi, used a more radical ideology to fight against what they called Westernization and government corruption. When the government arrested several members, Juhyman and others moved to rural areas and started publishing letters and calls against the government. In 1979, they seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca (*Al Masjed Al Haram*), where they exchanged gunfire with security forces. This resulted in many victims, and

the security forces ended up liberating the Mosque after several days (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011).

In 1991, the highest religious body, *the Council of Senior Scholars (Salafi inclusivists), issued a fatwa* supporting the Saudi government's decision to allow foreign coalition troops to help the Saudi government liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's military control (Wrampelmeier, 2001). Al Sahwa organized an oppositional campaign against the traditional Salafi inclusivists' *fatwa* and the government's alliance with the United States and other Western nations, particularly during the Kuwaiti liberation period. Despite the government crackdown on Al Sahwa figures, the protest continued for few years, and Al Sahwa movement denounced the government's alliance with Western nations, particularly the United States. *Terrorist events, such as* extremist Shiite Saudis bombing the American compound in Khobar Towers in 1996, the 9/11 attacks in the United States, and Al-Qaeda and ISIL bombings and attacks in Saudi Arabia from 2000 to the present, have contributed to the alleviation of protest.

Moreover, even though liberals backed the government's decisions regarding this issue, a few liberals protested the government, demanding social and political reforms. For example, in 1991, 47 women drove their cars in the streets of Riyadh, protesting the ban on women's right to drive, which ended with the detention of the women (Almahmoud, 2015).

In the last decade, with the Arab Spring uprisings, Saudi Arabia has witnessed the emergence of new sociopolitical groups that conduct political and social campaigns on social media calling for several demands (e.g., women being allowed to drive, women's rights, a constitutional monarchy system, a secular system). The government,

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recently, has jailed many of them, accusing them of coordinating with foreign entities and organizations.

The murder of the Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul was a shocking event for Saudi society and the international community. The reputation of Saudi Arabia was extensively harmed, as was the reputation of the Crown Prince Muhammad Ibn Salman, who had previously been welcomed in the Western media as a young, ambitious personality who was driving modernization reform in Saudi Arabia. The narrative then changed, and the media accused the Crown Prince of ordering Khashoggi's killing, an accusation that was denied by Saudi officials (Williams, 2018). In a *60 Minutes* interview, the Crown Prince denied any knowledge of Khashoggi's murder and rejected the CIA report. "I hope this information to be brought forward. If there is any such information that charges me, I hope it is brought forward publicly," the Crown Prince said (O'Donnell, 2019). Additionally, The Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia in the Yemen war and Saudi Arabia's boycotting of Qatar and Canada gripped the global media's attention. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is witnessing rapid changes in many aspects after a national transformation initiative, Saudi Vision 2030.

Saudi Vision 2030

In April 2016, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman announced a new modernization project: Saudi Vison 2030. What distinguishes this modernization project from previous ones is Saudi Vision 2030's immediate plan and the number of changes in terms of regulations, investments, and the economy; social and religious reforms; and the required restructuring of the government body. Saudi Vision 2030 is a plan to modernize

Saudi society, diversify the economy, and open up the country to the international community. It has three main themes: (a) a vibrant society, (b) a thriving economy, and (c) an ambitious nation.

A Vibrant Society

The government is building museums, developing holy sites and Umrah and Haj services, promoting tourism locally and globally, preserving historical and ancient sites in different areas, and registering more than double the number of Saudi heritage sites with UNESCO. Moreover, the government has established a general entertainment authority that has begun to organize concerts, seasonal festivals, art and theater shows, sport and recreation venues, and host local and international sports competitions. Notably, most of these activities had been banned for decades in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Vision website stated:

> Members of society live in accordance with the Islamic principle of moderation, are proud of their national identity and their ancient cultural heritage, enjoy a good life in a beautiful environment, are protected by caring families and are supported by an empowering social and health care system. ("Saudi Vision 2030," n.d.)

A Thriving Economy

The Saudi Arabian economy has depended on oil revenues for decades. The Vision 2030 aims to diversify Saudi Arabian revenues by supporting and facilitating regulations for small- and medium-sized enterprises to take on more active roles in driving the country's economy. Moreover, the government is working rapidly to build megacities, technology, and other infrastructures to entice the most competitive

companies worldwide to the Kingdom. For example, Neom, a megacity located northwest of Saudi Arabia, will be connected to Jordan and Egypt and be powered completely by renewable energy. "The business and industrial-focused city will span 10,230 square miles. To put that size in perspective, 10,230 square miles is more than 33 times the land area of New York City" (Garfield, 2018, n.p). There are also other megacities across the Kingdom, such as Qiddiyah (an entertainment megaproject to be established in Riyadh), the Knowledge Economic City, and King Abdullah Economic City in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. Those projects aim to create jobs, diversify the economy and investments, attract global and local talents, and place the Saudi economy among the world's top economies. Vision 2030 also aims to build a regional logistical hub that locates the country as a logistical gateway to Asia, Africa, and Europe. The campaign website stated:

> A thriving economy provides opportunities for all by building an education system aligned with market needs and creating economic opportunities for the entrepreneur, the small enterprise as well as the large corporation. Therefore, we will develop our investment tools to unlock our promising economic sectors, diversify our economy and create job opportunities. We will also grow our economy and improve the quality of our services, by privatizing some government services, improving the business environment, attracting the finest talent and the best investments globally, and leveraging our unique strategic location in connecting three continents. ("Saudi Vision 2030," n.d)

An Ambitious Nation

This theme is most closely related to the government's reconstruction and regulations, performance and services, and relations with business, industry, and the

public. For example, the government conducted a detention campaign targeting many senior princes, business people, and former officials in its vision to fight corruption. To fulfill a commitment to transparency, the government also holds a press conference every year so that ministers can brief the citizens about budget spending and strategic programs in the past and for the future. The Saudi Vision 2030 Website Stated:

> Our third theme is built on an effective, transparent, accountable, enabling and high-performing government. We will also prepare the right environment for our citizens, private sector and non-profit sector to take their responsibilities and take the initiative in facing challenges and seizing opportunities. ("Saudi Vision 2030," n.d.)

Modernity in Saudi Arabia

Mellor (2007) argued that while Arab governments carefully promote modernization, modernity has also been a source of uncertainty in losing its regional cultural values to hegemonic capitalistic Western values. For Arab nations, globalization

> has been part of the national plans to modernize and beautify the national and even regional image, and central to these plans are two institutions, namely education and the media: the former to sustain the notion of an imagined community and hence national belonging, and the latter to help to sustain a sense of cultural togetherness and harmony. (Mellor, 2007, p. 10)

In this case, the agents (including government actors, intellectual elites, and journalists) helped bridge the Western and Arab worlds. Meanwhile, agency forces monitor any dramatic changes to cultural heritage. In other words, modernization is not an economic

struggle. However, it is instead related to a national identity threat, whereby a door may be opened to losing an identity that has thus far bound them together. This has been evident since the beginning stages of the third state of Saudi Arabia.

Modernity in Saudi Arabia is associated with three concepts: modernizing the country's institutions, modernity as societal and lifestyle transition (immigrating from rural areas to urban areas, education, increased use of technology), and modernity as intellectual reform in the social and cultural context.

Modernizing Institutions and Social Transitions

Modernization in Saudi Arabia is associated with modernizing governmental institutions, modernizing society and lifestyle (moving from a rural lifestyle to a more urban and civilized lifestyle), and modernizing the societal structure (redefining the religion, values, and traditions in accordance with changes at the global and local levels)**.** Following is a selected overview of modernization projects that took place after establishing the third state of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia up until 2015, before the announcement of Saudi Vision 2030.

King Abdulaziz was intent on modernizing his kingdom. Hence, he provided discreet support to the Salafi inclusivist leaders, a group of religious leaders who supported Abdulaziz and opposed Salafi exclusivist ideology. Salafis have extreme views of the Hajj practices and protest all foreign innovations, such as telephone lines. Abdulaziz also increasingly appealed to Arab thinkers and Muslim reformists who had appeared in the late 19th century in Egypt and Syria, with the ambition of giving the Muslim world the means of catching up with the West.

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To accomplish this, the reformists, with inclusivist Salafists, called for a rejection

of servile imitation (taqlid) and a return to the foundations of Islam, but in their

case the return was to be based on a reinterpretation of the sacred texts (ijtihad)

that relied on some measure of reason. (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011, p. 14)

Moreover, before establishing the third state of Saudi Arabia, Ottoman rule and its

influences existed only in historical and religious areas, such as Hijaz (Mecca and

Medina). During the establishment of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz worked on building

modern cities in areas that were historically neglected by Ottoman rules in the Arabian

Peninsula, such as Najd and the North and South of Saudi Arabia. The building of small

modern cities helped the shattered Bedouin tribes and contributed to building one unified

nation. At this historical phase, the political, religious, and tribal groups had somewhat

harmonious benefits that allowed them to modernize and build the country's

institutions(Al-Ghathami, 2005; Lacroix & Holoch, 2011). It was a movement that laid

the early step of building a social and political system in Saudi Arabia, according to Al-

Ghathami (2005).

Another round of modernization was undertaken by King Faysal (1964–1975).

This round had two purposes. The first (internal) purpose was to modernize society via

the development of the economy, education, technology, and infrastructure (Al-

Ghathami, 2005). The second (external) purpose was to "serve as a means of promoting

the Saudi state in the eyes of the West and as a symbolic response to the progressive

states in the region that had been quick to place Saudi Arabia among the reactionary and

backward regimes" (Lacroix & Holoch, 2011, p. 15). The economy witnessed enormous

growth. The government was able to provide free Medicare and education and to develop

its military. Moreover, King Faysal's wife, Iffat Al Thunyan, played an important role in

expanding education for women (Zuhur, 2012). After King Faysal's development plan,

the government adopted a five-year development strategy, in which the government

reviewed and set governmental development and reforms for the next five years. Five-

year plans continued from 1970 to 2015 (Ministry of Economy and Planning, n.d.).

During King Abdullah's rule (1995–2010), women's empowerment and education

support were noticeable. According *The development plan* (2012), one priority of the

2005–2010 development plan was "enhancing competitive abilities and the plan paid

special attention to increasing women's participation, strengthening the roles of family in

community by developing the abilities of the Saudi women and removing obstacles that

deter women from participation in economic and developmental activities." For example,

women can vote and run for office in municipal elections (Agrawal, 2015). Twenty

women were elected in the first municipal elections in which women participated as

voters and candidates. Furthermore, 30 seats were offered to Saudi women in an

unelected parliament (Shura Council) for the first time in history (Hamdan, 2013). In

addition, the deputy education minister is a woman. Besides women's empowerment,

tens of universities were built in various regions, and hundreds of thousands of male and

female students were offered scholarships to study abroad. In Saudi Arabia, "education

was seen as the means to mobilize the nation and regenerate a new image of the

kingdom" (Mellor, 2007, p. 26).

Modernity as Intellectual Consciousness

The notion of modernity as a theoretical and practical base gained more attention

and was extensively debated in the mid-1980s, particularly regarding three factors: the

return of many Saudi students from Arab and Western universities, the attack that modernists face from religious hardliners, and the division and debate among modernists themselves about what modernization should be like in the Saudi context.

Abdullah Al-Ghathami, a well-known theorist of modernity in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world, has written several books that theorize the notion of modernity in the Saudi context. Al-Ghathami (2005) conceptualized Saudi modernity as intellectual consciousness that renews traditional thoughts consistent with the nature of the dialectical process between the global and local levels. Al-Ghathami (2005) argued that Arab society has gone through several historical phases that either has a static nature or a dynamic nature, depending on what motivates the intellectual consciousness. A static society opposes renovation and avoids uncertainty. On the other hand, a dynamic society calls for intellectual dialogue, criticizes tradition, and motivates human thought and production. For Al-Ghathami, modernity as a theory of practice can transfer Saudi society from a static and traditional society to a more productive one. He argues that modernity does not, by any means, conflict with Islamic teachings, as his opponents claim. Instead, he sees modernity (as a theory) as an opportunity to reform the traditional Islamic discourse that dominates social practice and the static intellectual scene.

Although modernization included minor social and religious reforms, social and religious reforms often faced obstacles due to opposition from religious hardliners. The oppositional religious forces usually denounced reforms on the assumption that they might affect the cultural identity of Saudi Arabia. Religious actors, particularly those related to Al Sahwa movement, decry the influence of modernist ideology on government decisions, the driving forces of modernization. According to Al Sahwa religious leaders,

who call the modernists secular, atheists, or traitors, modernization will open the door to Westernization, leading to the loss of Islamic identity, and will allow the West, particularly the United States, to control the country's resources (Al-Ghathami, 2005; F. M. Al Saud, 2000; M. Al Saud, 1982; Lacroix & Holoch, 2011; Zuhur, 2012).

Al-Ghathami criticized religious hardliners for demonizing Saudi modernists and some Saudi and Arab modernists who believe that Saudi society must remain the household for tradition and conservatism. For some thinkers, the modernization project that is taking place in a symbolic society for Muslims, Saudi Arabia, could be a disaster for Islamic civilization. This view has contributed to the static nature of the intellectual consciousness for decades in Saudi Arabia (Al-Ghathami, 2005).

While the intellectual and cultural modernity in Saudi Arabia still in its maturing stage, the concept of modernity has scholarly long been discussed and debated. Following, modernity from the pre-modern to the reflexive modernity is reviewed.

Modernity in Social Science: From Pre-Modernity to Reflexive Modernity

Early Islamic philosophers, between the eighth and 14th centuries (the Islamic Golden age), such as Ibn Sina (Avicenn), Ibn Bajja (Avempace), Al-Farabi (Alpharabius), and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), were affected by Greek writing and logic (Alwardi, 1994; Kennedy-Day, 2018) or, as Dale (2006) called it, Greco-Islamic philosophy. Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato were frequently referred to in early Islamic literature. However, there was an important shift in social science introduced by the Arabian-Islamic scholar, Abu Zayed Abdulrahman ibn Khaldun (1332–1406).

Ibn Khaldun, known in the West as Averroes, was recognized as one of the pioneer scholars in social science, history, and economy and "regarded by some Westerners as the true father of historiography and sociology" (Gates, 1967, p. 415). Although his name is now absent in Western scholarship, Ibn Khaldun's ideas flourished the fields of history, civilization, and culture (Ahmed, 2002). In his *Muqaddimah "Prolegomena,"* Ibn Khaldun wanted to introduce new theories and methods to examine society and state development as a natural process. "Indeed, Ibn Khaldun developed what modern scholars would identify as a structuralist methodology, using classical logic to identify enduring socioeconomic realities underlying cultural phenomena and ephemeral events" (Dale, 2006, p. 431). Ibn Khaldun's theory was based on the assumption that each society has its values, laws, and costumes and that in order to explore these phenomena, one should apply reason (*burhan*). Ibn Khaldun assumed that human organization and behavior could be obtained by tracking historical records or direct observation (Alwardi, 1994; Issawi & Leaman, 2018). According to Garrison (2012), Ibn Khaldun believed that a

> qualitative shift had to be made away from rote memorization of events, oral history, and personality criticism of their transmitters towards a method that took a critical stand on historical inquiry, employed reason in its examination of "facts," and sought to discern the underlying realities or "essences" of events, cultures, and civilizations (p. 21)

in social science methodology. Ibn Khaldun (2005) stated (as translated by Franz Rosenthal):

The normative method for distinguishing right from wrong in historical information on the grounds of inherent possibility or absurdity is to investigate human social organization, which is identical to civilization. We must distinguish the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization as required by its very nature; the things that are accidental and cannot be counted on; and the things that cannot possibly attach themselves to it… Such is the purpose of this first book of our work. (The subject) is in a way an independent science with its own peculiar object—that is, human civilization and social organization. (pp. 38-39)

In his theory of state cyclic (or development), Ibn Khaldun provided many concepts that describe the structure and contextual formation of human organizations. He suggested that humans are naturally communal and socially organized, given that their needs, desires, and security are the reasons to "settle together in cities and hamlets for the comforts of companionship and for the satisfaction of human needs" (Ibn Khaldun, 2005, p. 43). *Asabiya,* social cohesion or social solidarity, is the means of binding society together. *Asabiya* is a social construct and the driving force for collective identity, values, social norms, and mobilization. The ultimate goal of *Asabiya*, in Ibn Khaldun's view, is political power, social power, and hegemony (Garrison, 2012). Ibn Khaldun referred to Aristotle's notion that "man is political by nature" to build his argument of the relationship between the *Asabiya* and royal authority or rule (*Mulk*). Ibn Khaldun applied the concept of *Asabiya* in his exploration of the human nature of the Bedouins and urban dwellers' behaviors (patterns, lifestyles, and customs), the role of the religion in the *Asabiya*, and the rise and fall of civilization.

Many of Ibn Khaldun's ideas, especially his harsh language about the Arab tribes, are unacceptable in today's terms (Alwardi, 1994). The brief highlights of Islamic philosophical works show how they contributed to the modern theories in social science. "The philosophical roots of Ibn Khaldun's discipline are identical with those of French scholars [*Annales* school] and Western sociologists" (Dale, 2006, p. 446). Undoubtedly, the succession of various civilizations along with sciences has, to some extent, bridged the gap between scientific approaches in different cultures. The notion of the modern world developed after the Western industrial revolution. In the 21st century, the Western world is the stronghold of sociology, particularly theories and models related to modernity.

Modernity (Western Renaissance)

Modernity as a term developed in the late 15th century as an opposite to ancient (Călinescu, 1987). In 1627, the term modernity was used as a reference to "quality or character of being modern" (King, 1995, p. 108). In 1770, the term was used to refer to modernizing things or making them modern, such as modernizing ancient homes. The term developed to mean improving things or making them more efficient during the 19th and 20th centuries (King, 1995). Since then, the term has been used and defined in various ways based on the discipline. For example, in the humanities, the terms modernism and modern refer to an art orientation or movement: "the nature of the knowledge produced, temporal, spatial and conceptual boundaries which govern its construction, as well as the identity of its producers" (King, 1995, p. 109).

In contrast, modernity in sociology has been conceived as "a result of the association that developed between capitalism and the nation-state. Modern societies

differ from all forms of pre-existing civilization" (Giddens, 1994). The foundation of sociology was based on the distinction between pre-modern and modern societies (Beck et al., 2003). "The central claim of modernization theory is that economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life" (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 21). Modernity also has been linked to the concepts of revolution of changes, reforms, and future planning and innovation (Therborn, 1995).

Traditional Western-modern sociologists, such as Karl Marx (1818–1883), Emile Durkheim (1858 –1917), and Max Weber (1864 –1920), have linked the phenomena of modernity to the impact of capitalism and industrial revolution. They have recognized the downside of modernity, such as the conflict and power distance between the bourgeoisie and working class and the expansionism and hegemony of bureaucracy that limits individual autonomy and creativity. However, all three sociologists agreed that the positive effects of modernity on the social order are more than their adverse effects (Giddens, 1990).

Giddens (1990) criticized the theoretical tradition of sociology. First, the singularity of interpreting the dynamic of modernity was dominant. In contrast, Giddens argued that the dynamic of transformation modernity should be interpreted as a duality of structure. Marxist writers interpreted the economic system and social and political institutions only from a capitalistic competition order. On the other hand, Durkheim and Weber considered industrialism to be the dominant force shaping modernity and modern institutions. According to Gidden (1990), modernity is "multidimensional on the level of

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institutions, and each of the elements specified by these various traditions plays some part" (p. 12).

The second dilemma, Giddens argued, concerns the tradition of sociological analysis. The notion of society ordinarily connects sociology and modernity, which in turn conceptualizes society as a nation-state. However, the notion of nation-state is still conceptually uncharacterized. "In explicating the nature of modern societies, we have to capture the specific characteristics of the nation-state, a type of social community which contrasts radically with pre-modern states" (Giddens, 1990, p. 13). Moreover, Giddens rejected the focus on the problem of order that binds the social system together as the core of analysis and interpretation.

> We should reformulate the question of order as a problem of how it comes about that social systems "bind" time and space. The problem of order is here seen as one of *time-space distinction* the conditions under which time and space are organised so as to connect presence and absence. (Giddens, 1990, p. 14)

Third, sociology is the knowledge of human action concerning modernity, where the findings of the knowledge are either applied to the subject matter or examined through the self-understanding of social agents (Giddens, 1990). Hence, a new doctrine scholarship argues that the phenomenon of modernity in recent age (late 20s – and 21st century) is witnessing a new form of modernity, reflexive modernity. (Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1990)

Reflexive Modernity

Recently, sociologists have argued that the order that characterized early modernity is no longer valid; instead, scholars should explore the new order of

modernity, reflexive modernity, using a new conceptual approach. They have argued that reflexive modernity dissolves the earlier order (capitalism and industrialism) yet does not radically replace it. Crucially, one should not be confused or diminish the differences between postmodernity and reflexive modernity. Postmodernity is usually used to reference postmodernism and postindustrial society as if we are moving toward a new social and political order and agenda that is typically different from modernity and its institutions (Giddens, 1990). In contrast, Giddens (1990) argued, "it surely makes sense to see this as 'modernity coming to understand itself' rather than the overcoming of modernity as such" (p. 46). The central theme of the new order of reflexive modernity is the self-confrontation of the side effect of early modernity (Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1984, 1991, 1990). "Simple modernization becomes reflexive modernization to the extent that it disenchants and then dissolves its own taken-for-granted premises" (Beck et al., 2003, p. 2).

Reflexive modernity has several characteristics. For example, modernity and globalization are intertwined. Boundaries between nation, society, and nature are pluralized. Boundaries are not given but are a matter of choice, where individuals can draw their boundaries (Beck et al., 1994, 2003; Giddens, 1990, 1994). Moreover, the uncertainty of knowledge is another sign of reflexive modernity. There are no boundaries between scientists, experts, journalists, judges, or technicians, and ordinary people. All agents have an equal chance to access information, judge it, and draw their conclusion. Hence, no one has definitive confirmative evidence or information to hold reality or end the dispute. According to Giddens (1991), "the reflexivity of modernity actually undermines the certainty of knowledge, even in the core domains of natural science"

(p.21). Additionally, in reflexive modernity, risk calculation is an important element for decision-making, knowing that every step has a side effect. Thus, risk avoidance becomes part of a normal lifestyle in reflexive modernity. (Beck et al., 1994, 2003; Giddens, 1990, 1994).

Reflexive modernity contains a globalized movement based on the conjunction between politics, activism, and identity. Giddens (1991) provided two notions to this phenomenon, "emancipatory politics" and "life politics." Emancipatory politics refers to liberating lifestyles from customs and traditions and advocating for the equal distribution of power and participation. Emancipatory politics works in a hierarchical structure. While emancipatory politics concerns the politics of choice, life politics relates to the politics of lifestyle.

Life politics concerns the freedom to choose between various options and pathways. At its center is "the creation of morally justifiable forms of life that will promote self-actualisation in the context of global interdependence." Furthermore, it also "develops ethics concerning the issue 'how should we live?' in a post-traditional order and against the backdrop of existential questions" (Giddens, 1991, p. 214). Finally, life politics works within a generative structure.

Speaking of globalization and reflexivity, is the term "modernity" still associated with the West? Does it imply a conflict between the modern West and the rest of the world? Giddens, Beck, and Lash agree that the social structure in reflexive modernity is homogeneous and that no boundaries exist between the local and global order (Beck et al., 1994). Another scholarly position is that globalization in the modern age entails global identities.

Global Identities

In reflexive modernity, economic growth is still the driving force for political and cultural modernity, particularly in the Western world (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). However, King (1995) argued that modernity should be defined neither temporally nor geographically (referring to the industrial revolution and Western modernity); thus, such conceptualization in recent modern age should be problematized, especially in the light of the global interdependence. Black (1966) indicated that modernity "had its origins and initial influences in the societies of Western Europe, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these changes have been extended to all other societies and have resulted in a worldwide transformation affecting all human relationships" (p. 7). While Marx (1973) claimed that less developed societies would follow the economic model of developed societies, the Western style of modernization is no longer the central model in many parts of the world (Featherstone & Lash, 1995).

> Well into the twentieth century, modernization was widely viewed as a uniquely Western process that non-Western societies could follow only in so far as they abandoned their traditional cultures and assimilated technologically and morally "superior" Western ways. But during the second half of the century, non-Western societies unexpectedly surpassed their Western role models in key aspects of modernization. (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 19)

Therborn (1995) noted the dialectical process between structural location and cultural belonging in modernity. Structural location includes institutional resources, restraints of actions, and location in time sequence (e.g., time successions, distance, or proximity). Cultural belonging refers to having a distinct identity, containing a symbolic

code and a set of values and norms. In this regard, Therborn provided four entries to global modernities, referring to the modernity with its unique national identity. First, the European revolutions and reforms, which are "the birthplace not only of libralism and socialism, but also of legitimisim, ultramontanism, conservatism, and fascism (which embrace both anti-modernity and modernity)" (p. 132). The second entry is the New World: North, Central, and South America. In this route, the entrance to modernity was through independence. To people in the Americas, particularly in the United States, European empires were the external threat. Their conflict "centred on non-territorial ethnic relations and on federalism and centralism … which led to more more complex configuration of politics than European blocs of reform versus resistance" (p. 132).

The third entry to modernity is the modernity that emerged out of a sudden external threat. Modernity, in this case, includes enriching a country's resources and revenues, strengthening the army, and carefully moving toward modernity and enlightenment. This modernization comes in the form of reform from above as an instrument to strengthening the internal front, but resistance comes from below. This type of modernity started in Egypt in the 19th century under Muhammed Ali Basha; it was also found in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Thailand and was successful in Japan (Therborn, 1995).

The fourth entry is colonial: "where modernity arrived by *conquest*, *subjection and appropriation*" (Therborn, 1995, p. 133). Therborn (1995) described this entrance of modernity:

Here the road to modernity began as a massive defeat, from which the structuration of the conquerors had to be accepted and their culture learnt, which

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then could be turned against the conqueror himself and used as means to independence. Pre-modernity was indigenous but defeated, and became discredited by that defeat. Modernity was foreign, but could not be selectively imported and had to be assimilated. Attempts at assimilation, however assiduous, did not remove the barrier between conqueror and conquered, and therefore led to new struggles. The trauma of ex-colonial national emancipation and issues of national identity, national unity and national development have been of enduringly central significance. (p. 133)

Castells (2013) referred to the notion of a multilateral world in the wake of the rise of globalization. With the rise of globalization, the need for national identity is also on the rise. Under globalization, many underdeveloped countries promote their own identity internally and globally to legitimize their unity and distinguish themselves from others.

Industrialized societies focus on the economy's growth and the working class, moving from traditional values toward more secular values. In contrast, post-industrialized societies focus on self-expression, moving toward addressing issues like quality of life, environmental protection, the service and knowledge sectors, tolerance, and well-being. However, economic growth moves in a parallel direction with an adoptive cultural heritage, depending on the context of each culture. Hamilton (1994) argued:

What we witness with the development of a global economy is not increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western culture, but rather the

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continuation of civilizational diversity through the active reinvention and

reincorporation of non-Western civilizational patterns. (p. 184)

Modernization does not follow a linear path; rather, it depends on many historical and

cultural factors. For example, people in the United States hold traditional beliefs and

values more than similar prosperous societies do. Hence, labeling cultural changes as

Americanization can be misleading (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

In summary of this section, in light of reflexive modernity and globalization, the

identity of non-Western nations has become questionable for many researchers.

Providing the two scholarship camps, do global media frame the international events

similarly based on shared global structure (homogenously) or differently based on

national structure (heterogeneously)? "Advocates of globalization support the idea that

news is becoming homogenized at a global level" … "Localization advocates reject the

idea of global news in favour of its diversification along national lines" (Archetti, 2008,

p. 464). To understand how the global news media capture, frame, and report to their

audiences, these bi-structural underpins the researcher needs to dig deep into how news

media frame production works. A review of framing theory follows.

Framing Theory

Framing theory is of keen interest to communication researchers who employ the

theory in various fields (e.g., political communication, journalism studies, media effects

and presentation, public opinion, strategic communication, and intercultural

communication). The concept of *framing* is one of the most popular concepts in current

mass communication research. Framing theory has been conceptualized in three ways:

frame building, *frame setting*, and *frame effects*.

Frame Building

Frame building accounts for the role of hegemony, ideology, regulation, and

power that informs frame production (D'Angelo, 2002). It holds that communicators

(e.g., journalists) convey events or issues from the perspective of the social structure. It is

"the central process by which government officials and journalists exercise political

power over each other and the public" (Entman, 2003). Some scholars have referred to

this process as *frame-sponsorship*; others have used the term *frame building* (Colistra,

2012; Reese, 2001b).

According to Colistra (2012), there are several sources that influence the way that

media frames issues. External sources, including advertisements, public relations, and

governmental and political pressure, can influence frame production. For example, right

after 9/11, few journalists activated the *war on terror* frame from Afghanistan to Saudi

Arabia. "It picked up steam to become more a part of mainstream news discourse a few

months after Hersh and Friedman first activated the link between terrorism and the Saudi

elite" (Entman, 2003, p. 424). As Entman put it, the frame activation came about as a

result of the hegemonic power of the administration (e.g., the White House and political

elites) and media to advance foreign policymaking in the public's mind. Other literature

has suggested that journalists convey or activate frames mainly by relying on "official

sources and official government opinion for their news stories" (Colistra, 2012, p. 92).

Moreover, internal forces within media organizations, such as pressure from the

owner/executive, management, or staff, can influence how a frame is produced or

activated often through their routines of doing news work. Furthermore, frame production

may be influenced by what Zelizer (1997) called an "interpretive communities":

> Journalists, in this view, come together by creating stories about their past that
>
> they routinely and informally circulate to each other – stories that contain certain
>
> constructions of reality, certain kind of narrative, and certain definition of
>
> appropriate practice. Through channels like informal talk, professional and trade
>
> reviews, professional meeting, autobiographies and memories, interviews on talk
>
> show, and media retrospectives, they create a community through discourse. (pp.
>
> 405-406)

Breed (1997), for example, examined how newspaper policy affects the way an issue is

covered in medium-sized local newspapers. Breed (1997) defined policy as a consistent

orientation in editorials, news stories, columns, and headlines that follow a set of

selection and omission rules (framing). Interviews with several reporters and top

newspaper executives revealed that the newspaper owner and top executives (e.g., the

editor-in-chief) are likely to set policies that affect how a frame is set in a news story. The

results also suggested that policies are likely to be delivered to the staffers (e.g., reporters,

writers, copy editors) directly or indirectly by top executives.

Frame Setting

Frame setting concerns the discursive characteristics of a frame. It holds that the

message or news story is presented in "interpretive packages" that reflect a particular

narrative of the issue (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Interpretive packages refer to the

ideas, language, and symbols that implicitly or explicitly cluster in the news story

(D'Angelo, 2002; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989) and signify the narrative by making it

"more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to [the] audience" (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Gitlin (2003) defined frame setting as "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what matters" (p. 6).

This frame setting neglects the role of power, ideology, and hegemony to produce the frame and focuses on the narrative characteristics of the frame. It involves meaning structure through linguistic devices or visual items in a news story, such as metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars, rhetorical structure, or symbols in photos and videos (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Pan & Kosicki, 1993), and journalistic style of the story, such as thematic versus episodic frames (Entman, 2003; Iyengar, 1996).

For example, Pan and Kosicki (1993) indicated that the framing process could be detected via four framing devices: syntactic structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure. In a manual content analysis approach, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) developed a reliable instrument in which a coder had to manually answer "yes" or "no" to a series of questions (items) that detect a cluster in the frame of a news story. Factor analysis provided five generic frames (conflict, human interest, economic, morality and religion, and attribution of responsibility) to investigate the differences in frame setting in various news outlets.

Frame Effect

The frame effect pertains to the effects of framed messages on audiences' perceptions, judgments, or attitudes toward the framed issue. An underlying premise of the frame effect is that audiences perceive, organize, and activate received information that is consistent with how the message is framed (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). The frame effect process involves activating and processing the frame, starting from an internal

mental model of an event, where people's interpretations of messages are guided by an internal mental model (Entman, 1993).

Frame effect research has established two lines of research: idealist and pragmatic approaches (McLeod & Shah, 2014). The idealist approach is based on experimental studies, focusing on how individuals interpret news frames and activate stored frames for future events (Iorio & Huxman, 1996; Powell et al., 2015). Rhee (1997), for example, examined how individuals use available knowledge to interpret news frames regarding the 1991 Philadelphia mayoral election. By contrast, the pragmatic approach examines frame effects in a more natural setting by using surveys or opinion polls (e.g., Valenzuela et al., 2017). Audience engagement can be used as a new means for pragmatic frame effect research in the social media context (Bene, 2017; Bronstein, 2013; Sahly et al., 2019).

In an experimental study, de Vreese (2004) examined the effects of TV news frames on audience interpretation, the salience of the framed news versus other information in the story, and the effect of framed news on policy support. News stories about the expansion of the European Union that reflected the conflict frame and the economic consequences frame were produced and provided to 145 participants who reflected the adult Dutch population. The results revealed that participants exposed to economic-framed and conflict-framed stories expressed thoughts about the same issues presented in the story. Furthermore, de Vreese (2004) suggested that the salience in the frame is equal to other core and factual information in the story. Finally, de Vreese (2004) concluded that there was no difference between the two conditions regarding the effect of the framed story on policy support.

Framing Theory Gaps

The conceptual definitions provided above have flourished in framing theory. Nevertheless, framing scholars have called for moving beyond framing limitations that lead to "overused and sometimes misused in communication research to the point where it has become unclear what is framing and what is not" (D'Angelo et al., 2019). Before moving to address the framing gaps, it is essential to state that this study argues that framing research should be divided into two camps, namely frame-production research, and frame-effect research. It is important to emphasize that the national identity frame model in this study concerns frame-production. Hence, there are three literature gaps that this study attempts to address concerning frame-production.

First, it could be argued that framing studies have yet to provide a clear, holistic model that can heal the fractured framing paradigm. Entman (1993) indicated that framing is a "fractured paradigm." The framing process can exist everywhere, be it in the "communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture" (p. 52). Thus, Entman (1993) called for mending framing into a coherent research paradigm by including social science theories informing and providing a comprehensive understanding of the framing process. D'Angelo (D'Angelo, 2002) rejected Entman's call, stating: "I argue that there is not, nor should there, a single paradigm of framing" (p. 871). D'Angelo believed that framing research should be examined through distinct paradigmatic views, providing three framing paradigms as an alternative—namely, critical paradigms (or frame-production), constructionist paradigms (or frame setting), and cognitive paradigms or (frame-effect). To heal the fractured paradigm, this study looked to the framing from the perspective of agency and structure in order to unify the micro and macro levels into a cohesive model.

The second gap is that framing studies have not adequately explored the embedded, manifested, and latent frames. Certain studies have limited framing research to coding and comparison. They have neglected the interpretation process that helps us understand the embedded meaning in a news story, its production sources, and its effects (D'Angelo et al., 2019; Reese, 2001b). Reese (2001b) and D'Angelo et al. (2019) suggested employing both qualitative and quantitative methods (mixed methods) as a means to overcome the limitations of each. In this way, a mixed-methods approach can, first, develop measurable variables for the national identity frame and, second, detect the manifest and latent meanings embedded within the frame.

Finally, previous framing research has not clearly explored the notion of national identity framing, which may be particularly important for global news products in the context of reflexive modernity. Further to this, the study provides a measurable and replicable variable for the national identity frame. This study conceptualizes the national identity frame by adopting a theory of cultural identity (Collier & Thomas, 1988) and cross-cultural models, the six dimensions of national culture (Hofstede et al., 2010), the nine dimensions of the GLOBAL study (House et al., 2002), the three bipolar dimensions of cultural values (Schwartz, 1999), and the two dimensions of cultural change values (Inglehart, 2008, 2000). The following section will present the national identity frame.

National Identity Frame (Conceptualization)

Anderson (2006) connected identity on the macro-level (i.e., a nation) to what he termed the imagined community: "It is imagined [he argued] because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or

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even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 5).

On the macro level, identity is embedded in the national social structure—which here

refers to the set of rules, values, behaviors, or norms that constitute or regulate the social

organization of a society (D'Angelo et al., 2019; Giddens, 1990; Gurevitch et al., 1993).

Identity can also be embedded in the micro-level. For instance, in terms of agency,

individuals can question their identity in relation to the national social structure, culture,

and global order, particularly in the reflexive modern age (Berger & Luckmann, 1966;

Giddens, 1991).

Identity is a duality of structure, in which the interconnections between agents

shape identity (e.g., social actors) and societal structure (e.g., beliefs, values, and norms)

(Chen & Collier, 2012; Giddens, 1991). Hence, this study defines the national identity

frame thusly: a meaning-making process that shapes, and is shaped by, the dualistic

relationship between the agents involved in a story's production (e.g., gatekeepers, elites,

sources, or other social actors) and the social structures (e.g., rules, values, traditions,

norms, and ideologies) that produce, activate, and disseminate the frame.

On the micro-level, agents (e.g., journalists, producers, editors, managers, editors,

elites, sources, or other social actors) are members of social organizations with their own

individual experiences (House et al., 2002). Agents convey frames from their

interpretations, knowledge, background, and ideology. Accordingly, their self-identity is

the first tool for frame-production. While crafting a news story, agents (e.g., gatekeepers)

must take their audiences into consideration, thereby creating a sharable culture between

the self (micro-level) and social structures (macro-level). Giddens (1984) refers to this as

"structuration," i.e., the interconnection between agency and structure without giving

primacy to either, whereby the social structure is both the shared culture and the outcome of agents' actions.

However, there is a mediated layer between agents and social structures—the interpretive community, a network of associations embedded between agents themselves. The interpretive community has three sources. First, the contact within the media organization environment (e.g., between journalists, editors, owners, and managers, etc.). Second, colleagues' interactions from various media organizations (e.g., in press conferences, journalism associations, or any other social meetings). Third, the contact between the media organization and other social actors (e.g., advertising clients, lobbyists, non-government organizations, or political elites). These connections foster an interpretive community network that negotiates, activates, and disseminates the frame within the community ecosystem (see Breed, 1997; Colistra, 2012; Entman, 2003; Zelizer, 1997). According to McNair (2009), "there is a link between the power structure of a society and its journalistic output; that journalism is part of a stratified social system; part of the apparatus by which that system is presented to its members in terms with which they can be persuaded to live" (p.46). Therefore, the interpretive community is key to frame production. However, under what circumstances the interpretive community plays such a vital role within the agency–structure relationship needs further exploration.

Media content (interpretive packages) serves to signify the frame to the public mind (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014; Zhou, 2008). A focal key of the interconnection between agents and social structures can be explored through the ongoing dialectical narrative within media content to unpack the national identity frame.

National Identity Frame Variables

The current study conceptualizes the national identity frame from the communication, cross-cultural management, and modernity works of literature. This study assumes that identity can be enacted by two properties: identity positioning and identity structure.

Identity Positioning

The constructed meaning of identity in media stories moves from static to a more discursive meaning determined by the relationship of self-identity and social structure (Golden & Jessica, 2019). Van Dijk (2009) argued that identity is constructed and organized as self-presentation versus other-presentation. Othering, in Said's (1978) view, is an orientalist discourse that media or politicians use. Orientalism is "a style of thought based upon the ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and … 'the Occident'" (Said, 1978, p. 2). In the media narrative, self vs. other can be embedded through the consistent description of a community that presumably differs from the orator culture (e.g., journalist, cited sources, or elites).

Cultural identity theory (CIT), developed by Collier and Thomas (1988), posits that identity formation relies on social communication and negotiation "along with contextual structures and public discourses that produce representations and subjectivities" (Y. W. Chen & Collier, 2012, p. 45). Moreover, Collier (2000) posited:

> Within a cultural identity approach, scholars recognize that cultural identities are
> shaped not only by the ideologies and structures of the nation-state of residence,
> but also by broader international structures and social processes, histories,

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institutions and ideologies pertaining to ethnicities, social classes, and genders. (p.

221)

The CIT proposed two identity categories relevant to this study: avowal and ascription.

Avowal refers to one's views or ideas one articulates about one's group or community;

on the other hand, ascription is defined as how one labels or characterize other groups.

Avowal involves the reference of personal or group identity: *this is who I am*. Ascription

involves stereotypes of another group: *this is who you are.* Avowal and ascription are

affected by many factors, including historical events, political conditions, and stances; the

presenter or the communicator; and the situation of the public discourse (Berger &

Luckmann, 1966; Collier, 2009b).

In some research programs, particularly organizational identity (OI) studies, the

concept of identification refers to the avowal and ascription process. However, it is

crucial here to emphasize that the term identification does not grasp the whole embedded

meaning of avowal and ascription. Identification has been defined as the self-belonging

to the community or organization. "Identification is an imaginative process through

which an audience member assumes the identity, goals, and perspective of a character"

(Jonathan Cohen, 2001, p. 261). Cheney (1983) stated that "Identification—with

organizations or anything else—is an active process by which individuals link themselves

to elements in the social scene" (p. 342). Hence, the conceptual perspective of

identification is built upon the self, an individual's perception of his or her identity

formation, which is one side of identity formation. Moreover, as the definitions imply,

identification concerns the individual level, where a member identifies his or her self-

concept to the organization or community (Whetten & Godfrey, 1998).

Similar to the concepts of avowal and ascription, cultural anthropology addresses how the concepts of phonemic and phonetic (emic and etic) are used to refer to the interpretation of social organization from the perspective of the local members (emic) or the perspective of the outsider members (etic) (Pike, 1967). As Young (2005) indicated that "[e]mic refers to the concept of 'insider perspective,' that is having personal experience of a culture/society. Etic refers to the idea of 'outsider perspective,' which is the perspective of a person who has not had a personal or 'lived' experience of a particular culture/society" (p. 152). Lett (1990) defined the concepts of emic and etic from the perspective of the culture's members (emic) and the researcher or observer (etic):

> Emic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the native members of the culture whose belief and behaviors are being studied.
> Etic constructs are accounts, descriptions, and analyses expressed in terms of the conceptual schemes and categories regarded as meaningful and appropriate by the community of scientific observers. (p. 130)

Ricardo (2004) defined emic and etic from a different perspective, in which he articulated emic as a micro-level of analysis and etic as a macro level of analysis (individual versus community level of analysis). On an individual level (emic), the researcher's interest focuses on the individual behavior within a specific culture. On the other hand, at the group level (etic), the focus of the study shifts to the cultural behavior holistically.

Avowal and ascription are also defined as positioning processes. Golden and Jessica (2019) indicated that avowal and ascription is an identity positioning action.

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"Positioning shifts away from the static sense of a fixed identity or role, and includes the ways that discourse, language use, or other literacy events contribute to constructions of self or other" (p. 212). Positioning concerns the avowed self-identity formation (avowal) as well as the ascribed identity formation (ascription), which takes into account the two sides of identity formation (insider and outsider). Moreover, identity positioning (i.e., avowal and ascription) is a framing process embedded in the discursive narrative of the news story. According to Nutter (2017), positioning refers to "the way in which people understand the world and their placement within it relies on the placement of themselves within a story" (p. 40). Hallahan (1999) described positioning as an "attribute framing [that] relies on semantic differences" (p. 213). Typically, for journalistic objectivity and neutrality, news content often uses sources that belong or are related to the event and oppositional sources that are considered an outsider perspective. Hence, this study used the term positioning for avowal and ascription to reflect both insider and outsider sources.

The positional identity framing is evident in media narratives in various ways. For example, media may construct avowal through the employment of history to create an image for the public to unite a nation, legitimize an ideology or action (Bruner, 2005; Nietzsche, 1980), or preserve societal values heritage. On the other hand, ascription is found when the media characterizes, labels, or describes an entity or culture or compares two entities (e.g., countries, societies, institutes, or religions). Hence, how news story narrative characterizes, defines, or compares identities is a positional framing process.

The majority of the studies that employed avowal and ascription focused on intercultural communication settings. It was driven by critical or interpretivist paradigm, in which they investigate phenomena in their natural settings. (see e.g., Abdalla, 2019;

Chen & Collier, 2012; Moss & Faux, 2006). For example, Collier (2009a) studied how

Palestinians and Israelis participating in a U.S. peace-building dialogue program 1997–

1998 positioned and constructed their identities, considering contextual factors such as

history, politics, and social hierarchies. Interviews were conducted with Palestinians,

Israelis, and Palestinian-Israeli participants. The study concluded that "the role of

contextual histories, political structures, economic conditions, and institutions, such as

government, military, and education, are recognized forces and go hand in hand with

their socially constructed, negotiated identifications, ascriptions, and relationships"

(Collier, 2009a, p. 364).

Van Heelsum and Koomen (2016) explored Moroccan identity in Western

Europe. The study examined three demotions: identification (avowal), ascription, and the

differences between first- and second-generation Moroccan immigrants. "The study

conducted several methods: EURISLAM data sets: (a) a cross-sectional survey; (b) a

media content analysis; and (c) interview data from focus group discussions with

transnational immigrant families" (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, p. 6). For media

content analysis, the researchers sampled five major European newspapers using the

keywords *Muslim* and *Islam* from 1999 to 2000. In the survey, identification (avowal)

was measured using two indicators: To what extent do you see yourself as Moroccan? To

what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim? To what extent do you see yourself as

Dutch/German/Swiss/Belgian/French? Ascription was measured using one indicator in

the survey ("To what extent do people of nonimmigrant origin regard you as

Dutch/German/Swiss/Belgian/French?") and the other indicator used media content, in

which articles were coded as either anti-Islam/xenophobic or pro-Islam/anti-racist. The

study concluded that Moroccans relate their religious identity to their ethnic-group identity. Moreover, the study concluded that "negative reporting overall leads to diminished feelings of national belonging and lesser religious identification" (van Heelsum & Koomen, 2016, p. 12). The study also indicated that second-generation Moroccans were more reliant on national identification than first-generation Moroccans.

Avowal and ascription have not been clearly considered in terms of the role of the media narrative in a cross-cultural setting. Furthermore, the two notions have not been examined through different global media outlets. Thus, we adopted CIT (Collier & Thomas, 1988) to understand how various global online news channels, with different geo-political stances, positioned the Saudi identity.

Identity Structure

Cross-cultural studies have provided measurable variables that help us observe the identity structures of the societies, such as behaviors, norms, and values, across modern nations. Minkov and Hofstede (2011) argued that national culture could be measured through several "variables that correlate at the national level and are conceptually linked to cultural phenomena" (p. 12). Their model posits six dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, indulgence versus restraint, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and long-term orientation. Their model of national culture was inductively developed from their analysis of 116,000 survey questionnaires administered to IBM corporation employees in 72 countries, including Saudi Arabia.

According to their model, Saudi Arabian society accepts a hierarchal order, in which centralization and unequal power distance are common societal practices. Saudi

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Arabia is also a collectivistic society, where commitment and loyalty to the group are more important than many other rules. It is a feminine society, where caring for others and quality of life are important values. The beliefs, traditions, and rules are fundamental in Saudi culture; thus, the society avoids uncertainty. Saudi Arabians can be characterized as having a normative nature in their thinking, where they express great respect for tradition and their norm is to achieve quick results. Saudi society is neither high in indulgence nor low in restraint when it comes to health, life quality, or prosperity (G Hofstede, n.d.).

Building on Hofstede's work, House et al. (2002, 2004) developed a cross-cultural model, Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE). The GLOBE project provided nine cross-cultural dimensions: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, assertiveness, gender egalitarianism, future orientation, performance orientation, and human orientation. An important argument for House et al. (2002) is the interconnection between societal culture and organizational culture:

> societal culture has a direct influence on organizational culture, as the shared meaning that results from the dominant cultural values, beliefs, assumptions, and implicit motives endorsed by culture, results in common implicit leadership theories and implicit organization theories held by members of the culture. (p. 8)

Rejecting this argument, Hofstede (2006) indicated that "after having done both a large cross-national and a large cross-organizational culture study, we believe that national cultures and organizational cultures are phenomena of different order: using the term 'cultures' for both is, in fact, somewhat misleading" (p. 885).

House et al. (2004) recruited around 200 contributors to investigate 17,300 middle managers respondents from 62 societies. This massive project examined 27 hypotheses that tested the nine cross-cultural dimensions. Relevantly, the study divided the 62 societies into ten clustered cultures: Anglo (e.g., United States [white sample], Australia, Canada), Latin Europe (e.g., France, Israel, Spain, Italy), German Europe (e.g., Germany, Austria, Netherlands), Eastern Europe (e.g., Russia, Albania, Greece), Latin America (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Argentina), Sub-Sahara Africa (e.g., South Africa [black sample], Nigeria, Zambia), Middle East (e.g., Kuwait, Egypt, Turkey), Southern Asia (e.g., India, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia), and Confucian Asia (e.g., China, South Korea, Japan). The study examined the societal values and practices of the ten clustered cultures. The following table summarizes the ten clustered cultures on the GLOBE dimensions.

Table 2.

Global Identities Based on House et al.'s (2004) Findings.

Cultural Dimension	High-Score Cluster	Mid-Score Clusters	Low-Score Clusters
Performance Orientation	Confucian Asia Germanic Europe Anglo	South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Latin Europe Nordic Europe Middle East	Latin America Eastern Europe
Assertiveness	Germanic Europe Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa Latin America Anglo Middle East Confucian Asia Latin Europe South Asia	Nordic Europe
Future Orientation	Germanic Europe Nordic Europe	Confucian Asia Anglo South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Latin Europe	Middle East Latin America Eastern Europe
Humane Orientation	Southern Asia Sub-Saharan Africa .	Middle East Anglo Nordic Europe Latin America	Latin Europe Germanic Europe

		Confucian Asia Eastern Europe	
Institutional Collectivism	Nordic Europe Confucian Asia	Anglo South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East Eastern Europe	Germanic Europe Latin Europe Latin America
In-Group Collectivism	South Asia Middle East Eastern Europe Latin America Confucian Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa Latin Europe	Anglo Germanic Europe Nordic Europe
Gender Egalitarianism	Eastern Europe Nordic Europe	Latin America Anglo Latin Europe Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia Confucian Asia Germanic Europe	Middle East
Power Distance		South Asia Latin America Eastern Europe Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East Latin Europe Confucian Asia Anglo Germanic Europe	Nordic Europe
Uncertainty avoidance	Nordic Europe Germanic Europe	Confucian Asia Anglo Sub-Saharan Africa Latin Europe South Asia	Middle East Latin America Eastern Europe

In line with House et al. (2004), Schwartz (1999) argued that social institutions such as families, education, governmental institutions should be the unit of analysis for exploring cultural identity and values. Schwartz (1999) validated a cultural value model that characterizes cultural differences across nations, containing three bipolar dimensions: conservatism versus intellectual and affective autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony. The study examined these values using teacher samples from 44 nations across cultures. The study suggests that the Far East, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern societies, such as China, India, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Arab countries, and Turkey, are hierarchal societies that emphasize unequal power distribution among

individuals and groups. English-speaking societies, such as Canada, the United States, and New Zealand, are categorized as affective autonomy societies. While Western European countries are categorized as egalitarian and intellectual autonomy, Eastern European countries are categorized as conservative.

Inglehart and Baker (2000) argued that the economy affects cultural and political changes in two directions. The first dimension is associated with early industrialization societies, while the second dimension is related to post-industrialization societies. They used World Values Surveys, 1990–1991 and 1995–1998, to investigate 65 societies across cultures on two dimensions, traditional versus secular-rational and survival versus self-expression. The two dimensions include several items that measure values, beliefs, and attitudes on individual and national levels. The study concluded that economic development is associated with cultural changes.

The aforementioned identity structure models provide numerous variables and dimensions. Table (3) summarizes the definition of each variable. These variables were used in this research to guide the study's conceptual framework and develop measurable national identity frame variables to analyze media content.

Table 3.

Conceptual Definitions of Social Structure Categories from Various Studies.

Category	Definition
Dimensions of National Culture (Hofstede et al., 2010)	
Power Distance	The extent to which the less powerful members of an institution or organization and an organization within a country expect and accept that power is distributed equally.
Uncertainty Avoidance	The extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by an ambiguous or unknown situation.
Indulgence	The tendency to allow free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun.

Restraint	The idea that gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms.
Individualism	The extent to which ties between individuals within a society are loose: everyone is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family.
Collectivism	The extent to which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in groups in a society, and throughout people's lifetime, those groups continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.
Masculinity	A society in which emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focus on material success.
Femininity	A society in which emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with quality of life.
Long-Term Orientation	The fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift.
Short-Term Orientation	The fostering of virtues related to the past and present—in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of "face," and fulfilling social obligations.
*GLOBAL Study (House et al., 2002)	
Humane Orientation	The degree to which a collective encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others.
Institutional Collectivism	The degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action.
In-Group Collectivism	The degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
Assertiveness	The degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.
Gender Egalitarianism	The degree to which a collective minimizes gender inequality.
Future Orientation	The extent to which individuals engage in future-oriented behaviors, such as delaying gratification, planning, and investing in the future.
Performance Orientation	The degree to which a collective encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence.
Cultural Values (Schwartz, 1999)	
Conservatism	A cultural emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidary group or the traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom).
Intellectual	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity).

Affective autonomy	A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing positive affective experiences (pleasure, exciting life, varied life).
Hierarchy	A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth).
Egalitarianism	A cultural emphasis on the transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty).
Mastery	A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence).
Harmony	A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty).
Cultural Change Values (Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart & Baker, 2000)	
Traditional	Placing a strong emphasis on religion and respect for authority, having relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion and divorce, and having relatively high levels of national pride.
Secular-Rational Orientations	Having the opposite characteristics. Agrarian societies tend to emphasize traditional values; industrializing societies tend to emphasize secular-rational values.
Survival	Societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, are low on interpersonal trust, are relatively intolerant of out-groups, are low on support for gender equality, emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism, and are relatively favorable to authoritarian government.
Self-Expression	Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics, bringing new political issues to the center of the stage and motivating new political movements.

Note. House adopted the same concepts of power distance and uncertainty avoidance as Hofstede.

To sum, the national identity framing can be detected in the news story narrative through two properties, identity positioning, and identity structure. Identity positioning entails two categories (i.e., avowal and ascription). Identity structure consists of several categories presented in table (3) from various studies. Nevertheless, identity framing is also inherited in the socio-political system that the media belongs to. Following, media systems in three global geopolitical systems are presented.

Global Media System

The news media on a global level produce content that reflects the complex interplay between the various factors that construct identities. Of course, cinema, popular music, and social media are part of this cultural ecosystem globally. However, this study will focus on journalistic coverage from legacy media organizations (e.g., Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, RT, BBC, CNN). Several critical studies have helped scholars understand global media systems and their interplay of influences.

First, the media system, and ultimately its content, formed based on the social system, including ideological, political, economic, and cultural considerations, reflects its stances (Hallin & Mancini, 2012; Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). While media operates within a social system, it is misleading to conclude that neutral media outlets report on foreign affairs (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). "One of the key functions of the media is to maintain the boundaries within society, to define ideas and actions as either within the bound of acceptability or as deviant and not politically legitimate" (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014, p. 75). Hofsted (2006) defined national culture as "a collective programming of mind in which lifestyle, values, or norms differentiate one group of identity from another" (p. 21). On the global level, the media narrative conveys these societal structures and contributes to our consciousness of differences (Hofstede et al., 2010).

Second, in some cases, especially government channels, media establish their global networks for "supporting the foreign policy interests and agendas of the states in which they are based" (Robertson, 2013, p. 330), advancing public diplomacy and building relationships with foreign audiences (Leonard et al., 2002; Yablokov, 2015). Moreover, global media networks that report global affairs take into account not only

global audiences but also local ones; this phenomenon is known as glocalization. Glocalization "refers to the strategic adaptation of global brands to local markets" (Reese, 2008, p. 244). Accordingly, glocalization refers to the interconnection between the global and local in the context of globalization.

For the purposes of this study, global media networks represent three geopolitical and ideological systems: pan-Arab (Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera), Russia (RT), and Anglo (BBC and CNN). The following briefly reviews the social and ideological stances that shape their philosophy and practices, professionalism (including freedom of expression and objectivity), and market systems.

Pan-Arab Media System (Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera)

Most Arab nations, after independence from colonialism, have been unstable. Some countries have suffered civil wars, such as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Somalia, and Libya. Other countries have suffered military coups, such as Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, and Comoros. Other countries are monarchies, which also suffered from coup attempts but survived, including the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Oman), Jordan, and Morocco. The Palestinian/Israeli conflict has also been a source of instability in the Middle East. More recently, the Arab Spring uprisings became another source of conflict and instability. The history of conflicts in the region is also reflected in the media system regarding freedom, professionalism, and its role in society.

Previous research has recognized the complexity of the socio-political system of each Arab nation. However, the political Arab regime system is often labeled as authoritarian (Fandy, 2000; Jamal & Tessler, 2008). Gulf countries are more religiously

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conservative and yet, at the same time, more economically and technologically advanced than other Arab countries (Fandy, 2000; Kraidy, 2011; Mellor, 2007). Moreover, patriarchy is rooted in Arab culture (more in some societies, such as the Arab Gulf, than others). It exists in family, religion, the economy, and the political system (Joseph, 1996). "Most writers on the Arab world agree that kinship is the center of Arab society" (Joseph, 1996, p. 15).

Most media outlets in the Arab world are owned or controlled by the government (Bayat, 2010; Hachten & Scotton, 2016). The exceptions are in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, in Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Hachten & Scotton, 2016). Rugh (2004) classified the Arab press into four categories: the mobilization press in Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Iraq (before the U.S. invasion), which is tightly controlled by the government and used to propagate government messages and state positions; the loyalist press, particularly in the Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which have private media outlets, but they are still pro-government and provide little, if any, criticism of the regime, thereby adding no natural diversity of opinion; the transitional press in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, and Tunisia, where journalists enjoy slightly more freedom and may be able to criticize the government, although significant control is still prevalent; and the various press, primarily in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, in Morocco, Yemen, and Kuwait. Kraidy (2011) described the Arab media system, in a general sense, as a transitional media system.

In the current study, the focus is on media in the Gulf countries, particularly Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera, controlled by two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, respectively. Although media laws in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries

state that freedom of expression is guaranteed, some provisions limit the freedom of expression. Duffy (2014) studied the media laws in all GCC countries and identified provisions that limit freedom of expression. First, the protection of reputation (defamation laws) limit the freedom of expression in that defamation in GCC countries is treated as criminal rather than civil, unlike many other nations. In the Arab culture, the protection of privacy, human dignity, honor, and good reputation is a central cultural value rooted in Islamic teaching and values (Duffy, 2014; Hafez, 2002). "The absence of clear laws and precedents that protect journalists from defamation charges arising from truthful reporting about public figures is a major impediment to press freedom in the region" (Duffy, 2014, p. 13). Second, maintaining harmony in society is an important concept in GCC media laws. GCC media laws prohibit criticism or reporting that threatens national security or public order. For example, Article 9 of the Saudi media law indicates that publications and journalists have the right to objective, constructive criticism in the public interest and facts and evidence. However, publications are prohibited from publishing content that contradicts Islamic and national laws, contradicts national security or the national interest, serves a foreign interest that conflicts with the national interest, stirs up conflict between citizens, approves of or encourages crimes ("The Implementing Regulations for Publishing," n.d.). Third, criticism of the ruler or other public officials is also limited in GCC countries. "With the exception of Saudi Arabia, the laws of the GCC countries prohibit criticizing their rulers" (Duffy, 2014, p. 21).

While these laws are considered broad and vague (mainly as Saudi media laws provide no detailed written penal code), ambiguity in media laws leads to limiting the

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role of journalism and its potential in society and leads to self-censorship by journalists, according to Duffy (2014). Notably, coverage of the freedom of the press and criticism depends on the level of political or social tension in most Arab nations; most press laws emphasize avoiding any journalism practices that could lead to disunity, sedition, or insecurity. Journalists in tense situations often tend to practice self-censorship; at other times, the government interferes. Additionally, these laws apply specifically to national media outlets that publish or broadcast from inside a country. Pan-Arab stations enjoy slightly more freedom and are less subject to these laws. Professionally, the editorial policy is subject to editor ideology. That is, editors-in-chief decide how and what to publish rather than administrative regulations (Mellor, 2007). "For instance, one prominent TV presenter (Mohamed Kreishan, al-Jazeera) pointed out that a change of editor may be accompanied by a change in the whole editorial policy, and hence inconsistency" (Mellor, 2007, p. 67).

Arab media has two public spaces for media markets: national and pan-Arab. The national media market is mostly controlled or regulated by the government in the country in which they are based. For example, the national media system in Saudi Arabia can be divided into two categories. First, TV channels and radio that are government-run under the Saudi Broadcast Authority are primarily conservative in content and are highly controlled by the government (e.g., SBC, Holly Quran Channel, Cultural Channel, Al Ekhbaryah News Channel, Generation Channels, Jeddah Radio, and Islam Call Radio). The second type, private commercialized media companies, are owned by Saudi businessmen who publish from Saudi Arabia; their main audiences are Saudi citizens and foreign workers in the country.

The other market is the shared regional media market (pan-Arab). The pan-Arab media market is a more commercialized system that targets larger audiences in the Arab region and worldwide and competes with nation-state media. Moreover, pan-Arab media focuses on development issues and promotes the idea of Arabism as one united nation that competes with foreign influences (Kraidy, 2011; Mellor, 2007). The two most influential TV networks in the Arab region are Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera.

Al Arabiya. One of the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) networks, Al Arabiya, was launched in 2002 and broadcasts from Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). The TV channel broadcasts only Arabic news and provides online news in Arabic, English, Persian, and Urdu. Al Arabiya is one of the most influential news sources and opinion-makers in the Arab World (Al-Rawi, 2017; Nisbet & Myers, 2011). Al Arabiya, owned by the Saudi Businessman Waleed Al-Ibrahim, is pro-Saudi Arabia and was launched as competition to its rival Al Jazeera (Al-Rawi, 2017; Hachten & Scotton, 2016).

Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera network is another influential media outlet in the Arab World. Al Jazeera is a state-owned news organization founded in 1996 based in Doha, Qatar (Powers, 2009; Toumi, 2011). The establishment of Al Jazeera was a turning point in the Arab political news, breaking taboos and bringing journalistic professionalism to the Middle East scene (Kraidy, 2011; Mellor, 2007). It is one of the most influential media outlets and opinion-makers in the Arab World (Rugh, 2004). Moreover, Al Jazeera's coverage of the war in Afghanistan gained global attention, particularly in the West (Whitaker, 2003).

Although it played a significant role in bringing professionalism to Middle East journalism, its coverage and content have been under criticism. For example, during the U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, the news channel "earned the enmity of the U.S. administration" (Kraidy, 2011, p. 276) by airing videos released by Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States (Telhami, 2013), and broadcasting "bloody war scenes from the invasion of Iraq, images Western news organizations would consider too shocking to show" (Kraidy, 2012, p. 276). Its office in Kabul was bombed by U.S. forces in 2001, as was its office in Baghdad in 2003, killing the station's correspondent (Jamail, 2013; Kraidy, 2011). In the Middle East, Al Jazeera has faced challenges in several countries. Its offices were shut down in several countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Iran, after being accused of misleading the public and distorting the facts, inciting violence and terror, and threatening peace and security in the region in violation of pan-Arab policies. Notably, during the Arab Spring, Al Jazeera was accused of supporting and empowering the Muslim Brotherhood (Hachten & Scotton, 2016).

Russia's Media System (RT)

The post-Soviet early 1990s witnessed significant transformation in the Russian system, including its media system. It was a period of new institutional construction that ended the Communist Party's monopoly. The constitution granted freedom of mass information and expression and prohibited censorship (Palmer, 2009). The 1991 media law stated that

the inadmissibility of censorship (article 3) and guaranteed unlimited (except by

existing legislation) freedom to seek, obtain, produce, and disseminate

information; to found media outlets; and to own, use, and manage them (article 1).

The crucial provision was that which allowed the establishment and operation of

nonstate-owned (private) media. (Vartanova, 2011, p. 123)

Although the Russian media system attempted to imitate the Western model in

privatizing the media industry and adopting freedom of expression, censorship

legislation, and professional journalism, adopting new laws and practices was superficial

(Palmer, 2009; Vartanova, 2011). As Vartanova (2011) argued, the Russian political and

cultural experience differs from Western Europe and North America, limiting the

adoption of the Western model.

The transition of the Russian economy from a planned, state-controlled, and

highly ideologized system to a market system was followed by economic

depression, the loss of societal unity, disappointment in politics and economic

reforms, and a moral crisis in society. (Vartanova, 2011, p. 123)

These were all factors that contributed to the different experiences of the Russian media

system. Moreover, in the last two decades, the government has notably interfered with

media autonomy, offering little protection for journalists and media organizations, and

has the power to sanction media organizations

Despite the privatization of the market and a large number of TV stations in

Russia, with more than 7,306 TV stations, most influential TV stations are state-

controlled. Moreover, independent TV stations face challenges not only in advertising,

market share, and viewers but also as players in the political process (Palmer, 2009; Vartanova, 2011).

RT. RT has grown substantially. Based in Moscow, RT is an international network funded by the Russian Government. RT was launched in 2005, aiming to reflect Russia's opinion of the world and provide a more balanced picture (Sputnik, 2005). RT Arabic (Rusiya Al-Yaum) started broadcasting in 2007. It reaches about 350 million viewers in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe (Suchkov, 2015).

The Anglo/British American Media System (BBC and CNN)

The British and American media systems have many common features. Both countries are democratic, liberal, and capitalistic nations, theoretically apply the same concept of professionalism, and have commercialized their media markets. However, zooming out, the two countries differ in many features, politically, culturally, and historically. The United States "is a purer example of the liberal system—and Britain, where statist conservatism, liberal corporatism, and social democracy have been stronger than in the United States" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 198).

In both countries, professionalism is an important element in journalism: "the liberal theory of a free press rooted in the civil society and the market" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 228). Although early British journalistic practices and laws were brought to North America, the American declaration of independence from the UK was essential to moving toward more press freedom, as reflected in the first amendment (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
> the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or

the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for

a redress of grievances. (Constitution of the United States, n.d.)

John Milton (1608–1674) is one of the earliest English writers who advocated for

freedom of the press and the marketplace of ideas. "This was the revolutionary ideology

of a radical, progressive class fighting against a declining absolutist and authoritarian

order" (McNair, 2003).

The separation of media from government power is a valuable concept in both

countries. However, cases relating to social responsibility, the threat of national security,

or harmful speech have been debated in the United States' freedom of speech history

(Briggs, 2009), such as the Sedition Act of 1918, Vietnam War, *New York Times Co. v.*

the United States 1971, and the Pentagon Papers. In terms of objectivity, Hallin and

Mancini (2004) argued that the political parallelism in the British media is more

substantial than its counterpart in the U.S. media. Broadcasting in the UK is presumably

more autonomous than broadcasting in the United States. Nevertheless, "American and

European journalists among the world press corp often criticized one another's

professionalism" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 226).

The commercial media market in the United States is highly dominated by

private sectors and somewhat less in the United Kingdom. The history of TV stations in

the United Kingdom involves several phases, from being regulated by the government to

what is known today as a mixed market (including public service outlets such as the BBC

and independent private outlets such as Sky News). In contrast, the private

commercialized TV system emerged in the United States from the beginning (Liseblad,

2020). This, in fact, provided the American liberal model with a unique experience and

success that many European countries have tried to imitate (Bourdon, 2000). Liseblad (2020) investigated American news consultants' role in the development of television news in the UK in the 1990s when public service TV stations started shifting toward privatization. Liseblad (2020) concluded that, with the help of American consultants, the effectiveness, attractiveness, satisfaction, and dissemination of the news in the UK media industry has improved. On a global level, the U.S. and UK TV networks are considered to be prestigious. BBC is "recognized worldwide as the pre-eminent public broadcasting organization, and, until the development of CNN, the most valued international broadcaster" (Henningham & Delano, 1998, p. 144).

BBC. BBC is one of the largest broadcasting companies around the world, reaching about 200 million viewers globally (Cruikshank, 2010). BBC Arabic television started broadcasting in March 2008 (Al-Rawi, 2017). According to the BBC Arabic website (BBC-Arabic, n.d.), the news organization is perceived by the Arab viewers as the most credible and objective outlets in the Arab world.

CNN. CNN is the leading American network for international news coverage. It was the first channel while covering the Gulf War in 1991 to introduce "the concept of a 24/7 news channel that was capable of holding its viewers' interest" (Hachten & Scotton, 2016, p. 179). Following CNN's model, several Arab TV networks have been launched, including Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. According to the CNN Arabic website, CNN Arabic, based in UAE, covers a wide range of news based on an Arab perspective (CNN-Arabic, n.d.).

Chapter Summary and Research Questions

Saudi Arabia is undergoing a period of rapid political, economic, and social transformation (epitomized by Saudi Vision 2030). While the country has historically encountered many progress-limiting obstacles, the current transformation seeks to overcome previous challenges and implement a future roadmap. This study examines how a new and emerging Saudi identity is framed by global online news channels in the context of reflexive modernity and global identities

Saudi modernization cannot be isolated from reflexive globalized modernity. In reflexive modernity, while societies are connected by media communication technologies (globalization), they also produce global identities. Identity is dual-structured. It is the interconnection between agents (e.g., journalists, editors, sources, elites, or other social actors) and social structures (e.g., values, traditions, norms, and rules), mediated by journalistic interpretive communities.

This study adopts the national identity frame variables from several models proposed in the literature, such as the avowal and ascription of cultural identity theory (Collier & Thomas, 1988), the six dimensions of national culture (Hofstede et al., 2010), the nine dimensions of the GLOBAL Study (House et al., 2002), the three bipolar dimensions of cultural values (Schwartz, 1999), and the two dimensions of cultural change values (Inglehart, 2008, 2000), as well as from the data-driven. The methodology chapter will provide further detail on the development of the national identity frame variables and categories.

Research Questions

The research questions are divided into two sections. The first section concerns the identity positioning categories (i.e., avowal and ascription) in framing the Saudi identity through the political, economic, and cultural contexts:

RQ1: In what ways do Arabic global online news channels position the Saudi

identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture?

RQ2: In what ways do English global online news channels position the Saudi

identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture?

The second section concern the identity structure categories (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance)[2] in framing the Saudi identity through the political, economic, and cultural contexts:

RQ3: In what ways do Arabic global online news channels frame the structure of

the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture?

RQ4: In what ways do English global online news channels frame the structure of

the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture?

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[2] The identity structure categories developed after conducting a qualitative exploratory approach to develop a coding scheme. A further explanation is addressed in the methodology chapter.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research methods are systematic investigation tools that establish to obtain valid answers to hypotheses or questions. Research methods are "the means used to collect evidence necessary for building or testing explanations about that which is being studied" (Frey et al., 2000, p. 13). This study drew a sample from five global online news channels (five from Arabic online websites and five from English online websites). This study employed a mixed-methods approach (qualitative and quantitative content analysis). The qualitative analysis was first used to develop a coding scheme, then quantitative and qualitative analysis was conducted to analyze the data. Following, research methods and design is presented. Second, data collections and procedures are described. Third, unite of analysis as well as the sampling strategy is explained. Fourth, the study's variables are operationalized, and the training and reliability measurement is provided. Lately, the analytical plans for analysis is highlighted.

Methods and Study Design

Framing scholars have argued that framing qualitative analysis does not simply involve coding; instead, it is a process of interpretation (D'Angelo et al., 2019). Reese (2001b) argued that using quantifiable measurements may neglect the importance of the underlying meaning constructed in a frame. On the other hand, qualitative methods may not adequately explain the size, significance, or patterns associated with the framed issue. Thus, Reese (2001b) and D'Angelo et al. (2019) suggested employing both qualitative and quantitative methods, i.e., mixed methods, to overcome the limitations of each.

Recognizing this gap, this study employed both qualitative and quantitative content analysis (mixed methods).

Content Analysis

According to Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, content analysis is defined as the "analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probable effect" (as cited in Krippendorff, 2004, p. xvii). The content analysis method "was developed primarily as a method for studying mass-mediated and public messages" which has recently become one of the dominant methods in mass communication research (Frey et al., 2000, p. 236).

Content analysis can be conducted qualitatively and quantitatively, though quantitative content analysis dominates mass communication research (Frey et al., 2000). Qualitative methods seek an in-depth understanding of social phenomena within their natural setting to make sense of the associated meaning (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). It "involves in-depth, case-oriented study of a relatively small number of cases … seeks detailed knowledge of specific cases, often with the goal of finding out 'how things happen (or happened)" (Ragin et al., 2004, p. 10). Qualitative research adds an essential element that quantitative research cannot. For example, researchers can draw underlying meaning from the interaction that takes place between the researcher and participants. Rather than relying on survey instruments to collect data, human researchers can be intelligent, adaptable, flexible, and observant instruments that collect data with skills, tact, and understanding. Qualitative methods also provide rich information about the

phenomenon with small samples (Altheide & Schneider, 2013; Messaris & Abraham, 2001; Seidman, 1991).

Qualitative content analysis is interested in the latent meaning of the message through tracing and interpreting the embedded narrative associated with the message (Frey et al., 2000). Hsieh and Shannon (2005) indicated three approaches to qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed, and summative qualitative content analysis. The conventional approach (also called the inductive approach) is used when there is no existing theory or model to guide the analysis. Instead, researchers established categories or coding schemes based on the data—this is data-driven analysis. In contrast, in directed qualitative continent analysis (also called the deductive approach), researchers need to rely on theory or a model that guides the process of coding scheme development. The third approach is summative qualitative content analysis, which is used along with quantitative content analysis to examine the underlying (latent) meaning that quantitative methods are insufficient (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).

Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are numerical measurements that aim to explain the relationship between variables and predict patterns and behavior (Reinard, 2008). Quantitative methods are a systematic empirical examination of measurable variables through statistical or computational techniques. Quantitative methods have several advantages. For example, they can test unstructured or large datasets with little time or effort. They can examine changes in behavior or in texts over time. Quantitative research is replicable—it can be repeated to obtain the same results. More importantly, quantitative data can be generalized to the entire population (Creswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Gorard, 2001).

Quantitative content analysis is interested in the manifested meaning of the message, utilizing numeric counting of the characteristics associated with the message. Researchers code text and assign numerical values that can be tested using statistical procedures.

Mixed Methods

Mixed methods have become a keen interest for many researchers in the communication field and other disciplines. It has been described as the " third methodological movement" (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 5), the " third research paradigm" (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15), "a new star in the social science sky" (Mayring, 2007, p. 1), and "multiple ways of seeing and hearing" (Greene, 2007, p. 20). Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007) defined mixed methods as a process of combining "qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use qualitative and quantitative viewpoint, data collection, analysis, inference technique) for the purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration" (p. 123). Creswell and Clark (2018) identified several reasons to use mixed methods:

> In general, research problems suited for mixed methods are those in which one data source may be insufficient. Further, results often need to be explained, exploratory findings need to be generalized, a primary experimental design needs to be expanded or enhanced, multiple cases need to be compared or contrasted, the participants need to be involved in the research, and/or a program needs to be evaluated. (p.8)

Creswell and Clark (2018) provided three core mixed methods designs. First, *the convergent design (concurrent or parallel design)* is when researchers collect two

separate sets of data (one quantitative and the other qualitative), analyze them separately (one quantitatively and the other qualitatively), and then compare or combine the two results. The goal for this design is "obtaining a more complete understanding of a problem, to validate one set of findings with the other, or to determine if participants respond in a similar way if they check quantitative predetermined scales and if they are asked open-ended qualitative questions" (p. 65).

The second design is *the explanatory sequential design*, which takes place in two interactive phases. First, the researcher collects and analyzes the data quantitatively. At this phase, the aim is to develop a qualitative protocol, such as interview questions. In the second phase, qualitative data collection and analysis are conducted. The results of the two phases are integrated and interpreted (Creswell & Clark, 2018).

The third design is *the exploratory sequential design*. The exploratory sequential design starts with qualitative data collection and analysis. The intent is to develop a quantitative instrument, or any feature based on the qualitative results, such as a codebook. Once the instrument is developed, the researcher then tests the data quantitatively. Finally, the quantitative results are interpreted (Creswell & Clark, 2018). This study employed an exploratory sequential design. However, while this design suggested that the final data analysis only use quantitative methods, this study went one step further in analyzing the data and used both quantitative and qualitative analysis and interpretation.

This study utilized *the exploratory sequential design*. The following figure (1) illustrates the study design.

Figure 1. *Procedures of the Exploratory Sequential Design*

Data Collection

This study collected the data from global television networks, particularly their online websites (global online news channels). Five online news channels were selected: Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, Russia Today (RT), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and Cable News Network (CNN). The data collected from the Arabic and English websites of each online news channel. This study did not conduct a content analysis of the broadcast or satellite distributed news content by these five global news channels.

Four criteria were used to rationalize the selection of the global online news channels. First, they represent or are based on various geopolitical systems. Second, they contain similar operation features (TV networks), and their websites publish online news in Arabic and English while their coverage targets local, regional, and international audiences. Third, they have a leading, recognizable, or popular role in global media. Finally, the data for each website is accessible. As discussed in the literature review, all five online news outlets met these criteria.

To collect data, the researcher specified four search criteria: First, the search was limited to a timeframe of three years, from the first day of the Saudi Vision 2030 announcement to the date that the researcher started collecting data (April 25, 2016, to April 25, 2019). Second, the search phrases "Saudi Vision" and "Saudi Vision 2030" in English and "رؤية السعودية 2030" and "رؤية السعودية" in Arabic were used to specify the terms associated with the targeted articles. Third, the researcher searched the sites or domains of the online news channels, Al Arabiya-Arabic (https://www.alarabiya.net/), Al Arabiya-English (https://english.alarabiya.net/), Al Jazeera-Arabic (https://www.aljazeera.net/), Al Jazeera-English and (https://www.aljazeera.com/), RT-

Arabic (https://arabic.rt.com/,) RT-English (https://arabic.rt.com/), BBC-Arabic (https://www.bbc.com/arabic), BBC-English (https://www.bbc.com/), CNN-Arabic (https://arabic.cnn.com/) CNN-English (https://www.cnn.com/). Fourth, the researcher set the language to either Arabic or English.

The researcher compared three databases to find sufficient operators that provided accessible data for all five media websites (Arabic and English): Nexis Uni, ProQuest, and Google Advanced Search. The results indicated two limitations of Nexis Uni and ProQuest. First, both databases provided no articles for some of the online news channels. Second, both databases provided articles that were not related to the searching phrases, usually articles related to Saudi Arabia in general. In contrast, Google Advanced Search was more consistent. The following table shows the comparison between the three databases.

Table 4.

Comparison of the Data Generated from Three Databases.

Online News Channels	Language	Nexis Uni	ProQuest	Google Advanced Search	Google Advanced Search (After data cleaning)
Al Arabiya	Arabic	904	0	202	140
	English	520	400	199	152
Al Jazeera	Arabic	0	0	160	117
	English	0	0	81	55
RT	Arabic	0	0	102	94
	English	0	0	58	56
BBC	Arabic	0	0	91	85
	English	0	181	60	53
CNN	Arabic	175	0	200	130
	English	49	138	84	65

Therefore, Google Advanced Search (https://www.google.com/advanced_search) was used to generate the data from the five media websites (Arabic and English). Google Advanced Search enables users to specify a variety of commands, where Google operators help to navigate and narrow the search for specific websites, contents, dates, region, language, and other features.

However, one of the challenges of this database is that collecting and organizing metadata (e.g., date, number of articles, and number of paragraphs) must be done manually. After collecting, organizing, and cleaning the data on separate Excel files, a number of articles were excluded. Articles that included no text (e.g., only photographs or videos) were excluded. Also, because only three online news channels' data included opinion articles (Al Arabiya-Arabic and -English and CNN-Arabic), the researcher decided to exclude opinion articles and include news articles so that the data for all online news channels remained consistent.

Unitizing

In content analysis, researchers need to segment the data into several units, a process called unitizing. "In unitizing, the researcher draws relevant distinctions within an observational field. This creates a multiplicity of observations, information-bearing instances, or units for short, and readies that multiplicity for subsequent analysis" (Krippendorff, 2018, p. 102). For content analysis unitizing, Krippendorff (2018) identified three types of units: sampling, context, and coding.

Sampling units refer to the "units that are distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis" (Krippendorff, 2018, p. 103), such as issues of a newspaper. Context units

are "units of textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in the description of recording units" (Krippendorff, 2018, p. 105), such as the text of the news story. Coding units (or recording units) refer to the "units that are distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording, or coding" (Krippendorff, 2018, p. 103), such as a sentence, paragraph, headline, words, or phrases. To distinguish context units and coding units, Benoit (2010) stated that "coding unit, which specifies the part of the text to be coded (e.g., words, sentences, paragraphs, camera shot) as well as the context unit, which specifies the larger part of the text used to interpret a given coding unit" (p. 272).

The *sampling unit* in the current study was the number of articles from each online news channel. Articles referred to the textual narrative of the news story that contained headline, authors, date, and body text. The *coding unit* and *context unit* in this study were the same. The coding unit and context unit were the paragraphs in each news story. Paragraph referred to a passage in a news story identified by a new line, indentation, or numbering. Notably, from the data of this study, the paragraphs vary in writing style from one media website to another, from one language to another, and from one article to another. Some paragraphs may contain one to two sentences, while others may contain more than five sentences.

Sampling Strategy

The generated data varied in sample size, between 53 and 152 articles per media website. To overcome the sample size variation, the researcher limited the sample size for each online news channel to 60 articles or less. Online news channels that contained 60

articles or less were entirely included. The rationale for selecting 60 articles was to have

an approximately equal sample size. Besides that, 60 articles entailed a large number of

paragraphs (coding units) that would be adequate for any statistical test. Table (5)

summarizes the sample units and coding units used in the current study.

Table 5.

Sample Units and Coding Units Included in the Final Analysis.

Online News Channels	Language	Sample units	Coding units	Mean	SD
Al Arabiya	Arabic	60	496	248.50	143.32
	English	60	624	312.50	180.27
Al Jazeera	Arabic	60	836	418.50	241.47
	English	55	1106	553.50	319.41
RT	Arabic	60	554	277.50	160.07
	English	56	608	304.50	175.65
BBC	Arabic	60	904	452.50	261.10
	English	53	986	493.50	284.77
CNN	Arabic	60	469	235.00	135.53
	English	60	1263	632.00	364.74
Total		584	7846		

For sampling, the researcher grouped all articles into three categories: political

articles, economic articles, and cultural articles. The purpose was to categorize the

articles in a way that represented different types of issues or topics. Because the

exploratory sequential design requires two sampling phases, the researcher drew samples

in two different phases.

First Phase Sampling (Developing Coding Scheme Qualitatively)

This study developed a coding scheme for national identity frame (i.e., identity

positioning and identity structure) and the contexts (i.e., political, economic, and cultural

contexts). The national identity frame frame were adopted from several studies as

reviewed in the literature review: avowal and ascription of cultural identity theory

(Collier & Thomas, 1988), the six dimensions of national culture (Hofstede et al., 2010),

the nine dimensions of GLOBAL Study (House et al., 2002), the three bipolar dimensions

of Cultural Values (Schwartz, 1999), and the two dimensions of cultural change values

(Inglehart, 2008, 2000).

In the first phase, purposive sampling was used. Purposive sampling is used to

analyze a portion of the sample qualitatively to develop a quantitative instrument

(Creswell & Clark, 2018). The purposive sampling is used when "researchers

intentionally select (or recruit) participants" or articles that are representative of the

phenomenon being studied (Creswell & Clark, 2018, p. 176). It is a process of intentional

selection of cases or events that characterize different groups of the population (Reinard,

2008). Nine articles were selected from each online news channel (three political articles,

three economic articles, and three cultural articles), with a total of $n = 90$ articles. The

aim of this phase was to develop a codebook that contained measurable variables for the

national identity frame and its contexts.

Second Phase Sampling (Coding the Data Quantitatively)

In the second phase, stratified random sampling was utilized to analyze the rest of

the data quantitatively. Stratified random sampling is a method of selecting cases or

events based on known categories (or strata) that represent the population. Stratified

random sampling was employed for the online news channels that contained more than

60 articles (Al Arabiya-Arabic and English, Al Jazeera-Arabic, RT-Arabic, BBC-Arabic,

CNN-Arabic, and CNN- English). Online news channels that contained 60 articles or less

were entirely included, (Al Jazeera-English, RT- English, and BBC- English). The total

of the second phase sampling was *n* = 584 articles.

Developing Coding Schemes (National Identity Frame and Contexts)

To develop coding schemes, directed (deductive) qualitative content analysis was

conducted. Directed qualitative content analysis is used when an existing theory or model

provides pre-defined categories (variables) (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-

Donnerstein, 1999). Operationally, the researcher adopted Gamson and Modigliani's

(1989) framing analysis guide, where they suggested that framing discourse can be

deduced by analyzing the text using several devices. Their typology suggested manifest

framing devices that explain how to think about the issues and framing devices that

justify what should be done about it. The manifest framing devices take the shape of (1)

metaphors, (2) catchphrases, (3) depictions, and (4) exemplars. They are manifested in

the content itself.

On the other hand, three reasoning devices justify what should be done about it:

(1) roots (i.e., a causal analysis), (2) consequences (i.e., a particular type of effect), and

(3) appeals to principle (i.e., a set of moral claims). The coders applied these devices to

help code the message under one of the national identity categories. Moreover, the

researcher traced the contexts of each paragraph to identify the cluster of the contexts.

The contexts in this study were political context, economic context, and cultural context.

The researcher carefully read each unit (paragraph) and assigned the unit to one of

the pre-defined national identity frame categories as well as context categories. Units that

cannot be coded at this phase were highlighted for a second analysis. As the researcher

continued labeling, comparing, and combining units, some units fit the determined categories, some categories combined, some new categories emerged, and other categories died out.

Ultimately, two pre-defined identity positioning categories were found evident (i.e., avowal and ascription). Additionally, four pre-defined identity structure categories were found evident (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, and uncertainty). Besides, two identity structure categories were added as data-driven categories (i.e., thriving governance and doomed governance). Furthermore, each identity structure category has three sub-categories. Finally, the three context categories were found evident (i.e., political, economic identity, and cultural contexts). The codebook variables and their operationalizations are presented below.

Variables' Operationalization

This study consists of three main variables, the identity frame (with two sub-variables), the context, and the global online news channels (with ten categories). Each variable has several categories. Following, an operational definition for each variable is provided.

National Identity Frame

The national Identity frame refers to the way a message is constructed and framed. The national identity frame consists of two sub-variables, identity positioning and identity structure.

Identity Positioning. The identity positioning has two categories (i.e., avowal and ascription). The coder assigned each unit (paragraph) into one of the identity

positioning categories. Each unit was coded as (1) frame evident or (0) no frame. If the

paragraph did show neither of the identity positioning categories (i.e., avowal and

ascription), then it was coded as (0), no frame. Hence, coding within identity positioning

categories was mutually inclusive. Additionally, coding between identity positioning and

identity structure categories was mutually inclusive. That is, a unit can be coded into one

of the identity positioning categories as well as into one of the identity structure

categories at the same time. For example, if the paragraph described Saudi Vision 2030

as a "modernizing move in the monarchy country," then this would be assigned to the

ascription category (monarchy country) and the indulgence category (modernizing).

Tables (6) provides the operational definitions for identity positioning categories with

their sub-categories.

Table 6.

The Identity Positioning Categories and their Operational Definitions.

Categories	Operational definition
Avowal	- The paragraph cites Saudi sources (e.g., individuals, government, society, or groups) who express, define or characterize themselves concerning the event or concerning others.
	- The paragraph cites Saudi sources (e.g., individuals, government, society, or groups) who suggest that the event preserves or promotes Saudi culture, history, heritage, value, or identity.
Ascription	- The paragraph mentions or cites non-Saudi sources (e.g., individuals, government, society, or groups) that label or characterize Saudi's culture, society, political, or economic system in general terms.
	- The paragraph mentions or cites non-Saudi sources (e.g., individuals, government, society, or groups) that compare between cultures, political, or economic systems, or between two distinct times, groups, or individuals.

Identity Structure. The identity structure has six categories (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance). The coder assigned each unit into one of the identity structure categories. Each unit was coded as (1) frame evident or (0) no frame. If the paragraph did show neither of the identity structure categories (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance), then it was coded as (0), no frame. Hence, coding within identity structure categories was mutually inclusive. The table that follows provides the operational definitions of the identity structure categories and their sub-categories.

Table 7.

The Identity Structure Categories and their Operational Definitions.

variables	Sub-category	Operational definition
Indulgence	Tolerance	The paragraph suggests that the event provides liberty, freedom, modernization, tolerance, inclusion, participation, and engagement or openness.
	Prosperity	The paragraph suggests that the event allows the development of life quality such as entertainment, arts, healthcare, education, and sports.
	Equality	The paragraph suggests that the power, rights, ideas, or decisions are unconsolidated or distributed equally between socioeconomic classes, groups or communities, superiors, and subordinates, or institutions.
Restraint	Intolerance	The paragraph suggests that the event restrains liberty, freedom, modernization, tolerance, inclusion, participation, and engagement or openness.
	Deprivation	The paragraph suggests that the event restrains the development of life quality, such as entertainment, arts, healthcare, education, and sports.
	Inequality	The paragraph suggests that the power, rights, ideas, or decisions are consolidated or distributed unequally between socioeconomic classes, groups or communities, superiors, and subordinates, or institutions.
Certainty	Harmony	The paragraph suggests that the event corresponds with the belief of truth or desires. The speaker expresses comfort, support, or certitude about the event.

	Security	The paragraph suggests that the event provides security, safety, or stability consequences.
	Agreement	The paragraph suggests an agreement or reconciliation about the event between countries, societies, parties, individuals, or groups.
Uncertainty	Disharmony	The paragraph suggests that the event contradicts the belief of truth or desires. The speaker expresses disappointment, disownment, doubt, or skepticism about the event.
	Insecurity	The paragraph suggests that the event causes insecurity, unsafe, or instability consequences.
	Conflict	The paragraph suggests disagreement or conflict about the event between countries, societies, parties, individuals, or groups.
Thriving governance	Progression	The paragraph suggests that the government broadens or diversifies partnerships, investments, and funds locally and globally. The government's institutes or private sector is advancing, or its rating is increasing locally or globally.
	Reliability	The paragraph suggests that the government considers the importance of accountability, transparency, evaluation, adaptiveness, dialogue, and negotiation.
	Proficiency	The paragraph suggests that the government provides sufficient governmental services, promising opportunities, and solutions for administrative bureaucracy. The government account for the importance of training, competitiveness, and sustainability.
Doomed governance	Retrogression	The paragraph suggests that the government fails to broaden or diversify partnerships, investments, and funds locally and globally. The government's institutes or private sector is retreating, or its rating is declining locally or globally.
	Unreliability	The paragraph suggests that the government ignores or neglects the importance of accountability, transparency, evaluation, adaptiveness, dialogue, and negotiation.
	Incompetence	The paragraph suggests that the government fails to provide sufficient governmental services, promising opportunities, and solutions for administrative bureaucracy. The government neglects the importance of training, competitiveness, and sustainability.

Note: event refers to the subject being discussed, described, or dealt with in the article.

Contexts

The context refers to the event, topic, or issue of the unit (paragraph) in which the framing process accrues. The coder assigned each unit into one of the three contexts: (1) politics (2), economy (3), culture (3). The context categories were coded mutually exclusive. For example, if the paragraph talked about tourism in Saudi Arabia and its economic impact, this was coded under economic context. The context was coded as mutually exclusive. Table (8) provides the operational definitions for the political context, economic context, and cultural context.

Table 8.

Operational Definitions of the Political, Economic, and Cultural contexts.

Variables	Operational definition
Politics	Issue, event, or policy that discusses Saudi politics, political relationship or tension, royal family, political government's institute or personages, political consequences of actions, or reform and legislation related to the political system.
Economy	Issue, event, or policy that discusses Saudi economy, private sector, growing or declining economy, economic consequences, global or local economy, economic relationship, deals, industry, or reform and legislation related to the economy.
Culture	Issue, event, or policy that discusses Saudi culture, identity, religion, values, lifestyle norms, citizen's benefits or suffering or prosperity, human rights, justice, tourism, media, sport, arts, entertainment, or reform and legislation related to the culture.

Global Online News Channels

The online news channel refers to the news websites that the TV network organization operates. This variable is a categorical variable with ten categories: (1) Al Arabiya Arabic, (2) Al Arabiya English, (3) Al Jazeera Arabic, (4) Al Jazeera English,

(5) RT Arabic, (6) RT English, (7) BBC Arabic, (8) BBC English, (9) CNN Arabic, (10) CNN English.

Training and Reliability

The researcher recruited a second coder for training and testing the reliability of the developed coding schemes. Arabic is the native language of the researcher and the second coder, and both are proficient in English as a second language. Over two months, four coding training sessions were conducted. After training, both coders coded 10% of the sample to test the level of agreement between the two coders.

Cohen's Kappa for inter-rater reliability test was conducted. The agreement scores varied between .72 and .88. There is disagreement about the acceptable reliability score for two rater-reliability. Cohen (1960) and Landis and Koch (1977) indicated that scores between .61 and .80 are substantial. Fleiss (1981) pointed out that an agreement exceeding .75 is excellent. McHugh (2012) indicated that agreement between .60 to .80 is moderate. Nevertheless, the researcher concluded that inter-rater agreement between .73 and .88 in the current study is considered acceptable. Table (9) provides the inter-coder reliability results of the identity positioning categories, the identity structure categories, and the contexts categories.

Table 9.

Intercoder Reliability of the Positioning Identity Categories, the Identity Structure Categories, and the Context Categories.

Code	Cohen's Kappa K
Avowal	.75
Ascription	.73
Indulgence	.78
Restraint	.76

Certainty	.77
Uncertainty	.75
Thriving governance	.81
Doomed governance	.74
Political theme	.83
Economic theme	.86
Cultural theme	.8

Analytical Plan

This study employed mixed methods, qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Following, presentation of procedures used in both methods.

Quantitative Analysis (Statistical Assumptions and Procedures)

After coding all the data, the researcher conducted a series of statistical tests to examine the stated research question. All statistical analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 27. Because the study's variables were all categorical, the Chi-Square test was utilized. The Chi-Square test is an inferential statistical test. It is used to determine whether there is an association or differences between categorical variables (on a nominal or ordinal level). It produces a statistic based on the overall difference between the expected and observed frequencies.

The Chi-square test was employed to determine the relationship between the national identity frame and the political, economic, and cultural contexts in each of the global online news channels. The Chi-square test has two assumptions. First, independence of observations should be met across all variables. This assumption was met when data were exclusively coded, in which there was no relationship between the observations across all groups. The second assumption is that all cells should have expected counts greater than five. In several cases, this assumption was violated. However, Fisher's Exact Test is suggested for this situation (Gignac, 2019; McKinney et

al., 1989) and is automatically generated in SPSS. Thus, this study used Fisher's Exact

Test (indicated by (F)) when the cell's expected count was less than five.

Moreover, Adjusted Standardized Residual Analysis (Bonferroni correction) was

used. The Bonferroni correction is used to avoid the "chances of concluding erroneously

that a statistically significant effect has been observed across a series of statistical

analyses on the same sample of data [which] is known as the familywise error rate"

(Gignac, 2019, p. 17). In other words, the Bonferroni correction is used to avoid Type I

errors when conducting a series of posthoc tests for the Chi-square test (Beasley &

Schumacker, 1995; García-pérez & Núñez-antón, 2003). There are several ways to

conduct a Chi-square test with a Bonferroni correction. In this study, the researcher

conducted a series of Chi-square tests for each variable individually and then compared

the *p*-values against the adjusted Bonferroni correction's significance level.

To get the Bonferroni correction's significance level, one can divide the Chi-

square's significance level (0.05) by the number of the cells in the cross-table in SPSS. In

the current study, three adjusted significance levels for the Bonferroni correction were

used. First, the significant level for adjusted Bonferroni correction of the positioning

categories that had two cells (i.e., avowal and ascription), thus, was $0.05/2 = 0.025$.

Second, in Al Arabiya-Arabic, the restraint variable had zero observations; thus,

SPSS dropped this variable from the analysis, resulting in five cells (i.e., indulgence,

certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance). In only Al

Arabiya-Arabic, the significance level for the adjusted Bonferroni correction of the social

structure variables was $0.05/5 = 0.01$. Third, in the rest of the analysis, identity structure

categories had six cells (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving

95

governance, and doomed governance). Therefore, the significance level for adjusted

Bonferroni correction in the rest of the media platforms was $0.05/6 = 0.008$.

Additionally, Cochran's Q test was used to determine if there were significant

differences between related groups categories. Cochran's Q test assumes that the

independent variable consists of two or more categorical related groups while their

coding is mutually exclusive. The dependent variable should be one dichotomous

variable with two mutually exclusive groups. Moreover, Cochran's Q also requires the

sample size to be equal to or greater than 4 and the ($n*k$), which is the sample size (n)

multiplied by the number of related groups (k), should be equal to or greater than 24

(Cochran, 1950). These assumptions were all met in this study. However, posthoc tests

are required when there are more than two groups. Thus, pairwise comparisons were

used, running Dunn's test (1964) with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons

to detect the specific differences between groups.

Qualitative Analysis (Summative Content Analysis Approach)

The researcher also analyzed the texts qualitatively, using the summative content

analysis approach. The summative approach is one of the three approaches to qualitative

content analysis (the others being conventional and directed qualitative content analysis)

(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Typically, the summative approach to qualitative content

analysis is used as a secondary analysis, while the primary method is quantitative.

Quantitative content analysis can help understand the manifested content of the media

framing. However, the summative qualitative content analysis goes beyond that to

interpret the content's underlying (latent) meaning (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The

qualitative content analysis was conducted only for the significance results of the quantitative data.

The methodology employed in this research is complex, yet that is what was needed to unpack the ways in which global news channels framed national identity during a time when news coverage captured a cultural shift in Saudi Arabia. The results of the study's research questions are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the research questions addressed in the current study. First, the descriptive statistics of the data are presented. Second, the study's research questions are answered. Finally, a summary of the findings is presented.

National Identity Categories

The descriptive statistics showed that across all global online news channels, the data showed that uncertainty ($M = .20$, $SD = .40$) was the most frequently employed identity category, followed by thriving governance ($M = .18$, $SD = .38$), and indulgence ($M = .14$, $SD = .34$). Conversely, the least used categories were doomed governance ($M = .04$, $SD = .20$) and avowal ($M = .04$, $SD = .19$).

Table 10.

Descriptive Statistics of the National Identity Frame Categories.

National Identity Categories	M	SD	Count
Avowal	.04	.19	291
Ascription	.09	.28	696
Indulgence	.14	.34	1077
Restraint	.12	.32	941
Certainty	.10	.30	776
Uncertainty	.20	.40	1544
Thriving governance	.18	.38	1386
Doomed governance	.04	.20	339
Total			7050

Contexts

Across all global online news channels, the cultural context ($M = .40$, $SD = .49$) was the most prominent context, followed by the economic context ($M = .33$, $SD = .47$), and the political context ($M = .27$, $SD = .44$), respectively.

Table 11.

Descriptive Statistics of the Political, Economic, and Cultural Contexts.

Contexts	M	SD	Count
Political Context	.27	.44	2098
Economic Context	.33	.47	2628
Cultural Context	.40	.49	3117
Total			7843

Global Online News Channels

English online news writes longer stories than Arabic news online news channels. CNN-English had the highest number of paragraphs per story ($M = 21.52$, $SD = 8.92$), followed by Al Jazeera-English ($M = 20.15$, $SD = 9.099$), and BBC-English ($M = 19.43$, $SD = 9.57$). In contrast, CNN-Arabic had the lowest number of paragraphs per story ($M = 7.82$, $SD = 4.56$), followed by Al Arabiya-Arabic ($M = 8.27$, $SD = 4.95$), and RT-Arabic ($M = 9.25$, $SD = 5.53$).

Table 12.

Descriptive Statistics of the Global Online News Channels.

Media platforms	Language	Paragraph per story		Total paragraphs	Total stories
		M	SD		
Al Arabiya	Arabic	8.27	4.95	496	60
	English	10.42	5.41	624	60
Al Jazeera	Arabic	13.97	6.67	836	60
	English	20.15	9.09	1106	55
RT	Arabic	9.25	5.53	554	60

99

	English	10.86	4.75	608	56
	Arabic	15.03	7.70	904	60
BBC	English	19.43	9.57	986	53
	Arabic	7.82	4.56	469	60
CNN	English	21.52	8.92	1263	60
Total				7846	584

Next, the findings of the study's research questions are presented in the following order: (1) Arabic online news channels positioning the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts; (2) English online news channels positioning the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts; (3) Arabic online news channels framing the structure of the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts; (4) English online news channels framing the structure of the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Findings of the Research Questions

In this section, the findings of the research questions are presented quantitatively and qualitatively. First, the statistical results will be reported. Second, the qualitative reading of the data will follow based on the order of the statistical results. The qualitative report of the results will include only the categories that were found statistically significant. Equally important, the quantitative and the qualitative results in this section focused on the positive relationship between the national identity framing and the contexts. That is, the negative relationship between the national identity framing and the contexts was not reported because the focus of the study was concentrated on how news media selected and signified the frame rather than omitting the frame.

Research Question 1

The first research question asked about the ways that the Arabic online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya-Arabic, Al Jazeera-Arabic, RT-Arabic, BBC-Arabic, and CNN-Arabic) positioned (i.e., avowal and ascription) the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. A Chi-square test with the Bonferroni correction was used to test the association between the identity positioning categories and political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Political Context. The statistical results revealed that there was a statistically significant relationship between ascription and the political context in Al Arabiya-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 92.85, p = 0.001) and in Al Jazeera-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 16.18, p = 0.001). The qualitative reading of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-Arabic and Al Jazeera-Arabic used ascription framing differently. Al Arabiya-Arabic characterized the identity of Saudi politics as "progressive," "competitive," "ambitious," and the Saudi political leader as "hardworking," and "engaged." Another line of ascription was comparing the political identity of Saudi Arabia and its regional rival, Iran. The narratives stated that Iran's vision is to create regional chaos and "drag the region into the past with its intellectual and sectarian conflicts." Conversely, Saudi Arabia's vision is characterized as modernization that will "lead the region towards the future and the welfare of the people."

In contrast to Al Arabiya-Arabic narrative, Al Jazeera-Arabic narratives focused on two aspects. First, Al Jazeera-Arabic positioned the identity of Saudi politics as a nationalist political system. In particular, Al Jazeera-Arabic linked the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and the changes in Saudi politics, characterizing it as a "Machiavellian

bloody system." "neo-nationalism" or creating "illusionary enemies." Moreover, Al Jazeera-Arabic characterized the Saudi Crown Prince as a "dictator", "savage," "surly," and "nationalist." The term "illusion" was prominently used to label modernization in Saudi Arabia. For example, Al Jazeera-Arabic indicated in its coverage that: "The new nationalism [in Saudi Arabia] strengthens the home front against real and imagined enemies such as Iran."

Second, Al Jazeera-Arabic used the comparison to compare between two political systems. Al Jazeera- Arabic compared the current Saudi political system to other forms of Islamic models and presented the Saudi Islamists movement as an alternative system:

> Islamic goals often include a large number of aspirations, such as the Islamic state
> or the caliphate, the application of Sharia, the imposition of Islam into the public
> sphere, the empowerment of women according to their own agenda, the pursuit of
> an "Islamic" foreign policy, the search for Islamic economics, and Islam - and
> Islam only - as the reference framework for doing all the affairs related to the
> Islamic nation.

Table 13.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of Politics.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	p-value	Test Type*
Avowal						
Al Arabiya	10(21.8%)	5	2.55	6.49	0.020	P
Al Jazeera	1(12.5%)	3	-1.51	2.29	0.163	F
RT	2(28.6%)	2	0.05	0.00	1.000	F
BBC	4(18.2%)	6	-1.12	1.26	0.263	P
CNN	3(12.5%)	6	-1.45	2.09	0.148	P
Ascription						
Al Arabiya	16(72.7%)	2	9.64	92.85	0.001**	F

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	p-value	Test Type*
Al Jazeera	44(60.3%)	28	4.02	16.18	0.001**	P
RT	3(10.7%)	8	-2.07	4.29	0.038	P
BBC	24(38.1%)	18	1.67	2.81	0.094	P
CNN	9(32.1%)	7	0.91	0.82	0.364	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Economic Context. The statistical results indicated no significant association between the identity positioning categories and the Saudi economic context across all Arabic online news channels. The following table presents the results of the association between the positioning categories and the economic context.

Table 14.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of Economy.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	p-value	Test Type*
			Avowal			
Al Arabiya	7(21.7%)	32	-7.31	53.43	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	3(37.5%)	3	0.18	0.03	1.000	F
RT	1(14.3%)	3	-1.68	2.81	0.132	F
BBC	1(0.4%)	6	-2.26	12.17	0.001	P
CNN	2(8.3%)	10	-3.49	12.17	0.001	P
			Ascription			
Al Arabiya	10(4.5%)	15	-6.71	45.05	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	2(2.7%)	25	-5.99	35.83	0.001	P
RT	4(14.3%)	13	-3.42	11.71	0.001	P
BBC	6(9.5%)	16	-2.97	8.85	0.003	P
CNN	2(7.1%)	12	-3.92	15.34	0.001	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context. The statistical results showed that there was a statistically significant relationship between avowal and the

Saudi cultural context in Al Arabiya-Arabic ($\chi2$ (1) = 41.64, p = 0.001) and BBC-Arabic

($\chi2$ (1) = 8.93, p = 0.003). Moreover, the results showed statistically significant

relationships between ascription and the cultural context in RT-Arabic ($\chi2$ (1) = 35.54, p

= 0.001). In CNN-Arabic, both avowal ($\chi2$ (1) = 25.24, p = 0.001) and ascription CNN-

Arabic ($\chi2$ (1) = 10.89, p = 0.001) were found significantly associated with cultural

context. In comparing the avowal and ascription framing in CNN-Arabic, Cochran's Q

test showed that there were no significant differences between avowal (12.5%) and

ascription (11.2%) in framing the Saudi cultural context in CNN-Arabic, $\chi2$ (1) = 0.12, p

= 0.732.

The qualitative reading of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-Arabic used the

avowal framing by citing the Saudi journalists, analysis, citizens, and officials who

characterized the new Saudi culture as the moderate culture that rejects extremism.

Phrases such as "moderate Islam," "fighting terrorism," and "confronting extremism"

were prominently evident in Al Arabiya-Arabic. Moreover, the language of openness,

competitiveness, optimism, and promoting and encouraging cultural heritage tourism,

combined with preserving cultural values, norms, and traditions in light of globalization,

was prominent in the avowal framing. Frequently, Al Arabiya-Arabic quotes Saudi

officials who avowed to enhance "creativity, innovation, and communication with

various cultures and civilizations" … "in accordance with the values and beliefs of the

Kingdom."

Using avowal framing, BBC-Arabic reports the Saudis' definition of their culture.

BBC-Arabic frequently cited Saudi journalists and citizens in narrating their stories of the

Saudi culture. The narratives of promoting "moderate Islam," "arts and music," "the

openness on other cultures," and confronting "extreme ideology" were salient in BBC-Arabic. Moreover, the Saudis avowed that such modernization in the Islamic discourse and practice does not contradict "values and tradition" but reforms the extreme side of it.

RT-Arabic used a mixture narrative. For example, RT-Arabic used ascription to characterize the Saudi culture as "one of the most conservative countries in the world" in which women enjoy less freedom. Nevertheless, it highlighted the recent changes in social modernization, characterizing the social reforms as "revolutionary" and a "historic step."

In CNN-Arabic, avowal framing was evident through conveying the officials, journalists, and citizens' views about the social and cultural transformation in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis avowed that countering extremism and promoting moderate Islam, empowering women, and enhancing openness were the essential issues that characterized the Saudi culture. Expressions like "Saudi women are coming strongly" and "the kingdom is the patron of truly moderate Islam" were prominent in avowal framing in CNN-Arabic. Along with avowal, CNN-Arabic also used ascription mainly to characterize changes in the Saudi cultural lifestyle. For example, in comparing two distinct times, CNN-Arabic observed that Saudi Arabia had historically been a "conservative" and "masculine" that changed "toward new beginnings," becoming a "moderate society."

Finally, positioning the identity of the Saudi culture was not evident in Al Jazeera-Arabic. The flowing table indicates the results of the association between the positioning categories and the Saudi culture.

Table 15.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of culture.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
			Avowal			
Al Arabiya	26(56.5%)	9	6.45	41.64	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	4(50.0%)	2	1.47	2.16	0.222	F
RT	4(57.1%)	2	1.85	3.41	0.084	F
BBC	17(77.3%)	10	3.00	8.93	0.003**	P
CNN	19(79.2%)	8	5.02	25.24	0.001**	P
			Ascription			
Al Arabiya	5(22.7%)	4	0.31	0.09	0.786	F
Al Jazeera	27(37.0%)	20	2.00	4.02	0.045	P
RT	21(75.0%)	7	5.96	35.54	0.001**	P
BBC	33(52.4%)	29	1.07	1.14	0.285	P
CNN***	17(60.7%)	9	3.30	10.89	0.001**	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.
***CNN-Arabic used avowal and ascription equally.

Research Question 2

The second research question asked about the ways that the English online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya-English, Al Jazeera-English, RT-English, BBC-English, and CNN-English) positioned (i.e., avowal and ascription) the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, (c) and culture. A Chi-square test with the Bonferroni correction was used to test the association between the identity positioning categories and political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Political Context. The statistical results indicated no significant association between identity positioning categories (i.e., avowal and ascription) and the Saudi political context across all English online news channels.

The following table shows the statistical results of the association between the

positioning categories and the Saudi political context.

Table 16.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Politics.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Avowal						
Al Arabiya	7(14.6%)	9	-0.58	0.33	0.564	P
Al Jazeera	17(50.0%)	14	1.12	1.26	0.262	P
RT	0(0.0%)	3	-2.07	4.27	0.032	F
BBC	5(10.9%)	12	-2.50	6.226	0.013	P
CNN	2(4.0%)	10	-2.86	8.18	0.004	P
Ascription						
Al Arabiya	12(22.6%)	9	1.00	1.00	0.317	P
Al Jazeera	29(37.7%)	31	-0.56	0.31	0.575	P
RT	17(22.7%)	15	0.78	0.61	0.436	P
BBC	24(18.6%)	35	-2.25	5.053	0.025	P
CNN	24(18.6%)	26	-0.36	0.128	0.720	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Economic Context. The statistical results

indicated no significant association between identity positioning categories (i.e., avowal

and ascription) and the Saudi economic context across all English online news channels.

The following table shows the statistical results of the association between the

positioning categories and the Saudi economic context in the English online news

channels.

Table 17.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Economy.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Avowal						
Al Arabiya	5(10.4%)	19	-4.24	17.97	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	1(2.9%)	9	-3.18	10.10	0.001	P
RT	1(5.9%)	7	-3.07	9.41	0.002	P
BBC	1(2.2%)	5	-1.86	3.47	0.078	P
CNN	1(2.0%)	17	-4.77	22.74	0.001	P
Ascription						
Al Arabiya	3(5.7%)	21	-5.22	27.20	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	7(9.1%)	21	-3.62	13.08	0.001	P
RT	7(9.3%)	32	-6.14	37.69	0.001	P
BBC	1(0.8%)	13	-3.83	14.66	0.001	P
CNN	6(4.7%)	43	-7.25	52.50	0.001	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context. The statistical results

indicated that avowal was significantly associated with Saudi cultural context in Al

Arabiya-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 21.33, p = 0.001), RT-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 23.04, p = 0.001),

BBC-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 11.98, p = 0.003), and CNN-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 45.94, p = 0.001).

On the other hand, ascription was also found significantly associated with the Saudi

cultural context in Al Arabiya-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 19.07, p = 0.001), Al Jazeera-English ($\chi2$

(1) = 15.98, p = 001), RT-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 31.88, p = 0.001), BBC-English ($\chi2$ (1) =

20.01, p = 0.001), and CNN-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 50.64, p = 0.001).

However, comparing the avowal and ascription, all English online news outlets

used ascription significantly more than avowal, except Al Arabiya-English. Cochran's Q

test showed that there were no significant differences between avowal (13.3%) and

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ascription (14.1%) in framing the identity of Saudi culture in Al Arabiya-English, $\chi2$ (1)

= 1.32, p = 0.251. In RT-English, ascription (21.6%) was employed significantly more

than avowal (6.9%) in positioning the identity of the Saudi culture, $\chi2$ (1) = 19.28, p =

0.001. In BBC-English, ascription (16.8%) was employed significantly more than

restraint (6.5%) in positioning the identity of the Saudi culture, $\chi2$ (1) = 29.26, p = 0.001.

In CNN-English, ascription (16.6%) was employed significantly more than avowal

(7.9%) in positioning the identity of the Saudi culture, $\chi2$ (1) = 18.78, p = 0.001. Thus, all

English online news channels employed ascription more than avowal, accept Al Arabiya-

English.

The qualitative reading of the data showed that avowal in Al Arabiya-English

conveyed Saudi citizens and officials regarding the cultural transformation that is taking

place in Saudi Arabia. In avowal framing, a women's rights reform narrative was salient,

positioning Saudi women's roles and achievements in society. Statements such as

"women have achieved a lot in our country, and we are very proud of this, achievements

the outside community does not know about" ... "I feel happy and proud" … "I look at

these changes as steps toward a better future since most of the recent changes are visible,

which have a direct impact on the Saudi culture," were salient in Al Arabiya-English

narrative. In the ascription narrative, Al Arabiya-English described the perceptions of

international figures (such as artists, musicians, diplomats, global media, and journalists)

of the cultural changes in Saudi Arabia. Expressions such as "revolutionary changes for

the kingdom under Vision 2030" … "A sense of vibrancy has been thrust in cities such as

Riyadh" … "Now is the time when artists are some of the best story-tellers and ideas

merchants," were evident in Arabiya-English, framing how international figures

positioned the identity of the Saudi culture.

Al Jazeera-English employed ascription framing in the context of Saudi women's

rights as well as religiosity, characterizing how Saudi culture treats women, such as

"second-class citizens," "[has] the world's tightest restrictions on women," "[has] long

[been] a symbol of repression against women," and "women are looked down upon" were

salient in the ascription framing of Saudi culture. Furthermore, phrases that highlight the

nature of Saudi religiosity included "religiously conservative kingdom," "the socially

conservative country," "strict version of Islam," and "an ultra-conservative theocracy"

were prominent in the ascription framing of the Saudi culture.

RT-English employed ascription framing with the women and religiosity of Saudi

culture. Consistently, RT-English characterized women's status in Saudi Arabia as

"second-class" and "legal minors," characterizing Saudi Arabia as one of "the worst

countries in the world for gender inequality." RT-English also characterized the Saudi

society as "ultra-conservative Wahhabist" and a "conservative state," describing the "the

Saudi dictatorship" that applies extreme practices in their social lifestyles. For example,

RT-English indicated that religious clerics in Saudi Arabia view the entertainment and

arts as "immoral, atheistic or rotten." RT-English also used the comparison narrative

between the Western culture and the Saudi culture. For example, RT-English indicated:

> On Tuesday, Saudi officials pitched the idea of Disney theme parks, live shows
>
> and resorts to assembled Disney executives. If Prince Mohammed succeeds in his
>
> negotiations with the company, a Disneyland in Saudi Arabia might look a little
>
> different from those in Paris or Orlando, however. For starters, the Disney

princesses' costumes would be illegal on the streets of Riyadh. In a country where every aspect of life is regulated by an ultra-conservative Wahhabist interpretation of Islam, women are required to be fully covered at all times.

BBC-English employed ascription framing on the women and religiosity of Saudi culture. BBC-English characterized the women's status in Saudi Arabia as "one of the most gender unequal countries in the Middle East." BBC-English characterized religiosity in the Saudi society as a "strict form of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism" and described Saudi Arabia as a "conservative kingdom" that applies extreme practices in their social lifestyles. For example, BBC-English consistently focused on three exemplar narratives of Saudi religiosity culture in the public sphere, which were "gender segregation," "restrict women code dress (abaya)," and "every woman must have a male companion with her in public." Moreover, BBC-English utilized the comparison narrative to relate the Saudi cultural lifestyle to that in the West. Comparison statements such as "Some reports suggested that Keith, whose musical repertoire includes songs like Whiskey Girl and I Love This Bar, was asked to tone down some of the content in a country where alcohol is banned" … "It is not clear whether Nelly will be asked to do the same given that his most popular song, Hot in Herre, asks women to remove their clothes."… "It is unclear how something like a Six Flags will work in a country where women and men are largely segregated" were prominently evident in BBC-English.

CNN-English used ascription framing in characterizing Saudi society's religiosity as "conservative Saudi society" and describing Saudi Arabia as an "ultra-conservative Kingdom" that "follows a strict form of Wahhabi Islam." Frequently, CNN-English connected religiosity to women's rights, such as by saying that "women are still treated

like second-class citizens in Saudi Arabia," pointing out that religious practice "bans the mixing of sexes at public events and places numerous curbs on women," and describing how a male guardian "must give his approval before a woman can obtain often basic entitlements." CNN-English described Saudi Arabia as "one of the worst countries in the world for gender inequality." Moreover, CNN-English utilized a comparison narrative between the Saudi cultural lifestyle and that in the West. For example, highlighting the loosening cultural restrictions under the Vision 2030, CNN-English stated that this "could mean women will be allowed to sunbathe and swim wearing bikinis, hitherto unheard of in the conservative kingdom where women are expected to cover their skin with robe-like dresses known as 'abayas.'" … "Restrictions on visitor visas will be eased in the tourist zone, although it is unclear if Saudi's ban on alcohol will still apply" … "The project's appeal to foreign tourists may be limited if the country's rules on alcohol consumption and attire are applied." Nevertheless, CNN-English described in its narrative some of the cultural changes under the Vision 2030 that "make Saudi Arabia more open and moderate" and cause its youth to engage with Western arts and music such as "Comic-Con" and "rap." The following table provides the results of the association between the positioning categories and the Saudi culture in the English online news channels.

Table 18.

The Statistical Results of Identity Positioning in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Culture.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Avowal						
Al Arabiya***	36(75.0%)	21	4.62	21.33	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	16(47.1%)	11	1.82	3.32	0.069	P
RT	16(94.1%)	7	4.80	23.04	0.001**	P

BBC	40(78.0%)	29	3.46	11.98	0.001**	P
CNN	47(94.0%)	24	6.78	45.94	0.001**	P
			Ascription			
Al Arabiya	38(71.7%)	23	4.37	19.07	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	41(53.2%)	25	4.00	15.98	0.001**	P
RT***	51(68.0%)	29	5.65	31.88	0.001**	P
BBC***	104(80.6%)	81	4.47	20.01	0.001**	P
CNN***	99(76.7%)	61	7.12	50.64	0.001**	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.

** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.025$.

***RT-English, BBC-English, CNN-English used ascription significantly more than avowal. Al Arabiya-English used avowal and ascription equally.

Research Question 3

The third research question asked about the ways that the Arabic online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya-Arabic, Al Jazeera-Arabic, RT-Arabic, BBC-Arabic, and CNN-Arabic) framed the structure (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance) of the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, (c) and culture. A Chi-square test with the Bonferroni correction was used to test the association between the identity structure categories and political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Political Context. The statistical results indicated no significant association between indulgence, restraint, thriving governance, doomed governance, and the Saudi political context across all the Arabic online news channels. However, the political context was associated with certainty and/or uncertainty categories across all the Arabic online news channels.

The results showed that certainty was significantly associated with the Saudi political context in Al Arabiya-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 33.91, $p = 0.001$). The results also found

that there was a significant association between uncertainty and the political context in Al

Jazeera-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 11.55, p = 0.001) and BBC-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 30.37, p = 0.001).

The results also showed that both certainty ($\chi 2$ (1) = 55.94, p = 0.001) and

uncertainty ($\chi 2$ (1) = 60.12, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with the political

context in RT-Arabic. The Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significance

differences between uncertainty (36.4%) and certainty (27.9%) in framing the Saudi

political context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 1.78, p = 0.182. Moreover, in CNN-Arabic, both certainty ($\chi 2$

(1) = 34.66, p = 0.001) and uncertainty ($\chi 2$ (1) = 21.60, p = 0.001) were significantly

associated with the political context in RT-Arabic in CNN-Arabic. The Cochran's Q test

showed that there were no significant differences between avowal (12.5%) and ascription

(11.2%) in framing the Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 0.12, p = 0.732.

The qualitative reading of the data indicated that Al Arabiya-Arabic employed

certainty framing, which focused on the agreement between Saudi Arabia and other

countries regarding the Kingdom's political stance and its role in the region's stability.

Moreover, certainty framing was salient when foreign leaders expressed support for the

Saudi modernization move. Al Arabiya-Arabic cited a foreign leader praising the Saudi

Vision 2030 as "exactly the kind of reforms that people have always wished for" and

consistently attributing these reforms to the Saudi leaders, particularly the Crown Prince

of Saudi Arabia.

Al Jazeera-Arabic employed uncertainty framing, where the conflict was the

dominant narrative in Al Jazeera-Arabic. Conflict with regional countries such as Iran,

War in Yemen and Qatar; conflict between Saudi sociopolitical actors and the

government; and power conflicts between royal family members were frequent

uncertainty narratives in Al Jazeera-Arabic. Moreover, Al Jazeera-Arabic used the disharmony narrative with words like "disappointing," "doubt," "illusions," and "skepticism," or metaphor such as "pipe dreams" and "swamp for its creator" (referring to the Crown Prince's war in Yemen) to describe the current structure of the Saudi political context. Al Jazeera-Arabic often cites Western media or the Saudi dissidents to narrate its news stories in its writing style. For example, citing an opinion article from a British media, Al Jazeera-Arabic included in its coverage:

> In his article in the British newspaper, The Times, the author and historian Michael Burley believes that the hopes of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to be a reformer who cures the region's diseases will be in vain.

In BBC-Arabic, the narrative of conflict and skepticism were salient in framing the political context. In the conflict narrative, BBC-Arabic focused on the conflict between Saudi Arabia and other countries (e.g., Iran and the war in Yemen), the conflict between royal family members (e.g., corruption purge), the conflict between the government and extremists (e.g., terrorism), and conflict over human rights violations in Saudi Arabia (e.g., the Khashoggi murder). Invariably, BBC-Arabic attributed these conflicts to the Crown Prince's policies, describing his actions as "aggressive behavior," "confusing or disastrous," "[creating] problems," and "reckless," and describing the Crown prince as "the most dangerous man in the world." In the disharmony narrative, BBC-Arabic prominently narrated the doubt and lack of confidence of the international community in the Saudi political system regarding delivering justice and human rights for citizens and achieving successful modernization and reforms.

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RT-Arabic employed certainty through describing the mutual relationships, and common political interests between Saudi Arabia and other countries, such as confronting terrorism, Iran's role in the region, and support for Saudi's modernization were the dominant topics that RT-Arabic emphasized. For example, RT-Arabic includes in its coverage, "The White House spokesman said that the agreement expands cooperation [between Saudi Arabia and the United States] in the security field and contributes to stabilizing counterterrorism operations throughout the region." Certainty also focused on the harmony that reflected the relationship between the Saudi citizens and their leaders regarding political crises as well as social and economic modernization, such as "Saudi male and female participants in the survey sample are satisfied with Muhammad bin Salman assuming the mandate of the Covenant." On the other hand, RT-Arabic primarily employed uncertainty in narrating the conflict between the Saudi government and other countries, between the Royal family, and surrounding the war in Yemen. RT-Arabic associated the new structure of the political context and the ongoing conflicts with the Saudi Crown Prince. Notably, RT-Arabic put more emphasis on the conflict over the Saudi government's pursuit of nuclear energy production, narrating that such a move will "cause concern among experts and members of the US Congress" and "will inevitably lead to an escalation of tension in the Arab Gulf region."

CNN-Arabic used certainty, addressing harmony and agreement narratives. For harmony narrative, CNN-Arabic highlighted the officials' and citizens' supportive stances toward Saudi leadership and the modernization reforms, where expressions like "Saudi youth love what the 32-year-old does" were consistently used. For the agreement narrative, CNN-Arabic focused on the mutual political relationships and interests

between Saudi Arabia and other countries, particularly the United States. On the other

hand, the uncertainty framing emphasized the conflict narrative. The political conflict

between Saudi Arabia and its regional rival, Iran, was the most salient narrative in CNN-

Arabic. Notably, the conflict narrative of CNN-Arabic usually conveys the Saudi political

side. For instance, CNN-Arabic indicated in its coverage of the conflict that "Mohammed

bin Salman had worked to intensify joint efforts to confront Iran during his visit to

Washington last March, where he said that Saudi Arabia is the "front line" to confront the

challenges posed by "the actions of the Iranian regime that are disturbing the world and

support terrorist organizations." The following table shows the statistical results of the

association between the identity structure categories and the political context.

Table 19.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of Politics.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Indulgence						
Al Arabiya	4(6.2%)	7	-1.27	1.61	0.205	P
Al Jazeera	8(18.6%)	17	-2.74	7.51	0.006	P
RT	3(7.3%)	11	-3.04	9.25	0.002	P
BBC	13 (9.7%)	39	-5.31	28.15	0.001	P
CNN	8 (8.8%)	23	-3.97	15.74	0.001	P
Restraint						
Al Arabiya	-	-	-	-	-	-
Al Jazeera	76 (46.3%)	63	2.33	5.44	0.020	P
RT	9(21.4%)	12	-0.96	0.92	0.338	P
BBC	25(19.5%)	37	-2.52	6.34	0.012	P
CNN	7(41.2%)	4	1.58	2.48	0.150	F
Certainty						
Al Arabiya	14(40.0%)	4	5.82	33.91	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	24(44.4%)	21	0.94	0.89	0.345	P
RT	43(67.2%)	18	7.48	55.94	0.001**	P
BBC	34(38.6%)	25	2.13	4.53	0.033	P
CNN	40(51.3%)	20	5.89	34.66	0.001**	P

	Uncertainty					
Al Arabiya	1(33.3%)	0	1.27	1.62	0.288	F
Al Jazeera	108(47.8%)	87	3.40	11.55	0.001**	P
RT***	56(60.9%)	26	7.75	60.12	0.001**	P
BBC	92(44.0%)	60	5.51	30.37	0.001**	P
CNN***	34(46.6%)	18	4.65	21.6	0.001**	P
	Thriving					
Al Arabiya	16(5.8%)	30	-3.95	15.58	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	9(16.7%)	21	-3.39	11.53	0.001	P
RT	11(6.9%)	45	-7.00	49.07	0.001	P
BBC	17(17.5%)	28	-2.61	6.81	0.009	P
CNN	28(20.0%)	35	-1.62	2.61	0.106	P
	Doomed					
Al Arabiya	1(12.5%)	1	0.17	0.03	0.598	F
Al Jazeera	39(31.2%)	48	-1.79	3.22	0.073	P
RT	1(4.0%)	7	-2.72	7.39	0.007	P
BBC	4(13.8%)	8	-1.82	3.32	0.069	P
CNN	0(0.0%)	1	-1.16	1.34	0.576	F

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.

** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.008$.

***RT-Arabic and CNN-Arabic used certainty and uncertainty equally.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Economic Context. The

statistical results indicated no significant association between indulgence, restraint,

certainty, uncertainty, and the Saudi economic context across all the Arabic online news

channels. However, the Saudi economic context was associated with thriving governance

and/or doomed governance categories across all the Arabic online news channels.

The results showed that thriving governance was significantly associated with the

economic context in Al Arabiya-Arabic ($\chi2$ (1) = 67.99, p = 0.001) and CNN-Arabic ($\chi2$

(1) = 51.87, p = 0.001).

In Al Jazeera-Arabic, the results indicated that both thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) =

43.65, p = 0.001) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 34.47, p = 0.001) were significantly

associated with the economic context. However, Cochran's Q test showed that doomed

governance (24.9%) was employed significantly more than thriving governance (14.2%) in framing the Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 8.50, p = 0.004.

In RT-Arabic, the results showed that that both thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 110.80, p = 0.001) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 15.50, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with the Saudi economic context. Nevertheless, in comparing the thriving governance and doomed governance framing, Cochran's Q test showed that thriving governance (51.0%) was employed significantly more than doomed governance (8.3%) in framing the Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 78.81, p = 0.001.

In BBC-Arabic, the results revealed that both thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 169.00, p = 0.001) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 52.59, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with the Saudi economic context. In comparing the thriving governance and doomed governance framing, Cochran's Q test showed that thriving governance (33.8%) was employed significantly more than doomed governance (10.5%) in framing the Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 28.37, p = 0.001.

The qualitative reading of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-Arabic used thriving governance to frame the Saudi economic context in various ways. First, it framed the economic context as a progressive economy by citing global economic observers and experts that confirmed the progressive nature of the Saudi economy. It also prominently conveyed that the government is interested in "broadening the investments" and building "partnership" with internal private sectors as well as global investors. Second, reliable governance framing was evident in focusing on terms like "transparency" and "accountability." For example, one paragraph reads: "The first benefit of Aramco's offering will be transparency because people are upset by the absence of its data, and that

the offering a part of Aramco will make it transparent and under the supervision of banks and everyone, indicating that its IPO will be the largest in history." Third, proficient governance framing was prominent via emphasizing the promising opportunities that the Saudi Vision 2030 provides, such as health care programs, education, training, and technical solutions for administrative bureaucracy. Notably, Al Arabiya-Arabic reporting addresses details about the goals, aims, and progress of the vision programs in an informative style such as numbers, statistics, and information rather than a persuasive style.

CNN-Arabic used progressive, reliable, and proficient governance narratives. The progressive narrative was prominent under the Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move towards broadening investments with other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors and diversifying economic resources. Notably, besides technology, petrochemicals, and trade deals, military deals with the U.S and Russia a prominent topic in CNN-Arabic reporting. The reliable governance narrative was prominent by emphasizing that countering corruption aimed to reform the economic system and enforce accountability and transparency to provide a safe, equal, and trustworthy investment environment. The proficient governance narrative highlighted government policies and programs the encourage competitiveness, innovation, and promising opportunities for youth.

In Al Jazeera-Arabic, doomed governance of economic context was employed using three narratives. First, the regressive economy narrative was salient. Al Jazeera-Arabic, usually citing Western media, described the poor performance of the Saudi economy with phrases like "failed vision" and "misery economy," or sometimes sarcasm

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such as "it will have to be named Vision 3020 in ten years." Second, the unreliable governance narrative was evident through narrating that the government provides inaccurate numbers on its companies' valuation or lack of transparency and accountability: "It faces a desperate stalemate and complex administrative complications, not to mention an enormous amount of corruption." Third, Al Jazeera-Arabic framed the structure of the Saudi economic context as incompetent, describing the economic policy as "floundering," "vague," and "desperate measures."

RT-Arabic used the thriving governance by focusing on the progressive economy under the Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move towards broadening investments with other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors. Moreover, the narrative of reliable and proficient governance was evident, with RT-Arabic citing Saudi officials about "the Kingdom's keenness to adopt the highest standards of transparency and financial disclosure" and "the commitment of the Kingdom's leadership to work to provide more services, improve the quality of life and invest in infrastructure." Importantly, unlike other media platforms, RT-Arabic constantly addressed the interest of the Saudi government in broadening the military, solar energy, and nuclear energy production in cooperation with countries like the United States, Russia, and China.

In BBC-Arabic, thriving governance framing focused on a progressive narrative. The progressive narrative was prominent under the Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move toward broadening the investment with other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors. Additionally, BBC-Arabic frequently reports the international indexes and ratings that show a progressive rating of the Saudi economy, describing the Saudi economic role in the future as "the main locomotive (of the

economy) in the whole world, and there will be no investment or development movement

in any region of the world without the fund having a voice in it." The following table

shows the statistical results of the relationship between the identity structure categories

and the Saudi economic context.

Table 20.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of Economy.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Indulgence						
Al Arabiya	6(9.2%)	45	-11.22	125.91	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	1(2.3%)	15	-4.56	20.84	0.001	P
RT	0(0.0%)	19	-6.10	37.22	0.001	P
BBC	1(0.7%)	34	-7.07	49.97	0.001	P
CNN	6(6.6%)	39	-7.75	59.99	0.001	P
Restraint						
Al Arabiya	-	-	-	-	-	-
Al Jazeera	3(1.8%)	57	-9.83	96.69	0.001	P
RT	1(2.4%)	19	-5.86	34.32	0.001	P
BBC	1(0.8%)	32	-6.87	47.23	0.001	P
CNN	0(0.0%)	7	-3.62	13.12	0.001	P
Certainty						
Al Arabiya	18(51.4%)	24	-2.36	5.55	0.019	P
Al Jazeera	13(24.1%)	19	-1.68	2.81	0.094	P
RT	9(14.1%)	29	-5.40	29.13	0.001	P
BBC	19(21.6%)	22	-0.83	0.68	0.409	P
CNN	21(26.9%)	33	-3.07	9.45	0.002	P
Uncertainty						
Al Arabiya	1(33.3%)	2	-1.35	1.82	0.226	F
Al Jazeera	70(31.0%)	78	-1.33	1.77	0.183	P
RT	16(17.4%)	42	-5.96	35.55	0.001	P
BBC	39(18.7%)	53	-2.49	6.21	0.013	P
CNN	28(38.4%)	31	-0.81	0.65	0.420	P
Thriving						
Al Arabiya	233(84.4%)	191	8.25	67.99	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	41(75.9%)	19	6.61	43.65	0.001**	P
RT***	129(80.6%)	73	10.53	110.80	0.001**	P
BBC***	77(79.4%)	25	13.00	169.00	0.001**	P
CNN	95(67.9%)	60	7.20	51.87	0.001**	P

	Doomed					
Al Arabiya	6(75.0%)	6	0.36	0.13	1.000	F
Al Jazeera***	72(57.6%)	43	5.87	34.47	0.001**	P
RT	21(84.0%)	11	3.94	15.50	0.001**	P
BBC	24(82.8%)	7	7.25	52.59	0.001**	P
CNN	4(100.0%)	2	2.33	5.43	0.033	F

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.

** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.008$.

***RT-Arabic and BBC-Arabic used thriving governance significantly more than doomed governance. Al Jazeera-Arabic used doomed governance more than thriving governance.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context. The statistical results indicated no significant association between certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, doomed governance, and the Saudi cultural context across all the Arabic online news channels. However, the Saudi cultural context was associated with indulgence and/or restraint categories across all the Arabic online news channels.

The results showed that indulgence was significantly associated with the cultural context in Al Arabiya-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 193.06, $p = 0.001$). The results also found a significant association between indulgence and cultural context in CNN-Arabic ($\chi 2$ (1) = 140.48, $p = 0.001$).

In RT-Arabic, indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 99.39, $p = 0.001$) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 57.48, $p = 0.001$) were significantly associated with cultural context, In comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, the Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significant differences between indulgence (25.9%) and restraint (21.8%) in framing Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 0.56, $p = 0.453$.

In BBC-Arabic, indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 120.68, $p = 0.001$) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 68.52, $p = 0.001$) were significantly associated with cultural context. In comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significant

differences between indulgence (28.9%) and restraint (24.6%) in framing Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 1.57, p = 0.212.

In Al Jazeera-Arabic, indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 62.23, p = 0.001) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 63.59, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with cultural context. However, in comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, Cochran's Q test showed that restraint (37.6%) was employed significantly more than indulgence (15.0%) in framing Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 23.02, p = 0.001.

The qualitative reding of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-Arabic prominently framed the structure of the Saudi cultural context by employing the prosperity narrative, highlighting changes in the Saudi cultural context as being a vibrant one. Reporting on the arts, music festivals, entertainment, and sports events and projects was often evident in informative reporting styles (episodic framing). Moreover, women's empowerment stories were prominent, using the equality narrative to reflect the granting of women's rights and easing of previous restrictions, such as stories about women who held senior positions in government and private sectors. For example, Al Arabiya-Arabic reported, "Prince Mohammed has implemented a number of reforms at making the country more modern and gradually easing restrictions on women's rights."

In CNN-Arabic, the indulgence framing was salient in the equality narrative, which addressed the equality policies and legislation, women's empowerment, women holding high governmental positions, and society granting more rights for women. The tolerance narrative focused on confronting extremism and promoting "moderate Islam." The prosperity narrative was also prominent through highlighting the cultural interest in arts, music, sports, education, tourism, and entertainment, as well as government

programs that improve citizen life quality and happiness. For instance, CNN-Arabic indicated in its coverage:

> There is no doubt that the role of Saudi women in the career field has undergone a major transformation recently. They were able today to exceed the leadership positions in family companies and use their professional experiences to access large institutions in the field of Saudi finance.

> In BBC-Arabic, the indulgence framing was evident in equality, tolerance, and prosperity narratives. Citing Saudi journalists and citizens in its coverage, the BBC-Arabic focused on equality. The new policies of women's rights, equality, and empowerment include women driving, participating in municipal elections, and holding high governmental positions. The equality narrative was also prominent in judicial system reform and fighting corruption, which Saudis expressed as "No person is immune, and there will be no tolerance anymore for corruption and waste of the economy" … "These measures will create a better future free of corruption and evils that hinder our beloved country." Moreover, the tolerance and prosperity narratives were evident in observing changes in cultural lifestyle such as women's engagement in public events, eased restrictions on music and arts, mixed-gender events that were restricted in the past, and welcoming of the new cultural reforms: "The feeling that my Saudi friends generated from the general atmosphere in Saudi Arabia, seeing that there is a state of happiness."

> Moreover, the restraint framing was salient in the cultural deprivation, intolerance, and inequality narratives in BBC-Arabic. Women's rights issues were the central context. For the cultural deprivation narrative, BBC-Arabic's narrative emphasized the historically conservative lifestyle in Saudi society, where many cultural

activities (e.g., music, arts, gender mixing, and women's participation in public events) were religiously restricted. Additionally, the intolerance narrative highlighted the restrained freedoms and imprisonment of women's activists in Saudi Arabia: "The authorities arrested dozens of women for driving cars in Riyadh in 1990. Some women also published videos showing them driving in 2008, and between 2011 and 2014." The inequality narrative was salient in women's fundamental rights compared to men in Saudi society, such as the "guardianship system."

In RT-Arabic, the indulgence framing was evident in RT-Arabic's narrative in issues related to the new women's rights, equality, and empowerment policies such as women driving, participating in municipal elections, and holding high governmental positions. For example, listing several developments in women's equality in Saudi Arabia, RT-Arabic indicated that "the largest stock market in the Middle East and Africa, which is in Saudi Arabia, [is] headed by Saudi women" Moreover, the indulgence framing was prominent in social prosperity in terms of the arts and entertainment, describing it as the "beginning of a new era in entertainment in the Kingdom." The restraint framing was mainly focused on women's rights. RT-Arabic used the inequality narrative to make women's rights salient in framing the Saudi cultural context. Notably, RT-Arabic frequently cites Western media or human rights organizations to report about the human rights issues in Saudi Arabia. For instance, RT-Arabic coverage included, "In July of last year, Human Rights Watch published a report denouncing what it described as the restrictions still imposed on women in Saudi Arabia."

Al Jazeera-Arabic focused mainly on restraint framing. The intolerance narrative was prominent in Al Jazeera-Arabic by focusing on religious intolerance and exclusion of

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others, such as "religious school curricula in Saudi Arabia incite[s] hatred and incitement towards Islamic religions and traditions that do not adhere to their interpretation of Sunni Islam." Additionally, the repression of religious clerics that belong to Al Sahwa "The Awakening" was evident: "He [the Crown Prince] concealed the figures of the so-called "awakening" by arrest or house arrest" … "The recent arrests of thousands of Saudi preachers greatly reflect the way the Saudi authorities dealt with political or religious opposition and the truth about their "appalling" record with regard to suppressing freedom of opinion and expression."

Deprivation was also salient in Al Jazeera-Arabic narrative. Poverty and the absence of basic human necessities for many Saudi families and foreign workers were evident in the deprivation framing. Citing international reports, Al Jazeera-Arabic described the poverty in Saudi Arabia as "shocking," "inhuman," and "humiliating." Furthermore, Al Jazeera-Arabic used the slogan "Saudi First," mimicking the Trump slogan "America First," to characterize the Saudi policy on increasing taxes and fees at the expense of foreign workers. Inequality was evident in Al Jazeera-Arabic's narrative. The inequality discourse was framed by two issues. First, women's right in Saudi Arabia issues was a prominent framing. Frequently, Al Jazeera-Arabic indicated that "the guardianship system [in Saudi Arabia] requires a woman to obtain the consent of a male relative in order to make basic life decisions." Another line of inequality framing was used to highlight socioeconomic or sociopolitical class privileges. For example, in several paragraphs, Al Jazeera-Arabic linked the poverty of many Saudi families to the life of luxury of the Saudi Crown Prince who "pleasure and luxury spending, beginning with the purchase of the palace, the yacht and the most expensive painting in the world." The

table that follows shows the statistical results of the relationship between the identity

structure categories and the Saudi cultural context in the Arabic online news channels.

Table 21.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the Arabic Online News Channels in the Context of Culture.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
			Indulgence			
Al Arabiya	55(84.6%)	13	13.89	193.06	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	34(79.1%)	12	7.89	62.23	0.001**	P
RT***	38(92.7%)	11	9.97	99.39	0.001**	P
BBC***	120(89.6%)	62	10.99	120.68	0.001**	P
CNN	77(84.6%)	30	11.85	140.48	0.001**	P
			Restraint			
Al Arabiya	-	-	-	-	-	-
Al Jazeera	85(51.8%)	44	7.97	63.59	0.001**	P
RT	32(76.2%)	11	7.58	57.48	0.001**	P
BBC	102(79.7%)	59	8.28	68.52	0.001**	P
CNN	10(58.8%)	6	2.37	5.62	0.018	P
			Certainty			
Al Arabiya	3(8.6%)	7	-1.77	3.14	0.076	P
Al Jazeera	17(31.5%)	15	0.76	0.58	0.447	P
RT	12(18.8%)	17	-1.50	2.25	0.134	P
BBC	35(39.8%)	40	-1.22	1.48	0.224	P
CNN	17(21.8%)	25	-2.19	4.81	0.028	P
			Uncertainty			
Al Arabiya	1(33.3%)	1	0.57	0.33	0.492	F
Al Jazeera	48(21.2%)	61	-2.30	5.272	0.022	P
RT	20(21.7%)	24	-1.14	1.30	0.254	P
BBC	78(37.3%)	96	-2.84	8.07	0.004	P
CNN	11(15.1%)	24	-3.45	11.87	0.001	P
			Thriving			
Al Arabiya	27(9.8%)	56	-6.45	41.64	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	4(7.4%)	15	-3.36	11.27	0.001	P
RT	20(12.5%)	43	-4.77	22.73	0.001	P
BBC	3(3.1%)	45	-8.96	80.21	0.001	P
CNN	17(12.1%)	45	-4.77	37.42	0.001	P
			Doomed			
Al Arabiya	1(12.5%)	2	-0.54	0.30	1.000	F
Al Jazeera	14(11.2%)	34	-4.32	18.68	0.001	P
RT	3(12.0%)	7	-1.39	2.84	0.092	P

BBC	1(3.4%)	13	-4.66	21.75	0.001	P
CNN	0(0.0%)	1	-1.39	1.93	0.310	F

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.

** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.008$.

***RT-Arabic and BBC-Arabic used indulgence and restraint equally.

Research Question 4

The fourth research question asked about the ways that the English online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya-English, Al Jazeera- English, RT- English, BBC- English, and CNN- English) framed the structure (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance) of the Saudi identity in the context of (a) politics, (b) economy, (c) and culture. A Chi-square test with the Bonferroni correction was used to test the association between the identity structure categories and political, economic, and cultural contexts.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Political Context. The statistical results indicated no significant association between indulgence, restraint, thriving governance, doomed governance, and the Saudi political context across all the English online news channels. However, the Saudi political context was associated with certainty and/or uncertainty categories across all the English online news channels.

The results showed that certainty ($\chi2$ (1) = 61.07, p = 0.001) and uncertainty ($\chi2$ (1) = 42.41, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with the political context in Al Arabiya-English. However, Cochran's Q test showed that certainty (40.0%) was employed significantly more than uncertainty (7.3%) in framing the Saudi political context, $\chi2$ (1) = 24.92, p = 0.001. Additionally, the results found that certainty ($\chi2$ (1) = 10.78, p = 0.001) and uncertainty ($\chi2$ (1) = 87.105, p = 0.001) were significantly

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associated with the political context in Al Jazeera-English. Nevertheless, the Cochran's Q test showed that uncertainty (36.4%) was employed significantly more than certainty (9.8%) in framing the Saudi political context, $\chi2$ (1) = 72.73, p = 0.001.

Th rest of the English online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi political context using only uncertainty. Uncertainty was significantly associated with the Saudi political context in RT-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 50.97, p = 0.001), BBC-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 117.466, p = 0.001), and CNN-English ($\chi2$ (1) = 15.737, p = 0.001).

The qualitative reading of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-English primarily used certainty in the context of agreements between Saudi Arabia and the other countries on issues of regional conflict, supporting the Saudi transformation and modernization vision as well as partnership and mutual political relationships between Saudi Arabia and the other countries. Statements from foreign political leaders that affirmed the "support for the kingdom and its leadership," "long-term partnership in various areas in support of Saudi Vision 2030," and "the friendly relations between the two countries" were salient in the certainty framing in Al Arabiya-English. The certainty framing also focused on a harmonious narrative, in which Saudi officials affirmed the relationship between Saudi citizens and their leaders regarding political crises and modernization programs. For example, statements such as "every Saudi feels represented by his leadership, and every Saudi represents his leadership" and "the world should not judge before the entire details of the investigation are disclosed" were evident in Al Arabiya-English. In contrast, the uncertainty narrative was evident mainly in addressing the ongoing political conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, accusing Iran of "spreading chaos" and "[continuing] to feed sectarianism and disrespect international laws."

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Al Jazeera-English focused on three types of framing. First, disharmony discourse was salient by shedding light on the government dealing with human rights and justice issues. For example, sentences like "So, how can the people believe in the judicial system of Saudi Arabia?" and "Diplomatic missteps have also damaged the 33-year-old crown prince's progressive credentials" were frequently used to highlight the differences between the Saudi political identity and the West's. Second, a conflict narrative was also evident, emphasizing the political conflicts between Saudi Arabia and other countries. Al Jazeera-English employed the conflict narrative in which the Kingdom's leaders, particularly the Crown Prince, escalated the political crises and tensions. Third, the instability and security narrative about Saudi political identity was prominent in Al Jazeera-English, which framed political actions of the Saudi government, describing Saudi Arabia as a "high-risk country" that is creating political "backlash," creating "disorder within the country," and spreading "speculation in the business community." Notably, human rights (e.g., Khashoggi murder and women activists) was the central issue in Al Jazeera-English framing the identity of the Saudi politics.

RT-English employed uncertainty in narrating the conflict between the Saudi government and other countries such as Iran, between members of the Royal family, and surrounding the war in Yemen. In particular, RT-English attributed the political conflicts to the Crown Prince's policies that caused "the House of Saud broke" while he "consolidate[d] power," describing a "palace coup," instability in the "oil market," the "disastrous and bloody conflict in Yemen," and how he is "extremely hawkish towards Iran." Moreover, RT-English employed the disharmony narrative to highlight the contradicting political identities of the Saudi government and its Western allies, the US

and the UK, such as "The US is naive if it thinks that Riyadh shares its values, and cynical if it doesn't care" … "UK governments have enjoyed a toxic and damaging relationship with the Saudi regime." Notably, human rights (e.g., humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Khashoggi murder) was the central issue in RT-English framing the identity of the Saudi politics.

In BBC-English, conflict, insecurity, and disharmony were the salient narratives in framing the identity of the Saudi politics. In the conflict narrative, BBC-English focused on the conflict between Saudi Arabia and other countries (e.g., Iran and the war in Yemen), the conflict between members of the royal family (e.g., the corruption purge), the conflict between the government and extremists (e.g., terrorism), and conflict over human rights (e.g., the Khashoggi murder). Invariably, BBC-English attributed the regional insecurity to the Crown Prince's policies, describing his actions as "toxic," "erratic," and "hawkish." BBC-English also criticized the United Kingdom prime minister and the United States president for ignoring the Saudi human rights violations. In the disharmony narrative, BBC-English's coverage expressed doubt and lack of confidence in the international community about succeeding in the war in Yemen, delivering justice for the Khashoggi murder, and moving social and economic modernization forward. In particular, BBC-English focused on the Khashoggi murder, conveying international political figures and investors' doubts and skepticism about the Saudi narrative related to the incident. Notably, human rights (e.g., the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, Khashoggi murder, and women activists) was the central issue in BBC-English framing of the Saudi political identity.

In CNN-English, conflict and disharmony were the salient narratives in framing the Saudi political identity. Consistently, CNN-English attributed the status of conflict and skepticism to the Saudi Crown Prince's foreign policies, characterizing him as "reckless," "ruthless," and a "gangster." In the conflict narrative, CNN-English focused on the conflicts between American political institutes (e.g., the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon) over human rights issues in Saudi Arabia, particularly the Khashoggi murder. In the disharmony narrative, CNN-English's framing focused on the doubt and lack of confidence from U.S political leaders, particularly those Congress members who expressed skepticism towards the Saudi leadership. Moreover, CNN-English expressed doubt about the relationship between the White House leaders (e.g., Trump and Kushner) and the Saudi Crown Prince, "which has raised conflict of interest questions." Notably, human rights (e.g., Khashoggi murder and women activists) was the central issue in CNN-English framing of the Saudi political identity.

The following table shows the statistical results of the relationship between the identity structure categories and the Saudi political context.

Table 22.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Politics.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Indulgence						
Al Arabiya	1(0.7%)	26	-6.20	38.40	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	10(10.1%)	40	-6.49	42.15	0.001	P
RT	3(3.0%)	20	-4.54	20.62	0.001	P
BBC	8(4.0%)	54	-8.21	67.44	0.001	P
CNN	9(5.8%)	31	-4.64	21.50	0.001	P
Restraint						
Al Arabiya	0(0.0%)	0	-0.66	0.43	1.000	F

Al Jazeera	59(28.0%)	86	-4.18	17.5	0.001	P
RT	13(14.9%)	17	-1.13	1.28	0.258	P
BBC	32(19.3%)	44	-2.39	5.72	0.017	P
CNN	16(12.9%)	25	-2.03	4.11	0.043	P
Certainty						
Al Arabiya***	42(46.7%)	16	7.81	61.07	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	44(58.7%)	31	3.28	10.78	0.001**	P
RT	11(37.9%)	6	2.55	6.49	0.011	P
BBC	34(34.3%)	27	1.79	3.22	0.073	P
CNN	41(25.0%)	33	1.79	3.22	0.073	P
Uncertainty						
Al Arabiya	14(73.7%)	3	6.51	42.41	0.001**	F
Al Jazeera***	164(66.4%)	101	9.33	87.11	0.001**	P
RT	59(39.9%)	29	7.14	50.97	0.001**	P
BBC	113(57.4%)	53	10.84	117.47	0.001**	P
CNN	90(27.3%)	65	3.97	15.74	0.001**	P
Thriving						
Al Arabiya	25(11.7%)	38	-2.80	-2.82	0.005	P
Al Jazeera	16(17.8%)	37	-4.62	21.31	0.001	P
RT	7(6.0%)	23	-4.09	16.76	0.001	P
BBC	12(17.1%)	19	-1.89	3.57	0.059	P
CNN	18(10.7%)	34	-3.21	10.27	0.001	P
Doomed						
Al Arabiya	0(0.0%)	1	-0.93	0.86	1.000	F
Al Jazeera	16(26.7%)	24	-2.27	5.17	0.023	P
RT	1(3.2%)	6	-2.36	5.56	0.018	P
BBC	6(70.0%)	5	0.33	0.74	0.799	P
CNN	7(21.2%)	7	0.21	0.04	0.836	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.

** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.008$.

***Al Arabiya-English used certainty significantly more than uncertainty. Al Jazeera-English used uncertainty significantly more than certainty.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Economic Context. The

statistical results indicated no significant association between indulgence, restraint,

certainty, and the Saudi economic context across all the English online news channels.

However, the Saudi economic context was associated with thriving governance and/or

doomed governance categories across all the English online news channels. Moreover, in

only CNN-English, uncertainty was associated with the Saudi economic context.

The results showed that thriving governance was significantly associated with the Saudi economic context in Al Arabiya-English $\chi2$ (1) = 131.37, p = 0.001). In Al Jazeera-English, thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 114.32, p = 114.32) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 51.88, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with economic context. However, Cochran's Q test showed that thriving governance (22.7%) was employed significantly more than doomed governance (13.6%) in framing the Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 6.18, p = 0.009.

In RT-English, thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 97.19, p = 0.001) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 27.13, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with economic context. In comparing the thriving governance and doomed governance framing, the Cochran's Q test showed that thriving governance (37.5%) was employed significantly more than doomed governance (10.5%) in framing Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 38.71, p = 0.001.

In BBC-English, thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 137.13, p = 0.001) and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 43.89, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with economic context. In comparing the thriving governance and doomed governance framing, the Cochran's Q test showed that thriving governance (35.3%) was employed significantly more than doomed governance (10.8%) in framing Saudi economic context, $\chi2$ (1) = 13.30, p = 0.001.

In CNN-English, uncertainty ($\chi2$ (1) = 19.91, p = 0.001), thriving governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 104.03, p = 0.001), and doomed governance ($\chi2$ (1) = 24.04, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with economic context. In comparing uncertainty, thriving governance, doomed governance, Cochran's Q test showed there were significant

differences between uncertainty (34.0%), thriving governance (27.3), and doomed governance (5.7%), $\chi 2$ (2) = 84.16, p = 0.001. Pairwise comparisons were conducted using Dunn's test (1964) with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. The results showed that thriving governance was employed significantly more than doomed governance, p = 0.001. The results also showed that uncertainty was employed significantly more than doomed governance p = 0.001. However, there were no significant differences found between uncertainty and thriving governance, p = 0.112.

The qualitative reading of the data revealed that Al Arabiya-English employed a thriving governance narrative similar to Al Arabiya-Arabic's: progressive economy, reliable governance, and proficient governance. However, there was more emphasis in Al Arabiya-English narrative on broadening investments with other countries and global firms compared to Al Arabiya-Arabic, which focused more on the partnership between the internal private sector and the government. Moreover, Al Arabiya-English focused on military equipment deals with Russia, the United States, China, and the United Kingdom for domiciliation and the manufacturing of high-grade military equipment inside Saudi Arabia, such as: "The Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Russia's state company for exporting military products ROSOBORONEXPORT to manufacture high-grade military equipment in the kingdom."

Al Jazeera-English used a thriving governance narrative focused mainly on investment in global companies and governments as well as building the internal partnership between the government and private sectors. Thus, Al Jazeera-English framed Saudi economic identity as a progressive economy. For instance, Al Jazeera-English's

coverage included: "Multibillion-dollar deal caps Saudi crown prince's Asian tour, aimed at expanding Riyadh's trade ties in the East."

In RT-English, thriving governance framing focused on the progressive economy under the Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move toward broadening investments with other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors. Additionally, a proficient governance narrative that highlighted the competitiveness and sustainability of economic modernization was constantly used in RT-English. Sentences like "prosperous and sustainable economic future" were frequently used to characterize the proficient performance of the Saudi government in dealing with long-term economic challenges. Notably, oil prices, nuclear production, and technology were frequently discussed topics in RT-English framing of Saudi economic identity. For example, RT-English reported: "Saudi Arabia has unveiled plans to start procuring uranium in the kingdom as part of its developing nuclear program. A high-ranking Saudi official termed it the first step to "self-sufficiency" in nuclear fuel production."

BBC-English employed thriving governance framing using progressive narrative. The progressive narrative was prominent under Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move towards broadening investments with other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors, as well as diversifying economic resources. For instance, BBC-English reported, "Even just selling 1% of Aramco would create the biggest initial public offering in history, the prince said, outstripping blockbuster sales like Facebook and Alibaba."

In CNN-English, thriving governance framing employed progressive and reliable governance narratives. The progressive economy narrative was prominent under the Vision 2030 modernization, highlighting the move towards broadening investments with

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other countries, global firms, and internal private sectors, as well as diversifying

economic resources. The reliable governance narrative focused on legislation and policies

that create a "transparent, secure, stable and understandable" environment for foreign and

local investors. Unlike other online news channels, CNN-English used the uncertainty

framing in the Saudi economic context. The uncertainty framing was prominent in

international investors' lack of confidence and doubt about the Saudi investment

environment after the Khashoggi murder incident. Using the disharmony narrative, CNN-

English expressed how investors, particularly American businessmen, tried to distance

themselves from becoming "associated with what they might consider as blood money."

This narrative was prominently evident in sentences like: "Dozens of top business leaders

from around the world had pulled out of the Future Investment Initiative as questions

mounted over the Saudi government's role in the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,

who disappeared after entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul." The following table

shows the statistical results of the relationship between the identity structure categories

and the Saudi economic context.

Table 23.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Economy.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Indulgence						
Al Arabiya	12(8.1%)	58	-8.85	78.27	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	4(4.0%)	26	-5.34	28.48	0.001	P
RT	3(3.0%)	42	-8.66	75.08	0.001	P
BBC	3(1.5%)	21	-4.64	21.5	0.001	P
CNN	8(5.2%)	51	-7.85	61.66	0.001	P
Restraint						
Al Arabiya	0(0.0%)	1	-1.14	1.29	0.52	F

Al Jazeera	1(0.5%)	56	-9.57	91.51	0.001	P
RT	2(2.3%)	37	-8.12	65.24	0.001	P
BBC	2(1.2%)	17	-4.24	17.98	0.001	P
CNN	0(0.0%)	41	-8.25	68.02	0.001	P
Certainty						
Al Arabiya	26(28.9%)	35	-2.15	4.61	0.03	P
Al Jazeera	11(14.7%)	20	-2.44	5.93	0.015	P
RT	1(3.4%)	12	-4.32	18.67	0.001	P
BBC	3(3.0%)	10	-2.52	6.35	0.012	P
CNN	56(34.1%)	54	0.31	0.09	0.759	P
Uncertainty						
Al Arabiya	2(10.5%)	7	-2.59	6.72	0.01	P
Al Jazeera	41(16.6%)	66	-4.06	16.5	0.001	P
RT	47(31.8%)	62	-2.93	8.59	0.003	P
BBC	15(7.6%)	20	-1.41	1.98	0.159	P
CNN	142(43.0%)	109	4.46	19.91	0.001**	P
Thriving						
Al Arabiya	150(70.1%)	84	11.46	131.37	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera***	67(74.4%)	24	10.69	114.32	0.001**	P
RT***	96(82.8%)	49	9.86	97.19	0.001**	P
BBC***	36(51.4%)	7	11.71	137.13	0.001**	P
CNN***	114(67.5%)	56	10.92	104.03	0.001**	P
Doomed						
Al Arabiya	3(75.0%)	2	1.48	2.18	0.305	F
Al Jazeera	40(66.7%)	16	7.20	51.88	0.001**	P
RT	27(87.1%)	13	5.20	27.13	0.001**	P
BBC	11(55.0%)	2	6.63	43.89	0.001**	P
CNN	24(72.7%)	11	4.90	24.04	0.001**	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was *p* < 0.008.
***Al Jazeera-English, RT-English, BBC-English, and CNN-English used thriving governance more than doomed governance.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context. The

statistical results indicated no significant association between certainty, uncertainty,

thriving governance, doomed governance, and the Saudi cultural context across all the

English online news channels. However, the Saudi cultural context was associated with

indulgence and/or restraint categories across all the English online news channels. The

results showed that indulgence was significantly associated with the cultural context in Al Arabiya-English ($\chi 2$ (1) = 181.70, p = 0.001).

In RT-English, the results showed that indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 156.97, p = 0.001) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 84.82, p = 0.001) were statically significantly associated with cultural context. In comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significant differences between indulgence (40.1%) and restraint (30.6%) in framing the Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 3.72, p = 0.054.

BBC-English's results indicated that indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 109.20, p = 0.001) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 23.67, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with cultural context. In comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significant differences between indulgence (30.8%) and restraint (21.3%) in framing Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 11.27, p = 0.00.

In CNN-English, the results also showed that indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 123.29, p = 0.001) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 88.24, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with cultural context. In comparing the indulgence and restraint framing, the Cochran's Q test showed that there were no significance differences between indulgence (23.0%) and restraint (18.2%) in framing Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 3.74, p = 0.053.

The statistical results of Al Jazeera-English indicated that indulgence ($\chi 2$ (1) = 140.07, p = 0.001) and restraint ($\chi 2$ (1) = 179.68, p = 0.001) were significantly associated with cultural context. However, Cochran's Q test showed that restraint (41.8%) was employed significantly more than indulgence (23.5%) in framing the Saudi cultural context, $\chi 2$ (1) = 19.27, p = 0.001.

The qualitative analysis revealed that Al Arabiya-English used three narratives in the indulgence framing. First, in prosperity, Al Arabiya-English highlighted the cultural and lifestyle changes from conservativism to a more tolerant, indulgent, and open society: "the dream of creating a modern, prosperous and inclusive Saudi society is now a living reality." Second, in the equality narrative, the women empowerment and women's right reforms were prominently salient in Al Arabiya-English. For instance, Al Arabiya-English's coverage included:

> Three years ago, Saudi Aramco launched a special unit to train its women in leadership positions. Aramco raised the number of women in those roles from just four women to 48 today.

Third, using tolerance narrative, Al Arabiya-English prominently covered the multicultural events and festivals, framing the Saudi society as a welcomed and tolerated society to other cultures. Al Arabiya-English, for instance, reported: "Edge of Arabia's goal is to foster and improve understanding through free exhibitions and public programming, acting as a conduit between different cultures."

The indulgence framing was evident in RT-English's narrative on issues related to the new policies of women's rights, equality, and empowerment, such as women driving, participating in municipal elections, and holding high governmental positions. For example, listing several developments in women's equality in Saudi Arabia, RT-Arabic indicated that "women were allowed to vote and run as candidates in municipal council elections" and the government of Saudi Arabia "appointed 30 women as part of the Shura Council, the country's highest advisory body." Moreover, the indulgence framing was

prominent in social prosperity in terms of the arts and entertainment, described as "liberalization reforms."

The restraint framing was salient in the cultural intolerance and inequality narratives. For cultural intolerance, RT-English's narrative emphasized human rights in Saudi society, describing it as having "the worst human rights records in the entire world." RT-English also described Saudi "conservative" society that "segregated by gender," where women "must wear loose-fitting, full-length robes" and any religious practice that contradicts what is believed to be true are restrained, "including the death penalty, for breaking both religious and secular laws." Furthermore, the inequality narrative was prominent in issues related to women's rights. For example, RT-English indicated in its coverage that "women in Saudi Arabia have been banned from working outside the home."

In BBC-English, the indulgence framing was evident in equality, tolerance, and prosperity. The equality narrative was devoted to women's rights issues. Citing Saudi journalists and citizens, BBC-English focused on women's rights empowerment (e.g., women driving, participating in municipal elections, and holding high governmental positions). Moreover, the tolerance and prosperity narratives were evident in observing the changes in cultural lifestyle such as women's engagement in public events, eased restrictions on music and arts, gender-mixed events that were forbidden in the past, and welcoming new cultural reforms. BBC-English reports from inside Saudi Arabia described the changes in the Saudi atmosphere towards a more indulgent lifestyle, especially concerning women, arts, and music events.

The restraint framing was salient in the cultural deprivation, intolerance, and inequality narratives, in which women's rights issues were the central context of restraint framing. For the cultural deprivation narrative, the BBC-English narrative emphasized the historically conservative lifestyle in Saudi society, where many cultural activities (e.g., music, arts, gender mixing, and women's participation in public events) were religiously restricted. Additionally, the intolerance narrative highlighted the restrained freedom of women's activists in Saudi Arabia as well as imprisoning them: "the authorities arrested dozens of women for driving cars in Riyadh in 1990, and some women also published videos showing them driving in 2008, and between 2011 and 2014." The inequality narrative was salient in BBC-English, such as the "guardianship system" issue in Saudi Arabia.

In CNN-English, the indulgence framing was evident in the equality, tolerance, and prosperity narratives. The equality narrative was devoted to women's rights issues. CNN-English focused on women's rights and empowerment (e.g., women driving, participating in municipal elections, and holding high governmental positions). Citing citizens, CNN-English described the women's rights reforms as "a huge step towards a brighter future" and "a historic shift" in which "everyone can have fun and enjoy these changes in Saudi Arabia." Moreover, the tolerance and prosperity narratives were evident in observing changes in cultural lifestyle such as women's engagement in public events, easing restrictions on music and arts, gender-mixed events that were forbidden in the past, and welcoming of the new cultural reforms.

The restraint framing was salient in the cultural deprivation, intolerance, and inequality narratives, in which women's rights issues were the central context of restraint

framing. For the cultural deprivation narrative, like BBC-English, CNN-English's narrative emphasized the historically conservative lifestyle in Saudi society where many cultural activities (e.g., music, arts, gender segregation, and women participation in public events) were religiously restricted. Additionally, the intolerance narrative highlighted the restrained freedom and imprisonment of women's rights activists in Saudi Arabia. The inequality narrative was salient in women's fundamental rights compared to men in Saudi society. For example, CNN-English indicated that "before May, women weren't able to access government services without getting permission from a male guardian or having him present."

In Al Jazeera-English, restraint framing was twice as salient as indulgence. Unlike Al Jazeera-Arabic, Al Jazeera-English used the restraint framing mainly in the context of women's inequality and activism intolerance. For the women's inequality narrative, Al Jazeera-English focused on the guardianship system in Saudi Arabia, framing it as "systematic discrimination," "women are in effect legal minors who must defer to men to make key decisions about their lives," and "laws that treat women as second-class citizens in comparison to men." Moreover, Al Jazeera-English prominently focused on the intolerance narrative, especially towards women's activism in Saudi Arabia. The table that follows shows the statistical results of the relationship between the identity structure categories and the Saudi cultural context in the Arabic online news channels.

Table 24.

The Statistical Results of Identity Structure in the English Online News Channels in the Context of Culture.

Online News Channels	count	expected	z-value	Chi-square	*p-value*	Test Type*
Indulgence						
Al Arabiya	135(91.2%)	64	13.48	181.70	0.001**	P
Al Jazeera	85(85.9%)	32	11.83	140.07	0.001**	P
RT	94(94.0%)	38	12.53	156.97	0.001**	P
BBC	191(94.6%)	127	10.45	109.19	0.001**	P
CNN	137(89.0%)	73	11.10	123.29	0.001**	P
Restraint						
Al Arabiya	2(100%)	1	1.62	2.63	0.187	F
Al Jazeera***	151(71.6%)	69	13.4	179.68	0.001**	P
RT***	72(40.9%)	33	9.21	84.82	0.001**	P
BBC***	132(79.5%)	104	4.87	23.67	0.001**	P
CNN***	108(82.8%)	58	9.39	88.24	0.001**	P
Certainty						
Al Arabiya	22(24.4%)	39	-3.90	15.18	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	20(26.7%)	25	-1.14	1.31	0.253	P
RT	17(58.6%)	11	2.30	5.31	0.021	P
BBC	62(62.30%)	62	-0.06	0.00	0.956	P
CNN	67(40.9%)	77	-1.72	2.96	0.085	P
Uncertainty						
Al Arabiya	3(15.8%)	8	-2.46	6.03	0.014	P
Al Jazeera	42(17.0%)	81	-5.95	35.36	0.001	P
RT	42(28.4%)	57	-2.86	8.18	0.004	P
BBC	69(35.0%)	124	-9.05	81.84	0.001	P
CNN	98(29.7%)	156	-7.37	54.36	0.001	P
Thriving						
Al Arabiya	39(18.2%)	93	-9.12	83.23	0.001	P
Al Jazeera	7(7.8%)	29	-5.25	27.55	0.001	P
RT	13(11.2%)	45	-6.68	44.59	0.001	P
BBC	22(31.4%)	44	-5.65	31.93	0.001	P
CNN	37(21.9%)	80	-7.06	49.79	0.001	P
Doomed						
Al Arabiya	1(25.0%)	2	-0.74	0.55	0.637	F
Al Jazeera	4(6.7%)	20	-4.41	19.47	0.001	P
RT	3(9.7%)	12	-3.37	11.34	0.001	P
BBC	3(15.0%)	13	-4.48	20.05	0.001	P
CNN	2(6.1%)	16	-4.79	22.92	0.001	P

*Test type is the reported test for the p-value. (P) refers to the Pearson Chi-Square that reported when cells expected count is not violated. (F) refers to the Fisher's Exact Test that reported when cells expected count is violated, cells expected count has less than 5.
** The adjusted significance level with the Bonferroni correction was $p < 0.008$.
***RT-English, BBC-English, and CNN-English used indulgence and restraint equally. Al Jazeera-English used restraint significantly more than indulgence.

Findings Summary

This study examined how global online news channels framed the national identity in the Saudi political, economic, and cultural contexts during the period of three years, from the announcement of the Saudi Vision 2030 (April 25, 2016) to (April 25, 2019). Four research questions guided the study. The first research question asked about the ways that Arabic online news channels positioned the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The second research question asked about the ways that English online news channels positioned the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The third research question asked about the ways that Arabic online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The fourth research question asked about the ways that English online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The chapter above provided detailed answers to these research questions. The following is a summary of the findings.

Positioning the Saudi Identity

The study results indicated that the national identity frame model provided a consistent pattern in employing the identity positioning categories (i.e., avowal and ascription) to frame the identity of the Saudi culture. The results indicated that

positioning framing was associated with the cultural context across all global online news channels. However, in the political context, only Al Arabiya-Arabic and Al Jazeera-Arabic employed positioning (ascription) framing. Finally, the positioning the identity of the Saudi economy was not salient across all global online news channels.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Political Context

The study's findings indicated that positioning framing of Saudi identity in the political context was salient only in Al Arabiya-Arabic and Al Jazeera-Arabic. The two online news channels positioned the Saudi political identity in two different directions. Al Jazeera-Arabic, for example, characterized the Saudi political identity as a "neo-nationalist system" that creates "illusionary enemies" and compared the Saudi political identity to a "Machiavellian bloody system." In contrast, Al Arabiya-Arabic characterized the Saudi political identity as a progressive political system, promoting the idea that Saudi political leaders are hard-working, competitive, and ambitious.

Positioning the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context

The study found that English online news channels, mainly American and British, are the leading producers of positioning the identity of the Saudi culture. The findings suggest that Western media framing of the Saudi cultural identity used comparison and characterization (ascription framing). The comparison was more prominently evident in English online news channels operated by non-Arab states (U.S., U.K., and Russia) than their Arabic counterparts. Characterization of the Saudi cultural identity was dominant in English online news channels more than their Arabic online news channels counterparts (except RT-Arabic). For example, in its coverage of the Saudi Arabia launching beach resorts project, CNN-English stated that: "That could mean women will be allowed to

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sunbathe and swim wearing bikinis, hitherto unheard of in the conservative kingdom."

BBC-English indicated that "every woman must have a male companion with her in public."

Such comparison was absent in Al Jazeera (Arabic and English), Al Arabiya (Arabic and English), BBC-Arabic, CNN-Arabic, and RT-Arabic. Additionally, such characterizations were either absent or carefully addressed in the Arabic online news channels. The Arabic online news channels, including Al Arabiya-Arabic, CNN-Arabic, BBC-Arabic (along with Al Arabiya-English), used avowal and ascription to frame the Saudi cultural identity as a moderate Islam society that is moving towards tolerance, inclusivity, and openness. RT-Arabic employed mixed narratives, highlighting how Saudi Arabia is religiously extreme but promotes moderate Islam or points out that women are treated as second-class citizens yet hold high governmental positions. Finally, the Saudi cultural identity was not prominently positioned by Al Jazeera-Arabic.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity

The national identity frame model has shown an approximately consistent pattern in terms of the relationship between the identity structure categories (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, thriving governance, and doomed governance) and the Saudi political, economic, and cultural identity. Across all global online news channels, political identity was associated with the certainty and uncertainty categories. Across all global online news channels, economic identity was associated with thriving governance and doomed governance; one exception is that CNN-English employed uncertainty to frame the Saudi economic identity. Across all global online news channels, cultural

identity was associated with indulgence and restraint. Thus, the contexts (i.e., political, economic, and cultural contexts) are related to the dichotomic categories. The dichotomic categories are the diametric categories that take two opposite sides (i.e., certainty vs. uncertainty, thriving governance vs. doomed governance, and indulgence vs. restraint).

However, while structure framing had similar patterns between the contexts and the dichotomic categories, the relationship within the dichotomic categories was employed differently by the online news channels. Following is a representation of how the dichotomic categories were employed differently in framing the Saudi political, economic, and cultural identity.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Political Context

Al Arabiya-Arabic, Al Arabiya-English, and CNN-Arabic framed the Saudi political identity using certainty. The narrative prominently characterized harmonic relationships and confidence between citizens and leaders in Saudi Arabia and that modernization is welcomed and supported by the international community. RT-Arabic also framed the Saudi political identity using mixture framing (using certainty and uncertainty). Certainty framing focused on the harmonic relationship and confidence between the citizens and the leadership. However, uncertainty framing focused on the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran and conflict within the Royal family. Finally, Al Jazeera-Arabic, Al Jazeera-English, RT-English, BBC-Arabic, BBC-English, and CNN-English framed the structure of the Saudi political identity using uncertainty framing. The uncertainty framing prominently highlighted escalating conflict that resulted in human rights violations in Saudi Arabia and the region. These online news

channels usually attributed the human rights violations, conflicts, and instability

narratives to the Crown Prince's rise in political power in Saudi Arabia.

Notably, the Western media, particularly American and British media, was the

leading producer of the Saudi political identity uncertainty framing. The Arabic online

news channels (i.e., Al Jazeera-Arabic, BBC-Arabic, and RT-Arabic) frequently cite

American and British media to convey their political criticism on the structure of Saudi

political identity. For instance, RT-Arabic included in its coverage, "The "Times"

newspaper, Thursday, published an article that severely criticized the Saudi Crown

Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, saying that the hopes placed on him as a reformer who

heals the region's wounds resulted in nothing."

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Economic Context

All global online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi economic

identity as thriving governance, except Al Jazeera-Arabic used the doomed governance

frame. All global online news channels framed the Saudi economic identity as a

progressive economy that broadens long-term partnerships with the local private sector

and global firms. The Saudi economic identity was also framed as accounting for

transparency, proficiency, sustainability, reforms, or evaluation. Unlike other online news

channels, Al Jazeera-Arabic framed the Saudi economic identity as a regressive failure

built on fake estimations. Besides thriving governance, CNN-English framed the Saudi

economic identity using uncertainty framing to highlight the doubt and speculations of

international investors in the Saudi investment environment, mainly due to the human

rights issues in Saudi Arabia.

Framing the Structure of the Saudi Identity in the Cultural Context

Al Arabiya-Arabic, Al Arabiya-English, and CNN-Arabic framed the structure of the Saudi cultural identity as indulgent, vibrant, and tolerant, and correspondent with the Saudi tradition and values. In contrast, Al Jazeera-Arabic and Al Jazeera-English framed the structure of the Saudi cultural identity as an intolerant culture that restricted social lifestyle, particularly for women. The rest of the online news channels (i.e., RT-Arabic, RT-English, BBC-Arabic, BBC-English, and CNN-English) used mixture framing, indulgence and restraint, with much emphasis on religiosity norms, cultural lifestyle, and women's rights before and after the modernization process (Saudi Vision 2030) took place in Saudi Arabian society.

The findings presented in this chapter answered the main research questions of the study. Following, the discussion chapter highlights the conceptual meaning of the results and their contributions to the national identity frame model.

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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This study examined the ways that global online news channels framed Saudi political, economic, and cultural identity in the wake of the Saudi modernization transition, called Saudi Vision 2030. Four research questions guided this inquiry. The first research question asked about the ways that Arabic online news channels positioned the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The second research question asked about the ways that English online news channels positioned the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The third research question asked about the ways that Arabic online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture. The fourth research question asked about the ways that English online news channels framed the structure of the Saudi identity in the contexts of (a) politics, (b) economy, and (c) culture.

Framing theory guided the study's theoretical framework. The researcher collected online news stories published on the websites of ten global online news channels (i.e., Al Arabiya-Arabic, Al Arabiya-English, Al Jazeera-Arabic, Al Jazeera-English, RT-Arabic, RT-English, BBC-Arabic, BBC-English, CNN-Arabic, and CNN-English). The researcher developed a coding scheme for national identity frame; identity positioning variable (i.e., avowal and ascription); and identity structure variable (i.e., indulgence, restraint, certainty, uncertainty, doomed governance, and thriving governance) as well as the contexts (i.e., political, economic, and cultural contexts). A

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mixed-methods analysis was conducted, and findings were presented in the previous chapter. This chapter discusses research findings, which reveal evidence of a new national identity model frame.

First, the chapter examines the findings of how global online news channels framed Saudi political, economic, and cultural identity in the context of reflexive modernity as this nation launched a new campaign—Saudi Vision 2030—to change its society's future. The findings suggested three embedded meanings (cues) in the global media framing of the Saudi identity. Deviation posits that the global media frames cultural identity through its agencies and social structural interpretation. Domination concerns the agents' interpretive community, in which the identity framing spread across all contexts with a similar tone during a specific circumstance (e.g., contestations, crises, or national campaigns). Hybridization refers to framing the identity through a specific issue that is globalized and shared across all global media but with a political twist that serves the media's national geopolitical interests.

Second, the chapter introduces the comprehensive view of the national identity frame model. The national identity frame model concerns frame production. The national identity frame production model posits two interconnected levels: agency-micro and social structure-macro. The agency refers to the agents' self-identity (e.g., journalists, reporters, editors, sources, and other social actors). The social structure refers to the roles and regulations that bind a society (e.g., values, norms, traditions, and lifestyles). Nevertheless, a mediated level (meso-level) accrues between the agents within the media organizations that can contribute to the frame production and the interpretive community

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(e.g., the connection between journalists, sources, and elites). Finally, the model also provides suggestions to operationalize the national identity frame model.

Third, the chapter discusses the research's theoretical and practical implications and suggests avenues for future studies. Last, the summary of the chapter and the study conclusion is addressed.

Findings Discussion

The findings' discussion is presented using three clustered cues that show the constructed meaning of the identity framing: deviation, domination, and hybridization.

Deviation (Glocalization)

Deviation refers to the media's framing of differences between two cultural identities (e.g., values, lifestyles, norms, or traditions). This study's findings indicated that the English online news channels positioned the Saudi cultural identity using comparison and characterization. In contrast, positioning the Saudi cultural identity was not salient in the Arabic online news channels.

English online news channels frequently test Saudi cultural identity against Western identity (the ideal Western identity), depicting Western identity as the expected standard for modernity and Saudi cultural identity as deviant or odd. For instance, in characterization, Al Jazeera-English, RT-English, and CNN-English consistently mention that women are treated as "second-class citizens" in coverage of Saudi women's rights. In comparison, BBC-English coverage includes reports like the following: "Some reports suggested that Keith, whose musical repertoire includes songs like Whiskey Girl and I

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Love This Bar, was asked to tone down some of the content in a country where alcohol is banned."

Comparisons and characterizations have omitted the patriarchy, conservative, collectivist, and family-oriented aspects of Islamic culture (G Hofstede et al., 2010; House et al., 2004; Joseph, 1996). Instead, the events' interpretations are based on individualistic and liberal Western cultural values and norms. Notably, Saudis (officials, citizens, or journalists) have prominently contended that such modernization in the Islamic discourse and practice does not contradict "values and tradition" but reforms the extreme side.

The comparison and characterization (ascription framing) of global events is a process that involves agency and social structure in the frame production. The agents (e.g., gatekeepers, journalists, or editors) interpreted Saudi Arabia's cultural identity in a way that is meaningful to the local advances. Both local audiences and journalistic agents are parts of the same social structure, sharing similar values, traditions, norms, or rules. This structure comprises the deviation cue: It creates the differences between the culture's local identity to which the media belongs and the other culture that is located across the globe (glocalization).

The deviation is an ideologically driven cue because a global event is interpreted based on the local social structure that Western media often adapts for its audience. In other words, based on the cases presented, the deviation cue is an orientalist stereotype that promotes the ideal Western modernization identity (e.g., Western norms, values, tradition) compared to other identities in the light of the globalized world. As McNair (2009) stated, "News media of a particular society- press and broadcasting- tend to

construct accounts of events that are structured and framed by the dominant values and interests of society of that society" (p. 46). News media reporting on foreign affairs constructs meaning for events based on whether it is socially, politically, or ideologically acceptable or deviant according to an inevitable reality (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014). Moreover, Gurevitch et al. (1993) argued that global media agencies localize foreign events in favor of the local ideology:

> First, by casting far-away events in frameworks that render these events comprehensible, appealing, and "relevant" to domestic audiences; and second, by constructing the meanings of these events in ways that are compatible with the culture and the "dominant ideology" of the societies they serve (p. 206).

In the light of reflexive modernity, the media frames global identities heterogeneously. That is, media framing cultivates the idea that the world consists of different cultural identities. In reflexive modernity, the globalization phenomenon is witnessing a multilateral world. While modernization inherently affects the entire globe, every nation tries to preserve its unique identity to legitimize their unity and distinguish themselves from others (Castells, 2013; Featherstone & Lash, 1995; King, 1995; Therborn, 1995). Thus, modernization has become a goal for every nation worldwide, including the most conservative, like Saudi Arabia. However, identity has been adopted and constructed differently; thus, the Western online news channels have framed it as a deviant culture. The following figure illustrates the relationship between the local and global as well as the agents and social structure in positioning the cultural identity.

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Figure 2. *Representation of the Deviation Cue.*

Note: Social Structure (e.g., values, norms, traditions, regulations, rules).
Agents (e.g., Journalists, editors, elites, sources, and financial sponsors).

Domination (Contestation versus Campaigning)

Domination refers to the dominant frame that spread in all news contexts with a similar tone due to the communications between the agents themselves. That is, the identity framing dominates media content across all contexts (i.e., political, economic, and cultural contexts) with either a favorable or an unfavorable tone. The frame's spreading is resonated and gained more momentum within the agents' interpretive community during political contestation or political campaigning.

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The domination of the frame is due to the contact between government elites and journalists, between journalists within the media organization (e.g., journalists, editors, columnists, executive managers, or owners), or between media organizations and market pressures (e.g., advertisements, public relations, and governmental and political pressure). This interconnection between these agents creates a network community called an interpretive community (Zelizer, 1997).

The study's findings indicated that Al Arabiya-Arabic and Al Jazeera-Arabic framed Saudi political, economic, and cultural identities differently. Al Jazeera-Arabic, for example, described Saudi political identity as a "neo-nationalist system" that creates "illusionary enemies" and compared Saudi political identity to a "Machiavellian bloody system." Al Jazeera-Arabic used uncertainty in framing Saudi political identity structure, doomed governance in framing the structure of Saudi economic identity, and restraint in framing the structure of Saudi cultural identity. In contrast, Al Arabiya-Arabic promoted the idea that Saudi political identity is progressive with hard-working, competitive, and ambitious leaders. Al Arabiya-Arabic employed a specific political identity, a thriving economic identity, and an indulgent cultural identity.

To explain these findings, one can look at the regional political systems. Al Arabiya-Arabic and Al Jazeera-Arabic are owned or controlled by countries (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) with similar sociopolitical systems. Both countries are undemocratic monarchist countries (hierarchal political systems) with conservative societies. They are geographically neighboring members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Thus, theoretically, glocalization is an unfit model. Instead, the nature of the relationship between media outlets and governments is key.

According to Fandy (2000), "Any content analysis of Al-Jazeera would reveal that it is a channel that represents the viewpoint of a new alliance in the Middle East, namely the Ba'thist nationalists and the Islamists." Both ideologies advocate for the idea of collective identity, Arabism (Ba'thist nationalists), or Islamism (Islamists or Muslim Brotherhood). By framing the new Saudi political identity structure as Saudi-nationalist, Al Jazeera-Arabic signified that Saudi political identity is a deviated identity from the rest of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Moreover, the Saudi identity's framing in Al Arabiya-Arabic corresponds with Fandy's (2000) argument that Arab media is highly ideologically selective, in which media avoids criticizing the nation to which it belongs. The Western media's journalists routinely account for autonomy, criticism, and the watchdog model. Conversely, Arab media (and developing countries) adopts a mobilization model, primarily when covering issues related to the nation it serves. Its coverage enhances development and unity and promotes its nation's agenda (Kraidy, 2011; Mellor, 2007). Thus, Al Arabiya-Arabic devoted its coverage to promoting the Saudi political, economic, and cultural agenda.

Additionally, the domination cue was activated during contestation, crises, or campaigning circumstances. Thus, the political contestations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are embedded in the framing process in all contexts in Al Jazeera-Arabic's coverage. The coverage adopted a neutral tone before the political contestation, but that coverage dramatically changed to a negative tone across all contexts when the contestation erupted. Conversely, Al Arabiya-Arabic advocated for campaigning the Saudi agenda across all contexts.

From the reflexive modernity and global identities perspectives, domination is a politically driven cue that accounts for contestations or campaigning to serve the nation's geopolitical interests. The propagandistic or persuasive narratives aim to mobilize the audience toward a unified national, regional, or global identities. The domination cue reflects the belief that the media cultivate fragment identities even across geographically neighboured nations (Castells, 2013; G Hofstede et al., 2010). The following figure illustrates the role of the agents in creating the interpretive community that informs the dominant frame production.

Figure 3. *Representation of the Domination Cue.*

Note: Social Structure (e.g., values, norms, traditions, regulations, rules).
Agents (e.g., Journalists, editors, elites, sources, financial sponsors).

Hybridization (Humanization)

Hybridization is a framing process that refers to media advocacy on shared global issues, such as human rights, poverty, global health, climate change, and human trafficking. Hybridization involves a universal issue that corresponds with globalization values in reflexive modernity. The issue of hybridization tends to be shared across global media. However, the narrative may differ based on political gains, social structure differences, and contestation causes. Additionally, hybridization involves more than a context to frame the issue where the issue is framed politically and culturally, or economically and culturally. Hence, in hybridization, issues are the central elements for frame activation that travels across global media and is framed through integrated contexts.

The study's findings found a connection between framing the structure and several contexts (such as cultural context and political context). This approach used uncertainty framing (in the political context) and restraint framing (in the cultural context), where human rights issues comprised the central theme. The English online news channels (along with BBC-Arabic, Al Jazeera-Arabic, and RT-Arabic, which consistently cite Western media) prominently connected the structure of Saudi political and cultural contexts to the human rights that the Saudi political and cultural system restrains. Whereas human rights were the central issue in framing Saudi cultural and political identity, CNN-English also connected the structure of Saudi economic and cultural contexts to uncertainty and restraint framing of human rights.

However, the global online news channels twisted the human rights issues to reflect local political ends. For example, RT-English directed its coverage to Western

audiences or Western public opinion, criticizing Western hypocrisy in dealing with Saudi human rights violations. In one RT-English story, the headline read, "Welcome to Google, forget Yemen: the US will pander to Saudi ambitions during crown prince's grand tour." The way in which CNN-English domesticated the framing as the contestation between the White House and Congress over human rights issues in Saudi Arabia was salient: "While both Democrats and Republicans at Abizaid's nomination hearing decried the 'grotesque violations of human rights,' as Rubio put it, Democrats touched on the close ties between Trump and the Saudis, including the relationship of his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, with bin Salman, which has raised conflict of interest questions."

Human rights are a Western-owned frame. That is, individual freedoms, including freedoms of speech, assembly, and protest, are values that Western media and governments always consider in their foreign coverage. Further, non-government organizations (NGOs) across Europe and America have advocated for human rights values worldwide. This study found that Western online news channels, mainly American and British media, were the primary producers of the human rights narrative. Arabic online news channels (i.e., Al Jazeera-Arabic, BBC-Arabic, and RT-Arabic) were frequently willing to share American and British media criticism of Saudi politics that restrict human rights. For instance, Al Jazeera-Arabic cited a British news website, "Middle East Eye report showed its pessimistic view of the Saudi vision, whereby it has been carefully designed a miserable reality of education to create citizens unable to think independently."

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To explain the hybridization cue, Giddens (1991) provided a helpful direction in which the human rights movement became a manifest phenomenon in reflexive modernity. Giddens called it "*emancipatory politic*s" (Giddens, 1991, p. 215), referencing the integration between human rights (e.g., equality, justice, and participation) and politics in reflexive modernity. Therefore, humanization refers to the conjunction between human rights, activism, and politics**.**

This argument resonates with the perspective of the globalized world, connected and unified through communication technologies and the media, sharing a similar identity and values. Boundaries between the local and global levels are blurred, where "social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Thus, hybridization in reflexive modernity is a corollary of globalization (Beck et al., 1994; Giddens, 1990).

However, while human rights framing is sharable across global news media (homogenous), global news media tend to twist the frame politically in a way that serves its national interest (heterogeneous). As Shoemaker and Reese (2014) indicated that global news media interpret and report foreign events based on the national ideology or interest. The line between human rights driven by compassion versus political gains on a global level becomes difficult to distinguish "because humanitarianism [has] become more clearly political in its objectives"(Barnett, 2011, p. 193). Current scholarly work on framing human rights has indicated that the human rights frame is highly selective and politically objective in Western media. For instance, Jenkins and Hsu (2008) indicated that in the United States, "economic or social justice issues, such as poverty, education,

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or health care, are not discussed as rights issues at all but, rather, as matters of charity, good government, or consumer choice" (p. 440). Brandle (2018) confirmed this assertion with empirical evidence:

Human rights continue to receive extremely little coverage in both British and American news outlets. In the case of television news, coverage of human rights continues to decline in amount and depth, and demonstrates a significant tendency to only frame international affairs as human rights…Some news stories actually include human rights information, but do not include the phrase human right, which means that even when journalists cover human rights stories, they do not use human rights frames… [Concluding that] the government-leading-media perspective on who determines news coverage, making the press far less of an independent check on government when it comes to human rights in both the USA and UK. (p. 190)

The following figure illustrates the use of uncertainty and restraint framing of the human rights issue that travels across global news media.

Figure 4. *Representation of the Hybridization Cue.*

Note: Social Structure (e.g., values, norms, traditions, regulations, rules).
Agents (e.g., Journalists, editors, elites, sources, financial sponsors).

The three cues discussed above explain the embedded meaning of the frames as they related to the agents (micro) and social structure (macro) as well as the interpretive community (meso). These cues were also discussed as they related to the context of reflexive modernity and global identities. Next, the study presents the national identity frame model.

Toward a National Identity Frame Model

This study has revealed the national identity frame model on a global level, considering the contexts of globalization, modernization, and global identities. Following, I present the conceptual and operational definitions of the identity frame model.

Agent's Self-identity and Social Structure (Micro and Macro Level)

This study attempted to heal the fractured paradigm (Entman, 1993) by providing a holistic model that bridges the gap between the micro and macro levels. It defines the identity framing as a meaning-making process that shapes and are shaped by the dualistic relationship between the agents involved in a story's production (e.g., gatekeepers, elites, and social actors) and the social structures (e.g., rules, values, traditions, norms, and ideologies) that produce, activate, and disseminate the frame.

On the micro-level, media organization members—the agents— (e.g., journalists, editors, managers, or owners) are members of the social structure who bring their unique experiences. Thus, media organization members are active agents in constructing the frame through their unique experiences. In identity framing on a global level, journalists' unique experiences should concentrate on the relationship between the global and local levels. Their unique experiences include but are not limited to their (a) background in the global issues they cover; (b) ideological stances (e.g., liberal, conservative, or moderate); (c) definition of the local and global order (either heterogeneous or homogeneous); and (d) their global journalistic professionalism (e.g., symmetrical or asymmetrical international journalistic standards).

While crafting the news story of the global events, journalists consider their local audiences. Thus, they create a sharable culture between the self (micro-level) and social structures (macro-level). On a macro level, the social structure is an entity that binds sociopolitical and socioeconomic systems to a comprehensible standard. When examining national identity on a global level, media would likely adopt different frames due to each society's different social structures (e.g., values, lifestyle, norms, and

tradition). For example, Western society's social structure is a non-hierarchal, capitalistic, individualistic, and liberal system. In contrast, Arab society's social structure is a patriarchal, socialistic, collectivistic, and conservative system. Thus, the verity of the media-framing production results from differences between the local (national) structure and the social structure.

Interpretive Community (Meso Level)

A mediated level (meso-level) may involve the agent–social structure relationship. The interpretive community accrues between the agents themselves (Zelizer, 1997). This mediated level takes place on three levels: (a) within the media organization agents (e.g., journalists, editors, owners, managers); between journalists' colleagues from various media organizations (e.g., in the press conferences, the journalism association, or any other social meetings); or (c) between the media organization members and other social agents (e.g., advertising clients, lobbyists, non-government organizations, sources, or political elites or institutions) (Breed, 1997; Entman, 2003; Zelizer, 1997). This connection creates a network of interpretive communities that negotiate, activate, and disseminate the frame within the community's ecosystem. Therefore, the frame production on the agents' level may account for the relationship among the agents involved.

As this study proposed, the meso-level (between the agents) frame production is activated in certain circumstances, such as contestations, crises, disputes, media propaganda wars, or diplomatic and political interests. It is also activated when a society announces a transformational cultural shift such as occurred and is unfolding during Saudi Vision 2030. Furthermore, when researchers find a news channel or newspaper that

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uses a similar narrative across all contexts (i.e., political, economic, and cultural), this indicates a consistent interpretive community that feeds the frame production on a meso-level. Moreover, the frame production is activated in a hierarchal order in the interpretive community. That is, the frame production is constructed from the top of the system (e.g., political elites, regulators, executive managers in the media organization, or financial sponsors) to down (e.g., journalists, editors, and professional producers of the content). The following figure illustrates the national identity frame model.

Figure 5. *Representation of the National Identity Frame Model.*

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

AGENTS

Interpretive
Community

Interconnection between Agents
(Domination cue)

Micro/Macro Interconnection
(Deviation and Hybridization cues)

(Identity Frame)
Positional Identity Framing
Structural Identity Framing

Note: Social Structure (e.g., values, norms, traditions, regulations, rules).
Agents (e.g., Journalists, editors, elites, sources, financial sponsors).

Operationalization of the National Identity Frame

Framing identity in news media content can be detected through two framing devices: identity positioning and identity structure. Moreover, the identity frame should be examined through a context. In this study, the context was limited to the political, economic, and cultural contexts. However, the context can be adapted to the research interest. Other such contexts can include gender contexts (e.g., male, female, or transgender), ethnic group contexts (e.g., White, Black, Persian, Latino, Arab), or geographical contexts (e.g., American, European, Asian, Middle Eastern).

Identity positioning contains two categories (i.e., avowal and ascription). The typical media reporting style consists of two sides: a frame and a counter-frame. Thus, positioning framing involves how identity is positioned by those who belong to the identity (avowal) versus the outsider who does not belong to the identity (ascription). This study used an exploratory sequential design to develop a measure for identity-positioning variables in media content (see Table (6) in the method chapter).

For the identity structure, this study proposed six categories: (a) indulgence, (b) restraint, (c) certainty, (d) uncertainty, (e) thriving governance, (f) and doomed governance. Moreover, each variable contains several categories (see Table (7) in the method chapter). This study operated the six categories separately, but based on the results, it is recommended to use dichotomous variables. Each has two categories (i.e., indulgence versus restraint, certainty versus uncertainty, thriving governance versus doomed governance).

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Moreover, the mixed method (inductive and deductive approach) approach is a powerful tool to implement this type of research, as it moves the model forward, provides more substantial implications, and advances the model's replicability.

Research Contributions and Implications

This dissertation contributed to the framing literature, media studies, identity and cultural studies, and modernity research knowledge. This dissertation provided several theoretical and practical implications by bringing in all of these scattered areas into one study.

Theoretical Implications

Framing scholars have long criticized the lack of advancement in framing research (D'Angelo et al., 2019; Reese, 2001b). One of this dissertation's purposes is to contribute to the body knowledge in the framing literature. This dissertation extended framing theory by providing a new conceptual and operational model, the national identity frame model.

This study attempted to holistically bind a least a portion of the fragmented framing research into a cohesive model. In particular, this study contributed to the framing research by providing a replicable and measurable model of framing identity in the context of modernity and globalization (framing identity in reflexive modernity). It opened a new window to sources and methods for frame production research both conceptually and operationally.

Finally, the study provided a practical way to implement the mixed-method approach (qualitative and quantitative research). This approach helps to obtain both the

manifest and latent embedded frames in media discourse. It also provided a practical way to develop a coding scheme, operational definitions for the variables, and reliable and applicable measurements.

Practical Implications

This study suggests that journalists and media organizations covering global events should be intellectually and practically aware of the global identities phenomenon. That is, reporting and interpreting events from local (the national level) social structure, journalistic routine, and common standers (e.g., values, ideology, journalistic objectivity) are different from that on a global level. Thus, adding both interpretations (local and global) will enrich journalistic reporting objectivity. What is yet to be advanced for the practitioner of the journalism craft is how to help the audience know and care about the importance of the distinction between local and global.

Limitations

Three limitations of this research merit attention. First, this study intended to collect opinion pieces, but several online news channels do not publish opinion articles on their websites. Other online news channels published only one or two articles about the Saudi Vision 2030. Thus, one of the limitations of this study was obtaining an adequate sample that examines agents' self-identity in more depth.

Second, the sample obtained in this study covers only the Arabic and English online news channels. Therefore, the frame production may only involve the social structures of Arab and Western nations, which limits conclusions from being generalized

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globally. With these two limitations in mind, the following presents suggested future

studies.

Third, the study results included only the significantly positive relationship

between the identity framing and the contexts. In other words, the negative relationship

between the identity framing and the contexts across all online news channels was not

reported. Because the context categories were coded in a mutually exclusive manner, the

prominence of a certain context necessarily resulted in the underrepresentation of other

contexts. Notably, the overall positive significant results associated with political and

cultural contexts were not isolated from significant negative results of the economic

context. Such a pattern was observed across all news channels in the results.

Future Studies

Future research can expand this model in various ways. I present five potential

areas upon which this study may be expanded.

First, studies that add more covariate variables into the national identity model.

Future studies can examine identity framing production longitudinally, assessing how

identity framing changed over time. Additionally, future potential research may include

variables like proximity (e.g., national, regional, and global), visual-verbal congruence,

more languages (e.g., Russian, Chinese, French, and Spanish, Urdu, Turkish, or Persian),

and more global news outlets (e.g., The New York Times, The Washington Post, Fox

News (U.S), Le Monde and Le Figaro (France), TRT network (Turkey), Al-alam and

Iran Daily (Iran), DW (Germany).

Second, while the study is devoted to exploring the Saudi identity, future studies may examine the identity of other nations or cultures. Perhaps, how other nations frame the Western identity is worth studying. Moreover, how Western media frame eastern cultures (e.g., China, Russia, or India). Such studies will provide a comprehensive understanding of framing identity on a global level. Finally, it would be interesting for future researchers to apply this model to different ethnic identities within a nation.

The third area for future research is adopting methodological instruments other than the one used in this study. Future research may use more methodological instruments such as interviews along with content analysis, or content analysis and survey questionaries, to examine the three levels of the national identity model.

Fourth, future studies may conduct research targeting each level of the model separately. Such studies will provide a better and deeper understanding of how national identity frames unfold within each level. For example, researchers may conduct ethnographic case studies in newsrooms (within the media organization) to understand frame production in its natural setting. Another researcher may conduct a survey instrument to examine how a journalist's self-identity impacts frame production.

Crucially, it is recommended that future studies that adopt this model code the context categories as mutually inclusive. This procedure will help avoid the underrepresentation of the contexts, as explained in the limitation section. Furthermore, future research may account for treating the identity structure categories as dichromic variables, such as indulgence versus restraint, certainty versus uncertainty, and thriving governance versus doomed governance.

Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This study provided evidence that English online global news channels positioned the Saudi cultural Identity differently from the Western culture (deviation). The study also concluded that Al Jazeera-Arabic news channel framed the Saudi identity across all contexts negatively; on the other hand, Al Arabia-Arabic framed the Saudi identity positively across all contexts (domination). Finally, the study concluded certain global issues such as human rights that are very much sharable through most global news media. However, each media outlet tends to twist it differently based on the nation's political interest that the media belongs to (hybridization). Finally, while global online news channels framed the political and cultural identity heterogeneously, the study found that economic identity was framed homogenously across all global online news channels except Al Jazeera-Arabic.

Second, the chapter introduced the ultimate view of the national identity frame model. The national identity frame model includes three levels. All three levels interconnect with each other. The first is the micro-level, in which agents' (e.g., journalists, sources, elites, or financial sponsors) self-identity relates to the frame production. The second is the meso-level, which concerns the agents' interconnection within the media organization member or between the media organization member and other agents. The third or macro-level concerns the role of social structures (e.g., values, norms, tradition) in the frame production. Finally, suggestions for improving the operationalization of the national identity frame model were provided.

Third, the theoretical implications indicated that the national identity frame model expanded and contributed to the conceptual and operational knowledge of the framing

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research and literature. The practical implications indicated that journalists and media organizations that cover global events should adopt intellectual and practical international standards in light of global identities. The limitations highlighted that the data sample obtained in this study did not cover all aspects of the national identity model, such as self-identity. Lastly, several future studies are suggested, which expand our understanding of framing national identity in the wake of reflexive modernity.

To conclude, global media tend to frame nations' identity heterogeneously, which prove that in reflexive modernity, media cultivates fragmented global identities. The study's findings are in line with the scholarship camp arguing that modernization is not a linear path, but multilateral identities (Castells, 2013; Featherstone & Lash, 1995; G Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Therborn, 1995). It is true that the globe is unified through media technological connections and bridges the gap between time and space (globalization). At the same time, the media frames nations' identities differently. Nevertheless, the global online news channels frame the economic identity homogeneously, which shows that economic identity, on global level, tend to have sharable interest across nations.

The way national identity framing is employed in the media is objectively questionable. Under what standard and circumstances do news channels interpret the global events to their local audiences? How is the objectivity of media coverage measured on a global level? "Many media scholars would share the conviction that there should be an international standard of journalistic professionalism with basic shared values" (Reese, 2001a, p. 137).

In a globalized and connected world, audiences are active agents, the global order is very much connected, and the world engages in similar issues. For example, audiences in Saudi Arabia translate the English news report and compares and contrasts it with other news sources to draw their conclusions. Therefore, it is imperative for global media organizations to adopt journalistic standards that take into account local and global interpretations with a balanced tone and mutual understanding. Taking this step will both improve journalistic objectivity and also provide their audiences a better understanding and build bridges to connect cultural gaps.

In Saudi Arabia, youth, men and women are energized and optimistic toward the Saudi vision 2030 modernization because it overcomes decades of the youth struggle toward a better future. The Saudi citizens recognize globalization, thus, try to connect with the rest of the world and cultures, but with their own definition of identity in a globalized world. Muthafar (2019), a Saudi female columnist, wrote that Al Sahwa (the Saudi Muslim Brotherhood movement) had dominated the Saudi system over three decades, promoting extremism and hijacking the moral system from its human nature. "Today, in the wake of reforming what Al Sahwa messed up, we see another group in the media promoting that the Western values are the ideal one. We should establish an ethical system that protects our values, identity, and beliefs from any extremism and protects law and order" (Muthafar, 2019, n.p.).

In reflexive modernity, what the Saudi citizens seek from the media is not over-dramatization (e.g., women in Saudi Arabia treated as a second class or women in Saudi Arabia cannot leave their homes without male permission), or mobilization (e.g., mobilizing the public opinion against or for the government), or politicization (e.g.,

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twisting the criminal actions and human rights violations to meet some political gains), but they want the truth and the fact-based evidence that proves it. They can then become more active and powerful citizen agents to act for themselves. While these actions may be local, as they unfold, they help build a new global identity frame that can be disseminated by both local and global news channels around the world.

As the Saudi government moves forward with their transitional plan, Saudi Vision 2030, it is essential that they communicate their national identity in powerful and inspirational ways. Failure to do so will result in disconnection between the citizens and the state's government. To do so, local freedom of the press must take on a new role to criticize their wrongdoing, tell their story, amplify their voice, and shape their new national identity in the time of reflexive modernity.

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