

Slavery in Thought and Action
Reconciling the Duality of John Locke

by

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ABSTRACT

The Enlightenment era in the West is traditionally referred to as the “Age of Reason” and the cradle of liberalism, which has been perhaps the dominant political ideology in the West since the eighteenth century. Philosophers such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill are credited with developing liberalism and their theories continue to be studied in terms of liberty, the social contract theory, and empiricism. While liberalism is heralded as a societal advancement in the field of philosophy, some thinkers’ actions were not consistent with their written principles. This essay investigates how John Locke was involved in the creation and perpetuation of slavery in North America, but later crafted and endorsed more liberal ideologies in his writings.

This dual nature of Locke has a prominent place in academia and scholarly research. Many try to address the contradictory nature of Locke by looking to the location he had in mind when crafting his philosophies, specifically those concerning the state of nature, slavery, property rights, and empiricism. While some concepts, like slavery, seem to find him contemplating only English citizens, Locke’s reference to Indigenous Americans in his philosophical works supports the argument that the philosopher’s ideology was not necessarily written exclusively for English application. By analyzing Locke’s philosophy and his economic involvement in the Carolina colony through a postcolonial theoretical framework, this essay aims to understand the Eurocentrism of Locke and how his philosophy was applied differently across borders. Using postcolonial theory, this thesis concludes Locke was a colonialist and Western author who portrayed non-European cultures, practices, and experiences for European consumption and application.

I dedicate this thesis to my family: Sarah, Gary, Mary Kate, Clay, and Julianna. Without their unceasing love and support, I would not be where I am today.

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Finally, I want to thank my family. Through trials and strife, they continue to be my rock and my source of motivation. I persevere because my family perseveres.

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PREFACE

Before you is a thesis entitled “Slavery in Thought and Action: Reconciling the Duality of John Locke,” which is a comprehensive synthesis of political philosophy and historical analysis. It has been written to fulfill the graduation requirements of the Master of Arts in Global History program through the School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies (SHPRS) at Arizona State University. I was involved in researching and writing from March 2020 to April 2021.

Since high school, I have been interested in politics, history, and political philosophy. I knew exactly what I wanted to study in college from an early age. When I began my MA program at ASU, I thought my research interests would be confined to mid-20th century United States—studying political movements and social unrest. My interests soon changed, obviously, as I started taking courses in Early American History and Nationalism and Colonialism. I was enthralled by the connections between Enlightenment theory and colonial practices. We learned about John Stuart Mill’s involvement in British India and analyzed a paper in Historical Methods mentioning the subject of this thesis: John Locke in Carolina. I wanted to know more and came to choose this as my field of research.

I initially wanted to perform a broad intellectual study of this connection and understand the Eurocentrism of Enlightenment theory. However, it is thanks to my committee members that I narrowed my interest to focus on the individual case study of John Locke’s contradictory nature in the context of Carolina. My research questions were formulated with the help of my advisor, Dr. Catherine O’Donnell.

This research was difficult and extensive. I chose to write on this topic in late February of 2020 and formalized my committee by early March of the same year. In mid-March, the COVID-19 pandemic halted any archival, historical research I planned on completing. I had intended to visit the South Carolina Department of Archives and History, where there are various boxes of documents such as Locke's *Carolina Notebook* and letters of correspondence between various actors in the founding of Carolina. However, archives were still closed and/or limiting their visitations. It is with the help of my committee that I shifted my research questions to focus on the intellectual history and use Locke's writings for my primary sources.

Overcoming these challenges, I present this thesis to my committee and colleagues. I wish to add to the conversation on Locke by synthesizing the literature, providing an in-depth analysis of his philosophy, and applying postcolonial theory to his writings.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Enlightenment era in the West is traditionally referred to as the “Age of Reason” and the cradle of liberalism, which has been perhaps the dominant political ideology in the West since the 18th century. Philosophers such as John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, and John Stuart Mill are credited with developing liberalism and their theories continue to be studied in terms of liberty, the social contract theory, and empiricism. While liberalism is heralded as a societal advancement in the field of philosophy, some thinkers’ actions were not consistent with their written principles. This essay investigates how John Locke was involved in the creation and perpetuation of slavery in North America, but later crafted and endorsed more open-minded ideologies in his writings.

This dual nature of Locke has a prominent place in academia and scholarly research. Many try to address the contradictory nature of Locke by looking to the location he had in mind when crafting his philosophies, specifically those concerning the state of nature, slavery, and property rights. While some concepts, like slavery, are confined to England, Locke’s reference to America in his *Two Treatises* supports the argument that the philosopher’s ideologies could be applicable outside of English jurisdiction. By analyzing Locke’s philosophical concepts and his economic involvement in South Carolina, this essay aims to understand the Eurocentrism of Western thought and how it varied across borders.

This thesis explores the contradictory nature and application of John Locke’s philosophy in the New World, specifically regarding his involvement in the creation of

Carolina. By evaluating Locke's philosophy and the foundations of the Lord Proprietors of Carolina, I argue that while some ideological concepts are applicable elsewhere, Locke intended his writings for a European consumption and application. However, Locke's characterization of non-European societies proves exclusive: his political theories, intellectual philosophies, and colonial documents did not allow for non-European participation without assuming European qualities. Moreover, while many scholars attempt to place Lockean slavery in an African slave trade context, I argue his philosophy assumes Indigenous enslavement rather than African enslavement. By adopting a postcolonial theoretical approach in the final chapters, I assess the psyche of Locke as a colonialist and Western author and how that may have shaped his philosophical writings and actions in Carolina.

Since the mid-20th century, scholars have turned from solely analyzing Locke's philosophy to applying it to the study of colonialism. It is an interesting application as Enlightenment philosophy and colonial practices both began in the seventeenth century and many Enlightenment philosophers were also involved in colonies such as India and regions of Africa. John Stuart Mill is a prime example of this as he wrote directly on the subject of Great Britain's presence in India and justified such imperialism. This direct connection between Mill and colonialism prompts the question: to what extent are other Enlightenment philosophers involved in colonialism and/or imperialism and do they justify such actions in their ideological writings? Western literature is saturated with such questions, especially concerning John Locke because of his legacy in the creation of liberalism (commonly referred to as the "Father of Liberalism") and the organization of

governments that are still seen today in the West. However, in this application of philosophy, scholars continue to fall into a Eurocentric point of view.

To correct for this perspective, I adopt a postcolonial theoretical lens and use scholarly theory as a framework to understand Locke's decisions and contradictions when comparing his philosophy with his political involvement in Carolina. Postcolonial theory highlights Locke as colonizer who separated his life in the English colonies from his life as a theorist. By analyzing Locke as a Western author and colonialist, we see how his philosophy and his role as participant in colonization could seem so divergent. The question of contradiction, then, is not in answering for such differences, but rather showing how Locke as a colonialist advocated for personal and national interests.

This thesis will provide chapters that act as building blocks. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of the current literature and the recurring themes in the scholarly conversation, while also outlining the methodology and scope of this project. Chapter 3 provides a narrative of the Carolina colony: its beginnings, its actors, and its challenges and shortcomings. Chapter 4 outlines and analyzes John Locke's ideological concepts on the state of nature, property, slavery, just war, and empiricism. Chapter 5 then applies those philosophical writings in the context of Locke as a colonial actor, specifically focusing on the viability and extent of Locke's influence in Carolina. Finally, Chapter 6 puts Locke in a postcolonial framework to contextualize the competing aspects of his thought. The conclusion of this thesis synthesizes these chapters to succinctly argue that understanding Locke as a colonialist and Western European author allows the contradictions to exist rather than be resolved.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

John Locke continues to be held in high esteem in Western academia, but also in non-academic conversations. His place in Western politics is well established and many government officials and those who follow politics understand his main ideas because of his influence in the development of classical republicanism and liberalism. For example, Locke's central philosophy of 'life, liberty, and property' was molded by the American founding fathers and solidified into the Declaration of Independence as "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." His philosophical concepts of government influenced Western democratic states like the United States, France, and numerous others. After the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln and Congress reflected Locke's conception of slavery to only be applicable in the event of a crime, as enshrined in the 13th amendment to the Constitution.¹ John Locke's high status and influence as a political philosopher continues to affect the global community today.

However, as more archival evidence became available on the foundations of Carolina, documents revealed how Locke was involved in the creation of the colony, specifically in his correspondence with the Lord Proprietors and their colleagues and in his composition of the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*. These colonial documents describe the founding principles of Carolina, including the practice of slavery and the extent of rights provided to enslavers and enslaved. Scholars began to notice the

¹ Holly Brewer, "Slavery, Sovereignty, and 'Inheritable Blood': Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery," *American Historical Review* 122, no. 4 (2017): 1078.

initial inconsistency of this practice because Locke outwardly believed that slavery was “vile and miserable.”² The question quickly gained popularity in the fields of history, political science, and philosophy wherein scholars critically analyze and compare both facets of Locke in an attempt to reconcile, explain, or justify his inconsistencies.

Literature Review

This thesis analyzes a conglomerate of literature from different fields using political theorists, historians, and contemporary philosophers to frame the issue of John Locke. There are three recurring themes that arise in the research. First, many try to provide an answer to Locke’s contradiction on slavery by evaluating his philosophy to find any ideological justifications of the practice. Secondly, scholars attempt to analyze Locke’s level of involvement in the creation of Carolina. Finally, some historians contextualize Locke’s philosophy by following the timeline of events to determine if his ideological writings are directly related to colonial proceedings or English affairs.

When evaluating Locke’s philosophy, most scholars look to his two famous writings: *Two Treatises of Government* and *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. In *Two Treatises*, Locke presents a single chapter titled ‘Of Slavery’ (Chapter IV), which is where researchers begin their analysis. This chapter is only three sections and, when compared to most chapters in the text, is very short. Moreover, it provides virtually no justification for the American colonial form of slavery. So, scholars look elsewhere in the text like Chapters II, III, and V which discuss the state of nature, state of war, and property rights, respectively. Very few look elsewhere in *Two Treatises* for evidence,

² John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (London: Yale University Press, 2003): 7.

such as Chapter XVI where Locke discusses the process of conquest and the different powers ascribed to the actors involved. This is an important aspect of the question that many scholars omit.

Within the literature, there is debate as to whether the colonial context was prevalent or absent in Lockean philosophy. Scholars who argue that the colonial context is irrelevant focus on African enslavement in North America. They analyze the tenets, rules, and treatment of enslaved Africans, compare them to Locke's discussion of slavery, and conclude they are incompatible.³ Political scientist James Farr adheres to this argument. By primarily using *Two Treatises*' Chapter IV, 'Of Slavery,' Farr believes Locke is speaking in a strictly English context: slavery here relates to the concept of freedom from absolute monarchy. While he does recognize Locke's involvement in crafting the *Fundamental Constitutions*, Farr attests this only highlights his "indifferent" attitude toward this "glaring contradiction."⁴ Farr's argument, conversely, is too simplistic: it does not consider the probable timeframe in which *Two Treatises* was written, nor the practice of indigenous slavery in Carolina.

Historian Holly Brewer echoes Farr's claim; however, she does account for contemporary historical context. Brewer briefly analyzes passages from *Two Treatises* to highlight Locke's anti-slavery rhetoric both at home and abroad.⁵ Moreover, she uses the events surrounding the English crown as evidence that Locke specifically confines his

³ While this argument does not consider many facets, it is viable to an extent and will be further explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁴ Farr, "Locke, Natural Law," 516.

⁵ Brewer, 1055-1056.

argument against slavery in *Two Treatises* to his fellow Englishmen who were experiencing an historic unrest concerning absolutism and the divine right of kings. Brewer furthers this concept by suggesting that the fight either for or against absolutism during an age of early empire led to significant changes in colonial practices of slavery.

Numerous scholars, like Farr, confine their analysis of colonial slavery to Africans, excluding other marginalized communities like indigenous peoples. However, some, like political theorist Martin Seliger, use Locke's discussion of property to identify the issue of indigenous enslavement in the colonies. This is a well-structured and contextualized argument because of the heightened attention Carolinian officials gave to surrounding native communities. The colonists established trade with indigenous groups, but Seliger argues there was no avenue for authentic exchange between the two parties because of their differing conceptions of money and value. Using Locke's theory of property and just war, Seliger concludes that "as regards slavery, [Locke] had only colonial war or slave-raiding in mind."⁶ But as Brad Hinshelwood suggests, Seliger's analysis does not include an in-depth evaluation of the practice of hereditary slavery nor the enslavement of "non-aggressors," both of which Locke argues against in Chapter XVI.⁷

Two prominent scholars in the field, Hinshelwood and James Tully, adopt aspects of both Farr and Seliger's arguments while bringing in new evidence. They make a stronger claim: the practice of African enslavement is not consistent via Locke's just war

⁶ Martin Seliger, *The Liberal Politics of John Locke* (New York: Praeger, 1969): 115.

⁷ Brad Hinshelwood, "The Carolinian context of John Locke's Theory of Slavery," *Political Theory* 41, no. 4 (2013): 564.

theory, but indigenous enslavement is. By analyzing Chapters V and XVI, instead of relying on Chapter IV, Hinshelwood and Tully show how Locke's philosophy is consistent with the enslavement of Native Americans based on the different concepts of land.⁸ Hinshelwood goes further to argue that Carolina "appears to be a far more suitable target" for Lockean slavery than England or Africa.⁹ He supports this argument by providing evidence that Locke wrote his chapter on slavery in *Two Treatises* while revising the *Fundamental Constitutions* when there were issues to be addressed concerning the indigenous slave trade in Carolina.

When analyzing *Essay*, some scholars review the concept of *essence* to evaluate the inconsistency of Locke. American philosopher H. M. Bracken argues that because Locke believes the true essence of things could not be known, "it then becomes possible to treat any or no property as essential."¹⁰ Locke does not adhere to the belief that we are capable of knowing the essence of things, because if we did, it allows us to subscribe to a dominant narrative, which has the ability to be based on cultural differences. Locke writes, "if we could have... an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities or Powers of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an Idea of the Essence of that Thing."¹¹ Bracken suggests that Locke could not provide a response to those who claim color is

⁸ For further analysis, see Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁹ Hinshelwood, 565.

¹⁰ H. M. Bracken, "Essence, Accident, and Race," *Hermathena* 116 (1973): 84.

¹¹ Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, XXXI, sec. 13.

essential because humans are ignorant on the essence of substances and no argument is sufficient to propose what the essence of any one species may be.¹²

In his *Essay*, Locke makes note of some qualities that he believes are critical to the ability to reason. In Chapter XVI, he speaks on indigenous people who are “quick and intelligent,” but “didn’t have our ability to count to 1,000, and had no distinct idea of that number.”¹³ Another is the difference in language. Locke calls the Native languages he encountered “scanty” and “being accommodated only to the few necessities of survival in a simple way of life.” Bracken argues these empirical qualities of European descent “made racism easier to justify” in the colonies because it provides “ways of counting colour, head shape, language, religion, or IQ as essential properties of the person” and not secondary qualities, as Locke claims.¹⁴

However, while Bracken attempts to argue that race is evident in the concept of essence, philosopher William Uzgalis breaks down Locke’s essence theory and argues that he does not provide any justification for slavery on the basis of race alone. Locke believes that there are essences for every substance, but humans are not fit to determine what those essences may be. Uzgalis criticizes scholars who interpret Locke’s ‘Of Maxims’ as justification for racial slavery by highlighting the key points from this chapter that others misinterpret.¹⁵ Locke uses the analogy of a child to provide a Maxim,

¹² Bracken, 84.

¹³ Locke, *Essay*, XVI, sec. 6.

¹⁴ Bracken, 93.

¹⁵ ; William Uzgalis, ““An Inconsistency not to be Excused”: On Locke and Racism,” in *Philosophers on Race*, ed. Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002): 84.

proposing that a white child's only experience with men is of those who are white. When the child sees a black man, the secondary quality of color may transfer in the child's mind as a primary quality and therefore determine the essence of that man to the child. While some scholars take this as evidence that Locke argued for slavery along racial lines, Uzgalis argues that Locke finds this maxim to be "dangerous and absurd" because it is not the "true proposition," rather it is only a "perception" in an "inadequate" mind because the idea comes from a child who is unable to rationalize and use reason.¹⁶

The second theme that arises in contemporary literature is Locke's level of involvement in Carolina. Was he the mastermind behind the *Fundamental Constitutions* and other legal documents, or was he merely the scribe of others' ideas? Most scholars recognize the role of Locke as primarily the secretary of the Lord Proprietors and the protégé of Ashley Cooper. They contend Locke did not play a key role in the drafting process. However, other scholars point to the similarities in language between Locke's philosophies and the *Fundamental Constitutions* with terms such as "absolute power" in a slavery context. Moreover, they recognize the level of contact and correspondence Locke had with contemporary colonialists in Barbados (an English colony where slavery was prevalent), like Sir Peter Colleton.

Holly Brewer also aligns with this theme. Brewer analyzes Locke's life from an early stage to his death in 1704. She looks at the role Locke played as a young man (mid-30s) in Carolina writing the *Fundamental Constitutions*. She believes Locke as secretary

¹⁶ Ibid., 84-85.

wrote the document “as a lawyer writes a will.”¹⁷ Most of the Lord Proprietors had strong ties to Charles II and the monarchy, leading Brewer to argue that Locke was primarily a scribe. Locke’s mentor and friend, Anthony Ashley Cooper, was put on trial for treason in the 1680s, and while Locke was still involved in Carolina to an extent, Brewer states that the dissipation of his mentor’s position in the English inner circle would undermine his influence in the colony.¹⁸ Moreover, Locke’s philosophical position on slavery, Brewer argues, was crafted during his time in Holland with Ashley Cooper in the 1680s, where they fled to evade sedition charges. It is in Holland where they, along with other refugees, “helped to plan the Glorious Revolution.”¹⁹ Brewer argues that it is because of Locke’s initial involvement with the monarchical “slave program” that “gave him the incentive and knowledge to challenge it.”²⁰ Locke challenged slavery practices alongside his fellow radical Whigs by advocating to reverse slave policies in Virginia and the West Indies later in his life as a member of the Board of Trade and an active participant in undermining the Tories and royal absolutism.

The final recurring theme in the literature is an analysis of the timeline to determine to which historical events and communities Locke’s philosophy are relevant. Scholars in this vein of research contextualize Locke’s writings with both historical events of England and the colonies. Locke’s *Two Treatises* was traditionally understood

¹⁷ Brewer, 1052.

¹⁸ Ibid., 1053.

¹⁹ Ibid., 1054.

²⁰ Ibid., 1075.

to be linked to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England because of its proximity to the work's publication date and revolutionary ideas. However, British historian and demographer Peter Laslett argues that *Two Treatises* aligns more with the Exclusion Crisis of 1679 during which Charles II attempted to exclude Catholic family members from rising in monarchical power.²¹ Laslett also concludes that the majority of Locke's *Two Treatises* responded to contemporary theorists' work from the early 1680s, such as Robert Filmer's *Observations of Aristotle*, initially released to Oxford University in 1681.

Historian David Armitage agrees with Laslett that *Two Treatises* was most likely written in the early 1680s, however, he uses this presumption to argue its relevance to the colonies rather than England. Expanding on this argument, Armitage uses Chapter V 'Of Property' to highlight its direct correlation to the revisions of the *Fundamental Constitutions* in 1682. Moreover, the crops mentioned in Chapter V (wheat, barley, tobacco, and sugar) were native to the Americas and not England. With this and other evidence that will be explored further in this thesis, Armitage argues that an in-depth analysis of Chapter V of *Two Treatises* supports the argument for a colonial application of Lockean theory.

Brewer also falls into this category, albeit in a different vein of thought. Brewer tracks the development of slavery throughout the 17th and 18th centuries as a result of English absolutism. She argues that slavery developed in "bits and pieces," reflecting the monarchical status at the time.²² Brewer provides an example of this when speaking on

²¹ Peter Laslett, "The English Revolution and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government,'" *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 12, no. 1 (1956): 42.

²² Brewer, 1043.

the change of hereditary monarchical power in England in the 1660s. It was only with the restoration of absolute power of the throne that hereditary slavery laws were instituted in Barbados, Virginia, and Maryland. She argues that “these laws were a response to Charles II’s explicit requests to his governors in 1661 to support the R[oyal African Company] and to codify their laws.”²³ To further this argument, Brewer claims that before the power shift in the English monarchy, servants (a term given to both white and black people) were treated “similarly, if badly.”²⁴ The slave trade grew exponentially after Queen Anne, “who aligned with the high Tories” fought to expand England’s share in the international slave trade at the beginning of the 18th century.²⁵ Brewer follows the tumultuous historical events of the late 17th century in England—such as the rise of the Whig party, the strengthening of Anglicanism, and the unrest and restoration of the monarchy—to highlight the development of slavery as congruent with English hierarchical power.

The variety of scholars highlighted here aim to account for Locke’s surface contradiction. However, by doing so, they convolute the problem even further. There are many different schools of thought on the topic and within those schools of thought are differing opinions, perspectives, and evidence. An objective of this thesis is to synthesize

²³ Ibid., 1048.

²⁴ Ibid., 1047-1048.

²⁵ “Tories” is a term to describe members or sympathizers of the Tory Party, which was in opposition to the Whig Party. They consisted of more conservative ideologies and could be considered royalists, *see* Ibid., 1073.

the relevant literature while also providing an analysis of Locke's philosophical publications to identify the most valid argument.

Methodology

In analyzing Locke's philosophy, this paper is restricted to focus on his two primary works: *Two Treatises of Government* (1689) and *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). To examine these writings, I apply them to the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* (1669): the basis for enslavement in the colony, drafted by Locke, which influenced various laws concerning slavery and the treatment of enslaved persons in Carolina into the late colonial period. To understand Locke's relationship to Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper and Sir Peter Colleton, this essay uses a comprehensive work on the founding of Carolina published by the South Carolina Department of Archives and History along with complementary secondary sources.

For theoretical context, this essay incorporates a postcolonial framework which provides different approaches for how to analyze power structures and the relationships between those in power and those under it. Postcolonial theory is a theoretical approach which attempts to critically analyze the global effects of European colonialism. It generally tries to understand how and why colonized countries developed in the ways they did after the fall of state colonialism. While there is a focus on the decolonization process in this field, some prominent postcolonial theorists track colonialism from its beginnings and analyze its effects on both the colonized and the colonizer throughout its duration. In reviewing Locke's actions and philosophy through postcolonial theory, it is best to understand it through the lens of Edward Said and Albert Memmi: there are the developed, rational Europeans (West; colonizer) and those who are underdeveloped and

irrational (East; colonized). Said and Memmi provide an understanding of how the West came to power through colonization and exploitation by analyzing the psyche of the colonizer.

Edward Said's work, *Orientalism*, contends that the West had appropriated the culture, ideas, and values of the East into their literature, politics, and scholarship. Said argues that the terms *Oriental and Occidental* (the East and West, respectively) were created by Western European powers and used for "dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."²⁶ Said's work analyzes how colonial conquest resulted in an effort to understand colonial subjects and expand the interests of the mother country, which resulted in the 'othering' of the colonized. From the accelerated dichotomy between the Occident and the Orient, the image of the imaginary 'Other' was constructed and led to ideas about racial superiority in the West and inferiority in the East. Said defines the problem of representation when describing the West's Occident view of the Orient as "the Other." He believes that cultural misunderstandings allow for prejudice to permeate the discourse about the East due to the vast collection of Western scholarship and literature on the Orient.

Although Said restricts his theory to Asia and the Middle East, it can also retroactively apply to the study of Enlightenment philosophy in the American colonies. When evaluating who is the 'Other,' Locke provides explanatory theories about which humans fall under civility, that is, those who come to reason through experience. Here is where Locke's *Essay* will be incorporated. Locke contends that without the ability to

²⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 2.

reason, we are like “children.” However, Locke is an empiricist, not a pure rationalist like his predecessor, Rene Descartes. It is through internal and external experience that humans are able to rationalize. However, Locke outlines many different constructs he believes are crucial to rationality and civility, such as a system of government, an understanding of mathematics, reflection of ideas, and economic activity. But when applied to the study of colonialism, his assertion of what marks humans as rational proves itself Eurocentric. Through a framework of Said, this thesis analyzes Locke as a distinctly Western European actor in the early period of British colonialism.

To supplement an Occidental, or Western European, view of Locke, Albert Memmi’s work will be used to analyze the social and psychological aspects of British colonialism in North America. Memmi outlines in his book, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, the interdependent relationship between the two groups and their contingencies. For the purposes of this essay, I will focus on Memmi’s portrait of the colonizer and the different characteristics he believes they display. For Memmi, there are two types of colonizers: those who refuse and those who accept. Those who refuse are not detached from colonialism itself, because although they are sympathetic to the colonized and reject the colonial system, they continue to perpetuate it by merely living within the colony instead of the mother country. He who accepts colonialism justifies their involvement by distinguishing and highlighting the cultural differences within their relationship to the colonized and defends his social norms as superior to those of the natives. Memmi calls this group of colonizers “colonialists,” to which, this thesis attests, Locke belonged. Memmi argues that the colonialist “endeavors to falsify history, he

rewrites laws, he would extinguish memories. Anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation into legitimacy.”²⁷

Memmi’s examples are geographically confined to North Africa and French colonialism, but he asserts that this relationship and the psychology of the colonialist are universal themes. When examining the reasons for justification, he argues that “no matter what happens [the colonialist] justifies everything—the system and the officials in it. He obstinately pretends to have seen nothing of poverty and injustice which are right under his nose; he is interested only in creating a position for himself, in obtaining his share.”²⁸ The greed that Memmi highlights here is a universal concept and is applicable to the legal systems in place in Carolina. Additionally, Locke’s epistemology is analyzed through the lens of Memmi—does experience shape the colonizer’s understanding of the colonized? *The Colonizer and the Colonized* contextualizes the psychology of the Carolinian settlers and what justifications they gave for slavery in their founding documents.

Scope of Project

This project analyzes Locke’s two major philosophical works: *Two Treatises of Government* and *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. These two writings are then compared to *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*. These sources will be used to analyze Locke’s contradictory nature when comparing Locke the colonialist and Locke the philosopher.

²⁷ Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (London: Souvenir Press, 1974): 52.

²⁸ Memmi, 90.

Throughout chapters in *Two Treatises* as well as the chapters in *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the concepts of slavery and race are identified. By analyzing these chapters, this essay highlights how Locke viewed other races, namely Africans and Indigenous Americans, in a philosophical context. With this understanding, political documents from Locke are also analyzed to address racial biases in Locke's life aside from his philosophy. After the analysis of both lives are concluded, this research will attempt to clarify any contradictions that arise.

Other specific questions this study aims to answer are if John Locke had a concrete role in the creation of South Carolinian slavery and if so, to what scale. *The Fundamental Constitutions* was initially drafted in 1669, while *Two Treatises* and *Essay* were not published until 1689. Could it be possible that the same person who was involved in South Carolina was the same as the man who was instrumental in crafting political theory 20 years later?

Therefore, according to the literature, the research questions are as follows:

1. Did John Locke have a concrete role in crafting Carolinian slavery?
2. Can Locke the colonialist and Locke the philosopher be the same person? Can the contradiction be put to rest? If not, what evidence is needed for rectification?

These questions are important to the study of the Enlightenment period. The Enlightenment is upheld as a beacon of freedom and free-thinking; however, this research aims to contribute to the conversation on the Enlightenment's influence on the trepidation of colonialism and how the two are connected.

This research combines political philosophy and secondary literature and analyzes the questions through the lens of postcolonial theory. While some recent political theorists and historians have written on the subject of Locke's inconsistencies in political theory and colonial life, using a postcolonial framework as the basis for analysis is novel for the field.

The originality of this project emerges from the synthesis of literature on the question and the use of postcolonial historiography and theory to understand the relationship of the colonizers to the colonized and the Occident to the Orient in an American context.²⁹ Applying Memmi and Said's frameworks to John Locke's perception of slavery in his philosophy as well as his defense of it in colonial writings can provide a more complete narrative to understand the social and psychological underpinnings leading to the apparent contradiction between the many faces of Locke. I argue that Locke's writings assessed the needs, culture, and influences of different audiences, but otherized and excluded non-European communities.

²⁹ In applying Said's Occidental-Oriental dichotomy in a North American and, to a lesser extent, Caribbean context, this thesis replaces the terms Occidental/Occident with "European" and Oriental/Orient with "non-European."

CHAPTER 3

CAROLINIAN BEGINNINGS

The British colony of Carolina began in the mid-seventeenth century with multiple charters from Charles II. The charters were given to a group of established Englishmen called the Lord Proprietors of Carolina. The colony was planned to provide financial security, religious freedom, and economic mobility to its colonists, but soon received pushback from different factions with diverse and stronger interests. Carolina was set up to be a beacon of aristocracy and democracy where any colonist could create a good life, but the various problems they encountered soon showed that this dream was short lived. This chapter explores the beginnings of Carolina, the intentions of the Lord Proprietors, and the problems the organization faced in their colonial implementation, specifically the rise of the settlers from Barbados. Understanding the intentions and shortcomings of the Lord Proprietors provides context for an analysis of John Locke’s involvement in and objectives for Carolina’s continuation.

The Lord Proprietors of Carolina

Founded by an initial charter issued by Charles II on March 24, 1663, Carolina began as a colony for wealthy English proprietors who sought to extract more wealth. In 1672, the proprietors approved of the *Fundamental Constitutions* for the colony which created a “gothic” style of society.³⁰ The “First Charter” granted a variety of privileges to

³⁰ Gothic society is a term used by Ashley Cooper that refers to an ideal commonwealth which is modeled on the English manorial society—an “ancient form of feudalism” see Thomas D. Wilson, *The Anthony Ashley Cooper Plan: The Founding of Carolina and the Origins of Southern Political Culture* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2016): 32.

the Proprietors that were later outlined in the *Constitutions*, such as judicial, political, economic, and “absolute power.”³¹ Judicial and political power included the right to pardon and abolish crimes, the total “Establishment of Justice unto Courts,” organizing towns, designing and building infrastructure, and collecting dues.³² Economic power was provided to the Proprietors by way of trade with the indigenous communities and trade of all “Goods, Wares and Merchandizes.”³³ The documents use of “absolute” authority regarded all of these concepts and the authority was unto the Proprietors and their heirs alone.

The Lord Proprietors were a collection of eight prominent Englishmen holding a variety of titles: Lord, Baron, Sir, Earl, etc. These eight men were a disparate group, all with differing aspirations and commitments. Most of the members were loyal advocates and allies of the English throne and monarchical power and some even participated in the English civil wars under Charles I to protect the crown.³⁴ Some, like the 1st Earl of Clarendon (Edward Hyde) and Sir William Berkeley, were nothing more than a figurehead for the organization—helping to acquire the colonial charter. The other six

³¹ Charles II, *The Two Charters Granted by King Charles IId to the Proprietors of Carolina: With the First and Last Fundamental Constitutions of that Colony* (San Marino, CA: Henry E. Huntington Library, 2019): 5-8.

³² Charles II, 5-7.

³³ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁴ Brewer notes that Ashley Cooper did not hold as strong of royalist principles like the other Proprietors, *see* Brewer, 1052.

members were active in their respective roles.³⁵ However, the proprietorship of Carolina may have fallen apart if it were not for Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper.³⁶

While there was exploration of Carolina prior to the 1660s, the colony's true roots trace back to Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper. In 1662, Ashley Cooper was influenced by the Duke of Albemarle, to whom the colony's ideation is attributed. He joined the Lord Proprietors of Carolina, which received a charter from King Charles II a year later. The charters were initially headed by Sir John Colleton, but due to problems on the home front, such as war, political unrest, and disease, he was unable to successfully complete the duties entrusted to him.³⁷ From these challenges, Ashley Cooper rose to leadership. He was initially granted the task of funding and the financials and rose in rank from there. In this new role, Ashley Cooper implemented the "improvement urges" that he and the Proprietors shared in developing Carolina.³⁸

Ashley Cooper referred to the Carolina proprietary colony as "my darling" in a letter of correspondence to Peter Colleton, the son of Sir John Colleton. It was Ashley Cooper's unwavering belief in the potential of Carolina that sustained its growth and

³⁵ In alphabetical order: John Berkeley, George Carteret, John Colleton, Anthony Ashley Cooper, William Craven, and George Monck, *see Ibid.*, 4.

³⁶ Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper gained the title the 1st Earl of Shaftesbury in 1672, by which he is usually referred. However, because this thesis begins in the 1660s, he will be referred to as Ashley Cooper for clarity purposes; Charles H. Lesser, *South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1669-1721* (Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1995): 4-9.

³⁷ L. H. Roper, *Conceiving Carolina: Proprietors, Planters, and Plots, 1662-1729* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 18.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

continuation. His estate in England and its large household staff served colonial affairs for the majority of its existence. Ashley Cooper's associates even helped him manage the charters and implement his ideas.³⁹ John Locke joined Ashley Cooper's household in 1667. After saving Ashley Cooper's life by performing an operation on his ruptured cyst in 1668, Locke was invited to be the secretary of the Lord Proprietors. By 1671, the Ashley Cooper estate (Exeter House in London) was the primary manager of the Carolina Proprietorship.⁴⁰

Ashley Cooper's plans for the colony were a response to the events in England at the time. British Historian L. H. Roper argues that Ashley Cooper's goals for colonization in Carolina reflected the population boom and civil war at home. Events such as the Great Plague and the Great Fire of 1666 prompted English citizens to look elsewhere for settlement. Moreover, English cities became overpopulated. By promising independence through land acquisition and creating wealth for England by alleviating its reliance on foreign imports, the Carolina colony sought to serve the needs of the mother country.⁴¹ The combination of political freedom and land ownership, the Proprietors believed, would solidify the social and economic structures of the colony to reflect that of England.

Slavery practices can also be tied to the English crown and the shifting power structures that plagued the 1600s. Holly Brewer attests that the shift in slavery practices was in direct relation to the changing status of power with the English monarchy. Before

³⁹ Lesser, 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 16.

⁴¹ Roper, 26.

the 1660s, servants (of both white and black descent) were treated, all things considered, similarly. It was not until the restoration of hereditary monarchical power that there was the instillment of hereditary and degrading slavery practices in English colonies. The 17th century was a tumultuous period for England with the English Civil War, the Restoration, the Exclusion Crisis, and the Glorious Revolution all while the nation attempted to expand their empire. While attempting to regain and solidify power, the monarchy, specifically under Charles II and James II, advocated for increasing absolutism that “enshrined hereditary hierarchy and absolute obedience for everyone.”⁴² Brewer argues that absolutism in England did not stop at the borders. With the newly expanding imperial power, the monarchs attempted to show their power at home and abroad.

Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper and Sir John Colleton, two of the most influential Lord Proprietors of Carolina, were tasked with setting up the colony and recruiting colonists. Initially, English citizens were recruited for the colonization. English recruitment was targeted toward the sons of aristocratic and artisan families but also to those looking for passage to the New World by way of indentured servitude.⁴³ However, the Proprietors had already planned on seeking more colonists from Barbados, an English colony from 1625 to 1966.⁴⁴ The recruits from America and the West Indies were not

⁴² Brewer, 1054.

⁴³ Lesser, 11.

⁴⁴ The Barbadians later became known as the Goose Creek men because of their settlement near Goose Creek, a tributary of the Cooper River, which bordered Charles Town, see M. Eugene Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina: A Political History 1666-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966): 7.

meant to be indentured servants, but rather financiers and landholding colonists who would provide future governance and wealth for the colony. Recruitment and the process of actually colonizing the land proved difficult as there were runaways, shipwrecks, and a failure to recruit servants.⁴⁵

Ashley Cooper inherited the colony from other Proprietors who faced insurmountable challenges.⁴⁶ In the Carolinian territory, there were a few major settlements for colonization: Albemarle County, Cape Fear, and Charles Town. Initially, the start-up funds would come from the Proprietors themselves, other English settlers, immigrants from Virginia, and some from the West Indies. The Proprietors refused to provide any “substantial portions of their governmental power” to the Barbadians; however, with the death of Sir John Colleton in 1667, the Cape Fear settlement failed soon after. This weakened the Lord Proprietors as Sir John Colleton and Cape Fear were vital to its financial and territorial success. With this roadblock, the organization needed a stronger source of funding, so they turned to their Barbadian colleagues for emigration and money, as they were now more inclined to concede substantial power in their land holdings.⁴⁷ The power conceded in Albemarle laid the foundation for heightened Barbadian influence later in the Carolina colony.

⁴⁵ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 15.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

⁴⁷ Lesser, 10-11, 14.

Politics and the Social Hierarchy

Ashley Cooper proposed a different kind of government than that of Carolina's neighbors. He sought to create a "reciprocity" among the social classes, ensure religious tolerance, and manage economic growth. This is evident in his idea for a mixed system of government and his goal of protecting property in order to avoid having a small group control all inhabitants of the colony.⁴⁸ Political Scientist Vicki Hseuh argues the *Fundamental Constitutions* stages a "specific type of civic republicanism" that was practical and differential rather than imposing authoritative constitutionalism on the colonists.⁴⁹

Enlightenment philosophy and republicanism influenced Ashley Cooper's goals for the colony, which can be seen in concepts such as civil rights, fair judicial systems, religious tolerance, and land settlement found in *Fundamental Constitutions*.⁵⁰ Ashley Cooper intended to impose a republican political system while his protégé John Locke adopted such principles and emphasized a new reformation of Ashley Cooper's republicanism: classical liberalism. Scholar Thomas D. Wilson iterates this point, stating, "Classical liberalism, also known as Lockean liberalism, is Locke's reformulation of republicanism."⁵¹ Pre-Enlightenment and Enlightenment political philosophies—feudalism and republicanism, respectively—influenced Carolina to be a government that

⁴⁸ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 10.

⁴⁹ Vicki Hseuh, "Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina," *Journal of History of Ideas* 63, no. 3 (2002): 427.

⁵⁰ Wilson, 35.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

experimented with republican ideals. These philosophies found themselves to be flexible and adaptable in reality when confronted with instability and dissent.

Another point of interest is the ideology behind city planning the Lord Proprietors implemented. Ashley Cooper and Locke created a type of instructional manual for land allocation, townships, public spaces, urban growth, and where to keep rural territories. City planning required inductive reasoning, equality, and design—all of which are Enlightenment principles.⁵² Ashley Cooper and Locke hoped to reflect those ideas, in addition to traditional English colonial plans, when developing townships in Carolina. English colonies typically began with a town square with public buildings on a tiered street grid, allowing for varied types of transportation. Traumatic historical events, like the Great Plague and the Great Fire of 1666, influenced Ashley Cooper to develop towns that were less concentrated, emphasizing an “agrarian orientation of English gentry and nobility” which “made their cities greener, less dense, and less vibrant.”⁵³ Ashley Cooper and Locke presented a distinctly seventeenth century outline for their colony that would soon be ideal for the proliferation of enslaved labor and a plantation economy.

While some scholars of southern political culture hold that the document was inefficient and weak, Hseuh claims it was meant to reflect English ideals and a republican-like adaptability that would be receptive to any instabilities and insecurities.⁵⁴ In contrast to other scholars, Hseuh believes Ashley Cooper did not intend the social

⁵² *Ibid.*, 21.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁵⁴ Hseuh, 433.

hierarchy in the *Fundamental Constitutions* to be feudal or manorial but rather an “independent freeholding” that encompassed political and economic life as much as land acquisition.⁵⁵ Using previous philosophies found on Locke’s bookshelf, such as Machiavelli and James Harrington’s *Oceana*, Hseuh’s argument hinges on Locke’s previous readings of philosophy as evidence for why the *Fundamental Constitutions* was a flexible, “breathing” document—able to adapt to the realities of settler colonialism. However, this flexibility within the hierarchy was only granted to specific social and economic classes.

When Ashley Cooper outlined his goals for Carolina, he wanted to develop what he called “the Grand Model” of society which would implement British ideals like liberty, property, and class. He created this Grand Model with the English manorial society in mind, an idealized form of feudalism that supported a traditional class system. Wilson furthers the argument that this was not fully realized in Carolinian society because of outside influences like the Barbadians. Ashley Cooper needed to modify his Grand Model to reflect the reality of the situation in the colony’s economy and society. Therefore, Wilson calls what came about a “hybrid” model that incorporated both Ashley Cooper’s utopian goals and the English Caribbean plantation system.⁵⁶ Wilson identifies practical changes made to appease the upper classes, including the Barbadians, which undermined Ashley Cooper’s intentions and plans.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 435.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 46-27.

This social hierarchy in Carolina identified the proprietors and wealthy landowners as the aristocratic class. At the bottom were enslaved people, which they deemed necessary until further economic development. The social hierarchy was meant to be flexible for freemen and nobility to move classes based on land acquisition. It was intentionally not a fixed hierarchy for these social statuses, but the requirements to move classes were rigid enough that one must acquire 3,000 acres of land before petitioning the proprietary government for a status change, political power, and “manorial rights.”⁵⁷ Moreover, this fluidity in the social and political hierarchy was not provided to *leetmen* or slaves.

Carolina’s dependence on enslaved labor soon grew exponentially with the influence of the Barbadian settlers.⁵⁸ With the growing dependency on enslaved labor, Wilson argues, the idea of class reciprocity quickly turned into a caste system.⁵⁹ The court system and social hierarchy outlined by the *Fundamental Constitutions* reflected feudalism to such an extent that the liberal intentions of Ashley Cooper could never be fully realized. By the end of the proprietary period, the political and economic structures of Carolina were dependent on the plantation-enslaved labor model and the classes of master, freeman, and enslaved were practically solidified.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 13.

⁵⁸ Wilson, 2.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

As the lines between classes became more rigid, Wilson argues that Ashley Cooper's plan for a partially fluid social hierarchy turned into solidified groups—this he calls a “*fraternalistic* political culture.” Fraternalistic political culture captures the hierarchical nature of Southern colonies and the uniformity of class and race, which were intrinsically related at this time. Wilson states that fraternalistic political cultures are typically oligarchic. Property is a central tenet of this political culture, and the elite sought to protect their property, whether that be their estate or the enslaved persons under them.⁶¹ Wilson argues that the elite's role in this culture and “the reciprocity of benefits” that this system offered “to all strata within the class hierarchy” continued to be an essential function of a “balanced government and a stable, productive society.”⁶² Fraternalistic political culture in Carolina allowed for a strong ruling class and the narrative of enslaved people as property.

Religious Culture

Ashley Cooper intended for religious and conscious liberty in the colony and even recruited Englishmen with the promise of such freedom. This religious liberty was intended to extend to all groups of both Christians and those outside of the Christian faith, and only required 7 members for establishment.⁶³ However, most of the churches set up in the colony were of Christian persuasion. This is evident in the 1704 map of Charles Town, which outlines the acreage allotted to various religious sects. As shown in

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 58.

⁶³ *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* (San Marino, CA: Henry E. Huntington Library, 1669): sec. 96.

Figure 1, Reference P denotes the English (Anglican) Church, the largest building visualized on this map. Other churches and sects include the French (Q), Independent (R), and Ana Baptist (S), which are also housed within the city walls. The only religious building outside of the central part of Charles Town is the Quaker meetinghouse (T). However, this isolation from the other churches does not insinuate any ill-will toward the Quakers, as there were many important posts outside of the township like prominent private farms and the Minister's House (O).⁶⁴ Every religious congregation was required to register with the precinct and produce a book of "Terms of Admittance and Communion" for religious record.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Quakers began as a religious sect in the mid-seventeenth century in England. They soon received persecution for their abandonment of traditional church practices such as sermons, elaborate churches, and a clergy. They emphasized an individual spiritual connection as opposed to a Puritan view of the ethereal. While most Quakers settled in the Pennsylvania colony, there were groups of Quakers in Carolina, most likely because of the religious tolerance incorporated into its colonial documents, *see* Stephen J. Stein, *Communities of Dissent: A History of Alternative Religions in America* (New York: Oxford Publication Press, 2003): 37.

⁶⁵ *Fundamental Constitutions*, 18-19.




Figure 1. *Charles Town, 1704* map detailing the allotted land dedicated public architecture (e.g., bridges, bastions), private acreage (e.g., plantations, town houses), and public spaces (e.g., churches, courts).⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Edward Crisp, *Charles Town, 1704*, 1704, map, South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, SC, e-archives.sc.gov/records.

Along with the various Christian sects, Ashley Cooper's radical religious toleration included religious freedom to "heathens, Jews, and other dissenters."⁶⁷ However, this was not a commonly shared view among the Proprietors. Some of the Proprietors demanded the *Constitutions* claim the Church of England as the "National Religion" of the colony, "empowering the Carolina parliament to levy taxes for its support."⁶⁸ The influx of Barbadian immigration further influenced the religious culture of the colony, due to their staunch belief in the Church of England.⁶⁹ The *Fundamental Constitutions* and the religious foundations of the colony were heavily debated throughout the late seventeenth century, leading to the rise of factions. One example of this tension is shown in the relationship between politics and religion. In 1700, the government chose an Anglican as governor over a leader of the dissenting sects. The dissenter, Joseph Morton, was the "logical" option, but the court and royal commission endorsed and elected the Anglican, James Moore. This event spurred the emergence of revivalism and an anticlerical sentiment.⁷⁰

In addition to their political presence, leaders in both the Anglican and dissenting churches operated missionary and conversion work. Their primary targets for conversion were enslaved Africans and indigenous peoples. The baptizing of the enslaved concerned white settlers, believing newly Christianized enslaved people might gain political and

⁶⁷ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 14.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 14; This tax would later be repealed, ensuring other religious sects that they would not be taxed to support the Church of England, *see Ibid.*, 37.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 76-77.

social power. Church leaders alleviated these concerns by offering a new “slaveholding ethos”: God created the African too, but to be a servant. Moreover, in this new ethos, they adopted a paternalistic logic that it was the enslaver’s responsibility to Christianize the enslaved and it was the enslaved person’s responsibility to obey his enslaver, even citing the book of Ephesians for biblical authority on the matter.⁷¹ Christianity was also used to require complete obedience from enslaved persons. J.H. Lefroy, a British colonial administrator, stated that baptizing the enslaved does not make them equal, “but rather, by means of their Christian profession, [they are] obliged to a more strict bond of fidelity and service.”⁷² In early colonial history, Christianity was an enslaver’s tool for controlling the enslaved persons under them.

The connection between religion and slavery is underscored again in the *Fundamental Constitutions*. Locke and the Lord Proprietors outlined in section 106 that “*Charity* obliges us to wish well to the *Souls* of all Men, and *Religion* ought to alter nothing in any Man’s Civil Estate or Right, it shall be lawful for *Slaves* as well as others, to Enter themselves, and be of what *Church* or *Profession* any of them shall think best, and thereof be as fully *Members* as any *Freeman*.” This section follows a long discussion

⁷¹ The passage Church leaders used from Ephesians states, “Slaves be obedient to those who are you masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in the sincerity of your heart, as to Christ; not by way of eye-service, as people-pleasers, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart. With goodwill render service, as to the Lord, and not to people, knowing that whatever good thing each one does, he will receive this back from the Lord, whether slave or free” see Eph 6:5-8 NASB; Thomas J. Little, *The Origins of Southern Evangelicalism: Religious Revivalism in the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1670-1760*. *The Origins of Southern Evangelicalism* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2013): 73-75.

⁷² J.H. Lefroy, *Memories of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somers Islands, 1511-1687* (London: Longmans Green, 1879), 293, quoted in Little, 16.

on religious tolerance. However, equating enslaved persons to full members only refers to their status as Christian converts. It does not incorporate them into society. The section continues to outline that any Christian enslaved person is still under the “*Civil Dominion*” of his “Master.”⁷³ The intention of Ashley Cooper was to preserve religious liberty, even to those outside the various Christian sects. However, with a growing Barbadian influence and dependence on enslaved labor, the Church of England came to prominence and Christianity was used as justification for the needs of enslavers.

Carolina Economy

Profit was used as a primary motivator for colonization in Carolina. The original hopes for the colony’s economic activity were to sell goods to the West Indies, such as wine, whale oil, and livestock.⁷⁴ The colonists began to participate in subsistence farming, extracting tar and furs from the forest, and conducting commercial trade with the surrounding indigenous communities. Scholar Alexander S. Salley provides a comprehensive collection of narratives from early settlers of Carolina, some describing the abundance of resources available on the land. One letter from Thomas Ashe highlights the fruit trees and vines, the possibility of silk production, olive oil, lumber availability, and fertile land for traditional agriculture.⁷⁵ However, without a surplus in agricultural output, the colony would not survive nor financially thrive. Carolina

⁷³ *Fundamental Constitutions*, 21.

⁷⁴ Lesser, 14.

⁷⁵ Alexander S. Salley, *Narratives of Early Carolina: 1650-1708* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911): 143-144.

experienced a food shortage in the early 1670s, which was so devastating that colonists were rationed “five quarts of peas a week” and were barred from practicing any work that did not pertain to agriculture.⁷⁶ With a shortage in food for survival, Carolina’s economic development was stagnant. Sir Peter Colleton, the son of Proprietor John Colleton and the heir to a share in the Barbadian colony, posited that the colony would never be able to discover which staple crops are most profitable if they continue to struggle for subsistence.⁷⁷ In this message, Colleton might have insinuated that the colony needed to expand their use of enslaved labor if they were to become profitable in agriculture.

Carolinian colonists began to either raid indigenous communities for enslaved labor or create alliances and convince tribes to raid and enslave their neighbors for colonial plantations. While all the colonies in North America at the time used indigenous slavery, Carolina settlers enslaved more indigenous persons than their neighbors.⁷⁸ As if this were not enough free labor for the colony, white, English immigration from Barbados and the Bahamas introduced enslaved African labor in the 1690s. While Ashley Cooper and other Proprietors spoke out in opposition to the indigenous slave trade, the colonists continued to use enslaved labor and engage in the trade of enslaved persons.⁷⁹ As the practice of slavery continued and grew in Carolina, the colony began to engage in the Atlantic Triangle Trade system, from which its economy thrived thereafter.

⁷⁶ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 20.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁷⁸ These raids, either by persuasion of allies or settler action, resulted in either enslavement in service of the colony or export to the West Indies, *see Ibid.*, 25.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

In this system, raw materials produced in the Caribbean (mainly Barbados) and the southern colonies were exported to their northern neighbors as well as Great Britain for manufacturing. These manufactured goods were then exported to Africa in exchange for enslaved persons who were then sent to the American and Caribbean colonies. Charles Town was a hub for this exchange because of its lucrative geographic and political position.⁸⁰ Having natural seaport access, Charles Town did not need to seriously invest in any new infrastructure, making their position more viable and financially beneficial.⁸¹

Proprietary Instability

Toward the end of the proprietary period, large land acquisitions weakened the townships. Ashley Cooper and the Proprietors hoped for strong towns to engage in the established trade routes with England, but as their land grants grew in size, towns were no longer attractive for the colonists as a place for their estate. The colonists furthermore viewed the land as related to the enslaved persons, conceptually depicting the enslaved as one with nature. With a growing enslaved population, plantation owners adopted the belief that the land drained their own bodies, while the enslaved were “indispensable mediators with the natural world.”⁸² Moreover, the *Fundamental Constitutions* provided a guarantee to any future white settlers that they would not lose ownership nor authority

⁸⁰ Charles Town was the biggest settlement of the Carolina charter and was later changed to Charleston after the American Revolution, now the largest city in South Carolina *see* Wilson, 55.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁸² Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, *Cultures and Identities in Colonial British America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015): 22.

over the enslaved persons under them.⁸³ While there was little slavery in the early years of the colony, the increasing influence of the Barbadian settlers and plantation agriculture exponentially grew Carolina's dependence on enslaved labor.⁸⁴

A primary consensus among scholars is that heightened factionalism became the main issue in realizing proprietary goals for the colony.⁸⁵ Problems arose quickly with the arrival of the Barbadians who began to undermine the *Fundamental Constitutions* and the society that Ashley Cooper and the Proprietors outlined for the colony by increasing activity in the slave trade (both Africans and Native Americans), participating in the pirate trade (undermining colonial currency by inflation via silver), and creating religious intolerance by imposing the Church of England's doctrine once they were in power.⁸⁶ The Barbadians were inherently anti-proprietary.⁸⁷ It was increasingly possible for the strong faction of Barbadians to rise in rank and influence policies from the inside because the Proprietors did not intend a top down approach to government, but rather wanted strong county councils to handle local affairs.⁸⁸ The proprietary government's goals for political organization may have been too idealistic to compete with the realistic self-

⁸³ Ibid., 24; *Fundamental Constitutions*, sec. 109.

⁸⁴ Wilson, 2.

⁸⁵ James Haw, "Political Representation in South Carolina, 1669-1794: Evolution of a Lowcountry Tradition," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 103, no. 2 (2002): 107-108.

⁸⁶ Sirmans, *Colonial South Carolina*, 33.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 41.

⁸⁸ Haw, 107.

interest and preservation of the factional elite and the recurring “manipulation of representation for practical advantage.”⁸⁹

The reasons for the political instability of Ashley Cooper’s model were lack of control of local government, indigenous trade relations, and townships by way of land settlement.⁹⁰ A key initiative of Ashley Cooper was the settlement of townships rather than the colonists owning large amounts of land far apart from other colonists. This proved difficult to implement because of the lack of power and the large acreage allotted to each man—distance was unavoidable.⁹¹ The Lord Proprietors’ lack of control was a symptom of their intentional detachment from local politics and further allowed for the rise of the Barbadians.

The Carolina colony has an interesting history that is unique in comparison to its neighbors. With the help of Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, Carolina set out to be a beacon of religious and economic freedom. The *Fundamental Constitutions* outlined some of these goals, specifically focusing on class structure, economic ability, and religious tolerance. However, the colony and Proprietors soon experienced many challenges which were not aligned with their original goals. The rise of the Barbadians in politics inherently shifted the economic and religious experiences of the colonists and undermined the political power of the Proprietors. Their rise was only achievable because of the Proprietors emphasis on local control and a comparatively weaker provincial government. Understanding the intentions for Carolina followed by its

⁸⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 54-55.

⁹¹ Ibid., 57.

blossoming reality provides context when discussing John Locke's involvement in the colonial government.

CHAPTER 4

LOCKE THE PHILOSOPHER

There is debate among scholars whether Locke's philosophical writings of *Two Treatises of Government* and *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* are ideologies reserved for strict application in England or if it is able to be expanded to other geographical locations like North America, the Caribbean, and Africa. There are multiple analyses that look at location as a research question to answer for the surface inconsistencies of Lockean theory, giving attention to different philosophical concepts. This chapter will provide primary analysis of the concepts State of Nature, Just War, Property, and Empiricism and supplement the arguments with secondary literature. These four concepts are evaluated by focusing on the construction of slavery and reason.

Application of the State of Nature

The State of Nature theory rose to prominence during the Enlightenment period and drew a large following. Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke are the two major thinkers associated with asking what the state of nature is and how we might control it through the process of civilization. According to these philosophers, the state of nature is how man behaves before societal development. For Hobbes, the state of nature is more like a constant state of war—"nasty, brutish, and short"—and a government under a powerful sovereign is how the "natural condition of mankind" is able to be reined

in.⁹² However, for Locke, the state of nature is not as ‘brutish’ as Hobbes would like to believe.

Locke’s theoretical state of nature focuses on the rights of man found without societal restrictions: “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions...within the bounds of the law of nature; without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”⁹³ Locke rebuts the argument that a strong government is the best route in minimizing the faults of the state of nature. He states, “that *absolute monarchs* are but men, and if government is to be the remedy of those evils...I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature.”⁹⁴ To be sure, he does understand that a “civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature,” but these “inconveniences” do not reach the level of animosity and destruction that Hobbes argues appear in this state.⁹⁵ Locke’s approach to the state of nature is vastly different from his predecessors because he highlights the aspect of freedom found there (unlike Hobbes’ warlike conditions) and marks *equality of rights* as a vital element.

It is with reason, Locke claims, that people rise out of the state of war and into a “proper” state of nature. Those in the state of war “are not under the ties of the common

⁹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Ch. 13, 158. All citations of Locke’s *Second Treatise* and Hobbes are found in *Modern Political Thought: Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche*, ed. David Wootton, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008).

⁹³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, sec. 4.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, sec. 13.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

law of reason” and “have no other rule but that of force and violence.”⁹⁶ Within the state of nature, however, reason is equated with natural law, which he explicitly contends is foundational for the equality of man in this state. Reason “teaches all mankind...that being all equal and independent, no one out to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”⁹⁷ When an individual’s preservation is not threatened, it is their duty to “preserve the rest of mankind.”⁹⁸ In this passage, reason acts as the law of nature and is critical to understand Lockean thought. Locke believes reason is the ultimate distinction between the state of war and of nature: “men living together according to *reason*, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature.”⁹⁹ Those who do not possess reason, that is those who are outside of the law (and state) of nature and do not act to preserve their fellow man, are, by Locke’s logic, in a state of war.

The state of war is “a state of enmity and destruction” which can occur in the state of nature, but Locke argues it is not constant and not the “properly” ordered version of it.¹⁰⁰ This is one reason Locke argues men organize themselves into societies: to “avoid the state of war.” The avoidance occurs through a judicial process that allows men who have been wronged to appeal to an earthly authority, whereas in the state of nature and/or war, there is “no appeal but to heaven, and wherein every the least different is apt to

⁹⁶ Ibid., III, sec. 16.

⁹⁷ Ibid., II, sec. 6.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., III, sec. 19.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., III, sec. 19-20.

end.” Through a judicial process upheld by the government, the probability of a state of war decreases or dissipates and creates “relief.”¹⁰¹ The process of emerging from the state of nature into a civilized society, therefore, is through necessity.

Locke argues that the freedom from absolute power in a state of nature is the driving force and the proper alignment in the creation of a civil government. The protection of the “natural liberty of man” is vital and cannot be violated by any “legislative power, but that established, by consent, in the commonwealth” because it was a critical component of life in the state of nature.¹⁰² Locke’s definitional structure of freedom, then, is rooted in a civil society that is ruled by a standing set of laws which are applicable to all of society, including those in a position of power. His definition is wholly different from that of Robert Filmer, whom Locke directly refers to throughout his *Two Treatises* to refute his promotion of absolute patriarchal power within a monarchy and uses freedom in the most libertarian sense of the word: the freedom to not to be tied by any laws and to “live as he pleases.” Locke claims that all men are equal in nature, but it is those who transcend the state of nature in avoidance of the state of war who organize into political and civil societies.

Some scholars point to the theory of the state of nature to examine the extent of Locke’s intended geography for the application of slavery. Chapter IV, ‘Of Slavery,’ sequentially follows Locke’s chapters examining the state of nature and the state of war. In the opening sections of Chapter IV, Locke further explains his emphasis on liberty and

¹⁰¹ Ibid., III, sec. 21.

¹⁰² Ibid., IV, sec. 22.

freedom within a commonwealth, showing how important freedom under government really is, even when posing a theory on slavery. In trying to correct for Locke's contradictory actions in America and elsewhere, some scholars use the state of nature theory to analyze how Lockean thought might align with Locke the citizen.

Jennifer Welchman provides scholarship on the question of the state of nature's application to outside of Europe. She argues that Locke's writings on the state of nature could be read as a justification for chattel slavery because sub-Saharan Africa was in a state of nature, and therefore does not live within a civil society. Chattel slavery is a separate concept than that of 'freehold slavery' which comes from 'freehold property.' Freehold slavery does not give the enslaver complete ownership over the man nor his descendants, but chattel slavery (like chattel property) does, thus creating the problem of hereditary and generational enslavement.¹⁰³ By not adhering to some semblance of a social contract, Welchman argues that Locke would see the enslavement of Africans as legitimate: "sub-Saharan Africa was, by Locke's standards, a State of Nature."¹⁰⁴ For evidence, Welchman quotes *Two Treatises* for Locke's distinction between the state of nature and a political society: "Those who are united into one Body, and have a common established Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies

¹⁰³ Freehold slavery provided more legal rights for the enslaved—the enslaver was only entitled to the use of the enslaved's labor, not complete ownership. Chattel property includes possessions that can be listed in a will for generational ownership. Chattel slavery created the practice of including enslaved persons in probate proceedings, thus creating hereditary slavery for both enslavers and enslaved *see* M. Eugene Sirmans, "The Legal Status of the Slave in South Carolina, 1670-1740," *The Journal of Southern History*, 28, no. 4 (1962): 465.

¹⁰⁴ Jennifer Welchman, "Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 25, no. 1 (1995): 81.

between them, and punish Offenders, *are in a Civil Society* one with another: but those who have no such common Appeal, I mean on Earth, are still in the state of Nature...”¹⁰⁵ Welchman uses this quote to show how the practice of African enslavement is validated. Because regions of Africa are not organized into societies and engage in inter-tribal war (not *directly created* by European colonialism but definitely increased by it), Welchman states that “each tribe violated their duty to act for their own and others’ preservation and thus forfeited their natural rights.”¹⁰⁶

Welchman makes the claim that “in Locke’s state of nature, we are all slaves, all another being’s property,” but this is inaccurate. Locke’s state of nature does not suppose that “we are all slaves,” as Welchman declares. He states in Chapter IV that the perfect condition of slavery “is nothing else, but *the state of war continued, between a lawful conqueror and a captive.*”¹⁰⁷ Locke’s italics make known the importance of this distinction: while there can be a state of war *within* the state of nature, the two are not equal. Equating the two states allows for Welchman’s argument to hold, but when the distinction is made, the gaps are exposed. Locke’s state of nature is also one of equality, “wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal...without subordination or subjection.”¹⁰⁸ It is evident throughout Chapter II, ‘Of the State of Nature’, that no man has “absolute or arbitrary power” over another, even in retribution for transgressions

¹⁰⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, VII, sec. 87.

¹⁰⁶ Welchman, 79.

¹⁰⁷ Locke, *Second Treatise*, IV, sec. 24.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, II, sec. 4.

against mankind.¹⁰⁹ Throughout Chapter II, Locke makes no equation of the state of nature and the state of war—he makes quite the opposite.

In Chapter II of his *Two Treatises*, Locke writes on the subservience of those who violate the communal guidelines, as realized in natural law:

In the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another, but yet no absolute or arbitrary power to use a criminal...but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint... In transgressing the law of Nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity... and so he becomes dangerous to mankind.¹¹⁰

In this passage, Locke alludes to the potential dangers of living in the state of nature. In doing so, he states that men in accordance with natural law have the right to “restrain... destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on anyone who hath transgressed that law... and thereby deter him, and by his example, others from doing the like mischief.”¹¹¹ To be sure, standing alone, Locke’s language in this passage allows for broad interpretation of what might be considered a transgression in the state of nature and the extent of restraint those in power can employ. However, this is not a constant practice, as Welchman would like to believe, but is only applicable to the violation of laws and criminal activity within a community. The power one might have over another, does not equate with Welchman’s claim that “we are all slaves, all another being’s property,” specifically in Locke’s philosophy of the state of nature.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., II, sec. 8.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

In addition, Welchman makes the claim that “hereditary slavery is fundamental to Locke’s conception of rights.”¹¹² This is her conclusion for her second point of her argument concerning chattel slavery. For this discussion, she uses Locke’s forbiddance of the enslavement of the “*innocent* wife and child” to forward the idea that *in principle* the philosophy is consistent. Welchman provides some of the most comprehensive scholarship in trying to use Lockean thought to justify the enslavement of Africans, and further, chattel slavery, but her evidence is lacking, and her arguments are circumstantial. She tries to *imagine* what Locke would have meant in the practices of buying and selling African slaves, especially women and children: “Locke *might simply* have called for regulations on the purchase of female slaves. Provided they were properly obtained, there was no bar to holding women, even married women, as slaves.” For arguments like this, she relies on small sections of *Two Treatises*, and applies them anecdotally.

Furthermore, other scholars maintain that Locke’s theory on the state of nature is not applicable to African enslavement. Bernasconi and Mann are two scholars who directly challenge Welchman and do not accept her analysis. They argue that Welchman is forgoing the historical context of Locke and how Africa was viewed at the time. Welchman “converted the Lockean state of nature into the Hobbesian state of war.”¹¹³ They concede that Locke “threatens to pass into a state of war” at times, but when analyzed within the historical context, Welchman’s fundamental argument fall apart.

¹¹² Welchman, 79.

¹¹³ Robert Bernasconi and Mann, Anika Maaza, “The Contradictions of Racism: Locke, Slavery, and the Two Treatises,” found in *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Valls (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005): 97.

For Bernasconi and Mann, it is critical to note the distinction between Locke's definition of the state of nature as a "state of perfect freedom" and Thomas Hobbes' theory on the state of nature as warlike, which has been thoroughly examined here.¹¹⁴

Locke's theory on the state of nature and the state of war are two distinct concepts and cannot be equated, especially when discussing the idea of slavery as an extension of the state of war. By thoroughly analyzing Welchman's claim, it is evident that Lockean slavery is consistent with his state of nature because slavery can only exist in a state of war. The practice of chattel slavery is inconsistent with Locke's definition of the state of nature and a civil society and therefore cannot be applied to slavery outside of the context of an absolute power, by which Locke is referring to English absolutism and monarchical conquest.

Application of the Just War Theory

Locke presents a glaring contradiction on slavery in *Two Treatises*. He opens the *First Treatise* by criticizing Filmer's absolutism, claiming, "slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that tis hardly to be conceived that an Englishman much less a Gentleman, should plead for it."¹¹⁵ In contrast to this, Chapter IV of *Two Treatises* continues Locke's distinction between the state of war and the state of nature by including an explanation of valid slavery practices. As noted, Locke believes there is no place for slavery in the state of nature and is only applicable as an extension of the state of war between a just victor

¹¹⁴ Locke, *Second Treatise*, II, sec. 4; Bernasconi and Mann, 97.

¹¹⁵ Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, sec. 1.

and an unjust aggressor. Because of his extensive writings on the two states and the relationship between slavery and the state of war, the chapter on slavery consists of four small sections, not paying much attention to the subject. However, much attention has been given to this subject by scholars who look to Locke's explanation of slavery when evaluating his economic entanglements abroad.

Locke focuses a large portion of the chapter on the fundamental rights of individuals and the importance of the "freedom from absolute, arbitrary power."¹¹⁶ The freedom of nature is "to be under no other restraint but the law of nature," or reason.¹¹⁷ Therefore, it is by reason that man does not live under restraint of absolute political powers and lives together in societies governed by common laws. In a society with a legal structure, consented to by the election of a representative legislative power, man has the liberty to live freely as long as his actions do not violate the common laws. In saying this, however, Locke extends the restrictions on liberty to include suicide and consensual enslavement: "for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself...nor put himself under the absolute power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases."¹¹⁸ Here Locke provides the background to his just war theory of slavery. If an individual, nor anyone else, has the power to take their life in the state of nature and in the commonwealth, slavery cannot exist. However, if one is to

¹¹⁶ Ibid., *Second Treatise*, IV, sec. 23.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., IV, sec. 22.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., IV, sec. 23.

perform “some act that deserves death,” then they are therefore unjust aggressors, acting outside of reason and the common law.

For Locke, slavery is the extension of the state of war.¹¹⁹ When an atrocious act takes place, by their own fault, the perpetrator “forfeited his own life.”¹²⁰ Therefore, those who have been wronged assume the role of the conqueror with absolute power. For retribution of the transgression, the conqueror has the ability to take the perpetrator’s life or has the choice to “delay to take it, and make use of him to his own service, and he does him no injury by it.”¹²¹ This is the creation of slavery and is only justified in the occurrence of a just war. Locke also refers to slavery in Chapter II, ‘Of the State of War,’ arguing that an individual with absolute power over another “compel(s) me by force to that which is against my freedom, i.e., make me a slave.”¹²² In this definition of slavery, Locke argues that because every right is forfeited by the perpetrator to the conqueror with absolute power, the only action available for the resistance of slavery is to “draw on himself the death he desires.”¹²³

Chapter IV alone does not provide context for what these actions that “deserve death” might be nor what a just war entails. An analysis of Chapter XVI ‘Of Conquest’ as it relates to Locke’s justification for slavery is a necessary component in

¹¹⁹ Ibid., IV, sec. 24.

¹²⁰ Ibid., IV, sec. 23.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid., III, sec. 17.

¹²³ Ibid., IV, sec. 23.

examining the concept of just war. Here, Locke thoroughly outlines the guidelines for just and unjust war which relate to his arguments on slavery in Chapter IV. Locke explains how unjust war and just war intertwine. If one experiences injustice from another party, that individual may wage a just war against them. Therefore, the two are inextricably linked and there is always a victor who is justly fighting.

Locke begins this chapter by outright claiming that any government which seeks to erect their power without the consent of those it overpowered is invalid. An aggressor who wages an unjust war against another, never has any rights over the conquered because of its unlawful nature. Locke mentions that these aggressors may come in the form of “the wearer of a crown, or some petty villain.”¹²⁴ This may speak to his anti-authoritarianism views—evidence for its relation to England. In this section, he continues that the only reprieve one has from this injustice is an appeal to the courts, and if that fails, to his or her god. Other than a portrait of a robbery, Locke does not provide any concrete, ‘warlike’ examples to contextualize his analysis of an unjust war. However, Holly Brewer provides context for Locke’s view of conquest. She argues this was in relation to the Stuart Crown and James II’s unwavering belief in their claim and power over all of England. Locke believed the right of hereditary dominion was “a myth” and “it made a nation into slaves,” supporting the argument that Locke’s philosophy was strictly intended for an English audience.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, XVI, sec. 176.

¹²⁵ Brewer, 1055.

Locke devotes most of Chapter XVI to explaining the powers prescribed to the lawful conquerors in a just war. Like his section on unjust war, Locke does not provide any specific reasons or explanations of what constitutes a just war between countries, only that it contrasts injustice. The chapter is primarily focused on the powers bestowed upon the victors. While he hopes for a peaceful transition of the conquered into society, he acknowledges this may not be a constant practice. When there is not a unified incorporation of both parties, “which seldom happens,” the conquerors have an “absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them.” He thinks this is “despotal,” but continues to describe the rights of each group if it is to occur.¹²⁶

Locke argues that the conquered persons who practiced injustice are subject to submission by the conquerors. However, this only extends to those who were directly involved in the war effort and “have concurred in that force; all the rest are innocent.”¹²⁷ Those who are deemed innocent by Lockean standards are not subject to the conqueror in any way. Locke goes so far as to say that even “if their former government be dissolved, they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves.”¹²⁸ Moreover, the only power the conquerors possess over the conquered is their lives and does not extend to their possessions.¹²⁹ This absolute power of a conqueror over the conquered lives is consistent with his discussion on slavery in Chapter IV.

¹²⁶ Locke, *Second Treatise*, XVI, sec. 178.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, XVI, sec. 179.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, XVI, sec. 185.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, XVI, sec. 180.

In addition to possessions, the conqueror also does not have claim to the children of the conquered. Because “the miscarriages of the father are no fault of the children,” the only life forfeited is that of the conquered.¹³⁰ In addition, the possessions of such a person are to be relinquished to his wife and children and cannot be claimed by the conqueror of a just war, for that “would be robbery.” However, if there is to be some kind of reparation owed to the conqueror by the conquered, this may be taken out of his estate. But because of the shared interest among his family, Locke believes that if there “be not enough fully to satisfy” both parties, the estate and possessions are to be maintained by “those who are in danger to perish without it,” namely, the wife and children.¹³¹ In this discussion on reparations, Locke refers to the kinds of possessions that hold inherent value, money being one that does not retain value across cultures. He uses America as an example: the “wampompeke” (currency) of the Americas has no intrinsic value to European royalty, while silver is worthless for the Americans.

Locke continues his anti-authoritarian rhetoric when further describing the right of man against any government power to which he did not consent. While the government may force nonconsensual individuals “to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint,” they have a right to “free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny which the sword hath brought in upon them” until the ruling party provide a government to which they feel ready to consent.¹³² Locke further states that if they are to be under

¹³⁰ Ibid., XVI, sec. 182.

¹³¹ Ibid., XVI, sec. 183.

¹³² Ibid., XVI, sec. 192.

such government, they “are not in the state of freemen, but are direct slaves under the force of war.”¹³³ This reference to slavery is interesting in this context because Locke’s previous description of slavery only relates to those who relinquish their right to life by way of unjust war, excluding those who are living under a despotic government and did not participate in such injustices. It seems the nature of slavery in this section is closely tied with Locke’s views on the English monarchy. However, if this section were to be applied elsewhere, it may relate to other forms of slavery, like in the American context. Using this passage, if African persons are forcefully taken to live under a nonconsensual governing body, as well as not allowed to freely participate in society, they may be categorized as slaves. However, even with this argument, Locke’s staunch advocacy for the suppressed does not lend itself to any justification *for* slavery—it is consistently *against*.

Historians maintain either Locke’s philosophy justified American slavery and poses no contradiction, or that Locke’s theories are not supportive of the practice of slavery in America, and he is simply “indifferent” when he is held to the same principles.¹³⁴ Political theorist James Farr argues that slavery was considered powerful rhetoric within English society as it was linguistically linked to the crown. The term ‘slavery’ had connotations of monarchical “absolute power” which, Farr claims, is why Locke’s philosophy of slavery is “primarily, if not exclusively” restricted to England. Taking this into account, Farr argues that “Locke, whatever else, was making a case

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ James Farr, “Locke, Natural Law, and New World Slavery,” *Political Theory* 36, no. 4 (2008): 516.

against slavery on *his* island, not *for* slavery in the new world.”¹³⁵ Brewer echoes this claim but makes a stronger case for Locke’s anti-slavery rhetoric. Absolutism grew under Charles II and James II, both of whom Locke consistently advocated against.¹³⁶ This strengthens the argument that Locke was primarily focused on philosophically limiting the concept of slavery for his fellow Englishmen against the throne.

Even though there is some historical context found in *Two Treatises* and provided by secondary literature, Locke fails to specify the country or race he may be referring to when discussing slavery. Farr states this is not accidental. He continues to claim that the context in which Locke writes on slavery is geographically restricted to England but notes that Locke’s failure to distinctly mention Native Americans or Africans in these chapters may be due to his economic associations abroad.¹³⁷ Locke may have intentionally disregarded these marginalized groups in his chapter on slavery because of his strong financial and political entanglements in the New World colonies and lines of international trade.

While some scholars propose the argument that Locke’s philosophy on slavery was inconsistent with his idea of natural rights, Farr believes the just war theory of slavery in Chapter IV of the Second Treatise *is consistent*. He again points to the locality of the chapter and the context in which it was written, that is, as a response to Filmer’s *Patriarcha* (1680). Also, with the historical context in England at the time, Locke’s

¹³⁵ Farr, “Locke, Natural Law,” 507.

¹³⁶ Brewer, 1073-1074.

¹³⁷ Farr, “Locke, Natural Law,” 506.

conversation on slavery and absolute power concerns itself with absolutism and divine rights of the monarchy.¹³⁸ Farr seeks to show how the application of Locke's just war theory of slavery to African enslavement is "woefully inadequate."¹³⁹

The restricted geographical application of Lockean slavery posed by Farr is built upon the philosophy that is put forward in *Two Treatises* with some historical context. African slavery in America is an institutional practice where it is hereditary and based on racial prejudice. On this definition, this type of slavery is unquestionably invalid under Locke's just war theory and conquest—offspring of the conquered cannot be claimed by the conqueror, it is only those who "assisted" in the conflict.¹⁴⁰ For these reasons, Farr argued America and Africa were "out of sight and out of mind" in Locke's drafting of his philosophy on slavery.

However, other scholars believe that to make such a claim based solely on Chapter IV and with minimal historical context, or other mentions outside of this chapter, is naïve and does not grasp the full range of Lockean thought. Bernasconi and Mann speak against Farr's literal interpretation of Chapter IV, stating "that those commentators...have to consider what the implications would have been had the chapter's principles been literally applied in Locke's day."¹⁴¹ To forward this argument, the authors claim that an application of Lockean just war theory would have "allowed for

¹³⁸ Brewer, 1053-1054.

¹³⁹ James Farr, "'So Vile and Miserable an Estate': The Problem of Slavery in Locke's Political Thought," *Political Theory* 14, no. 2 (1986): 264.

¹⁴⁰ Farr, "'So Vile,'" 273.

¹⁴¹ Bernasconi and Mann, 96.

the reintroduction of slavery in Christian Europe” as it is outlined in Chapter IV.¹⁴² However, they do not provide the historical context to make such an assertion. They mention the war state of Europe during the 17th century (leaving the reader to assume reference to the Glorious Revolution in 1688—*Two Treatises* published in 1689—and the subsequent Nine Years’ War ending in 1697), but do not provide any further contextualization for this claim.

Bernasconi and Mann further argue for the application of Lockean theory to chattel slavery in America by using circumstantial arguments. They put forward the claim that Locke’s contemporaries justified the global enslavement of Africans through the slave trade by referencing Locke’s just war theory. They cite the Massachusetts “Body of Liberties” slavery document that used the just war theory to support their slavery practices.¹⁴³ Again, the authors dedicate a short amount of analysis to this point and conclude based on this evidence that the just war theory was “widely used” in the 17th century as justification for hereditary slavery in America and the Caribbean.¹⁴⁴ However, the evidence put forward by Bernasconi and Mann does not outweigh Farr’s philosophical argument. Locke’s just war theory in slavery practices may have historical implications, but, as Farr put forward, it is difficult to view Chapter IV alone as justification for slavery outside of Europe.

From this analysis it is shown that Chapter IV of *Second Treatise*, with context from Chapter XVI, is philosophically consistent with a limited geographical application.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 99.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 100.

Locke's specificity in his just war theory limits the type of slavery that is justifiable. In addition to the limitations posed in the just war theory, Locke's explicit philosophy on conquest cannot be applied to the type of slavery that is evident in the American practice of African enslavement. Locke's philosophical depiction of slavery is difficult to expand outside of English absolute, monarchical power. It is mostly confined to an English and European application because of the hereditary nature of African enslavement in the American colonies.

Application of Property

Perhaps the strongest argument for Locke's application of theory to America is found in analyzing Chapter V of *Two Treatises*, 'Of Property.' Locke refers to America in seven of the eight chapters in his *Second Treatise* but makes consistent references in his discussion on property. In this chapter, he speaks of America seven times, widely referring to it as a "waste" or "vacant" land. Because of his continual and explicit allusion to America, critical analysis is not as necessary in this section.

Locke's references to America as a "waste" or "vacant place" is present in his discussion on the commons. The commons is the notion that God provided the earth and "all inferior creatures" to be enjoyed by all men. Locke uses America as an example of the commons, assumedly because at the time, England's commons were already possessed and therefore could not act as an illustration of the concept. He poses the question, asking whether a thousand fertile acres in the "wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature without any improvement, tillage or husbandry" would yield the "conveniences of life" for the "needy and wretched inhabitants" of America as

ten acres would in England.¹⁴⁵ Aside from the overtly prejudiced commentary, Locke's use of America in this passage is to explain the idea of the commons and how useful it can be when cultivated for the sustainment of society: "there are still great tracts of ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste, and are more than the people who dell on it do, or can make use of, and so still lie in common."¹⁴⁶ The use of America in this section may have been used to justify colonial settlement in the region during the 17th century and beyond.¹⁴⁷

Locke argues that private property can only be obtained from the commons through individual labor. Labor, for Locke, is intrinsically tied to the laborer and is inseparable from the property on which he labored. When an individual takes a piece of the commons for his own husbandry and consumption, it then becomes his property because of the labor that he put into its cultivation.¹⁴⁸ It is through the process of labor that land in the commons becomes property. For Locke, labor is what makes land valuable.¹⁴⁹ Though, if the land goes uncultivated, even if already possessed by an individual, the unused land is able to be repossessed by another: "if either the grass of his

¹⁴⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, V, sec. 37.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, V, sec. 45.

¹⁴⁷ Viewing the majority of American land as vacant and lying in waste can be seen as a justification for settlement, not only in the colonial period, but in the 19th century with westward expansion and Manifest Destiny.

¹⁴⁸ Locke, *Second Treatise*, V, sec. 27.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, V, sec. 43.

enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished...this part of the earth...was still to be looked on as waste.”¹⁵⁰ Locke demonstrates this proposition by referencing the “several nations of the Americans” who are “rich in land” but do not employ the land as effectively as the English.¹⁵¹ He says that nature has liberally provided the Americans with “materials of plenty,” but they “have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy” for “want of improving [the land] by labour.”¹⁵² Locke’s portrayal of indigenous land overtly disregards indigenous experiences and norms. In doing so, Locke’s characterization of America allows for Europeans and colonialists to justify their settlement across the Atlantic. American land offered settlers a lucrative alternative: there are “materials of plenty” in land that is being wasted whereas there is very little available land in England. With personal economic growth as a primary factor of American settlement, Locke’s emphasis on property likely contributed to this process by generously framing of American soil and characterizing the indigenous communities there as inadequate.

Some historians and political theorists look to Locke’s discussion of property to broaden the scope of his philosophical application. David Armitage maintains that Locke’s other mentions of America, specifically as it relates to Chapter V, extend the application of Lockean thought. If there were not these mentions, Armitage argues, “Locke’s colonial activities would nonetheless be irrelevant to the interpretation of his

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., V, sec. 38.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., V, sec. 41.

¹⁵² Ibid.

political theory.”¹⁵³ Barbara Arneil, a political theorist, agrees with Armitage’s proposition. She looks to the discussion happening among the British about colonization of America in the 1600s and the value of land as an imperial investment. It is because of this discussion, Arneil argues, that Locke’s arguments on property formed a justification for English colonization because “each colonist has a natural right within himself, through his labour to appropriate land.”¹⁵⁴ While Locke does not exclude the Indigenous Americans from taking part in the commons, it ultimately depends upon who creates an agrarian lifestyle first. However, Arneil argues that this is still Eurocentric: “the difficulty is that in meeting all the requirements of Locke’s property owner, the Amerindian must in all significant ways become European.”¹⁵⁵ Therein lies the problem: the indigenous person can either “relinquish himself” and subscribe to a European agrarian lifestyle or give up their right to the land and remain in the state of nature.

With consistent reference to American land in Chapter V, it is easy to conclude that Locke’s vision for the primary mode of property acquisition (agricultural cultivation) was outside of the English scope. Relying on labor as the ultimate claim to a piece of land disenfranchises indigenous people and disregards their way of life. The idea of America as a place of commons was used as justification for the colonization of the land by the English, as Arneil outlines. With the explicit reference to America in Chapter V and the historical context from Armitage and Arneil, Locke’s ideology on property is not

¹⁵³ David Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina, and the “Two Treatises of Government,”” *Political Theory* 32, no. 5 (2004): 603.

¹⁵⁴ Barbara Arneil, “The Wild Indian’s Venison: Locke’s Theory of Property and English Colonialism in America,” *Political Studies* 44, no. 1 (1996): 74.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

geographically restricted to Europe; however, it is unambiguously related to English colonialism in America and is primarily confined to a European application and practice.

Application of Empiricism

John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* engages the philosophical trend of innate principles, that humans are born with the ability to reason because of these innate ideas, and all knowledge is founded on them. Some well-known thinkers who follow this line of thought are the prominent ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, and French philosopher, Rene Descartes. However, Locke does not agree with these men, proposing that all people are born as a *tabula rasa*, or "blank slate." He argues that all thought comes from external impressions, namely, one's experiences. From one's simple ideas, derived from the senses, Locke explains that humans then have the ability to form complex ideas through their own reflection and perception. Through individual reflection and perception, Locke's position falls into a kind of subjectivism—one can only positively know what is in his or her own consciousness. In *Essay*, Locke provides different examples to show this subjectivism, highlighting America and the people who lived there as evident of this phenomenon.

Locke mentions Indigenous Americans in three separate sections in *Essay*: 'Of Idea and Space,' 'Idea of Duration and its Simple Modes,' and 'Idea of Number.' In Chapter XIII, 'Of Idea and Space,' Locke provides a definition for *substance*, which, to him, is a collection of simple ideas into a complex one. *Substance* is derived from individual or cultural experience, and "are signs of and stand for determined ideas."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, XIII, sec. 18.

He uses the example of a stranger who is attempting to explain architecture to “an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things.” Using words like pillar and basis to describe the building process, the American may “think himself mocked instead of taught” because of the difference in descriptions of *substance*. However, if the stranger were to use words such as “sticking on and under-propping,” the American would have a “great clearness” in understanding the substance of a thing.¹⁵⁷ The nature of these substances cannot be communicated without a description the individual mind or cultural experience associated with it.

In Chapter XIV, ‘Idea of Duration and its Simple Modes,’ Locke provides his understanding of *duration*: how an individual or community perceives the passage of time. *Duration* consists of different modes of various lengths, recognized in English as hours, days, years, time, and eternity.¹⁵⁸ This is not derived from the “permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession.”¹⁵⁹ Ideas are consecutive and the reflection of that string of ideas Locke calls *succession*. *Duration* is the distance between “any parts of that succession,” and this conception is how an individual acknowledges existence.¹⁶⁰ Being English and knowing his English audience,

¹⁵⁷ Locke, *Essay*, XIII, sec. 20.

¹⁵⁸ Modes are defined as complex ideas that refer to nonexistent concepts which are constantly dependent on the existence of a substance. Some examples of modes are mathematics, morality, language, politics, and culture, see William Uzgalis, “John Locke,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, May 1, 2018, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/>, sec. 2.2.

¹⁵⁹ Locke, *Essay*, XIV, sec. 1.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, XIV, sec. 3; This is in line with Rene Descartes famous line, *cogito ergo sum*, or *I think therefore I am*, see Rene Descartes and John Cottingham, *Meditations on First*

Locke claims the most proper measure of time for humans is the “revolution of the sun” as it is “universally observable by all mankind and equal to one another.”¹⁶¹ However, Locke again highlights the cultural differences of these concepts. In the following section, Locke alludes to Indigenous Americans who “counted their years by the coming of certain birds...at their certain seasons, and leaving them at others.”¹⁶² In this section, Locke attempts to explain to his audience that there are various modes that “serve men to reckon their years by”—these he calls *periodical appearances*. He continues this argument by recognizing the different seasonal turns in geography.¹⁶³ Locke believes those who do not have a “sensible” or “obvious” mark to distinguish years by should not be held to the same temporal standard as the English because of their different modes of substance.

Locke’s Chapter XVI on ‘Idea of Number’ defines the concept of *number* as the most simple and universal idea, relating to almost everything touched, perceived, or imagined by humankind. There are various modes of *number*, such as addition or weight, and each is distinct from the other. Locke argues that not only are numbers important themselves, but the naming of numbers is critical to “distinguish that precise

Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies: a Latin-English Edition (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

¹⁶¹ Locke, *Essay*, XIV, sec. 19.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, XIV, sec. 20.

¹⁶³ Here, Locke references an unknown “late indigenous author” who supposes the sun dispersed its light equally among parts of the earth, but with variations in the tropics, *see Ibid.*, XIV, sec. 20.

collection.”¹⁶⁴ It is in the naming of numbers that avoids confusion—it is, Locke maintains, a necessity within language. Section 6 (‘Another reason for the necessity of names to numbers’) introduces Indigenous Americans with whom Locke interacted who were not able to count to a higher number like 1,000 because their language did not allow for it. Locke thinks this is because their language is “scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessities of a needy, simple life, unacquainted either with trade or mathematics.”¹⁶⁵ In Locke’s interactions with indigenous communities, like the Tououpinambos, individuals would point to their hair to metaphorically express a high number in lieu of a name. Moreover, they would use their fingers and others’ fingers to show numerical expression. Locke provides these examples to stress the necessity of definite names for numbers, while also acknowledging that there are modes (like those found in geometry) which still required contemplation from his English contemporaries. Locke’s presentation of the indigenous way of mathematics is specifically for English consumption. Locke misrepresented indigenous communities by not concretely engaging with them about their language or expression of numbers, substances, and time.

Essay Concerning Human Understanding attempts to provide an explanation of the sources and nature of knowledge. Because there is no evidence of innate ideas, such as family, religion, or identity, Locke argues individuals come to know these concepts through experience, namely, sensation and reflection.¹⁶⁶ Sensation allows one to develop

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., XVI, sec. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., XVI, sec. 6.

¹⁶⁶ Locke’s rejection of innatism in *Essay* is in line with his anti-authoritarianism views, as previously acknowledged in *Two Treatises*.

simple ideas, which are passive in nature, but when combined with reflection, these ideas gain complexity because the mind is active. Throughout *Essay*, Locke maintains that these concepts are universal, albeit realized in different ways. By alluding to various cultures and parts of the world, Locke highlights Indigenous American experiences and modes, but characterizes them as inferior. An analysis of Locke's philosophy on empiricism indicates that it was intended for Europeans to understand their own intellect in juxtaposition with the modes, ideas, and substances of non-Europeans. By juxtaposing these two groups, Locke highlights the heightened knowledge and experiences of the European.

John Locke's greatest work *Two Treatises* receives vast attention for its theories on the state of nature, slavery, and property rights. The emergence of Lockean thought provided a new foundation of liberty and freedom for the creation of governments. However, since the death of Locke, scholars have looked to connect his philosophical writings with his economic and personal involvements in Europe and abroad in America and Africa. As shown in this chapter, Locke's philosophy is internally consistent. Chapters continually complement one another and provide negligible opportunities for misinterpretation—diligent readers of his ideological publications would find it challenging to prove otherwise.

Still, evidence suggests that Locke's *Two Treatises* is difficult to apply outside of its written intent. Some scholars try to circumvent the state of nature, state of war, slavery, and conquest; in doing so, however, they experience pitfalls such as falsely equating the states of nature and war. Concerning property theory, it is evident that Locke uses America as an example for his idea of the commons, which scholars have

argued justified colonial practices and the proprietorial rights of Englishmen across the Atlantic. However, these concepts were still confined to English application. Moreover, through evidence found in *Essay*, Locke attempted to broaden the English understanding of other cultures through an analysis of substance, duration, and numerical expression.¹⁶⁷ Still, Locke's philosophical publications excluded non-European societies from complete participation by disregarding their experiences, cultures, and values. Based on the evidence provided in this chapter from *Two Treatises* and *Essay*, Locke most likely intended his philosophical practices for a European application, while promoting a Western understanding of non-European communities.

¹⁶⁷ These concepts will be further analyzed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

CHAPTER 5

LOCKE THE COLONIALIST

To understand the ambiguities of Locke's philosophy, it is important to analyze his political and financial life. As previously established, one of Locke's primary colleagues was Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper. Locke learned about the colonies from his mentor, Ashley Cooper, who graciously assumed the role. One of Locke's critical roles was the oversight of Ashley Cooper's "colonial matters."¹⁶⁸ Ashley Cooper provided Locke with the necessary connections to invest in companies related to the colonies, such as the Lord Proprietors of Carolina and the Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations. In 1668, Locke was appointed as secretary to the Lord Proprietors. In this role, he helped draft and revise multiple versions of the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* until the 1690s when the *Constitutions* was abandoned due to the rise in Barbadian leadership.

As secretary to the Lord Proprietors, Locke drafted the *Fundamental Constitutions* of 1669 with the help of Ashley Cooper and, to a lesser extent, other Proprietors. This chapter attempts to analyze Locke's personal and political life during and after the drafting of the *Constitutions*. Locke's philosophical writings were published in 1689, 20 years after the drafting of founding Carolinian documents. This chapter situates the publication *Two Treatises* within historical context to identify Locke's motivations and influences in its publication. Some scholars relate its publication to contemporary events in England, while others apply colonial activities. After gaining contemporary context, the *Constitutions* is evaluated thoroughly to

¹⁶⁸ James Farr, "'So Vile,'" 266.

highlight its effect on Carolinian society. While the *Constitutions* provides evidence concerning Locke's role in crafting slavery practices, there is debate as to what role Locke played in perpetuating slavery in the American colonies. Locke's correspondence with Barbadian colleagues and actions in the Board of Trade are analyzed to highlight the development of Locke as an English colonialist throughout the late 17th century.

Historical Timeline

In understanding Locke's geographical application of *Two Treatises*, the time lapse between the first draft of the *Constitutions* in 1669 and the publication of *Two Treatises* 20 years later must be addressed. The initial publication date of Locke's *Two Treatises of Civil Government* was 1689, with 1690 appearing on the title page of the original publication in circulation. With its broad theme of liberty and the refutation of the divine right of kings, scholars have contextualized Locke's writings with the overthrow of King James II and the crowning of Queen Mary and her husband King William of Orange in 1688. The Glorious, or "Bloodless," Revolution as historical context for *Two Treatises* is sound on its face, but with deeper analysis of the drafting and publication process, the revolutionary context is not as likely.

Since its publication, the Glorious Revolution in England was widely used as historical context for the drafting of Locke's *Two Treatises* by scholars until Peter Laslett, an English historian of the 20th century, debunks this interpretation by correlating the work with the Exclusion Crisis in 1679.¹⁶⁹ The Exclusion Crisis was a political event from 1679 to 1681 where King Charles II attempted to prevent Catholic family members

¹⁶⁹ Peter Laslett, "The English Revolution and Locke's 'Two Treatises of Government,'" *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 12, no. 1 (1956): 42.

from ascending to the throne on religious grounds. Laslett believes this event would be consistent with Locke's chapter on the dissolution of Parliament.¹⁷⁰ While the preface and titles are allusions to the revolutionary era of seventeenth century England, the content of *Two Treatises* provides more references and insinuations to the late 1670s and early 1680s.

Even with this argument that the preface was written separately, other sections of the work make similar references to those in the preface. Locke's references to Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* appear throughout the entirety of the monograph. *Patriarcha* was formally published in 1691, but it was initially released to Oxford in 1681. Additionally, drafts of Filmer's work were available as early as 1679 and there are similarities of language between Locke's reference to Filmer and the early drafts of his work. In section 22 of Chapter IV, 'Of Slavery,' Locke debunks Filmer's claims about freedom that he outlines in *Observations on Aristotle*: "Freedom then is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us, O, A. 55."¹⁷¹ Locke is referring to the statement Filmer makes on freedom:

Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Filmer tells us: "A liberty for everyone to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws"; but freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ See John Locke, *Second Treatise*, XIX, sec. 211-243.

¹⁷¹ Locke, *Second Treatise*, IV, sec. 22.

¹⁷² Ibid.

Filmer's 1680 and later publications of *OA* and *Patriarcha* do not have the language of "a liberty for everyone to do what he lists" on any page numbered 55, but the 1679 edition of *OA* includes this phrasing on page 55.¹⁷³

Laslett provides further evidence for these claims through historical context like access to documents used to compose the *Two Treatises*—borrowing books in 1681 that are consistently referenced in the text like Robert Knox's *Ceylon* and Richard Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*.¹⁷⁴ Multiple references from Hooker are included in the composition of *Two Treatises*, primarily found in the second. Specific references to Knox are made in section 92 of *Second Treatise* when speaking on political society:

He that would have been so insolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it. For what the *protection of absolute monarchy* is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be, and to what a degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government is grown to perfection; he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily see.¹⁷⁵

Here, Knox's source is used as an example to further Locke's argument against the political structure of absolute monarchy because of his use of Ceylon's authoritarianism as an example of absolutism.

Knox was a sailor and acted as an anthropologist in his book. His work, *An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon*, looked to explain the culture, topography, and

¹⁷³ Laslett, 51.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁷⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, VII, sec. 92.

economics of what is now Sri Lanka. Knox was taken prisoner for nineteen years there and wrote about his experience under an absolute monarchy outside of Europe.¹⁷⁶

References to the famous 1681 text loosely supports the argument that *Two Treatises* was published before the Glorious Revolution, but Laslett further claims Locke lost his copy of Knox's *Ceylon* in 1683.¹⁷⁷ Assuming he did not acquire nor possess an additional copy of *Ceylon*, the likelihood of Locke's drafting of *Two Treatises* in the early 1680s strengthens.

By analyzing the historical context of the drafting of *Two Treatises*, it is easier to understand the intended location for Locke's theories. Using the arguments posed by Laslett that the document was drafted in the early 1680s and refers to editions of books from the 1670s, Locke's intended geographical application for the body of the work is restricted to England. However, with the use of Knox's work that is outside of Europe, it broadens the probability of Lockean thought being applicable elsewhere.

David Armitage expands on Peter Laslett's argument that the body of *Two Treatises* was written in the early 1680s rather than later. However, he uses this in relation to American history at the time as opposed to English. Armitage argues that if *Two Treatises* were to be drafted as early as 1680, Locke's discussion on property would directly relate to the revisions of *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* in 1682 because of Ashley Cooper's public concern for Carolina after his release from the Tower

¹⁷⁶ Robert Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island Ceylon* (London: Royal Society, 1681) Accessed through Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14346/14346-h/14346-h.htm>

¹⁷⁷ Laslett, 49.

of London prison in 1681 and Locke's continual relationship with Ashley Cooper. Armitage additionally makes the claim that the agricultural products Locke refers to in Chapter V of *Two Treatises* are native to the Americas and not England: barley, wheat, tobacco, and sugar.¹⁷⁸ Using these arguments of the date of drafting and the references to America, like colonial crops, Armitage believes Chapter V poses the most direct relation of Locke to the Americas.

Moreover, Brad Hinshelwood claims this time lapse between publications does not diminish the argument that evidence from *Second Treatise* can apply to *Constitutions* because of Locke's continued correspondence about Carolina after he left his secretary post and moved to France in 1675.¹⁷⁹ Concerning slavery, Hinshelwood argues Locke had Indigenous Americans in mind when drafting the *Constitutions* and providing mastery of land-holding colonists over the enslaved; however, the practice of African enslavement in the American colonies is still not applicable under Locke's just war theory in Chapter IV and XVI of *Second Treatise*, due to its hereditary nature.¹⁸⁰

The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina

The initial 1669 draft of the *Fundamental Constitutions* begins by acknowledging the sovereignty of the monarchy, specifically "Our Sovereign Lord the King," Charles II. The reasons the Lord Proprietors provide for the settlement of Carolina was to establish the interests of the Proprietors that are "most agreeable to the Monarchy," of which they

¹⁷⁸ Armitage, 612; Locke, *Second Treatise*, V, sec. 40.

¹⁷⁹ Brad Hinshelwood, "The Carolinian Context of John Locke's Theory of Slavery," *Political Theory* 41, no. 4 (2013): 573.

¹⁸⁰ Hinshelwood, 582-583.

recognized Carolina a part. The *Fundamental Constitutions* aimed to establish a government which might avoid a “numerous Democracy,” but do not specifically state what that might be. However, for multiple pages, the document continues to elaborate on the titles, class structure, and the rights bestowed upon each group, highlighting the importance of social hierarchy and the avoidance of complete democracy.¹⁸¹

The highest class contained the Lord Proprietors themselves, of which there could only be eight at any given time, and the Pallatine who was the eldest of the Proprietors. These positions were to be the judge and executive of colonial affairs. There were three different types of land grants at the beginning of Carolina, namely Signiory, Barony, and Colony. Each consisted of 12,000 acres, with 20% of all Carolina belonging to the Signiory category, 20% to the Barony, and 60% as the Colony. The land grants were predetermined for the different classes in section 4 of *Constitutions*. Signory was shared among the Proprietors, Barony among the Nobility and their heirs, and the land deemed Colony was set aside for the settlers.¹⁸² While they set aside three-fifths of Carolinian land for the people, 40% of available land was divided among maybe 20 men and their families.¹⁸³ Moreover, a colonist had to obtain land from the Proprietors themselves—if one was to receive land as a gift from an indigenous community or

¹⁸¹ Complete details of each class’ names, responsibilities, and rights are outside the scope of this paper; however, it is worth noting the importance of class to the Proprietors in understanding the static nature of the *leetmen* and slaves. For more on early Carolina class structure, see *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*, sec. 1-22.

¹⁸² *Fundamental Constitutions*, sec. 4.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, sec. 3-6.

another colonist, they forfeit their estate and risk “perpetual banishment.”¹⁸⁴ Through their explanation of class, the Lord Proprietors in this document showed the importance of title and land—power was deeply rooted in property ownership.¹⁸⁵

Land was only one component of the power provided to the Proprietors and the Nobility—political and judicial power were also key aspects of the *Constitutions*. There were different courts assigned to different classes and crimes. For example, each precinct contained a Criminal Court and a Civil Court. The Criminal Court was for all offenses except those punishable by death (i.e., treason, murder); however, the Nobility were exempt from this Court as they underwent their own trial system. For larger offenses, colonist offenders were to appear before the Grand Council, which consisted of judges from several counties. However, for a small fee of fifty pounds, the offender had the opportunity to appeal to the Proprietors Court for further review.¹⁸⁶ The strong class structure and the legal and economic rights outlined to each social group in the *Constitutions* shows that Carolina may not have been as liberal as scholars make it out to be.

While some scholars may argue that class was not inherently structured, as examined in Chapter 3, a reading of the *Constitutions* may prove otherwise. This is evident in Locke and Ashley Cooper’s discussion on *leetmen*. Section 23 of *Constitutions* states, “All the Children of Leet-men shall be Leet-men, and so to all

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 111.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, sec. 81-85.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, sec. 63-65.

Generations.” Clearly, in this first draft, the practice was intrinsically hereditary. The document goes on to highlight the minimal economic privileges allotted to leetmen: after a leetman and a leetwoman enter marriage, their “Lord” must provide ten acres of their own land for the servants, whose only payment for such land was not to exceed one eighth of “all the yearly Produce and Growth of the said ten Acres.”¹⁸⁷ This legal clause mimics the basic tenets of feudalism, which was abolished in England in 1660 via the Tenures Abolition Act. Leetmen, leetwomen, and their descendants are only one of two groups who experience this kind of treatment. The document provides no context for who falls under the category of leetmen, but it can be assumed that this mainly included indentured servants from England and surrounding European countries.

Landholders in Carolina, too, had to pay a “Chief Rent” to acknowledge the Lord Proprietors power as “their heirs and successors for ever.”¹⁸⁸ This kind of tax also extended any natural goods found on individual property or through economic gain like mines or pearls.¹⁸⁹ It may be argued that the rigid class system outlined in *Constitutions* was incorporated because of feudalism’s decline in the Proprietors homeland. However, most of the classes enjoyed property rights and full citizenship in the colony and under the Crown, even with strong taxes to the Proprietors and allusions to fragments of absolutism.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., sec. 24-26.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., sec. 112.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., sec. 113.

In understanding Carolina's political and legal structure, some historical studies note their relation to the practices of feudalism. Historian Shirley Carter Hughson traces the developments of the Carolina colony by analyzing the language found in the *Fundamental Constitutions* and how distinctive terms are linguistic placeholders which mirror a traditional feudal system. Additionally, he analyzes the political and class dynamics that created and sustained the feudal-like colony.¹⁹⁰

At the death of feudalism in England, many lords and upper class men "saw that England was determined to trample upon every tradition of the system to which they owed their greatness," setting their sights on America as the place in which they could continue their way of life.¹⁹¹ The drafting of the *Fundamental Constitutions* provided a clear class hierarchy within Carolina, creating new titles with Landgraves, Cassiques, and Baronies acting as the nobility, followed by free men, and leetmen.¹⁹² Leet refers to the English title of "court-leet," which is a jurisdiction that a lord acquired through their wealth and for the continuation of it. In these courts, the nobility assumed responsibilities of local law enforcement and tried to maintain peace throughout their jurisdiction. In the drafting of the *Constitutions*, 'leet' was used as a linguistic alternative for 'serf,' which supports the argument that the nobility in Charles Town carried over their feudal way of life and incorporated its fundamental characteristics into Carolina.

¹⁹⁰ Shirley Carter Hughson, "Feudal Laws of Carolina," *The Sewanee Review* 2, no. 4 (1894): 472.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 476.

Hughson refers to Locke in the drafting of the *Constitutions* as a contributor to some of the ideas on slavery and argues they were “justly characterized as a bold attempt to breathe life into the dead body of English feudalism.”¹⁹³ The leetman referred to in the Carolinian context was tied to the land and was distinctly generational.¹⁹⁴ The *Constitutions* outlines in paragraph 22: “nor shall any leet-man or leet-woman have liberty to go off from the land of their particular lord and live anywhere else, without license obtained from their said lord.”¹⁹⁵ Although the *Constitutions* was never formally established, it served as the framework for a feudal society in Carolina and allowed it to develop and flourish.

While his argument concerning feudalism is valid, Hughson’s comments on Locke do not reflect on the inconsistencies highlighted in later historical research. He attempts to address the brief contradiction “student(s)” may find in his article. He believes “it is difficult to understand how so wise a man as John Locke could have lent himself to the work of devising so utopian a code” because although there was debate among clauses, it is not certain that Locke was the author.¹⁹⁶ Hughson does not seriously contemplate Locke’s relationship to Carolina, but he did highlight the distinct class system and its development through the colony’s settlement. Scholars that followed Hughson further his argument by looking at not only the class status and history of leetmen, but also persons enslaved in the Carolina colony.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 473.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 480.

¹⁹⁵ *Fundamental Constitutions*, sec. 22.

¹⁹⁶ Hughson, 481.

While the *Constitutions* did not initially provide generous class fluidity, Locke and Ashley Cooper did intend for almost radical religious tolerance. To be sure, Carolina was rooted in Christianity, but the document's reference to "a God" allowed for different sects to be included in colonial citizenship, not just the Church of England.¹⁹⁷ While the foundations of the colony were Christian in nature, there was a tolerance for indigenous religions as well. Section 96 states: "But since the Natives of that place, who will be concerned in our Plantation, are utterly Strangers to Christianity, whose Idolatry, Ignorance, or Mistake, gives us no right to expel, or use them ill."¹⁹⁸ Religious differences, even those outside of a theocratic structure, were to be treated with civility so "Civil Peace may be maintained amidst the diversity of Opinions." However, as examined in Chapter 3, there was a strong missionary sentiment among the settlers. With this, the Proprietors believed such conversion should be peaceful and inoffensive so as to highlight the good of the Christian doctrine to the "Jews, Heathens, and other Dissenters."¹⁹⁹

Religious tolerance additionally extended to the class of enslaved people. The *Constitutions* states that "Charity obliges us to wish well to the Souls of all Men, and Religion ought to alter nothing in any Man's Civil Estate or Right." Therefore, "it shall be lawful for Slaves as well as others, to Enter themselves, and be of what Church or Profession any of them shall think best." While enslaved persons were granted the same

¹⁹⁷ *Fundamental Constitutions*, sec. 94.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, sec. 96.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

religious liberty as any freeman, the document clearly states that this does not otherwise equate the two parties. Locke writes, “no Slave shall hereby be exempted from that civil Dominion his Master hath over him, but be in all other things in the same State and Condition he was in before.”²⁰⁰ In this section, there is no mention of conversion, only tolerance of the beliefs of enslaved persons.

The Proprietors discussion on slavery in these sections uses stronger language than their explanation of leetmen. While leetmen were still tied to the land and their “Lord,” the word “Master” is never used to describe their Lord. The use of “Master” in discussing enslaved persons is consistent with Locke’s description of the relationship between the conquered and the conqueror in Chapter IV, ‘Of Slavery,’ in *Two Treatises*. Moreover, *Constitutions* clearly and succinctly states that “Every Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute Power and Authority over his Negro Slaves, of what Opinion or Religion soever.”²⁰¹ The language here is reflective of that found in Locke’s description of slavery.²⁰² He states that the “freedom from absolute, arbitrary power” is of the utmost necessity in the preservation of man; however, if that man is to forfeit his life in some way, they fall under the power of the conqueror, or the Master. While Locke in *Constitutions* omits the use of *arbitrary*, it may be concluded that because of his

²⁰⁰ Ibid., sec. 106.

²⁰¹ Ibid., sec. 109.

²⁰² To be sure, *absolute power* and *absolutism* were broadly used terms in England at the time due to political unrest concerning the monarchy and the divine right of kings, see Brewer, 1045; However, in *Constitutions* Locke permits absolute power over enslaved persons (consistent with his discussion on slavery), but actively opposes absolutism when considering political and economic ideologies.

involvement in the colony, he sees this government and/or power as reasonable and principled, as opposed to arbitrary.

Locke's use of the term "Negro Slaves" in *Constitutions* also narrows the sphere of who is included in this class. It is evident from the language used that he means enslaved black persons either from Africa or Barbados. This means that the discussion on leetmen in *Constitutions* most likely is restricted to poorer English citizens, and possibly indigenous persons.²⁰³ Moreover, Locke was influenced by reading his contemporaries' publications, some of which provided strong support for slavery practices. One of these works was an early proposal on the dissemination of land to Carolinian enslavers which provided them with twenty more acres of land for every "Negro-man or Slave" and ten acres for every "Woman-Negro or Slave."²⁰⁴ These works read and cited by Locke highlighted the various practices of slavery in the Western hemisphere, from Spain to Barbados. These readings along with his executive position within the Lord Proprietors of Carolina contextualize Locke as a critical participant in the foundations of slavery in the colony.

Additionally, in discussing the state of nature in *Two Treatises*, Locke argues that all people, born with the same advantages and faculties, are to live in equality. However, he continues by arguing that in this state of nature, a "lord or master" has the ability to "set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an

²⁰³ Because England was a budding empire at the time, leetmen and indentured servants may also include other white persons under English rule such as the Scots or the Welsh.

²⁰⁴ Farr, "Locke, Natural Law," 497.

undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.”²⁰⁵ Again, the use of *dominion* is reflective of the *Constitutions* when describing the power of a master over enslaved persons.²⁰⁶ This quote from *Two Treatises* also highlights the possibility that persons with heightened status are able to clearly deem another person or people as a lower class who must be under their rule. Even in the state of nature, where Locke claims all men and women are treated as equal, he allows for the creation of a powerful ruling class.

David Armitage, a critical scholar in the field, argues it is “inconceivable” to believe Locke did not play a formative role in the drafting of the *Constitutions*. His role as secretary was not only as a scribe but was “an executive and administrative position.”²⁰⁷ Some scholars claim Locke was not the primary author of the *Constitutions* because the original documents only credit Ashley Cooper; Locke never assumed credit for its drafting. However, Armitage argues that aside from his *Essay*, Locke always published his works anonymously, strengthening the viability of Locke drafting *Constitutions*. Additionally, the original document in 1669 mirrored Locke’s language and handwriting. Political theorist, James Farr, furthers Armitage’s argument that, as secretary, Locke “read and often endorsed” documents on colonial slavery with his initials.²⁰⁸ While his title was secretary, Locke acted as an executive assistant who wrote, read, and validated his colleagues’ ideas.

²⁰⁵ Locke, *Second Treatise*, II, sec. 4.

²⁰⁶ *Fundamental Constitutions*, sec. 106.

²⁰⁷ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 607.

²⁰⁸ Farr, “Locke, Natural Law,” 497.

In the mid-1800s, a clerk from the State Paper Office in London, W. Noel Sainsbury, was tasked with assessing, arranging, and describing the records of Ashley Cooper and Locke both in the Public Records Office and at the Shaftesbury residence, Wimborne St. Giles. Two collections Sainsbury worked with were the Shaftesbury papers and Locke papers. In assessing these collections, he concluded that Locke “seems to have been the presiding genius” of Carolina, mainly citing the *Fundamental Constitutions* as evidence for such a claim. Sainsbury argues that Locke’s handwriting was enough proof; however, historian Charles H. Lesser believes Sainsbury had an “inflated misunderstanding of Locke’s role,” which he argues served as a weak foundation for future historical accounts of this period.²⁰⁹ Yet, it is not just Locke’s handwriting that lends credibility to Sainsbury’s theory, the language used in *Constitutions* provides further evidence that Locke played a strong role in crafting Carolina.

Locke from 1673 to 1704

Through his relationship to Ashley Cooper, Locke created a network of wealth by investing and participating in domestic and colonial companies. For example, Locke, Ashley Cooper, and their Barbadian colleague, Sir Peter Colleton were participating members of the Royal African Company for a time, which held a monopoly in the slave trade. Bernasconi and Mann outline a list of companies and nobility that Locke was either directly involved with or to which he was in relation as a secretary or investor. Included in these organizations are The Company of Royal Adventurers in England

²⁰⁹ Lesser, 33.

Trading into Africa, the Lord Proprietors of Carolina, the Royal African Company, and the English Board of Trade.²¹⁰ An organization of distinction, in which Locke was involved, was the Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations. Locke was appointed secretary to the Council in 1673 and held that position until 1676.²¹¹ Locke would be a ranking member of some of these organizations until nearing his death in 1704. These colonial positions provided Locke with relevant knowledge of slavery in the New World.²¹²

With his health declining and the death of his friend, Ashley Cooper in 1683, Locke took a hiatus from public life, but continued his political activism. It is within this period that it is assumed Locke wrote his *Two Treatises* as an outline for a new kind of civility along with *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke resided in Holland to avoid sedition charges under Charles II, and it is there that he and other Whig radicals would plan the impending Glorious Revolution in 1689.²¹³ After King James II of England was deposed, Locke could return to the public stage. He was appointed as a commissioner of the Board of Trade in England in 1696. Because of his experience in the early settlement of the colonies and his extensive understanding of government, Locke quickly rose to prominence within the Board.

While in this position, Locke drafted many different documents pertaining to the colonies, specifically Virginia, instructing the colony to keep a census of the enslaved

²¹⁰ Bernasconi and Mann, 89.

²¹¹ Lesser, 25-26.

²¹² Farr, "Locke, Natural Law," 497.

²¹³ Brewer, 1054.

population and even goes so far as to “discourage all slave trade except that organized and monopolized by the Royal Africa Company.”²¹⁴ Locke, however, does chastise the governor of Virginia and urges the colony to suspend the “inhumane severities” of slavery, even threatening death as a punishment for the killing of both indigenous and African enslaved people.²¹⁵ It is important to note that while Locke formally promoted the humane treatment of enslaved persons in Virginia, Carolinian slavery was not held to the same standards, even though their structures of slavery were very similar. This discrepancy may be due to Locke’s long-standing involvement in Carolina as opposed to Virginia. Farr accounts for this change in opinion by noting that Locke resided with Quaker abolitionists from 1687 to 1689, where he may have adopted their outlook on slavery practices.²¹⁶

When analyzing Carolinian slavery and its creation, historians like M. Eugene Sirmans focus on the colony’s relationship to the English colony of Barbados. Sirmans follows the linguistic and legal developments that created the “unique” Carolinian slavery. Borrowing language and practices from Barbados slavery traditions, Carolina continually developed their idea of slavery “without benefit of legislative action and without interference from England.”²¹⁷ The English Board of Trade was considerably

²¹⁴ Locke wrote these instructions to the governor of Virginia in 1698—almost 30 years after the drafting of *Fundamental Constitutions*, see Farr, ““So Vile,”” 268.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 268-269.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 268.

²¹⁷ M. Eugene Sirmans, “The Legal Status of the Slave,” 473.

influenced by Carolinian gentry and therefore did not hold the colony to the same standards on slavery as the others.²¹⁸ It is understood in later research that Locke was a member of the Board of Trade in the late 17th century and had a vested financial interest in its dealings prior to 1700.

Sirmans also attributes the *Fundamental Constitutions* solely to John Locke and examines his personal connections in Barbados. His colleague, Sir Peter Colleton was an enslaver in Barbados and a recurring correspondent of Locke. Sirmans argues that Locke “may well have acquired his knowledge on slavery from this source.”²¹⁹ Farr goes further to draw the connection between Locke and Colleton. Locke kept extensive documentation as a secretary, which directly show the interdependent relationship between Locke, Ashley Cooper, and Colleton. For example, they wrote to each other about “medical curiosities, Colleton informed [Locke] of herbal cures for yawes and gonorrhoea in slaves.” They discussed financial investments for Carolina, like timber and fishing, but also those after Locke’s direct involvement in the colony, such as “human cargo” for the Royal African Company.²²⁰ Colleton, Ashley Cooper, and Locke’s communication highlights the strong relationship among these colonizers and their continued interest in colonial slavery practices.

The laws concerning the enslaved of Carolina developed in the late 17th century, with the first ones written in 1690—two years after Barbados enacted their “most

²¹⁸ Armitage, “John Locke, Carolina,” 603.

²¹⁹ Sirmans, “The Legal Status of the Slave,” 464.

²²⁰ Farr, ““So Vile,”” 267.

important” version of their slave codes, including instructions on policing.²²¹ The slavery laws in Carolina were revised in 1696 when the economy boomed and the demand for cheap labor intensified. With Barbadian slavery in mind, Carolina created a strikingly similar legal structure but defined an enslaved person in terms so “vague to the point of being cryptic” that it became difficult to identify any rights the enslaved may have in the colony. The laws define the enslaved as "All Negroes, Mollatoes, and Indians which at any time heretofore have been bought and Sold or now are and taken to be or hereafter Shall be Bought and Sold are hereby made and declared they and their Children Slaves to all Intents and purposes."²²² This legal statute defined the race of enslaved persons within Carolina as well as instilled hereditary enslavement for those who were already enslaved and those who would be enslaved in the future alike. Sirmans argues the language of “all intents and purposes” found in these laws allowed for a loose interpretation of the restrictions of the relationship between enslaver and enslaved as well as the differentiation between freehold slavery and chattel slavery.

Locke at this time was concerned more so with the English Board of Trade, most likely paying little attention to the politics of Carolina later in his life. While he tried to continue his involvement in the colony, Ashley Cooper’s arrest, political unrest in England, and animosity among the Lord Proprietors weakened his authority in Carolina.²²³ However, Locke’s contribution to the *Fundamental Constitutions*, in addition to his colleague Colleton’s influence in Barbadian and Carolinian slavery when they

²²¹ Sirmans, “The Legal Status of the Slave,” 464.

²²² *Ibid.*, 466.

²²³ Brewer, 1053.

initially drafted their slavery laws, may have laid the foundation for the new legal structure of slavery to exist in Carolina after Locke's departure.

John Locke was involved in the creation of Carolinian slavery as a highly competent secretary to the Lord Proprietors. Additionally, the use of the term *absolute power* in the *Fundamental Constitutions* was reflective of the language and meanings used in his discussion on slavery in *Second Treatise*. Through his correspondence with Peter Colleton and Ashley Cooper, Locke continued his interest in the colony and its slavery laws, practices, or concerns. While there is debate among what historical events are applicable to Locke's philosophical publications, corroborating evidence strongly suggests the body of *Two Treatises* was written between 1679 and the mid-1680s. Furthermore, because of Locke's continued correspondence with Barbadian colonists in Carolina, Locke's philosophical writings can be geographically applicable outside the scope of Western Europe. However, as the next chapter will analyze, while there can be application of his philosophy elsewhere, Locke's verbiage and examples emphasize the actors of such application as European.

CHAPTER 6

LOCKE IN A POST-COLONIAL CONTEXT

Analyzing reason, empiricism, property theory, just war, slavery, and the *Fundamental Constitutions* through the lens of postcolonial scholars provides an alternative perspective in understanding the different personas Locke exhibited in his work. To do such theoretical analysis, this chapter employs the work of Edward Said and Albert Memmi. There is a novelty in this kind of postcolonial theory application when used in analyzing the Enlightenment and initial colonialism in North America. Retroactively applying a theory that is used to study colonized countries after ca. 1950 onto Enlightenment philosophers is a feat in and of itself, which is why most scholars tend to keep the theory contained to its intentions. However, the contradictions of John Locke are a broadly debated topic. By looking at Locke's psyche as a colonizer and under Western influences, this chapter provides context as to why there is ambiguity in the first place.

Postcolonial theory is defined by many scholars in different ways, but a common theme is proposed by Professors Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu:

“Postcolonial approaches emphasize that European modernity and identity have always been constituted against—and through the subordination of—a non-Western ‘Other.’”²²⁴

Postcolonial theory as a specific field arose in the latter 20th century with the 1978 publication of Columbia literature professor Edward Said's *Orientalism*, in which he

²²⁴ Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nisancioglu, “Limits of the Universal: The Promises and Pitfalls of Postcolonial Theory and its Critique,” *Historical Materialism* 25, no. 3 (2017): 42.

argues that the Western projection of the ‘Other’ is inextricably linked to the colonizing countries and is used to further their political power and global influence. Said claims that the West portrayed non-Europeans as ‘otherized’ and ‘backward,’ and that this narrative is perpetuated and continued in dominant Western discourse. Said’s work was and continues to be instrumental in deconstructing the dichotomy that remains from centuries of Western imperialism.

Before postcolonial studies was specified in academia, Albert Memmi published his major work, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*, in 1957. Memmi was a scholar in Tunisia and lived during the French occupation of his country. He was a Jewish man living in Northern Africa, so he had a unique perspective as a more privileged man than his fellow colonized Tunisians. In his work, Memmi aims to showcase the psychologies of both the colonizer and the colonized, perpetuating and experiencing imperial rule respectively.

By using postcolonial theory in analyzing Locke, we can then shed light on a few key concepts. One is how he misinterpreted and misconstrued Indigenous Americans’ concept of land and their experiences that, for Locke, lead to a sense of rationality and reason. Secondly, postcolonial studies can support the argument that Locke only intended his philosophical writings for a European audience. He projects an ‘otherized’ or ‘backward’ view of the Indigenous Americans for a Western audience’s consumption. Another question is the connection between labor, the laborer, and property and how Locke disregards enslaved labor without ownership of the land. Lastly, postcolonial theory allows a deeper analysis of the sliding scale of power present in the *Fundamental Constitutions* regarding lords and enslavers and the leetmen or enslaved persons under

them, respectively. It is in these three questions that Said and Memmi provide a critical framework to understand the inconsistent nature of John Locke more concretely.

Evaluation of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*

In *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, John Locke provides his analysis on innate ideas and empiricism. Empiricism is the philosophical concept that all knowledge is derived from individual experience. Taking this definition into account, if all knowledge is through experience, and accepting the premise that there are different experiences, did Locke believe some experiences are better than others, therefore leading to a heightened (or better) knowledge? Evidence found in *Essay* may support this theory. In discussing innate ideas, Locke illustrates how circumstances shape our understanding. He brings in his fellow Englishmen saying, “Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there.”²²⁵ Locke continues with an alternative example of the leader of the Apochancana, an indigenous community in the Virginia colony. If this indigenous leader “been educated in England,” he might have known a God or been as good at mathematics as any other Englishman. Locke uses these examples to acknowledge that the differences between understandings only lie in the “ways, modes, and notions” of one’s own community and circumstances. However, he characterizes the Englishman as “more improved” than the members of other nations.²²⁶ In this section,

²²⁵ The Bay of Soldania is commonly known as Saldanha Bay which is located along the coast of South Africa; Locke, *Essay*, III, sec. 8.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, III, sec. 12.

Locke argues that if the ‘Other’ is ignorant of ideas such as religion or science, it is because they pursued ideas and thoughts that led to different conclusions. While the level of knowledge, Locke maintains, is circumstantial, he still alludes to an intrinsic hierarchy of experience, therefore, falling into an argument of Western intellectual dominance.

Another example from *Essay* is when Locke argues against the presupposition of innate ideas because “they appear the least, where what is innate shows itself clearest.” In this section, Locke uses the examples of children, idiots, and “savages” to forward the argument that we are born as a “blank slate.” People from otherized countries (such as Africa, North America, and India, which Locke consistently references) are equated to children when discussing innate ideas because they are the “least corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines.” Locke believes that general propositions and abstract maxims are concepts concerned with education, therefore, are not present in the minds of children or communities Locke otherizes here.²²⁷ Moreover, Locke argues that sometimes these communities, along with the illiterate, may never develop the ability to reason on maxims and general propositions, even after their “rational age.”²²⁸ Minimizing the rationality and experiences of the non-European may allow for the creation of a social structure based on intellectual ability and competent civil participation.

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, I, sec. 27.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, sec. 12.

Memmi argues that the primary goal of the colonizer is to maintain the social structure they have created within the colony. The most effective way for this to happen was to implement racist practices. Memmi writes:

Racism appears then, not as an incidental detail, but as a consubstantial part of colonialism. It is the highest expression of the colonial system and one of the most significant features of the colonialist. Not only does it establish a fundamental discrimination between colonizer and colonized... but it also lays the foundation for the immutability of this life.²²⁹

Memmi believes that racism and colonialism are inextricably linked together and the continuation of one is dependent on the other. Said echoes Memmi saying that non-Europeans are “spoken for,” without being able to provide any of their own narrative.²³⁰ They are made into a figure—voiceless. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* highlights how degrading attitudes of the Europeans toward the ‘Other’ create and perpetuate that racism, which can be later used in the colonialist’s justification for colonization.

Evaluation of *Two Treatises and Fundamental Constitutions*

The concept of power in *Constitutions* is presented in different ways depending on the class in question. Leetmen were only allotted to the Proprietors and the Nobility (Landgraves, Cassiques, or Lord of a Manor), making them higher in servant status because of their proximity to the upper classes. Additionally, leetmen were provided land upon their marriage to a leetwoman. This highlights the autonomy, albeit minimal, given to this class. Leetmen were most likely white settlers from England who wanted

²²⁹ Memmi, 188.

²³⁰ Said, 122.

passage to the colony, but could afford neither the passage nor the minimal acreage requirements for full settlement. The main difference between the leetmen and the other settlers was their financial status. The voluntariness of this group's actions predetermined their class. Because of their shared culture and homeland, the Proprietors may have seen this as a reason to provide a separate status for these men and women, different from that of enslaved persons. Still, the generational indentured servitude leetmen experienced is inconsistent with Lockean theory, specifically through an analysis of Chapter XVI.

African and indigenous peoples were enslaved through either capture or through 'just war.' Indigenous persons were enslaved at the hands of the colonists, even though their relationship was initially benign and tolerant, and even rival indigenous communities. This began to change when the settlers perceived the surrounding tribes as a threat, therefore the settlers could justify their aggression toward the natives because they believed they were being unjustly threatened—consistent with Lockean thought. African enslavement, however, cannot be justified in any way because there was no threat from the Africans, nor does Locke allow for hereditary enslavement via Chapter XVI.

African and indigenous enslaved people also received different punishments from the sentence for leetmen. For example, in 1672 and 1673, the Grand Council in Carolina gave white servants (leetmen) a sentence of additional service and work, whereas the African and indigenous enslaved never received this as an option.²³¹ The "absolute

²³¹ The type of punishment the enslaved received is not specified, *see* Sirmans "Legal Status of the Slave," 464.

power” an enslaver has over the enslaved and not the leetmen, as outlined in *Fundamental Constitutions*, must be also accounted for via postcolonial theory. Said may argue this is simply because the Proprietors view the enslaved as the “Other,” having minimal commonalities with one another. Using Memmi, it may be answered through understanding the hierarchy of Carolina in a colonialist framework. However, the two coincide. Creating a rigid hierarchy allows for the otherization of various groups, specifically if those cultures and, as Locke would describe, modes were viewed as backward or at least inferior to the cultures and modes of the English.

Locke created a very specific and clear understanding of property and the commons. In his interactions with indigenous peoples, before the publication of *Two Treatises*, he viewed these communities as living in the commons, which was correlated with the state of nature. Under Lockean theory, this common land was available for privatization and consumption because, as Locke argues, indigenous communities failed to lay claim to a specific acreage through cultivation. By proposing that property is private and must be cultivated to be owned, Locke promotes a restricted view of land use. Moreover, by not engaging or consulting with any indigenous people on the subject, Locke imposes his Western European view of the non-European. Said argues that when the West writes on the subject of the Other, whether that be religion, culture, or government, they only do so with selfish intent. These writings, Said claims, “keep the region and its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to “attitudes,” “trends,” statistics: in short, dehumanized.”²³² By not incorporating any indigenous literature or

²³² Said, 291.

opinions on the matter of land, Locke relegates indigenous beliefs for English consumption.

Additionally, concerning property, Locke disregards enslaved labor in Chapter V of *Two Treatises*. As previously established, Locke argues that God provided the commons to all men, but it is through individual labor that a man may separate a portion of land from the commons for his own use. This is a process that requires consent from “his fellow commoners.”²³³ If this argument is to be accepted, enslaved persons who are performing the labor on a plantation or farm would be the owners of such property. This is obviously not how slavery was practiced. Labor and property, for Locke, are intrinsically intertwined, arguing that they are the foundation for almost all economic activity.

Locke continues his discussion of property to argue that man should not take more from the commons than he can take care of and practically use. He states, “for as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of.”²³⁴ This quote regards land as opposed to money, which Locke believes man can accumulate “without injury” because gold, silver, and paper currency do not spoil like agricultural goods.²³⁵ Applying this to colonial slavery practices, it may be answered that if one is to view currency as a permanent good that can be endlessly accumulated, and if enslaved persons are to be understood as primarily

²³³ Locke, *Second Treatise*, V, sec. 32.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, V, sec. 51.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, V, sec. 50.

property acquired through an exchange of money, it is the enslaver's property that is tending to their enclosed portion of land. With this argument, plantation enslavers are not acting outside of Locke's view of property because it is through their static wealth (money and proprietary goods) that justify their land ownership. When speaking about property and labor, Locke disregards enslaved labor when discussing labor as an intrinsic characteristic of the man. His discussion on property is again established as a concept for European consumption and application.

Locke's philosophies are not intrinsically universally applicable because of his reliance on the English language and European modes, ideas, context, and understandings. For example, Locke's discussion on conquest in *Two Treatises* does not include any examples of the kind of warfare used, but only makes reference to wars fought by the Danes or the Spartans. To be sure, he does refer to wars in the modern Middle East, however, these are limited to Christian Biblical examples of the Old Testament.²³⁶ There is no mention of the various aspects of war such as weaponry, natural barriers, or cultural beliefs. The guns manufactured and used by Europeans were detrimental when used against indigenous people because of their ability for larger and swifter destruction. Indigenous American communities at the time used spear throwers, Tomahawks (a type of axe), and bows and arrows. Locke's failure to consider these differences in warfare, specifically when discussing the details of a just war, highlights the exclusive nature of his philosophy.

²³⁶ Locke uses an example from 2 Kings where God helped Hezekiah of Judah cast off the dominion of the Assyrians, *see Ibid.*, XVI, sec. 196.

An evaluation of Locke in a colonial context shows that he was a European in a foreign environment and portrayed that environment and its people as such. Said outlines three categories where such a European may fall, who he argues has a separate and unequal consciousness than that of his surroundings. First, the European acts as a scientific and professional observer, collecting data for his own use. Second, there is the European who does the same, but does not interact with the 'Other,' therefore reducing their consciousness to detached characterizations.²³⁷ The last category includes the European who travels to non-European regions for a project of personal fulfillment and urgency. Persons in this category, Said maintains, write in such a way about the 'Other' that is personal and from the writer's own perceptions. These three categories of European authors reflect Locke's philosophical and colonial writings. His mentions of indigenous communities (whether in America, Africa, or India) are, as established, for European consumption and act as an exclusion of non-Europeans. While he does use some native terms, his portrayal of the indigenous people is woefully lacking, especially concerning property, experience, and knowledge. Locke's involvement in Carolina was a part of the larger English colonial agenda, therefore his colonial writings also reflect that of the goals of the mother country, the needs of the English colonialists, and his own personal perceptions.

Locke's theories are currently accepted as common universal principles, especially in the West. Locke primarily wrote in English but also wrote some of his works in French and in Latin. After completing *Essay Concerning Human*

²³⁷ Said, 158.

Understanding, Locke published a 50-page advance of the work in French for fellow intellectuals across the English Channel to engage in discussions on rationalism and empiricism. Locke also wrote and published *A Letter Concerning Toleration* in Latin, translated to *Epistola de Tolerentia*.²³⁸ While some publications, such as *Two Treatises of Government*, were more geographically restricted as a response to national events, translations were published within decades of Locke's death in 1704. *Two Treatises* was even translated into French during his lifetime. Additionally, Frenchmen Pierre Coste completed the first translation of *Essay* in 1704. It then spread farther east to Italy and Greece in the mid-18th century. Eugenious Vougaris translated *Essay* into Greek between 1740 and 1766, which was used as a fundamental text for his modern philosophy course at the school of Mount Athos.²³⁹

Locke's works were not just translated, but actually practiced during the revolutionary era of the late 18th century. Locke's ideas are reflected in both founding documents of the United States as well as the new French Republic. Within a century of publishing his philosophical works, Locke's ideas spread across borders, seas, and oceans. While the thinker may have restricted the universality of his writings to England and close allies, readers of Locke were inspired by his passion and drastically altered the global culture in the 18th century. However, universality was still exclusive. Concepts found within his publications were reliant on European values and experiences such as feudalism, monarchical power, and Christianity. Additionally, language barriers

²³⁸ William Uzgalis, "John Locke," Sec. 1.2.

²³⁹ G.A.J. Rogers, ed., *Offprint from Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 223-224, 229.

alienated non-Romantic or non-Indo-European speakers from any adequate translation at the time. Cultural differences, such as Oral history traditions of Indigenous Americans, were also disregarded. Universality, then, does not define access to Lockean thought, but how Locke provides universal examples of non-Europeans for a European understanding.

Locke's intended audience was European, mainly the English, both in England and in the various colonies abroad. Moreover, his philosophical principles exclude non-Europeans from the sphere of those who possess rights. This is evident in the language and examples he uses both in *Two Treatises* and *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. While Locke's foundational principles adapted to societal changes throughout modern history, a closer analysis of his writings highlight these seemingly universal concepts were conversely exclusionary. By adopting the postcolonial frameworks of Said and Memmi to analyze Locke's intentions, writings, and actions, we can conclude that Locke's publications, whether philosophical or political in nature, were adapted to fit the societal needs, culture, and influences of European colonialists in either Carolina or England.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This research aimed to analyze the contradictory nature of John Locke concerning the question of slavery in both his philosophy and in colonial actions. Based on an exploration and synthesis of the literature, a deeper inquiry of his philosophy, and an application of postcolonial theory, it can be concluded that Locke's publications were written with a specific audience in mind, excluding non-European communities and characterizing them for European consumption. By understanding Locke as a colonialist and an Englishman, the results of this thesis show the ambiguity of Locke can exist and does not necessarily need a proven consistency.

This thesis set out to answer two primary research questions:

1. Did John Locke have a concrete role in crafting Carolinian slavery, and
2. Can the two identities of Locke (colonialist and philosopher) coexist?

Through an analysis of literature, philosophy, and historical theory, I argue that Locke did have a strong role in crafting Carolinian slavery. His position in the Lord Proprietors of Carolina provided Locke the contacts that influenced his writings in the *Fundamental Constitutions*, like Peter Colleton and Ashley Cooper. Additionally, the language used in *Constitutions* reflected the verbiage in Locke's philosophical writings. The strong link in word choice is indicative of his drafting. While Locke was most likely vital in the creation of Carolinian slavery, from the evidence presented in this thesis, it is unlikely he was instrumental in continuing the practice in the colony. The first enslaved Africans arrived from Barbados in 1696, when Locke was in England and Holland, concerning himself with English politics and preparing for the Glorious Revolution. Therefore,

Locke did help to lay the foundation for slavery and its regulations in the colony but was not an active participant in the fulfillment and perpetuation of American slavery practices.

It is possible that Locke could embody both his philosophy and his colonial identity if he is understood as a European author and a colonialist who portrays the 'Other' for his own personal or national interests. As indicated through an analysis of Said, Locke intended his philosophy for an English and European audience in order to provide a European view of the 'Other' for European consumption and application. Furthermore, by focusing on English and European actors, Locke's apparent universality lends itself to exclusionist tendencies. This is clear in an analysis of *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and his property theory in *Two Treatises*. Locke excludes Indigenous Americans from fully participating in the concept of property unless they forfeit their traditions, practices, and values. While *Essay* provides examples of indigenous groups around the world, Locke omits their perspective, reducing their autonomy and portraying them as inferior to the Europeans. In Locke's philosophical publications, the possession of some rights and autonomy (such as property and intellect, respectively) were reserved for Europeans. Through an analysis of his limiting portrayal of indigenous and otherized communities, I argue Locke's duality can exist because of his Western perspective of non-European societies.

Analyzing Locke through a postcolonial framework highlights these nuances and allows the contradiction to exist rather than demands concrete consistency. Locke may have believed he was consistent because his writings were for European consumption and application, which is highlighted by the political unrest of the English crown in the 17th

century. Moreover, Locke's early participation in the American colonies under the English monarchy shifted throughout his life, as evident in his philosophy and his correspondence with Virginian officials during his time on the Board of Trade. However, by excluding identities outside the scope of Western Europe from fully participating in his ideal political and economic structure, Locke's superficially universal ideologies materialize as rejection or dismissal.

A primary conclusion of this research concerns the material application of Locke's theory on slavery along ethnic lines. Based on an understanding of his philosophy and Carolinian history, Locke's conception of slavery is applicable to the enslavement of Indigenous Americans. The cultural differences surrounding property rights allowed colonists to believe themselves just in taking land from, what Locke states, is the commons. Indigenous groups may attempt to protect their home and the colonists could view this as an unjust threat—believing they are the just actors based on the Lockean just war theory. With superior warfare, the early colonists most likely prove successful in any altercation and, therefore, can subject the perceived unjust actors to enslavement. While for Locke enslavement is temporary and restricted—that is, until death and does not include possessions nor one's lineage—the prevalent practice of indigenous enslavement in the early American colonial period is consistent with Locke's discussion on slavery.

Alternatively, 17th century colonial practices of African enslavement, as consistently argued in this thesis, are incongruent with the Lockean conception of slavery. Slavery, for Locke, is only justified in a just war where the conqueror acted justly against an unjust aggressor. The process of African enslavement does not fall

under the just war theory because there was no threat, real or perceived, from African communities. Even if there were an instance of just war, the exponential increase of enslaved Africans in the New World during the 17th and 18th centuries was paired with the new practice of chattel slavery.²⁴⁰ Chattel or hereditary enslavement perpetuated the punishment of the aggressor, which, when discussing the terms of conquest, Locke vehemently opposes. A person can only enslave those who unjustly wronged them, which excludes their families and, to an extent, their material possessions. By contextualizing Lockean slavery concepts with his theory of just war and discussion on conquest, I conclude practices of African enslavement are unfounded within *Two Treatises*, further highlighting Locke's English and Western perspective.

Additional research may include an analysis of the relationship between property and enslaved people. Does the absolute relationship between enslaver and enslaved infer that an enslaved person is now included in the enslaver's proprietary possessions, per Lockean theory? If labor is intrinsically tied to the man, how does Locke correct for enslaved labor (i.e., plantations) under the absolute power of an enslaver? Further analysis is needed to address these questions. If they are to be explored, it may further engage in the conversation on Locke's contradictory nature on the question of slavery, especially because the concept of property is central to Lockean philosophy.

Future research may include a detailed analysis of the chronology of legal statutes in Carolina. While this thesis provided mentions of different legal documents such as the

²⁴⁰ As previously outlined in Chapter 4, chattel slavery allowed for hereditary enslavement but also for those enslaved persons to be included in the enslaver's will to be given to their heirs.

Fundamental Constitutions, temporary laws prior to the *Constitutions* implementation, and the laws concerning slavery, there is much to be explored on the topic. By understanding the chronology of Carolina and following Locke's correspondence with colonial affairs until his death in 1704, scholars may gain more insight on the trajectory of enslavement practices in Carolina and Locke's opinions on it. This research could be completed by analyzing primary documentation from the Board of Trade and the state archives of North and South Carolina.

Furthermore, research should be conducted on John Locke's positions in British colonial organizations and how those were directly related to his involvement in Carolina. The primary sources for this thesis were limited due to restricted access to archives during the COVID-19 pandemic. Scholars allude to these connections between organizations like the Board of Trade and the Royal African Company to Carolina, but a deeper analysis of the primary sources from the Bodleian Library at Oxford University, the National Archives of Great Britain, or the South Carolina Department of Archives and History may provide more evidence for or against claims found in the literature and in this thesis.

This thesis contributes to the active conversation among historians, political theorists, and philosophers on John Locke and the consistency of his writings. Understanding Locke as a colonialist and Western author helps alleviate apparent tensions throughout his portfolio. His philosophical and colonial writings generated from a Western perspective, promoting personal and national interests. Still, Locke's incomplete and otherizing portrayal of non-European societies excluded those groups from the conversation on political rights, economic proliferation, and intellectual

capabilities. By incorporating a postcolonial framework, this thesis presents Locke in a different light than what has been previously established. With a wide selection of texts to analyze, the conversation concerning Locke and slavery practices is incomplete. There are many more questions to answer and writings to evaluate, to which I call on others to contribute.

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
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APPENDIX A

CARTE PARTICULIERE DE LA CAROLINE, 1696



Map of Carolina from 1697 which highlights the various individual colonist settlements along the rivers and creeks, different terrains (hills and savannas), and indigenous settlements more inland.

D'Abbeville Nicolas Sanson. *Carte Particuliere de la Caroline Dresse sur les Memoires le plus Nouveau, 1697.* 1697. Map. South Carolina Department of Archives and History, Columbia, SC. e-archives.sc.gov/records/.

APPENDIX B

THE GREAT SEAL OF THE CAROLINA PROPRIETORS (FRONT)



This Seal of the Lord Proprietors was engraved in 1664. Indigenous people were often used in European art as symbols of the Americas. The arms of the characters are near the engraving of a European style soldier helmet, which may show the dominion the Proprietors believed they had over the region. The inscription reads “Dominus, Cultoribus, Orbis” which, roughly translated, means “conquered and cultivated the world.” The characters are seen surrounding two intertwined cornucopias, highlighting the emphasis on agricultural wealth.

Lesser, Charles H. *South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1669-1721*. Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1995. Figure 7, pg. 12.

APPENDIX C


THE GREAT SEAL OF THE LORD PROPRIETORS (BACK)



The back of the Seal of the Proprietors portrays the eight family shields of the members of the Lord Proprietors, each with their own individuality. The shields are surrounding a cross of Saint George, commonly used in English symbolism.

Lesser, Charles H. *South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1669-1721*. Columbia, SC: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1995. Figure 8, pg. 13.

APPENDIX D
TIMELINE OF EVENTS



The first charters were granted to the Lord Proprietors in 1663 and 1665 by King Charles II. While the other major events in the colony's beginnings occur within this first five years, there is a significant time lapse between the first drafting of the *Fundamental Constitutions* and Locke's philosophical publications.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Caroline Cundiff is from Wichita, Kansas. After completing her high school education from Bishop Carroll Catholic High School in 2015, she attended Benedictine College in Atchison, Kansas where she earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and History. In her undergraduate work, she focused on American foreign policy, modern European history, and American feminist history. After graduating from Benedictine in 2018, she moved to Tempe, Arizona where she worked as a Legal Assistant in the Family Violence Bureau for Maricopa County Attorney's Office in Phoenix, Arizona. Wanting to continue her education, she entered the Master of Arts in Global History program at Arizona State University. In this program, her research interests included political philosophy, colonialism, and early American history.