Diplomatic Support for Protest Movements: Causes and Consequences

by

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ABSTRACT

Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics, especially, discontented citizens. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, praising protesters, and sympathizing with them- or imposing economic sanctions because of the host government's repressive behavior is now a significant component of diplomacy. Despite the growing importance of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements, little systematic research has been conducted on its causes and consequence. This study includes three interrelated papers to address this gap in the literature. The first paper addresses the question of why countries provide diplomatic support for protest movements. Focusing on Western diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, I argue that there are two reasons why Western democracies take diplomatic actions in support of protest campaigns. First, when the host government uses extreme violence against protesters; and second when the host government has an oppositional stance toward the U.S.-led liberal international order. I use original data of 523 diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2019 to test these theoretical expectations. The second paper asks whether and under what conditions diplomatic support is effective. I argue that diplomatic support is likely to reduce popular support or protest movements when it occurs alongside protesters' call for international help because it makes governments' common claim on the alleged coordination between opposition figures and foreign countries credible. I conduct a survey experiment among Iranian intelligentsia to test this argument. The results support the theoretical model. The third chapter asks whether the identity of supporter could make a difference in the public's attitudes toward protest movements. The central argument is that support from strategic allies is likely to weaken public support for protest campaigns. However, when diplomatic support comes from allies, it is likely to increase support for protesters. I test this theory by conducting a survey experiment of 1800 American citizens

on the Black Lives Matter Movement. The findings show that the identity of supporters plays a crucial role in shaping public attitudes toward protest movements.

To my parents

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| | | I | Page |
|------|-------|---|------|
| LIST | OF TA | ABLES | viii |
| LIST | OF FI | GURES | ix |
| CHAI | PTER | | |
| 1 | INT | RODUCTION | 1 |
| 2 | DIP | LOMATIC SUPPORT FOR PROTEST MOVEMENTS: | |
| | EVI | DENCE FROM WESTERN DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR | |
| | ERA | Δ | 8 |
| | 2.1 | Introduction | 8 |
| | 2.2 | External Interference in Domestic Politics | 10 |
| | 2.3 | Theoretical Expectations | 13 |
| | 2.4 | Data and Method | 17 |
| | 2.5 | Statistical Analysis | 21 |
| | 2.6 | Robustness Checks | 30 |
| | 2.7 | Conclusion | 35 |
| 3 | DIP | LOMACY IN SUPPORT OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS: EVIDENCE | |
| | FRC | M AN INTELLIGENTSIA EXPERIMENT IN IRAN | 37 |
| | 3.1 | Introduction | 37 |
| | 3.2 | External Support for Protest Movements | 39 |
| | 3.3 | Theoretical Expectations | 41 |
| | 3.4 | Research Design | 45 |
| | 3.5 | Statistical Analysis | 52 |
| | 3.6 | Conclusion | 56 |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| 4 | DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO FOREIGN STATES' DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT | |
|------|--|-----|
| | FOR PROTEST CAMPAIGNS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM IN- | |
| | TERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BLACK LIVES MATTER MOVE- | |
| | MENT | 58 |
| | 4.1 Introduction | 58 |
| | 4.2 Diplomacy and Protest Campaigns | 62 |
| | 4.3 Theoretical Expectations | 64 |
| | 4.4 Research Design | 67 |
| | 4.5 Results | 71 |
| | 4.6 Conclusion | 76 |
| 5 | CONCLUSION | 80 |
| REFE | RENCES | 85 |
| APPE | NDIX | |
| А | CHAPTER 2: DIPLOMACY CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES | 96 |
| В | CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES | 99 |
| С | CHAPTER 3: IRB APPROVAL | 102 |
| D | CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES ACROSS CONTROL AND | |
| | TREATMENT GROUPS | 104 |
| E | CHAPTER 4: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES . | 106 |
| F | CHAPTER 4: TRANSCRIPTS OF THE VIDEOS FOR TREATMENT AND | |
| | CONTROL GROUPS | 108 |
| G | CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL PRIDE ACROSS COUNTRIES | 110 |
| Н | CHAPTER 4: IRB APPROVAL | 112 |

LIST OF TABLES

| Table | F | Page |
|-------|--|------|
| 2.1 | State-level Logistic Regression Results for Diplomatic Support | 26 |
| 2.2 | Dyadic Logistic Regression Results for Diplomatic Support | 27 |
| 2.3 | Odds Ratio Table for Diplomatic Support | 29 |
| 2.4 | Dyadic Logistic Regression Results with an Alternative Measure of Violence | 32 |
| 2.5 | Dyadic Logistic Regression Results: Diplomatic Support from Major West- | |
| | ern Powers | 33 |
| 3.1 | Questions to Identify the Intelligentsia | 51 |
| 3.2 | Information Received by the Control and Treatment Groups | 51 |
| 3.3 | The Mean Score of the Dependent Variables for Each Group | 54 |
| 4.1 | Randomization Checks | 73 |
| 4.2 | The Kruskal-Wallis Test | 73 |
| 4.3 | The Kruskal-Wallis Test for Republicans and Democrats | 73 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure | | Page |
|--------|---|------|
| 2.1 | Diplomatic Stance Categories and Sub-categories | 18 |
| 2.2 | Number of Diplomatic Stances from 1990 to 2019 | 22 |
| 2.3 | Type of Diplomatic Stance | 23 |
| 2.4 | Diplomatic Supporters from 1990 to 2019 | 24 |
| 2.5 | Top 10 Countries and Organizations with the Highest Number of Diplomatic | |
| | Support | 25 |
| 2.6 | Predicted Probability: State-level Model | 28 |
| 2.7 | Predicted Probability of Extreme Violence and Opposition to the Interna- | |
| | tional Order: Dyadic Model | 30 |
| 2.8 | Predicted Probability: Support from Major Western Powers | 35 |
| 3.1 | Socio-occupational Status of the Respondents | 49 |
| 3.2 | Support for Protests, Future Participation, Repression and the Government | |
| | across Groups | 53 |
| 3.3 | Support for Protests: Conservatives vs. Reformists vs. Revolutionaries | 55 |
| 4.1 | The Wilcoxon Test to Evaluate Differences Between Experimental Groups . | 74 |
| 4.2 | The Wilcoxon Test to Evaluate Mean Differences Between Experimental | |
| | Groups | 75 |

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

On 25 January 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian citizens gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo to protest against President Hosni Mubarak who had been in power for nearly 30 years. The protest campaign against Mubarak was met with violence by security forces who attacked the protesters in order to disperse the crowd. The protest movement, however, did not stop and kept continued until the collapse of the Mubarak government. The protests received significant international attention most of which included supportive messages from political leaders around the world.

For example, US President Barack Obama asked his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, to "avoid a violent response to the thousands of protesters in the streets" and said "the United States will continue to stand up for the rights of the Egyptian people and work with their government in pursuit of a future that is more just, more free and more hopeful" (CNN 2011). David Cameron, UK Prime Minister, condemned the violence and called for political reform. In his statement, he specified that "change needs to start happening now, and the violence needs to stop" (GOV.UK 2011). German Chancellor Angela Merkel also called upon the Egyptian government "to allow peaceful demonstrations, to give the freedom of opinion a chance" (BBC 2011). The US, UK, and Germany were not the only countries that backed the Egyptian protesters. Many other countries took a variety of diplomatic actions to support the protest movement, condemn the government, or call for political reform.

The anti-government uprising in Egypt is not the only protest campaign to receive diplomatic support from third-party actors. Third-party diplomatic support for protest movements has increasingly become an indispensable component of international politics. It is not uncommon for political leaders and high-ranking officials, especially in Western democracies, to take a diplomatic stance when anti-government protest movements take place somewhere in the world. Diplomatic support comes in different forms. Sometimes political leaders simply condemn the repression of protesters, sympathize with their grievances, and/or demand policy change. Sometimes the support is more serious: it includes sanctions threats or implementation of actual sanctions.

This is usually referred to as "naming and shaming" in the existing literature of international relations. However, in this study, I use terms such as "diplomatic support," and "diplomatic backing" because my variable of interest is more than just naming and shaming. It includes a variety of diplomatic actions such as condemnation, demand, non-violent threat, punitive measure, and rhetorical support for protest campaigns. Therefore, I use the term "diplomatic support" instead of "naming and shaming" to avoid conceptual stretching, although I engage with the naming and shaming literature throughout the dissertation. Diplomatic support refers to "any backing of protests by a foreign government official or institution." In other words, the focus of this study is diplomatic actions taken by governments and not by intergovernmental or non-governmental international organizations.

Empirical research on the effect of international actors on human rights policies and practices has flourished in the last two decades. Yet, most of the existing studies focus on the role of intergovernmental or non-governmental international organizations. Research on the causes and consequences of support from third-party governments remains limited. Furthermore, the current literature involves a variety of outcome variables related to the broader issue of human rights but very few focus on protest movements.

This dissertation addresses three major interrelated questions on the causes and consequences of diplomatic support for protest movements. First, why do states provide diplomatic support for protest movements in other countries? The current literature on naming and shaming mostly focuses on its effects rather than its causes (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021; Tingley and Tomz 2022). The neighboring literature on external sources of democratization provides important insights into why democratic states seek to promote democratic values abroad. There is a variety of explanations for democracy promotion: from the role of security interests (Robinson and Robinson 1996) to the local political conditions (Pee and Schmidli 2018) to normative commitment (Wolff and Wurm 2011). Another neighboring literature is related to external intervention in civil war. Previous research provides different theoretical perspectives, on why states decide to intervene in civil conflict. Factors such as security considerations (Fordham 2008), ethnic ties (Huibregtse 2010), the presence of natural resources (Findley and Marineau 2015) have been discussed as the main causes for external intervention in civil war. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical knowledge on the causes of external support for protest movements remains very limited.

To explore the why of diplomatic support, I focus on diplomatic support from Western democracies in the post-Cold War period. Why only Western democracies? For two reasons. First, as shown in the second chapter, Western democracies make up the absolute majority of diplomatic supporters. Second, due to their enormous economic and political power, diplomatic support from Western democracies is more likely to influence the dynamics of protest movements. To clarify, I do discuss diplomatic actions in response to protest campaigns by non-Western countries but the discussion is more of a descriptive analysis. The explanatory analysis focuses on Western democracies.

I propose two hypotheses to answer the question of why Western democracies provide diplomatic support for protest movements. First, I argue that due to the importance of human rights issues in the post-Cold War era both in international relations and in the domestic politics of Western democracies, political leaders are expected to take a supportive diplomatic stance when the host government uses extreme violence to deal with protest campaigns. The reason is the use of extreme violence alarms both political leaders and draws media attention which itself creates domestic public pressure for diplomatic actions against the repressive government.

Second, while Western democracies are attentive to human rights, their diplomacy is also guided by the interests of the liberal international order. The U.S.-led liberal international order is believed to provide security and promote democratic norms. As a result, it needs to be protected from revisionist actors who usually happened to be autocratic governments. Therefore, protest movements that take place in countries that have an oppositional stance toward the liberal international order should be more likely to receive diplomatic support from Western democracies. In order to test these theoretical expectations, I collected data on 523 diplomatic stances toward protest movements from 1990 to 2019. The findings largely support the expectations.

The second question is about the consequences of diplomatic support on public attitude. Is diplomatic support effective? Does it increase public support for protest movements? Also, do different types of diplomatic support have different effects? For instance, is rhetorical support less or more effective than sanctions? The third chapter of the dissertation addresses these questions.

The existing literature on the impact of naming and shaming mostly focuses on pressure from international non-governmental organizations on a variety of domestic human rights issues rather than diplomatic support from other countries. As broadly discussed in the third chapter, the literature is divided into three major theoretical perspectives. The first perspective argues for the positive impact of international support on human rights (Keck and Sikkink 2014). On the contrary, the second theoretical perspective suggests that international support is likely to backfire due to the rally 'round the flag effect (Tingley and Tomz 2022; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021) or because it encourages movements to spend their time and energy to find global connections rather than trying to establish local networks (Jalali 2013). The third theoretical perspective argues that drawing conclusions on the impact of international support is a difficult task either because it cannot be explained without randomized studies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021) or because it depends on contextual factors (Hendrix and Wong 2013; Hafner-Burton 2008).

This study seeks to fill the substantive and methodological gaps in the existing naming and shaming literature. I conducted a survey experiment among Iranian intelligentsia (politically engaged and educated citizens) to explore the effectiveness of diplomatic support. I focused on the intelligentsia for two reasons. First, the intelligentsia has historically played a central role in the political mobilization of the masses in developing countries. They were at the forefront of two major revolutions (1906 and 1979) in Iran. Second, the intelligentsia has lower levels of preference falsification compared to the masses. In other words, they are more likely to speak their mind without self-censoring. For these reasons, understanding the intelligentsia's attitudes provides important information on how diplomatic support would influence public attitude toward protest movements.

My survey experimental conditions include a hypothetical protest that receives support from the United States. The findings demonstrate that diplomatic support from the United States does not affect attitudes by itself. However, sympathy toward the protesters is reduced when diplomatic support takes place alongside the protesters' call for foreign diplomatic pressure. The results also show that reformists' attitudes are more influenced by diplomatic support compared to conservatives and revolutionaries.

The third question asks about the consequences as well but focuses on the role of supporter identity. In other words, the question specifically asks how does the identity of supporter affect public attitude toward protest movements? My main argument is that domestic response to foreign diplomatic support for protest movements is expected to be conditional on the identity of the supporter. Diplomatic support from strategic rivals is expected to reduce public support for protest movements. However, diplomatic support for allies should increase support for protesters.

I test this argument by conducting a survey experiment in the United States on support

for the Black Lives Matter Movement and the Floyd protests. The findings suggest that individuals' willingness to join future protests is reduced when diplomatic support comes from strategic competitors. They also show that support from democratic allies increases sympathy for the movement among Democratic identifiers. On the other hand, diplomatic support from strategic allies reduces Republican identifiers' willingness to attend protests in the future.

This dissertation makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the flourishing empirical research on the impact of diplomacy on foreign publics. While the literature on the effect of diplomacy on foreign publics' attitudes and behavior has been growing, our knowledge remains limited. Especially, we know little about the impact of third-party diplomatic action on contentious political behavior and attitude in the host country. This study provides empirical evidence on how diplomatic support influences public opinion during times of domestic unrest.

Second, there is also little systematic research on the causes of diplomatic support. While there is a relatively well-developed literature on the impact of external actors (e.g., military invasion, financial aid, etc.) on the dynamics of domestic politics, research on the why of diplomatic support for protest movements remains rare. This study addresses this gap by analyzing original data on diplomatic stances from 1990 to 2019.

Third, this study introduces a new dataset on diplomatic stances toward protest movements. The dataset includes 523 diplomatic stances on protest events from 1990 to 2019 by extensive reading of more than 50 newspapers and other international news agencies. The dataset also includes other information (stance-taker, type of stance, etc.) related to diplomatic actions. The dataset could potentially be used by itself or in combination with other datasets to answer unexplored questions.

This dissertation is made up of five chapters. The first chapter - that you are reading nowis the introduction that sets the main theme and provides information on the main argument, contribution, and the organization of the dissertation. The second chapter discusses the causes of diplomatic support and answers the question that why countries provide diplomatic support for protest movements. I use my original data to analyze the why of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements. The third chapter examines the consequences of diplomatic support by conducting an intelligentsia survey experiment in Iran. The fourth chapter focuses on the Black Lives Matter Movement and seeks to understand if the identity of supporter makes a difference. I conduct a survey experiment in the United States to answer the question of supporter identity. The fifth and last chapter is the conclusion. This chapter sums up the dissertation and discusses the implications of this study for activists, policy-makers, and political leaders. It also includes suggestions for future research on diplomacy and protest movements.

Chapter 2

DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR PROTEST MOVEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM WESTERN DIPLOMACY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

2.1 Introduction

In March 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on the Nicaragua police force over its violent repression and the use of live ammunition against peaceful protesters (Reuters 2020). In another development, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her "support to the peaceful protesters in Belarus" and called for an end to the repression of Belarus's democratic movement (Deutsche Welle 2021). In January 2020, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani made a statement in support of the Pashtun Protection Movement, a political campaign for Pashtun human rights in Pakistan (Jamal 2020). These are just a few examples of foreign states' diplomatic support for political movements abroad.

Why do states provide diplomatic support for protest campaigns in other countries? Support for political campaigns abroad is not costless. Diplomatic support for anti-government movements could easily endanger the relationship between the supporter and the target country. Moreover, diplomatic support for protest movements could destabilize other states that might threaten regional and international security. If diplomatic support for protests is detrimental to bilateral relations and has the potential to destabilize the existing security order, then why do states still take such a risk? This study seeks to address this question using an original dataset of 523 diplomatic stances in response to protest movements in the post-Cold War era. The focus of this paper is on Western diplomacy because of two reasons. First, due to their enormous economic and diplomatic power, Western countries and organizations are more likely to shape the dynamics and outcomes of protest movements. Second, the majority of diplomatic support for anti-government protests in the post-Cold War era comes from the West. In fact, the United States and European Union have made human rights and democracy promotion a principled foreign policy goal in the post-Cold War era (Huber 2015). While human rights diplomacy has increasingly become a core focus of Western democracies, there is little empirical research on its causes. This study seeks to address this vacuum by using an original dataset of diplomatic support for protest movements from 1990 to 2019.

Of course, Western democracies differ from each other in their human rights and democracy promotion policies. Previous studies (Carothers 2009) identify different approaches toward democracy promotion among Western democracies. Despite the differences in their approaches and methods towards human rights diplomacy and democracy promotion, Western democracies share a commitment towards human rights values and democratic norms. This commitment has manifested itself in different human rights promotion programs and initiatives in the post-Cold War era (Lucarelli and Manners 2006).

The central argument of this study is that protest campaigns are more likely to receive diplomatic support from Western democracies under two conditions. First, diplomatic support becomes more likely when the host government uses extreme violence to quell protests. This is because of the increasing importance of human rights values in the post-Cold War era. Second, when the host governments' policies are incompatible with the US-led liberal international order. While Western democracies care about human rights, they also take into consideration their interests - and broadly speaking, the interests of the liberal international order- in dealing with protests in other countries. Thus, when protests took place in countries whose policy preferences diverge from those of Western democracies, they are more likely to receive diplomatic support.

Empirical findings provide support for my theoretical expectations. The results remain robust when control variables are included and when alternative measurements are used to check for the robustness of the results. This paper is organized as follows. First, I overview the literature on external interference and domestic politics. Then I present my argument and theoretical expectations. Next, I provide information on my data and research design. Finally, I present my statistical analysis on the causes of Western diplomatic support for protest movements.

2.2 External Interference in Domestic Politics

Little systematic research has been conducted on why states provide diplomatic support for protest movements abroad. The extant literature is mainly related to democracy promotion by democratic states, especially, the United States. Some scholars highlight the role of security and economic interests in democratic states' support for democratization. The gist of the argument is that democratic states instrumentalize democracy promotion to advance their strategic interests (Wolff and Wurm 2011; Wolff 2015). Democracy is supported as long as it serves the national interests of the supporter country abroad. Also, some critical theorists associate the U.S. democracy promotion with its goal to maintain its hegemonic power (Robinson and Robinson 1996; Wolff and Wurm 2011). According to this perspective, the U.S. democracy promotion in peripheral countries is an elite accommodation strategy in order to create stability and incorporate those countries into the US-dominated international system.

Nevertheless, many scholars highlight the importance of context. Some have argued that the U.S. diplomatic support for democratic movements depends on its reading of local political and military conditions. For instance, Schmidli (2018) argues that local factors played a key role in Reagan's democracy promotion policy. When the dictatorship seemed to be stable, the U.S. usually supported the status quo. However, when the dictatorship was failing or when there was a threat of Soviet-backed insurgency, the U.S. supported democratization if there was an acceptable alternative to the existing elites. In other words,

support for democratization is conditional on the existence of favorable local conditions. This approach is more consistent with realist and neo-Marxist theoretical paradigms in international relations that emphasize the priority of economic and security interests in shaping hegemonic powers' policies.

Some, however, explain democracy promotion as a normative commitment (Wolff and Wurm 2011). The idea comes from the democratic peace theory which argues democracies do not fight each other because they externalize their domestic democratic norms or/ and they consider domestic preferences- which arguably should prefer peace to conflict (Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1997). This perspective borrows from some variants -such as republican liberalism (Moravcsik 1997)- of the liberal theory of international relations.

Another line of research emphasizes the role of identity and culture. Scholars within this framework emphasize concepts such as national role conceptions (Holsti 1970; Wish 1980) and foreign policy cultures (Beasley et al. 2012; Wiarda 2016). According to this approach, the political culture or identity of states influences their international behavior. For example, if a state considers itself as a global protector of democratic values, democracy promotion abroad will be its guiding policy. However, it should be noted that the literature mainly comes from international relations and foreign policy theories. In fact, independent research on the why of external support for political campaigns remains limited within this approach.

Other than democracy promotion, external intervention in civil war has drawn the attention of political scientists as well. Some (Fordham 2008) have emphasized the role of security interests in external interventions in civil war. Some others (Ghose and James 2005) have highlighted the impact of role expectations in states' decisions to intervene in civil conflict. Previous studies (Huibregtse 2010) also explain ethnic ties as a strong motivation for external intervention in civil conflict. Some studies (Findley and Marineau 2015) associate intervention in civil war with the presence of natural resources in the target country. Previous studies (San-Akca 2016) also explain external support for insurgency as a

product of a deliberate selection process involving both the government and the insurgent groups. States make purposive choices to find certain rebel groups to support in order to deal with their external threats and internal challenges. Rebel groups, on the other side, choose their external patrons based on ideological and strategic considerations.

Another form of intervention is covert action by external actors, such as assassinating foreign leaders, organizing coup d'état, covertly meddling in foreign elections, or funding and arming opposition groups (O'Rourke 2018; O'Rourke 2020), that intends to influence the domestic politics of other countries. Most of the previous research focuses on U.S. covert operations during the Cold War. Some studies argue that the U.S. covert action was intended to promote democracy abroad (Muravchik 1992) but others emphasize the U.S. economic interests, such as protecting the interests of powerful multinational corporations (Kinzer 2007) or promoting the U.S. position as the leader of the capitalist world (Chomsky 2004; Sullivan 2008). A recent empirical study (Berger et al. 2013) shows that CIA interventions during the Cold War resulted in a dramatic increase in U.S. exports to the target country in industries in which the U.S. had a comparative disadvantage. Some other studies associate the U.S. covert operations with national security concerns and the necessity of maintaining its hegemonic position in the international system (O'Rourke 2020).

While the literature has made progress in identifying dynamics of democracy promotion, intervention in civil conflict, and covert operations, it remains limited when it comes to diplomatic support for protest campaigns. It is necessary to point out that protest campaigns that I study have a wide range of goals: regime change, institutional reform, policy change, territorial session, greater autonomy. Nevertheless, in general, they are against the entirety of the government or its policies. Therefore, I consider these non-violent movements anti-government campaigns.

2.3 Theoretical Expectations

When do Western states provide diplomatic support for protest campaigns? My main argument is that Western diplomatic support becomes more likely when the host government uses extreme violence against protestors and when the same government has an oppositional stance towards the US-led international order. The response from Western democracies to the use of extreme violence is due to the increasing importance of human rights norms in international politics since the end of the Cold War. The emergence of human rights norms in international politics goes back to the end of World War II when the U.S. played a central role in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. While support for human rights across the world remained a core concept of Western democracies, implementing consistent pro-human rights policies faced strong barriers in the context of the Cold War due to geopolitical considerations. The priority of security interests to contain communism across the globe limited the scope of Western human rights diplomacy. As a result, the geopolitical and security interests of the West, and especially the United States, outweighed human rights concerns.

The United States supported anti-communist authoritarian governments and enabled their persistence across the globe during the Cold War. It also engaged in planning and backing military coups against democratically elected governments in several countries including Iran, Guatemala, and Chile (Blum 2003). The military coups resulted in the establishment of authoritarian governments with egregious human rights violation records. Although Carter's administration sought to institutionalize human rights advocacy by founding a new State Department Bureau of Human Rights, his human rights policy remained inconsistent in its application (Stuckey 2008). In sum, the highly competitive bipolar international system imposed significant constraints on the foreign policy of Western democracies. As a result, Western diplomacy failed to actively promote human rights values in pro-Western

authoritarian states.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, however, provided a unique opportunity for Western democracies to actively promote human rights values at the global level. The emergence of a unipolar system, with the US as the hegemonic power and the leading liberal democracy, enabled Western democracies to focus on the issues related to human rights in autocratic countries. It does not mean that human rights concerns were the only guiding policy of the United States or other Western democracies in the post-Cold War era but human rights values significantly influenced foreign policy-making.

Especially, the post-Cold War international agenda emphasized the rights to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of opinion, and expression. The emergence of deadly civil conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, the Caucuses, and Central Asia highlighted the importance of peaceful political action, non-violent movements, and a more restrained government response. Western democratic leaders often encourage governments to refrain from violence in dealing with civil society actors and oppositional activism. Moreover, the emergence of a transnational advocacy network has raised awareness on human rights violations among international actors and put norm-violating states on international agenda (Risse et al. 1999).

Moreover, extreme violence is more likely to draw media attention, raise the visibility of repression against protesters, and as a result, mobilize public opinion against the repressive government. This could influence the attitudes of policy-makers given public opinion's key role in shaping foreign policy preferences in Western democracies (Tomz et al. 2020; Page and Shapiro 1983). Previous research Peksen et al. (2014) suggests media coverage of human rights violations increases the likelihood of economic sanctions against abusive governments by mobilizing public opinion. Previous studies (Whang 2011) also show that domestic political gain is one of the main purposes of using economic sanctions in foreign policy despite increasing pessimism about their effectiveness. Therefore, taking diplomatic actions in support of protest movements could yield political gains in domestic politics for

Western democratic leaders.

Given the increasing emphasis on the rights to peaceful protests and the necessity of restrained government response in the international relations agenda by Western democracies in the post-Cold War era, the use of violence by the government against protestors is expected to trigger an international response. In fact, if the government response to protests is restrained and proportional, international actors will have little justification to diplomatically intervene in the domestic politics of the host government. However, if the government responds to peaceful anti-government protests with extreme violence and repression, it will alarm international actors about human rights violations. Also, the use of extreme violence is likely to draw media attention and mobilize public opinion against the repressive government among the publics of Western democracies. This could incentives political leaders to take a diplomatic stance in order to please the domestic audience. Therefore, the theoretical expectation is that protest movements will receive diplomatic support when the government resorts to extreme violence to quell protesters.

Hypothesis 1. Protest movements that face extreme violence from the government are more likely to receive diplomatic support from Western democracies.

While human rights promotion has been on the foreign policy agenda of most major Western democracies since the end of the Cold War, it is not the only guiding principle for human rights diplomacy. Western democracies have a keen interest in protecting the liberal international order, especially from revisionist authoritarian governments. The liberal international order is believed to provide peace and security and at the same time it institutionally promotes human rights values. As a result, it is not surprising if undermining anti-system revisionist states becomes an important policy consideration for Western democracies.

An overview of the United States foreign policy since the end of the Cold War shows the selective aspects of its human rights diplomacy. For instance, the Clinton administration adopted a context-specific approach towards democracy and human rights promotion in the 1990s. While democracy and human rights promotion became Clinton's guiding policy in Eastern Europe and Latin America, he turned a blind eye towards human rights issues in China and Middle Eastern countries due to economic and security considerations (Carothers 1995). some have argued the Bush and Obama administrations also prioritize the United sates strategic interests over human rights. For instance, Selim (2013) argues that the United States tried its best during the Arab Spring to support authoritarian leaders. However, when it became clear that authoritarian governments are collapsing, the United States tried to manage the crisis by siding with revolutionary forces and at the same time, maintaining the main power structures. One of the most obvious examples of the United States selective strategy towards human rights is its relations with the United States foreign policy. Human rights considerations have consistently become a victim of the US strategic relations with Arab oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf even after the end of the Cold War (Jamal 2012). While Western democracies

Given the necessity of protecting the international system from anti-system actors, Western democracies view protests in those countries as an opportunity to undermine those actors. Major Western democracies view diplomatic support as a positive contribution to protest campaigns that strengthen them and could finally lead to "regime change" in those countries. It also provides a strong justification for coercive diplomacy (e.g. imposing economic sanctions) that itself could weaken the host government in the long term. Therefore, the emergence of protest campaigns in countries that hold an oppositional stance to the US-led international order is an opportunity for Western democracies to protect their broader strategic interests as well. The theoretical expectation is that Western democracies become more likely to support protest campaigns when they took place in countries with a strong oppositional stance against the liberal international order:

Hypothesis 2. Protest movements are more likely to receive diplomatic support from Western democracies when the host government has an oppositional stance towards the


2.4 Data and Method

I collected 523 diplomatic stances on protest events from 1990 to 2019 by extensive reading of more than 50 newspapers and other international news agencies. This includes diplomatic actions from Western and non-Western governments and institutions. I used the Nexis Uni search engine to identify diplomatic actions in response to protest campaigns. I define diplomatic support for protest campaigns as "any backing of protests by a foreign government official or institution." I used the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) codebook to classify diplomatic action in response to protest campaigns into seven categories: Disapprove, demand, non-violent threat, punitive measure, pro-protest supportive stance, neutral stance, and pro-government stance. Each of these categories also includes specific sub-categories. I made some minor changes (including adding several sub-categories) to the CAMEO's classification in order to cover all the diplomatic stances in my dataset. Figure 2.1 shows different categories and sub-categories of diplomatic actions.

I combined my original dataset on diplomatic stances in response to protests with Mass Mobilization (MM) data. The MM provides data on protest events where 50 or more protesters publicly demonstrate against the government. The MM includes information on the location, protest size, protest demands, and government responses. I identified protests in the MM dataset that received diplomatic support and then combined it with my original data. My dataset has a dyadic structure in which every protest interval in a country is paired with 35 Western supporters.

The dependent variable of this paper is diplomatic support. If a protest received diplomatic support from at least one Western country, the variable is coded 1, 0 otherwise. As figure 1 indicates, not all diplomatic actions are in support of protestors. Sometimes, governments take a neutral stance or they express support for the host government. I will use

Figure 2.1: Diplomatic Stance Categories and Sub-categories



the data for all types of diplomatic actions for the purpose of descriptive analysis. However, neutral and pro-government diplomatic stances will be dropped in the regression analysis because those stances clearly cannot be classified as "diplomatic support." My focus in on protest in non-Western states, whether democratic or authoritarian.

The fist independent variable is extreme violence by the government. I consider a government's response extremely violent if its response to protests includes the killing of the protestors. Thus, if a government's response includes killing, the independent variable takes 1; if not, it takes 0. The data on the government response is obtained from the MM dataset. The second variable is the position of the host government towards the US-led international liberal order. To measure the second independent variable, I use the national ideal point calculated by Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017) based on the voting in the UN General Assembly data. The measurement captures the position of states towards the US-led liberal international order.

As I pointed out earlier, this study focuses on Western diplomatic support for two reasons. First, the majority of diplomatic support for protest movements comes from Western democracies. Second, due to their enormous political and economic power, diplomatic support from Western governments is more likely to influence the dynamics and outcomes of protest campaigns. The concept of the West or the Western World has been used differently by different people over time. In this study, the West refers to the US, Canada (two major countries of North America), members of the European Union, UK, Switzerland, major Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), Australia, and New Zealand. This is a mostly politico-cultural definition commonly used in the post-Cold War era (Huntington 1996). In total, my analysis includes diplomatic support from 35 Western countries.

I conduct two-stage analysis in order to estimate the impact of extreme violence and opposition to the U.S.-led liberal international order on diplomatic support. The first stage includes a logistic regression model with regime type, protest violence, and protest size as control variables. To measure regime type, I use the Bjørnskov-Rode regime data (Bjørnskov and Rode 2020) that has been built on the binary regime classification (democracy vs. autocracy) of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's Democracy and Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010). The variables coded 1 if the host government is democratic and 0 otherwise. Incorporating a variable on protest violence is necessary because it could be argued that violence by protestors makes it difficult for international actors to support protestors. As a result, acts of violence by protestors might lower the likelihood of diplomatic support for protest campaigns. Previous studies suggest that peaceful movements are more likely to garner the support of the international community (Chenoweth et al. 2011). Protest size is an important signal for foreign governments on the success likelihood of protest campaigns. Some have argued that governments only support protest movements whose chances of success are high (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). Thus, the diplomatic support could be related to the strength of protest movements.

In the second stage, I conduct a dyadic analysis that includes additional control variables with dyadic features. The first control variable is difference in foreign policy preferences of the host government and the supporter. It could be argued that if two governments have significant differences in their foreign policy preferences, diplomatic support for opposition campaigns become more likely. I use the difference between national ideal points (Bailey et al. 2017)- calculated based on states' voting in the UN General Assembly- to measure the differences in foreign policy preferences of countries. More difference between ideal points of two countries means more difference in foreign policy preferences between them. I also include variables on different types of alliance from the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance dataset (Gibler 2008). It could be argued that governments are less likely to support anti-government movements when they happen in a country that is considered an ally because those movements could undermine their allies. I used the data for defense and

entente alliances to control for the potential effect of formal alliances on states' diplomatic actions in response to protest movements abroad.

Furthermore, I control for the impact of geographical proximity by adding a contiguity variable to the model from the COW Direct Contiguity dataset (Douglas et al. 2002). Given the possibility of diffusion, contagious states might be less likely to support protest movements in neighboring countries. I also control for colonial legacy. Previous studies(Bernhard et al. 2004; Neumayer 2003; Alesina and Dollar 2000) show that colonial legacies have enduring effects on the domestic politics of colonized societies and some of the former colonial powers are still somehow involved in the politics of formal colonies. For instance, France has maintained strong economic and political ties with former colonies even after decolonization (Charbonneau 2008). The variable aims to estimate the impact of previous colonial relations on the likelihood of diplomatic support for protest movements. In other words, it seeks to understand whether previous colonizers are more likely to diplomatically support protest campaigns in former colonies.

2.5 Statistical Analysis

In this section, I first provide descriptive statistics. Then I use the logistic regression model to show the impact of the use of extreme violence by the government on diplomatic support for protest movements.

Figure 2.2 demonstrates the number of diplomatic reactions to protest events from 1990 to 2019. Despite visible fluctuations, the trend line is moving upwards over time overall – especially it becomes more obvious after 2002. The spike in the number of diplomatic stances in 2011 is the result of anti-government protests in the Arab World that attracted global attention. Figure 2.3 provides information on the percentage of different types of diplomatic stances. The category "disapprove" accounts for 60 percent of diplomatic stances. "Disapprove" includes diplomatic stances such as "criticize or denounces the government",




Figure 2.2: Number of Diplomatic Stances from 1990 to 2019

Note: The dashed line shows the trend.

"accusing the government of human rights violations," and similar stances. The category "demand" (e.g., demand rights, demand policy change) makes up 14.4 percent of diplomatic stances. "Punitive measure" (e.g., imposing sanctions, stopping aid, or reducing diplomatic relations) constitutes 10.5 percent of diplomatic actions in response to protest campaigns. All the remaining categories account for less than 10 percent of diplomatic stances.

Figure 2.4 shows a map of all the countries that provided diplomatic support for protest movements from 1990 to 2019. According to the map, the United States (with 78 diplomatic stances) accounts for the largest number of diplomatic responses for protest campaigns in the post-Cold war era. As the map demonstrates, the majority of diplomatic responses to




Figure 2.3: Type of Diplomatic Stance

Note: The number over the bar shows the frequency of diplomatic stances.

protest movements come from Western governments.

Yet, it should be pointed out that states are not the only political entities that provide diplomatic support. Sometimes international organizations also engage in human rights diplomacy. Figure 2.5 shows the top 10 countries and organizations with the highest number of diplomatic support. The red color represents Western countries and organizations. Dark grey shows Non-Western countries. The United Nations is displayed in Blue color. Iran and Turkey are the only two non-Western countries on the list. The remaining supporters (with an exception of the UN that I considered neither Western nor non-Western) are Western countries and organizations.




Figure 2.4: Diplomatic Supporters from 1990 to 2019

Now I turn to the regressing analysis to test my hypothesis. Table 2.1 provides the statelevel logistic regression results. Since my dependent variable is binary, I use the logistic regression model to evaluate the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. I first run two bivariate models with two independent variables. The first model evaluates the impact of extreme violence on diplomatic support. The second model examines the impact of position on the U.S.-led liberal international order (LIB). Both independent variables demonstrate a significant relationship with the outcome variable in models 1 and 2. Extreme violence is positive and significant, meaning that diplomatic support becomes more likely when the host government uses extreme violence. Opposition to the liberal international order is negative and significant. It means that as the level of opposition to the




Figure 2.5: Top 10 Countries and Organizations with the Highest Number of Diplomatic Support

international liberal order increases, the likelihood of Western diplomatic support for protest campaigns increases as well. The third model includes both independent variables. The statistical significance for both variables remains the same.

Models 4 and 5 include control variables. Due to a large amount of missing data for the variable protest size, I included it only in model 5. Democracy is negative and significant in both models, indicating that protest movements in democratic governments are less likely to receive diplomatic support from Western democracies. The coefficient for protest violence is statistically insignificant in both models, suggesting no meaningful impact of violence committed by protesters on the diplomatic stances of Western democracies. Finally, protest

| | Dependent variable: Diplomatic support | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|--|
| - | | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
| Extreme violence | 2.90*** | | 2.72*** | 2.50*** | 2.97*** | |
| | (0.18) | | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.45) | |
| Opposition to LIO | | -1.43^{***} | -1.24^{***} | -0.76^{**} | -0.23 | |
| | | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.24) | (0.35) | |
| Democracy | | | | -1.51^{***} | -1.10^{*} | |
| | | | | (0.33) | (0.52) | |
| Protest violence | | | | 0.40 | 0.40 | |
| | | | | (0.26) | (0.44) | |
| Protest size | | | | | 0.68 | |
| | | | | | (0.57) | |
| Constant | -5.33^{***} | -5.65^{***} | -6.20^{***} | -5.51^{***} | -5.92^{***} | |
| | (0.12) | (0.19) | (0.23) | (0.27) | (0.40) | |
| Observations | 15,208 | 11,667 | 11,637 | 11,630 | 6,610 | |
| Log Likelihood | -669.93 | -438.76 | -380.48 | -366.04 | -148.87 | |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,343.86 | 881.51 | 766.96 | 742.07 | 309.74 | |
| <i>Note:</i> *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p< | | | | ***p<0.001 | | |

 Table 2.1: State-level Logistic Regression Results for Diplomatic Support


size is positive but not significant.


Figure 2.6 shows the predicted probability for both independent variables. The use of extreme violence increases the probability of diplomatic support from near 0 to 3 percent. Also, predicted probability of diplomatic support for protest movements in revisionist countries is 3 percent. However, as the level of opposition to the liberal international order decreases, the probability of diplomatic support decreases as well, nearing 0.

Now I turn to the dyadic analysis. Again, models 1 and 2 report bivariate results on the impact of independent variables. Both models suggest that extreme violence and opposition

| | | | Depende | nt variabl | e: | |
|-------------------------|------------|--------------|------------|---------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| - | | | Diploma | atic suppor | t | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Extreme violence | 2.85*** | | 2.87*** | 2.72*** | 3.15*** | 2.93*** |
| | (0.12) | | (0.15) | (0.17) | (0.30) | (0.32) |
| Opposition to LIO | | -1.89^{**} | * -1.92*** | -1.60*** | 0.35 | |
| | | (0.15) | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.28) | |
| Alliance (entente) | | | | 1.10 | | |
| | | | | (1.03) | | |
| Alliance (defense) | | | | -4.83 | -13.07 | -11.43 |
| | | | | (298.81)(5 | (5,751.98) ($(5,751.98)$ | 5,682.82) |
| Former colony | | | | 1.40*** | 1.97*** | 1.32*** |
| | | | | (0.26) | (0.35) | (0.39) |
| Contiguity | | | | 1.05 | -13.66 | -12.32 |
| | | | | (0.72) | (483.04) | (479.06) |
| Democracy | | | | -1.35^{***} | -0.96^{**} | -0.21 |
| | | | | (0.23) | (0.35) | (0.35) |
| Protest violence | | | | 0.26 | -0.26 | -0.29 |
| | | | | (0.17) | (0.29) | (0.32) |
| Protest size | | | | | 0.98** | 1.12** |
| | | | | | (0.35) | (0.36) |
| Foreign policy differen | ce | | | | | 1.24*** |
| | | | | | | (0.19) |
| Constant | -8.02*** | -8.93*** | * -9.63*** | -9.15*** | -8.37*** | -10.86^{***} |
| | (0.09) | (0.16) | (0.19) | (0.22) | (0.28) | (0.50) |
| Observations | 417,101 | 361,279 | 318,110 | 317,723 | 133,745 | 107,052 |
| Log Likelihood | -2,160.42- | <i>,</i> | , | , | -435.72 | -362.72 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 4,324.83 | 3,020.47 | 2,623.29 | 2,555.17 | 889.43 | 743.44 |
| Note: | | | | *p<0.05 | 5; **p<0.01 | ;***p<0.00] |

| Table 2.2: Dyadic Logistic Regression I | Results for Diplomatic Support |
|---|--------------------------------|
|---|--------------------------------|





to the liberal international order are significantly associated with diplomatic support. Model 3 also shows a similar pattern. I include other potentially influential variables in models 4, 5, and 6. The fourth model also supports the main theoretical expectations: that the use of extreme violence by the host government and its oppositional stance towards the liberal international order increases the likelihood of Western diplomatic support for protest movements. In addition, the model shows that former colonial powers are more likely to support protest movements when they took place in former colonies. Also, it shows that protests in democratic countries are less likely to receive Western diplomatic support than protests in authoritarian governments.

Again, I added protest size in model 5 because it includes a large amount of missing information. Extreme violence is still significantly associated with diplomatic support. However, opposition to the liberal international order loses its statistical significance. Never-theless, it should be emphasized that model 5 includes a large amount of missing data and the findings should be interpreted cautiously. Protest size also emerges as a significant predictor of diplomatic support in model 5. Larger protests are more likely to receive Western

| Variable | Odds ratio | Percentage |
|-------------------|------------|------------|
| Extreme violence | 15.1 | 456.9 |
| Opposition to LIO | 0.2 | -92.5 |
| Former colony | 4 | 48.6 |
| Democracy | 0.2 | -90.4 |

 Table 2.3: Odds Ratio Table for Diplomatic Support

diplomatic support. Finally, I added foreign difference to model 6 and excluded opposition to the international order due to multicollinearity concerns as the two variables are highly correlated ((0.8)). The results show that higher levels of difference in policy preferences between the supporter and the host government increase the likelihood of diplomatic support for protest movements.

To better communicate the results, I present the odds ratio of the significant variables of model 4 alongside their percentage in Table 2.2. According to table 2.2, the odds ratio of extreme violence is 15.1. This suggests that the use of extreme violence against protest movements by a government increases the odds of Western diplomatic support by a factor of 15.1. In terms of percentage, when a protest campaign faces extreme violence from the government, the odds of receiving diplomatic support increase by 456.9 percent. An odds ratio of 0.2 for opposition to the liberal international order means that there is a 92.5 percent decrease in the odds of diplomatic support when a government is more aligned with the liberal international order.

The results also show that being a former colonizer increases the odds of diplomatic support for protest movements by a factor of 4 or 4.8 percent. This is consistent with previous studies on the tendency of former colonial states to intervene in the affairs of their erstwhile colonies (Roper and Barria 2007; Chacha and Stojek 2019). Finally, the odds ratio for the variable democracy is 0.2. It suggests that when protests take place in democratic

countries, there is a 90.4 decrease in the odds of Western diplomatic support for protest movements.




Figure 2.7: Predicted Probability of Extreme Violence and Opposition to the International Order: Dyadic Model

Finally, figure 2.6 provides predicted probability results for the two independent variables. According to figure 2.6, there is around a 0.25 percent chance of Western diplomatic support when the host government uses extreme violence against protestors. Also, the probability of diplomatic support from Western democracies for protest movements is around 0.4 percent for the protests that took place in countries with the highest levels of opposition to the liberal international order. However, the probability decreases as the level of opposition to the liberal liberal order goes down.

2.6 Robustness Checks

In this section, I use alternative measurements and specifications in order to check whether the findings are robust. To do so, I first use a different measurement for the violence variable. In the main model, I treated extreme violence as a binary variable. When the government response involved killing protestors, it is coded 1, 0 otherwise. Now I use an alternative coding by treating violence as an ordinal variable. The violence variable is built based on the information the MM dataset provides on state response. In general, the MM data includes 7 types of state response: Ignore, accommodation, arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal, shootings, and killings. I code these categories of states response as an ordinal variable on the level of violence. The coding is as follows: Ignore and accommodation= 0; arrests, beatings, and crowd dispersal= 1; shootings= 2; and killings= 3. Note that state response does not necessarily include one of these categories. For instance, a protest could face arrests, beatings, and crowd dispersal at the same time. So I sum up values of different types of state responses if a government uses different types of violence against protestors.

Table 2.3 shows the logistic regression results. The level of violence is a significant predictor of diplomatic support both in bivariate and multivariate models. In other words, as the level of violence increases, the likelihood of Western diplomatic support increases as well. Results for the opposition to the US-led liberal international order are also robust in terms of statistical significance and direction. Similarly, the direction and statistical significance of control variables remain robust. The only exception is protest violence that emerges as a negative significant variable in models 5 and 6. This suggests that international actors are less likely to support protest movements when protestors resort to violence.

The second alternative analysis is to limit the number of diplomatic supporters to major Western powers. It is reasonable to argue that many Western democracies do not have an active human rights diplomacy. In fact, many of them such as Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, and Lithuania are not usually viewed as major diplomatic actors in international politics. As a result, including information on all of the Western democracies means including irrelevant dyadic data that do not fit into the question being analyzed. Thus, here I focus on five major Western democracies with a leading role in human rights promotion: the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy are usually considered as four major European countries (Debaere 2015) and the United States is usually

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|--|
| _ | Diplomatic support | | | | | |
| | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | |
| Level of violence | 0.63*** | 0.61*** | 0.58*** | 0.73*** | 0.69*** | |
| | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.06) | |
| Opposition to LIO | | -1.74^{***} | -1.47^{***} | 0.52 | | |
| | | (0.16) | (0.17) | (0.28) | | |
| Alliance (entente) | | | 1.95 | | | |
| | | | (1.01) | | | |
| Alliance (defense) | | | -5.66 | -12.60 | -10.73 | |
| | | | (296.96) | (5, 768.97) | (5, 683.64) | |
| Former colony | | | 1.36*** | 1.96*** | 1.33*** | |
| | | | (0.26) | (0.36) | (0.39) | |
| Contiguity | | | 1.10 | -13.42 | -11.97 | |
| | | | (0.72) | (475.48) | (473.19) | |
| Democracy | | | -1.16^{***} | -0.94^{**} | -0.13 | |
| | | | (0.23) | (0.36) | (0.35) | |
| Protest violence | | | 0.10 | -0.74^{*} | -0.84^{**} | |
| | | | (0.17) | (0.29) | (0.32) | |
| Protest size | | | | 1.06** | 1.12** | |
| | | | | (0.36) | (0.36) | |
| Foreign policy difference | | | | | 1.23*** | |
| | | | | | (0.20) | |
| Constant | -8.72^{***} | -10.09^{***} | -9.58^{***} | -9.14^{***} | -11.63*** | |
| | (0.11) | (0.19) | (0.22) | (0.33) | (0.54) | |
| Observations | 471,996 | 361,279 | 335,713 | 133,990 | 107,283 | |
| Log Likelihood | -2,086.04 | -1,290.43 | -1,254.60 | -404.44 | -337.76 | |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 4,176.07 | 2,586.87 | 2,527.20 | 826.87 | 693.52 | |
| Note: | | | *p< | 0.05; **p<0.0 | 01; ***p<0.001 | |

Table 2.4: Dyadic Logistic Regression Results with an Alternative Measure of Violence

| | İ | Dependent | t variable: | | |
|---------------|--|--|---|--|--|
| | | Diplomati | c support | | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| 2.73*** | \$ | 2.76*** | * 2.45*** | 2.79*** | 2.67*** |
| (0.14) | | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.37) | (0.40) |
| | -1.87^{***} | -1.96*** | * -1.60*** | 0.20 | |
| | (0.18) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.35) | |
| | | | -2.89 | | |
| | | | (309.08) | | |
| | | | | -8.55 | -7.50 |
| | | | | (840.27) | (840.11) |
| | | | -0.23 | 0.43 | 0.35 |
| | | | (0.27) | (0.39) | (0.44) |
| | | | -1.39*** | -0.99^{*} | -0.33 |
| | | | (0.27) | (0.43) | (0.44) |
| | | | 0.64** | 0.33 | 0.27 |
| | | | (0.21) | (0.38) | (0.41) |
| | | | | 0.69 | 0.82 |
| | | | | (0.49) | (0.49) |
| e | | | | | 0.66** |
| | | | | | (0.24) |
| -6.29^{***} | · -7.31*** | -7.98*** | * -7.49*** | -6.94^{***} | -8.67*** |
| (0.10) | (0.20) | (0.23) | (0.26) | (0.37) | (0.71) |
| 57,502 | 49,777 | 45,157 | 45,100 | 18,835 | 15,654 |
| -1,242.87 | -852.73 | -724.10 | -700.50 | -233.45 | -195.43 |
| | 1 = 0 0 4 = | 1 151 20 | 1,415.01 | 482.90 | 406.86 |
| | 2.73^{***} (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) 57,502 | $(1) (2)$ 2.73^{***} (0.14) -1.87^{***} (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) $57,502 49,777$ | $\begin{array}{c cccc} & & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ \hline & & & \\ \hline \hline & & \\ \hline \hline & & \\ \hline & & \\ \hline \hline & & \\ \hline \hline \\ \hline & & \\ \hline \hline \\ \hline & & \\ \hline \hline \hline \\ \hline \hline \hline \\ \hline \hline \hline \hline \\ \hline \hline \hline \hline \hline \\ \hline | $\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$ |

Table 2.5: Dyadic Logistic Regression Results: Diplomatic Support from Major Western Powers

obviously seen as the leading power of the Western world.

Table 2.4 shows that the regression results are similar to the main findings. Extreme violence remains a statistically significant predictor of diplomatic support. Also, opposition to the liberal international order is significantly associated with diplomatic support for protest movements. The only exception is model 5 when protest size is included in the analysis. The variable democracy is also negative and significant in models 4 and 5, consistent with the results from the main analysis that Western diplomatic support is less likely when protests happen in democratic countries. A major difference appears to be in the association between protest violence and diplomatic support. While protest violence is not a significant predictor in the main findings and is negatively associated with the outcome variable in the first alternative analysis, it demonstrates a positive and statistically significant relationship with diplomatic support in model 3. However, the relationship loses its statistical significance in models 4 and 5. Finally, foreign policy difference has a significant statistical relationship with Western diplomatic support, suggesting that protest movements are more likely to receive diplomatic support in countries with higher levels of policy divergence with major Western powers. In general, the findings are similar to those of the main analysis and support the theoretical expectations.

Figure 2.7 demonstrates that the predicted probabilities for both independent variables show stronger predictions compared to the predicted probabilities of the main analysis. The probability of diplomatic support from major Western powers reaches around 1.3 percent when the host government uses extreme violence in response to protests. Also, the probability of diplomatic support from major Western democracies for protest movements is 2 percent when they took place in countries with a stronger oppositional stance towards the liberal international order. It gets closer to 0 in countries whose international behavior is more aligned with the Us-led liberal international order.




Figure 2.8: Predicted Probability: Support from Major Western Powers



Diplomatic support for protest movements has increasingly become a popular foreign policy tool. Many political leaders around the world do not hesitate to express their support for protesters in other countries and condemn the host government's repressive actions. As fashionable as it has become, theoretical and empirical work on the causes of diplomatic support remains limited. We have little empirical knowledge of when states provide diplomatic support for protest campaigns.

This study provides the first systematic empirical analysis on the causes of diplomatic support by focusing on Western diplomacy towards protest movements in the post-Cold War era. The results suggest that extreme violence against protesters plays a central role in motivating international actors to back protest campaigns. Other than theoretical and empirical contributions, the findings have also policy implications. The immediate policy implication is that the host government should develop a careful and proportional response to protest movements and refrain from overrepression. The use of extreme violence against non-violent protesters is likely to provoke a diplomatic backlash and increase the likelihood of external involvement in its internal affairs.

The results also suggest that Western democracies are more willing to support protest movements when they emerge in countries that tend to have an oppositional stance against the liberal international order. Therefore, protests in these countries are more likely to alarm Western democracies than protests in countries that have a more sympathetic position toward the liberal international order.

While this study sought to provide empirical evidence on the origins of diplomatic support for protest movements, the literature still remains in its infancy. Future research could investigate the effectiveness of diplomatic support. We still have little knowledge of whether diplomatic support for protest movements raises the cost of repression for autocratic leaders and whether it contributes to the success of movements. Also, future research may focus on public attitude to understand whether diplomatic support encourages individuals to join protest campaigns and as a result, increase the mobilizational capacity of movements.

Chapter 3

DIPLOMACY IN SUPPORT OF PROTEST MOVEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM AN INTELLIGENTSIA EXPERIMENT IN IRAN

3.1 Introduction

Human rights diplomacy has become a growing feature of international politics since the end of the Cold War. While the concept of human rights emerged after the end of World War II, it never become a guiding policy of states during the Cold War. The United States, known as the champion of freedom and democracy, barely prioritized human rights values in its Cold War foreign policy. The geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union left little room for human rights and democracy. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the unipolar international system, with the United States as the hegemonic power, provided an opportunity for Western democracies to actively implement human rights diplomacy. One of the important aspects of human rights policy has been diplomatic support for protest movements across the world in the post-Cold War era.

As pointed out in the first chapter, diplomatic support for protest campaigns has been increasing in the last three decades. Especially, Western democracies have been quite vociferous in supporting protest movements. Diplomatic support could take different forms. For example, sometimes it comes in the form of verbal condemnation of repression, and sometimes it appears in the form of coercive diplomacy such as elite sanctions or reducing financial aid. While being increasingly popular, our knowledge on the effectiveness of diplomatic support for protest movements remain limited. While the literature on naming and shaming has been growing in the last decades, previous studies often focus on the impact of international non-governmental organizations on human rights. Also, previous research pays little attention to the impact of external support on public attitude toward protest movements.

This study conducts a survey experiment in Iran to understand how third-party diplomatic support influences public attitude in the host country. I conduct the experiment among Iranian intelligentsia (educated and politically engaged individuals) for two major reasons. First, the intelligentsia has historically played a key role in shaping and mobilizing public opinion in developing countries. In fact, the intelligentsia was the main engine behind political revolutions in Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Mexico, Portugal, China, and Iran in the 20th century (Kurzman et al. 2008). Second, the intelligentsia has the lowest level of preference falsification (Kuran 1991). This is especially important for public opinion research in politically closed environments as citizens tend to misrepresent their private preferences over sensitive issues when they have to express them publicly. As a result, using an intelligentsia sample reduces the preference falsification bias.

The findings of this study suggest that foreign diplomatic support for protest campaigns does not affect attitudes towards protesters by itself. However, when diplomatic support happens alongside protesters' demands for foreign diplomatic pressure on the government, public attitude becomes less supportive of protesters. The results also show that reformists are more likely to be influenced by foreign diplomatic support compared to conservative and radical revolutionaries.

This article is organized as follows. First, I investigate the current literature on third-party naming and shaming. Second, I lay out the theoretical expectations. Third, I discuss data collection, sampling, and research design. Finally, I present statistical analyses of the data. In my concluding remarks, I discuss the implication of the findings for activists, political leaders, and policy-makers.

3.2 External Support for Protest Movements

The broader literature on external support for peaceful resistance movements is divided into three camps (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021; Tingley and Tomz 2022). The first camp argues that external support has a positive impact on the outcome of movements. For instance, Keck and Sikkink (2014) suggest that transnational activists and international nongovernmental human rights organizations influence states' domestic policies by attracting international media attention that itself encourages global actors to pressure governments in order to improve human rights. It is also argued that these global networks and organizations inform citizens about the effectiveness of peaceful resistance (Risse and Ropp 1999).

Some empirical findings support the idea that external support contributes to the mobilization and success of protest movements. Murdi's (2011) findings show that higher levels of commitment by international non-governmental human rights organizations (e.g., local presence) result in greater number of non-violent (as well as violent) protest campaigns. Also, case studies (Bunce and Wolchik 2011; McFaul 2007) in post-Communist countries in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe demonstrate the effectiveness of external support, such as financial aid to civil society groups or the naming and shaming actions. Previous studies also point to the crucial role of Western diplomatic pressure in South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy (Landsberg 2004). Also, some evidence on external support for opposition activists shows that diplomacy could be an effective tool for human rights promotion. For instance, a recent study (Myrick and Weinstein 2021) on the United States human rights policy shows that a combination of public and private diplomacy mechanisms was effective in freeing female political prisoners in several autocratic countries.

The second camp, however, argues that external support is likely to backfire for several reasons. First, external support could generate a nationalist reaction and rally people around

the flag in response to foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the host country (Tingley and Tomz 2022; Chenoweth and Stephan 2021). Second, external support in the form of financial aid could undermine social movements as they seek to expand their international connections rather than local networks (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021; Jalali 2013; ?). Furthermore, foreign support might contribute to the institutional repression of movements as it provides justification for the host government to pass restrictive domestic laws that subject activists and movements to further government surveillance and control (Jalali 2013). Finally, it is also argued that external support in the form of financial aid is likely to weaken the mobilizational capacity of movements because they will no longer need to expand their support base as they engage in lobbying and other activities that involve foreign actors rather than domestic constituency (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021; Jalali 2013; Keck and Sikkink 2014).

Some evidence from the empirical literature of naming and shaming shows the negative consequences of external support for resistance movements and broader human rights issues. For example, experimental findings from China suggest that diplomatic pressure from the United States for women's rights in authoritarian countries increases public support for authoritarian governments (Gruffydd-Jones 2019).

The third camp takes an agnostic approach either because the effectiveness of external support cannot be explained without randomized controlled trials (Chenoweth and Stephan 2021) or because it is conditional on contextual factors (Hendrix and Wong 2013; Hafner-Burton 2008). From a methodological viewpoint, the concern is that external supporters tend to support movements that have high chances of success. As a result, findings from observational studies might be affected by the selection effect.

While existing literature has addressed the linkage between international support and human rights, it still is in the making. Especially, previous studies mainly focus on support from international non-governmental organizations and transnational activists. Second, while the current literature involves a variety of outcome variables on domestic human rights issues, little empirical research exists on popular support for protest movements. This study addresses these gaps by focusing on how third-party diplomatic support for protest movements influence public attitude toward protesters.

3.3 Theoretical Expectations

In every protest movement, there could be three types of relationship between opposition and international actors. The first type occurs when there is no international support for a campaign and the leaders of the campaign do not seek international help either. The second type is when a protest campaign receives diplomatic support from foreign governments without any calls from protesters. The third type of relationship occurs when there is an interaction between opposition groups and international actors. Previous studies on naming and shaming usually focus on the effect of support from international supporters without considering the role of domestic actors (e.g., opposition leaders). This could result in simplified and static theoretical models given dynamic interactions between international and domestic actors that happen in the real world. Especially, when it comes to protest movements, opposition groups are not passive actors. Sometimes they are the ones who call for help from the international community.

Take, for example, the protest movements in Hong Kong and Venezuela, two of the largest protest campaigns in the last few years. Both protest campaigns received strong support from the United States and other Western democracies. The United States not only expressed support for the protesters but also imposed sanctions on China because of the Chinese government's repressive actions. Similarly, the United States used economic coercion again Venezuela in support of protesters. However, in both cases, opposition groups also played a significant role in encouraging international actors to take action against their government. For example, the Hong Kong protesters tried to draw the United States into

their movements by waving American flags and publicly asking for tougher diplomatic pressure against China (Wong 2019). Similarly, in Venezuela, opposition leader Juan Guaido publicly asked for the United States' help (Charner 2019).

To be clear, these examples do not necessarily mean that opposition groups always ask for foreign assistance. In fact, in many cases, they avoid associating themselves with foreign actors because any interaction with them might damage their reputation and create a rally 'round the flag effect. However, there do exist cases in which opposition groups and individuals call for international help.

The central argument of this study is diplomatic support is likely to weaken support for protest movements and create a rally 'round the flag effect when opposition leaders publicly request help from foreign governments. The negative effect of opposition leaders' interaction with foreign actors is due to two mechanisms. The first mechanism is reputation cost. Social movements are usually concerned with their public image (Rohlinger 2015; Schroer 2008). Having a favorable public image is essential for social movements to generate public sympathy for their goal and appeal to a broader audience. This is the reason that governments usually seek to create an unfavorable public image of movements by spreading image-damaging information on them (Marx 1979). Especially, authoritarian governments constantly use propaganda techniques against opposition groups as a social control mechanism (Kenez 1985; Abrahamian 1999; Chen and Xu 2017a). Propaganda techniques usually aim to damage opposition groups' reputation and consequently, undermine their mobilizational capabilities. When protest leaders publicly ask for help from foreign governments, it hurts their public image.

Second, governments can effectively exploit diplomatic support for protest movements to create a rally 'round the flag effect. Foreign support provides political leaders with an opportunity to garner popular support for themselves and undermine the anti-government movement's mobilizational strength. The presence of a common enemy could create social cohesion among significant portions of the population. A well-established literature in social psychology and sociology shows that external threat creates in-group cohesion (Stein 1976). The first mechanism is intended to undermine the reputation of the movement. The second mechanism aims to garner popular support for the government.

But why is diplomatic support more likely to affect public attitude only when it happens alongside opposition demands for foreign diplomatic pressure? Because it reinforces the typical government narrative that protesters are backed and paid by foreign countries. In other words, it makes a government's claims on the logistic or financial association between foreign countries and protesters credible. In other words, diplomatic support by itself is unlikely to change attitudes toward protest movements. However, when it takes place alongside request for international help by protest leaders, it becomes more likely to reduce support for protest campaigns and future participation in protests. Also, it increases support for repression and generally, for the government.

Hypothesis 1. Diplomatic support is likely to reduce support for protest movements when it occurs alongside protesters' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure.

Hypothesis 2. Diplomatic support is likely to reduce support for future participation in protest when it occurs alongside protesters' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure.

Hypothesis 3. Diplomatic support is likely to increase support for government repression of protests when it occurs alongside protesters' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure.

Hypothesis 4. Diplomatic support is likely to increase support for the government of protests when it occurs alongside protesters' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure.

Furthermore, diplomatic support is likely to affect certain political groups more than others. With respect to the state-society relations, three types of political groups could be identified: conservative (pro-status quo), reformist, and revolutionary. Political conservatives tend to support the incumbent for a variety of reasons (e.g., ideological affinities or economic interests). Reformists believe that their goals could be achieved without overturning the government (DeNardo 2014). Finally, revolutionaries argue that the incumbent government is not capable of undertaking significant reforms and as a result, should be overthrown.

Conservatives' position with regard to anti-government protest movements is quite predictable: they are expected to oppose any type of anti-government protest. It could be because of their ideological commitment to the government or due to their economic interests that are tied to the survival of the political system. On the opposite side of the spectrum, revolutionaries are expected to support any kind of mobilization against the government because they view a radical movement as the only way for real change. Since regime change is the most important goal for revolutionaries, their calculus is unlikely to be influenced by other factors. In other words, most of the conservatives will oppose any protest movement against the government and most of the revolutionaries will support it; regardless of diplomatic support from foreign countries. Reformists, however, are expected to be more selective in their support for protest movements. They reject the status quo and radicalism because neither of them is optimal. While they agree with revolutionaries that change is necessary, they suspect that the costs of radical change might outweigh the costs associated with maintaining the status quo. From this perspective, political change should be a controlled and calculated process.

Therefore, reformists are more likely to take into account factors that could help or hurt a controlled transition. As a result, reformists are likely to pay closer attention to diplomatic support, especially in countries with a historical experience of vulnerability to great power interventions. Given the historical experience, reformists view cooperation between opposition groups and foreign countries not as a positive development but rather as a potentially destabilizing factor. As a result, reformists are expected to be affected by diplomatic intervention when it occurs alongside demands from protest leaders for foreign pressure on the government.

Hypothesis 5. Diplomatic support is likely to reduce support for protest movements

among reformists when it occurs alongside protesters' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure.

3.4 Research Design

This study uses a survey experiment of the political intelligentsia in Iran to explore the effectiveness of diplomatic support for protest movements. But who is intelligentsia and why intelligentsia?

The Cambridge Dictionary defines the term "intelligentsia" as "very educated people in a society, especially those interested in the arts and in politics" (Cambridge Dictionary 2022). In a similar way, the Oxford Dictionary refers to the intelligentsia as "the people in a country or society who are well educated and are interested in culture, politics, literature, etc" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary 2022). Historically, the term intelligentsia was used in Russia and Poland to refer to highly educated individuals who strove for the modernization of existing traditional institutions and values using their scientific, scholarly, and artistic skills (Szczepański 1962; Kochetkova 2009).

While there is little consensus over the exact definition of the intelligentsia, most previous studies consider educational achievements, political engagement, and an active public role as defining features of the intelligentsia (Bailes 2015; Eyal and Buchholz 2010; Karabel 1996). There is also no consensus on whether members of the intelligentsia constitute a particular class. While some studies treat the intelligentsia as a social class due to their shared interests, other scholars argue that the intelligentsia is classless and socially unattached (Kurzman and Owens 2002; Mannheim 2013). Members of the intelligentsia tend to come from different economic backgrounds and they could end up being in various socio-political camps. As a result, it is hard to argue that they belong to a cohesive class. Rather, they constitute what Max Weber (2013) calls "status group": a group whose members share similar prestige, lifestyle, or some other non-economic qualities. Members of the intelligentsia usually

possess strong cultural capital such as academic education, knowledge production, or intellect (Bourdieu 1987) and are interested and engaged in politics. These qualities make the intelligentsia a status group.

The intelligentsia has historically played a crucial role in political revolutions, particularly, in democratic movements. Quantitative and qualitative evidence demonstrates that the intelligentsia provides "hegemonic leadership and organizational infrastructure" (Kurzman and Leahey 2004) for pro-democracy movements across the world. The intelligentsia was the backbone of political revolutions against autocratic governments in Russia (1905), Iran (1906), the Ottoman Empire (1908), Portugal (1910), Mexico (1911), and China (1912) in the early 20th century (Kurzman et al. 2008). Writers, journalists, poets, and activists, influenced by modern Western thought, were at the forefront of the pro-democracy movements in the 1900s and 1910s. The intelligentsia also played a key role in anti-autocratic uprisings and movements of the late 1980s and 1990s in East Germany, Chile, China, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria (Kurzman and Leahey 2004).

The political role of the intelligentsia in public opinion formation and political mobilization is more important in countries with weak party institutions. One of the well-established political behavior findings is that public opinion formation is an elite-driven process. Especially, research on American politics shows that citizens tend to use party elites' cues to form political attitudes (Zaller et al. 1992; Berinsky 2009). However, the process of public opinion formation in authoritarian countries with limited party institutions is lesser known. While there is little systematic evidence on public opinion mobilization in authoritarian countries, the historical evidence demonstrates that the intelligentsia is one of the key forces of public opinion formation and political mobilization in the absence of strong party organizations. In the context of Iran, the intelligentsia played a central role in both the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the anti-Monarchy Revolution of 1979 (Abrahamian 1982; Mahdavi 2003; Gheissari 2010). Despite a significant crackdown on the intelligentsia after the 1979 revolution, they managed to continue their social influence. In fact, the intelligentsia took a leading position in the reformist movements of the 1990s and popularized concepts such as democracy, civil society, pluralism, and rule of law (Ridgeon 2013; Gheissari and Nasr 2009).

Relatedly, the intelligentsia tends to have a critical view of the status quo and are less vulnerable to social pressure. In other words, they are the least likely group to falsify their preferences under autocratic governments (Kuran 1991). This is the reason that they often lead oppositional campaigns against the government. This has important implications for public opinion research in politically closed environments. Self-censorship has been one of the important obstacles to public opinion research in autocratic countries. Previous survey research shows significant levels of self-censorship in autocratic countries (Robinson and Tannenberg 2019; Tannenberg 2022; Friesen 2022). As a result, focusing on public opinion in autocratic countries is likely to worsen the problem of the attitude-behavior gap (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Fishbein and Ajzen 2011) in social science. In other words, it does not tell us much about the political behavior of citizens, especially, in times of contentious politics and external interference. Therefore, conducting survey on intelligentsia attitude could mitigate the self-censorship bias in public opinion research in closed political environments.


In sum, focusing on the intelligentsia is likely to provide evidence on the effectiveness of foreign diplomatic support for protest movements for two reasons. First, they play a key role in public opinion formation and political mobilization, especially, in countries with underdeveloped political institutions. In other words, they are opinion-makers that are able to influence the way millions of ordinary citizens think and perceive political matters. This means that understanding their attitudes on diplomatic support provides significant information on how the public would respond to the support. Second, the intelligentsia has the least likelihood of preference falsification. This is particularly important in public opinion research given the high levels of preference misrepresentation by citizens of autocratic countries.

Iran is suitable case for understanding the effect of diplomatic support for protest movements for three reasons. First, anti-government protests have been a defining feature of Iranian politics since the late 19th century. In fact, it is one of the few countries that experienced two major political revolutions (the Constitutional of Revolution of 1906 and the 1979 Revolution) in the 20th century (Poulson 2005; Foran 1994). Anti-government protests have also been quite prevalent in Iran under the Islamic Republic. (Parsa 2017; Alimagham 2020). Second, protests in Iran usually receive strong support from Western democracies, especially, the United States. This contributes to the realism of the experimental design. Third, Iranian intellectuals played a key role in mobilizing political movements in the 20th century (Parsa 1989; Abrahamian 1982), and certainly after the 1979 revolution. As a result, a survey of intelligentsia provides important signal into citizens' potential response to diplomatic support for protest movements.

The survey experiment uses the snowball sampling method for data collection. Snowball sampling is usually used for surveys of difficult-to-reach or hidden populations (Tourangeau et al. 2014). Three criteria are used to recruit respondents: interest in politics, political engagement, and cultural capital. Each of these factors is necessary but not sufficient in itself. In other words, all of them are needed in order to qualify an individual to be included in the final analysis. I started the survey by sending the link to members of the intelligentsia from different political backgrounds. Then I asked them to send the survey to people who are interested in politics, politically engaged, and have an academic degree. I used three questions to identify whether one could be considered a member of the intelligentsia. Table 3.1 shows the three questions.

In total, 617 respondents participated in the study. The respondents had to be interested in politics, do at least one of the actions describes in the second question, and have an academic

degree in order to be included in the analysis. I dropped 89 participants because they did not meet the criteria of being a member of the intelligentsia. The respondents were asked how they describe their socio-occupational status. They were given 16 status categories and were asked to choose one or two of them. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the socio-occupational status of the respondents. The category "engineer" represents the highest percentage of the respondents' socio-occupational status. It is followed by socio-cultural activist, researcher, public intellectual, and political activist. The information on the socio-occupational status of the respondents shows that the majority of them perform mental and non-manual work. **Figure 3.1:** Socio-occupational Status of the Respondents



The experiment includes one control and four treatment groups. The control group reads a brief text on a hypothetical protest in several major cities. The first treatment group reads the same text but some information on verbal support of protesters by the United States is included in the vignette. The second group also reads the same text as the control group but some information on economic sanctions is included as well. The vignette for the third treatment group is the same as the first treatment group (US verbal support) but also includes information on the protesters' leaders' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure. Finally, the vignette for the fourth treatment group is the same as the second group's (US sanctions) but information on the protesters' leaders' demand for foreign diplomatic pressure is also included in the text. Table 3.2 summarizes information received by the control and treatment groups. All the vignettes are presented in the appendix.

This study includes four dependent variables. The first dependent variable is support for the hypothetical protest movement. It is measured by the following question: "To what extent do you support or not support this protest movement? On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "I don't support at all" and 10 means "I completely support," what position would you choose?" The participants were given a 10-point scale to express their level of support for the protest. The second dependent variable measures individuals' willingness to participate in future protests. The respondents were asked "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? If a similar protest happens in the future, people should join it. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "I don't agree at all" and 10 means "I completely agree," what position would you choose? The third dependent variable measures support for repression by asking "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The government has the right to confront this protest movement- if necessary, by using force. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "I don't agree at all" and 10 means "I completely agree," what position would you choose? Finally, the fourth dependent variable aims to measure support for the government by asking "To what extent are you satisfied with the performance of the political system? On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "not satisfied at all" and 10 means "completely satisfied," what position would you choose?

To measure respondents' political position, I asked the following question: "Which of the following is closest to your political views?" and then provided them with four statements:

Table 3.1: Questions to Identify the Intelligentsia

1. How interested would you say you are in politics?

Very interested

Somewhat interested

Not very interested

Not at all interested

2. Below are some of the types of political actions that people can take. I'd like you to tell me,

for each one, whether you have done any of these things.

Signing petitions

Encourage others to vote or encourage boycotts elections Join peaceful protest rallies Writing political content on the Internet and social networks Political activity in student associations Membership in political parties inside or outside the country

3. What is your highest level of education?

Middle/ Elementary school or less High school diploma Associate or BA MA PhD I have a religious degree

| Group | Verbal support | Sanctions | Demand for foreign pressure | |
|-------------|----------------|-----------|-----------------------------|--|
| Control | No | No | No | |
| Treatment 1 | Yes | No | No | |
| Treatment 2 | No | Yes | No | |
| Treatment 3 | Yes | No | Yes | |
| Treatment 4 | No | Yes | Yes | |

Table 3.2: Information Received by the Control and Treatment Groups

The first statement is "I fully accept the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran and I support the policies pursued by the Supreme Leader;" the second, "Although I accept the political system of the Islamic Republic, I believe that gradual reforms should take place within the framework of the constitution in the country;" the third, "I call for reform by changing the existing constitution;" and the fourth option is "The current political system cannot be reformed. I want a completely new political system." Respondents who chose the first statement are classified as "Conservative." The second and third statements are used to identify "reformists". Finally, those who chose the fourth statement were categorized as "revolutionary."

3.5 Statistical Analysis

Since data distribution for all the dependent variables is not normal, it is necessary to use a non-parametric method to determine differences between multiple groups. Therefore, I used the Kruskal-Wallis test to understand whether the differences between the groups are significant. I also use the Wilcoxon test to compare all the groups and determine which groups are significantly different from each other.

Figure 3.2 shows the results for all four dependent variables. The p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis test suggests a significant difference between the groups. The results of the Wilcoxon test show that support for the hypothetical protests reaches its peak with a median of 8 when the movement receives verbal support from the United States. However, it is not very different from the control and sanctions groups where the median score is 7. In other words, diplomatic support from the United States does not change attitudes by itself. However, when the diplomatic backing happens alongside protesters' demands for foreign diplomatic pressure, it reduces support for the protest campaigns. The median score for both verbal support + demand and sanctions + demand groups is 5. They both are significantly different from the verbal support group.




Figure 3.2: Support for Protests, Future Participation, Repression and the Government across Groups

Note: The dashed lines show the mean number.

The Kruskal-Wallis test for the participation plot is not statistically significant. All the treatment groups demonstrate a similar distribution with a median of 5. However, the median score for the baseline group is 7, suggesting a noticeable increase in support for future protest participation. This could be due to the perception of costs associated with the participation in protests supported by the United States. In other words, the respondents might perceive the cost of participation in a US-backed protest as higher (because repression justification is easier for the government) than participation in a protest movement that is not supported by a foreign country.

The Kruskal-Wallis test for repression is also statistically insignificant. The median

| | Protest | Participation | Repression | Government |
|--------------------|---------|---------------|------------|------------|
| Control | 5.8 | 5.7 | 4.1 | 2.1 |
| Verbal support | 6.8 | 5 | 4.8 | 1.7 |
| Sanctions | 6.2 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 2.2 |
| Verbal + Demand | 5.1 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 2.7 |
| Sanctions + Demand | 5 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 2.4 |

 Table 3.3: The Mean Score of the Dependent Variables for Each Group

value is 5 for all the groups except for the control which shows a median score of 3. This suggests that third-party support for protest movements increases support for repression. The government plot shows little difference between the groups. The median score for the control and verbal support group is 0 and for the three remaining groups 1. The difference is quite small, suggesting that diplomatic support does not significantly affect individuals' attitudes toward the government.

Table 3.2 displays the mean score of each variable on a scale of 0-10 across the groups. According to the table, verbal support from the United States results in the highest level of support with an average score of 6.8. However, protesters' demands for external pressure reduce support to 5 (when it happens with the United States' verbal support) and 5.1 (when it happens with the implementation of sanctions). The mean score for support for future participation is 5.7 for the control group. While higher than other groups, the difference is not large. Support for the repression of the protesters reaches its highest value in the sanctions + demand group but it decreases to 4.1 in the control group. In other words, support for repression is reduced when there is third-party involvement. Finally, when verbal support for the government increases to its highest value with a mean score of 2.7. However, the difference across the groups is minimal.




Figure 3.3: Support for Protests: Conservatives vs. Reformists vs. Revolutionaries

Note: The dashed lines show the mean number.

Figure 3.3 demonstrates support for protests across three major political groups: conservatives, reformists, and revolutionaries. For the conservative plot, most of the data is concentrated around 0 for all the treatment groups. Support for protest only increases in the control group with a median of 2. On the other side, most of the data is distributed around 10 for all the groups in the revolutionary plot and the median score for all of them is 10, except for the sanctions group which shows a median score of 9.5. The p-value for the Kruskal-Walls test is not significant for either of the two political groups.

The Kruskal-Walls test is significant for the reformist plot, suggesting that the difference are statistically meaningful. The results show that verbal support and sanctions receive significant support from reformists (the median score is 7 for both). However, when verbal support takes place with protesters' demands for foreign support, the median score drops to 3. The control and sanctions + demand groups receive a median score of 5 which is lower than the median score of the verbal support and sanctions groups. In fact, reformists respond positively to diplomatic support for protest movements but their support significantly wanes when they receive information on verbal support for anti-government movements and protesters' call for foreign diplomatic pressure at the same time.

3.6 Conclusion

Third-party diplomatic support for anti-government protests has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War. Especially, with the increasing role of online media in public opinion mobilization, democratic governments feel more pressure to take a diplomatic stance against repression and human rights violations around the world. Yet, despite the growing importance of human rights diplomacy, there is little empirical evidence on how diplomatic support for protest movements influences public attitude in the host country.

This study used a survey experiment of Iranian intelligentsia to explore whether diplomacy in support of protesters is effective. The survey experiment of the intelligentsia is important for two reasons. First, they play a central role in shaping and mobilizing public attitudes. In fact, they have been the backbone of major political movements in Iran and many other developing countries in the 20th century. Second, unlike the public which tends to misrepresent its sensitive private preferences, the intelligentsia often speaks their mind, no matter what the consequence may be.

The findings show that third-party diplomatic intervention in support of protest movements does not significantly affect public attitude in the host country by itself. However, when there is a call for international help by protesters and then the protest campaign is diplomatically backed by a third party (here the United States), the protesters receive less sympathy. It is also important to note that the effect is less significant for conservatives and revolutionaries who tend to oppose and support the anti-government protests, respectively, regardless of other factors. Diplomatic support has a more profound effect on reformists whose stance toward protest movements is more variable compared to that of conservatives and revolutionaries.

The results have clear implications for activists and policy-makers. Political activists and opposition groups need to exercise maximum restraint in their actions and statements. Requesting foreign countries to put pressure on the government will result in significant damage to the reputation of protesters and is likely to weaken the support base of protest movements. As a result, it could weaken the mobilizational capacity of protest campaigns. Political leaders and policy-makers in democratic countries should be also cautious with their diplomatic approach toward protest movements. Their diplomatic actions should be conducted independently of opposition groups. Any statements or actions that imply coordination between foreign countries and opposition groups could be detrimental to protest campaigns.

Chapter 4

DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO FOREIGN STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR PROTEST CAMPAIGNS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE BLACK LIVES MATTER MOVEMENT

4.1 Introduction

In January 2021, Joe Biden, the President of the U.S., expressed his concern over Russia's crackdown on anti-government protests. The States Department issued a press statement on the protests in Russia, condemning Moscow's use of harsh tactics against protesters (U.S. Department of State 2021; Radio Free Europe 2021). A few months later, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed her "support to the peaceful protesters in Belarus" and called for an end to the repression of Belarus's democratic movement (Deutsche Welle 2021). In another development, Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, made a statement in support of the Pashtun Protection Movement, a protest campaign for Pashtun human and ethnic rights in Pakistan (Jamal 2020). These are just a few examples of foreign states' diplomatic support for protest movements abroad.

Public diplomacy has become an increasingly important tool for international actors in order to inform and influence foreign publics. Especially, the emergence and expansion of the new digital communication technologies have brought new opportunities for governments to expand their efforts in order to communicate with publics of other states. An important aspect of public diplomacy is to communicate with discontented citizens in times of anti-government protest and unrest. Expressing official support for protest campaigns -through condemning government repression, encouraging political reform, or praising protesters and sympathizing with them- is now deemed as an indispensable part of diplomacy.

Despite the widespread use of diplomacy in support of protest movements, we still have little empirical knowledge of its effectiveness. How does the public respond to the diplomatic support from foreign countries? Does diplomatic support increase public sympathy for the protest campaigns? Does it encourage more people to join protests? Finally, does the identity of the supporter matter?

This article addresses these questions by focusing on diplomatic support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) Movement, and particularly, the George Floyd protests in the United States. The central argument of the article is that the impact of diplomatic support is conditional on the identity of the supporter. Diplomatic support is more likely to reduce public support for and individuals' willingness to attend protest campaigns when it comes from strategic rivals. I also argue that given the current extreme party polarization in the U.S., we should expect different attitudinal patterns from Republicans and Democrats. Since Democrats tend to be more cosmopolitan and favor democratic allies, I expect them to respond more positively to international support from democratic allies. On the other hand, since Republicans tend to be more nationalist and more concerned about the U.S. military advantage in the world and its strategic competitors, they are expected to respond more negatively to the diplomatic support from the U.S.'s strategic rivals. To answer the research questions and empirically evaluate the argument, I conducted a survey experiment involving 1768 U.S. adults. The experimental findings suggest that diplomatic support from China, America's strategic rival, undermines individuals' willingness to join future protest campaigns in the U.S. The results also demonstrate that diplomatic support from Canada, America's democratic ally, results in a significant increase in public support for BLM and the Floyd protests among Democrats. Furthermore, the experimental findings indicate that while support from China reduces individuals' willingness to join protest campaigns among Republicans, support from Canada encourages individuals to attend future protests among Democrats.

This study makes four major contributions. First, it contributes to the growing empirical literature on the impact of public diplomacy on foreign publics. While empirical research on the impact of different types of diplomacy on political behavior and attitude has grown in the last decade (Kohama et al. 2017; Hellmeier 2021; Frye 2019; Goldsmith et al. 2021; Kitagawa and Chu 2021; Myrick and Weinstein 2021; Gruffydd-Jones 2019; Tingley and Tomz 2022), the topic remains in the early stages of development with many questions still to be answered. Especially, empirical knowledge on the effect of foreign governments' diplomatic support for protest campaigns has not been effectively established. This article offers an empirical analysis of domestic response to the public diplomacy of international actors by focusing on the case of BLM.

Second, the article offers significant insights for policy-makers amid rising strategic tensions between the U.S. and its rival global actors, such as China and Russia. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of the U.S. as the hegemonic power provided a unique opportunity for Western liberal democracies, especially the U.S., to actively support democratic movements and influence domestic politics abroad without being worried about any counteractions. Nevertheless, the decline of the unipolar system and the growing geopolitical competition between the U.S. and increasingly assertive powers such as China and Russia have changed the landscape of global politics. An important aspect of the growing geopolitical rivalry is the significant increase in the interference of rival global actors, such as Russia and China, in U.S. domestic politics. The Russian interference in 2016, as well as the 2020 presidential elections, is the best-known example but foreign involvement in U.S. domestic politics is not limited to Russia. According to U.S. intelligence officials, China and Iran also tried to influence the 2020 election in different ways (BBC 2020). Interference in U.S. domestic politics is likely to be part of a broader strategy of the geopolitical rivals to further undermine the U.S.'s global hegemony. Especially, new technologies have provided emerging authoritarian powers with an unprecedented advantage

in influencing the internal affairs of the U.S. in the last few years (Wohlforth 2017).

Rival international actors might also use public diplomacy as a strategic tool against the United States. Especially, expressing support for protest movements in the U.S. could benefit the geopolitical rivals in several ways. First, it could highlight the domestic crisis in the U.S. and undermine its global images and soft power. Incidents of police violence against protesters could be portrayed as the hypocrisy of the U.S., the most vocal supporter of human rights in the world. Second, it could undermine the liberal democracy model of governance that the U.S. has been actively promoting since the end of the Cold War. Third, diplomatic support for protest campaigns in the U.S. could be used for domestic consumption purposes. The diplomatic support might intend to highlight the inefficiency of the Western model of democracy for the citizens of authoritarian states and especially, pro-Western intellectuals and activists. Finally, rival actors might also use public diplomacy in order to inform or influence the American public. Findings from this study could help policy-makers in the U.S. to better understand the effect of external actors' public diplomacy on American citizens. They could also help diplomats and political leaders around the world to understand how and under what conditions public diplomacy in support of dissatisfied citizens may work or backfire.

Third, previous studies (Gruffydd-Jones 2019; Gueorguiev et al. 2020) on the effect of diplomatic efforts on public attitude have mainly placed their focus on non-Western countries. Therefore, the dynamics of domestic response to public diplomacy in Western countries remain largely underanalyzed. This study focuses on a Western context, the U.S., to explore how international diplomatic support for protest campaigns affects public opinion. The U.S. has the advantage of being a least likely case (a case where the theory is expected to be rejected) for two reasons. First, due to the widespread presence of post-materialist values in the U.S., and generally in Western countries, the public is more receptive to cosmopolitan ideas (Inglehart 1971, 2008) and as a result, is less sensitive to supra-national verbal involvement in domestic issues. Second, unlike authoritarian countries that often exploit foreign diplomatic support and use it as a propaganda tool against opposition groups, democracies usually do not use official propaganda techniques. Therefore, it is unlikely that diplomatic support for protest movements to be exploited by the government in the U.S. to undermine the reputation of protesters. However, if the empirical analysis shows a meaningful impact of diplomatic support on public opinion in the U.S., the findings will have strong external validity.

Fourth, international reactions to BLM, and particularly, the George Floyd protests have drawn little scholarly attention despite becoming a focal point of media discussion (Allen-Ebrahimian 2020; Kim 2020). For instance, Tucker Carlson, the influential Fox News host, spent more than 12 minutes in his nightly political talk show to discuss how the Chines government uses the BLM movement "as a weapon" against the U.S. (Fox News 2021). The video clip received more than 1 million views and 10 thousand comments on YouTube. A systematic study of public attitude on the international support for anti-racism protests in the U.S. will contribute to the debate on foreign diplomatic involvement in American domestic issues. This article is the first empirical study to examine the impact of international diplomatic support for BLM on the American public's attitude towards the movement, and more generally, anti-racism protest campaigns.

4.2 Diplomacy and Protest Campaigns

The literature on individuals' contentious political behavior and attitude has mainly relied on domestic factors to explain under what conditions people support or participate in protest campaigns. Previous studies found variables such as education (Hall et al. 1986; Dahlum and Wig 2019), political interests (Schussman and Soule 2005), exposure to online news and media (Kirkizh and Koltsova 2021; Valenzuela et al. 2012), involvement in religious social networks (Arikan and Bloom 2019), and pro-democracy attitude (Abbasov 2021) to be significant micro-level predictors of individuals' protest attitude and behavior. Scholars also associate protest movements with political opportunities (Meyer 2004), the presence of sufficient resources (Edwards et al. 2004), and relative deprivation (Gurr 1971) at the mezzo and macro levels. More recent research (Bonilla and Tillery 2020) on BLM finds that different framing techniques of the protest campaign generate different reactions among individuals.

Previous studies have also contributed to our understanding of how international factors influence the dynamics of protest movements at home. Existing research has discussed the effect of external variables such as geographical diffusion (Braithwaite et al. 2015; Gleditsch and Rivera 2017) and foreign financial aid to non-governmental groups (Carapico 2002; Jalali 2013; Koubek 2020) on protest campaigns. While scholarly attention to international sources of protest behavior and attitude has been increasing, we still have limited empirical knowledge on how international variables influence individuals' attitudes and behavior towards protest movements.

More specifically, existing research largely overlooks the role of diplomacy, as an important foreign policy tool, in shaping public attitude towards protest movements. Especially, while countries have increasingly relied on public diplomacy to communicate with citizens of other countries, empirical research has been silent on its effectiveness. Previous studies on diplomacy (Goldsmith et al. 2021; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009) show that high-level visits by political leaders increase their approval among foreign citizens. Also, previous research (Kohama et al. 2017) indicates that negative diplomatic attacks are effective as they increase foreign public support for the attacking country.

Furthermore, the extant literature on transnational sources of domestic politics discusses how naming and shaming by international nongovernmental organizations affects human rights practices (Franklin 2008; Hafner-Burton 2008; DeMeritt 2012; Krain 2012), human rights perceptions in the shamed country (Ausderan 2014), and anti-government protests (Murdie and Bhasin 2011). A recent experimental study in China (Gruffydd-Jones 2019) suggests that public diplomatic pressure from the United States over women's rights in China backfires and makes citizens less likely to call for reforms on Women's issues. Further, evidence (Myrick and Weinstein 2021) from the United States human rights diplomacy to free female political prisoners shows that public diplomacy is not effective by itself.

The past decade has also witnessed increasing attention to the impact of diplomatic apology on the domestic politics of the victim governments (Lind 2011; Zoodsma and Schaafsma 2022; Schaafsma et al. 2021). Micro-level empirical research (Kitagawa and Chu 2021) on diplomatic apology for past wrongdoings shows that expressions of contrition have healing effects and increase public approval of the apologizer government in the recipient country, although the effect varies across different socio-political subgroups.

Despite growing scholarship on international sources of political behavior and attitude, limited attention has been given to how diplomatic support for protest campaigns affects public opinion towards those campaigns. We still have scant empirical evidence on whether public diplomatic support helps protest movements to gain more public sympathy and increase individuals' willingness to attend future protest campaigns. This study is an attempt to address this gap by using individual-level experimental data.

4.3 Theoretical Expectations

This article builds on the image and constructivist theories in order to hypothesize the impact of diplomatic support on protest movements. These theories emphasize the role of perception and shared understanding on attitude formation towards foreign countries. The image theory in international relations emphasizes that the perception of a country is important in how other countries understand its policies. If country A is perceived as an enemy in country B, then its actions are expected to be evaluated negatively in country B. However, if country A is perceived as an ally, its policies will be interpreted in an optimistic

way in country B (Boulding 1959; Kertzer et al. 2019).

While the image theory highlights the role of perception, the constructivist perspective emphasizes the importance of shared understanding and beliefs in international relations. From a constructivist viewpoint, shared understanding (or intersubjectivity) creates shared perceptions among states. In other words, shared understandings define interests and threats for countries (Wendt 1995). As Wendt (1995, 73) famously puts it, "500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons." The explanation for why this happens is simple from Wendt's viewpoint (1995, 73): because "the British are friends and the North Koreans are not." Findings from previous empirical research support the argument. For instance, an experimental study (Castano et al. 2003) in the U.S. indicates that individuals who perceive the EU as an ally consider its policies less harmful to the United States than those who perceive it as an enemy. Also, previous studies (Eicher et al. 2013) in political psychology suggests that individuals are more likely to project their values onto allies rather than enemies. Also, experimental evidence from china (Gruffydd-Jones 2019) shows that diplomatic pressure from geopolitical rivals results in higher levels of satisfaction with the status quo.

In line with the perception-oriented theories of international relations, this article proposes that domestic response to foreign diplomatic support for protest movements is expected to be conditional on the identity of the supporter. If the support comes from a geopolitical rival, it is expected to reduce public support for the protesters and individuals' willingness to participate in future protests. It is because of the public perception of the supporter state that is considered as a strategic competitor in the host country. On the other hand, diplomatic support from allies is expected to result in higher levels of public sympathy for the protest campaigns.

Diplomatic support could also have a different effect on different sub-groups in the overall population. Previous studies on public opinion and foreign policy highlight the

importance of sub-group analysis. For instance, micro-level evidence from the United States and Japan on diplomatic apology (Kitagawa and Chu 2021) shows that political ideology has a meaningful impact on individuals' attitudes in the apologizer country. Individuals with higher levels of nationalism and conservatism are more likely to support their government's diplomatic efforts.

Since this study is conducted in the U.S., the theoretical expectations need to be contextualized based on the current political climate in American politics. One of the most important developments in American politics has been the rise of extreme party polarization in recent years (Abramowitz 2018). Party polarization in American politics has also resulted in the partisan divide in foreign policy issues (Tarzi 2019). In terms of foreign policy, Republican elites tend to be more nationalist, advocate for maintaining the military superiority of the U.S., and often adopt a more unilateralist approach in international politics (Busby and Monten 2012). On the other hand, Democratic elites tend to have a more positive view of international organizations and see cooperation with allies as an effective tool to advance American national interests.

As previous studies show, party elites' attitudes are often transmitted to the party members. A well-established finding in public opinion research is that public attitude formation is an elite-driven process (Zaller et al. 1992). Previous research emphasizes that people usually have little knowledge of foreign affairs and they develop their foreign policy attitudes based on the cues sent by party elites (Baum and Groeling 2009). Therefore, divisions between Republican and Democratic elites should be reflected in the attitude of party members. A recent survey by PEW demonstrates clear differences between Republicans and Democrats in foreign policy issues. The survey shows that while a large majority of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (70 percent) consider maintaining U.S. military advantage in the world as a top priority, only 34 percent of Democrats and Democratic-leaning respondents believe that it should be a policy priority for the U.S. On the other hand, the survey shows that a large majority of Democrats (70 percent) consider improving the U.S. relations with its allies a top priority of foreign policy, while only 44 percent of Republicans believe that improving relationships with allies should be a policy priority.

Consistent with the extant research, diplomatic support for protest campaigns is expected to generate different reactions among Republicans and Democrats. Since Republicans tend to be more nationalist and more concerned about the U.S.'s strategic superiority over its rivals, they should be more likely to reduce their support for and avoid participating in protest campaigns if the campaign is backed by America's strategic rivals. After all, the U.S.'s strategic rivals have the willingness and capability of posing serious challenges to American military power. Therefore, any diplomatic effort in support of protesters in the U.S. will be a source of concern for Republicans. On the other side, Democrats tend to value multilateralism and advocate for a strong partnership with democratic allies. Thus, it is expected that diplomatic support protest for movements by democratic allies will increase support for protesters and reinforce individuals' willingness to attend future protest campaigns among Democrats. This theoretical discussion yields two hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. Diplomatic support from strategic rivals is expected to reduce support for protest campaigns and willingness to participate. This effect should be stronger for Republican identifiers and weaker for Democratic identifiers.

Hypothesis 2. Diplomatic support from strategic allies is expected to increase support for protest campaigns and willingness to participate. This effect should be stronger for Democratic identifiers and weaker for Republican identifiers.

4.4 Research Design

This article focuses on the U.S. as a least likely case. A least likely case is one where the theoretical prediction is not likely to occur either because background factors predict otherwise or the scope conditions of the theory are not satisfied (Levy 2008; Gerring 2006). However, if the theoretical expectations find empirical support, it will be regarded as strong confirmatory evidence (Gerring 2006). In other words, empirical support of a hypothesis in a least likely case increases the external validity of the findings.

The U.S. is a least likely case for two reasons. First, the U.S. is in general a post-material society where attachment to the nation-state is weak compared to developing countries. Especially, younger generations in the U.S. tend to be more welcoming of cosmopolitan values and more open to diverse global outlooks (Norris et al. 2009). An analysis of the seventh wave of the Wold Value Survey (conducted between 2017 and 2020) shows that national pride in the U.S. is significantly lower than the world average (I reported a cross-country analysis of national pride in the appendix). As a result, international diplomatic support for protest campaigns is not expected to face a significant nationalist backlash from citizens in a post-materialist society. Moreover, the U.S. is a democratic country where the government does not use the official propaganda techniques that are common in authoritarian countries (Kenez 1985; Abrahamian 1999; Chen and Xu 2017b). Authoritarian countries might frame international diplomatic support as foreign interference and use it as a mechanism for social control, pro-government mobilization, or social cohesion. However, this is unlikely to happen in democratic countries.

Therefore, international diplomatic support for protest movements in the U.S. is not expected to significantly influence public attitude. Nevertheless, if the empirical results support the theoretical expectations, they will offer a strong basis for generalizing the findings.

To explore the public response to diplomatic support for protest campaigns, I conducted a survey experiment between 2-5 June 2021 involving 1800 respondents. The participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk. I restricted the participants to Turkers located in the U.S. Thirty-two of the respondents were dropped from the sample either because they reported incorrect survey code or they answered the questions at an extremely quick, unrealistic pace. Amazon MTurk has increasingly become an important source of data collection for social scientists in the last two decades (Buhrmester et al. 2011). While Turkers tend to be more liberal, less religious, and younger (Berinsky et al. 2012), recent studies (Clifford et al. 2015; Mullinix et al. 2015; Johnson and Ryan 2020) point to the validity of samples drawn from Amazon MTurk for a variety of topics in social science research (sociodemographic features of the participants across control and treatment groups are available in the appendix).

The experiment included one control and two treatment groups. The first treatment group watched a one-minute video that briefly describes BLM and the George Floyd protests and then talks about the Chinese government's support for the BLM movement and the Floyd protests. I selected diplomatic support from China because it is a representative example of a strategic rival. The strategic competition between the U.S. and China has intensified in the last decade and dominated the U.S. foreign policy debates over the past years. Therefore, China is a typical case of a country being perceived as a strategic rival among American political and military elites.

The second treatment group watched a one-minute video that included exactly the same description of BLM and the George Floyd protests but then talked about the Canadian government support for the BLM movement and the Floyd protests. I selected diplomatic support from Canada because it is a very close democratic ally of the U.S. The videos were similar in terms of time and content. Finally, the control group watched a video about "9 signs that you are a political science student." The clip was completely irrelevant to the outcome variables. The purpose of asking control participants to watch the video was to ensure that all subjects are exposed to a similar environment (the transcripts of the videos for all the groups are available in the appendix). After watching the videos, the participants were asked to answer survey questions.

This study includes three dependent variables. The first dependent variable is about

individuals' support for the BLM movement. The variable is meant to measure support for the general protest movement against racial discrimination. To measure support for BLM, the respondents were asked "Do you support the Black Lives Matter Movement? On this scale where 1 means "no support at all" and 10 means "full support" what position would you choose?" They were given a numeric scale going from 1 to 10 to show their level of support for BLM. The second dependent variable measures support for the specific protests that took place in response to the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. The respondents were asked "Do you support the protest that took place in response to the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. The respondents were asked "Do you support the protest that took place in response to the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. The respondents were asked "Do you support the protest that took place in response to the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. The respondents were asked "Do you support the protest that took place in response to the death of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officers. The respondents were asked "Do you support the protest that took place in response to the death of George Floyd? On this scale where 1 means "no support at all" and 10 means "full support" what position would you choose?" Similarly, they were given a 10-point scale to express their level of support for the George Floyd protests.

Finally, the third dependent variable aims to measure individual willingness to participate in future protests by asking the following question: "If there is a protest (right now or in the future) for racial equality in your city/town/village, how likely is it that you will join the protest? On this scale where 1 means "not likely at all" and 10 means "extremely likely" what position would you choose?" Again, the respondents were given a 10-point scale to express how likely they are to participate in future protests for racial equality. All the three dependent variables take ordinal scales from 1 to 10.

I also ask a question on party identification. The party identification variable is measured by asking: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?" In addition, I also ask several questions on political knowledge, national pride, and sociodemographic features to reduce the potential confounding effect caused by unbalanced covariates. Political knowledge is measured by asking two questions about domestic and international political figures. The questions ask about the name of Trump's secretary of state and the current president of Turkey. If both questions are answered correctly, the variable takes 1, 0 otherwise. I also included a variable on previous protest participation by asking a question about respondents' previous participation in the protests.

I also included a question on how proud the respondents are of their American identity. If they are very or quite proud, the variable takes 1, 0 otherwise. Individuals with a stronger national identity might be more suspicious of racial minorities. Especially, ascriptive ideas on American national identity are believed to be associated with a more exclusive understanding of American identity (Schildkraut 2014). A question on the respondents' level of education was also included in the questionnaire. Existing research associates higher education with political activism and contentious politics in a variety of contexts (Rich 1980; Dahlum and Wig 2019; Asadzade 2021; Sawyer and Korotayev 2021). I also asked questions on the respondents' socioeconomic status, race, and gender.

Table 4.1 reports the mean number for control and treatment groups and the p-value based on an ANOVA test to compare three groups. None of the variables across the three groups show statistically significant differences at the 0.05 or less probability level. Overall, the ANOVA test suggests that balance is achieved across all three groups. This helps to mitigate the potential confounding effect.

4.5 Results

I first use the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine whether the difference between the three groups is statistically significant. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a non-parametric method for comparing mean ranks. Since the distribution of the data for the dependent variables is not normal, it is necessary to use a non-parametric method to determine differences between multiple groups ¹ (Chan and Walmsley 1997).

Table 4.2 demonstrates P-value for the Kruskal-Wallis test. According to the table, the difference between the three groups is statistically significant in the control and treatment groups for all of the three outcome variables. While the Kruskal-Wallis test shows a

¹the distribution of the dependent variables is reported in the appendix.

meaningful difference between the groups, it does not explain which groups are different from other groups. In order to determine which group is different from others, a post-hoc test needs to be conducted. I run the Wilcoxon test, a non-parametric method of testing the hypothesis, to evaluate differences between the three groups. Figure 4.1 visualizes the results for the Wilcoxon test. As the figure shows, there is a statistically significant difference between the first (China) and the second (Canada) treatment groups for all three variables. Those who received information on Chinese government support for the BLM movement and the George Floyd protests are significantly less likely to support BLM and the Floyd protests and also, less likely to participate in future protests for racial equality than those who received information on Canadian diplomatic support.

The results also show a significant difference between the control and Canada groups for the variable support for the Floyd protests. Individuals that are exposed to information on the Canadian support for the anti-racism protests are more likely to be supportive of the George Floyd protests than those who did not receive any information on international support. Finally, the findings for the variable future protest indicate a statistically significant difference between the control and China groups. Receiving information on Chinese support reduces the probability of participation in future protests. In sum, Canadian diplomatic support results in a significant increase in public support for the George Floyd protests. On the other hand, Chinese sympathetic diplomacy for BLM and the Floyd protest campaign significantly lowers the probability of participation in future anti-racism demonstrations.

In order to understand how individuals with different partisan identities respond to international diplomatic support, now I turn to a subgroup analysis based on party identification. As table 4.3 suggests, there is a statistically significant difference in the mean ranks of all three variables for both Republican and Democratic subgroups. Thus, treatment and control groups are different from each other across all the dependent variables.

Next, I run a Wilcoxon test in order to determine which groups are different from

| Variable | China | Canada | Control | P-value |
|------------------------|-------|--------|---------|---------|
| Gender (female) | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.86 |
| Income | 2.06 | 2.04 | 2.06 | 0.83 |
| College education | 0.93 | 0.92 | 0.91 | 0.58 |
| Age | 3.30 | 3.20 | 3.13 | 0.08 |
| Race (white) | 0.79 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.18 |
| Republican | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.27 |
| Democrat | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.61 |
| National pride | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.81 | 0.09 |
| Political knowledge | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.94 |
| Previous participation | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.06 |

Table 4.2: The Kruskal-Wallis Test

| Variable | P-Value |
|--|-----------|
| Support for BLM | 0.0339** |
| Support for the Floyd protests | 0.0063*** |
| Participation in future protests | 0.0016*** |
| <i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 | |

Table 4.3: The Kruskal-Wallis Test for Republicans and Democrats

| Variable | P-Value (Republican) | P-Value (Democratic) |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Support for BLM | 0.0387** | 0.0266** |
| Support for the Floyd protests | 0.0395** | 0.0071*** |
| Participation in future protests | 0.0029*** | 0.0033*** |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 4.1: The Wilcoxon Test to Evaluate Differences Between Experimental Groups

Note: The dashed lines show the mean number.

others. Figure 4.2 exhibits the Wilcoxon test results for Republicans and Democrats. For Republicans, there is no significant difference between the control group and any of the treatment groups in terms of support for BLM and George Floyd protests. However, the difference between the two treatment groups is statistically meaningful for both variables. For the future protest variable, two groups are different from each other: China-Canada




Figure 4.2: The Wilcoxon Test to Evaluate Mean Differences Between Experimental Groups

Note: The dashed lines show the mean number.

and China-Control. This suggests that exposure to information on Chinese government support for BLM significantly lowers the chances of participation in future pro racial equality protests. The results partially support hypothesis 1 on the negative impact of geopolitical rivals' diplomatic support for protest campaigns on individuals' participation in future protests. For the democratic sample, the statistical difference between Canada and China as well as between Canada and control groups is significant for all three dependent variables. In other words, Canadian diplomatic support results in a significant increase in the public sympathy for BLM, Floyd anti-racism protests, and willingness to participate in future anti-racism protests compared to Chinese diplomatic support or no diplomatic support at all. The results are consistent with hypothesis 2 which expects a positive, significant impact of diplomatic support from a democratic ally on public support for protest campaigns and future protest participation for democratic identifiers.

In general, the results mostly support theoretical expectations on the interaction between party identification and international diplomatic support. While diplomatic support from China, the U.S.'s strategic rival, reduces Republicans' sympathy for anti-racism protests, support from Canada, the U.S.'s democratic ally, results in a more positive view of protest campaigns among Democrats. It should be also noted that Republican respondents who received information about support from Canada are more likely to participate in future protests compared to those who did not receive any information on foreign diplomatic support. Therefore, support from a democratic ally has also a profound effect on the attitude of Republicans when it comes to participation in future protests. On the other hand, information on Chinese support for BLM makes Democrats significantly less likely to attend future protests. Therefore, the impact of diplomatic support from strategic rivals on future protest participation could be also observed among Democrats. Overall, the findings point to the meaningful effect of international diplomatic support on public attitude towards protest movements.

4.6 Conclusion

Diplomatic support for protest movements has increasingly become a norm in international politics. Many political leaders around the world do not hesitate to express their support for protesters in other countries and condemn the host government's repressive actions. As fashionable as it has become, theoretical and empirical work on the effect of public diplomacy on protest campaigns is still limited. We know little about how foreign publics respond to public diplomacy in support of protest movements in their countries.

This article was an attempt to explore the effectiveness of diplomatic support for protest campaigns. It offered theoretical expectations and empirical evidence on how public diplomacy in support of protests affects public attitude in the host country. The findings offered evidence that the impact of diplomatic support is conditional on the identity of the supporter. The empirical analysis suggested that individuals' willingness to join future protests is reduced when diplomatic support comes from strategic competitors. The results also pointed to the partisan dynamics of public diplomacy effectiveness. While diplomatic support from China, America's strategic rival, discourages Republicans from joining future protests, diplomatic support from Canada, the U.S.'s democratic ally, increases public sympathy for the movements and potential participation in future protests.

Other than scholarly contributions, the findings could be beneficial for policy-makers and diplomatic apparatuses as well. The results show that leaders and diplomats should carefully reflect on the perception of their government in the host country before engaging in public diplomacy. They should also identify their audience and understand the potential pitfalls of their public diplomacy that might damage the very people it is expected to help. The implications for rival governments interested in reinforcing protest activity in countries they view as a strategic competitor are also clear. Silence would be a much more effective option than loud diplomatic sympathy for a rival government. However, this is important to point out that the U.S.'s strategic rivals do not necessarily engage in public diplomacy in support of protest movements only for the purpose of communicating with American citizens. Their diplomacy is usually multi-purpose and aims at informing their domestic audience as well. So even if their diplomacy turns out to be ineffective in influencing public attitude in the U.S., the benefits might still outweigh the risks given its domestic consumption. The findings could also help policy-makers in the U.S. to better understand how the American public responds to international diplomatic interventions in U.S. domestic issues.

Furthermore, the results have implications for activists that usually tend to mobilize international support for their movement (Keck and Sikkink 2014). The findings imply that activists need to be selective in seeking international support. While diplomatic support from allies would benefit their campaigns, support from strategic rivals is very likely to weaken public sympathy for them.

While this study attempted to offer systematic empirical evidence on the effectiveness of diplomatic support for protest campaigns, the literature still remains in its early stages. Future research could develop in several directions. First, it may focus on the impact of framing. While some political leaders limit their diplomacy by only sympathizing with protesters or mild criticism of the host government, some others use much harsher language and threaten to use coercive diplomacy (e.g., economic sanctions) if the host government continues to repress its discontented citizens. Is using threatening language more or less effective in terms of public support for protest movements and why? Future research may provide empirical answers to these questions.

Moreover, future research could further investigate how the identity of supporters could affect public sympathy for protesters by comparing support from national states to support from international organizations. For instance, is support from the UN secretary-general more effective than support from a leader of a foreign country? Future studies could provide theoretical insight and empirical evidence on whether support from international organizations is more effective than support from foreign states. Third, does it matter what kind of official support protesters? Diplomatic support sometimes comes directly from the highest authority (e.g., president in presidential systems) that signals the level of importance for both the host government and the protesters. But sometimes the support is announced in a short statement by a foreign policy spokesperson. Does it matter at all who officially supports protesters? And if yes, why and under what conditions? These are also important questions from both scholarly and policy perspectives that future research could focus on and provide some answers to.

Finally, future research could develop new theoretical perspectives on how the content of protest movements affects public support for protestors, especially with regard to party identification. While party identification is expected to play a key role in shaping individuals' preferences, it is also important to note that the content of protest campaigns could potentially limit the impact of partisanship. Especially, protests on highly salient issues to members of a party could reduce the effect of support from international actors for the members of that party. For instance, if a strategic rival of the United States hypothetically supports a pro-gun ownership campaign, a highly salient issue for Republicans, it might not significantly reduce Republicans' support for the campaign. Future studies could focus on different types of protest campaigns to see how the content of protests affects public sympathy for protest campaigns.

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION

The use of diplomatic tools in support of protest campaigns has become an important component of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Especially, Western democracies, and the United States, in particular, have been on the frontlines of diplomacy in support of protest movements. Yet, despite its prevalence in world politics, diplomatic support for protest movements has received little scholarly attention.

The goal of this study was to address this vacuum in the existing literature by an empirical investigation of the causes and consequences of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements. To do so, I first discussed the causes of diplomatic support by focusing on the diplomacy of Western democracies. My argument was that Western diplomatic support is driven by two factors. First, due to the increasing importance of human rights in the post-Cold War era, the use of extreme violence against protesters is likely to alarm democratic leaders. As a result, protest movements become more likely to receive diplomatic support when they face extreme violence by the government. In addition, I argued that protest movements in revisionist states are more likely to be diplomatically backed by Western democracies because times of unrest provide an opportunity for pro-status quo states in the international system to undermine leaders who have an oppositional stance toward the liberal international system.

The results are consistent with both liberal and realist perspectives in international relations. Diplomatic support in response to the use of extreme violence provides evidence on the importance of human rights norms in international relations. The results show that states -in this case, Western democracies- care about human rights violations, at least when it comes to the use of extreme violence against protest campaigns. Nonetheless, the

findings also suggest that Western democracies view protest movements as an opportunity to undermine states that have an oppositional stance toward the U.S.-led international order. In other words, they use diplomatic tools in support of protest movements in order to serve their own interests.

While the second chapter makes a scholarly -rather than policy-oriented- contribution, leaders and policy-makers could draw policy lessons from the findings. A clear policy lesson for leaders in countries that face protest movements is to develop sophisticated protest management strategies and skills to control protest movements without resorting to extreme violence. To be clear, this is not a recommendation. Rather this is a policy lesson that leaders could draw from the findings.

Future research may build on the findings to advance the field. Variation in diplomatic actions provides an opportunity for future research to examine conditions under which countries use different types of diplomatic tools to support protest campaigns and punish the host government's repressive behavior. More specifically, when do Western democracies use coercive diplomatic tools, such as economic sanctions, (as against public diplomacy, such as rhetorical support) to punish repressive behavior? Under what conditions do Western democracies demand regime change and when do they confine their response to simply demand for policy change? The variation in diplomatic response remains a research area to be explored.

The third chapter used a survey experiment in Iran to explain when diplomatic support is effective. The empirical analysis suggested that diplomatic support does not make much of a meaningful difference by itself. However, when the support occurs alongside protesters' demands for diplomatic pressure on the host government, it reduces support for protesters.

The fourth chapter explained how the identity of supporter could influence public attitude toward protest campaigns. The results suggested that individuals' willingness to participate in future protests is reduced when the support comes from geopolitical rivals. The results also provided evidence on the effect of party identity on individuals' attitudes toward diplomatic support for protest campaigns. The findings showed that Democrats become more likely to support the Black Lives Matter Movement and the Floyd protests when they receive information on Canada's pro-protesters diplomatic stance. At the same time, Republicans' willingness to participate in protests is reduced when they are exposed to information on diplomatic support from China, the United States' strategic rival. In the context of Iran, the results showed that reformists' attitudes are more likely to be influenced by diplomatic Support. In general, the findings point to the importance of political identities in shaping individuals' attitudes toward third-party diplomatic support.

The findings on the effectiveness of diplomatic support speak to the theoretical perspective offered by the agnostic camp in the naming and shaming literature. As pointed out in the third chapter, the literature on the effectiveness of international naming and shaming is divided into three camps. The first camp views the impact of international support as positive. However, scholars in the second camp are pessimistic about the consequences of international support for democratic movements and human rights activism at home. The findings from the third and fourth chapters show that the third-party diplomatic support for protest movements is not significant by itself. However, it could become significant under certain circumstances.

This is consistent with the agnostic camp's argument that the impact of international support is conditional on other factors such as the identity of supporter and protesters' interaction with international actors. In other words, the effectiveness of diplomatic support is context-dependent.

Several major policy implications and practical recommendations for policy-makers and activists could be drawn from the findings in the third and fourth chapters. First, governments' diplomatic actions should avoid giving any impression of coordination with domestic opposition. While the survey experiment did not test for the effect of framing but the findings imply that diplomatic support that gives an impression of coordination between opposition figures and foreign governments will reduce support for protesters.

Moreover, political leaders need to be aware of their government's perception in the host country. The presence of widespread negative sentiments toward the supporter government in the host country is likely to make diplomatic support ineffective or even counterproductive. In other words, if the perception of the supporter in the host country is negative, the host government is more likely to benefit from diplomatic support rather than protesters. Thus, it is important to understand the dynamics of domestic politics in the host country and take a diplomatic stance accordingly.

Additionally, activists need to be cautious in their communication with international actors. Direct and explicit call for help from other governments is likely to reduce protest movements' support base. Therefore, they should avoid any kind of explicit call for foreign pressure on the host country. Otherwise, they risk alienating a significant portion of the potential popular base. Even if they want to communicate with international actors, they need to be selective. Seeking support from strategic rivals is likely to be counterproductive as the findings in chapter fourth suggested.

Future research on the effectiveness of third-party diplomatic support for protest movements may develop in several directions. First, it can broaden the scope of the analysis by focusing on other countries. This study focused on protest movements in Iran and the United States. Do the findings travel beyond these two cases? Future studies can test the external validity of the findings by simply replicating this study in other countries. Future research could also compare international support from the government to that of international organizations. It could be argued that support from international organizations is likely to be more effective because they might be perceived as less politically biased due to their transnational nature. Moreover, future research could examine how the type of stance-taker affects public attitude. Sometimes diplomatic support is expressed by the highest-ranking authorities(e.g., president in presidential systems) but in many cases, support is stated by a foreign policy spokesperson which could draw little public attention. Does it matter who expresses the support? This is also a question that future research could engage with.

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APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 2: DIPLOMACY CATEGORIES AND SUB-CATEGORIES

1. Disapprove

Criticize or denounce Accuse, not specified below Accuse of human rights abuses Asking for inquiry Concerned by the action **2. Demand** Demand political reform, not specified below Demand change in leadership Demand policy change Demand rights Demand change in institutions, regime Demand easing of political dissent Demand release of persons or property Demand that target allows international involvement (non-mediation) Demand de-escalation of military and/or security force engagement

3. Non-violent Threat

Threaten, not specified below Threaten non-force, not specified below Threaten to reduce or stop aid Threaten with sanctions, boycott, or embargo Threaten to reduce or break relations Threaten economic consequences Threaten with administrative sanctions, not specified below Threaten to halt negotiations Threaten to halt mediation Threaten to halt mediation

4. Punitive measure

Reduce relations, not specified below Reduce or break diplomatic relations Reduce or stop material aid, not specified below Reduce or stop economic assistance Reduce or stop military assistance Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions Halt negotiations Halt mediation Halt Diplomatic visit Summon diplomatic envoy Stop military exercise

5. Neutral

Criticize or denounce both sides Seek mediation Encourage dialogue Asking for inquiry Follow the events Hope for the best Encourage both sides to refrain from violence 6. Pro-government stance Criticize or denounce protesters Support the government 7. Pro-protest stance Support protestors

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES

Control group

Last week in several major cities protested against the government. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The police also arrested some of the protestors. There are reports that some people have been killed by the police.

Verbal support group

Last week people in several major cities protested against the government. The polices used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The police also arrested some of the protestors. There are reports that some people have been killed by the police. The United States government supported the protest movement. The U.S. State Department made a statement about the protests as follows:

"The United States of America closely monitors protests and violence in Iran. Unfortunately, the Iranian government continues to imprison and kill those who are brave enough to venture into the street. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the deaths and the arrests of protestors. To the regime's victims, we say: You will not be forgotten."

Sanctions group

Last week a group of people in several major cities protested against the government. The polices used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The police also arrested some of the protestors. There are reports that some people have been killed by the police. The United States government has supported the protest movement. The U.S. State Department made a statement about the protests as follows:

"Security forces have used extreme violence against protesters. For this reason, the US government will impose economic sanctions on Iranian institutions and officials for suppressing protesters and violating human rights."

Verbal support + Demand group

Last week people in several major cities protested against the government. The polices used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The police also arrested some of the protestors. There are reports that some people have been killed by the police. The leaders of the protest movement have called for US help and asked the president to take a tougher stand against the Iranian government.

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Sanctions + Demand group

Last week people in several major cities protested against the government. The polices used tear gas to disperse the crowd. The police also arrested some of the protestors. There are reports that some people have been killed by the police. The leaders of the protest movement have called for US help and asked the president to take a tougher stand against the Iranian government.

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APPENDIX C

CHAPTER 3: IRB APPROVAL



APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW

Timothy Peterson

CLAS-SS: Politics and Global Studies, School of (SPGS)

Timothy.M.Peterson@asu.edu

Dear Timothy Peterson:

On 5/10/2022 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:


| Type of Review: | Initial Study |
|---------------------|---|
| Title: | Diplomacy in Support of Protest Movements: |
| | Evidence from an Intelligentsia Experiment in Iran |
| Investigator: | Timothy Peterson |
| IRB ID: | STUDY00015913 |
| Category of review: | (7)(a) Behavioral research |
| Funding: | None |
| Grant Title: | None |
| Grant ID: | None |
| Documents Reviewed: | Consent_form.pdf, Category: Consent Form; |
| | IRB Social Behavioral- |
| | Peyman_Asadzadehmamaghani.docx, Category: IRB |
| | Protocol; |
| | • Survey questions.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey |
| | questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus |
| | group questions); |
| | |


The IRB approved the protocol from 5/10/2022 to 5/9/2023 inclusive. Three weeks before 5/9/2023 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.


If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 5/9/2023 approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use final, watermarked versions available under the "Documents" tab in ERA-IRB.

APPENDIX D


CHAPTER 4: DISTRIBUTION OF VARIABLES ACROSS CONTROL AND TREATMENT GROUPS



















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APPENDIX E

CHAPTER 4: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES



APPENDIX F

CHAPTER 4: TRANSCRIPTS OF THE VIDEOS FOR TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS

Treatment 1 (China)

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, and unarmed black man, was killed by Minneapolis police. When a video of the incident circulated in the media, protests broke out across the country. Floyd's death also triggered worldwide responses. Leaders around the world expressed their support for the Black Lives Matter Movement. The Black Lives Matter Movement has been around since 2013. Activists say that the movement seeks to break down systemic racism in the United States. The Black Lives Matter Movement received strong diplomatic support from China. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "Black Lives Matter and their human rights should be protected." China also asked the U.S. government to "take all necessary measures to deal with the violent law enforcement of police." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson also supported the Black Lives Matter Movement, saying that "racism against ethnic minorities in the U.S. is a chronic disease of American society."

Treatment 2 (Canada)


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Control (9 Signs You're a Politics Student)

You've been known to take pub arguments a bit too seriously but that's only because you know that politics comes into everything. You actually know what caucus means and even better you can spell it. Don't deny it! The posters in your room are mostly of people in suits on podiums looking pretty fired up. You talk about political figures like they're your best mates but that's only because in your heads they are your best mates. You have a real flair for giving speeches in fact you just can't stop yourself doing it. You spend more time in the library than anywhere else. You're constantly sharing articles about politics on social media complete with a full essay length opinion even when nobody asks for it. That TV show you know the one is the real reason that you chose your degree. People keep asking you if you want to become the next president or prime minister. When this happens you try and laugh and say no but everybody knows that really you mean yes.

APPENDIX G

CHAPTER 4: NATIONAL PRIDE ACROSS COUNTRIES



Percentage of people who are very proud of their national identity

APPENDIX H

CHAPTER 4: IRB APPROVAL



EXEMPTION GRANTED

Cameron Thies CLAS-SS: Politics and Global Studies, School of (SPGS) 480/727-2518 CAMERON.THIES@asu.edu

Dear Cameron Thies:

On 5/19/2021 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

| Type of Review: | Initial Study |
|---------------------|---|
| Title: | Domestic Response to Foreign States' Diplomatic |
| | Support for Social Movements |
| Investigator: | Cameron Thies |
| IRB ID: | STUDY00014003 |
| Funding: | None |
| Grant Title: | None |
| Grant ID: | None |
| Documents Reviewed: | Consent_form.pdf, Category: Consent Form; Debriefing Script.pdf, Category: Participant materials (specific directions for them); IRB Social Behavioral- Peyman_Asadzadehmamaghani.docx, Category: IRB Protocol; Survey questions.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions); |
| | |

The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 5/19/2021.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

If any changes are made to the study, the IRB must be notified at <u>research.integrity@asu.edu</u> to determine if additional reviews/approvals are required.