

Role of Organizational Power and Politics
in the Success of Public Service Public Private Partnerships

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the role of organizational politics and power and their role in the success of public service Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). By doing so, it addresses two areas of research in network governance and organizational theory. On one hand it explores the role of public private partnerships in the emerging network governance paradigm of public administration. On the other hand it studies the widely discussed but considerably under-researched role of organizational power in network governance. The literature review establishes public service PPPs as a sub type of governance networks, and provides an initial framework to study the nature and dynamics of power in these PPPs. The research is descriptive in nature and uses inductive reasoning in the tradition of Kathleen Eisenhardt. Case studies in rural areas of Punjab, Pakistan are conducted on two very similar PPPs. A replication logic is used to understand how power contributed to the success of one of those projects and lack of success in the other. Based on analysis of the findings, the dissertation concludes that public service PPPs succeed when the goals of the PPP are aligned with the goals of the most powerful collaborators. This is because regardless of its structure, a public service PPP pursues the goals targeted by the sum total of the power of its politically active collaborators. The dissertation also provides insight into the complexity of the concept of success in public service PPPs and the donor control on the operation and outcomes of public service PPPs.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

The concept of public private partnership (PPP) is not new to the practice of public administration. For the past few decades, governments have been encouraging local and international businesses to invest in public service projects especially the ones requiring heavy infrastructural investment. These projects have included motor ways, urban mass transit, parks and recreation facilities and so on (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Andersen, 2004). The problem oriented and project based nature of public private partnerships, makes for a simple and efficient partnership between government and private organizations (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). It provides an opportunity for sharing of financial risks across sectors (Allen, 2001), and ensures that each function in the delivery of the public service is being handled by the party most experienced and well trained to conduct it.

Success of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model has therefore made it lucrative for other public service projects as well. A number of international development projects especially those carried out by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other international donor organizations such as

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) now rely on the PPP model (ADB, 2008; World Bank, 2009; USAID, 2011). Money received from the international donor is not spent directly by the government agency in this model, but is disbursed to a network of government and non government organizations that work together to serve a public purpose. This ensures transparency and provides a way around corruption and inefficiency that troubles a number of governments in developing countries.

PPP in Public Administration Literature

As observed by Forrer et al (2010), public private partnerships have been in action, delivering public services, at least since the Roman Empire. However, in the past few decades they have found an unprecedented increase in significance and magnitude. This significance has been noted by scholars and practitioners alike in international development (Tennyson, 2003), urban development and infrastructure (Hodge & Greve, 2007) and with some differences in terminology, the civil society literature (Alexander & Nank, 2009; Brudney & Mendel, 2012; Salamon, 1995). By the very nature of their existence and operation, PPPs have become relevant to the field of Public Administration that has recently opened itself to concepts beyond the structure and functions of government organizations. PPPs are some of the easily observable empirical applications of the theoretical

concepts we have been reading about in the Network Governance literature, as in they are networks of organizations from different sectors that are usually governed in an indirect, imperfect fashion by government organizations and in many cases pursue critical public purposes, from mass transit to elementary education and from basic health to national security.

While Public Private Partnerships have become an integral part of the delivery of public service in the past couple of decades, they have not seen a commensurate representation in the public administration literature. A keyword search for "Public Private Partnership" returned only 30-odd articles in *Public Administration Review* and a mere 9 articles in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* in the past 10 years. Most of those articles dealt with matters of urban infrastructure and privatization. Another keyword search of "Public Private Partnership" AND "Network Governance" returned only 4 articles each from these two most reputed Public Administration journals for the past 10 years. Finally, the keywords "Network Governance" returned 40-odd articles in both these journals for the past 10 years. This means that for every 10 articles having to do anything with network governance, published in the two top public administration journals, only 1 talked about PPPs despite their theoretical and empirical relevance to the concept of network governance. New publications in public administration are however picking up on their significance and the *Public Performance and Management Review* (PPMR) published a special edition dedicated entirely to PPPs in June 2012.

PPP and Power

With the paradigm shift in public administration towards governance networks, the literature has addressed a number of "big questions" (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). One of these big questions is the role of power in network governance. A lot of theoretical and empirical pieces in network governance attempt to address the role of power (Brass et al, 2004). Power has been studied in different organizational settings and different models of public service delivery. Similarly, factors affecting power and the possible impacts of power have been the topics of several descriptive studies (Provan & Milward, 1991). However, most if not all of these studies address the question of power in an indirect way. They do not dig deeper into what exactly is the role that power plays in the outcomes of an organizational network. The question of power in network governance will therefore be a source of considerable curiosity in any study of PPPs in public service. Because if a public service PPP is a form of network governance, and it is a model being rapidly adopted in the practice of public administration, we are practicing something in the absence of critical information about it. This brings me to my research question.

Research Question

How does organizational power affect the success of a public service public private partnership?

The theoretical grounding of this question will be revisited after the literature review in Chapter 4. However the importance of this question comes from the fact that it addresses two sources of intellectual curiosity at the same time. On one hand it explores the idea of success in Public Private Partnerships, and on the other hand it explores the question of the role of power in network governance.

Research Agenda

The research consists of two case studies. The case studies were conducted in the rural areas of the Punjab province in Pakistan. Punjab is the largest province in the country and houses about a half of the country's population. The majority of the provinces population lives in rural areas and is dependent on agriculture for their sustenance. A number of local and national organizations in Punjab have been engaging in different individual and PPP based projects to address the overwhelming health issues encountered by rural communities. Case studies for this project dealt with two of these PPP projects involving the same collaborators. Despite the similarity among partners and structure, one of the projects proved to

be highly successful while the other faced crippling challenges. The similarity of the PPPs and the difference in the outcomes presented a unique opportunity for applying a replication logic to study the factors that contributed to the high achievement of one project and the low achievement of the other.

The evidence was collected and studied using guidelines by Yin (2009) and was analyzed for inductive reasoning in the tradition of Eisenhardt (1989). The key contributions of this study are in the form of testable theoretical propositions that respond to the research question while adding to existing theory on organizational power and network governance.

Dissertation Outline

The rest of this dissertation is divided into to five chapters. Chapters 2 presents the literature review on Public Private Partnerships and their significance in public administration in general and network governance in particular. Chapter 3 deals with the role of power in network environments, and presents a theoretical framework that can shed some light on the concept of power and politics in public service PPPs. Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology and details the data collection and analysis approaches. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study along some basic analysis. Chapter 6 concludes the study by presenting the theoretical propositions emerging from inductive reasoning, outlining avenues for future research and discussing the merits of the study and its limitations.

Chapter 2

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Chapter 2: Public Private Partnerships in Public Administration

Network Governance and Public Administration

Throughout its self-conscious history, the field of Public Administration has found several theoretical, philosophical and implementation perspectives at its mainstream. The first and foremost of such perspectives was brought into the public administration literature by the very introduction of the field to American academics by authors such as Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900). This view saw government as a dichotomy of politics and administration, where the work of the government was to express and execute the will of the public. This will was expressed by politically elected representatives of the public and was documented as acts of legislative bodies. The execution of this will was then the responsibility of technical and managerial experts retained by government agencies, also known as public administrators. It was perhaps because of this dichotomy that some significant contributions to the field of public administration that came out towards the mid twentieth century were either specialized in public policy or in the executive side of public administration. Public policy theorists explored the dynamics of what Goodnow (1900) called "the expression of the will of public" by studying the phenomena of collective action (Olson, 1965), political pluralism (Dahl, 1961), governmental agenda setting (Kingdon, 1984; Arnold, 1990;

Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) and so on. Administrative theorists on the other hand discussed the empowerment and accountability of public administrators, most notably in the Friedrich - Finer debates (Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941) as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of public management (Simon, 1947).

A clear paradigm shift in the field of public administration was introduced by Waldo (1953) . The key feature of Waldo's paradigm was an appreciation of the responsibility public administrators held towards the public they served, as opposed to the political representatives. This re-imagination opened a whole new chapter in the theoretical development of the field. The resulting academic discussions explored the role of public administrators in the public policy making process beyond legislative bodies and interest groups (Lindblom, 1959; Lipsky, 1980) and their legitimacy in doing so (McSwite, 1997). The responsibility of public administrators to the public was also envisioned as the responsibility of a vendor to a customer in a market, and manifested in the New Public Management (NPM) movement (Lynn, 1996). NPM discussions resulted in the inclusion of entrepreneurial variables such as economic efficiency, competition and customer service into the study of public administration.

NPM dominated the practice of public administration and stayed a leading topic in theoretical literature for almost two decades. However the high expectations from this new approach did not materialize in the long run. For one, adopting NPM strategies resulted in an increased size of the government rather than the perceived decrease (Salamon, 1995; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007a) and its public

service benefits were highly criticized in later works, notably Denhardt & Denhardt (2002) who proposed the New Public Service approach as a more citizen focused alternative to the market focused approaches of new public management. Despite these failures, NPM had a significant impact on the research imagination of the academics in the field. The market was the centerpiece of NPM and the market was open to all organizations, public and private. Even though the inclusion of organizations outside the government in the NPM vision was for the sole purposes of managerial benchmarking and making outsourcing decisions, this openness to the environment, for the first time, encouraged public administration theorists looked for public service outside the confines of government organizations.

Perspective	Key Actors
Governance	All stakeholders relevant to a public purpose, including public, private and nonprofit agencies, individual scholars, politicians and activists, general public
New Public Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Entrepreneurs - People (Customers)- Private Contractors
Politics versus Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elected Officials - Public Managers

Accountability Mechanisms	Leadership Style
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Steering Agencies - Public Service Network Members (Mutual Accountability) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Network Management Competencies - Self Regulation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Indicators - Regulatory Agencies - Market Competition 	<p>Based on contemporary business leadership</p>
<p>Technocrats accountable to members of elected bodies</p>	<p>Formal/Bureaucratic leadership</p>

Organizational Goals	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Problem-oriented - Each actor has full or partial stake in network goals; Individual organizational goals may be pursued through inter-organizational relationships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Survival in Market - Economic Efficiency - Customer Service
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy implementation - Economic Efficiency 	

Table 1: *Key Theoretical Perspectives in Public Administration*

The late 1990s and early 2000s saw the latest perspective in the field of public administration in the concept of Governance. The new theoretical lens was an acknowledgement of the fact by public administration theorists that public service is not being delivered solely by the hands of government employees. Through contracted services, community development initiatives, information and communication technologies and mass communication channels, a number of business, social, academic and other organizations were involved in serving one

or the other public purposes. Even the public services apparently rendered by a government agency depended heavily on the active involvement of multiple organizations within and outside the government. Table 1 summarizes the three research imaginations discussed in this section along with their key characteristics.

Earlier theories in this perspective focused on the "hollowing" out of the state by replacing government bureaucracies with multisectoral networks. That is, the government agencies, instead of being large entities providing public service on their own, should reduce their size and assume a coordinating role while the services are being provided by organizations from private and voluntary sectors networked through contractual arrangements (Rhodes, 1994; Milward & Provan, 2000; Milward & Provan, 2003; Alexander & Nank, 2009). Authors such as Sorensen & Torfing (2007a), however, do not consider network governance as hollowing of the state. In their opinion, the advent of a network does not require the government agencies to reduce in size. Instead, it warrants development of an alternative set of competencies by government administrators so they can provide regulation and oversight to the networks at the same time allowing the networks to regulate themselves from within. This abstract level steering is termed as "meta-governance" (Sorensen & Torfing, 2005; Sorensen, 2006; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007a; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007b). Sorensen & Torfing (2007a) have identified various approaches by which networks can be meta-governed and have classified them into four categories, namely Interdependency, Governability,

Governmentality and Integration theories, based on the researcher's focus on rational behavior versus cultural conformance and conflict versus coordination among network actors.

Governability theory suggest that the state can exercise meta-governance without directly intervening in the network processes, i.e. using a "hands-off" approach. Instead of directly altering the network, the state can define institutional norms of communication and interaction and can even establish reward and punishment mechanisms throughout the network's environment. Defining the rules of the game this way will ensure that even though network actors are self governing, the regulation of the network from within is not hindered by deadlocks caused due to internal conflict.

Integration theory, like Governability theory is also prescriptive in nature, and suggests "hands-off" strategies for efficient meta-governance such as meta-governance of the network actors' identities and capacities. Meta-governance of the actors' identities makes them better aware of their position in the network, the role they are performing the achievement of network goals and the significance of communicating and understanding other actors in the network. Meta-governance of the actors' capacities can be done by enhancing their capacity to understand and act upon the democratic political ideals with which the network intends to serve the society. Understanding their position in the society and developing and enhancing their political competencies and making them aware of the democratic

values are, in this theory, best ways to regulate self regulating networks to achieve positive outcomes.

Governmentality theory is another hands-off approach to meta-governance though it is of a descriptive nature, hence it only reflects on the observed phenomena rather than suggesting future strategies. It notes the significance of the role of state in network governance. The state is responsible for facilitating network formation and operation. At the same time however it is also responsible for evaluating, rewarding or sanctioning network actors. So the government allows the network actors to self regulate but at the same time defines the limitations to that self regulation.

Interdependency theory has a descriptive perspective on meta-governance.

According to this theory, allowing the networks to self regulate without any external steering can result in network failure as there can be too many conflicts among various actors. That is why the state usually adopts a "hands on" approach exercising direct influence on the network processes. This can be done through attempting to improve capacity of network actors to facilitate self regulation using process management strategies. Another option is to take the more invasive route of network participation where state agencies join the network so they can facilitate regulation from inside the network.

Public Service Networks: Theory and Practice

It is interesting to note that prior to the paradigm shift towards the idea of governance and the resulting "hollowing" of the state in mainstream research imagination, the literature on public administration was generally focused on the role of actors lying within some form of government organization. This has also been shown empirically by Bingham & Bowen (1994) who outlined the most recurring theoretical topics in publications in *Public Administration Review* and none of the topics dealt directly with the role of non governmental actors in public administration. On the other hand, as evidenced by Salamon (1995), the responsibility of delivering public service in the United States was being increasingly shared by civil sector organizations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and the presence of voluntary organizations providing services in healthcare, education, environmental conservation and several other areas was acknowledged in local governmental policies. A significant phenomenon in the practice of public administration that emerged in Europe around the last quarter of the twentieth century and caught up quickly to the American urban planners was of the Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; Hodge & Greve, 2007). This approach allows for private businesses to develop infrastructure, run services and collect revenues on behalf of the government for a specified amount of time. However unlike privatization, the infrastructure developed in PFI stays under government ownership with the private party acting

as a lessee. The provision of public service provided by a PFI brings operational efficiency to public service and the government ownership makes room for the public voice to enter the decision making processes not only through consumer choice but also from the democratic political channels.

Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is a term that has found acceptance in the practitioner community in the past couple of decades as a catch-all term for these collaborative ventures where the government mandates an organization or a group of organizations belonging to private sectors to provide certain public services (Allen, 2001; Koppenjan & Enserik, 2009; Wang, 2009; Forrer et al., 2010). The mandate usually involves the operation and development of government owned assets by these non government collaborators. PPPs are an essential part of the developmental aid strategies of organizations such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank and USAID etc, in which case the partnerships also includes nonprofit organizations (World Bank, 2007; ADB, 2008; USAID, 2011). In the developed world, these partnerships are used as a means of lowering government's investment risks in grand public projects such as urban mass transit schemes, healthcare infrastructure and even information and communication systems(DFID, 2007).

Despite the significance of PPPs in the practice of public administration, a very small amount of theoretical and empirical work appears in the mainstream public administration literature that specifically refers to PPPs. Most of the academic work on PPPs has been produced in the fields of community development and

urban planning and management with occasional entries from public administration scholars such as Klijn & Teisman (2003) and Koppenjan & Enserik (2009). This is rather an awkward observation since it is evident from the above discussion that PPPs are significant practical representations of the "hollowing" of the state that is the basic premise of the governance paradigm, especially in the area of network governance. There is, therefore ample opportunity to link the practical aspects of PPPs to the existing theory on network governance. Building on this opportunity, the rest of this chapter attempts to place PPPs in the realm of network governance by establishing them as an academically sub type of public service networks.

Public Private Partnerships vs Public Sector - Private Sector Partnerships

As mentioned in the above section, PPPs have historically been seen as partnerships between public and private sector organizations. This concept has resonated in a large number of works produced in academic as well as practitioner generated literature on PPPs (Patrinos & Sosale, 2007; Koppenjan & Enserik, 2009; Wang, 2009). However recent practitioner literature on PPPs, such as the Asian Development Bank's handbook on Public Private Partnerships (ADB,2008) and the Partnering Tool Book prepared by the International Business Leader Forum (Tennyson, 2003) supports PPPs that have nonprofits as partners. In fact, nowadays there exist partnerships that call themselves PPPs even though all

parties involved belong either to the public or the nonprofit sectors (Pakistan Ministry of Education, 2004). Similarly, some of the leading scholars on European PPPs such as Osborne (2001) indicate that the significance of PPP is not limited to urban infrastructure development but can also contribute to the effectiveness of the civil society. Even in one of the recent academic pieces published in *Public Administration Review* (Forrer et al., 2010), the authors, even after defining PPPs as partnerships between public and private sectors (p476), switch frequently between public sector and nonprofit sector organizations as PPP partners (p478 and p480). These observations, then, present an interesting puzzle, i.e. are Public Private Partnerships the same as Partnerships between Public-sector and Private-sector organizations? Given the fact that PPPs and their role in Network Governance and Public Administration in general is a focus of this chapter, it is important to address this question as early as possible.

Let us begin with the way PPP is defined in the urban development literature, which can be treated as the contemporary "home" of the concept in terms of the current scholarship. According to Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007) Some of the early academic definitions of PPPs can be seen in the works of Peters (1997) and Anderson (2004) who treat PPPs as special types of purpose built organizational partnerships developed around public service projects and can involve two or more organizations, one of which is must be a government agency. Note that these definitions do not specify the sector the other organizations belong to. Which means a partnership between a government and a nonprofit organization

can be called PPP without conflicting with this definition. This idea has also been confirmed by Wang (2009) who observes the general acceptance of a number of definitions of PPPs ranging from broad spectrum multi sector partnerships to the strictest interpretations of Public Finance Initiatives.

Urban planning and public administration are not alone in blurring the lines between private sector and non profit sector organizations when the term "private" represents being a non state actor. This same observation can be made in the works on government-civil society relationships as well. Salamon (1995) is notable for using the term "private" to describe private corporations and nonprofit organizations alike, factoring them into his "third party government" model that in its essence is very similar to the concept of network governance (Salamon, 1995). Another interesting observation made in this stream of literature is the shared financial responsibility between government and nonprofit institutions.

Given the above analysis, this chapter is now ready to take its own position on the definition of PPPs. We conclude that a Public-Private Partnership, at least for the sake of this chapter, is a concept that represents not only a partnership between public and private sector organizations, but also partnerships between government agencies and private parties, both for profit and nonprofit, that collaborate to deliver government sanctioned public services. A public service network with any combination of public, nonprofit or private organizations can be called a PPP as long as it satisfies the defining characteristics laid out by Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007). That is, at least one of the partners is a government agency, the

partnership is project based, and that the interorganizational relationships are governed by clear contractual agreements outlining the responsibilities and expectations of partner organizations regarding the shared infrastructural investment and shared responsibility for delivering the intended public service.

Public Private Partnerships and Network Governance

As discussed in the previous section, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to a discussion on the treatment of PPPs in the network governance literature. A pertinent starting point in this attempt will be to place PPPs in the network governance literature by establishing a working definition of PPP in the literature's vernacular. This can be done by developing a classification of public service networks based on some of the major studies in network governance, followed by an analysis of the existing definitions of PPPs to see how they fit into that classification. Establishing PPPs as a category of public service networks will help identify relevant topics in the network governance literature that address matters specific to such partnerships and will also help determine what the existing body of literature knows about PPPs and what needs to be learned through future research and academic work in other disciplines. Since the focus of this chapter is on the treatment of PPPs in the theory as well as the practice of network governance, it will make sense to place PPPs not only in the conceptual dimensions of network governance but also in the managerial dimensions of the

field. This can be done by identifying key elements of public management relevant to network governance and analyzing their applications on PPPs.

It should be worth mentioning at this point that while in theory, any combination of public, private, community, media and other organizations and individuals can constitute a public service network, this chapter narrows down the scope of "public service networks" to only those organizational networks that are formed through policy decisions or a "charter" on the part of a governing organization, such as a governmental agency or a legislative body. Similarly while a number of studies cited in this chapter define "sectors" differently, this chapter will limit itself to a tri-sector model with all organizations including businesses, NGOs, universities, media enterprises, legislative bodies, local governments and so on, identified as belonging to either the public, private or nonprofit sectors. .

Classification of Public Service Networks

The need for the classification of organizational networks goes beyond the attempt the purpose of finding a place for PPPs as public service networks. This need has been long felt in the fields of organization theory and network governance alike. Provan et al (2007) were among the first to critique attempts to establish catch-all frameworks that could be used to study organizational networks of all kinds. Based on a comprehensive study of recent empirical work

on organizational networks, they identified the common variables studied in the bulk of empirical work on organizational networks and classified the variables according to levels of analysis and other analytical dimensions. Herranz (2008) has also highlighted the problems associated with attempting to link the theory of network management with its practice without an appropriate classification of public service networks. His research classified public service networks according to the managerial models being used in the steering of network operations and outcomes. This classification linked the empirical observations of network management to familiar organizational management models. The classification proposed in this chapter varies from the works of Provan et al (2007) and Herranz (2008) in the sense that instead of traversing the levels of analysis, it stays at the network level of analysis and attempts to classify public service networks on structural and outcome-based dimensions. .

I begin outlining my classification framework by imagining the components of a public service network based on a working definition of network governance. The definition chosen for this purpose is Rhodes's (1996) conceptualization of network governance that is also the basis of Sorensen & Torfing's (2005) widely accepted definition of democratic network governance.

Rhodes (1996) begins his view of network governance as service provided to the public by "permutations of the government, private and voluntary sectors" (p. 658). These permutations, that I shall refer to as Public Service Networks for the rest of this chapter are elaborated by Rhodes as being "self governing, inter-

organizational networks" that are individually autonomous but depend on each other and engage in continuous mutual interactions based on resource exchange and shared purposes. Government in such networks does not enjoy formal authority, but can "indirectly and imperfectly steer networks" (p. 660).

While this definition provides a number of characteristics of public service network, three appear to be directly relevant for the purpose of classification. These are the service provided by the network, the organizational makeup of the network, i.e. the "permutation" of public, private and voluntary organizations providing the service and finally, the nature of interactions between these organizations. These categories can be broadened using terminology from Sorensen & Torfing's (2005, p. 197) definition of democratic public service networks. The term "actor grouping" can therefore be used instead of "organizations" as a catchall for organizations as well as the sectors that organizations belong to. Agranoff (2007) in his research has used the purpose of a public service network as a significant classifier. The term "Services" in the aforementioned definition can therefore be replaced with "public purpose" to establish another dimension of network governance classification. Finally, since the interactions within the network are at least imperfectly steered by a government agency despite self regulation, constant negotiations, bargaining and power struggles (Rhodes, 1996; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005), the mechanism of this governance can provide us with the third dimension for the classification of network. This chapter relies on the modes of governance identified by Provan &

Kenis (2008) that has been referenced by several notable works in network governance in Public Administration as well as management in general, such as Kenis et al (2009) and Raab & Kenis (2009).

While a working definition of public service networks gives us a basis for the classification of these networks, empirical examples are required to assign meaning to such classification. The categories developed in the following analysis are applied primarily to a set of public service networks listed in Agranoff (2007). The study has been selected to facilitate the analysis as it analyzes fourteen different networks with highly diverse sectoral affiliations, public purposes and control mechanisms and is thus rich in examples of various kinds of networks. Additional examples come from Herranz (2007), Salamon (1995) and Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007) and have been selected based on their relevance to the nature of categories in which they are used.

Classification by Actor Grouping

The understanding developed in this chapter for network governance pays an inherent attention to the sectors the actors within a network represent. Studies on management and strategy making in public service networks often reciprocate this emphasis and take careful note of the sectoral representation of network actors (Herranz, 2007). This makes a case for the importance of distinguishing public service networks from one another based on the types of actors that come together

to serve the public purpose. At the most abstract level, this category can group actors by their affiliation to the major "sectors" of the governance world, such as public, private and voluntary, media or the "fourth element" as well as individual stakeholders. The actor groupings within a network can be helpful in providing the researcher an ability to use theoretical models relevant to the groups involved when studying empirical phenomena. The following presents an abstract classification of public service networks through actor groupings.

Single Sector Networks

These networks pursue public purposes through interactions between individuals and organizations representing a specific sector of the governance world that can operate independent of each other and are not required to report to each other, nor to any common formal authority. A good example of such networks is the Des Moines Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, a network of city, county, state and federal governments and regional and metropolitan authorities in the Des Moines Metropolitan area in Iowa, formed for transportation planning in the metropolitan area (Agranoff, 2007).

Dual Sector Networks

These public service networks are common in several policy areas. The most common partnerships exist in urban planning and development where government organizations contract a private party to construct or renovate public service facilities with or without shared investment from the government. Such facilities are operated by the private contractor for a pre determined period of time and the government acts both as the customer and the regulator of the facility and its services (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). Similarly, the government agencies can partner with non profit organizations to enhance the delivery of public services by using human resource and business models developed by the non profit. Indiana Rural Development Council is an example of such networks that brings together government and nonprofit organizations on a "forum to address rural issues, establish partnerships and enable partners to take action" in the rural areas of Indiana (Agranoff, 2007).

Multi Sector Networks

More often than not, multi sector networks are formed around the solution of wicked problems, that cannot be tackled with foreseeable contractual or policy arrangements. A number of problem solving networks fall under this category. Examples include The Work Place, a network of several government agencies, nonprofits and private sector organizations set up to facilitate skill development and employment opportunities in the Boston area (Harranz, 2007). Iowa

Geographic Information Council, a network of federal, state, regional, county and city governments as well as private and nonprofit organizations and universities, working as a "clearing house for coordinated systems and data sharing" is also a good example of multi sector public service networks.

Classification by Public Purpose.

One of the defining characteristics of public service networks is the fact that they are set up to serve a certain public purpose (Rhodes, 1997; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005) which usually translates into countering certain public "problems" (Harranz, 2007). Agranoff (2007) used the nature of these public purposes or problems to assign public service networks into four categories, namely Action, Development, Informational and Outreach networks. This classification can help a student of network governance to use the service specific literature in order to understand the dynamics of a network in situations where empirical observations are hard to explain using generic network governance theoretical models. For example, the performance of a development network might be simpler to understand when compared to the performance of other development and capacity building related initiatives. The following explores Agranoff's (2007) categories to arrive at a classification of public service networks based on their public purpose.

Action Networks

Action networks are the kind of organizational partnerships where all collaborators work jointly on an area of mutual interest. The working relationships are established through formal organizational arrangements (Agranoff, 2007). These networks are usually formed to tackle problems with well researched solutions. These networks bring together competencies from different governance sectors to identify social problems or potential opportunities and then set specific targets for the collaboration to achieve in a project-based fashion. Examples of these networks include The Work Place, an organizational network set up to facilitate employment opportunities in the Boston area (Harranz, 2007) and Iowa Communications Network, a collaboration between federal, state and local government agencies to provide fiber optic network connectivity throughout the state of Iowa (Agranoff, 2007).

Developmental Networks

Development networks bring together partners that can benefit from an exchange of information and technical expertise and educate and provide services to each in order to enhance the capacity of partner organizations to implement solutions in their respective areas of operation (Agranoff, 2007). These networks are different from action networks because instead of all members of the network jointly

tackling social problems, some members of the developmental network enhance the ability of other members to deal with those problems. These networks may also bring academic experts on a matter of policy importance to the people responsible for implementation in those policy areas. A good example of such networks will be the Partnership for Rural Nebraska, a collaboration of federal, state and regional level government agencies that benefit from the research conducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in order to provide "resources and expertise to enhance rural development opportunities" in the state of Nebraska (Agranoff, 2007).

Outreach Networks

These networks tend to implement solutions to critical problems by conducting information, expertise, policy and resource exchanges between members on a large scale. The resulting action is taken by a multitude of organizations at different levels (Agranoff, 2007). Though similar in some aspects to developmental networks, these networks differ in the fact that instead of training an organization or a group of organizations to implement time tested solutions to public problems, these encourage action taken by organizations on an individual level in a broad yet coordinated manner. These networks can be informal, such as the Indiana 317 Taskforce, a group of public, private, nonprofit and academic organizations set up to research "strategies for developmentally disabled community services" as well as formal, such as the federal government facilitated

USDA/Rural Development Nebraska partnership that provides "outreach and assistance to leverage funds of other programs for public and private development" (Agranoff, 2007).

Informational Networks

Unlike the other three public purpose based forms of public service networks, informational networks do not take part in the implementation of solutions. Instead, they exchange information, technical knowledge and policy and program information within the network. The learning from network partnership may be reflected in the action taken by the partner agencies on a voluntary basis (Agranoff, 2007). Just like outreach networks, these networks can also be formed through formal arrangements or as informal groups. A relevant example of such networks is Indiana Economic Development Council, an informational network formally incorporated as non profit organization that brings together private, academic, non profit and state government agencies that, through this network, jointly serve as a "research consultant for state economic development" (Agranoff, 2007).

Classification by Mode of Governance.

While public service networks are formed by independent actors with no direct formal chain of authority, there still exist certain control models through which

network operations and outcomes can be steered one way or the other. Steering in network governance has found widespread interest in the research work on meta governance and power in networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Sorensen, 2006).

Provan & Kenis (2008) have conducted a seminal research on the control mechanisms within organizational networks and have identified three governance modes. They discovered that organizational networks can be governed by (A) a hub-firm or a lead-organization, (B) a network administrative organization (NAO), set up specifically for managing the network, or (C) be self governed by the participants.

Participant Governed Networks

These networks do not have a formal leadership mechanism. According to Provan & Kenis (2008) these networks solve problems through a strong goal consensus among actors and usually consist of a small number of member organizations operating in a high trust environment. Examples of such networks include the Small Communities Environmental Infrastructure Group, an informal group of state, federal and regional and metropolitan level government agencies as well as academic, private and nonprofit organizations, that, according to Agranoff (2007) "assists small Ohio governments in their water and wastewater systems".

Lead Organization Governed Networks

These networks, according to Provan & Kenis (2008), are usually formed when a central organization requires the services of other organizations to pursue its goals, such as in buyer-supplier relationships between a large organization and its vendors. For public service networks in this category, the lead organization is usually the one primarily responsible for the public purpose of the network. Accountability is usually centralized with the lead organization, as opposed to being distributed in the case of partner governed networks. The network goals is usually more aligned with the lead organization goals than the partner organizations. For example, the British agency responsible for federal prisons, Her Majesty's Prisons (HMP), is the lead organization in a public service network that includes privately constructed and maintained prison facilities. The partner organizations are usually construction companies and facility management organizations whose goals are indirectly aligned to the network's overall goal of prisoner safekeeping (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007).

Network Administration Organization Governed Networks.

In a lot of network governance structures where no clear lead organization is involved and the network is either too large or too complex to be participant governed, a separate organizational entity is created to serve as the lead organization. Such a governance model is called the NAO governance model

(Provan & Kenis, 2008). An NAO can be seen as an example of a "hollow government" or "meta-governance" entity that does not restrict the relationships between network members, however it does attempt to keep control on the performance of the network towards goal achievement and accountability. Unlike the other two models, NAO governed networks are larger in scale and the member organizations can have mutually unaligned or even conflicting goals. These complications require NAO managers to develop a high level of network management skills (Provan & Kenis). An example of NAO governed networks is the Iowa Enterprise Network that has been incorporated as a nonprofit organization and administers a network of federal government, state government, nonprofit and private organizations that "supports home-based and micro-enterprises" throughout Iowa (Agranoff, 2007).

Public Private Partnerships as Public Service Networks

After breaking down the basic definition of public service networks into various categories, this chapter will now attempt to find a placement for PPPs in the network governance literature. This will be done by matching the characteristics of PPPs described in relevant streams of academic as well as professional literature, on to the public service network categories identified in the previous section. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the classification described above, along with the position of PPPs with respect to the different aspects of

public service networks. The following discussion explores this placement in detail:

Actor Permutations and PPPs

More often than not, PPPs have been understood just the way they are titled, i.e. dual sector partnerships between public and private sector organizations (Nijkamp et al., 2002; Pongsiri, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). In fact, the historical development of the arrangement of PPPs has been rooted in the principles of private investment in public infrastructure and risk sharing between public and private organizations in large public projects (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; Hodge & Greve, 2007). In the recent years, however this apparently obvious assumption has been blurred by the introduction of the nonprofit sector in a number of PPP models, especially in the areas of education and other social services (ADB, 2008). The charter school system in the US is often seen as an example of PPP where the government agency responsible for education in a region can partner with a private and/or a nonprofit organization to provide education compliant with the "No Child Left Behind program" (Patrinos et al, 2009). Some of the mainstream academic definitions such as Peters (1997) and Anderson (2004) also leave PPPs open to interpretation as multi-sector, or even dual sector partnerships between government and nonprofit organizations, by

defining them as partnerships between two or more actors, at least one of whom belongs to the government sector.

Given the above discussion, it can be concluded that there are two distinct interpretations of PPPs in terms of actor permutations. The traditional interpretation, rooted in the European transport partnerships in the late 20th century sees them as dual sector networks, while the opening of the PPP model to a broad range of public services in the recent years has resulted in the partnerships being identified as multi-sector networks. Figure1 therefore places PPPs in both these categories with the respective qualifiers.

It might also be interesting to note that in a lot of contemporary work on PPPs, the term has increasingly begun to represent a concept than a specific type of organizational partnerships. PPPs have come to be understood as organizational arrangements in which different organizations bring together financial and human capital to serve a public purpose on behalf of a government agency. The traditional understanding of privately funded public projects is being muddled by projects such as the World Bank educational PPP program in Sindh, Pakistan (World Bank, 2011) where government funds private parties to run government chartered educational institutions and Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Healthcare in Punjab, Pakistan where an entrepreneurial nonprofit organization runs public health facilities funded by the provincial government (CMIPHC, 2008).

Public Purposes and PPPs

A significant body of academic literature can be used to interpret the concept of PPPs as any of the four public purpose networks discussed in the previous section. The Public Private Policy Partnerships described by Linder & Rosenau (2000) usually act as information, outreach and development networks and focus on knowledge generation, capacity building and exchange of information and technology between the public and private sectors in key policy areas. However, Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007) do not consider the policy partnerships as an extension of the mainstream PPP concept. According to them, PPPs are characterized by their project oriented nature, including focused plans of action, formal arrangements between partners and well defined milestones and timelines. Their concepts also resonates in the practitioner produced literature where the project based nature of PPPs is emphasized (ADB, 2008; Patrinos & Sosale, 2009). It will therefore be safe to state that based on the conceptualization of PPPs in the academic as well as professional literature, they can be classified as Action Networks in terms of public purposes.

Modes of Governance in PPPs

As the previous sections explored, while there is some consensus on the characteristics of PPPs in terms of actor permutations and public purposes, there

are also contrasting views at least in the academic literature as to the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders as well as the type of the public purpose to be served by a PPP. However, when it comes to the concept of governance within the network, academic and practitioner literature is fairly aligned in its understanding. The provision of public services is considered the responsibility of the relevant government agencies through full or partial input from the private and nonprofit sector organizations that bring the required finances, expertise and/or administrative infrastructure to the table. A significant example of this conceptualization is the emphasis found in Patrinos et al (2009) on the notion that the education provided by private funded charter schools in the US "is still public education".

The direct responsibility associated with government agencies towards the provision of public service through the PPP warrants the need for a relatively tight governance model within the partnership. The lead organization models identified by Provan & Kenis (2008) therefore appears to be a good candidate for such a governance mechanism. However this structure requires the lead organization to have significant know how and practical involvement in the implementation of the network's objectives (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Nolte & Boenigk (2011) consider the lead organization model to be the most prevalent model in PPPs in a disaster context, based on their case study on the PPP response to the Haiti earthquake of 2010

A number of PPPs these days are also governed with the NAO model (Provan & Kenis, 2008) where a government steered administrative organization is established to lead the network. This organization can be a for profit joint venture or a registered nonprofit organization that develops expertise in network level competencies such as coordination facilitation, monitoring and evaluation, collective learning and enforcement of accountability measures.

A "Network Governance" Definition of PPPs

The above discussion established PPPs as a type of public service networks as conceptualized in the network governance literature. Therefore based on what we have learned about PPPs so far, Rhodes' (1996) and Sorensen & Torfing (2005) conceptualizations can be altered as follows, to provide a definition of PPPs grounded in network governance:

Public Private Partnerships represent the networking of public organizations with private and/or voluntary organizations that aim to provide one or more public services with a predefined duration and scope. All organizations involved act semi-autonomously, although the network is meta-governed by a government organization. Rules of such meta-governance are outlined in formal contracts among organizations.




Figure1: Placement of PPP in the Network Governance Classification

Network Governance and Public Management

As discussed earlier in the chapter, every shift in the research imagination in public administration has warranted the redefinition of the role played by government officials in public service delivery. From technocrats in the traditional approaches to parts in a machine in the modern ones, and from entrepreneurs of NPM to servants of NPS, no paradigm shift in the study of public administration has gone without research on the position and responsibility of public administrators or managers in the newly realized situations. The network governance approach is no exception. Public service networks formed as a result of a government mandate with state agencies directly involved in the network, fall within the realm of the Interdependency Theory of meta-governance, specifically meta-governance with network participation (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007a). This theoretical perspective warrants development of managerial competencies at the network level that help public managers facilitate the regulation of self regulated network actors.

Unlike the conceptual components of network governance, not a lot of scholarly work is available to classify the requisite competencies along various theoretical and practical dimensions of public management at the network level. Denhardt (2010) however points us in the direction of two relatively new researches that venture into the analysis of network level management competencies in public administration and attempt to classify those as well. These

works by Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) and Thomson & Perry (2006) form the basis of the following analysis. From this point onwards, this chapter will use the term "Network Management" to encompass the entire set of network level competencies in public management necessitated by the paradigm shift towards network governance.

Managing the Dimensions of Collaboration

Throughout the public administration literature, the term "Collaboration" is often used synonymously with the formation of a public service network. For the purpose of this analysis, we can assert that collaboration is the set of process by which networks are formed and operated. According to Thomson & Perry (2006), in order for public managers to effectively manage collaborations, it is essential that they gain a deeper understanding of the processes that culminate into the collaboration. These processes can be classified along five variable dimensions, namely Governance, Administration, Organizational Autonomy, Mutuality and Norms of Trust and Reciprocity.

The Governance Dimension

According to Thomson & Perry (2006, p24), the governance processes form one of the structural dimensions of the collaboration. These processes usually deal with the formation of the public service network and outline not only the goals

pursued by the network, but also the rules by which actors within the network interact with each other. Given that the collaboration is free of hierarchical division of labor, the goal of the governance processes is to bring about a consensus over the solution to the problem that the network came about to solve such that all actors can feel jointly responsible for it. Such a solution might not be ideal for all actors, however it does reflect the interests of all actors in a way that they find themselves able to support it (p 24). Effective network managers nurture this shared sense of responsibility in order to facilitate dynamic negotiation processes among actors. The outcome of such dynamic processes is a state of equilibrium where conflict is minimized and rules of collaboration are generally agreed upon among the actors.

The Administrative Dimension

The process of administering the collaboration forms another structural dimension in Thomson & Perry's (2006) analysis. Using a detailed study of administrative competencies from administration in hierarchical as well as networked organizational structures, they conclude that a number of administrative competencies such as centrality of administration, clear job descriptions and accountability mechanisms are as relevant to collaborative administration as they are to hierarchical administration. However, the nature of such competencies changes in a collaborative environment in the absence of a formal chain of command. The need for another set of competencies then arises given this

interdependent nature of inter-organizational relationships. These competencies deal with the ability of managers to coordinate and administer beyond the scope of their respective organizations. Managers are therefore required to build interpersonal relationships with peers among different members of the collaboration. Such interpersonal relationships complement the organizational interdependencies and provide the basis for an administrative framework alternative to the leader-manager distinction prevalent in traditional public management.

The Autonomy Dimension

Thomson & Perry (2006) classify the organizational autonomy dimension as an Agency dimension of the collaborative processes. This dimension deals with the processes where members of the collaboration weigh their organizational goals against the overall goals of collaboration. The authors indicate a general convergence in Public Administration research on collaboration towards the tendency of organizations to contribute to a collaborative goal only if it satisfies one or more organizational goals. In other words, organizations in collaborations tend to exhibit collaborative behavior only when an immediate need to do so arises, while pursuing individual goals all other times. Such individualistic behavior creates various tensions and problems within the collaboration. As seen in the discussion on the governance dimension, in order for a collaboration to be effective, all members need to agree upon goals that each member can take

responsibility for. The autonomy dimension helps analyze how organizations decide the goals to agree upon. Thomson & Perry (2006) also observe that while organizations may not appear too keen to pursue collaborative goals, the cases in which they are able to coordinate such goals result in highly effective collaborations.

Based on this analysis, we can conclude that successful management of processes along the autonomy dimension requires network managers to span organizational boundaries and facilitate member organizations in realizing their dependency on other organizations in order to solve the problem being addressed by the collaboration. This realization will not only help them justify the alignment of organizational goals with collaboration goals, but will also encourage them to share information and resources with other members. By corollary, network managers also need to set up systems of checks and balances by which they can ensure that member organizations are not trying use the information and resources of the collaboration to serve individual goals that are unrelated, or in worse cases, detrimental, to the goals targeted by the collaboration.

The Mutuality Dimension

The mutuality dimension processes deal with matters similar to the governance and autonomy dimensions identified by Thomson & Perry (2006) in the sense that they are all related to the formation of mutually agreeable agendas within the

collaboration. However as opposed to the structural processes of the governance dimension or organizational identity and agency related processes of the autonomy dimension, processes in the mutuality dimension deal with the building of social capital within the collaboration. Effective management of such processes require network managers to emphasize not merely on the dynamics of the collaboration, such as information sharing and goal setting, but also on the reasons for organizations to join the collaboration in the first place. A collaboration is expected to be most effective when the need to solve the problem targeted by it is reflected in the vision and mission of all of its member organizations.

The Trust and Reciprocity Dimension

This dimension, according to Thomson & Perry (2006), consists of the processes responsible for establishing norms for developing social capital within the collaboration. The authors use literature on collective action, notably work by institutional economists (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 1998) and institutional sociologists (Meyers & Rowan, 1977) to enumerate such norms. They conclude that regardless of the formal structure of the collaboration, organizations take their time to develop their trust on their peers in the collaboration. Such trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of collaboration because as noticed in almost all dimensions of collaboration, the network managers are required to build informal relationships among member organizations. These informal relationships make

the collaboration effective because it eliminates the need for complicated check and balance processes and the overheads of additional formal contracts between organizations. The willingness of organizations to contribute to the collaboration almost always depends on their perception of reciprocity by other members. The presence of well established norms in a collaboration that ensure equitable contribution of all members to the collective goals, and reduce the need for complex formal arrangements complements the social capital built by the sense of shared purpose developed in the processes along the mutuality dimension and hence forms the foundation of a strong collaboration.

Network Management in PPPs

The previous section provided us with certain dimensions of network management that encompass various aspects of the formation and operation of public service networks. This section will attempt to map these dimensions over the available literature on the management of PPPs. The literature piece primarily used for this purpose is Goldsmith & Eggers (2004). This piece has been selected for its origins in mainstream public administration while keeping its focus on formation of networks between governments and public and voluntary organizations with the government organization serving as the core. Not only is their approach consistent with the definition of PPPs developed in this chapter,

they also cite several examples of PPPs while presenting their analysis on different aspects of governing by networks.

Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) consider the government organization at the core of the network responsible for leading most of the processes that Thomson & Perry (2006) would classify in the Governance dimension. According to Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), the network managers at the government agency at the core of the network should choose carefully what private or voluntary organizations are to be made a part of the network and what responsibilities are to be assigned to them. They also warn against making the private or voluntary organizations responsible for making network level decision. In terms of the governance dimension processes within PPPs, this translates into the elimination of the potentially long negotiations among network members to decide on the mutually agreeable network goals since the goals are provided by the government core and intent to support the goals is made a precondition for joining the network.

In the administrative dimension, Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) support Thomson & Perry's (2006) view that while the purpose of the administrative tasks might appear similar, such as coordination and accountability etc, the nature of these tasks changes significantly in a network setting. Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) note that most government organizations come to their first network without any knowledge or even appreciation for network level competencies. It is therefore important for the government core of the PPP to not base its management

strategies on its existing capabilities but to show an openness towards learning new skills that can cater to the requirements of the most effective network design.

In order to effectively govern the processes that Thomson & Perry (2006) would classify in the autonomy dimension, Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) recommend that network managers make sure to announce not only the network goals, but its values as clearly as possible to all members. They also need to provide as many points of direct and indirect communication to the member organizations as possible. Clarity of values and availability of points of communication provides opportunities for network members to develop shared values, which in turn facilitates the acceptance of shared goals. Network managers in a PPP also need to develop accountability mechanisms based strictly on merit to ensure that a member organization cannot use its reputation or political clout to sway the network's outcomes for its individual benefit at the cost of other member's interests.

The clear announcement of network goals and values also helps network managers while managing the processes that fall under Thomson & Perry's (2006) mutuality dimension. According to Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), government organizations at the core of the network should outline their expectations meticulously and then present them to the potential partner nonprofits and for-profit organizations as clearly as possible. The service contracts made between the government core and the private branches of a PPP should be made dynamic in nature so that they can be adjusted based on the collective learning of the network

and reduce transaction costs for the partners that will encourage organizations to participate towards the network goals. Usage of information technology to increase the points of contact is an example of a strategy that helps manage the autonomy processes, at the same time lowering the transaction costs for communicating parties.

Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) consider trust to be the essence of collaboration. In an argument similar to Thomson & Perry (2006) they conclude that the facilitation of informal relationships and normative contracts among members of a network helps develop trust and lowers transaction costs. A very important skill that the network managers can develop in this regard is of cross cultural management. Since members of PPPs come from different organizational sectors, it is highly likely that the personnel are accustomed to organizational cultures alien to each other. Network managers can therefore span the boundaries of their respective organizations by educating themselves about the cultures of the partnering organizations. This practice makes for effective communication which in turn increases mutual trust within the PPP. It can therefore be concluded that trust & reciprocity is the most important dimension of processes in PPP management as it complements all other dimensions. Effective trust building lowers transaction costs, reduces the need for accountability, makes way for simpler administrative structures and facilitates shared decision making. Table 2 provides a map of network management competencies outlined by Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) as

they become relevant to the collaborative management dimensions described by Thomson & Perry (2006).

Collaborative Management Dimension	Required Managerial Outcomes	Recommendations for PPP Network Managers
Governance	Mutual goal setting Selection of appropriate collaboration partners	Government core selects contractors Government core houses network managers that serve as architects for collaboration and set goals and values
Administrative	Development of distinct network level competencies	Network managers need to "forget" what they know about the administrative practices in hierarchical settings
Autonomy	Increased information sharing Accountability for	Network managers provide more avenues of communication

	individual versus collective objectives	Network managers provide a system of checks and balances
Mutuality	Everyone has a shared interest in collaboration	Network managers define and clearly communicate network values Network managers take measures to reduce transaction costs
Reciprocity and Trust	Informal relationships among collaborators Reduction in complex legal contracts	Network managers encourage usage of information technology in communication Network managers increased points of communications among contractors Network managers develop boundary spanning capabilities Network managers adapt to

		cross cultural environments
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Table 2: *Network Management in PPPs*

Chapter 3

POWER IN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Chapter 3: Power in Public Private Partnerships

Introduction

The role of power in public service networks has become one of the major areas of study in the field of network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Sorensen & Torfing, 2006). This chapter furthers extant research by using the literature on power in organizational behavior and theory to better explain power dynamics in network governance, especially in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). It begins with developing a basic understanding of the concept of power in organizational behavior and theory, leading into a typology of power based on different theoretical perspectives observed in literature. It then proceeds to an overview of the existing literature on power in network governance and identifies the points where theories from organizational studies can be applied to power in PPPs. The chapter concludes by providing a basic framework for studying power dynamics in PPPs using this new approach.

Emergence of The Concept - Power in Organization Theory

Power in and around organizations has established itself as a major aspect of organization theory in the past few decades. This significance is evident in the fact that at present, there is hardly a textbook on organization theory that does not list power among the key topics in literature. Significant examples include Hatch (1997), Scott and Davis (2007), Daft (2009) and so on. The current popularity of the topic makes it almost counter intuitive to imagine that about 50 years ago, power was hardly a research interest within organization theory, let alone a key aspect of the field. Discussions on organizations remained around their structures and their abilities to perform various functions. Power therefore was seen as something supervisors in the organizational hierarchy could use to get an efficient output from their subordinates (Weber, 1958). Simon (1947) was among the first to view organizations as decision making systems. Further research by March & Simon (1958) and others in the later years probed further into decision making within organization. Challenges to the rational decision making model made way for models of organizational decision making that could account for ambiguity, conflict of interest, and other issues that could not be covered under the assumption of rationality.

Now social scientists, from Hellenistic philosophers to postmodern scholars, have used different perspectives and metaphors to look at organizations (Hatch, 1997). Depending on the epistemological routes taken by theorists, they can choose to observe organizations as hierarchical structures designed to perform

specific functions (machines), homogenous systems adapting to the changes in environment (organisms), patterns of shared values (cultures), learning and information processing systems (brains), decision making and conflict management systems (political systems), systems for crafting human psychology (psychic prisons), art forms combining various perspectives (collage) and last but not the least, tools of domination (Hatch, 1997; Morgan, 2006).

The new found emphasis on decision making systems and anomalies therein created an opportunity for supporters of the “organization as political order” metaphor. The discussion was not contained to the decision making processes, but issues like control over means of production (resources) and methods of productions (actions) were also brought back to life within the scope of organizations (March & Olsen, 1984). The popularity of the political order metaphor brought a drastic change in the way power was viewed in organizational theory literature. The machine metaphor of classical organizational theorists saw formal authority as the only desirable form of power. Other forms of power were supposed to give rise to inefficiency (Weber, 1958). The modernist view worked with an assumption of rationality. Power was a factor that could affect rationality hence power was seen as an anomaly in the rational decision making process (Hatch, 1997). The political order metaphor helped organizational theorists research into different forms of powers and use them as integral components of the organizational discourse.

The case for power in organizations was made in the behavioral economics literature when empirical studies conducted by March & Simon (1958) uncovered the ambiguity and conflict in organizational decision making, as opposed to the existence of final and mutually agreeable solutions to all organizational problems. The relational nature of power called for social psychologists to contribute to the concept as well, hence we see the seminal work of French & Raven (1959) expanding on that. Not surprisingly, political scientists such as Dahl (1961) and Luke (1974) and many others, form the bulk of contributors to the concept. Power in the recent past has become an integral part of organizational studies and there have been significant contributions to the literature from organizational theorists such as Mintzberg (1983) and more recently Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips (2006).

Theoretical Perspectives on Power in Organizations

The literature on power in organization theory comes from several fields of social science. In terms of the generally accepted theoretical paradigms, the concept of power in organization has been discussed by functionalists (Weber, 1958; Simon, 1947), structuralists and post-structuralists (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1980; Foucault, 2000), new institutionalists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and so on. In terms of theoretical background, power has been studied by psychologists (French & Raven, 1959; Cialdini, 2001), sociologists (Perrow, 2002; Grewal, 2008) and of course political scientists (Bacharach & Baratz, 1962). The study of

power was not always seen as an integral part of organization studies. This was because power did not fit into the modern methods of research, nor could it be defined as rules that could be mechanically applied. It is interesting to note that while power has expanded into all forms of organizational analysis, its anomalous nature is still a topic of study both in and outside academic literature.

Among the metaphors Morgan (2006) uses to look at organizations, a particularly interesting one is “organizations as tools of domination”. While a considerable amount of literature can be reviewed regarding the relationship of an organization with its members as well as its institutional environment, not much academic literature can be found on the power amassed in, and exploited by an organization as it interacts with its social and political environment. Perrow (2002) has attempted to analyze the enormous power gathered by large organizations in the United States over the past two centuries. He claims that large organizations, in addition to controlling a large number of national assets, are capable of defining the social structure of the present day society in the US. He identifies two significant sources of this power gain, the massive collection of wealth within organizations as a result of mass production and mass distribution and the multinational corporation’s insensitivity to local and regional issues.

While Perrow touches upon types and sources of power unheard of in the organizational theory literature, Jackall (1988) raises an issue considering a more familiar language. He believes that individuals who enter bureaucratic organizations find themselves in an environment packed with standard procedures

and chain of command. Working under unquestioned formal authority requires them to be more loyal to their immediate supervisor than anything else. He cites the case of deliberate pollution of Hudson River by General Electric a few years ago, where middle managers had gone ahead with the decision, despite being ethical and environmentally conscious people in their personal lives. He therefore sees the organizations as “moral mazes” where the power of the system suppresses an individual’s morality.

Seeing that power has been studied at various levels of analysis and with different units of analysis, it will be a good idea to guide our analysis by a typology relevant to the subject matter being studied. Keeping in mind that this discussion will eventually focus on power in organizational networks, it makes sense to distinguish theories on power on the basis of their treatment of organizations as open or closed systems. Similarly it will be important to distinguish theories that treat power as a resource, something that can be observed, collected and utilized from theories that treat power as an inherent property of relationships that may or may not be fully observable. Finally, a relatively obvious distinction will be among theories that deal with power at various levels and units of analysis within an organizational network. Given the relational nature of power, such a distinction will identify theories on power at the interpersonal, inter group and inter organizational levels.

Power as an Organizational Commodity

These theories usually treat power as something that can be attained by a certain actor and can be used to gain certain advantages in an organization. Such attainment and usage of power is called politics (Pfeffer, 1994). These theories usually deal with the perception of power within an organization in terms of symbols, resources or abilities that constitute power, identify the actors that hold that power and the characteristics or tactics that enable them to hold and use such power. Based on the definition of power and interactions between internal and external organizational actors, these theories can be classified into two categories, i.e. theories that treat organizations as closed systems and theories that treat organizations as open systems.

Organizations As Closed Systems

Theories that treat organizations as closed systems deal with the power differences within organizational actors regardless of the interaction of those actors with the organization's environment. Power in such theories is often constituted as one actor's ability to coerce the other actor to perform a certain action. Pfeffer (1981) enlists a number of definitions that define power in terms of ability of an actor to coerce another actor into committing a non voluntary action. These theories mark the early contributions to the literature on power in organization theory and can be classified into two major types, apolitical theories, that treat power as a legitimate organizational resource and political theories that

focus on the usage of power within organizations for purposes other than fulfilling stated organizational goals.

Apolitical Theories

Weber (1958) is one of the first scholars who discussed the role of power in organizations. He identified three types of power in a hierarchical structure: Legitimate or formal, traditional and charismatic. He also distinguished between power and authority. According to him, a power exercised by a supervisor becomes authority when the subordinate sees it as legitimate. Formal authority therefore was a desirable form of power that could ensure enhanced efficiency. Traditional power was a result of the supremacy enjoyed by certain organizational actors due to their position in society. Charismatic power was the power amassed by individuals using their personal traits such as knowledge and expertise or social networking. While Weber presented an explanation of the concept of power in organizations, the first operational definition of power came a few decades after his death. Dahl (1961) defined power as the ability of an actor A to influence another actor B into doing something that B will otherwise not do. Power was therefore a function of the social relationship between two organizational actors. Dahl's was not the only voice sounding on the relational nature of power. French & Raven (1959) published their seminal work on the sources of relational power

around the same time. Their work had a lasting impact on the literature and their bases of power are still an essential part of every literature review on power. The following are the bases of power as identified by them:

Reward power is the ability of an organizational actor to hold resources that will be desirable to other actors. The actor in possession of those resources will therefore be able to influence other actors who will work with an anticipation to get a share of those resources as rewards. Use of reward power helps reduce resistance among organizational relationships.

Coercive power is the ability of an organizational actor to withhold certain resources that other organizational actors value. The actor in control of such resources will become powerful as the other actors fear deprivation of the valued resources as punishment for non conformance. Use of coercive power increases resistance among organizational relationships.

Legitimate power comes from the role of the supervisor as framed in the formal job description. It can include the right to exercise reward or coercive power. Coercive power generates lesser resistance if used as legitimate power.

Referential power is a result of the informal relationships between two organizational actors. Personal friendships and group camaraderie are significant sources of this power. However these relationships can also stem from indirect affiliations among two organizational actors such as similar natures of job, similar task group, religious or political affiliations etc.

Expert power is the possession of knowledge resources by an organizational actor that are considered valuable by other organizational actors. Expert power can also be used to strengthen legitimate power, as the perceived legitimacy of authority by a subordinate is increased with a high perception of supervisor's expertise.

French & Raven (1959) concluded that power driven from each of these bases is dependant on the importance given by organizational actors to the resources involved in the basis. Each basis is limited by scope hence expert power might not work in areas where coercive power is required.

Etzioni (1973) used the bases of power to one of the first power-based analyses of organizations. He used classification similar to French & Raven (1959), however he defined organizations are systems based on one or the other bases of power.

Prisons and lunatic asylums therefore were home to coercive power whereas workplaces were reward power centers where people went in anticipation of gaining resources. Normative power as defined by him was similar to French & Raven's referential power and was characterized by institutions such as places of worship and social networking groups etc.

Most of the early theories were concerned with the sources and usage of power for the positions of high authority. Mechanic (1962) however noticed that opportunity to gain expert and referential powers is available to organizational actors regardless of their position in the hierarchy. Lower level actors can acquire power in an organization if they gain expertise that is makes them irreplaceable in

the organization. Pfeffer (1981) conducted experiments in a cigarette factory where he noticed that repair workers were able to enjoy a special respect from line workers considerably higher than them in terms of pay scale. One of the reasons identified for this was the fact that the lengthy training process for the repair work made them hard to replace. The position of lower level actors in the organizational structure can prove another source of power if they serve as a point of access to someone with higher authority. This was in some ways similar to Crozier's (1964) study of bureaucracy where he noticed that bureaucrats often use their expertise to gain far more than the legitimate power assigned to them. The reverse was studied when Kanter (1979) used the bases of power to explain the leadership failure in organizations. The research concluded that in order to be successful, an organizational leader has to make use of different bases of power. For example, reward power was to be used not only to reinforce productivity but also to empower the subordinates that could create more support than ordinarily expected. Similarly coercive power was to be avoided as the resistance produced as a result could reduce overall support. Failure to manage powers can result in a situation where the formal authority is cancelled out completely by resistances in other scopes of power, leaving the leader powerless.

Political Theories

The previous section has discussed various theories about the sources and application of power. However all theories assume a certain notion of fairness

towards the availability and accessibility of power. It is inherent in all these theories that power is there to be taken over by anyone who can become eligible by holding on to one of its sources. This approach has received a lot of criticism especially from the postmodern and the feminist schools of thought. Both these bodies of literature generally discuss the problems associated with the hidden faces of power. The concerns in both critiques however differ both in terms of arguments as well as conclusions.

Two Faces of Power

While power in organizations was still a budding concept, Bacharach & Baratz (1962) voiced their concerns about one's ability to observe power in action. They saw power as having a visible and an invisible face. The visible face could be viewed using Dahl's (1961) definition and could be analyzed using French & Raven's (1959) sources of power. However the invisible face was there to limit this analysis. They used the classical "A has power over B" analogy to explain their argument. The visible face of power was the one used by A to make B do what A wants. However the invisible face made sure that B did not have any other option than to conforming to A. This limiting of options was done by A through influencing the language B uses to phrase the problem, by having power on B's ideology and sense of identity and by framing the problem in a way that other options clash with the values and norms that B follows.

The hidden face of power has received considerable attention from postmodernist scholars such as Lukes (1974) who developed his “three dimensional” view of power in society. He placed authority on one dimension, the other forms of visible power on the second dimension and on the third dimension he placed the invisible face of power. The characteristics of invisible power according to Lukes include ability to influence personal preferences of other individuals through altering norms and values, assigning meaning to language and pre determining decision outcomes by shaping ideology and identity.

While the concept of the invisible face of power has been accepted without much criticism in literature, there is considerable debate about a scholar’s ability to measure the impact of invisible power. The major problem with measure invisible power is the fact that the reason for invisibility is the incorporation of the tools of power into the subject’s thought. The exercise of invisible power appears more like normal behavior to both the powerful and the powerless (Luke, 1974).

However this also implies that power exists to some extent in all organizational relationship, whether or not power is being visibly exercised. This perspective opened research avenues for theorists who studied organizations as control mechanisms (Clegg, 1983; Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006).

With the development of techniques of organizational discourse analysis, it might become possible in the near future to study the impact of the invisible side of power. Lewis et al. (2003) have conducted studies in various non profit organizations in which they have used ethnography as a tool for the interpretation

of organization culture through the analysis of language of the organizational discourse as well as the informal communication between organization members.

Gender and Power

Gender critiques of power in organization suggest clear patterns of gender discrimination among organizations. Women are believed to encounter glass ceilings (Morgan, 2006) when pursuing high positions in a lot of organizations. While the literature on gender issues with power is multidirectional, two types of critical theories emerge appear more popular than the others. These theories deal with gender and the invisible face of power and the role of power as a source of power.

Morgan (2006), among many others has attempted to analyze the stereotypes associated with organizations and has matched them to the gender stereotypes. His study showed that the keywords associated with most of the organizations were strategic, rational, decision oriented, tough and aggressive. The list of keyword had an incredible resemblance to the list of male stereotypes that he collected. He further suggests that similar male stereotypes exist in many rituals within organizations. Therefore women working in those organizations are either forced to stay behind in the career race or to adopt a “masculine” profile. Hagberg (2003) also came to similar conclusion and developed a path to power for women

managers, which she argues is more complicated and difficult to achieve than the path male managers have to follow to achieve similar authority in an organization.

The other body of critical literature on gender issues with power comes from feminists in the neo-Marxist tradition (Hatch, 1997). These scholars argue that women are marginalized in male dominated organizations through the exercise power. This critique, in addition to posing a serious question, opens the floor for another array of questions about the use of power as a source of power.

Power as a Source of Power

Morgan (2006) discusses the different ways organizational actors can use their existing power to gain more power. The most common is the “log rolling” scenario where one powerful individual helps another powerful individual in the time of need who returns the favor in a similar situation. The reward power can also be used to create cognitive biases among subordinates that will result in gaining more support from them than could have acquired by actual rewarding.

Bies & Tripp (1998) picked a similar lead and conducted a research to study how employees cope with tyrant bosses. Tyranny was operationalized as the exercise of power by the supervisor to gain more conformance from the subordinate than mandated by legitimate authority. The bosses in those organizations were found to be trying to change the ways the employees thought. This was seen as a way of reducing resistance that was supposed to increase the overall effect of power and

influence. The studies however showed that in most of the cases the employees simply developed a “two-faced” approach towards their bosses. They would appear to conform in front of the boss but were actually growing more and more resentful, which was having a negative impact on the organization’s productivity.

It therefore appears that while reward power can be used to create situations where one can gain power and at the same time increase organizational productivity, the same cannot be achieved through coercive power. Therefore the use of visible power to marginalize subordinates does not seem logical for a self interested organizational leader. However going back to Bacharach & Baratz’s (1962) criticism of Dahl’s (1961) definition of power, it seems like A can marginalize B without making it obvious. The three dimensions of power discussed by Lukes (1974) also provide the tools for exercising power using those dimensions. A case can be made where senior management can inculcate a culture where the standard practices will create an environment unwelcome for women although there will be no visible indication of the marginalization. An example of such organizations is cited by Hatch (1997) that only accepts women as secretaries.

Organizational Power versus Leadership

In addition to the apolitical and the political theories of power in organizations, there are some other theories that exist mainly in the organizational

behavior literature that discuss the role the ability of one organizational actor to have an effect on the actions of another actor beyond the organization's formal chain of command. These theories, instead of dealing with the source of power or the usage of power, deal with the social psychological interactions that result in one actor's conformity to the other actor's wishes. Cialdini (2001) describes six reasons why people are able to change the actions of others without being in a formally coercive position. He calls these reasons "weapons of influence" use of which comprises what he calls the "art of persuasion". According to him, a person is likely to do something favorable for one person if he/she believes that it is in return for a past or future favorable action, hence being persuaded by "reciprocity". "Commitment and consistency" is another one of Cialdini's (2001) weapons of influence and applies to situation where people follow through with their initial decisions even when the conditions under which the decisions were made no longer exist. Making oneself liked by others can also improve one's ability to persuade them in decision making situations as Cialdini considers "liking" as a weapon of influence. Cialdini's work also shows that in uncertain situations, one can persuade someone to take a specific decision if it can be shown that other people are taking similar decisions, hence influencing by "social proof". Similarly, in uncertain situations, an actor can increase the chances of persuasion by limiting the amount of time or resources involved in the decision to be taken by the other actor as "scarcity" is another one of Cialdini's weapons of influence. Formal authority can also reach beyond the structural chains of command and can

persuade people to take decisions contrary to their moral beliefs or logical reasoning, hence making "authority" another weapon of influence according to Cialdini.

Perhaps the best known organizational phenomenon in which one organizational actor is able to influence the ideas and/or actions of other organizational actors is of leadership. Unlike the negative connotations often attached with the practice of organizational politics (Peffer, 1994, p 13-14), leadership is often reflected positively upon by researchers and practitioners alike. This is evident in Nahavandi's (2003) definition of leadership that consolidates a number of theoretical and practical definitions of leadership available in extant literature:

"A leader is a person who influences groups and individuals in an organization, helps them establish goals, and guides them towards achievement of those goals, thereby allowing them to be effective."

It will therefore be safe to assume that leadership is the use of power and strategies of influence that are generally accepted in an organization to ensure pursuit of legitimate organizational goals. There are however exceptions to this assumption pointed out by authors such as Lipman-Blumen (2005) that study the examples of toxic leaders who use their leadership abilities for personal gains against the organizational objectives. While a number of texts including Nahavandi (2003) do not require an organizational leader to be in a position of formal authority, the rest of this chapter will focus only on leaders that are

formally responsible for managing other organizational actors. Similar to the sources and forms of power discussed in the above sections, a number of theories exist on the practices of leadership and sources of the leader's influence. These theories are summarized below:

Theories of organizational Leadership

A number of scholars in the early days of organizational theory did not differentiate between a leader and a manager (Bernard, 1938; Weber, 1958). A leader in the traditional view was just a person of high ability who held a high position in the societal or organizational hierarchy whose influence came from legal authority. However Weber (1958) did see, as an exceptional case, a few leaders who could get more out of the subordinates than what normal authority will warrant. This special quality was called the leader's "charisma". A number of theories in traditional literature have tried to search for the qualities or traits that give a leader such an influence over his or her followers (Ott et al., 1989). These traits range from fulfilling certain responsibilities within an organization such as providing the vision and mission, staffing, and creating effective channels of communication (Bernard, 1938) to personal attributes of a leader's personality such as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1998).

Trait theories were disappointing for some scholars because while they listed general traits of an effective leader, they did not provide much input for developing effective leadership strategies or improving one's leadership

capabilities. This gave rise to the transactional theories of leadership. These theories focused on the interactions of leaders with their followers and researched styles of the leadership required in various scenarios, paying attention to the task at hand and the relationship dynamics between the leader and the followers.

Among the most popular style theories is Fielder's (1970) contingent leadership model. Fielder conducted empirical research that showed that authoritative leaders were more successful in environments where employees did not like their jobs. While more permissive leaders were effective where the employees were excited about the work they did. This led Fielder to postulate that the leader's effectiveness is contingent upon the fit of the leader's personality (authoritative versus permissive) to the subordinate's motivation to work. Since it is hard to change someone's personality, high level employers should take caution in positioning appropriate leaders above appropriate groups of subordinates.

Another significant contribution to transactional theories is Follett's (1926) situational leadership model. According to her, a leader is bound to fail in getting orders executed if the followers are not capable of performing the required task. This inability could come from communication failure or the complexity of the task being beyond the follower's capacity. In such a situation, a leader should participate in carrying out of the task. Hersey & Blanchard (1969) further developed this theory by analyzing leadership strategies in two dimensions, relationship and complexity. Relationship abstracted the willingness of the

employee to perform a task for the leader, and complexity of the task meant the ability of the follower to perform it. According to Hersey & Blanchard's matrix:

- For easy task and high willingness, the leader should *delegate* the task.
- For easy task and low willingness, the leader should *tell* the followers to perform.
- For complex task and low willingness, the leader should *sell* the task by motivating the followers to do it.
- Finally, for complex task and high willingness, the leader should *participate* in the task to help the followers.

Scholars such as Burns (1978) have raised questions about the status of transactional theories as leadership theories versus management theories and have noticed that most transactional strategies do not result in the creation of any additional influence other than what originates from the manager's formal authority. The cultural and transformational leadership theories explain the sources of such influence better.

Schein (1992) defines organizational culture as a shared set of assumptions, values and artifacts that are shared by all stakeholders in the organizations their effectiveness has been established by success in the past and therefore are taught to the new entrants to the organization. According to cultural theorists such as Schein and Pettigrew, organizational culture is responsible for almost everything that takes place in the organization from employee's motivation to work, their understanding of the organizational vision to the power structures in

the organization. Organizational culture theorists therefore emphasize the ability of the leader to define the organizational culture. The leader's actions determine the assumptions that will be taken as given in the organization. Similarly the leader will vanguard the organizational values and will oversee the development of the cultural artifacts. This way a leader will lead not only by personal charisma but also and more importantly by the ability to reshape the intellectual and cognitive foundations of the followers. Similar to the culture theories, the transformational leadership theories emphasize on the leader's ability to help the followers share the vision that the leader has set for the organization (Tichy & Ulrich, 1984; Burns, 1978). The leader brings in the transformation by easing out the fears and uncertainties by making them see the vision of future success and instilling belief in the leader's values through leading by example.

Another attempt to find the elements that provide a leader with the influence unmatched by a regular manager with similar formal authority has been made by Denhardt & Denhardt (2006) in their "dance of leadership" theory. They conclude that effective leaders gain that special influence through interactions with their followers in a way similar to how performing artists connect with their audiences. An effective leader appeals not only to the logical side of his or her follower but also the emotional and imaginative side. Leadership abilities therefore are not perfected through management trainings but in a way a dance is rehearsed. Good leaders are able to understand the interplay of space, time and energy, are able to understand the rhythms of human interaction, can

communicate through symbols, images and metaphors, can improvise with creativity and can cultivate leadership skills within themselves that are consistent with their own core values (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006).

Organizations As Open Systems

The study of organizations as open systems was made popular by theorists like Dill (1958), Evan (1966) and Thompson (1967). Being open systems, organizations were expected to be influenced by variables external to the organization such as cultural norms of the society, changes in technology and knowledge, laws and regulations and competition with other organizations for resources such as capital, labor, supplies and customers (Selznick, 1957; Dill, 1958; Evan, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Scott, 1987). This had significant implications on the ways by which organizational actors would obtain and use power on internal and external organizational actors. The two significant approaches to organizational power and politics that treat organizations as open systems are organizational environment theories of power and new institutionalist perspective on organizational power.

Organizational Environment Theories

Aldrich & Pfeffer (1976) theorized that the external environment of an organization provides a number of resources that the organization is dependant

upon. These resources include essential inputs and opportunities for output consumption. The organization, however shares those resources with a number of other organizations. Due to the scarcity of resources, organizations are always in competition with each other.

The strategic contingency theory (Salanick & Pfeffer, 1977) carries this discussion into the organization. The organization's dependence on scarce external resources adds significantly to the value of assets capable of acquiring those resources. This appreciation in value assigns power to the individuals in the organization who are in possession of the assets. This assignment is reflected in the structure of the organization that places those individuals on positions of high formal authority and increased autonomy. Structuring of an organization as a response to its external environment has also been discussed by Mintzberg (1979) who considers the environment as one of the variables that determines the complexity of an organization's structure.

According to the strategic contingency theory, a change in the external environment might change the structure of the resources it offers to the organization. Strategic contingency theory will therefore necessitate reorganization within organization. This reorganization will result in the selection of actors who are capable of accessing the external resources in the changed environment. Hence power might move hands from some individuals to the other as an organization attempts to align itself to its environment. As a corollary, ability of an organizational actor to predict and cope with ambiguity can prove to

be one of the most important sources of holding on to power (Morgan, 2006; Pfeffer, 1981).

It is important to note that the strategic contingency theory, like the theories studied in the previous section, places power as a function of the organization's structure (Pfeffer, 1981; Salanick & Pfeffer, 1977). However power in this case is exogenous (March & Olsen, 1984) while the earlier models treated power as generating within the organization.

Power as a Relational Function

The theories on organizational power discussed above treat power as something that can be collected, held and used by organizational actors. Power therefore is often observable and measurable. Some actors will have more power than the other and this power difference will be reflected in any organizational relationship established between those actors. Weber (1958) was one of the first to distinguish the compulsory subordinate behavior of organizational actors resulting from the exercise of power by a more powerful actor from the voluntary subordinate behavior exhibited by organizational actors towards organizational actors of higher authority without any direct influence or coercion. This means that at least part of organizational power lies not with the actor exercising power but within the relationship where power is being exercised. Theories that treat power as a function of the relationships between different organizational actors as opposed to a commodity can be classified into two broad categories. The first category

contains theories based on individual rationality. New Institutionalism in organization theory is home to most of these organizations. The other category consists of theories that treat organizational relationships as reflective of social structures existing in the world that the organization exists in. Most of these theories deal with the classification of power into various dimensions of social interactions between the actors inside and outside the organization.

New Institutionalism

The return of institutionalism or “new institutionalism” in social sciences opened new avenues for research in many areas of social sciences. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) brought new institutionalism to organization theory.

The advent of New Institutionalism to organization theory resulted in the rediscovery of a number of organization theory concepts by institutionalists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This new line of research opened up avenues for the study of a number of environmental variables that had been overlooked in resource dependence literature. These variables included societal norms, rules and regulations, shared values and advancement in shared knowledge and technology (Scott, 1992). The impact of societal values and their impact on an organization was discussed by scholars as early as Selznick (1957). According to new institutionalists, organizational environments accumulate norms and values that define rational behavior through social and technical learning over a period of

time (Meyer, 1994). An organization, as a rational actor feels pressurized to conform to these norms and values (Scott, 1992). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) differentiate between different kinds of pressures an environment puts on an organization for such compliance. The pressures that make an organization conform with local laws and regulations as well as international standards and codes of conduct are labeled “coercive pressures”. On the other hand, professionals within an organizations often try to conform with the norms developed by local or international professional organizations, hence pressuring the organization to adopt those norms as well. For example, doctors in the US, regardless of their hospital affiliation, are likely to conform with norms established by the American Medical Association, resulting in a uniform behavior among hospitals all over the country in the areas of practice governed by those norms. Such pressures coming from professional organizations with no legal authority are called "normative pressures" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In uncertain situations, organizations might feel pressurized to follow the footsteps of other organizations in a relevant industry. Such pressures are titled by DiMaggio & Powell as “mimetic pressures”.

While both discuss an organization's relationship with its environment, the main difference between new institutionalist view of power and the strategic dependency theory is about the way organizational structures develop. Strategic contingency theory considers an organization as responding to the environment by indigenously creating its structure. Institutionalism on the other hand suggests that

the organizational structures are developed by adapting existing societal structures to the organization. By corollary, the major difference between institutional theory of power and the resource based theories is that in resource based theories, power is treated as a relational phenomenon. Institutionalism on the other hand views power as a reciprocal phenomenon. It does fit not into Dahl's (1961) influence based definition, but it just defines how the powerful in an organization are differentiated from the powerless.

Multidimensional Theories of Power

In his seminal work on power, Lukes (1974) identifies three dimensions of power. The first dimension runs along the well known formal sources of power and the practice of politics, such as formal authority, knowledge and so on. The other dimension deals with behavioral elements of influence, much like the items discussed earlier in this paper under the headings of influence and leadership. The third dimension takes a more relational approach. Lukes (1974), like Bacharach & Baratz (1962) observes that the traditional approaches to study power always assume decision making situations where there is a conflict and hence power is used to resolve the conflict. However these theories ignore the fact that organizational actors with enough power can actually decide what options are available to the decision making party to chose from in such situation, or for that matter, whether or not to allow the conflict to be a part of the organization's agenda, hence keeping the other party subordinated without even letting the need

to use overt power. This dimension of power therefore assumes power as something that is always present in the nature of a social relationship between people at varying levels of authority as opposed to something that comes up only in transactions. However unlike Bacharach & Baratz (1962) who treat power as a property of the organizational actor, Lukes' (1974) three dimensional approach sets up power as a property of the relationship. So actor A can coerce actor B not because A is a more powerful actor than B but because given the nature of the organizational structure, A and B enter into a relationship that puts A at a position of higher power than B. The relationship therefore is where all power lies, whether it is obvious or hidden.

The third dimension as discovered by Lukes (1974) also resonates in the works of Foucault (1980; 2000) on power. Foucault considers power to be available everywhere, existing in every societal relationship. Actors therefore assume power not so much through strategies and tactics discussed in the earlier sections, but simply by the role they have come to play in societal or in this case, organizational relationships. The position of power will change only when there is a radical change in the nature of the social structure within which the relationship exists, hence changing the nature of the relationship. It will be interesting to note at this point that while the origin or location of power might be a topic of debate among scholars, the usage of power by actors, i.e. politics, is studied in quite similar ways. So Bacharach & Baratz (1962) and Foucault (1980) might disagree

on where power comes from, but they both agree on the way actors in position of power use both overt and covert power as tools of oppression.

The absence of individual agency in Foucauldian (1980) perspective on power makes it less lucrative for organizational managers as they search for actionable strategies to control and use power in various organizational settings. Lukes (1974) therefore warns against the emphasis on structural determinism and suggests that a balanced approach must be adopted when studying power paying attention to all of this three dimensions. Grewal (2008) has come to the rescue of such managers by presenting his concept of "network power". It is a multi dimensional, relational perspective on power that acknowledges the dimensions of power as put forward by Lukes (1974) and the automatic submission to the societal structures of power, whether the submission is voluntary, in line with Weber's (1958) formal authority or coerced, as theorized by Foucault's (2000) social domination. It however assumes that the actors in a social network, including an organization, is often able to enjoy a decent amount of social agency, however actors become subject to social structures not necessarily because of external pressures but by an internal need for socialization. Managers therefore can make decisions such as entering into organizational relationships that will warrant desirable changes to their organizational units. Examples of such decisions include a new manufacturing facility's decision to join trade unions with various objectives and values, selections of markets for foreign direct investment and so on. Each of these decisions will require the organization to conform to the

norms, laws and other social structures of the existing network, but by choosing a network that requires changes for which the entrant is already prepared will make for a healthier environment inside and outside the organization.

Table 3 breaks down the above discussion into comparable elements. The first column lists the different types of power studied above and groups the literature on power in organization theory into Traditional, Resource Dependence, New Institutional, Conflict, Behavioral, Structural and Multi-dimensional categories. Each category has its key authors and mentions whether it treats power as an organizational commodity amassed and controlled by an actor (attribute of actor) or if it is inherent in the organizational relationship (attribute of relationship). The table also mentions if the category of theories deals with power in an organization's external or internal environment and differentiates visible and measurable forms of power from invisible forms. Finally, the table identifies the area of organization where power as treated by the category in question can be observed. These areas can include the organization's structure, its day to day operation or the practice of power within the organization by its actors to achieve various ends, i.e. organizational politics.

Category	Key Authors	Attribute of	Environment	Visibility	Observed in
Traditional theories	Dahl (1961)	Actor	Internal	Visible	Structure Operation

	French & Raven (1959) Weber (1958)				
Resource Dependence Theories	Salancik & Pfeffer (1977) Pfeffer & Aldrich (1976)	Actor	Internal relative to external	Visible	Operation Politics
New Institutional Theories	DiMaggio & Powell (1983)	Actor	External	Visible	Structure
Conflict Theories	Bacharach & Baratz (1962) Hagberg (2003)	Actor	Internal	Invisible	Operation Politics
Behavioral Theories	Tichy & Ulrich	Actor	Internal	Visible	Operation Politics

	(1984) Cialdini (2001) Denhardt & Denhardt (2006)				
Structural Theories	Foucault (1980; 2000)	Relationship	Internal in the light of External	Visible and Invisible	Structure Politics
Multi dimensional Theories	Lukes (1974) Grewal (2008)	Relationship Actor has some agency	Internal and External	Visible and Invisible	Structure Operation Politics

Table 3: *Concept of power in organization theory*

Power in Public Private Partnerships

Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), are organizational networks set up to deliver public services efficiently (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). Power in PPPs can therefore be studied in the light of literature available on the topic of power within the area of network governance in public administration, as well as the more

recent works that analyze various aspects of management in PPPs directly. Power has been a topic that has been given significant importance in network governance literature. Agranoff & McGuire (2001) list the issue of power as one of the "big questions" in network governance. Brass et al (2004) in their review of literature dedicate an entire section to the concept of power in network governance. Most of this research has maintained a focus on power as an attribute of the network. Several studies therefore equate power of an organization within a network with its centrality within the network (Brass, 1984). At the same time, a lot of notable contributions to literature consider delivery of public service through organizational networks as an inherently effective practice (Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Sorensen & Torfing, 2006; Agranoff, 2007; Raab & Kenis, 2009). Even in the case of criminal and terrorist organizations, network formation has been considered as one of the major reasons that imparts resilience to the "dark" operations being undertaken by the network (Raab & Milward, 2003). In the same vein, the literature on PPPs favors the formation of these networks strongly in the interest of effective public service delivery (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; Steijn et al, 2011). The effectiveness perceived in theory also reflects in professional case studies and as a result, formation of PPPs for public service delivery is suggested by policy guidelines prepared by a number of international development organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008), the World Bank (World Bank, 2007) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 2011).

Based on the above evidence from the literature and empirical studies, it makes sense to work with the assumption that network creation is the phenomenon where real value is being added to the operation of a PPP, hence if one is to study power, it should be studied using network analysis tools, both qualitative, using computerized techniques of social network analysis (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) and quantitative, using the spheres of influence of different organizational units with the network in terms of their ability to define the network's institutional values (Provan & Milward, 1991). A recent study by Steijn et al (2011) however has shown that while formation of PPPs increases the effectiveness of the intended public service, the correlation between PPP formation and increase in effectiveness becomes insignificant when organizational management practices are taken into account. This suggests that the real value is being added not at the structure of the PPP but at its management. Furthering this idea, a considerable body of literature now exists dealing with network management and the competencies required for effective network management (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Milward & Provan, 2003; Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Thomson & Perry (2006), for example, classify such management competencies into five dimensions. Competencies that enable network managers to facilitate consensus building among member organizations on the network's objectives fall in the *governance* dimension. Competencies that enable managers from one member organization to get involved in the managerial decisions of the other organization fall under the *administrative* dimension. Skills using which managers

convince organizations that the network goals are in line with their organizational goals are classified under the *autonomy* dimension. On the other hand, the *mutuality* and *trust and reciprocity* dimensions include managerial skills to develop social capital within the network.

The competencies mentioned above and other competencies identified by Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) and Provan & Kenis (2008) essentially have a similar theme, i.e. the ability of organizational actors (network managers) to influence other organizational actors by using formal and informal strategies to ensure conformity to certain objectives (network/ service goals). This observation hints towards the fact that the concept of network management contains considerable, if not significant similarities with the concept of organizational power. Lessons from network management can, therefore, be combined with the theories on organizational power in order to a framework for studying power in public service networks, such as PPPs.

Framework for Studying Power in PPPs

Identification of Active Actors.

PPPs are formed by bringing together organizations representing different sectors around a shared set of organizational goals. A study of how various actors access and utilize power will have to begin with identifying the "active" actors whose individual objectives can support or hinder the PPPs overall objectives and who

will be needing to access and utilize power to further those objectives. From Andersen's (2004) definition of PPPs, we know that there are at least two active actors in the PPP, i.e. a government agency and a private (nonprofit or for-profit) organization. For the purpose of this analysis, we can call them the "government" and the "implementing" organizations respectively. Inevitably there must be a government organization that took the decision to create the PPP in the first place, lets call that the "Policy making" organization. In the above discussion we have also observed that a special category of actors, known as network managers exists specifically to ensure the smooth operation of the network. The literature on organization's institutional environment suggests that "professional organizations" such as international associations of accountants, or doctors and the like can exercise a certain influence by defining the professional norms of the trade that the organization is in (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Finally, a PPP cannot continue to exist unless its client, the local "community", values the service being provided and is satisfied by its quality. The active actors of for studying power in PPPs are shown in Figure 2.

Actors and their Power in PPPs.

Each actor in a PPP has capabilities that enables it to access more power compared to other actors in the partnership. According to Srinivas (2009) the implementing organizations are usually brought in to a because it has a better

technical/professional capabilities than any other stakeholder to serve the intended purpose of the partnership. The implementing organizations in a PPP therefore have what French & Raven (1959) will call "expert power" over their government sector partners and other private entities such as supply contractors. Since the involvement of such organizations is usually favored by strong actors in the PPPs external environment such as the UN and international development organizations (ADB, 2008; World Bank, 2007), these organizations also gain power from the strategic contingency perspective (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), as they are the best equipped to deal with changes in the external environment through their expertise as well as their reputation.

According to Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), the policy making organization should also exercise caution when including and assigning responsibilities to non governmental network members and should keep control over network level decisions. Such a structure will impart powers to the government agency that are classified under the third dimension of powers as identified by authors like Lukes (1974) and Grewal (2008) as the government agency can set the agendas for decision making at the network level and can select the actors that will be involved in the decision making processes. The government organization involved in the operation of the PPP usually has control over financial resources and thus has the ability to shut the PPP down if results are not satisfactory, hence giving the government organization "coercive power" as identified by French & Raven (1959).

Network managers in a PPP usually rely on the coercive power shared with them by the government agency in charge. However most theories on network management emphasize on skills that will give them access to influence through informal channels. Strategies of interpersonal influence (Cialdini, 2001) and the resulting "referential" (French & Raven, 1959) capital is the source of their power in the network. Finally, the community, if satisfied, has the power to "reward" (French & Raven, 1959) the government organization by reelecting the officials that championed the formation of the PPP. Figure 2 represents a basic power map with reference to the usual active actors in a PPP.




Figure 2: *Organizational Power in Public Private Partnerships*

Role of Power in Success of PPPs

Figure 2 presents a simplified framework of power in public private partnerships. On a practical level, usually a PPP involves more than one government agencies and more than one private parties, not to forget a host of contractors, suppliers, consultants as well as the internal political conflicts of the community and various organizations involved. Also, other forms of power observed in networks, such as power as conceptualized in the methods of Social Network Analysis, power with respect to a detailed organizational environment taking into account factors identified by Dill (1958) such as competitors, technology and government regulations will also impact the organizational power of the active actors. At a conceptual level, however, it provides clear insight into the organizational power dynamics of a PPP and can be used to guide empirical research to study such power dynamics.

On the topic of PPP success, we recall Steijn et al's (2011) research that puts network management as the most significant factor in the success of a PPP. As noted earlier, each of the network management competency dimensions identified by Thomson & Perry (2006) and others deals with the preparedness of managers for decision making situations that involve probable conflicts of interest in the absence of a formal authority structure. As with all decision making situations among actors with varying interests, the formation and operation of a PPPs are also ideal grounds for the practice of organizational politics. The managerial

competencies identified by Thomson & Perry (2006) will provide network managers with the political clout they need to advance the PPP in the direction of its public service goals. However, as observed in the framework developed above, those competencies cover only part of the political forces at play within the PPP. Unless every active actor is inherently motivated to achieve the PPP goals, the only way network managers can ensure success is if the sum total of their power, informal influence and the authority they experience by virtue of their position in the PPP's structure, combined with the power of their supporters within the PPP outweighs the combined power of actors opposing the PPP goals.

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY

Chapter 4: Methodology

Research Question

Introduction

The previous sections discussed the relevance of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in the Network Governance area of Public Administration theory and the significance of the concept of organizational power in this area. However, as observed in my literature review, there exists a gap in extant literature between the discussion on the role of organizational power and empirical studies on this role. Similar gaps in literature have been identified in other aspects of organizational behavior and theory. Denhardt & Denhardt (2011), for example, made a similar observation on the concept of leadership in network governance. They found that while leadership was considered an important aspect of network governance in several theoretical works, there was an absence of empirically applicable frameworks to study network leadership. They contributed to bridging this gap by presenting a competency model that outlined characteristics of successful network leaders.

While the above sections focused on identification of the gap in literature with respect to power in network governance and its role specifically in PPPs, the

remainder of this dissertation will attempt to identify a theory that can explain the role of organizational power in the success of public private partnerships. The research question, therefore, was stated as follows:

*How does organizational power affect the success of a public service
Public Private Partnership?*

The research question, while short in statement, is quite complex and calls to attention a number of theoretical, analytical and practical considerations that were critical in the nature and design of my study. First, it establishes the nature of the study as a descriptive one. It also suggests that the outcome of the study will be in the form of a theory or elements of a theory that will explain the role of organizational power in the success of public private partnerships. It also makes obvious my theoretical starting point that organizational power definitely has to do something with the success of a PPP. So the research design was made not to measure the amount of power in organizational relationships, but to measure the usage of power by organizational actors. In that way it can also be stated that the research design attempted to study organizational politics as defined by Pfeffer (1994).

Secondly, the research question helps determine a scope of the study. While the concept of "success" in public service can be quite complex and can range from

economic efficiency and organizational effectiveness to economic and social externalities and capacity building; the same concept can be defined rather clearly in a PPP. As mentioned in the network typography earlier, PPPs by their very nature are project based. Their success, therefore, is dependent on the achievement of project goals as specified by the PPP contract. So while studying power, my methodology focused on this tight definition of success in PPPs as opposed to other approaches to success in network governance.

Finally, the research question provided an analytical lens for the variables to be compared and contrasted using my research methodology. Since the quest was to find not just the role of power in the success of PPPs but the deterministic role of power towards such success, it was crucial that power was compared to other contenders for PPP success. So throughout the course of the study, the questions asked and the patterns analyzed focused on determining characteristics of the PPPs, such as design of the partnership contracts, monitoring and evaluation, quality and reliability of the intervention being attempted by the PPP and so on, that could have contributed to its success (or failure thereof) and comparing those characteristics to organizational power in relevant situations.

Theoretical Significance

The gap in literature that my research attempts to bridge called for the study of empirical phenomena that could not be linked directly to any existing theory in

network governance or organizational literature. As represented by the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter, existing theories able to provide broad based constructs that can guide the study of power in PPPs, however they do not provide the insight required to create a testable theoretical model. Noting the necessity for linking the theory of public administration to the empirical phenomena of power in PPPs as identified in the literature review and the lack of existing theory to explain it necessitated the need for an inductive study design.

Undertaking an inductive study design has several implications on the process and outcomes of a research project. The induced theory is often incomplete (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) so the researcher has to focus on developing a small number of significant and testable theoretical propositions that help explain the phenomena under study. Also, such a study design in social science is more suitable for developing descriptive theories rather than prescriptive ones (Perry, 1998). This study does not assume absolute induction as the case is with grounded theory research (Perry, 1998; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a) but will attempt to build upon the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter. Finally, my epistemological approach falls under the realistic paradigm as defined by Perry (1998), such that I admit the role of power in PPPs as an external observable reality.

My study design is based mainly on the works of Kathleen Eisenhardt (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt, 1989b) in the field of business management and entrepreneurship. My approach

makes use of naturalistic qualitative techniques similar to those known to the students of grounded theory, however it distinguishes itself from traditional grounded theory because the final product are elements of a positivistic theory as opposed to interpretive insights into an observed phenomenon which is often the case with grounded theory research (Perry, 1998). Additionally, as mentioned above, my research does not imply absolute induction as the case is with grounded theory, but it begins with a partial deduction of constructs from existing theories and uses those to induce theory from observed phenomena. Finally, given my realistic epistemology, the validity of my research depends on my ability to establish the elimination of personal bias in my observations, most commonly done in such studies through triangulation of findings using multiple methods and sources.

Exploratory Research

Theoretical Exploration

The above section makes several references to the theoretical model developed in my literature review. These references are very relevant to this section because they helped me define the scope of my empirical study. Defining the scope is critical in any empirical research on networks, or for that matter on organizational environments, because defining the network's boundary or defining the boundary that separates an organization from its environment is always a big question in

such research. My literature review served as the theoretical exploratory research for this project. This exploration was immensely helpful as it streamlined the actors, interactions and sources and types of power to be studied in the empirical study phase. It also helped me draw the line between deductive and inductive nature of my study. The deductive nature of my study was to come as close to the empirical phenomenon as possible using existing theory in network governments and organizational literature. The inductive part was then to bridge the gap between the theoretical propositions required to answer my my research question and the theoretical propositions that were the result of my deductive theoretical findings.

Empirical Exploration

The empirical exploration of my research dealt with a number of questions. First and foremost, I needed to operationalize some of my theoretical constructs. For example, I needed to define clearly what ‘success’ meant in the context of public service collaborations. I also needed to verify which actors among the ones identified in my theoretical framework are empirically relevant. The same question needed to be answered for empirical relevance of the types of power and the types of interactions identified by my theoretical framework. I also needed to look into my sampling pool. While theoretical sampling was going to be my approach in the selection of my research methods, some pre-analysis was required to understand the nature of my sources of data and my interview respondents.

For my exploratory research on the empirical side, I relied mainly on expert testimony. I conducted interviews with experts in community conflict resolution, seasoned bureaucrats from the US and from Pakistan, as well as academics and community leaders, and finally non-profit workers, especially those working in the field in community mobilization in rural Pakistan. The following table provides a list of my interview respondents for the exploratory research, along with the purpose of the interview. For the sake of anonymity the respondents are identified by their professional roles rather than their names.

Resource	Areas of Exploration
Bureaucrat (Pakistan) #1	Policy infrastructure in Pakistan
Bureaucrat (Pakistan) #1	Concept of success in public service
University Professor (Pakistan)	Policy infrastructure in Pakistan Identification of potential informants
Nonprofit Leader (Pakistan)	Power of community in networks
Nonprofit Manager (US)	Power of community in networks
Community Conflict Resolution Expert	Identification of potential

(US)	informants
Community Leader (Pakistan)	Power of community in networks
Public Health Expert (Pakistan)	Concept of success in public service
Public Health Program Coordinator (Pakistan)	Identification of potential informants

Table 4: *List of Exploratory Interview Respondents.*

Findings of Exploratory Research

After my initial round of interviews, all three of my questions were addressed. On the matter of success in public-private partnerships I came to realize that in public service projects the absence of success is not necessarily failure. So, the question could not be framed around the success or failure of public-private partnerships. It had to be framed around the achievement of success or the non-achievement of success. Public-private partnerships in public service are usually project driven and have set timelines and contractually agreed upon goals. If those goals are met within the timelines a public-private partnership can be assumed to be successful. On the other hand, if for some reason those goals are not met within the budgeted amount of time or the budgeted financial resources, the public-private partnership is considered less than successful.

Since any public service project measures its success not just by the accomplishment of the aggregate of all the agreed upon goals but also on the effectiveness of the efforts of the project or the organizations involved there are chances that even a less than successful public-private partnership may have been successful in some of its targeted areas. This finding also made me sensitive to the questions regarding success and failure in my semi-structured interviews. It became evident that calling a public-private partnership a failure might offend most of my respondents; because even the respondents representing less than successful organizations would not consider their organizations a failure.

While the actors and their relationships I identified in the theoretical framework of my literature review were vetted by experts outside of Pakistan, the local experts had a different view. Given the context of Pakistani public-private partnership, especially in the public health sector, it appeared that community does not have the reward power that the literature review suggested it has. The reason for this problem is the difference between policy making power of the community and the local bureaucrats and politicians. The way Pakistan's bureaucratic infrastructure works has little room for the inclusion of entities that operate any lower than federal or provincial levels. There is some involvement of city level officials, but their role in policy making is negligible.

So, while in a fully devolved democracy the community will have significant reward power that can alter the outcomes of the network, the empirical phenomenon that I was about to study did not conform to that aspect of my

theoretical framework. I still wanted to keep some focus on community in the questions that I was going to ask from my respondents and the documents that I was going to analyze. However, after this discovery, community and the role of community in the success of public-private partnerships was not one of my primary concerns. I was now mainly focused on the government organizations, the network administration organization and the implementing non-profit organization in the delivery of the public service.

Research Method

Background

In the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars such as Mintzberg & Waters (1982), Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) and Gilbert (2005) have used naturalistic qualitative methodologies, i.e. interviews and analysis of existing texts, to conduct positivist inductive studies. The following section elaborates my methodology further and explains how the data collection and analysis methods were employed to answer questions specific to this study. It also discusses the legitimacy of such methods based on their appropriateness to the subject matter as well as by comparing my research to some well known studies that have employed similar methods.

Method Selection

The inductive nature of this study warranted the selection of a research method that is best suited for developing elements of theory from observed phenomenon. Case study therefore was the main method selected, as it is preferred by a number of academics in the field of organization theory in particular and social science in general (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2009) . With a focus on theory building a dual case study model was developed where the case studies were to be compared using replication logic. The selection of case study as a method can be justified by Yin (2009) analysis of situation that warrants selection of different research strategies. Since this research question is a ‘how’ question, surveys and archival analysis are not suited for this kind of research, as they are better suited for answering ‘who’ ‘what’ ‘where’ ‘how many’ and ‘how much’ questions. Experiments are not viable since, in the observed phenomenon, I as a researcher had no control on the events taking place. I could merely observe and analyze. Finally, since I was observing ongoing phenomenon and not the “dead” history of the phenomenon, doing a history could not guarantee accuracy or validity.

Case study was therefore the only method that suited the form of my research question, the extent of my control over observed events, and my temporal focus on the events. Yin (2009) defines case study as, “*An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.*” It also states that “*the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive*

situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion and as other results benefits from the prior developments of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis [Reformatted - bullet points removed]". In the light of the above discussion my research question fits perfectly with Yin's definition of situations that require a case study analysis.

Case Study Design

My research required the study a phenomenon that needed to be observed in the light of its context and the boundaries between context and current observations were not quite visible. Similarly, my theoretical framework urged me to study multiple variables through multiple vantage points. And finally, instead of being purely inductive, the study was to be primarily guided by existing theory. Since the purpose of this study was to develop elements of a theory as suggested by Yin (2009) a dual case study could "*immeasurably expands the external generalizability*" of my findings as compared to a single case study. Since my focus was specifically on the management practices within both the public-private partnerships as opposed to the overall impact of these partnerships in addition to their operation, an embedded case study design was favored over a holistic case study design when conducting case studies individually.

Within the realm of the dual case study, replication logic was preferred over a pooled sampling logic. This was done simply because the purpose of the study was to compare the findings from one case study to the other as opposed to generalize the overall observations from both the case studies. Guidelines provided by Yin (2009) were used in this replication logic, where the theoretical framework developed in the literature review was used as starting point that led into several iterations of data collection and analysis until the case studies were enriched to a point where individual case descriptions could be prepared and compared to each other. Cross-case comparisons was then used to develop new theoretical propositions.

Sample Selection and Unit of Analysis

While the discussion so far has focused mainly upon the research question and the elements of theory governing the study design, it might be a good idea at this point to discuss sample selection and units of analysis for my study. As recommended by Eisenhardt (1989a), sampling strategy best suited for an inductive case study research is of theoretical sampling. That is, you select your samples based on their ability to answer theoretical questions that arise as a result of your attempts to link observed data to theory.

For the purpose of my study, I needed to find examples where I could see organizational relationships between different members of public-private

partnerships in action, could observe the role of power in those relationships, and to observe the development of those relationships vis-a-vie power, and finally to assess the role of this power in the success of the public-private partnership. I also needed an organizational environment where I could find at least two comparable public-private partnership projects in order for my replication logic to work. The cases that I selected therefore for my study were of two public-private partnerships from the Punjab province of Pakistan.

These organizations were selected because, for one, they were structured closer to the contemporary definition of public-private partnership as discussed in my literature review, as in they were partnerships formed between the community and different organizations within the local and provincial governments of Pakistan as opposed to a simple subcontracting agreement between a government agency and a private service provider. Secondly, these two projects provided a tremendous opportunity to apply replication logic since both of these involved almost the same organizational actors, very similar organizational arrangements, the same organizational and infrastructural environments, and even then very different outcomes. One project, the Chief Ministers Initiative on Primary Health Care (CMIPHC), had been a tremendous success in the eyes of the organizations involved as well as the governing bodies overseeing and evaluating the project. The other project on Reproductive Health, on the other hand was considered problematic if not failed.

Both the projects had as implementing partner a large non-profit organization called the Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) partnered with city and provincial governments of Pakistan, the local communities in rural areas of the Punjab province, as well as the private sector providers of medicine and equipment. For the remainder of this dissertation, I refer to these two projects as the Basic Health Project (BHP) and the Reproductive Health Project (RHP) respectively. The network administration organization for both projects was the Project Support Unit (PSU), that coordinated the network managers also known as the District Support Managers (DSMs). The PSU also housed a Project Coordinator for the RHP.

Finally, being situated in a culture where I grew up, these organizations were better suited for interpretation of cultural symbols and other informal elements during my data collection and analysis. As an added benefit, all the actors involved were fluent in English, so translation or language barriers were not an issue in generalization of findings or interpretation of common themes. Also, while not relevant from a theory building perspective, the operational areas of these PPPs are of significant importance in Pakistan, a country with a large rural population and an often alarming lack of access to health and education facilities for the rural population.

Having an embedded design, the case studies had a complex unit of analysis. My focus was mainly on how the organizational goals were developed for the PPP project and what steps were being taken by different actors to achieve those goals.

In essence, I was attempting to identify actors that were being able to govern the formation of the PPP goals, and to influence the operation of partner organizations such that those goals were achieved. The unit of analysis, therefore, was the decision. These decisions were to be analyzed at two different scopes as I defined within my theoretical framework: i .e. the formation of the public-private partnership and the operation, the variables to be studied from each decision or the actors involved, and the direction of power and the final decision.

While Yin (2009) admits an inability of existing literature to provide universally acceptable strategies for linking data to theory, I felt that using theoretical sampling and guiding my data analysis by my theoretical framework developed the literature review will allow me to make that connection without causing much controversy. The replication logic discussed above was of course my intended strategy to interpret the findings of my study.

Validity and Reliability Measures

The identification of unit and variables of analysis also address the construct validity of the study. Since the research question attempts to link organizational power to the outcomes of a public-private partnership, and since the outcome of a PPP is determined by the organizational decisions taken by its actors at a network level, and since organizational power is a function of organizational decision making (Hatch, 1997), a study of power in the context of organizational decision

making, is the most direct way to understand the role of power in the success of the organizational network or the PPP. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the ontological approach of my study is realist. Therefore collection of data from multiple sources also supported the construct validity of the study. It minimized my observer's bias through triangulation of observations from multiple sources, hence enhancing the external validity of the findings.

As discussed by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), the theory developed through inductive research is often incomplete so this study alone may not be able to ensure universal generalizability of the theoretical propositions developed. The replication logic, however, ensured the maximum possible generalizability achievable in such projects, this approach has been supported by a number of well received inductive case studies including Eisenhardt (1989b), Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) and Chandler (2005). The concurrence of findings of this research with existing theory also contributes to the external validity of the findings. Finally, for the purpose of reliability, the case study protocol that this methodology manifests and a case study database was developed in accordance with Yin's (2009) guidelines.

Data Collection

Evidence for the study was collected mainly through three sources; organizational documents, semi-structured interviews with different actors involved with the PPP, unstructured interviewed with PPP employees as well as external experts.

Semi-Structured Interviews

A total of five semi-structured interviews were conducted with key officials involved in either one or both of the projects. These included a former organizational leader from PRSP, a middle management representative from PRSP, a project coordinator from BHP, a top management official from Packard Foundation, the chief collaborator for RHP and a senior official from the Punjab government. Each of these interviews lasted from 50 to 75 minutes and all these interviews were recorded and were transcribed within 24 hours of recording.

Table 5 provides a participant overview for semi structured interviews. Appendix A consists of the interview guide.

Resource	Organizational Affiliation
Top Level Manager	Donor Organization (RHP)
Former Top Level Manager	Implementing Organization

Mid Level Manager	PSU (Both Projects)
Network Manager	PSU (Both Projects)
Senior Official	Provincial Government

Table 5: *List of Semi-Structured Interview Respondents.*

Unstructured Interviews

A total of 10 unstructured interviews were conducted. These interviews had varying lengths and were directed towards confirming or verifying information provided in the semi-structured interviews as well as to identify avenues for collection of documents. Unstructured interviews were also conducted in cases where an understanding needed to be developed of the situation on the ground as opposed to what was being observed in documents and semi-structured interviews. For example, a member of one of Pakistan’s most active reproductive health non-profits was interviewed to determine whether or not a reproductive health project in a rural area of the Punjab province caused any conflict with the religious elements in the area, as the documents provided by the projects and the officials interviewed did not address this concern. Similarly, a representative of a local professional organization was interviewed when it was discovered that one of the projects was involved in a legal battle with that organization. That individual was also able to provide me with a copy of the court records pertaining

to the legal conflict. Table 6 provides a participant overview for semi structured interviews.

Resource	Organizational Affiliation
Mid Level Manager	Donor Organization (RHP)
Mid Level Official	District Government
Professional Organization Representative	National Level Doctor's Association
Nonprofit Consultant	For Donor Organization (RHP)
Reproductive Health Expert	
Reproductive Health Program Coordination Expert	
Basic Health Program Coordination Expert	
Pharmacy Representative	
Local Community Leader	
Religious Expert	

Table 6: *List of Unstructured Interview Respondents*

Document Collection

In addition to the documents mentioned above i.e. the court documents and external reports, my main focus was the collection of internal reports such as organizational memoranda, monitoring and evaluation reports, annual reports, minutes of meetings and so on. Documents spanning a few hundred pages were collected through different organizational websites and through special permission from organizations responsible for creating those in case of internal / non-public documents. Documents were sampled based on their ability to answer questions posed in the semi-structured interviews so that the information collected from interview participants could be corroborated from organizational documents and to fill the missing links in parts of the stories untold by the interview respondents.

Case Study Database

The case study database was therefore mainly composed of notes taken during the interviews and the preliminary analysis of evidence as well as the documents collected and the interview transcripts. Guiding the collection of documents through interview questions also ensured a proper chain of evidence, which according to Yin (2009) is critical in maintaining the reliability of a case study

research. The semi-structured interviews were often followed up by emails or phone calls to clarify any confusions regarding statements made or information provided. Table 7 presents the case study database.

Case Study Database		
Data Type	Artifacts	Storage
Semi - Structured Interviews	Semi - Structured Interview Recordings	Digital (Destroyed)
	Semi - Structured Interview Transcripts	Digital
Unstructured Interviews	Unstructured Interview Recordings	Digital (Destroyed)
	Unstructured Interview Transcripts	Digital
	Unstructured Interview Notes	Digital
Documents from Implementing Organization	Annual Reports	Digital
	Newsletters	Digital
	Minutes of Meetings	Digital
	Contracts	Photocopied Paper
	Project Proposals	Digital
	Progress Reports	Digital

Government Documents	Court Cases	Photocopied Paper
	Monitoring and Evaluation Reports	Digital

Table 7: *Case study database*

Data Analysis

It is common for case study research to intertwine data collection and analysis throughout the duration of the research project. However, a major distinction between data analysis and collection can be drawn at the point where the research database is saturated and the other moves towards creating case descriptions.

Case Descriptions

It is important to note that while the study design mainly followed Yin (2009) in most of its aspects, at the analysis phase I parted ways from Yin's recommendation of creating individual case reports and adopted the strategy selected by Eisenhardt (1989a). I began my analysis by writing case descriptions which were less formal compared to Yin's model of case study reports and focused more on highlighting the link between theoretical and empirical observations made during the literature review and during the data collection as opposed to attempting to increase readability for a general audience.

The case descriptions were 5-6 thousand words on average and focused on transforming the theoretical framework developed in the literature review into an empirical set of observations. Therefore, each case description detailed the public and private actors involved in the partnership, the organizational interests of these actors, conditions under which the partnership was made and a history of the partnering process, an overview of the organizational and functional environments of the network, a comparison of the relative powers of actors and the sources of those powers, and finally an assessment of the success of the public-private partnership. Factors contributing to the success or lack of success of each project as noted by various interview participants as well as observed in evaluation documents were carefully recorded. Creating case descriptions guided by theoretical framework was a very helpful approach when it came to analysis within and across the case studies.

Within Case Analysis

Within case analysis as mentioned above, relied heavily on theoretical propositions developed in the literature review. This analytical strategy according to Yin (2009) is the most preferred in case study analysis. Theory based analysis allowed me to focus on the more relevant aspects of the case study and to ignore elements that may seem important but are of little theoretical significance. Basing the analysis of data on theoretical propositions also enabled me to use rival theories in an attempt to explain empirical observations. According to Yin, the

more rival theories one can analyze and reject the more confidence you can place in the findings of the study. The main rival theory that I used to compare my theoretical framework with was one where a network would automatically work perfectly based on the wisdom with which it was structured and the contractual obligations that define the relationships in the public-private partnership. Hence, for all the decisions that were being taken in the organization and across the relationship among organizations, the question I kept asking was, whether the network actor was acting towards the pursuit of network goals based on its contractual obligations voluntarily, or if it was acting in compliance with the will of other organizational actors. Similarly, situations in which the network goals were not being pursued actively by partner organizations, I would ask the question whether the lack of action was caused due to the flaws in contractual structure of the project or by the inability of powerful actors to steer those elements towards network goals.

Basing the within case analysis on theoretical propositions also helped immensely in cross case analysis. This was because, due to the qualitative nature of data, it was hard to create narratives that could be incorporated into pattern matching techniques used by Yin. Theoretical propositions therefore could guide an approximation of a pattern on which different narratives could be compared to one another.

Cross Case Analysis

The cross case analysis as mentioned by Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt (1989a) was an iterative process. I began with the within case analysis and compared my analysis to the theoretical framework. I would refine the theoretical framework and redo the within case analysis, in the light of the refined framework.

Eventually I compared my findings from the two cases with each other and used the comparison of findings to extend my final theoretical propositions. These findings are detailed in the next chapter. This phase of data analysis is the reason why Miles & Huberman (1994) considers induction and deduction as inter-related processes when it comes to case study analysis. This differs from the Glaser & Strauss (1967) approach of absolute induction where empirical data is analyzed to develop theoretical hypothesis independent of the existing theoretical propositions.

The iterative nature of such explanation building can often lead to pitfalls such as the author's focus being skewed into an irrelevant direction of data and so on. However, as Yin (2009) suggests, this was avoided by paying close attention to the case study protocol and maintaining the chain of evidence at all levels of analysis. In addition to the validity measures discussed earlier the principles outlined by Yin were adopted to ensure the quality of the case study in terms of both data collection and analysis.

Quality Control for Data Analysis

In terms of evidence collection, all evidence was collected regardless of its ability or inability to deliver outcomes conducive to my theoretical framework. When collecting organizational documents, all organizational documents were collected that were identified either through the theoretical sampling technique or were suggested by interview respondents. Similarly, while conducting semi-structured interviews, the respondents were given complete freedom to discuss the role of power, the sources of power, and the evaluation of the projects success without leading them into a specific narrative. This openness in data collection ensured the ability of data to provide a stable base for testing of rival theories.

While the evidence was collected open mindedly, the collection was not entirely without a strategy. Quality was also ensured by keeping the case study protocol and the chain of evidence focused on the role of power in the success of public-private partnerships. According to Yin (2009), such a focus improves the quality of a case study by keeping the analysis close to the topic of study, because once the evidence becomes part of the case study database all of it has to be used. If the evidence collected does not focus on the issue being studied, using it will only confuse the researcher and the reader, and will diminish the quality of the study.

Finally, my own experiences in the research setting, i.e. the rural health sector in Pakistan, my familiarity with the culture of rural Punjab, and my familiarity with

the operation of the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan based on my previous research projects, enabled me to have a better understanding of the management discourse in both my case studies, as opposed to other involvements where I could have conducted such a case study.

Ethical Considerations

With the advent of institutional review boards in universities, any dissertation research nowadays almost guarantees the protection of its human subjects. However, in social science research while physical health aspects are not much relevant to the safety of human subjects involved, attention is paid to the emotional and social risks, upon ones inclusion in a case study research as a key informant. For my study these risks mainly included but were not limited to the consequences for quality of life such as job security and social standing of the respondents. My research took several precautions to mitigate the risk involved with the inclusion of my key respondents to the study.

First of all, all interview data was stored anonymously and was filed according to the strategic position of the respondent in my theoretical framework as opposed to their physical position in the organizational or network structure. The interview recordings were destroyed as soon as transcripts were complete and verified. No names were used during the interviews except for well established political or

organizational figures. In addition to that, organizational consent was sought from all organizations where interviews were conducted or where data was retrieved from. The only exception was data freely available on the internet or public archives such as the court cases and the annual reports and newsletters of the organizations involved.

Another safety measure was taken by including the top management of both key organizations into the interviewing process. That developed a level of comfort across the entire network and made it easy for my interview respondents to answer my questions freely and candidly. Since the research did not require extensive investigative practices, because most if not all data was collected through sources that maintained full disclosure policies, no respondent was observed to be fearful of divulging information that could result in negative consequences from the employer or colleagues.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis

Introduction

The data analysis started right during the data collection phase. This is quite the norm for inductive qualitative research because as Yin (2009) mentions, case study analysis is done through collecting data, analyzing the data, and then collecting more data to address the questions that arise from the incremental analysis. These iterations continue until a level of data saturation is achieved that upon final analysis can derive theoretical propositions addressing the research question. Since this research design consists of two case studies that follow a replication logic, the analysis of data consists of within case analysis as well as cross case analysis.

The main artifacts created after several iterations of initial data collection and analysis were two separate narratives done in the tradition of Eisenhardt (1989) case histories. These case histories combined everything that was gathered from analyzing interviews notes and transcripts and the organizational and public domain documents. These case histories, presented as appendices to this dissertation, served as the finally saturated case data formed as the result of several iterations of data collection and analysis. The remainder of this chapter will present the final iteration of data analysis and will present the replication

logic outlined in the previous chapter in the light of the theoretical framework that was developed after the literature review. Theoretical propositions emerging from this replication logic will be presented in the next chapter along with general conclusions of this study. The replication logic will be presented over structural, functional, and temporal dimensions of the public private partnerships (PPPs) represented by the Basic Health Project (BHP) and the Reproductive Health Project (RHP).

Explanation of Terms

The term "organizational group" will be used to describe *an organization or a group within an organization that forms a node of a governance network.*

The term "project" from this point forward will be used to describe *a governance network formed by different organizational groups through a Public Private Partnership agreement as described in the literature review.* Both BHP and RHP are therefore governance networks that operate as PPPs.

The term "collaborator" from this point forward will be used to describe *an organizational group that is a part of either the BHP or the RHP and is considered an active or otherwise significant organizational group within the network.*

Structural Elements

Formation

The BHP was formed as a result of a project pitch developed by the top management of Punjab Rural Support program (PRSP), along with support from political leaders of the community. The project was granted by the government of the Punjab province and the district governments were brought on board through negotiations. The success anticipated from the project was demonstrated in the form of a pilot project conducted by PRSP in southern Punjab. A senior civil servant with work experience both in the government of Punjab and the BHP described the problem and solution approach in the following way:

"This initiative started in the southern Punjab city of Rahim Yar Khan. The basic issue at that time was that the health service delivery was inefficient and it was nonexistent in the villages. Its quality was not up to the mark, and the real issue was that of the absence of the needed service providers, that is the doctors....[S]o what was happening was, that at many of these places doctors were absent, but they were taking salaries from the government. There was a mutual, I would say, corruption mechanism..... the novel model of Public Private Partnership was in this way conceived"

The BHP was mainly staffed by members of the civil service that were either seconded from their positions in public service, or were on leave from their public

service position. A small number of retired public servants were also hired to staff the project. No new financial resources were assigned to the project however PRSP was made responsible for the existing financial resources available to the Basic Health Units (BHU). The main instrument for the implementation of BHP was a service contract between PRSP and the district government brokered by the government of Punjab. According to a seasoned ex-civil service member that was among the founders of PRSP, the following were the reasons for staffing the organization with people from the civil service:

"[T]here were 3 reasons. Number one is that there was a scarcity of qualified human resource, good managers and leaders are not available in private sector or in other sectors, that's number one. Number two: even if they are available, they lack the experience of how government sector works because we have a dominant government- the entire resources come from the government, and you know, it needed somebody....who understood government structures....and how to become a bridge between organizations.....Number three....the lack of trust by the government. Because government knew that this way they could pull the strings regardless of the organizational arrangements. So this was also one of those things."

In the RHP the collaboration came into being by a project pitch from PRSP top management to the David and Lucille Packard Foundation's (Packard Foundation)

Pakistan chapter. After an initial agreement was arrived on, the government of the Punjab as well as the district governments were taken into confidence regarding the operation of the new collaboration that was supposed to operate through the existing BHUs. The success of the project was expected by the Packard Foundation in the form of having a greater outreach in rural Punjab as a result of collaborating with government and government-like organizations. According to a senior official at the Packard Foundation:

"[Y]ou know one of the weakest areas as you know in Pakistan has always been the services in the rural areas, and the services to the poor, the real poor....So instead of, you know, thinking of models, we said why don't we partner or work with those organizations that already have community outreach"

" _____ was the leader at that time and was very impressive. So this grant was basically given because he provided that kind of leadership at that time that we had a lot of confidence that they will make it work....they came to us and said we want to work with you"

The RHP was to rely on the existing staff of PRSP deployed at the BHP which was primarily consisted of the aforementioned on-service and retired public service. However, some key positions were to be filled by private or non-profit sector experts in reproductive health. There was no added government funding for the RHP. However the project was allowed the use of capital and human resources available at the BHUs. Packard Foundation was responsible for

providing the funding for the operational cost of the project, which PRSP responsible for the utilization of funds. Table 8 outlines the salient features of the formation of both projects.

	Basic Health Project	Reproductive Health Project
Decision to form PPP	By government of Punjab to improve condition of basic health facilities in the province	By Packard Foundation to outreach to rural communities in Punjab
Funding party	- Government of the Punjab - District Governments (Physical infrastructure)	- Packard Foundation - District Governments (Physical infrastructure)
Key Staff	Civil Service Employees (Seconded, on leave or retired) PRSP Management	- Civil Service Employees (Seconded, on leave or retired) - Project Coordinator for Reproductive Health

Table 8: *Formation of both projects*

Project Structure

Since the organizational groups involved in the formation phase of a project might not be as involved during its operational phase, this section uses a two level approach to identify the project structure. The collaborators in the project structure at the formation level are therefore distinguished from the collaborators in the operational level. This distinction is maintained in some of the other sections in this chapter as well.

The collaborators for the BHP at the formation level needed the government of Punjab in a financial or donor role, PRSP in an expert role and the local government organizations in a competitor role. At the operational level, it consisted of four major collaborators. These included a project support unit (PSU) and its affiliate district support managers in a network management role, the government of Punjab in a monitoring and evaluation role, PRSP in an expert role and the district governments in a support role. Table 9 Outlines the roles of different collaborators in the BHP structure.

Collaborator	Role
Government of Punjab	- Donor (Formation level) - Support (Operation level) - Monitoring and Evaluation (Operation

	level)
District Governments	- Competitor (Formation level) - Support (Operation level)
PRSP	- Expert (Both levels)
Project Support Unit	- Network Management (Operation level)

Table 9: Roles of collaborators in the BHP structure

In the case of the RHP the formation level structure had Packard Foundation in a donor role, PRSP in an expert role, and the provincial and district governments in a support role. At the operational level the structure consisted of the Packard Foundation in a monitoring and evaluation and role, PRSP in an expert role, the Project Support Unit and its associated district support managers in a network management role, and the local government in a support role. The project coordinator hired specifically for RHP, being the only in-house reproductive health specialist at PRSP was also expected to help facilitate the communication between PRSP, the Packard Foundation and the organizations and individuals brought in as external experts. According to the senior management official at Packard Foundation:

"[T]he only position that was created new was of the Project Coordinator. And the project coordinator, we had to hire from the reproductive health or family planning job market because they really lacked that capacity"

Table 10 Outlines the roles of different collaborators in the RHP structure.

Collaborator	Role
Government of Punjab	Support (Formation level)
District Governments	Support (Both levels)
PRSP	Expert (Both levels)
Project Support Unit	Network Management (Operation level)
Packard Foundation	- Donor (Formation level) - Monitoring and Evaluation (Operation level)
Project Coordinator for RHP	- Network Management (Formation level) - Liaison between Managers and Reproductive Health Experts (Operation level)

Table 10: *Roles of collaborators in the RHP structure*

Funding

The funding for the management of BHP was coming directly from the government of the Punjab. This was done by allotting a single line yearly budget item to PRSP for the project. The funding for the operation of BHUs was released through district governments upon receiving invoices from PRSP. The budget renewal was not tied to any progress indicators. However, it was understood that progress indicators played an important role in renewal of the budget. According to a network manager for the BHP:

"what they do is that for the purchase of the medicine and for the payment of the salaries of the employees who are working in the the basic health units, they transfer the funds to the district government, and then it becomes a liability of the district support manager from our side to get in touch with the EDO Finance, the person who is basically executive on the district government side, and the district coordination officer for the release of the funds. On the other side, the provincial government transfers the fund to the PSU for salaries for the people who are working here."

The funding for the RHP was the sole responsibility of the Packard Foundation and was provided in tranches agreed upon in the project proposal between PRSP and Packard Foundation. According to the project proposal produced by PRSP and approved by the Packard Foundation, renewal of funding as well as

continuation of project was conditional upon the progress indicator reports that PRSP was required to produce on a regular basis. The funding structures of both projects are summarized in Table 11.

	Basic Health Project	Reproductive Health Project
Operational Funds	Government of the Punjab	Packard Foundation
Buildings and Fixed Capital	District Governments	District Governments
Supplies	District Governments	Packard Foundation
Funding Renewal Policy	Discretion of Provincial Government	Based on Progress Indicators

Table 11: *Funding details for both projects*

Monitoring Approaches

As mentioned above, the BHP did not have a monitoring and evaluation system built into its contract with the government organizations. However, the government of the Punjab had a separate monitoring and evaluation system called the Punjab Health Sector Reforms Program (PHSRP). This project constantly

evaluates all health facilities owned by the provincial or district governments and ranks them using a quantified system of measurement. In addition to that, the local government officials were allowed to audit the project run BHUs at any time.

While the BHP was not contractually obliged to keep its BHUs in the top positions of these rankings, it was generally understood throughout the project that these rankings were important for the continuation of the project. And the network managers found it important to maintain a strong presence of BHP run BHUs in the top-10 of these rankings. According to a network manager for BHP:

"[P]er our agreement the designated employees can come and visit and check the health facilities at any time.... there is a third-party....PHSRP: Punjab Health Sector Reform Program. This third-party is specifically introduced by the provincial government.....they are neither influenced by PRSP nor by the district government.....there are 8 indicators of the health facilities: staff presence, the paramedical staff presence, the doctors' presence, the outreach staff presence, the cleanliness of the health facility, and the availability of medicine, and so on and so forth. So they have their numbers"

In addition to this external monitoring, the BHP had a very strong internal monitoring system in the form of Monthly Review Meetings (MRM). Every

month, all key officials of PRSP got together with the district support managers and review various metrics relevant to the operation and outreach of the BHUs. Local partnerships with community and capacity building efforts through inviting guest lectures and sharing latest research with medical staff was also an important part of the MRM agenda. The MRMs reviewed progress of matters relevant to both BHP and RHP.

The RHP on the other hand was monitored constantly from the inside and the outside, through evaluation tools provided in the project proposal and Packard Foundation grantee guidelines. A list of objectively verifiable indicators of progress was created of the result of a pilot study or a base line study at the beginning of the project, and progress is measured in comparison to progress made in the previous years. The project also employed the service of external evaluators to enhance the credibility of its monitoring and evaluation systems. Table 12 presents the monitoring and evaluation approaches for both projects.

	Basic Health Project	Reproductive Health Project
Monitoring Agency	- Government of the Punjab via PHSRP - Internal monitoring by PRSP	- Packard Foundation - Internal monitoring by PRSP

Evaluation Processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PHSRP Audits - PRSP Monthly review meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRSP Self Reporting - External Evaluations - PRSP Monthly review meetings
Type of Indicators	Objective/Quantitative	Quantitative and Qualitative
Impact of Evaluation Reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No Contractual Obligations - Perceived as Important for Project Continuation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project continuation dependent on evaluation - Project Goals Redesigned According to Achieved Progress

Table 12: *Monitoring and evaluation approaches*

Network Environment

Collaborator Goal Analysis

As noted by various writers on network management such as Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), different collaborating organizations in a governance network can become part of the network to support organizational goals that may or may not coincide with the organizational goals. It is therefore important to study the goals of each

collaborator organizations in order to understand their ability to contribute towards the network and its expected outcomes.

In the BHP, the government of Punjab joined the network in order to improve the performance of health service units in rural areas of the Punjab province. Hence the organizational goal of the government of Punjab in the network was to achieve a higher level of service delivered at the network run BHUs compared to local government run BHUs.

The goal of PRSP, in turn, was to demonstrate its success in achieving a highly efficient model of BHU management. The targeted media of this demonstration was the PHSRP ranking and the budget documents that would show that the higher operational efficiency was achieved without spending extra public money.

Like the government of Punjab, the local government also wanted to see an increase in the efficiency of the BHUs. However; their goals were different at different phases. In the formation phase, the goal of the local government was to demonstrate that they could run the BHUs without the intervention of outside organizations, hence not allowing BHP to exist in their districts. This was the reason why in some districts BHUs run by the government were starting to appear in the top rankings of PHSRP. However, once BHP was implemented in a district, district governments just provided assistance in terms of financial disbursements and maintenance of law and order.

At the project support unit, the network managers, based on their training in the civil services of Pakistan were experts in the practice of public administration. The job description however did not require any experience with the treatment of patients or the delivery of direct public health services. Their goal was therefore to enhance the organizational efficiency of the BHUs, by making sure that there were no difficulties arising from bureaucratic red tapes, law and order problems, or other problems such as corruption or employee absenteeism. They were keen on ensuring that the BHUs under their control were exceeding all measures of efficiency outlined in the PHSRP evaluation processes. All of these measures were concerned with the condition and operation of the BHU such as cleanliness, availability of medicines, and so on. Table 13 outlines the goals of different collaborators in BHP. According to a PRSP employee:

" All these indicators have their numbers like I can roughly say 60% marks goes to the attendance of the paramedics, doctors, and outreach staff. The remaining 20% marks goes to medicines, and final 20% marks are basically divided into equipment functionality and cleanliness. And the PHSRP regularly produce their reports. They produce their reports monthly on the 36 districts. There are 36 districts in Punjab and they show how the PRSP is working and how the district government is working. Like 14 districts are not in PRSP's hands, they are still run by district government. So with the grace of Allah Almighty almost 14 of our

districts are in the top twenty and we are trying to bring them into the top 1"

Collaborator	Goal
Government of Punjab	Improved Efficiency of BHUs
District Governments	Improved Efficiency of BHUs
PRSP	- Improved Positions on PHSRP Rankings - Project Continuation - Project Expansion into more Districts
Project Support Unit	- Improved Positions on PHSRP Rankings

Table 13: *Collaborator goals for BHP*

In the RHP, the government of Punjab wanted to support the collaboration between Packard Foundation and PRSP to promote reproductive health in the rural areas of Punjab. The role of the local government was the same as their role in the operational phase of the BHP. They were obliged to provide administrative and financial support to the BHUs for their basic health operations.

The goals of the Packard Foundation were to enhance the condition of reproductive health in rural areas of Punjab by training a number of female medical support providers called Lady Health Visitors (LHVs), who could provide information and support to rural families on the topic of reproductive health at a grass root level. Packard Foundation also wanted to build capacity of the Basic Health Units to be able to provide basic reproductive health services to the populations being served by the BHP. According to a Packard Foundation official:

"[T]his project was for already established BHUs and it was for capacity building and then strengthening of providers and setting up systems "

The goals of PRSP in the RHP were to keep the commitments it made to Packard Foundation in the project proposal and by achieving the targeted progress indicators that were agreed upon at the beginning of the project. Most of the objectively verifiable indicators dealt with the training and deployments of LHVs. Other progress indicators dealing with non quantifiable improvement of the condition of public health were to be operationalized and delegated to the network manager by the resident reproductive specialist hired as a Project Coordinator at the project support unit.

The remaining network managers had goals similar to their goals with the BHP. Their focus was hence on economic efficiency and attaining the highest possible results with the objectively verifiable indicators such as conducting the training of LHV's in a timely and cost effective manner and making sure that adequate staff

was deployed at the BHUs for reproductive health related medical advice and treatment. Table 14 outlines the goals of different collaborators in RHP.

Collaborator	Goal
PRSP	Project Continuation
Packard Foundation	Increased Progress on Objective and Subjective Indicators
Project Coordinator for RHP	Increased Progress on Objective and Subjective Indicators
District Support Managers	Increased Progress on Objective Indicators

Table 14: *Collaborator goals for RHP*

Organizational Power of Collaborators

This section is an empirical counterpart to the theoretical framework developed in the literature review. It analyzes the power of different collaborators observed in the network, as opposed to what was expected based on theoretical evidence. The similarities or dissimilarities between the two will help develop the theoretical propositions expected from the inductive study.

In the BHP, the government of Punjab being the founding organization had a lot of power. With the ability to terminate the project at any point, it definitely had coercive power. Another source of coercive power came from its ability to control the funds that would go into the operation of both BHP as well as PRSP itself. While PRSP was technically a non profit organization, its sole donor was the government of Punjab itself that created PRSP through a provincially mandated endowment. In addition to the visible power, the government of Punjab also possessed the "invisible" power described in the literature review and written in detail by authors like Lukes (1974) and Grewal (2008). This invisible power further empowered some collaborators in the network and disempowered others, as discussed below.

PRSP, the key organization in both of the projects, was empowered through its expert power. This expertise came from PRSP's very capable human resource, and its ability to takeover the delivery of public services while circumventing the hurdles of typical bureaucratic procedures. The organization also drew its power from its position in the strategic contingency mechanism of the basic health network. It was able to deal with a number of external pressures including unlawful interventions from powerful landowners who had enjoyed control over the BHUs in the past. It was also able to respond effectively to external pressures stemming from isolated political incidents. One distinct example of such a strategic contingency is marked by the time when most doctors throughout the Punjab province went on strike, leaving the hospitals unstaffed. BHP doctors,

under PRSP leadership, not only continued to perform their duties in their BHUs, but were even able to serve patients in the government hospitals left untreated as a result of the strike. A PRSP employee said of the strike:

"[T]hat was basically not good for the people, but that was very symbolic for PRSP because PRSP has provided its doctor in district hospitals for that very time period, like in service hospitals our doctors worked, in general hospitals our doctors worked."

The Project Support Unit and the District Support Managers housed in it, due to their backgrounds in the civil service of Pakistan, enjoyed great referential power throughout the network. This was because of their well reputed administrative training by the civil service of Pakistan as well as the camaraderie shown to them by fellow civil servicemen at key positions in various government institutions . They also shared PRSP's ability to deal with strategic contingencies especially those relating to PHSRP monitoring and evaluation which were vital for the continuation of the project.

The local government, while having control over financial resources for the BHUs, did not enjoy any significant power in the network as their role was minimized by the government of Punjab. Similarly, the way the network was structured resulted in making the PHSRP evaluation the main reward mechanism for the network. This evaluation system had little room for community input. Therefore the local community, while being the main beneficiary of the project,

did not enjoy any significant power in its operation. Table 15 outlines the types of power associated with significant collaborators in BHP.

Collaborator	Types of Power
Government of Punjab	- Coercive Power - Invisible Power through Ability to Design Network Structure
District Governments	Disempowered through Network Structure
PRSP	- Expert Power - Ability to Respond to Strategic Contingency
Network Managers	- Referential Power - Ability to Respond to Strategic Contingency
Community	Disempowered through Network Structure

Table 15: *Power of collaborators in BHP*

In the RHP, the power structure was slightly different from the BHP. The government of Punjab maintained the same role that it had maintained in the formation phase of the BHP. However Packard Foundation was collaborating with PRSP only in the districts where the BHP had already been implemented. Therefore the role of actors involved in the formation phase of the BHP was irrelevant in the RHP. Both provincial and district governments maintained a supporting role in the RHP and their power in the operation of the project was insignificant.

Packard Foundation had coercive power by being the sole provider of funds to the project. It was however very reluctant to use this power due to an organizational policy that requires the adoption of grantee empowerment practices as opposed to direct influence. PRSP enjoyed expert power originating from its managerial capital as discussed earlier. The district support managers in the project support unit maintained their referential power and their power to respond to strategic contingencies as discussed above.

The project coordinator for reproductive health held referential power by being able to outreach to colleagues within PRSP and having strong reputation in the reproductive health sector of Pakistan. In addition to this, by being the only in house reproductive health expert in the PRSP top management, the project coordinator was a position of considerable power as it responded to the most significant strategic contingencies for the network. These strategic contingencies arose from the ambiguity the civil service trained network managers felt in the

subjective progress indicators identified by Packard Foundation. The RHP director was expected to bridge the gap in this understanding, saving the network from a possible deadlock. Table 16 outlines the types of power associated with significant collaborators in RHP.

Collaborator	Types of Power
Packard Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coercive Power (Decides not to use) - Invisible Power through Ability to Design Network Structure
PRSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expert Power - Ability to Respond to Strategic Contingency
Project Coordinator for RHP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expert Power - Referential Power - Ability to Respond to Strategic Contingency
Network Managers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Referential Power - Ability to Respond to Strategic Contingency

Table 16: *Power of collaborators in RHP*

Outcomes

Outcomes for Collaborators

This section outlines the outcomes of BHP and RHP from the perspectives of each of the collaborating organizations. For the sake of brevity, it leaves out the organizations that were determined to have no significant power in the operation of the network:

The health infrastructure in the Punjab province was already devolved to district governments. However, since the civil servants in charge of managing this infrastructure, spanned the boundaries of different levels of government. This made the provincial government, especially the Chief Ministers Office, concerned with the quality of public health management at every level of government.

Partnering with PRSP and monitoring the project performance through PHSRP, helped the provincial government to change its role from direct involvement to meta-governance.

For PRSP, the BHP brought home credibility that enabled it to survive a massive political regime change in the provincial government. Such survival is quite remarkable in Pakistan where shelving of even beneficial government projects upon a political regime change is standard practice. It also enabled the organization to expand its sphere of influence to several districts of the Punjab province. Its success attracted international organizations such as the World Bank,

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance), and most significantly the Packard Foundation to conduct joint projects with it in the health sector. Such success and exposure was unprecedented for PRSP as it previously held the reputation of mainly being a microfinance organization.

The projects support unit for the RHP did not enjoy success or progress comparable to its basic health counterpart. The first project coordinator that completed the baseline studies quit the project before the implementation phase even began. The project coordinator hired with much trouble as a replacement was let go due to performance issues as noted by the PRSP top management in the progress report. After that, the projects support unit of the BHP attempted to resume the responsibilities of the RHP director. But due to the lack of expertise in reproductive health, they were unable to bridge the gap between the organizational cultures of PRSP and the Packard Foundation. The RHP support unit had therefore become defunct after the departure of the second project coordinator. A Packard Foundation official described the issues arising from the project coordinator position as follows:

"[P]roject coordinator was kind of the only post that they agreed to endure in the budgets as a specific to this project.... they hired a project coordinator which was a very experienced doctor and we were happy to see her there....but I think she got really really tired of the bureaucracy....then they hired somebody....who'd been working in the

army, again a very different kind of environment....she got fired, and they kept saying, 'we haven't been able to find a good coordinator'"

Regarding the role of the civil service trained network managers that tried to run the RHP after the departure of the last project coordinator, a Packard Foundation executive said:

" [I]f you look at the quantitative indicators, they were able to do it completely. So they have trained the providers, they have done a baseline, they have completed whatever they were supposed to do, but when we go in and look at their providers, we look at things differently. We want to see what is the quality of her counseling, how she's been taking that kind of direction...and how she's been obtaining and generating the data. They don't want to look into these things. So that becomes like a different thing"

The Packard Foundation had started their participation in the RHP with high hopes. However, towards the end of the project, the Packard Foundation had become weary of its inability to form a mutual understanding of the project's intended outcomes with PRSP. The funds transferred to PRSP in the later stages of the projects, ended up being unassigned. Packard Foundation decided not to show too much interest in future collaborations with government organizations. Table 17 summarizes outcomes for significant collaborators in both projects.

Collaborator	Outcome
Government of Punjab	Meta-Governance
PRSP	- Increased Influence - Increased Resources - Increased Outreach
Packard Foundation	Being Wary of Future Collaborations with Government Organizations
Project Coordinator for RHP	Collapse of Position

Table 17: *Outcomes for collaborators in both projects*

Outcomes for Networks / PPP Success

As discussed in the previous chapter, success of a public service network is a complicated concept. Even with the problem oriented approaches of public private partnerships, it is often hard to label a project successful or unsuccessful on the basis of a single set of measures. This ambiguity in evaluating PPP success was also apparent in participant interviews.

When asked whether or not their respective project was successful, most participants referred to more than one aspects of success, which could be classified into three categories. These aspects consisted of the achievement of objectively verifiable indicators as well as the satisfaction of the donor agency

that was responsible for creating the partnership in the first place. The feelings of collaborators from the partnership experience, including collective learning and shared values that evolved in the partnership also seemed important to almost all respondents. Finally, while describing what they considered success or failure of the network, many respondents referred to contributions made by the network beyond its intended outcomes. I call such outcomes "externalities" and classify them as "positive" or "negative" based on whether the respondents considered those beneficial or harmful to the network or the community.

The BHP was able to achieve its goals in terms objectively verifiable indicators as well as. The partnership experience among all members of the BHP, had proved to be pleasant. With the exception of a few cases of bureaucratic red tape, PRSP enjoyed a cordial relationship with the provincial government as well as the district governments. The most significant outcome of these relationships was observed in the case stated above where doctors from the BHP helped the provincial and district governments continue to provide services when the remaining doctors in the province were on strike. The MRMs also provided for a regular opportunity to share learning among the network and promote opportunities for capacity building.

The project was also successful in creating a positive externality by encouraging the district governments to improve the efficiency of their basic health operations (BHU) by creating a healthy competition for the fear of losing basic health units to external organizations, several district governments improved their

management practices to match the efficiency of network run BHUs. With the convergence of all three dimensions of the criteria towards the positive, it can be concluded that the BHP was successful in achieving its goals. The donor agency, the Government of Punjab, was satisfied with it and showed its satisfaction through continued renewals of project funding as well as funding for PRSP.

In the case of the RHP, there were mixed feelings on the idea of achievement. The project had done well in the case of objectively verifiable indicators. However, it had not done so well in achieving the relatively subjective progress indicators. In terms of stakeholder's feedback, the PRSP employees considered the project to be a success at their end, as they were able to achieve all of the project's goals as understood by them. This feeling of success was not shared by the Packard Foundation that maintained the mere achievement of economic efficiency was not a significant goal of the project. The donor agency was therefore not satisfied with the project. When asked if the project was a success, a Packard Foundation employee said:

"[A]ctually that project is not closed because they have our funds, but we have not decided what to do with them.....there has been modest success; I mean I wouldn't call it highly successful, but yes, definitely I would not call it a failure or anything"

The partnership experience was perhaps the most noticeable area where success was not observed in the RHP. Coming from two different sectors, PRSP and the Packard Foundation had very different organizational cultures that resulted in

very different operational interpretations of the network outcomes even though the original spirit was the same. To make matters worse, the position in the network, created to bridge this cultural gap could not be effectively staffed. This resulted in an overall lack of shared learning from the partnership experience.

According to a Packard foundation employee:

"[W]e had had some very high expectations....definitely by design I feel that there was a miss from our side; we completely forgot that there are like government, they call themselves a kind of a, uh, whatever they call themselves, it's not even an NGO, but they gave us that confirmation - that they will work like a independent entity...we didn't realize they will be unable to really do that "

The project was however successful in developing collective knowledge in the network that resulted in a positive externality. As soon as RHP came to a de facto halt, PRSP launched its own reproductive health program offered at the BHUs.

When asked about that program, a PRSP district support manager responded:

" Yes, they're part of the reproductive health services directly by PRSP - basically within the products of the basic health unit. Like the we have deliveries at the basic health unit, maternal healthcare, prenatal/ postnatal healthcare, and immunizations, immunization of mother, vaccines."

On the other hand, the project created a negative externality by making Packard Foundation wary of collaborating with public sector organizations. The Packard

Foundation executive described it as follows:

" we are exhausted because, as I told you, this is the project that we invested so much of our efforts, but we still have a very large portfolio, we have like twenty grantees, and if you evaluated one grantee, it's taking away so much of our time....And we really worked hard to make it a success....But who could have known: the bureaucracy, the transitions, the changes, the slow pace, the very slow spending and you know despite several suggestions and technical assistance from our side, we did not see the acceleration that we thought we would see."

The above analysis is summarized in Table 18.

	Basic Health Project	Reproductive Health Project
Goal Achievement As Measured	High	- High (Quantitative Goals) - Low (Qualitative Goals)
Goal Achievement As Perceived	High	- High (PRSP Employees) - Mediocre (Packard Foundation Leadership)
Donor Satisfaction	High	Low

Externalities	Positive	Both Positive and Negative
Development of Shared Learning, Values/ Partnership Experience	- Positive in development of shared values and learning - Pleasant partnership experience	- Positive in development of shared values and learning - Unpleasant partnership experience

Table 18: *Factors pointing to success or lack of success*

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the findings from the evidence with some degree of analysis. However this analysis was focused mainly on organizing the findings in a manner that will make it easier to link those to theory. This chapter takes the analysis further and attempts to generate theoretical propositions from empirical observations.

As warned by Yin (2009), this is the most uncertain yet extremely important part of a case study research. He encourages the researcher to eliminate any alternative theoretical explanations of observed phenomenon. According to Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), inductive research done through case studies is often provides incomplete theory. At best, it offers a set of theoretical propositions that explain parts of the observed phenomenon related to the research question and can be tested in future research.

With this in mind, I focused my final analysis on identifying a small number of testable theoretical propositions that offer the best possible answer to my research question. Moreover, the analysis was limited to those theoretical propositions that

could effectively be challenged by an alternative explanation from theory. The analytical strategy involved isolating sub-phenomena pertinent to the research question that could be observed in both the case studies. For each pair of sub-phenomena, at least two theoretical propositions were identified that seemed to explain the comparison and contrast between the case studies. Among those, the proposition that seemed to better explain the sub-phenomenon and stayed robust across the replication logic was chosen as the emerging theoretical proposition.

In a number of situations presented by the evidence, the emerging theory found organizational power as a key factor shaping the turn of events. The alternative propositions usually stipulated that the observed changes were due to virtues or vices of the network structure. In most cases the analysis did not find the total defeat of alternative theory against the emerging theory. The theoretical propositions therefore reflected the theoretical position that bore more weight of the explanation.

The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the contribution of this research to theory including avenues for future research. I have also provided my comments the key opportunities and limitations faced by this research project.

Success of Public Service Public Private Partnership

As discussed in the previous chapters, success of public service public private partnerships (PPPs) is a complicated concept. Since PPPs are essentially problem solving networks, a simple demonstration of their success will be the eradication of the targeted problem within the duration of the partnership project. However, that is often not the case. Most public service problems are "wicked" problems and cannot be completely rooted out no matter how elaborate the PPP design is.

Success, in the simplest of ways, can then be measured by achievement of specific milestones set at the beginning of the project and amended during its course.

While the achievement of milestones marks the success of a public service PPP, inability to achieve these does not necessarily point towards its failure. Since the PPP is not set up to completely eradicate the problem or completely solve it, the milestones are arbitrarily decided by the decision makers based on past experiences and speculations about the future. Therefore, when a PPP is not able to achieve all of those milestones, it can be due to bad performance by the collaborators, but it can also be due to the fact that the milestones were not reasonable or comprehensive in the first place.

A public service PPP might be able to make impact in areas that were not captured by the official project goals. These unintended outcomes, that I refer to as "externalities" of a PPP, can also point to the success or lack of success of a

PPP in serving its public purpose. An interesting example of these complexities were observed in the Reproductive Health Project (RHP). The network was clearly not able to meet the milestones set for it in the project proposal and subsequent progress reports. However, none of the collaborators was willing to call it a failure even though both key collaborators showed a lack of interest in pursuing it any further. This meant that while the network was not able to achieve its intended goals, it definitely had been able to achieve some success that albeit unintended was of value to the collaborators.

Similarly the way a PPP builds capacity of its collaborators through shared values and mutual learning, also nurtures a feeling of success by actors within and outside the PPP. By building capacity of its collaborators, a PPP can create a solution of the targeted problem that can sustain the end of the partnership, again showing well recognized success in serving its public purpose. In case of RHP, this capacity building was observed in the fact that even though the partnership had effectively stopped its operations, Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) was providing reproductive health services on its own. That way the PPP was able to serve its public purpose of providing reproductive healthcare even beyond the life of the project. This can be seen both as a positive externality and as an example of shared network learning.

Another complexity in this regard can be summarized as satisfaction of the collaborator whose decision was responsible for the creation of the network in the first place. In the case of a PPP, this organization is almost always the donor

agency. Since the donor agency has control over the life of the project, it will be safe to assume that BHP continue to maintain its success as long as the Government of Punjab considers it successful. And RHP stopped pursuing success because the David and Lucille Packard Foundation (Packard Foundation) stopped seeing it as viable.

So an analysis of the evidence identified at least three factors that the success of a public service PPP depended upon. These included the PPP's ability to achieve its intended outcomes, the collaborators' perception of the success of the success of the PPP in serving its public purpose through goal achievement or externalities, the shared learning developed within in the network.

Proposition 1

The success of a public service governance network, implemented as a public private partnership is determined by its achievement of its intended goals, its ability to create positive externalities, its ability to generate positive network values, and its ability to satisfy its donor agency.

This proposition explains why BHP was seen so clearly as a successful project and why RHP suffered from a loss of interest by the collaborators, even though none of the collaborators was willing to call it an outright unsuccessful project. A case can be made that some PPPs will be bound to fail simply because the goals

identified by initial decision makers will either be impractical or ineffective in serving the public purpose. This objection, while valid, made for a detailed discussion on the quality of the PPP's intended outcomes at the point of its formation and is touched upon towards the end of this chapter. My study however dealt with the PPPs success at the time of its operation.

Power in Public Service Public Private Partnerships

As discussed extensively in Chapter 3, academic discourse on power in networks spans several disciplines and several theoretical paradigms. These paradigms, when generalized in the broadest possible sense, can be divided into two schools of thought. These include the views of power that treat it as a characteristic of an actor in a network, and others that treat power as a function of the network structure or the social structure on which the network is based.

It was predicted in chapter three that power in public service PPPs will be observed in several different shapes and forms. In some cases, power would be encountered as acquired and used by the network actors and in other cases actors within the network will appear to be in positions of power based on their location within the network structure. In either case, it was expected to observe the use of this power to achieve organizational goals. Hence, the use of power to achieve goals i.e. organizational power, was expected to be observed regardless of how

the actors were able to get access to the power. It was also expected to encounter the effects of invisible forms of power, i.e. power that will not be seen as actively used in politics by the actors but will limit or enhance the power of different actors.

Upon the analysis of the evidence, all these predictions were found to be true. Power was clearly observed as a function of the collaborators. For example, in the case of BHP the Government of Punjab had the coercive power to resume or terminate the network. This coercive power was accumulated by the government of Punjab by its control of the public funds required for the running of the project. Another source of coercive power was the formal authority it had over the local governments that were responsible for partnering with PRSP. On the other hand, PRSP had expert power in both of the projects. The source of this power was PRSP's managerial capital, its outreach in rural Punjab and its ability to circumvent bureaucratic red tapes prevalent in formal government agencies. The district support managers as well as the Project Coordinator for Reproductive Health possessed considerable referential power. The source of their power was their network management capabilities, reputation of their training, and their professional relationships with organizations that formed the immediate environment of both networks.

In RHP, Packard Foundation had coercive power being the sole donor for the project. However its internal policies did not allow for any direct intervention into the project including any immediate termination of funding. Packard Foundation

therefore had power but no political potential. Its coercive power was also relatively lesser than the Government of Punjab because the Government Punjab was not only the sole donor for BHP but also the sole donor for PRSP itself.

The role of power as a function of the network structure was also equally clear during the analysis of evidence. While the referential power of the district support managers was evident, the sources of this power were shared by employees of the provincial government, the local government, as well as PRSP. However, what set them apart as significantly powerful collaborators was their position in the network structure.

The BHP was operating in an environment that had considerable potential for adversity from influential members of the community. These people, usually large land owners, that had previously enjoyed unbridled control over the Basic Health Unit (BHU) resources. Some of them were even using the BHUs as their cattle stables. In order to deal with these intrusions, the BHP had to rely on a number of organizations outside the network. And the district support managers were responsible for this network boundary spanning. They had to make sure that the law and order agencies were providing adequate security to the BHU premises. They also had to make sure that the district governments were not withholding funds required for the BHU operation based on any personal or organizational grudges. So, their position in their network not only empowered the district support managers, but also gave them an opportunity to engage in politics to deal with strategic contingencies faced by the network from its environment.

Similarly in RHP, the project coordinator for reproductive health had expert power by being the only reproductive health expert on the PRSP side. The project coordinator also had referential power and due to an established reputation in the reproductive health sector of Pakistan. However what made this person critically powerful in RHP was its position in the network structure. As observed in the evidence, the two major collaborators of RHP, Packard Foundation and PRSP, suffered from a lack of understanding of each other's organizational culture and expectations from each other. This lack of understanding was the source of major strategic contingencies for both organizations. The position of the project coordinator was the only one that could respond these contingencies by deciphering the communication within the network. So the position in the network empowered the incumbent of the project coordinator's seat way beyond the power acquired through individual characteristics.

Finally, while invisible forms of power, by definition, cannot be observed directly, their effects can definitely be felt upon an analysis of evidence. For example, in the case of BHP my theoretical framework predicted that the community served by the BHUs will have some form of reward power within the network. However such power was neither observed as a characteristic of the community nor it was observed in the position of community within the network. This absence of power then can only be explained by what authors like Bacarach and Baratz (1962), Grewal (2008), Lukes (1975) refer to as the "invisible power" or "agenda setting power". This kind of power, while not visible in the active

operation of an organization, allows a powerful actor to give power to or take power away from other organizational actors.

The government of Punjab was able to exercise this invisible power by its control over the structure of the BHP. The network had no formal room for the community's voice to be heard. This way, the Government of Punjab disempowered the local community in BHP. In a similar way, the Government of Punjab was able to limit the potential of the district government to intervene in the operation of the network. This was done by making a network structure that made the district governments in charge of operational funds but with little ability to actually terminate the operation of the network.

Proposition 2A

Power in a public service PPP comes from the individual characteristics of the collaborators as well as their position in the network structure.

Proposition 2B

The donor agency of a public service PPP has the ability to empower or disempower collaborators by controlling the network structure at the time of its formation.

Proposition 2C

Power in a public service PPP is only effective when the powerful collaborator is in a position to engage in organizational politics. i.e. use its power to pursue its individual goals regardless of the goals of other collaborators.

Power and Success

The analysis till this point developed an understanding of the dynamics of organizational power and politics in the formation and operation of public service PPPs. A discussion on different aspects of success in PPPs along with the measurement and causes of their success or lack thereof was also now complete. It was therefore time to address the research question directly.

Proposition 2B established that the structure of a PPP is one of the key determinants of power of its collaborators. However it still needed to be explained whether the success of the PPP is dependent entirely on the structure and formal management of its various functions, or if power and politics play a role in this success. The emerging theory suggested that power plays a very important role in making a PPP successful. The rival theory on the other hand suggested that the success or lack thereof in a public service PPP can be completely explained by its structure and management mechanisms such as monitoring and evaluation.

In the case of BHP, the success of the network could be attributed to its structure and monitoring and evaluation systems. The PPP followed almost the exact same structure as outlined by the pilot project. The intended goals of the project remained unchanged through years of operations and the project expanded without having to change its model. Evidence shows that BHP was consistently successful despite several changes in its top management even though leadership by visionary public service veterans of Pakistan, was considered a key factor in the establishment and initial success of the project. Similarly it was initially assumed that civil service trained officials were critical for network management of BHP. However the network stayed effective even when a PRSP employee became network manager with no training in the civil service of Pakistan or any other public institution.

All these observations from the evidence may point to the conclusion that the success of the network was due to its structure with little room for organizational politics. However when the success of BHP is contrasted with the relevant lack of success of RHP, it becomes evident that the structure of a network and its monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms cannot ensure its success. RHP had considerably stronger M&E tools compared to BHP which was being evaluated by an organization external to the network, and the network was not contractually obligated to uphold a strong performance on those evaluations. RHP's progress indicators on the other hand were built into its project proposal. Evaluations of these progress indicators were a key component of the project's

consideration for continuation. Similarly, the structure of RHP was almost identical to BHP with the added benefit of having a smaller number of bureaucratic procedures involved with the disbursement and allocation of funds. Despite these structural advantages, RHP was unable to enjoy the success or resilience enjoyed by BHP.

This difference in success can be explained by how power was discovered and used in both networks. In the case of BHP, there were a number of powerful collaborators in the network. The most powerful of those were the government of Punjab, PRSP, and the district support managers. Evidence shows that all of these collaborators had goals in complete alignment with the intended outcomes of the network. That is, the improvement of the service provided at the BHUs as measured by Punjab Health Sector Reform Program (PHSRP). So each of the powerful collaborators, while using politics to pursue its own goals, was actually pursuing the network's goals ultimately. This convergence of goals resulted in the success across all dimensions identified by Proposition 1.

The RHP on the other hand had four powerful collaborators, i.e. the Packard Foundation, the project coordinator for reproductive health, the district support managers, and PRSP. Out of these collaborators, PRSP wanted to add reproductive health capabilities to the BHUs so its goals were fairly aligned with the network's goals. The district support managers wanted to perform strongly on the objectively verifiable progress indicators agreed upon in the project proposal. The project coordinator for reproductive health was expected to pursue the

subjective yet equally important progress indicators representing the expected outcomes of the project. Finally, the Packard Foundation had the organizational goals seem as the expected outcomes of the network, i.e. improved progress on both objective and subjective goals of the RHP.

Out of these powerful collaborators, the Packard Foundation, due to its non interventionist organizational policies, was not able to exercise politics. The project coordinator for reproductive health was a position that got vacated early in the life of the project. So even though this position had considerable power, it was unable to engage in politics due to human resource issues. The sum total of power in the network was therefore represented by the district support managers who steered the network in the direction of the objectively verifiable progress indicators only. Therefore, due to the imbalance of politics, the project proceeded in a direction where it was destined to lack achievement on a whole dimension of its intended outcomes. The organizational tensions arising from this imbalance resulted in the negative externalities and the lack of shared values and learning that are often by-products of a successful network.

Therefore, while a solid network structure explains the success in one of the networks, rule of power and politics proves to provide a robust explanation that holds even when their logic is replicated in case of a lack of success.

Proposition 3

A public service PPP tends to pursue goals converged upon by the sum total of its politically active collaborators. The PPP is successful if its net political direction is towards its intended outcomes.

The Role of Leadership and Personal Influence in PPP Success

Any implementation of network governance involves not just organizations as collaborators but also groups and individuals. It might therefore be important at this point to discuss the role of individual influence and leadership in the success of public service PPPs. As described in the evidence, both BHP and RHP were formed after the leadership of PRSP pitched impressive project proposals to the government of Punjab and the Packard Foundation respectively. The theory discussed in chapter 3 had predicted that the role of leadership and personal influence may play some role in the success of public service PPPs. While evidence showed that leadership and personal influence had an important role in the formation stages of these networks, these had little to do with the resilience or operation of the network. This is evidenced by the fact that neither of the projects experienced any major deterioration after the departure of their initial leadership. It can therefore be concluded that individual leadership can play an important role in designing the structure of a public service PPP, hence manifesting in the power described by Proposition 2C. However these were not found to have any direct effect on the success of the network. This is perhaps because the self governing

nature of the governance network necessitates a form of leadership that is indirect in nature. According to Denhardt & Denhardt (2011), network leadership is focused more on developing network competencies and values shared by the collaborators, as opposed actively steering them.

Donor Control over PPP Success

The term Public Private Partnership has its roots in the theory and practice of urban infrastructure development. In that discourse, PPP is often seen as a unique outsourcing model in which government and non government actors join forces to develop some form of public infrastructure while sharing the risks of infrastructural investments. PPPs are seen as project based problem solving organizations with very clear goals and time frames, and can be controlled tightly by the government agencies that granted the project to private parties. Using the same term, in public service delivery would make one assume that the government agency, or any donor agency for that matter, would be able to enjoy the same level of control. However, the evidence revealed that such was not the case. The Packard Foundation, despite having complete financial control on the RHP, was not able to steer the network in its intended direction.

As discussed earlier in this section, the donor agency in a public service PPP has the unique ability to design the structure of the project. This allows the donor

agency to select the collaborators that will have more powers than the others in the network. Another unique ability that the donor agency has in a public service PPP is the ability to define the goals of the network. The Packard Foundation in RHP provided the project with a set of goals as seemed fit based on its organizational goals as well as its assessment of the situation of reproductive health in rural Punjab. However, at the time of the formation of the project, it was not sure if those goals will be understood by the organizations it was going to partner with. It attempted to mitigate that risk by insisting on the appointment of a reproductive health specialist by PRSP to oversee the RHP, which did not prove to be a sustainable strategy. The reproductive health experts felt alienated in the PRSP's government-like environment and kept quitting their jobs, leaving the position permanently vacant eventually.

In the case of BHP on the other hand, where the government of Punjab was the chief donor organization, the donor agency was fully aware of the organizational cultures of its collaborators. So BHP was given goals that were understood and acknowledged not only by the implement collaborator, PRSP, but also by the monitoring and evaluation teams of PHSRP. This sharing of goals and vision was ensured by the government of Punjab's insistence on staffing PRSP in general and BHP in particular by civil service trained officials.

Packard Foundation was leading a network whose collaborators did not share or understand its intended outcomes from the project. Therefore, the only option Packard Foundation had was to engage in organizational politics that would steer

the network towards the pursuit of its intended outcomes. The chances for its success were high given by the considerable coercive power Packard Foundation had over the network. However, due to organizational policies and a general lack of interest in the later years of the project, Packard Foundation failed to engage in these politics. For example, when the position of the project coordinator for reproductive health got vacated the lack of understanding between PRSP and Packard Foundation became obvious. Packard Foundation at this point could have used its coercive power to force PRSP into hiring a new project coordinator, or better still, fill the position directly with someone it trusted. Given the critical nature of the job, it would have made sense for the Packard Foundation to insist on the creation of a small department consisting of reproductive health experts instead of just one position. That way the departure of one employee would not have caused a communication breakdown within the network that appears to be significant in its lack of success.

Proposition 4

In order to make sure that a public service PPP follows its intended outcomes, a donor organization has to either (a) actively engage in politics; (b) select goals that are fully understandable to its powerful collaborators, or (c) select collaborators that fully understand its goals.

Discussion

Contribution to Literature

My research started by identifying a plausible theoretical framework, based on an extensive literature review on public private partnerships, public administration, network governance, organizational theory, and the concept of power and politics. The case study method was chosen to collect and analyze the evidence and an inductive reasoning approach was employed to link the empirical evidence to theory in the form of testable theoretical propositions. However, upon completion, every social science research study is faced with the much dreaded, "So What?" question. Regardless of how creative the research question was, how skillfully the research was conducted, and how valid the research findings are, any research study is as good as the contribution it makes to the theoretical literature and its discipline.

I touched upon the theoretical significance of the research question in the introduction and methodology chapters of this dissertation. I strongly believe that the role of organizational power and politics in the success of a public service PPPs is critical to the study of network governance and the study of public administration in general. As discussed at several points in this dissertation, the concept of power and politics in network governance is considered a major topic in the field. Despite a number of questions presented by leading authors in the

field on the significance on the study of power and the need to conduct research on it, little to no theoretical insight is available in the extant literature on the topic.

In addition to this, while the organization theory literature presents some high quality research on organizations involving private sector networks, not much literature is available on multi sector organizational networks. Similarly, while both theoretical and practical literature is available on PPPs, most if not all of theoretical studies deal with the partnership between government and business organizations. The availability of the above mentioned literature might lead one to believe that this literature provides us with enough theoretical insight to understand power in PPPs involving government and nonprofit organizations.

This however was not found to be the case upon further investigation. Rufin & Rivera-Santos (2012) goes at length to explore differences between business to business (B2B) organizational networks as opposed to public private partnerships. They conclude that the governance models for PPPs will be very different than the B2B governance models.

This dissertation therefore makes its contribution to two disciplines related to Public Administration. For the Organizational Theory literature, it explores the power dynamics of organizational networks that involve multi sector organizations especially the public and nonprofit sectors. For Network Governance, It also attempts to answer the question of power which, according to Agranof & Mcguire (2001), is one of the "big" questions in the discipline and which to this day remains largely unaddressed, let alone unanswered.

Further Research: What was NOT Studied?

While this research study was successful in generally answering its research questions, there are a number of questions on the topic of success of public service PPPs and the role of power in the success or lack thereof, that has not been addressed. For example, this study has focused primarily on the success of the operation of these PPPs, it has not addressed the formation of these PPPs as a response to the public service problems addressed by them.

The study, in its attempt to deal only with politically active collaborators, did not collect data from all stakeholders involved in the solution presented by the PPP. An analysis of evidence suggested that formation of these PPPs was not accepted by all stakeholders critical to these projects. While both of the project case studies dealt with health sector projects, no input from health experts was observed in formation of either of the projects, neither were doctors or other medical staff given any voice in the operation of the project.

This approach backfired in at least a couple of districts of the Punjab province where doctor's associations sought legal recourse to counter the deployment of BHP in their districts. These doctors complained that while their jobs were previously guaranteed by the government of Punjab, handing their services over to a non government organization, meant that they would not be able to enjoy the benefits and job security they use to enjoy in government service. This problem

was also non-existent in the beginning of the project where the wages paid by BHP were considerably higher than the wages paid to regular government appointed doctors. However, after a number of reforms in the Public Health Sector throughout Pakistan, this salary differential was considerably low and the doctors had less incentive to work for BHP.

Another factor questioning the formation of these public service PPPs, in their current form, arises from the challenges to the quality of solutions provided by these initiatives. More often than not, the milestones given to a PPP project in public service are conceived by the decision makers based on their own analysis of the situation and their problem solving skills. A major disagreement between Packard Foundation and PRSP was based on the fact that none of the BHP goals dealt with the quality or effectiveness of the services provided at the BHUs. This concern also resonated in interviews of ex-PRSP employees that had some experience in Pakistan's health sector.

A future study exploring the formation of public service PPPs, and the quality and effectiveness of their goals will help improve the understanding of success partly explained in this study. Another avenue for future research can be undertaken by increasing the number of cases added to the replication logic. According to almost all academic authors that specialize in inductive research involving case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perry, 1998; Yin, 2009), increased number of cases considerably enhances generalizability of the findings of a study and strengthens the validity of its results.

As discussed by Eisenhardt (1989) and revisited by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) a successful inductive study results in the creation of testable theoretical propositions. While discussing avenues for future research, it is important to suggest the ways in which these theoretical propositions can be tested upon further research.

These propositions can be tested in the same way in which new cases can be added to the research, i.e. deductive studies can be conducted on networks that are formed by the same donor organizations in other public policy areas. For example, irrigation is a sector where government of Punjab has a long running project with the World Bank and local communities. Test cases can also include the role of other rural support programs in reproductive health. For example, Packard Foundation is has a long history of conducting successful projects with the National Rural Support Program of Pakistan. Other deductive studies can be conducted in similar settings in other countries where government organizations are partnering with non government organizations and international donors to form public service PPPs.

Limitations

The replication logic for this study consists of only two cases. The cases enjoyed a high potential for comparison and contrast resulting in a very strong replication. However, addition of further cases into the replication logic might bear results

different than the study, even though chances of the occurrence is relatively low. As with all qualitative research projects, time was another limitation for this project as some respondents had to be dropped because of unavailability within the few months allocated for data collection for this project. These potential respondents were mainly key political figures from Pakistan that had been involved in the formation of PRSP and had pioneered the BHP.

The major limitations of this project however were in the inductive nature of this study. As noted by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), deductive case study research is not capable of providing detailed theory. Its main contribution is in the form of theoretical propositions that bridge the gap between the theoretical and the empirical to some extent. The theoretical propositions developed here answer the research the research question which, as discussed in chapter four, is a critical question in the field of network governance. However they still leaves a number of related questions from the field unanswered. Future research suggested above will help significantly in developing a consolidated understanding of topics surrounding but not covered by this study.

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APPENDIX A
GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Interview Guide

Introductory Statement

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. Your experience and insights are very important for my research. Before we begin the interview, let us go over the informed consent form that outlines your rights and my responsibilities with respect to your participation.

Please let me know whenever you need to take a break and I will stop the recorder and we can continue when you are ready. Again, it would be very helpful to us if you can offer as much information as possible in answering each question. Do you have any questions or concerns before we start?

I - Understanding the Project

Question 1: Can you briefly describe the history of the Public Private Partnership project that you are involved with?

Probes:

- Can you elaborate more on how the partnership was formed?
- Who took the initiative to form the partnership?
- Which organization was responsible for deciding the goals of the project and related timelines?
- Can you elaborate more on the objectives of the program?
- Is this program following some documented policies?

Question 2: What is the importance of becoming a part of the PPP for your organization?

Probes:

- What benefits were perceived from forming this particular alliance as compared to going with other government or nonprofit organizations?
- What benefits have been received?
- Did you have some fears regarding this transition?

II - Operation of the PPP

Question 3: What is the management structure of the PPP?

Probes:

- What are some of the resources and barriers that you have experienced in the implementation of your PPP goals?
- Can you identify leaders or pioneers, whether individuals or groups, who have played key roles in making the PPP work?
- What were the most powerful positions in the partnership, and what in your opinion were the sources of their influence?
- How was your organization maintaining its oversight on the project?
- What kind of investments did your organization make for the project?

Question 4: What progress has the program made so far?

Probes:

- What are the milestones that have been achieved so far?
- How did the operations and outcomes of the partnership compare to the initial objectives.
- What were some of the most significant challenges that were faced in achieving the objectives?
- Were there challenges related to the interactions of partner organizations?
- Were there challenges within the organization of the project (such as budgetary or human resource/management/leadership issues)
- Were the initial goals changed to adapt to the situation on ground in the face of the challenges?

III - Impacts

Question 5: How is the success or failure of the program formally measured?

Probes:

- What is the program evaluation process?
- What kind of progress indicators do you use?
- What are your impressions about the effectiveness of the program?
- Would you call the project a success?
- Would you call the partnership a successful experience?

Question 6: Do you feel all stakeholders involved in the PPP benefit from its success?

Probes:

- Who are the key stakeholders? Are there any major stakeholders that are not formally parts of the PPP?
- Which stakeholders in your opinion benefit most from the success of the PPP?
- Which stakeholders in your opinion have to make compromises to be part of the PPP?

Question 8: Has the PPP developed shared goals and values that hold it together beyond the benefits that each participant derives from membership?

This concludes my last question for this interview. Thank you very much for your time. Do you have any questions for me?

APPENDIX B

EXEMPTION LETTER FROM ASU IRB

To: James Svava
UCENT

From: Mark Roosa, Chair
Soc Beh IRB

Date: 04/17/2012

Committee Action: **Exemption Granted**

IRB Action Date: 04/17/2012

IRB Protocol #: 1204007729

Study Title: The Role of Organizational Power in the Success of Public Private Partnerships

The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the Institutional Review Board pursuant to Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 46.101(b)(2) .

This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by investigators in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

Abbreviation/Acronym/Short Form	Full Title/Explanation
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BHP	Basic Health Project (One of the two case studies)
BHU	Basic Health Unit
CMIPHC	Chief Minister's Initiative of Primary Healthcare
CSP	Civil Service of Pakistan
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DMG	District Management Group of the Civil Service of Pakistan
DSM	District Support Manager
EDO	Executive District Officer
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccinations and Immunizations
HMP	Her Majesty's Prisons, United Kingdom
LHV	Lady Health Visitor
MRM	Monthly Review Meetings

NAO	Network Administration Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPM	New Public Management
NPS	New Public Service
PA	Public Administration
Packard Foundation	The David and Lucille Packard Foundation
PFI	Public Finance Initiative
PHSRP	Punjab Health Sector Reforms Program
PPMR	Public Policy and Management Review
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRSP	Punjab Rural Support Program
PSU	Project Support Unit
RHP	Reproductive Health Project (One of the two case studies)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of

	Agriculture
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