

Citizen Evaluation of Local Government Performance and Service

by

Catherine McNamara

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved April 2012 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Nicholas Alozie, Co-Chair
N. Joseph Cayer, Co-Chair
Joanna Lucio

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

May 2012

© 2012 Catherine McNamara
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

Government performance and accountability have grown to be predominant areas within public administration literature over the last forty years. The research presented in this dissertation examines the relationship between citizen satisfaction and local government performance. Citizen review of service delivery provides vital feedback that facilitates better resource management within local government.

Using data from a single jurisdiction, two aspects of citizen satisfaction are reviewed. This includes citizen review of overall city performance, and citizen satisfaction with individual service delivery. Logit regression analysis is used to test several factors that affect citizen evaluation of service delivery in local government, while ordinary least squares regression is used to test the relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services.

The results generated four major findings that contribute to the scholarly body of knowledge and local government knowledge application. First, citizens who are predisposed to supporting the local jurisdiction are more likely to rate service delivery high. Second, customer service is important. Third, those who experience government services similarly will collectively react similarly to the service experience. Finally, the length of residency has an impact on satisfaction levels with specific services. Implications for the literature as well as for practice are discussed.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the loving memory of my grandparents, Joseph and Rita Fite, and James and Alma McNamara whose love and support I carry with me. To my parents, Danny and Judy, I am forever appreciative of the sacrifices you have made. Your support and encouragement has allowed me to turn dreams into reality. You have taught me to welcome the challenges life brings, hard work matters, to use courage when voicing a different view, and to always remain true to who I am. To my sisters, Maureen, Maryann, and Christine who keep me grounded by actively being my biggest critics and my strongest supporters. To my aunt and uncle, Robert and Cathy Funnell, I am truly grateful for of all of your support throughout the years. To my many friends who have provided tremendous encouragement, understanding, and kindness throughout this endeavor.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Dr. Nicholas Alozie, Dr. N. Joseph Cayer, and Dr. Joanna Lucio. Their commitment, encouragement, flexibility and endless support through this process has made this possible. In particular, I am indebted to Dr. Alozie's underlying belief and support in me. I took my first public administration course at Arizona State University from Dr. Alozie and I knew that public administration was the discipline I needed to become a part of. I am humbly appreciative for Dr. Alozie's teaching style, his critical guidance, his mentorship, his unrelenting work ethic, and his animated excitement towards research. Thank you, Nick.

I have been incredibly fortunate to have many influential teachers throughout my formal educational endeavors. I am grateful for my undergraduate professors Dr. Ted Schmidt and Dr. Michael Pendleton who set the foundation for my interests in economics and political science.

I am blessed to have incredibly supportive friends. In particular I'd like to thank Jan and Tracy McKelvey, Wayne Olin, Rachael Brown, Mary Timmons, Neil Davis, Jr., and my wonderful friends that have been with me since my days at Mount Mercy Academy. The support, reassurance, inspiration, and tough love I've received over the years from my family, friends, mentors, and alike has influenced who I am and allows me to remain humble and appreciative for having incredible people remain in my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
Research Questions.....	4
Organization	9
2 LITERATURE REVIEW	10
Personal Experience.....	10
Race / Ethnicity.....	17
Gender.....	21
Age	25
Neighborhood Effects.....	26
Government Structure.....	34
Infrastructure, Location, Privatization, and Contracting Out	38
Tax Base and Budget.....	42
Public Choice Literature	44
Tiebout	47
City – Size Interpretations	50
Homogeneity and Sorting.....	51
Capitalization	53

Migration.....	55
Micro-Level Data.....	57
3 RESEARCH DESIGN (METHODOLOGY)	65
Venue of the Research.....	65
Source of Data.....	68
Research Questions.....	73
Measurement of Variables.....	75
Analytical Models.....	75
4 FINDINGS.....	80
Profile of the Sample	80
Analysis.....	81
Testing Research Question #1 and Hypothesis.....	84
Testing Research Question #2 and Hypothesis	92
5 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	99
Implications for the Literature.....	101
Implications for Practice.....	109
Consideration for Further Research	114
REFERENCES	116

APPENDIX

A	Individual Service Frequencies	138
B	2002 Survey	146
C	2004 Survey	151

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Sample Statistics	80
2. Correlation Matrix.....	82
3. Citizen Rating of City's Overall Performance	83
4. Citizens' Ratings of Individual Service by Race / Ethnicity	83
5. Citizens' Ratings of Individual Service by Gender	84
6A. Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with City's Overall Ability to Deliver Services	86
6B. Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with City's Overall Ability to Deliver Services (Zip Code Results).....	87
7. Logit Regression of Effect on Satisfaction with City's Overall Ability to Deliver Services (Factoring in the Effects of Contact with City) .	91
8. Determinants of Citizens' Ratings of City Performance in Individual Service Areas.....	94

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Visual Analysis of Contextual Results for Service Districts	88

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines citizen satisfaction with local government services and performance. Two dimensions of citizen satisfaction are reviewed; one, citizen review of the overall city performance, and two, specific citizen satisfaction with individual service delivery. To examine this relationship, the City of Phoenix, Arizona is used as a case study. Because citizen evaluation of city performance remains a high priority on their agenda, Phoenix commissions a biannual survey to glean citizen review of government services and performance. These data are used to examine the relationship between citizen review and local government performance and service delivery. Chapter 1 provides a further description detailing why this relationship is important to understand and outlines the specific research questions.

Every day, citizens interact with local government willingly or not. Whether it is getting trash picked up on the correct day, getting the street plowed after a hard snow fall, going to the library to use the Internet, or paying taxes, local government is part of one's daily life. Given this interaction, it becomes necessary for government officials and bureaucrats alike to pay close attention to their citizen's response to local government service and performance. Citizen reviews can take on many forms including citizen opinion surveys, needs assessments, and program and policy evaluations. Ultimately, these reviews

factor into the quality of life aspect and can determine the health and longevity of a city.

Fundamentally, a citizen review provides necessary feedback that enables local government administration the opportunity to manage its resources – money, staff, time, or some combination thereof. For example, if a review of library performance data is excellent, and the citizen satisfaction with library services is also excellent, then local administrators can determine to keep current levels of resources (funding, staff, hours of operation) intact, or shift resources (give more or take away from) where needed.

The idea of government performance and accountability became relevant and increasingly more predominant to the public administration literature within the last thirty to forty years. Initially, this type of review centered on outcome performance measures (Brown & Coulter, 1983) Local governments could determine whether or not the service they were providing measured up to normative criteria, and/or national benchmarking standards. For example, in reviewing police services, a performance measure could include the response time to a call, the number of arrests, lower crime statistics, etc.

The late 1980's and 1990's saw a shift from performance outcome measures, to citizen satisfaction surveys. Arguably, this shift resulted from an increased focus on government accountability and the 'reinvention of government' (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Under this paradigm, a review of police services included performance outcome measures as well as the citizen

review of those services. For example, if you are Chief of Police and have excellent performance outcome measurements, yet the citizens still rank police services as poor, you have problems on your hand. Dissecting this information based on population, age, race/ethnicity, gender, income, neighborhood, etc. can exacerbate the problem.

Ultimately, cities compete to attract business, industry and people. The quality and caliber of such is determined by the performance and sustainability of that city to continue its growth and attractiveness. In present day terms, it is the difference of being Seattle, Washington, versus Detroit, Michigan.

Fundamentally, citizen input into government has always been part of the check and balance process. Ultimately, this review is actualized through the voting process of government officials. While a city manager represents the bureaucratic side of government, citizen accountability of government's performance remains at the elected official level; i.e., mayor, city councilman, judges, etc. Elected government officials then hold government bureaucrats accountable from the city manager down to the clerk level.

Part of the 'reinventing government' model included the outsourcing of many municipal services out to private contractors, based on the belief that private enterprises were more cost efficient. It also represents an alternative means of local officials for holding government bureaucrats accountable. The threat of outsourcing can 'rejuvenate' or motivate a lackluster department to reprioritize its efforts to carrying forth its mission.

The active role of a civil society adds legitimacy and is a crucial element towards the success and viability of democratic governments. Citizen participation is paramount to this process, and the opportunity for citizens to participate and vocalize their priorities within the community can become a determinant of how successfully that community develops. An examination of this relationship is robust in the literature – see Putnam, 1993 for further review.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

While it is important to review citizen evaluation of local government performance and service, a critical review of the following research questions yields specific attention to the uniqueness of demographic and community variables.

Question 1: What factors determine citizens' evaluations of local government performance and service delivery? In particular, to what extent do such evaluations hinge on personal experience with local government?

There are several veins within the literature that flesh out the role of personal experience. Seminal work by Michael Lipsky (1980) examines the importance of street level bureaucrats with respect to service delivery and performance. For example, a citizen's review of police service can squarely rest on one's personal experience. If one is stopped by a police officer and receives a ticket for a traffic violation, is the review positive because the officer was enforcing the law, or negative, because the individual experienced a negative consequence for one's personal failure to adhere to traffic laws?

How long does the positive or negative experience with a street level bureaucrat resonate and what is the long term effect? This specific question is difficult to answer but nonetheless plays a role in the determination and review of government performance.

Question 2: Does citizen evaluation of local government and service delivery generally differ from citizen evaluation of local government performance with respect to specific services?

The existing literature does not focus and call attention to this theoretical consideration. The idea here of course is that generally, specific services can have low satisfaction rates and yet not impact the overall satisfaction levels of city services. So what if the city's satisfaction level of "controlling street flooding" yields low levels of satisfaction – especially given that the annual rainfall in Phoenix is considerably low. In addition, specific sub-populations can rate specific services low, and yield the same effect; an overall high satisfaction with local government provision and delivery of services.

Taken together, this would seemingly yield what I would call the "good enough" effect of citizen satisfaction with the provision and delivery of services with local government. As long as the level of dissatisfaction with a specific service does not have a negative effect on the overall level of satisfaction, there is no motivation for local government to address the dissatisfaction because it ultimately doesn't have a net impact. This would hold true with sub-populations as well. This concept is similar to explaining full employment, whereby a

percentage of unemployment is accepted within the definition. It stands to reason then, if overall satisfaction with local government services is evident, there could also be a level of dissatisfaction with specific service delivery, but not to the extent that it displaces overall satisfaction.

Question 3: How does race/ethnicity factor into citizens evaluation of government performance and service? And, if so, how does it interact with factors such as actual service experience?

While race is a social construct, its effects continue to be experienced. Formally, over the last fifty years, much has been done in the form of public policy changes, yet, on an individual level, racism remains. *Race Matters* (West, 1993) brought the conversation of race to a popular mainstream audience. Within the introduction West discusses his personal difficulties experienced with local police within the Princeton University area. As a black man, he describes that he “didn’t belong” within that community and hence received special attention from police, despite being a university professor. West’s experiences are not unique by any measure.

Contextually, you don’t have to be black to know that race indeed matters. Within the urban literature, these experiences carry over in understanding if and how race/ethnicity plays a role in service delivery. While the literature demonstrates the relationship between race/ethnicity factoring heavily into neighborhood composition, this only explores the connection to residential segregation. Nevertheless, race and ethnicity remain as unique variables given

the individual human experience. This question remains important in determining whether or not race/ethnicity leads to a different service delivery experience.

Question 4: How does gender factor into citizens evaluation of government performance and service? And, if so, how does it interact with factors such as actual service experience?

Gender differences provide a unique assessment into service delivery. Traditionally, women have taken on the responsibility of child rearing and family management. This experience provides the foundation for having unique needs from government. Many veins within the gender literature focus on the differences in how men and women are socialized (Norris, 2003; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008) This socialization process coupled with individual experiences tends to align women with prioritizing different government services such as work force development, child care, services for the elderly, etc.

Question 5: How does age factor into citizens evaluation of government performance and service? And if so, to what extent does generational change impact citizen evaluation of performance and service?

Age and generational differences factor into government performance and service evaluation given variances within age-related needs. For example, younger residents (parents and children) may focus their interest on the city's ability to provide art and cultural programs, youth programs, after school programs, etc. Older residents may focus more specifically on their needs for assisted living, lower or fixed income housing, community center programs, etc.

These normative differences can play a role in determining funding provisions. For example, older residents may not see the value in the provision of youth programs and may petition to have the city impose fees to support these services rather than the allocation of tax revenue. Given voting blocs among the elderly, there may be political ramifications for service redistributions.

Question 6: How does context and shared experience within neighborhoods factor into citizen evaluation of government performance and service?

The distribution of government services across its various neighborhoods has been the subject of vast research for over thirty years (Lineberry, 1977, Rich, 1982, Hero 1986). Truly, this is the idea of “who gets what, when, and why.” In essence, this is an equity issue, that is, not all neighborhoods are created equal. Miller and Miller (1991) found that communities in which residents felt that they received the best services tended to be midsized with residents who were wealthier and were more likely to commute to a metropolitan job center.

Contextually, all citizens can attest to this notion. Does their trash get picked up first thing in the morning – are their neighborhood streets the first to be plowed – does their neighborhood library have the same hours of operation as the other neighborhood libraries? Are new services introduced in specific neighborhoods first, and why? To some extent, neighborhood preferences can contribute to service distribution. Also, neighborhood preferences can be derived from the composition of the neighborhood – that is, a more mature neighborhood may have stronger preferences for street repair and maintenance than a newly

developed neighborhood. Additionally, the residential segregation literature is compelling and offers a different view towards neighborhood composition. This lens continues to question whether or not neighborhood residency is a matter of choice, or necessity.

ORGANIZATION

Chapter two addresses a detailed review of the literature associated with the research questions. This review provides a theoretical foundation for understanding current paradigms related to citizens and local government. Chapter three addresses the methodology used. Discussion of the research design, research questions, data collection are included. Chapter four discusses the findings of the research. Four major findings are reviewed. Chapter five presents a discussion of the implications to both the literature and to practitioners with respect to the findings.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review provides an overview of the key areas that support broad knowledge with respect to local government and citizens. The literature assesses capacity of local governments to deliver services and includes aspects of government structure, privatization of services, and tax base. To gain a better appraisal of residential choice and location, a review of the public choice literature is examined. Taken together, the literature areas present a foundation to better understand the relationship between variables found within the research model.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

The ‘personal contact model’ examines the relationship between personal interaction and satisfaction with the government service. In other words, if citizens have a specific contact and personal experience using a service, generally, they are satisfied with their review of local government. Often, personal interaction is driven by need and is citizen initiated. That is, a person needs to register a vehicle and needs to interact with someone from the Motor Vehicle Department; or a person needs to have utility services turned on and therefore contacts someone from the city, or there is a need to have graffiti removed so a phone call is placed to the city’s graffiti hotline. Satisfaction can be derived from not only the service provided, but the quality of the interaction. This aspect is

normative in nature, and requires the citizen to review such qualities as friendliness, willingness to help, fair treatment, response time, etc.

As Hero and Durand note (1985), this model underscores the importance of Lipsky's (1980) "street-level bureaucrats" calling attention to the importance of personal interaction between citizens and those involved in the immediate delivery of public services. Brown and Coulter (1983) highlight the importance between the quality of the interaction between the street level bureaucrat and the citizen to reveal the satisfaction level. Lipsky's (1980) investigation also revealed that satisfaction with contact increases with age. Not surprising, Brown and Coulter (1983) found that satisfaction with police was related to satisfaction with response time and treatment by the police, correlating with age and income. Of the three models of citizen satisfaction with urban services assessed by Hero and Durand (1985), evidence supported the personal contact model and demonstrated the importance of interpersonal contact in influencing how citizens evaluate public services.

Satisfaction with specific municipal services can vary. Kelly and Swindell (2002) compared citizen reviews of their direct experiences with police, fire, emergency medical, and parks services to citizen reviews that did not have a direct use of the service. According to their findings, personal experience decreases satisfaction with police services and increases satisfaction with emergency medical and parks, and that personal experience does not appear to affect satisfaction with fire services (p. 101).

While personal interaction is a contributing factor within one's evaluation of government services, personal expectations and perceptions also contribute. Expectancy disconfirmation has been a dominant model of customer satisfaction within private sector consumer behavior studies, and accounts for both positive (performance exceeds expectations) and negative (performance does not meet expectations) experiences. The model views satisfaction judgments as determined – not just by product or service performance – but by a process in which consumers compare performance with their prior expectations (Van Ryzin, 2004). The discrepancy or gap between prior expectations and actual performance has been termed expectancy disconfirmation (Erevelles and Leavitt, 1992; Oliver, 1997; Yi, 1990 as cited in Van Ryzin, 2004).

Van Ryzin (2004) was the first to formally apply the expectancy disconfirmation model to public sector citizen survey data. The results from his study suggest citizen responses to urban services are more complex and are not just direct performance reviews. Perceptions of equity in the delivery of urban services can factor into overall satisfaction judgments. In the aggregate, this could have profound effects within neighborhoods that compete for services.

Citizen attitudes and belief systems contribute greatly to key aspects of trust in government, generally, and to one's political identity. Gamson (1968) emphasized political factors to assert that citizen trust in government is important because it enables governments to act without having to resort to coercion or the use of force for every decision undertaken. Aberbach and Walker (1970) assert

that the level of trust in government strongly influences the kind of policies and strategies available to political leaders. Indeed, legitimacy of political and administrative institutions and actors is based largely on trust (Christensen and Laegreid, 2005). Recent political uprisings continue to remind us and reinforce how important the concept of trust is to the legitimacy of political regimes and their ability to meet citizens' need for local services.

A deeper review of the literature surrounding the concept of public trust allows us to examine diffuse and specific support for a political system (Easton, 1965). Diffuse levels can be seen on an ideological level (people favoring large public sectors) and within structural legitimacy (rules and roles of those working in government). Generally, political and cultural factors contribute to diffuse support of trust in government. March and Olsen (1989) found that those who are interested or have participated within the political process have more trust in government because their engagement lends itself to a better understanding of the norms and values within the political-administrative system.

The concept of specific support encompasses process and output (Easton, 1965). The process concept addresses how the decision-making process is carried forth; i.e., the approach to problem solving, rules that are followed, the competency of government employees, etc. The output concept relates to the classic "who gets what" in politics. Overall, governments can have varying combinations of diffuse and specific support that yields different levels of trust. The literature does offer empirical examples whereby citizen satisfaction and trust

are positively correlated. Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and Immerwahr (2004) find strong links between overall satisfaction with public services at the local level and confidence in government. Yet, Van de Walle, Kampen, and Bouckaert (2005) provide evidence that this linkage may be more attributable to a general attitude toward government. Kampen, Van de Walle, and Bouckaert (2006) find that the impact of a negative experience with a public agency is much more pronounced than the effect of a positive one.

Public perception of political actors and bureaucrats as it relates to trust impacts citizen satisfaction levels and can promote levels of distrust. Aberbach and Rockman (2000) found that citizen needs and perceptions of what services should be provided vary, and impact levels of satisfaction. Clearly, what satisfies some may leave others dissatisfied. However, certain levels of distrust or skepticism are institutionalized within democratic systems toward political actors, knowing that those actors have motivations based on their own self-interests. This is actualized within democracies by providing opportunities for citizens to monitor and review the actions of institutions and of political actors (Warren, 1999). Christensen and Laegreid (2005) find that citizens are often skeptical toward the public sector when asked in general and abstract terms but relatively satisfied with more specific services. Recent evidence suggests that failing government performance is at the basis of distrust (Barnes & Gill, 2000; Bok, 2001). However, Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2003) assert that the link between performance and trust can only be made when specific conditions are present.

Distrust and skepticism can manifest into public cynicism and causes further forms of alienation and disengagement. Cynicism can include pervasive beliefs that government policies and public officials are corrupt, inept, and out to take advantage of citizens (Johnson, 1993). Berman (1997) found that cynicism was present in about one-third of all cities with populations over 50,000. In addition, cities that used frequent information, participation and reputation strategies experience less cynicism (Berman, 1997).

People's satisfaction with public services as related to trust can be seen in a broader or narrower performance perspective (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003). Over the last three decades significant literature has been generated which has examined the linkages between administrative performance, trust, and citizen satisfaction. Scholarly research generated in the 1980s examined local government performance through a "hard" and "soft" lens. Brown and Coulter (1983) and Parks (1984) defined performance data as objective (hard) and citizen satisfaction (soft) as subjective. Most scholars called for linkages between objective and subjective data, while practitioners were left on the fence receiving citizen evaluations that did not have direct ties to the political ramifications in which elected officials establish the priorities (Kelly & Swindell, 2002).

The *Report of the National Commission on Public Service*, commonly known as the Volcker Commission (1989) released its finding over the public's perceptions of government waste, corruption, and overall ineffectiveness within government. The commission warned that this general distrust undermines the

public service and in the long run could jeopardize the democratic process itself (*Report of the National Commission on the Public Service*, 1989, p. 12-13).

Countless examples of this sentiment have been actively refueling political campaigns as opponents market themselves as those who are going to ‘clean up the waste.’ A perceived performance gap between the public and private sectors pertains to quality and customer service as well as the efficiency of service delivery (Poister & Henry, 1994). Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the integration of ‘total quality management,’ ‘customer driven,’ and ‘continuous improvement’ made significant strides in the makeup of the public sector.

The 1990s ushered in a new line of thinking with respect to the operational accountability of government. Most noticeable, the New Public Management paradigm holds government performance and accountability as key variables to its literature. This entrepreneurial model was popularized by Osborne and Gaebler’s *Reinventing Government* (1992) and championed ten basic principles that included such reforms as public-private partnerships in delivering public services, customer driven-government, results orientated government, and community owned government to name a few. Osborne and Gaebler’s ten basic principles provided a new conceptual framework for public administrators and created the ‘citizen-as-consumer’ model whereby performance measurements were used to maximize service effectiveness and thus provide service performance improvements captured by increased consumer satisfaction. Adoption of this new model was evident throughout various levels of government, but gained

significant attention at the national level through Vice President Al Gore's National Performance Review (1993) which promised more streamlined government programs and services.

RACE / ETHNICITY

Cleavages within citizen satisfaction are evident using a race/ethnicity lens. Within society, race has been a powerful social construct. Race is a historically contingent, relational, intersubjective phenomenon – yet it is typically misbegotten as a natural, fixed marker of phenotypic difference inherent in human bodies, independent of human will or intention (Rumbaut, 2006). So, does race matter? Conventional wisdom still says yes, and over the years, academic scholarship has redefined the importance of race. This scholarship contains three distinct nodes: (1) historical analyses of the interaction between race and U.S. political institutions; (2) analyses of the class/race (or gender/race) nexus, especially in regard to the political economy of the American South; and (3) analyses of the impact of racial attitudes and racism on political beliefs and policy preferences (Manza, 2000). Indeed, the racial/ethnic dimensions and correlates of urban politics are and have long been numerous, varied, and interconnected (Hero, 2005).

Research generated during the 1960s and 1970s consistently revealed blacks less satisfied than whites with urban services (Durand, 1976; Rossi, Berk, & Eidson, 1974; Schuman & Gruenberg, 1972). This research taps into the broader and compelling question of what difference an increasing Latino

(Hispanic) population makes, focusing specifically on citizen satisfaction within public service delivery in local government. The subject has gained currency in light of the tremendous growth and geographic dispersion of the Latino origin population in the last two decades (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Concretely, the question has implications for the literature on Latino assimilation (Stone & McQuillan, 2007; Gimenez, 1998; Moran, 1997; Chavez, 1991), socioeconomic and political development (Dutwin, et al., 2005; Leal, et al., 2005; de la Garza 2004; 2001; Cavalcanti & Schleef, 2001), the racial/ethnic divide (Hispanic Business, 2006), and matters pertaining to inter-group relations in an increasingly multi-ethnic America (Huntington, 2004; de la Garza, et al., 1991). It is equally clear, at least in the short- to medium run that the most penetrating effects of Latino demographic change manifest at the immediate community level. In addressing this research domain, the general proposition is that Latino population growth will alter local service delivery either by the differential choice of Latinos or through Latino willingness to pay for services.

Because of residential segregation and discrimination, Latinos have experienced higher levels of poverty relative to Anglos (Santiago & Wilder, 1991). These factors equally account for inadequate public services relative to non-Hispanic whites (Claassen, 2004). While that deprivation has been both absolute and relative, the fact that most Latinos are aware that things could not only be better, but that they are actually superior “uptown” is the key to linking Gurr’s (1969) relative deprivation thesis to Latino demand for urban public

services. While Gurr and his contemporaries (e.g., King, 2003) examine relative deprivation and its linkage to political violence, other analysts articulate the significance of relative deprivation to group demand-protest (Fox, 2001; McVeigh and Smith, 1999; Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1986). Relative deprivation should broaden Latino demand for services, even if that means increasing taxes and other user fees. As Claassen has aptly noted, “a group that has experienced life with public services that lag qualitatively behind those available to Anglos is more likely to desire increasing social services spending” (2004: 617).

The relative deprivation thesis, critically pertinent to anticipating Anglo-Latino differences generally, is particularly germane to explaining those differences in Phoenix. Latinos now comprise 42 percent of the population of Phoenix (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). However, that population is fairly residentially segregated (dissimilarity index with Anglos=60%). When Phoenix switched from at-large to district election in 1983 (Luckingham, 1989), partly in response to demand-protest from the minority community, Latinos constituted 36.1 percent of Council District #8, 35.9 percent of Council District #7, and 16.2 percent of Council District #4 (The Rose Institute, 1983). In no other of the remaining five districts did the Latino population reach more than seven percent of the total. By 2000, Latinos had attained a majority in all three council districts, as follows: District #7, 63.5%; District #8, 58.6%; and District #4, 58.2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000b). Even with some of these seemingly “safe” majorities in place, Latinos still lack representation on the Phoenix city council. While a

number of explanations are pertinent here, including the recurrent theme of the legal status of many Latinos, their “newness” that makes networking difficult, their youthfulness and their lack of economic resources to cultivate and advance a coherent political agenda (de la Garza, 2004), the absence of Latino councilors at city hall in a city where Latinos now comprise almost one-half of the total population is most salient. Moreover, Phoenix’s council districts with heavy Latino concentrations lag well behind others on every quality-of-life indicator. Specifically, districts 4-5 and 7-8 are plagued by lower household incomes, lower educational attainment, higher unemployment, higher poverty levels, and lower property values and ownership.

Latino-focused research has underscored the particularly important implications of institutional design in determining political access for distinct segments of the American polity (Jones-Correa, 2005). Current institutional design provides limited Latino input towards the influence of policy decision making and can have strong implications towards the accessibility of municipal service delivery. In fact, it is now widely speculated that the next decisive political realignment will be orchestrated by the “rising Latino tide” (Leal, et al. 2005; Gimpel & Kaufmann, 2001).

Blacks (African-Americans), Latinos and other minorities share unique experiences that must not be overlooked when reviewing evaluations of government performance and service. A racial / ethnic diversity approach brings careful theoretical attention to emerging groups and issues in state and local

issues, given that a central characteristic of states is their racial and ethnic diversity; or lack thereof (Hero and Tolbert, 1996). While racial and ethnic diversity is important in itself, it may also be used to bridge economic, political, and cultural perspectives on state politics (Fitzpatrick & Hero, 1988, Dye, 1969). In addition, race plays a role in citizen satisfaction when neighborhood, socioeconomic status, and trust in government variables are controlled, especially in the case of police, fire protection, and parks services (Van Ryzin et al, 2004, p.625.)

GENDER

Social scientists exited the 20th Century attentive to the subject of the gender gap (see Carroll, 2003; Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001; Norris, 2003; Peterson & Runyan, 1999; Carroll, Dodson, & Mandel, 1991 for a more comprehensive review). While the breadth of scholarship spans the social sciences, the primary focus here concerns public policy orientation and gender variances. No matter how small the differences in particular policy spheres (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, 251; Burns & Schumaker, 1988, 1987) the notion that women are “different” is the primary fixture of gender scholarship and forms the nucleus of the gender research tradition (Burrell, 1997).

For political scientists, at least, the women-are-different paradigm appeared destined for an early demise given foundational debates on the bases of potential gender differences as well as sketchy data documenting actual gender disparities (see extensive literature cited in Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995,

252-254; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Pomper, 1975). However, all that changed in the late-1970s, early 1980s, with the emergence of compelling scholarship (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Githens & Prestage, 1977; Welch, 1977; Chodorow, 1974) which, presumably, anchored more firmly the sources of potential gender differences even in public life. Decidedly, where such gender differences were minimal, even doubtful, some analysts came to take them for granted (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995, 252-254).

Earlier research on gender differences in policy orientation was scoped out on a broad theoretical framework. It suggested that women are more liberal and progressive in their orientation than men. In time, it became apparent that this “straight-jacket” ideological framework is both too simplistic and inadequate for describing gender differences (Burns & Schumaker, 1987; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). As Burns and Schumaker (1987, 139) have explained, citing Jennings and Farah (1981: 473), Sapiro (1983: 153), and Baxter and Lansing (1983:57), this ‘single liberal-conservative ideological dimension implied gender differences on a wide variety of policy fronts notwithstanding the fact that women may be more liberal than men only on some specific policy concepts addressed in liberal or conservative ideology’. The premise is, to make any sense at all, investigations of gender differences must be grounded in the realities of men and women’s lives. For instance, it has been suggested for decades that men are more active politically than women. However, grounded research has clarified the true picture: it is now apparent that men are more active politically only to the extent

that the kinds of activities women typically engage are either not classified as “public” and “political” at all, overlooked, or dismissed altogether as “nonpolitical activity” (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

The particular rendition may vary, but the central theme on grounding gender research in the realities of men and women’s lives is unmistakable. Considering the literature in its entirety, the cleanest rendition would read as follows: from birth through adulthood, males and females are exposed to psychological and developmental stimuli that shape their experiences, worldviews, and social expectations differently (e.g., Blocker & Eckberg, 1989; Burns & Schumaker, 1987; Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; Sapiro, 1983). By design, men’s stimuli prod them, consistently, toward the model of the “economic man” fraught with power, competition, and economic rationality, the kind that promotes social Darwinism, market-based policies, and desires for government to be run like a “business.” Conversely, women’s stimuli channel them, systematically, toward nurturing, sharing, cooperation, egalitarianism and compassion, eventually making them likely advocates for what some Republicans in the late 1980s, and early 1990s dubbed a “kinder and gentler” dispensation.

To the extent that gender differences are anticipated on policy choices, the grounding approach expects those differences to be driven by these gender-specific stimuli, including how the sexes view the role of government generally, redistributive justice, use of force, public assistance, ‘compassion issues’ and community protection. For instance, Burns and Schumaker (1987, 138) found

women to be more supportive than men of public welfare and neighborhood protection against economic development and concluded that the “public-and-private-spheres” theoretical perspective (the grounding approach) provides a better guide than ideology to gender differences on local policy concepts. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986, 24) found that gender differences in preferences toward policies involving the use of force remained moderately large between the 1960s and 1980s and concluded that “the salience of issues has increased greatly for women, and as a result differences in preferences have increased in ways consistent with the interests of women and the intensions of the women’s movement.”

Scholars may have neglected gender differences in ideology in part because past research concluded that Americans do not think in ideological terms, that is, ideological identities are the product of political beliefs (Norrander & Wilcox, 2008). The conventional wisdom is that the gender gap in ideology has reversed from the 1950’s, whereby today women are more liberal than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Over time, men and women have had increasingly different views regarding key policy preferences. If policy preferences are the source of the gender gap, then the most likely causes of a gender gap in ideology are issues where there is a real and growing gender gap, such as attitudes toward the role of government in solving problems such as poverty (Kaufmann, & Petrocik, 1999). Kaufmann (2002) reported that for women, gender-specific issues such as reproductive rights, gender equality and equal rights for gays and

lesbians became more central to partisanship, whereas for men, social welfare issues continue to dominate their partisan ties.

AGE

Age of housing, population growth, extent of suburbanization and proportion of the population above 65 contribute significantly to the explanation of age segregation (LaGlory et al, 1980). Earlier research found urban elderly generally concentrating in central cities within areas that are older and have lower housing values (Zelinsky, 1966; Culter & Harootyan, 1975). Generally speaking, compared to renters, homeowners tend to move less often because they have greater financial and psychological commitments to their current residences. And, because families with children have a stronger desire for spacious living, they tend to prefer homeownership. However, as the family size later contracts, the need for space declines, thus the aged tend to prefer smaller and cheaper residential spaces (LaGlory et al., 1980). Earlier research confirms that the elderly have been a relatively non-mobile group who generally remain behind as neighborhoods change (Goldscheider, 1966). Additionally, LaGlory et al., (1980) found that residential segregation of the elderly was a function of the housing market, where small and/or fixed incomes reflected smaller housing options. New research examines the interaction of age amongst other variables in contributing to the explanation of continued residential segregation. Clark (2009) found that income and age play important defining roles in explaining the willingness of whites to move into racial/ethnically mixed neighborhoods.

NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS

Generally, a neighborhood may be defined as the aggregation of dwellings and the physical, social, political, and economic systems that bind these dwellings together (Connerly & Marans, 1988). The organization of the built environment, growth patterns, and local and historical traditions can affect how different racial/ethnic groups regard one another and are variables that contribute to neighborhood development (Lewis and Hamilton, 2011).

Much of the research gathered prior to the 1970s focused on the identification of the determinants of local policy outputs (Lineberry & Welch, Jr., 1974). While empirical measurement focused on per capita tax and expenditure levels, a call for redirection shifted focus to distribution. Lasswell (1948) began this discussion with his “Who gets what, when, and how” approach, while Easton (1965) fleshed out the issues around “authoritative allocation of values.”

The Kerner Commission (1968) cited inadequate distribution of urban services as a cause of many urban riots that took place in the mid-1960s. At that time, whether real or perceived, inequitable distribution and inadequate provision of services contributed to high levels of dissatisfaction with local government and reinforced feelings of alienation within certain populations (Lineberry & Welch, Jr., 1974). During this time period, inadequate urban service distribution underscored racial discrimination in many regions and has thus left a legacy for city managers to change. Lineberry and Welch, Jr., (1974) outlined and discussed three important dimensions that deter the collection of data with respect to

distribution of public services. These include output measurement problems of public services, choosing a distribution standard, and availability of the distribution data.

Research throughout the 1980s focused on objective and subjective measurements of service delivery and satisfaction (Brown & Coulter, 1983). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s the importance of citizen satisfaction became a ‘closing the loop’ practice for many municipalities (Miller & Miller, 1991; Van Ryzin, 2004, 2007). While much of the “who gets what, when, and how” had been answered, questions shifted towards how satisfied citizens are with what they are getting.

Today, an individual’s choice of residency is often determined by its proximity to available jobs, and affordable housing. State and local government policies frequently establish a community’s development by determining levels of job growth and development practices within the area. Specifically, local governments influence the location of business growth, distribution of tax and business support incentives, and infrastructure investment. These specific measures determine an area’s industrial locations and thus influence access to different types of jobs to which persons of different racial groups have access, and hence opportunities to earn higher or lower incomes (Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist, 1991; Martin, 1997; as cited in Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).

Further, resource allocation to neighborhood communities varies and can be influenced by citizen need, political influence, and community need. Lewis

and Hamilton (2011) found that levels of racial disparity in income and housing within regions may be related to underlying structures of government that mediate the distribution of local resources. While neighborhood composition can be influenced by variables such as zoning ordinances, neighborhood planning boards, impact fees, local sales and property tax, and private sector interest, ultimately, people from different social groups may or may not decide to live together. Nonetheless, the nation's history as well as the sociological evidence suggests that sorting people along ethnic, religious, or racial lines contributes to social and economic disparities (Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).

Historically, residential segregation has contributed to shared community experiences within each segregated community. Lewis and Hamilton (2011) suggest that residential segregation has been a more enduring social construct than has any particular set of public policies. Residential segregation can be defined as the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another in different parts of an urban environment. The most used measurement of residential segregation is the index of dissimilarity (Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Taeuber & Taeuber, 1965; and Massey & Denton, 1988). While this index holds no mathematical relationship to the minority composition of the population, it may have a behavioral relationship. (Lieberson, 1980). Nevertheless, residential segregation can be characterized as a multidimensional construct that has five dimensions; evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering and each having their own respective indexes.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, sharp improvements in racial attitudes among whites occurred. This timeframe also saw the development of a flourishing black middle-class. By the 1980s, more blacks than ever had access to the levels of income and economic resources that have permitted other groups to achieve spatial assimilation in American society (Massey & Denton, 1987). Finally, job creation and population growth of the 1970s flourished into suburban areas, often leaving minorities segregated into depressed inner-city neighborhoods (as cited in Massey & Denton, 1987).

Massey and Denton (1987) examined residential segregation trends of the 1970s and 1980s and attempted to account for interurban variation in segregation. Massey, White, and Phua (1996) analyzed Census data from 1980 and 1990 to replicate the 1980 study. The results yielded empirical validation of the five-dimensional scheme for determining residential segregation. Johnson, Poulsen and Forrest (2007) used Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000 to recreate the original Massey and Denton study. The results yielded unique findings for various racial and ethnic groupings. During this timeframe, a district pattern for African-Americans emerged. Unevenness, isolation, and clustering were evident throughout the period, however, whereas in 1980 concentration was linked to the unevenness dimension, in 1990 and 2000, it was closely linked to centralization (Johnson, Poulsen, & Forrest (p. 490.)

Immigration of racial and ethnic minorities' remains an important variable and its impact on residential segregation is two-fold. First it can stimulate

negative attitudes of natives towards immigrant groups, and second, it can create concentrated ethnic immigrant enclaves. For example, in 1900, about 80% of the U.S. foreign born were from Europe, but by 2000 this figure only represented 16% of U.S. foreign born immigrants (Timberlake et al., 2011). By 2000, over half of all U.S. foreign born immigrants were from Latin America, and over 25% were from Asia (Malone et al., 2003). Current scholarship remains interested in the spatial assimilation (Massey and Mullan, 1984) of immigrants which includes access to the suburbs (see Alba & Logan 1991; Logan & Alba, 1993; Massey & Denton, 1988; Schneider & Phelan, 1993). This theory posits that minority groups experience a process toward residential contact within a society's majority group in part by adopting the language and cultural practices of that group (Massey & Denton, 1985).

Beginning post World War II and throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Anglo suburbanization rates grew very rapidly, partly fueled by federal government FHA and VA programs that supported Anglo and suppressed Black suburbanization (Massey & Denton, 1993). These efforts supported what academic scholarship referred to as a “chocolate city” and “vanilla suburbs” (Farley et al., 1978). Timberlake et al., (2011) found that generally, Anglos are the most suburbanized racial/ethnic group, followed by Asians and Latinos, with African Americans lagging, although experiencing increasing rates of suburbanization since 1960 (p. 219). Studies that expanded Farley et al., (1978) examined residential preferences of racial and ethnic groups. This research

showed that African Americans preferred integrated residential settings, while Anglos preferred majority Anglo residential neighborhoods (Clark, 1991, 1992; Farley, Fielding, & Krysan, 1997). Hispanics and Asians also routinely express preferences for neighborhoods for which they are the majority presence (Clark, 2009).

More recent scholarship has pointed out that prior research considered racial groups as having economic homogeneity. Significant policy interest differences exist between low and upper income Blacks and Hispanics who may have different views on redistributive income or housing policies (Dawson, 1995). Lewis and Hamilton (2011) consider how patterns of residential segregation and opportunity are different for different income groups, and thus local government structure may have disparate impact on different income levels, even among a single racial group.

Neighborhood composition plagued by the residue of racial and ethnic segregation has influenced citizen evaluation of government performance and service. Studies that examine neighborhood satisfaction typically review one of two categories; individual household characteristics and/or neighborhood quality characteristics (Basolo & Strong, 2002). Individual household characteristics include standard SES factors including age, race, education, gender, marital status, children, tenure of residence, etc. Neighborhood quality can be defined through agents such as physical environment, access to various activity nodes,

local services and facilities and the neighborhood's sociocultural settings (Connerly and Marans, 1988).

The 'social access model' (Williams, 1971) explains the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and urban service delivery. Accordingly, residents who can afford to live in neighborhoods with higher levels of access to municipal services will have a greater value and review of local government. The literature has generated several studies that have reviewed this relationship – see Bolotin and Cingranelli (1983); Lineberry (1977); Antunes and Plumlee, (1977). Other studies have included examining the effects of both individual and neighborhood characteristics on citizens' evaluation of services (Durand, 1976; Lovrich & Taylor, 1976).

Lineberry (1977) suggested that neighborhood characteristics might lead to different service evaluations. Neighborhoods that boast low crime rates, exemplary schools, quality libraries and parks, and high property values, are highly sought after, thus creating a demand to be a part of that community. Once in, neighborhood pressures to conform can generate a united sense of community pride. Research indicates that neighborhood cohesiveness has an impact on citizen values of municipal services. For example, Brown and Coulter (1983) found that the belief that service is better in one's neighborhood, rather than in surrounding ones, makes a citizen more satisfied with municipal police service.

Physical and social disorder can negatively affect an individual's evaluation of satisfaction in one's community (Woldoff, 2002). Thus,

neighborhood satisfaction is typically seen as an important ingredient in a resident's quality of life; personal views of one's housing environment may affect the way one interacts within the community (Lu, 1999).

The inter-group contact hypothesis states that interactions among different groups will influence the attitudes and behavior between members of these different groups. This literature has examined two distinct forms; context and behavioral. The contextual contact literature finds that Anglos residing in areas with high concentrations of minority populations have significantly more negative attitudes toward minorities and minority based public policies than Anglos residing in areas with low concentrations of minority populations (Stein, Post & Rinden, 2000). Context here is the size of the minority population within a specific geographical area; i.e., neighborhood. This literature suggests that context exerts a stronger impact on Anglo attitudes towards Blacks than towards Hispanics and Asians. Forbes (1997) explains this finding as a function of cultural differences; that is, most Hispanics identify their race as Anglo, and this association narrows the cultural differences between Anglos and Hispanics as opposed to Anglos and blacks.

The behavioral contact literature finds that inter-group contacting among majority and minority populations significantly reduces prejudicial attitudes and opinions about minorities and minority based policies. (Stein, Post & Rinden, 2000). Based on a review of inter-group studies, Forbes (1997) concluded that "...liking and association go together..." that is, inter group contact often leads to

positive attitudes between groups. Variables contributing to this association include contact opportunities via work, leisure, residential, frequency of contact, etc. It stands to reason that the ethnic composition of a city or metropolitan areas determines the opportunity for inter group engagement.

Sigelman and Welch (1993) and Stein, Post, and Riden (2000) have examined the interaction of contextual and behavioral measures of the inter group contact hypothesis. Sigelman and Welch (1993) found that both contact and respondent perception of the racial makeup of the neighborhood are positively related to white and black attitudes and perceptions of race as well as black/white social relations. Stein, Post, and Riden (2000) found that the interaction between the behavioral and contextual measures of contact provides a more realistic test of the inter group hypothesis because it accounts for both individual behavior and the environment in which contact occurs. In addition, their findings concluded that contact facilitates contact, whereby the positive effect of interaction of behavioral and contextual measures of inter group contact demonstrates that contact can reduce the negative consequences of context.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

Local governments are determined by citizen preferences for their size and capacities. As Rubin (1998) explained, cities deliver services to citizens directly, which creates the image that taxpayers are spending money to buy the bundle of services they desire from localities. For decades, the academic conversation concerning the impact of government structure over municipal expenditure levels

has remained unsettled. Early literature established the linkage between local government structure and its fiscal policy, however, more recent contributions have suggested otherwise. Arguably, new and more complex forms of local government structures are contributing to this change. Nevertheless, the review of local government remains at the academic forefront given that it represents the most responsive level of government, that is, the most visible relationship between citizens and elected officials.

Over the years, analysis concerning the form of local government has been an area of vast study. Traditionally, these dichotomous forms of local government have been categorized into two primary structures; council-mayor, council-city manager. According to the ICMA Municipal Handbook (2010), the most popular form of government is the council-city manager form. Fifty-four percent (54%) of municipalities with a population between 5,000 and 250,000 residents are governed under the council-city manager model.

Extensive review over the political authority within local governments have focused on the relationship between institutional structure and fiscal spending (Booms, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978; Dye and Garcia, 1978). These initial contributions provided early empirical evidence that cities with council-manager structures spent less than their mayor-council counterparts.

Council-mayor cities are based on the concept of separation of powers where the council (legislative) and mayor (executive) divide the political

authority. The literature further reviews this structure by distinguishing the strength of the mayor. A strong mayor structure represents strong executive authority, whereby veto power over council actions and the authority to appoint and remove department heads are often actualized. A weak mayor structure represents a more disbursed and fragmented power structure between the mayor and council (Duvall, 1999; see Desantis and Renner, 2002 for further analysis of power arrangements within the council-mayor structure.)

Council-city manager forms consolidate political power exclusively to the council, who collectively hire a city manager to administer city operations. This dichotomy model of the politics-administration relationship assumes that local elected officials and appointed administrators bear separate responsibilities in the policy process: making policy and carrying out policy (Zhang and Feiock, 2009). Numerous studies have examined the dichotomy model to clarify and reveal the extent of policy formation carried out by city managers. Alternatives to the dichotomy model were developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Svava's dichotomy-duality model (1985) suggested that elected officials should dominate in the formulation of mission of local government and managers should exert control over the administration and management side. Svava (2006) describes the evolution of the dichotomy-duality model to a complimentary model, whereby "...administrators accept the control of elected officials and elected officials respect what administrators do and how they do it. At the same time there is interdependency and reciprocal influence between elected officials and

administrators who fill distinct but overlapping roles in policy and administration.” (p. 1081). The Montjoy and Watson (1995) model emphasizes the city managers’ policy making role. DeSantis and Renner (2002) assert that the council-manager arrangement can be further subcategorized based on the formal authority provided to the mayor by the city charter.

Today, local government structures represent more hybrid structures that are multidimensional (see Carr and Karuppusamy, 2010 for a detailed review of the literature) Newer approaches in measuring municipal structures are derived from the work of H. George Frederickson, Gary Johnson, and Curtis Wood (2004). Whereas previous efforts have focused on how to add categories to the mayor-council and council-manager forms, their approach is to identify a third form of government they contend is a blending of the two forms (Carr and Karuppusamy, 2010, p. 214) As such, Deno and Mehay (1987), Hayes and Chang (1990), Jung (2006) and Craw (2008) have provided analysis that shows no evidence to support the claim that municipal structure impacts local fiscal decisions. Carr and Karuppusamy (2010) reconfirm these more recent findings by also revealing the importance of social and economic context in explaining differences in city spending. Specifically, factors such as total population, per capita personal income and intergovernmental revenues are revealed as consistent predictors of per capita expenditures.

Local governments also operate in a very seemingly complex and multilayer system whereby various state level political and legal institutions

influence and constrain policymaking at the local level (as cited in Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008). Such constraints are tax and expenditure limitations (TEL) that can shift fiscal responsibilities from a local to state jurisdictions. A local government TEL is a restriction imposed by states on local governments (Shadbegian, 2003). Local government TELs tend to have a negative effect on local revenues and expenditures while stimulating state direct expenditures and grants to local governments (Fernandez, Ryu, & Brudney, 2008).

INFRASTRUCTURE, LOCATION, PRIVATIZATION AND CONTRACTING OUT

Public administration theory focuses primarily on the nature of the service, yet broader theoretical frameworks which focus on geography, economics, and planning allows for the consideration of the industrial organization and the structure of the market (Hefetz and Warner, 2011- see citation for detailed review of literature). When reviewing service delivery, municipal infrastructure is examined to determine the capacity in which services can be actualized, given its geographical size and population while remaining cost efficient. For example, a new city needing to establish fire and emergency services may determine that given its population, geographical size and location, it is cheaper to outsource the service in lieu of heavy operational costs, large equipment investments and other start-up costs. However, as the city's population grows, the city may plan when it is time to bring this service in-house.

Over the last thirty years, municipalities have implemented various means of privatizing the delivery of public services. This predominant theme of “new

public management' called for a shrinking of government size along with a strong reliance on market based services, which ultimately yields a presumably more efficient government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987). Nonetheless, the key variable assumed within market based services is competition, and lack of competition thus undermines a government's ability for cost savings.

To no surprise, rural governments have difficulties finding competitive market based solutions for the delivery of public services. Additionally, rural communities have lower public interest in service delivery and its smaller population size usually results in rural governments providing fewer services (Hefetz and Warner, 2011). Needing to gain economies of scale, often rural governments look to intergovernmental or interjurisdictional agreements as an alternative.

Other motivations factor into the privatization decision as well. These may include such aspects as government not having the expertise and/or experience in a particular service area, or the necessary equipment to perform a service. Evidence of real cost savings actualized through privatization remains contradictory, but the practice continues unabated primarily due to increased practical and political pressures (Boyne, 1998; Brudney, Fernandez, Rhu, & Wright, 2005; Savas, 2005).

Using ICMA survey data, Greene (2002) identified 59 discrete municipal services that cities have outsourced, thus exposing that no city service is 'safe' from privatization. More recently, empirical reviews of cost savings between

public and private service delivery of specific services is becoming more robust within the literature. For example, in reviewing the contracting out of solid waste services, evidence supports no significant cost savings between public delivery and private contractor delivery of solid waste services (Bae, 2010; Bel & Costas, 2006; Callen & Thomas, 2001).

Various structural elements play a role in determining whether or not contracting out is a feasible option for cities. These elements can include political and ideological factors, managerial factors, fiscal stress, supply and cost factors, and contract management capacity. Contracting out also presents potential issues such as agency problems, adverse selection, and moral hazard that result from information asymmetry and opportunism (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008).

Transaction costs as related to service delivery characteristics also figures importantly into the analysis of the public sector. Within the literature, transaction costs have been used to explain government's decision to contract out (Nelson, 1997; Sclar, 2000). Transaction costs in the market have been used in explaining decisions regarding service delivery choice (Bel and Fageda, 2008, 2009; Brown and Potoski, 2003; Hefetz and Warner, 2004). Coase's seminal work (1937) outlined transaction costs as a means in understanding why firms exist. Williamson's work (1991, 1999) gave specific attention to transaction cost within the public sector. Combining the Coase and Williamson theories suggests that the decision to make or buy a service will be determined primarily by service characteristics: (1) the level of specific physical infrastructure or technical

expertise and (2) difficulty in contract specification and monitoring (Hefetz and Warner, 2011).

Empirical research conducted in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that political consideration, specifically, political ideology and party identification had a significant impact on the decision to privatize service delivery (see Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney 2008 for a detailed review of the literature). Political conservatives touted privatization as a means for reducing the size of the public sector, limiting the power of the state, and bringing forth a sense of competitiveness and productivity to public bureaucracies (Savas, 2000). However, more recent empirical evidence produced within the last ten years reveal that political and ideological consideration have little or no effect as to whether or not the service delivery is contracted out by the state (Brudney et al. 2005; Hefetz and Warner 2004; Brown and Poroski, 2003).

Managerial considerations such as collective bargaining, ex ante management, council-administrator/manager, monitoring capacity, as well as contract management capacity are now scrutinized more closely. Recent literature indicates that contract management capacity is a crucial variable for successful privatization by allowing governments to plan effectively and oversee contracting out by allowing public managers to monitor and regulate (where needed) contractor behavior (Fernandez, Ryu, and Brudney, 2008; Hefetz and Warner, 2004; Brown and Poroski, 2003.)

Despite this now prevailing model, innovative deviations exist and are in use. For example, newly incorporated cities have adopted an approach to almost exclusive contracting out to private firms while maintaining a staff of high-level professional administrators. Such examples include Weston, FL; Centennial, CO; and Sandy Springs, GA (Bradbury and Waechter, 2009). It is noteworthy that all three examples incorporate the use of private sector provision of public services, along with interjurisdictional and/or intergovernmental agreements. Conversely, several small towns have adopted a different deviation, whereby, in house government employees perform and deliver most services, all while the high-level administrator positions are contracted out. Examples include a variety of North Carolina cities such as Kitty Hawk, Shelby, Mount Pleasant, and more. Local government scholars have also identified a sub-category of contracting out called *interjurisdictional*, or *intergovernmental* agreements (Bradbury and Waechter, 2009.) These agreements typically consist of “interlocal service contracts between two or more units of government in which one pays the other for the delivery of the service to the residents of the jurisdiction of the paying government” (McGuire, 2004, p. 193).

TAX BASE AND BUDGET

Historically, government budgeting within the United States has been based on the assumption that public revenues and expenditures would continuously grow. This premise was true, up until the 1970s, when state and

local governments underwent ‘cutback management.’ Levine (1979, p. 180) defines cutback management as “...the management of organizational change towards lower levels of resource consumption and organizational activity.” From the 1970s to the 2000s, government response has been to increase taxes, and/or cut services; neither of which represents popular decisions. In addition, many state and local governments are mandated by law to maintain balanced budgets.

In establishing how a local government can generate revenue, its structure needs to be understood; that is, is the local government a city or a special district. Cities/municipalities (the terms are interchangeable) are general purpose local governments that can provide a broad range of services to their community. Generally, municipalities are funded through state governments, and are able to levy property and sales taxes. Many cities today rely solely on property tax as their main revenue source. Generally speaking, property tax assessments can lag behind the true value of the house, thus leaving city budgets in a vulnerable condition. The fallout from the current U.S. housing crisis (subprime loans, foreclosures, declines in real property values) continues to negatively plague city budgets and reinforces this vulnerability. Levying a sales tax can also take several months for city sales tax revenues to reflect changes in consumption, largely because of collection and administrative issues (Hoene and Pagano, 2009).

A special district is an independent local government that generally performs only a few local government functions and is not accountable to other governments. Generally speaking, revenue sources of special districts are

comprised of user charges, utility revenues and federal aid. A critical difference between municipalities and special districts is the type of bonds they are able to issue.

Recent cutback management practices by local governments have included hiring freezes, employee layoffs, furloughs, delays and cancellations of planned infrastructure projects, reduction in services, and tax increases. These tax increases have come in various forms and include increases in fees (vehicle registration, impact and development, etc.), personal income tax, property tax, sales tax, business tax, and alcohol and tobacco taxes.

Levine (1979) articulated four major causes of and responses to city fiscal stress and decline and includes: political vulnerability, organizational atrophy, problem depletion, and environmental entropy. Political vulnerability and organizational atrophy were envisioned as internal forces that threatened to force an organization to restructure or eliminate services or programs. Problem depletion and environmental atrophy represent external threats to organizational fitness (as cited in Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010, p. 179).

PUBLIC CHOICE LITERATURE

To understand the early classics of public choice, one must understand the origins laid forth by two French mathematicians, Jean-Charles de Borda (1781) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785). Condorcet's contributions are two-fold, discovering the existence of cycling and proving a theorem about juries, which is now called the Condorcet jury theorem. The problem of cycling exists when

using the simple majority rule that an alternative x can lose to y in a vote between the two, y can lose to another alternative z , but z will also lose to x . The issue then is how does a community decide among three alternatives, when a cycle exists? Many contributions to the literature have analyzed the implication of cycles. The Condorcet jury theorem rests on three assumptions and has produced a justification for making collective decisions with a simple majority rule, and for the institution of democracy itself. Condorcet's work left many modern theorists questions to struggle with; Do individuals actually share common interests? Are voters sufficiently informed to make informed choices representing the majority's preferences? What voting rule should be used to aggregate these preferences?

Borda was more critical of the simple majority rule and instead provided a different measure of assigning preferences. The Borda rule states that if there are n possible outcomes to a collective decision, each voter assigns a one to the most preferred choice, a two to the second most preferred choice, and so on. Then the scores are tabulated, and the choice that has the lowest score is the winner. Also, when $n > 2$, the problem of cycling is avoided.

It is said that Duncan Black (1948a,b), James Buchanan (1949), and Kenneth Arrow (1950) got the public choice ball rolling so to speak. Duncan Black's two articles take up the problem of cycling under the simple majority rule and provide a proof to the famous median voter theorem. This theorem has been frequently invoked to describe equilibria in theoretical studies and has been the analytical foundation for much of the empirical work in public choice.

Buchanan's work prior to 1962 was important; however it is his co-authored book with Gordon Tullock, *Calculus of Consent* that permanently affirmed his identity with the public choice literature. Here it is important to note the literature contribution that provides distinction between the constitutional stage of collective decision making in which the voting rules and other institutions of democracy are selected, and the applications of these rules to the actual work of making collective choices. Arrow's theorem demonstrated that no procedure for aggregating individual preferences could generate a social ordering while satisfying five axioms. His work has generated controversy along with a substantial body of literature. Anthony Downs, (1957) a student of Arrow, introduced a mode of analysis of competition using spatial modeling as well as developed the rational voter model that puts forth the concept that voters rationally choose to remain ignorant of most issues within an election.

Other significant contributions include Mancur Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* (1965) in which the 'logic of collection action' prevents individuals from voluntarily giving up their time and money to the provision of public goods thus creating the "free-rider problem," Anne Krueger's (1974) and Richard Posner's (1975) works on rent seeking behaviors and its high social costs and William Niskanen's (1971) work on bureaucracy, revealing that bureaucrats seek to maximize the size of their budgets and the respective implications of said behavior. More contemporary literature examines political business cycles, minority governments, and focuses more on empirical testing of existing theories.

TIEBOUT

Initially, Tiebout offered a solution to the then-emergent theory of public goods and to Paul Samuelson's (1954) conundrum over the various nature of public goods; i.e., how do governments address the issue of balance between citizen's paying for and consuming public goods. The Tiebout (1956) model presents a theoretical approach for examining the relationship between the level of expenditures for public goods and services, with citizen preferences for those goods and services. This model is applied at the local level and provides the theoretical foundation to the public choice paradigm. Ideally then, a citizen who chooses to live within a community does so because he or she is satisfied with the local level of public goods and services, and is satisfied with the tax rate that provides that level of public goods and services.

The Tiebout model makes a distinction with the institutional design of government viewing consolidated and fragmented governments differently. Accordingly, the model implies that satisfaction with local government in fragmented settings should not vary. Citizens will receive different combinations of services at a variety of quality levels and tax prices, but they should all be equally satisfied because services received and taxes paid should closely mirror individual preferences (Kelleher and Lowery, 2002.) In contrast, consolidated governments should produce greater variation in citizen satisfaction due to the mismatch of government's limited service choices and citizens' individual preferences. Ultimately citizen dissatisfaction will arise. When this occurs,

Tiebout concludes that the result is “voting with one’s feet” whereby citizens opt to move into another area and thus exit.

As with any theoretical model, assumptions are provided. Implicitly embedded are assumptions about individuals that are important to institutional design recommendations. Tiebout’s model (1956) stipulates the following assumptions:

1. Consumer-voters are fully mobile to move from community to community. Their decision to stay within a certain community demonstrates their preferences towards the local level of public goods provided.
2. Consumer-voters have perfect knowledge of differences among revenue and expenditures of local governments that enable them to react to these differences.
3. There are a large number of communities in which consumer-voters can choose to live.
4. Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered.
5. Public services supplied exhibit no external economies or diseconomies between communities.
6. Some factors are fixed and therefore limit growth within a community’s size.
7. Communities below an optimal size will seek out new residents to lower their existing average costs for public goods and services. Those above the optimal size will do the opposite.

Mobility is a key factor within Tiebout’s model. With this measure, Tiebout provides a solution to Samuelson’s (1954,1955,1958) argument that the market cannot correctly identify demand for collective goods (Dowding and

John, 1994). According to Tiebout, “The act of moving or failing to move is crucial. Moving or failing to move replaced the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods. Thus each locality has a revenue and expenditure pattern that reflects the desires of its residents (Tiebout, 1956, p. 420)

Pitfalls within these assumptions include not accounting for transaction costs of moving, as well as consumer-voter attentiveness to tax-service packages in other nearby communities. Further, the Tiebout model never provided minimum levels of exiting to make the model work. In other words, how many residents must move out of the community before local officials take note and respond to citizen preferences? This aspect has made the model difficult to test empirically.

Building directly on Tiebout’s work, Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) emphasize the need to consolidate or reduce the number of local governments that serve urban areas. Bish and Ostrom (1973) assert the need to create and maintain numerous local government units by offering a mix of local services within each urban area and thus maximize opportunities for individuals to choose a tax-service package that best suit one’s needs. Their “new reform tradition” provides an existing option whereby locational choice is a demand mechanism to which local governments respond appropriately with the supply of services.

The public choice literature asserts that citizens who live in fragmented government service areas are better informed. This tenet is underscored with

Tullock's (1971) arguments about the loss of information in large organizations and Bish and Ostrom's (1973) assertion that these citizens who live in governmentally fragmented areas have more opportunities to match their unique needs and preferences for public services, whereby "...the more uniform the output, the less likely that those citizens whose preferences and problems differ from the average will be satisfied with the service product."

Over the years, the Tiebout model has been examined empirically. Dowding and John (1994) extensively surveyed studies from various disciplines including economics, political science, and demography to interpret five different types of empirical test of the differing implications from Tiebout. These include city-size interpretations, homogeneity interpretations, capitalization studies, migration studies, and micro-level tests (Dowding and John, 1994, p. 769)

CITY-SIZE INTERPRETATIONS

In reviewing Tiebout with respect to city-size interpretations, the literature reveals a supply-side and a demand-side argument. These two models come together and represent the Leviathan literature (Dowding and John, 1994). The literature deepens as it tries to empirically demonstrate the relationship between expenditure levels and fragmentation. Several conclusions are exposed. First, fragmentation of multi-purpose governments generally leads to reductions within expenditures. Secondly, local government jurisdictions compete in a spatially constrained market. Thirdly, concentration of market share in large top-tier units

is associated with higher spending. Finally, the findings are consistent with an alternative hypothesis. (Dowding and John, 1994, p. 771).

The demand-side literature focuses on whether or not fragmented systems are more effective in meeting citizens' demands. Key contributors within this literature include the research of Elinor Ostrom, Parks, and Oakerson throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and Lowery and Lyons (1989, 1992). Based on the research generated, it is difficult to make consistent conclusions with respect to citizen satisfaction and the impact of city size.

HOMOGENEITY AND SORTING

Homogeneity and sorting interpretations are treated one of two ways. The first interpretation reveals that the greater the number of jurisdictions the more homogeneous. In the literature, this is referenced as statistical sorting. The second implication is that households will deliberately move to jurisdictions which best satisfy their preferences for local goods. In the literature, this is identified as the Tiebout-competition implication because it underscores the competitive nature of his model. However, the empirical problem for the sorting literature is that statically generated sorting, Tiebout-competitive sorting, and sorting due to non-Tiebout factors are very difficult to separate (Dowding, and John, 1994, p.775)

More contemporary research on sorting has surfaced over the last ten years or so. Epple and Sieg (1999) have developed a structural econometric model of households' choices of communities, based on the logic outlined in their

earlier work (Smith, 2007). The Epple and Sieg framework uses a specific algebraic form for preferences, whereby it must satisfy conventional properties, such as diminishing marginal rates of substitution, nonsatiation, and monotonicity, along with what is described as the single crossing property. This condition assures that the relationship between a change in a local public good and the price of constant quality housing will undergo a predictable change with increases or decreases in household income (Smith, 2007, p. 159). People must evaluate public good contributions exactly the same way. This method is referred to as vertically differentiated preferences.

Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005) have also developed a sorting model that relaxes some of the assumptions pertaining to public goods; namely the fact that people can evaluate differently and use individual data as a means of calculating the equilibrium analysis in an urban setting. This method is referred to as horizontal differentiation.

Two main approaches to homogeneity can be identified. This includes accounting for variables such as education, occupation, age, and income. However, the approach that best measures the effects of local government factors with the migration process to Tiebout sorting is to run multiple regression analysis to sort estimates that measure the relative influence of various factors such as taxes and services.

Studies that have demonstrated sorting have included Miller's (1981) study of Los Angeles counties whereby sorting occurred along income, race, and

age; Grubb (1982) study of the Boston area identifying income and age; and Pack and Pack (1977) study of Pennsylvania whereby evidence of homogeneity was found in age, years of education, occupation, and to a weaker extent income and household type. While these studies are consistent with Tiebout, they truly do not corroborate Tiebout (Dowding, and John, 1994). Stein's work (1987) attempts to test Tiebout by regressing service-bundle differentiation against mean municipal heterogeneity whereby results generated found no significant relationship, except that the variation in common service activities significantly influences sorting by race (Dowding and John, 1994).

CAPITALIZATION

The capitalization model addresses the relationship Tiebout identifies between local services and taxes. Potential migrants will weigh the benefits of a locality's services against their tax liability and choose areas with the greatest surplus of benefits over costs (Oates, 1969; Tullock, 1971). The extent to which property tax and local service differentiation are capitalized into property values has been used to test the validity of Tiebout.

Initially, Oates set out to test the validity of Tiebout by studying capitalization. Most studies model Oates's (1969) methods, whereby property values are regressed against dwelling characteristics, commuting distances, household income, community status, annual expenditure per pupil in public schools, and the effective property tax rate. Oates found that property values bear a significant negative relationship to the property tax rate and a significant

positive association with expenditure per pupil (Dowding and John, 1994). Nonetheless, there are several methodological problems with Oates-based methodological studies. Capitalization estimates are likely to be subject to a left-out variable bias if regression models do not include all house-value determinants correlated with taxes (Bloom et al. 1983, as cited in Dowding and John, 1994). A second problem occurs with respect to accurate measurement of local public services' effects on property taxes. Also, variance within several studies measure education expenditure per pupil, total non-school expenditure per capita, crime rates, and recreational-quality index and highways-maintenance per square mile. A mathematical issue related to the actual regression analysis reveals a third problem. By using average effective tax rates as the independent tax variable, a simultaneity bias occurs, resulting in even estimation of the negative effect of taxes on property values (Bloom et al. 1983; Yinger et al. 1988, as cited in Dowding and John, 1994). A fourth problem reveals issues around misspecification of the tax variable. The Oates's regression estimates capitalization using the tax rate instead of using the tax burden. Oates's specification always underestimates capitalization of expensive homes and overestimates its effect on cheaper properties (King, 1977 as cited in Dowding and John, 1994). Over the years, capitalization has been studied as its own outright phenomenon rather than as a means to confirm Tiebout.

In 1975, Hamilton extended the Tiebout model to include local zoning. By taking into consideration the issue with local zoning, Hamilton shores up a

problem with local governments financing their budgets with property taxes and thus creating an incentive for free-riding behavior. Effectively, if one purchases a home with a house value substantially lower than those surrounding it, yet is allowed to consume the same amount of public goods, in essence partial free-riding occurs. By imposing a layer of zoning, a floor on local housing consumption is effectively created. In equilibrium within a Tiebout-Hamilton model, communities are homogeneous both for their demand of local public goods but also with local housing consumption. Since households carry the same tax liability, the free-rider problem becomes void.

Today capitalization studies fall into one of two general groups; those based on the Tiebout-Oates model, and those based on the Tiebout-Hamilton model. The later model suggests that the efficient distribution of local public goods is possible with the introduction of some form of zoning regulation (Dowding and John, 1994). However, Pack and Pack (1978) demonstrate that it's difficult to find real world examples of the Tiebout-Hamilton model given that most communities are not that homogeneous.

MIGRATION

Migration studies used to empirically test Tiebout attempt to measure the effect of local fiscal differentials on migration flows and residential location. This literature is sizable and the welfare variable is most commonly studied (Cebula, 1979). Simply stated, migrants who are potential welfare recipients will tend to be attracted by the economic incentive of higher welfare payments (for an

extensive literature review, see Dowding and John, 1994). Cebula's contributions to this literature are extensive. Cebula (1978) examines the influence of average AFDC payments in real terms and public expenditure in real terms on in-migration figures, utilizing data from metropolitan areas rather than the state level as in past studies (Cebula, 1974a, 1974b; Cebula and Kohn, 1975). Tullock (1971) extends Tiebout's thesis and emphasizes the evaluation of government goods and services, along with the tax burden at potential locations of choice in which voters-consumers make exiting decisions. Support for the 'Tiebout-Tullock' hypothesis is evident, whereby white migrants prefer areas with low property taxes while non-white migrants appear insensitive to local differentials and areas with high real welfare benefits attract non-white migrants though real welfare differentials do not significantly affect white migration (as cited in Dowding and John, 1994).

Traditionally, studies that empirically study the migration aspect of the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis examine both economic and non-economic factors. Economic variables often include nominal median family income in the state, the overall cost of living in the state for the average four-person family, and the percentage growth rate of employment of the civilian labor force in the state, while non-economic variables include so called 'quality of life' factors (Cebula, 2005; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Clark and Hunter, 1992).

Cebula (2009) updates and extends the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis and migration. He includes nominal per capita state and personal income tax liability

within the state, the nominal outlay in state per pupil (rather than per capita) on primary and secondary public education, and per capita level of state plus local government property taxes in the state. Cebula adds an environmental condition (quality of life factors) that includes the average annual number of heating degree days within the state over the long run, as a measure of cold climate. This is consistent with other migration studies (Clark and Hunter, 1992; Cebula and Alexander, 2006) and yields similar results to no surprise that migrants have an aversion to cold weather and are more attracted to warmer climates. The results within Cebula's 2009 study supports prior conclusions in Vedder (1995) and Holcombe and Lacombe (2004) whereby higher state incomes taxes reduce net in-migration and thereby reduce economic growth. Further, Cebula's study supports consumer-voters attraction to lower state income tax burdens and lower property tax burdens, whereas they appear to be attracted to higher per pupil public primary and secondary outlays (Cebula, 2009, 548).

MICRO-LEVEL DATA

The use of aggregate data cannot provide the motivational link between household movement and tax service packages. However, the use of micro-level data can detail an individual's behavior and motivations between tax service packages and household movement. Tiebout (1957) prescribed the use of survey data as a means to acquire these linkages, and thus the use of micro-level data is used as an accurate means to test the Tiebout model. Studies from sociology, psychology and geography suggest that relocation decisions stem from

dissatisfaction with current housing provisions, neighborhood characteristics and from changes in the family life cycle. The premise that highly satisfied households do not consider moving even when benefits outweigh costs is implicit within these studies (Quigley and Weinberg, 1977, as cited in Downing and John, 1994).

Several studies match household micro-level data to aggregate data for location characteristics and fiscal differences (Cushing, 1993; Fox et al. 1989, Islam 1989; Mills et al. 1983; Reschovsky, 1979). Cushing (1993) measures the effect of the social welfare system on the migration patterns on low-income workers and considers gender and family structure differences. The results suggest that influence of social welfare programs becomes more significant for in-migrants.

Fox et al. (1989) employed a three-stage migration process which included the decision to move, the decision to leave the metropolitan area, and the decision to enter somewhere else. They concluded that fiscal factors are more important factors in pushing people from an area than in pulling them toward one because information on fiscal structure is more readily available in an area where a person has been living than for areas under consideration as migration destinations (Fox et al. 1989, p. 532).

Islam (1989) used 1981 micro-level data from the Canadian census to analyze the effect of property tax and welfare differentials on migration. The results revealed that individuals prefer to live in low-taxed high welfare spending

communities. Mills et al. (1983) analyzed the influence of a detailed set of fiscal factors on the out-migration of Canadian family-allowance recipients between 1961 and 1978. The findings revealed that migrants tend to be more responsive to fiscal than market incentives. Reschovsky (1979) examines the effect of three fiscal factors on in-migration in Minnesota and concluded that fiscal factors play a significant role in residential choice decisions. While all of the aforementioned studies yield revealing results, the use of aggregate data to identify individual preferences is still problematic.

Several studies have utilized Hirschman's (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (EVL) model and its relationship between the option of exiting and the dwindling will to engage in collective action (Lowery and Lyons, 1989, Lyons et al. 1992; Orbell and Uno, 1972; Sharp, 1984, 1986). Lowery and Lyons (1989) study the impact of jurisdictional boundaries on the behavioral assumptions of Tiebout using data from Louisville-Jefferson and Lexington-Fayette counties and conclude that tax/service packages of city governments do not have a particularly influential effect on locational decisions. Their data revealed mixed perception on the availability of alternatives, in which, Lowery and Lyons concluded that perceptions of alternative availability have little relation to actual or objective availability (Lowery and Lyons, 1992). Additionally, their results provided little evidence to support several of the assumptions underlying Tiebout (1992). Sharp uses data drawn from a 1978 national HUD survey on the quality of urban life and

finds that schools and comparative tax levels were considered important by 51 percent and 35 percent of respondents respectively.

Using Hirschman's EVL model as an empirical test of Tiebout generates some flaws, including the fact that it measures intentions of individuals moving, rather than those who have actually moved. Furthermore, measures of dissatisfaction are concerned with the push factors influencing people to leave communities while the cost-benefit approach implicit in Tiebout suggest that the pull factors influencing locational choice are equally important (Downing and John, 1994). Micro-level tests reveal that tax/service packages seem more important on the pull than on the push side of moving decisions.

Micro-level studies have also used individual-level survey data as a means for detailing factors affecting moving decisions (Percy, 1993; Percy and Hawkins, 1992) Percy's work (1993) analyzes both push and pull factors, whereby home and housing values, schools, lower crime, public services and lower taxes were pull factor indicators. Locational proximity to people and places, concerns over local schools, taxes and family income all were push factors. Percy concludes that his results provide some support for the behavioral foundations of the Tiebout model (Downing and John, 1994).

Present day research still reveals a failure within empirical evidence that determines the micro-foundations of Tiebout's sorting mechanism. It is important to remember the historical placement of Tiebout's initial work, written during a time when racial and social equality were not on the major social and political

agendas. Arguably, the longevity of the micro-foundation of Tiebout's literature rests on the establishment that sorting occurs having less to do with service tax bundles and more to do with racial and economic preferences. This literature is also referenced as the social stratification governmental inequality (SSGI) school (Neiman, 1976; Ostrom 1983; Lyons and Lowery, 1989.) The key assumption is that people base their residential location decisions on demographic characteristics of people already residing in a community. As a result, people with economic means are attracted to reside in communities with others of the income, class, and race (Bickers et al. 2006, p. 59). This is tantamount to understanding why in particular whites live in economically and racially homogeneous communities. Under the SSGI model the decision to move is a function of income distribution and racial concentrations in a jurisdiction, generating a relationship that is used to explain in-moving.

In more recent years another body of literature has been developed to explain why people do not move. Under the social capital paradigm (Putnam, 1993; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; and Miller, 1998) people will be unlikely or unwilling to move given their social connections to their communities. These personal investments into friends, civic groups, churches, and the like work to keep them tied to their neighborhoods. Social capital is immobile and for some, the transaction costs for finding friends are significant. Hence the theoretical implications are that high levels of social capital investments may lead

to a reduced likelihood to move out of a particular residential community despite compelling Tiebout or SSGI considerations.

Trying to identify the extent to which Tiebout and non-Tiebout factors weigh in on the decision-making process of potential movers, Bickers et al. (2006) examined survey data of four metropolitan areas to analyze the factors that contribute to exiting, using Tiebout, SSGI, and Social Capital models. Their data showed that not only was the SSGI hypothesis not supported, but that the effect of income seemed to be the complete opposite. The likelihood of moving is generally higher for lower-income families living both in low-income and high-income neighborhoods. Families with higher income are generally less likely to move (Bickers et al. 2006, p. 73). Additionally, the probit analysis and breakdowns by income distributions provide support for the Tiebout hypothesis with the least likely support for the social capital hypothesis.

This literature review highlights key research findings over the last fifty years that explain and expand the Tiebout model. Clearly, Tiebout's seminal work has provided a theoretical framework in which multiple models continue to be developed that assist our understanding of the relationship between local governments and communities. The depth and breadth of the Tiebout model continues to embrace multidisciplinary approaches and begins to integrate new public goods such as the environment, and the availability of Internet related technologies.

The Tiebout model is also being used as a theoretical basis for new economic models such as determining the income elasticity of housing demand given multiple home ownership (Belsky, Zhu, and McCue, 2006). That is to say, how does owning a second home in a compellingly different geographical location (sunbelt vs. rustbelt) that caters to a particular type of community (retirement community vs. traditional family community) fall into the Tiebout model?

Moving forward, it is also clear that the Tiebout model will need to address other and more poignant variables that may include immigration status, sexual orientation and religious affiliation. Finally, the application of Tiebout will need to continue branching out to include other country studies to empirically find whether or not the model only conforms to the United States local government structures.

The literature review provides the theoretical basis for understanding the research presented in the study. Personal experience, ideological considerations, the role of race/ethnicity, the role of gender, the role of age, and neighborhood context all provide various lenses to use when reviewing the relationship between citizens and local government. As noted, sometimes there are inconsistencies within the literature. This is not surprising given the nature of what is being reviewed. A lengthy review is provided to support the understanding of government structure, privatization of services, tax structures and an in-depth examination of the public choice literature with respect to locational choice.

Chapter 3 outlines the research design and methodologies used in the study. Two different hypotheses are addressed and the appropriate models are detailed.

Chapter 3

RESEARCH DESIGN (METHODOLOGY)

VENUE OF THE RESEARCH

Phoenix's modern history began in 1868 as the first post office was established along with an election precinct. By 1881, Phoenix was incorporated as a city. In 1913 the residents of Phoenix ratified a new charter establishing a council-manager form of government. This set Phoenix apart, making it one of the first to adopt such a progressive form of government. The growth of Phoenix was centered on agriculture up until the end of World War II, when it then transitioned into an industrial center. By 1948, residents of Phoenix voted to strengthen the role of the city manager position. This type of reform proved valuable as it provided a consistent foundation while the city experienced considerable growth and political turnover throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Modifications to its charter are reliant on its residents. The development of Phoenix over the last 70 years has been tremendous, growing from its 17.1 square miles in 1950, to its present size of over 500 square miles. Today Phoenix has over 1.4 million residents and ranks as the 6th largest population in the United States.

Officially, in 1979, the City of Phoenix adopted an urban village model as a means to address growth and planning. Instead of focusing development in the urban core region, it divided the city into smaller geographic communities to achieve a desirable jobs and housing balance (Gober, 2006, p. 155). Today,

Phoenix is divided into 15 urban villages, with each village having its own planning committees that is appointed by the City Council (<http://www.phoenix.gov/PLANNING/vpcommitt.html>, n.d.). Committee members help plan and direct growth of the city by assisting the Planning Commission and the City Council in reviewing land use plans, and zoning proposals within the neighborhoods. Mostly as a result of the urban village model, Phoenix has the least developed urban core of most major metropolitan regions.

Several variables contribute to this growth and include domestic migration from other parts of the U.S., migration from abroad, and natural increase (Gober, 2006). Domestic migration accounts for more than half of all growth, with California and Illinois as the top one and two contributors respectively (U.S. Census, 2000 “County-to-County Migration Flows” as cited in Gober, 2006). Between 1990 and 2000 Phoenix’s foreign-born population tripled, whereby Mexicans accounted for two-thirds of local immigrants. (Gober, 2006). Comparatively, Mexican immigrants have very low naturalization rates. Only 31 percent of the Phoenix-area Mexican migrants who arrived in the United States prior to 1990 became citizens by 2000 (U.S. Census, 2000, Summary File 3). Low level participation in civic responsibilities keeps this group at a distance within the local political process.

The city’s budget is made up of three distinct pieces: enterprise funds, federal and other restricted funds, and general funds. More than half of the total

budget is comprised of these three areas

(<http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf>, n.d.). Enterprise funds come from earmarked sales taxes, and fees paid by those who use water, wastewater, aviation, solid waste, golf, and the Phoenix Convention Center. Enterprise funds can only be used to pay for costs associated with those services and programs

(<http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf>, n.d.). Federal and restricted funds include Community Development Block Grants, HHS grants, and other restricted funds such as Highway User Revenue Funds. Again, these funds can only be used to support these specific programs. The remaining budget, approximately 46 percent, represents the General Fund whereby revenues predominantly come from local sales taxes, state-shared sales, income and vehicle license taxes

(<http://phoenix.gov/NRG/aboutcitygov.pdf>, n.d.). Given that nearly half of the city's revenues come from sales taxes, dependency on growth and tourism is vital and highly volatile. The city's dependence on revenue streams configure what types of funding can be applied to specific services.

Taken as a whole, the residents of Phoenix have an integral role in how the city functions, as many of the city's services are at the mercy of on its residents' volunteer time to function. Volunteers are an integral part of the city's operational landscape. Currently the city has more than 800 citizens serving on its boards and commissions (<http://phoenix.gov/NRG/citizenvol.pdf>, n.d.). Volunteer opportunities are provided at the local level in many of the city's departments and throughout many city neighborhoods. These service areas

include police, fire, neighborhood services, human services, parks and recreation, libraries, mountain preserves, arts commission, public works, streets, and more.

The community buy-in through volunteerism curbs city staffing costs, reinforces city involvement, facilitates a pathway for residents to directly interact with some aspect of the service delivery approach, and in some aspects may influence citizen satisfaction with services provided.

SOURCE OF DATA

Beginning in 1985, the City of Phoenix biannually commissions an overall objective to measure citizen attitudes regarding the city services and issues for policy development, program improvement, and resource allocation. Specifically, this project was commissioned for the following purposes:

- To provide a vehicle for public participation.
- To identify public opinions on relevant issues.
- To identify public satisfaction with current service levels.
- To pre-test public response to proposed or revised services.
- To provide user service data.
- To provide public awareness data.
- To identify program or policy alternatives.

The 2002, and 2004 (9th and 10th installations) surveys were designed by Behavior Research Center (BRC) in conjunction with the City of Phoenix. The methodology used by Behavior Research Center for the 2002 and 2004 surveys are congruent. After approval of the preliminary draft, each respective survey was pre-tested using a randomly selected cross-section of 20 Phoenix residents. Key determinants of the pre-test focused on the value, understandability of the questions, adequacy of response categories, and questions for which probes were

necessary. A final form of the survey instrument was approved by the City of Phoenix and a Spanish language version of the questionnaire was prepared.

For both surveys, selection of the respondents was accomplished via a computer generated random digit dial telephone sample which selects households based on residential telephone prefixes and includes all unlisted and newly listed households. This methodology was selected because it ensured a randomly selected sample of households proportionately allocated throughout the sample universe.

Heads of households were used exclusively because these individuals have the knowledge and background to respond to the survey questions. This methodology is confirmed within the literature. In addition, the sample was selected so that an equal proportion of male and female heads of households were integrated into the sample.

The information contained in the 2002 report is based on 703 in-depth telephone interviews conducted with City of Phoenix heads of households. The information contained in the 2004 report is based on 702 in-depth telephone interviews conducted with City of Phoenix heads of households. Interviewing for the 2002 survey took place during late May and early June 2002. Interviewing for the 2004 survey took place in early June of that year.

The targeted sample size for both surveys was set at 700 respondents. At the 95% confidence level, the sampling error of a 700 respondent sample size is 3.8%. Sampling error can be defined as the difference between the results

obtained from a sample and those that would be obtained by surveying the entire population. The 95% confidence level is frequently used within research generated by social scientists. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the sampling error increases for those subset populations examined within the overall sample.

Interviews for both surveys took place at the center's central location. This facility uses computer assisted telephone interviewing, whereby each interviewer worked under the direct supervision of BRC supervisory personnel. All of the interviewers who were employed on this project were professional interviewers of the center and were briefed over the City of Phoenix Community Attitude Survey. During the briefing, the interviewers were trained on (1) the purpose of the study, (2) sampling procedures, (3) administration of the questionnaire, and (4) other project-related factors. Lastly, each interviewer completed a set of practice interviews to ensure that all procedures were understood and followed.

Interviewing was distributed evenly across evening and weekend hours. BRC followed this procedure to ensure that all households were equally represented, regardless of work schedules. Further, during the interviewing segment of the studies, up to four (4) separate attempts, on different days and during different times of the day were made to contact each selected resident. Only after four unsuccessful attempts was a selected household substituted in the

sample. Partially completed interviews were not accepted nor counted toward the fulfillment of the total sample quotas.

Of the completed interviews, one hundred percent of them were edited, and those found containing errors of administration were pulled, the respondent re-called, and the errors corrected. In addition, fifteen percent of each interviewer's work was randomly selected for validation to ensure its authenticity and correctness. No problems were encountered during this phase of interviewing quality control.

During the data collection segment, completed and validated interviews were given to BRC's in-house data coding department, where editing, coding, and validation of interviews took place. Upon coding completion, a series of validity and logic checks were run on the data to ensure the data were 'clean' and representative of the sample universe.

Both surveys utilized a "split" sample methodology. Using this methodology, selected survey questions were designated core questions and asked of all survey respondents while other survey questions were asked of only one-half of the survey respondents. This methodology is commonly used when the volume of information desired is particularly extensive and the number of interviews to be conducted is of adequate size to justify the split. In the 2002 survey, questions 1 to 3, 5 to 6, and 17 through 20 were designated core questions. In the 2004 survey, questions 1 to 4, 6 to 7, and 19 to 22 were designated core

questions and asked of all survey respondents. Respectively, the remaining questions were asked of one-half of the survey respondents.

Aligning the core questions of both surveys provides commonality and year to year consistency that allows for both longitudinal and pooled cross-sectional analysis. These are as follows:

Question 1 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys)

“To begin, would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement, “Overall, Phoenix is a good place to live.”

Question 2 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys)

“On the whole, would you say that the quality of life in the City of Phoenix is excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor?”

Question 3 (Both 2002 and 2004 surveys)

“Next, what do you feel is the single most important problem the City should be working to solve in your neighborhood? (IF CRIME MENTIONED, PROBE). And what is the next most important problem?”

Question 5 (2002 survey) / Question 6 (2004 survey)

“Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the overall performance of the City in providing services to Phoenix residents?”

Question 17 (2002 survey) / Question 19 (2004 survey)

“Now before I finish, I need a few pieces of information about yourself for classification purposes only, First, which of the following categories comes closest to your age?” (Choices are: Under 25, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64, 65 or over)

Question 18 (2002 survey) / Question 20 (2004 survey)

“How many years have you lived in the City of Phoenix?” (No choices, is a continuous number)

Question 19 (2002 survey) / Question 21 (2004 survey)

“Which of the following categories best describes your ethnic origin?” (Choices are White, Black, Hispanic, American Indian, Asian American)

Question 20 (2002 survey) / Question 22 (2004 survey)

“And finally, was your total family income for last year, I mean before taxes and including everyone in your household, under or over \$50,000?”

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The particular questions used from the 2002 and 2004 City of Phoenix Community Attitude Survey examine the relationship between overall satisfaction with the city’s ability to provide services to its citizens, and with specific city services. Two hypotheses are generated to determine the relationship between citizen satisfaction and the City of Phoenix ability to provide services.

Hypothesis one examines the relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of the overall service delivery of the local government. Ideally,

one should expect that if the local government is adequately providing services to its residents, then the residents should be satisfied with the overall performance of the local government.

H_1 = Several factors will affect citizen evaluation of service delivery in local government, including race/ethnicity; gender, age, residential tenure, and income. Furthermore, personal experience with local government will impact citizen evaluation of local service delivery.

H_0 = There is no relationship between personal factors, including personal experience and citizens' evaluation of service delivery in local government.

Hypothesis two examines the relationship between personal factors and citizen satisfaction with the delivery of specific local services. Of the numerous services the city provides, fifteen services have been identified to include within the analysis. These services are frequently examined within the literature and include: police, fire, crime prevention, waste disposal and recycling, street repair, street cleaning, parks and recreation, providing housing for the poor, youth programs, new employment, ambulance services, art and culture programs, job training, prevention of gang activity, and library services.

H_2 = There is a relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services, say police services.

H_0 = There is no relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services.

MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

The dependent variables in both hypotheses support the idea of citizen satisfaction but slightly differ given the focus of each question. Hypothesis one focuses on citizen satisfaction with the City of Phoenix's overall performance in providing services, generally. Hypothesis two focuses on citizen satisfaction with respect to the local government's ability to support specific services – police, fire, library, etc.

In both research hypotheses, the independent variables used to predict satisfaction include race/ethnicity, gender, age, personal experience, residential tenure within the local government, and income. Within the urban literature, these independent variables are often included and demonstrate various relationships with experiences. The literature often examines education levels, and political party affiliations into these types of models, however, limitations within the survey do not allow for this to happen in this study.

ANALYTICAL MODELS

Testing Hypothesis #1

The analytical model that supports hypothesis one is derived from question 5 of the 2002 survey and question 6 of the 2004 survey. This question is the same for both surveys and reads:

“Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the overall performance of the City in providing services to Phoenix residents?”

Responses were coded as follows:

Very Satisfied	=1
Satisfied	=2
Dissatisfied	=3
Very Dissatisfied	=4
Not Sure	=5

Categories very satisfied and satisfied are collapsed and treated as satisfied which takes the value of 1; while categories dissatisfied and very dissatisfied are collapsed and treated as dissatisfied, which takes the value of 0. With a discrete dependent variable that takes a value of 1 or 0, an analytical model that takes into account the nature of the distribution and makes the correct assumptions about the error term is needed. Therefore, logistic regression is suitable. There are two logistic models for hypothesis #1. The first supports the first part of the research question, as follows:

What factors determine citizens' evaluations of local government performance and service delivery?

$$y = a + b\sum x + e, \quad (1A)$$

Where,

y = the probability that the person responding is satisfied;

a = the intercept;

b = the slope of the effect of each independent variable;

x = vector of independent variables predicting satisfaction, and includes race/ethnicity; gender, age, residential tenure, and income; and

e = error term.

The second logistic model estimates the second part of the question:

To what extent does this depend on personal experience with local government?

$$y = a + b_1x_1 + b_2x_2 + e, \quad (1B)$$

Where,

y = the probability that the person responding is satisfied with local government performance and service delivery;

a = the intercept;

b = the slope of the effect of each independent variable;

x_1 = vector of independent variables predicting satisfaction, and includes race/ethnicity gender, age, residential tenure, and income;

x_2 = measure of personal experience with local government; and

e = error term

Testing Hypothesis #2:

In order to evaluate citizen satisfaction with individual city services, this research relies on question 4 on the 2002 survey and question 5 on the 2004 survey. Both questions are the same and ask:

“As you know, the City of Phoenix provides various services to the community ranging from fire protection to street maintenance. On a scale of one to ten where one means you think the city is doing a poor job and ten means you think the city is doing an excellence job, how would you rate the City of Phoenix on (sic)which of the following? Remember, one means poor job and ten means an excellent job.”

Since the dependent variable is continuous with values of one through ten, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is appropriate. Specific services include:

1. Police services
2. Fire services
3. Crime prevention
4. Garbage / recycling
5. Street repair
6. Streets clean
7. Parks and recreation
8. Housing for the poor

9. Youth programs
10. New employment
11. Ambulance services
12. Art and culture
13. Job training
14. Gang activity
15. Library services

The analytical model for the second hypothesis regression is as follows:

$$y = a + b\Sigma x + e, \quad (2)$$

Where,

y = Rating of the particular service, say police protection;

a = the intercept;

b = slope of the effect of the individual independent variable;

x = vector of independent variables, explaining rating and includes race/ethnicity, gender; personal experience, residential tenure, and income; and

e = error term

Separate regressions will be carried out to represent each of the fifteen different specific services examined, thus reducing equation #2 practically we

have:

$$\text{Police services} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2A)$$

$$\text{Fire services} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2B)$$

$$\text{Crime Prevention} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2C)$$

$$\text{Garbage/Recycling} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2D)$$

$$\text{Street Repair} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2E)$$

$$\text{Streets Clean} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2F)$$

$$\text{Parks \& Recreation} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2G)$$

$$\text{Housing for Poor} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2H)$$

$$\text{Youth Programs} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2I)$$

$$\text{New Employment} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2J)$$

$$\text{Ambulance Services} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2K)$$

$$\text{Art \& Culture} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2L)$$

$$\text{Job Training} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2M)$$

$$\text{Gang Activity} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2N)$$

$$\text{Library Services} = a + b\Sigma x + e \quad (2O)$$

Chapter 4 provides detailed information reviewing the findings. Four major findings are presented. In addition, contextual information is provided to help understand specific findings within the analysis.

Chapter 4

FINDINGS

PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

The analysis begins with the descriptive summaries of the final sample. As Table 1 shows, there were 1405 heads of household in the sample. Their mean age is approximately 46 years old, suggesting that these are adults of middle age, divided almost evenly amongst the sexes. As indicative of the general population of the City of Phoenix, Anglos make up a majority of the sample (64.7%). The mean household income is \$47,880. These are adults who have lived in the City of Phoenix fairly long, approximately 22 years.

Table 1
Sample Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD
Gender (Male)	47.0% (n=660)	
Age	45.8	13.56
Race/Ethnicity (Anglo)	64.7% (n=909)	
Income	\$47,880.50	\$19,626.31
Residential Tenure	21.8	17.01
City Performance	89.0	0.39
Support City	91.0	0.29
Contact City	32.0 (n=223)	0.47
Contact City -- Treated Professionally	86.0 (n=192)	0.35
Contact City -- Handled Timely	74.0 (n=164)	0.44
N	1405	

The respondents in the sample rate the City of Phoenix highly as a good place to live (mean = 91.0%). They also rate the overall performance of the city in delivering services to its residents very highly (89%). Interestingly, of the 1405 respondents, only 223 (32.0%) reported having made contact with the city within the previous 12 months; seeking service, information, or to make a complaint. The 223 who reported making contact, reported positively on their experience with the city “customer service.” Of the 223, 192 (86.0%) said they were treated professionally, while another 164 (74.0%) reported that their needs were handled in a timely fashion.

ANALYSIS

The correlation matrix on the interrelationships among the variables is presented in Table 2. The purpose of a correlation matrix analysis is to determine how intercorrelated the variables are in order to deal with multicollinearity. As the data in Table 2 indicate, the interacting correlations are fairly good for multivariate analysis. Given the patterns of these correlations, multicollinearity will not be expected.

Table 2
Correlation Matrix

	Gender	City Performance	Contact	Professional Treatment	Handled Timely	Race/Ethnicity	Residential Tenure	Age	Support City	Income
Gender	-----									
City Performance	0.00	-----								
Contact	0.01	-0.09*	-----							
Professional Treatment	-0.12	0.23**	•	-----						
Handled Timely	-0.21	0.23**	•	0.49**	-----					
Race/Ethnicity	-0.01	0.04	0.14**	0.04	0.05	-----				
Residential Tenure	-0.10	-0.89**	0.12**	-0.06	-0.04	0.17**	-----			
Age	-0.07	-0.03	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.27**	0.47**	-----		
Support City	0.01	0.34**	-0.02	0.14	0.05	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-----	
Income	0.05	0.02	0.05	-0.03	-0.06	0.21**	-0.01	-0.07**	-0.03	-----

Note: Significance levels are two tailed.

*p<.05; **p<.01.

A second level of diagnostic analysis for the regression models involves evaluation of the nature of the distribution of the dependent variables. The first dependent variable examined is overall performance in service delivery by the city (Table 3.) The sample gives the city a very high rating. As much as 88.5% report being satisfied with the ability of the city to provide services. Of course due to the literature, one would expect these statistics to differ amongst Anglos and non-Anglos as well as between men and women.

While 89.4% of Anglos report being satisfied, 86.8% of non-Anglos report being satisfied, although these differentials are much closer for men and women with only 0.02% differential, 88.4% and 88.6% respectively. The distribution of the dependent variables for each of the individual services included in the dissertation is presented in Appendix A. As these data show, there is quite a bit of variability. These distributions provide meaningful deviations for the regression analysis.

Table 3
Citizen Rating of City's Overall Performance

Performance	Race / Ethnicity						Gender			
	All		Anglo		Non-Anglo		Male		Female	
	Sample	% Satisfied	Sample	% Satisfied	Sample	% Satisfied	Sample	% Satisfied	Sample	% Satisfied
	1405	88.5	909	89.4	496	86.8	745	88.4	660	88.6

Table 4 and Table 5 report the mean citizen rating for all fifteen services and explore the potential for gaps that may occur for particular services. Table 4 examines mean service ratings by comparing Anglos versus Non-Anglos. With the exception of one service, countering gang activity, there are no gaps that are significant. Table 5 examines mean service ratings between men and women to determine if a gender gap is evident. With the exception of police services, no others achieve significance.

Table 4
Citizens' Ratings of Individual Services by Race / Ethnicity

Service	Rating						Race / Ethnicity Gap
	All		Anglo		Non-Anglo		
	Sample	Mean Rating	Sample	Mean Rating	Sample	Mean Rating	
Police Protection	704	7.12	434	7.02	270	7.29	-0.27
Crime Prevention	701	6.49	475	6.39	226	6.70	-0.31
Countering Gang Activity	704	6.64	434	6.47	270	6.91	-0.44*
Fire Protection	701	8.55	475	8.59	226	8.47	0.12
Ambulance Services	701	8.50	475	8.52	226	8.45	0.07
Garbage & Recycling	704	7.79	434	7.89	270	7.63	0.26
Streets Clean	704	6.98	434	6.84	270	7.19	-0.35
Street Repair	701	6.73	475	6.68	226	6.81	-0.13
Attracting New Employers	701	7.04	475	7.02	226	7.07	-0.05
Job Training	701	7.01	475	7.15	226	6.73	0.42
Services / Housing for Poor	701	6.34	475	6.25	226	6.53	-0.28
Youth Programs	704	7.16	434	7.04	270	7.35	-0.31
Art & Culture	701	7.16	475	7.10	226	7.28	-0.18
Parks & Recreation	704	7.14	434	7.11	270	7.19	-0.08
Library Services	1054	8.01	687	8.03	367	7.98	0.05

*p<.05

Table 5
Citizens' Ratings of Individual Service by Gender

Service	Rating						
	All		Male		Female		Gender
	Sample	Mean Rating	Sample	Mean Rating	Sample	Mean Rating	Gap
Police Protection	704	7.12	351	6.92	353	7.33	-0.41*
Crime Prevention	701	6.49	309	6.49	392	6.49	0
Countering Gang Activity	704	6.64	351	6.51	353	6.78	-0.27
Fire Protection	701	8.55	309	8.48	392	8.61	-0.13
Ambulance Services	701	8.5	309	8.37	392	8.6	-0.23
Garbage & Recycling	704	7.79	351	7.79	353	7.8	-0.01
Streets Clean	704	6.98	351	6.92	353	7.04	-0.12
Street Repair	701	6.73	309	6.74	392	6.72	0.02
Attracting New Employers	701	7.04	309	6.93	392	7.12	-0.19
Job Training	701	7.01	309	7.09	392	6.95	0.14
Services / Housing for Poor	701	6.34	309	6.47	392	6.23	0.24
Youth Programs	704	7.16	351	7.08	353	7.24	-0.16
Art & Culture	701	7.16	309	7.21	392	7.12	0.09
Parks & Recreation	704	7.14	351	7.03	353	7.25	-0.22
Library Services	1054	8.01	484	7.88	570	8.13	-0.25

*p<.05

TESTING RESEARCH QUESTION #1 AND HYPOTHESIS

What factors influence citizens' evaluation of the ability of a local government to deliver services?

H₁: Several factors will affect citizen evaluation of service delivery of local government including gender, ethnicity, age, residential tenure, and income.

H₀: There is no relationship between personal factors and evaluation of local government ability in service delivery.

The logit regression analysis directly testing these hypotheses is presented in Table 6. The chi square ($\chi^2 = 178.24$, $p < .001$) testing the overall fit of the model is robust and significant. Thus the null hypothesis that these variables have no effect on the dependent variable can be rejected. Having rejected the null hypothesis, we can now proceed with interpreting the regression results.

The results show very clearly that gender, ethnicity, age, and income have no marginal significant effects on citizens' evaluations of the city's overall ability to deliver services. However, residential tenure does have a negative effect (MLE = -0.02, $p < .01$), suggesting that residents who have lived longer in the city are less likely to rate the city high on service delivery. That is, men and women, Anglos and non-Anglos, older and younger adults, and lower and upper income residents do not differ in their ratings of the city's ability to deliver services. Arguably, what may be occurring is that residents who continue to live within the city have an association with time in regards to service delivery. Thus, the longer one lives within the city, the more one can remember when cost for services was less than present day.

The most important significant positive effect appears to be coming from citizens' overall feelings about the city. That is, citizens who are predisposed to seeing the local jurisdiction as a good place to live are generally more positive about its ability to deliver services to its residents (MLE = 2.45, $p < .001$). This is a very important finding that speaks to a recurring question within the literature. The question has been posed frequently as to whether or not citizens' evaluations of local government emanate from their personal experience dealing with the government, or from more general feelings about the local government. This result clearly speaks to the importance of citizens' general feelings toward the local government.

Table 6A
Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with
City's Overall Ability to Deliver Services

Variable	Effect	t -ratio	Significance
Gender (Male = 1)	-0.05	0.27	
Ethnicity (Anglo = 1)	0.14	0.61	
Age	0.01	0.14	
Tenure	-0.02	2.67*	yes
Income	0.03	0.63	
Support City	2.45	10.73**	yes
Constant	0.83	1.46	
χ^2	178.24**		
Percent Correctly Classified	89.60		
N	1392		

Note: Zip code dummies (38) are not reported.

*p< .01; **p<.001.

The regression reported in Table 6A does not include place dummies (zip codes). These place dummies are reported in Table 6B. They test the hypothesis that location of the place of service within the city will impact citizen's ratings of city services. This is linked to residential segregation and the unevenness of service delivery across the city.

Table 6B
Logit Regression of Effects on Satisfaction with City's
Overall Ability to Deliver Services (Zip Code Results)

Zip Code	Effect	t-ratio	Significance
85003	-1.77	1.75†	yes
85004	17.80	0.00	
85006	0.76	0.64	
85007	-0.84	0.83	
85008	0.09	0.13	

85009	-0.84	1.28	
85012	-1.85	1.83†	yes
85013	-0.15	0.16	
85014	0.17	0.23	
85015	-0.94	1.45	
85016	0.65	0.73	
85017	-1.54	2.61**	yes
85018	-1.37	2.45*	yes
85019	0.20	0.25	
85020	-0.34	0.52	
85021	-0.61	0.91	
85022	0.10	0.13	
85023	0.56	0.75	
85024	-0.88	0.90	
85027	-0.37	0.62	
85028	0.09	0.10	
85029	-0.25	0.36	
85031	-1.68	2.40*	yes
85033	-1.35	2.55**	yes
85034	17.89	0.00	
85035	-1.58	2.16*	yes
85037	-1.26	1.91†	yes
85040	-0.74	1.17	
85041	-1.20	1.94†	yes
85042	-0.95	1.38	
85043	18.02	0.00	
85044	-0.33	0.42	
85045	17.81	0.00	
85048	0.01	0.01	
85050	-1.01	1.27	
85051	-0.88	1.38	
85053	-0.25	0.32	
85086	-3.41	2.40*	yes

Note: Zip Code 85032 is the omitted reference category


†p<.05 one tail test; *p<.05;

**p<.01.

Of the 38 zip codes within the model, ten of them reached significance and are indicated within the table. Interestingly, all the zip codes achieving statistical significance are negatively signed. This means residents in these areas are less likely to rate the city high on service delivery relative to reference zip code

85032. This type of analysis is important because it provides geographical context to service areas that are less likely to rate the city high on its overall ability to deliver services. A better contextual understanding is provided once these zip code areas are mapped and provide for visualization. Figure 1 shows this data mapped for easy visualization.

Figure 1: Visual Analysis of Contextual Results for Service Districts



The top portions of Figure 1 highlight the zip code regions that make up Phoenix. The bottom portions of Figure 1 are those zip codes that reached significance within the regression model. This visualization shows that areas

within specific urban villages of the city are impacted. The very north region indicated by zip code 85086 represents a newly annexed land that was acquired in 1995 and again in 2003. While pockets of this area remain unincorporated, the Phoenix General Plan (2010) includes this area. Incorporation may influence the quality of service. Contextually this may explain why this area was less likely to rate the city high for overall support of services. Zip codes found within the west and south regions of the city represent the Maryvale and South Mountain urban villages. These communities demographically are Black and Latino concentrated areas which have been historically underserved. The effects of residential segregation may explain why these areas are less likely to rate the city high overall.

The second part of research question one asks whether personal experience with local government will impact citizens' evaluations of service delivery in local government. The hypothesis derived from this question says that personal experience will be a factor. The null hypothesis states that personal experience will not matter. The analysis in Table 7 answers these hypotheses directly.

The data in Table 7 are arranged under three (3) regression models. Regression model 1 tests the effect of contacting the city, while regression models 2 and 3 test two different renditions of the experience of contacting the city and having a positive experience. Model 2 tests the effect of contacting the city and being handled professionally, while Model 3 tests the effect of contacting the city

and having needs handled in a timely fashion. Looking very closely at the chi squares ($\chi^2 = 103.46, 24.26, 26.49, p < .001$) testing the relevance of the three models, it is clear that these variables have no clear effects on the dependent variable, therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected. With the robustness of these models now confirmed we can move to the marginal effects of the variables.

Model 1 shows very clearly that the effect of contacting the city is negative and significant (MLE = -0.78, $p < .01$). That is, those who contacted the city for any reason were less likely to rate the city high. This is obviously explained by the fact that those who contact the city make their contact on the basis of some inadequacy and may already be exacerbated about what they may already be defining as the general failing of the city.

The contrasting tale emerges in Models two and three where the results clearly show that those who have contacted the city and left with a positive experience rate the city much higher than their counterparts who did not leave with a satisfactory experience (MLE=1.21, $p < .05$ and 1.20, $p < .01$, respectively). Interestingly while the effect of contacting has been introduced to the models, the positive effect of general feelings of the city remains robust and positive across all three models. The story is clear, while citizens' general feelings about their community comes into play in evaluation of their local government's ability to provide services to its residents their personal experience dealing with the local government should not be discounted. In other words, both factors are relevant.

Table 7
 Logit Regression of Effect on Satisfaction with City's Overall
 Ability to Deliver Services (Factoring in the Effects of Contact with City)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Contacted City	-0.78** (2.69)	-----	-----
Contacted City & Handled Professionally	-----	1.21* (2.48)	-----
Contacted City & Handled Timely	-----	-----	1.20** (2.77)
Gender (Male = 1)	-0.23 (0.79)	-0.12 (0.29)	0.02 (0.04)
Race/Ethnicity (Anglo = 1)	-0.05 (0.15)	0.33 (0.72)	0.34 (0.74)
Age	0.05 (0.03)	0.10 (0.43)	0.08 (0.36)
Residential Tenure	-0.01 (1.56)	-0.02 (1.36)	-0.02 (1.54)
Income	0.19* (2.44)	0.11 (0.92)	0.10 (0.84)
Support City	1.87*** (5.04)	1.80*** (3.24)	2.02*** (3.61)
Constant	0.738	-1.15	-1.12
χ^2	106.46***	24.60***	26.49***
Percent Correctly Classified	89.90	85.90	85.50
N	694	220	220

Note: Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics
 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

TESTING RESEARCH QUESTION #2 AND HYPOTHESES

What personal factors influence citizens' evaluation of local government to deliver specific local services?

H₂: There is a relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services, say police services.

H₀: There is no relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of specific local services.

The ordinary least squares regression analyses directly testing these hypotheses are presented in Table 8. Three of the fifteen services analyzed (not reported) did not generate any effects. Their F-ratios did not achieve significance. These services included fire, garbage and recycling, and parks and recreation services. Therefore, the null hypotheses are accepted for fire, garbage and recycling, and parks and recreation services, indicating that there is no relationship between personal factors and citizen evaluation of these services respectfully.

In reviewing the results within the reported models, it is clear that overall support for the city impacts the review of specific city services. Within each regression for the specific service reported, support for the city is significant. Heads of households, who already have a positive opinion of the city, tend to rate delivery of specific services highly. This supports the broader view of the 'bandwagon effect' whereby people who have a positive view of the city to begin with will have a positive review of specific services across the board. This result

is observed in rating the city's overall ability to deliver services. Now one also sees the effects across specific services.

Table 8
Determinants of Citizens' Ratings of City Performance in Individual Service Areas

Variable	Police Services	Crime Prevention	Gang Prevention	Ambulance Services	Street Clean	Street Repair	New Employ	Job Training	Housing for Poor	Youth Programs	Art and Culture	Library Services
Gender (Male =1)	-0.43** (2.49)	-0.05 (0.28)	-0.30 (1.50)	-0.24† (1.72)	-0.16 (0.89)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.21 (1.18)	0.08 (0.36)	0.14 (0.62)	-0.15 (0.75)	0.11 (0.63)	-0.23 (1.62)
Race/Ethnicity (Anglo = 1)	-0.40* (2.09)	-0.28 (1.32)	-0.46* (2.05)	0.09 (0.60)	-0.35† (1.73)	0.05 (0.22)	-0.04 (0.22)	0.34 (1.44)	-0.13 (0.51)	-0.49* (2.29)	-0.18 (0.90)	0.00 (0.02)
Age	0.04 (0.50)	0.18* (2.01)	0.03 (0.26)	0.09 (1.27)	0.16† (1.77)	0.03 (0.32)	0.13† (1.64)	0.18† (1.70)	0.06 (0.52)	0.44*** (4.53)	0.24** (2.77)	0.09 (1.26)
Residential Tenure	-0.01 (0.84)	-0.02** (2.81)	-0.01† (1.88)	-0.00 (0.73)	-0.03*** (4.13)	-0.02** (2.81)	-0.01 (1.44)	-0.02* (2.05)	-0.03*** (3.72)	-0.03*** (5.27)	-0.01† (1.76)	0.00 (0.68)
Income	0.08† (1.68)	0.04 (0.76)	0.02 (0.46)	-0.09* (2.53)	-0.03 (0.60)	-0.05 (1.06)	0.02 (0.34)	0.13* (2.33)	0.01 (0.21)	-0.03 (0.68)	-0.07 (1.48)	-0.02 (0.46)
Support City	1.41*** (4.43)	1.97*** (6.45)	0.89* (2.38)	0.65** (2.86)	0.58† (1.75)	1.43*** (4.72)	1.42*** (4.84)	1.27*** (3.65)	0.80* (2.22)	0.63† (1.77)	1.01*** (3.51)	0.61** (2.58)
Constant	6.00***	4.60***	6.37***	8.09***	6.85***	5.90***	5.56***	4.91***	6.05***	6.39***	6.02***	7.27***
F-Ratio	5.36***	9.30***	2.92**	3.39**	4.28***	5.68***	4.89***	4.78***	3.93**	6.87***	4.17***	2.29*
R ² (x100)	4.50	7.50	2.50	2.90	3.60	4.70	4.10	4.00	3.30	5.70	3.50	1.30
Adj. R ² (x100)	3.60	6.70	1.60	2.00	2.80	3.90	3.20	3.20	2.50	4.80	2.70	0.70
N	693	697	693	697	693	697	697	697	697	693	697	1045

Note: Reference category for gender is male. Reference category for ethnicity is Anglo.

Figures in parenthesis are t-statistics.

†p<.05 one tail test; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.

Four personal factors impact citizen's ratings of police services. One is gender. The data reveal that men are less likely than women to rate the city high on police services. Race/Ethnicity is also important. Compared to non-Anglos, Anglos were less likely to rate police services high. The last two are overall support for the city and income. Age and residential tenure are not significant and therefore do not explain for police services ratings. Wealthier households are more likely to rate police services high. The null hypothesis is rejected.

Three factors explain citizen's ratings of the city in crime prevention services. The first is overall support for the city. The data also reveal the older the head of household was, the more likely they rated the city high on crime prevention services. Additionally, the data reveal the longer one has resided in the city the less likely they rated the city high in crime prevention services. Gender, race/ethnicity, and income are not significant and therefore do not explain crime prevention service ratings.

In reviewing gang prevention services, overall support for the city remains a strong personal factor determining satisfaction. The data also reveal that Anglos are less likely to rate gang prevention services high. In addition, the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely they are to rate prevention of gang activity high. Gender, age, and income are not statistically significant and therefore are not personal factors related to explaining gang prevention service ratings.

Moving to ambulance services, overall support for the city remains strong. Males are less likely than females to rate ambulance services high, and those

whose incomes are higher are less likely to rate ambulance services high. Race/ethnicity, age, and residential tenure are not statistically significant and therefore are not personal factors that explain citizen evaluation of ambulance services. The profile of a resident rating the city high on ambulance services is a lower income female who is already sanguine about the city.

The longer one has lived in the city, the less likely they rated the city high on street cleaning performance. Anglos are less likely than non-Anglos to rate the city high on street cleaning performance. Age is also a contributing personal factor, whereby older residents are more likely than younger residents to rate street cleaning services high. Those who show overall support for the city are also more likely to rate street cleaning services high. Gender and income are not statistically significant and therefore are not personal factors associated with citizen evaluation of street cleaning services.

Support for the city is a strong personal factor in determining satisfaction with street repair services. Residential tenure is also significant, and produces a negative effect. In other words, the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely they are to rate the city high on street repair services. Gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income are not statistically significant and are not personal factors related to explaining citizen evaluation of street repair services.

In reviewing services to attract new employers, overall support for the city remains a strong factor. Age is also a contributing personal factor, whereby the older one is, the more likely he or she is to rate the city high in attracting new

employers to the city. Gender, race/ethnicity, residential tenure, and income are not statistically significant and are not personal factors that contribute to understanding citizens' service ratings of the city's efforts in attracting new employers.

Overall support for the city is the strongly related to high service ratings in job training services. Age and income also contribute; whereby the older one is, and the more income one has, respectively each are likely to rate the city high in providing job training services. Residential tenure is statistically significant, and has a negative effect, whereby the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely he or she is to rate the city high in job training services. Gender and race/ethnicity are not statistically significant. are not personal factors that contribute to job training service ratings.

In reviewing housing services for the poor, length of residence is important. Residents who have lived in the city for much longer rated the city lower on housing services for the poor. Overall support for the city contributes, whereby if one supports the city overall, the more likely he or she will rate housing services for the poor high. Gender, race/ethnicity, age, and income are not statistically significant and do not contribute to explaining ratings for housing service for the poor.

Age and residential tenure are associated with explaining the likelihood of high ratings for youth program services. The older one is, the more likely he or she will rate the city high in youth program services. However, the effect of

residential tenure is negative, and therefore, the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely he or she will rate the city high in youth program services. Anglos are less likely than non-Anglos to rate the city high in youth program services. Those who have an overall support for the city are more likely to rate youth program services high. Gender and income are not statistically significant and do not contribute as personal factors that explain youth program service ratings.

Regarding art and culture services, overall support for the city is germane and has a positive effect. Age also contributes, whereby the older one is, the more likely he or she will rate art and culture services high. Residential tenure is significant and negative, indicating the longer one has lived in the city, the less likely he or she will rate the city high in providing art and culture services. Gender, race/ethnicity, and income are not statistically significant and thus are not personal factors that explain art and culture service ratings.

Finally, library services; overall support is the only significant factor determining citizen's ratings of library services. Gender, race/ethnicity, age, residential tenure, and income are not statistically significant.

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Previous chapters have discussed various aspects of local government, including the relationship between local government and citizens' review of service delivery. This chapter discusses implications for both scholarly considerations, and practitioner applications based on the discovery of findings within chapter four. It also provides areas of consideration for local government knowledge application.

There are four major findings within the study. First, there has been a recurring question within the literature: does citizens' evaluation of government rest within more general feelings and attitudes towards local government, or does this germinate from their own personal experience? This study answers that question unambiguously. Second, in recent times, especially following the kinds of investments and attention local governments have been paying to "customer service," there has been question as to how important customer service is to the relationship between local governments and their citizens. This study addresses that question and shows that customer service is important. Third, there have also been questions as to whether citizens who experience government services similarly will collectively react similarly to the service experience. This study uses its contextual variables to address that question. Finally, since Charles Tiebout presented his theory of competition in local government, there have been

questions as to what exactly lengthy long term residence in a community means. The study demonstrates that lengthy residency may mean more than people think.

While the study focused specifically on the community of Phoenix, Arizona, the findings can be extrapolated and used to further generalize theoretical considerations incorporated into local government practices. The City of Phoenix is not unlike any other city in that it provides services to its community and remains accountable to the community. The demographic makeup of the city, the operational structure of the city, are both compatible to other jurisdictions. Like any other city, it is not immune to economic challenges, issues with growing diversity, and overall accountability to its citizens.

According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the City of Phoenix now ranks as the 6th largest city in the U.S. with a population of approximately 1.4 million people. This represents a 9.4% population increase from the 2000 Census. Median household income (2006-2010) for the city is \$48,823. White persons non-Hispanic represent 46.5% of the overall population, persons of Hispanic or Latino origin represent 40.8% of the overall population, and Black persons represent 6.5% of the overall population of the city. Of those persons 25 years or older, 25.5% have a Bachelor's degree or higher, while 79.8% are high school graduates. Under the city charter, Phoenix's government structure is described as being empowered by the voters. The operational structure of the city represents the council-manager form of government.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LITERATURE

The first major finding generated from the study speaks to citizens' general feelings of local government. The results garnered from research question one indicate that citizens who are predisposed to supporting the city are more likely to rate the city high in service delivery. This finding supports the general view that citizen evaluations of government derive in part from their general feelings about government. Broader ideological considerations may contribute to one's overall general feelings of local government. Such considerations include political ideology, political culture within the region (Elazar, 1984; Lieske, 1994); and a sense of trust in government (Gamson, 1968; Christensen and Laegreid, 2005).

Much discussion has taken place within the literature over the influence of political ideology. Generally, one's political ideology shapes one's views with respect to the role of government. Within the 21st century, political ideology has been integrated into the two major political party platforms – modern liberals associate themselves with the Democratic Party and modern conservatives associate themselves with the Republican Party. Traditionally, a liberal view shows positive support towards the role of government in citizens' lives. Aspects of government should be infused via the support of women's rights, multiculturalism, reproductive rights, healthcare reform, environmental issues, and support of social programs such as welfare, social security and Medicare.

Conversely, a more conservative position believes in a reduced role for government within citizen's lives. Emphasis is based on the role of free market capitalism and individual achievement. This ideology opposes entitlement programs such as welfare and Medicare programs, and frowns at progressive social issues such as feminism and reproductive rights. Additionally, faith based conservatives have become more predominant within the Republican Party since the 1980s. These conservatives infuse religious ideology into the political ideology of the party and influence public policy at federal, state, and local levels.

In reviewing broader ideological considerations affiliated with local government, political culture is often discussed. Elazar's (1984) political culture sub classifications of individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic help explain variations in political processes, institutional structures, and political behaviors within a region, and arguably, is now one of the most empirically tested with respect to political culture (Lieske, 1994). Despite the empirical applications of Elazar's work, several criticisms remain to his classification schemes.

Political culture theory was furthered by the work of Joel Lieske (1994). Lieske and Kincaid (1991) contend that people who settled in the United States came with distinctive ethnoreligious identities, cultural preferences and ways of life. As groups settled in clusters and migrated westward, values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors were passed down generationally. Given the pervasiveness of local self-government that constituted the American democratic experiment, groups could give significant social and political expression to their

cultural preferences within geographically defined political jurisdictions, namely, towns, townships, cities, and counties (Kincaid, 1982, as cited in Lieske, 1994, p. 890).

Lieske contends that regional subcultures are products of historical interactions between the cultural preferences of different ethnoreligious settler groups and the nationally centripetal and regionally centrifugal demands of their environments (p. 891). This formulation is helpful in understanding why specific city services differ within local governments throughout a region. Local preferences may in fact be a bi-product of regional subcultures which help explain, at least contextually, why specific city services may remain high on the local agenda. This may also prove helpful in understanding why certain regions maybe more accepting of government services and policies.

Finally, the findings within research question one support continued theoretical considerations between the relationship of trust and government. Theoretically, we understand that citizen trust enables governments to act without having to use acts of coercion (Gamson, 1968) and that high levels of trust within government make available additional policies and strategies to political leaders (Aberbach and Walker, 1970). In addition, the literature offers recent empirical examples whereby citizen satisfaction and trust are positively correlated. Christensen and Laegreid (2005) found legitimacy of political and administrative institutions and actors is based largely on trust. Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and

Immerwahr (2004) find strong links between overall satisfaction with public services at the local level and confidence in government.

The second significant finding of the analyses speaks to the importance of customer service. Within the last twenty to thirty years many local governments integrated various aspects of ‘New Public Management’ as a means to operate government more like a business and use market based services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Savas, 1987). As a result, organizational culture within local governments evolved and now residents are viewed as ‘customers.’

The results from Table 7 indicate that indeed, customer service is an integral component of service delivery and ‘customer satisfaction.’ Within model one, residents who contacted the city were less likely to rate the city high. It is safe to assume that contacting the city is a form of “demand protest” due to some sort of shortfall they had experienced. The results within Models 2 and 3, where contacting the city comes into play reveals that this additional contact with the ‘customer’ represents an opportunity for the city to ‘right a wrong.’ The outcome within the models support this; those who contacted the city and left with a positive experience rate the city much higher as opposed to their counterparts who left with a negative experience.

This finding underscores the importance of customer service as an integral component to the organizational culture of local governments. It supports the idea of local governments having a critical second chance at addressing their customers’ needs and problem solving service failures. If local governments can

provide successful customer service transactions, their opportunity to ‘win back their customer’ is rewarded via a renewal of citizen satisfaction. In doing so, this may keep citizens engaged and develop and strengthen civic participation. This aspect adds an important linkage to the theoretical considerations at play and certainly provides an avenue to test empirically.

Van Ryzin (2004, 2006) applied the concept of expectancy disconfirmation theory onto citizen satisfaction of local public services. This body of literature resonates primarily within models examining private goods and services. Others including Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen, 2005; Lyons, Lowery, and DeHoog, 1992; and Oliver, 2009) have contributed to the body of knowledge between publically provided goods and services to citizen (“customer”) satisfaction. The findings here support continued examination that furthers this scholarship.

The third important finding within the analyses speaks to context and shared experience within neighborhoods. The findings within the regression reported in Table 6B addresses this aspect; specifically, the service areas of zip codes 85003, 85012, 85017, 85018, 85031, 85033, 85035, 85037, 85041, and 85086. Once mapped, it is clear that several of these zip code areas form a contiguous region. Several possible scenarios could be at play.

An area of concern is that this may represent a service distribution issue. The literature representing service distribution within local governments is vast (Lineberry, 1977, Rich, 1982, Hero 1986). The contextual issue here of “who

gets what” is important to establishing an equitable distribution of services that generates consistent and effective performance outcomes. Earlier research with respect to service distribution underscored racial discrimination as a factor (Lineberry and Welch, Jr., 1974). Physical environment of the contiguous areas, crime rate levels, access to libraries and parks, etc. may play a contributing role to the neighborhood composition and neighborhood quality within these areas (Lineberry, 1977; Durand, 1976; Lovrich & Taylor, 1976; Brown and Coulter, 1983). Indeed, given that residential segregation has contributed to shared community experiences, this legacy establishes an enduring social construct (Lewis & Hamilton, 2011).

While much of the empirical analyses in local government service distribution took place thirty and forty years ago, the evidence presented within this study indicate that this type of analysis remains important in today’s discussion.

A corollary to service distribution is service quality. This aspect is addressed within the street level bureaucracy literature (Lipsky, 1980). Given the contiguous areas of the zip codes affected, service quality may be a contributing factor within these regions. In other words, are residents who live within these zip code areas receiving “extra attention” from police, or not enough attention from other street-level bureaucrats such as trash collectors and street repairs?

The theoretical considerations of service quality should reinforce the customer service model many local governments have adopted throughout the

years. Empirical tests directed at determining the levels of impact street level bureaucrats contribute to citizen satisfaction would be important contributions to the literature.

The fourth and final major finding relates to the relationship between residential tenure and service delivery. The results of the study indicate that residents who have lived in the city longer, are less likely to rate the city high on service delivery across the board. Recent analyses over current municipal responses to ‘The Great Recession’ (Rampell, 2009) highlight several important contributing factors that may explain this relationship. Most state and local governments rely on revenue streams associated with the housing market – i.e., property taxes. When state governments cannot collect revenue from this traditional stream, it no longer can provide local government support; ergo, the trickle down stops. The impact on local municipalities is two-fold. Local governments cannot run deficit budgets and therefore must either raise other revenue streams, traditionally by raising taxes, or cut costs.

Since employee compensation represents a major portion of the overall cost associated with local government, public scrutiny has increased with respect to this area. Employee compensation includes not only salary, but health care benefits to current and retired employees, as well as pension benefits. Unsustainable pension costs drive government budget liabilities, and play an increasingly larger role in deficits (Levine & Scorsone, 2011). In fact, according to the National Council of State Legislatures, between 2010 and 2011, thirty-nine

of the fifty states enacted significant revisions to at least one state retirement plan (as cited in Levine & Scorsone, 2011). Since most municipal employees are covered under state pension benefits, the impact affects local governments.

Local governments experience the same type of growth and recession periods as found within economic business cycles. Residents who have lived within a city for a long duration of time also experience these boom and bust cycles. This may explain why residents who hold a longer residential tenure have a lower likelihood of rating the city high on service delivery. In essence, these residents use time as a contributing factor towards their evaluation of local government.

For example, if given a twenty year span whereby a resident's tax liability to the city increased by 50%, that resident maybe questioning why overall cost to deliver the same set of services cost so much more. In fact, as demonstrated above, this is a valid question, given that municipal liabilities are tightly wrapped into employee associated costs. While the resident maybe very satisfied with his or her trash collection throughout the years, he or she may overall harbor negative feelings against the city because it's costing them a lot more for that service.

This is an important theoretical consideration that hasn't had much discussion within the literature. If satisfaction of local government services is tied negatively to time what other casual variables could help reshape negative feelings when time is a constant? Could this be a factor in shaping regional

political cultures, and if so, what other factors would help mitigate the effects?

Longitudinal analysis should help in this type of review.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

Public administration is an applied field that should focus on solving the key challenges facing the public sector (Waldo, 1968.) As public administration emerged as its own field of study within the early 20th century, there was a strong connection between academic and practitioner worlds, particularly led by Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick, and Leonard White and their respective work with organizations such as the Bureau of Municipal Research (Bolton and Stolcis, 2003.) However, over the years, that relationship diminished so much so that now the scholarship of public administration research rarely goes beyond the boundaries of academic journals.

Bushouse et al., (2011) recently reviewed the gap between practitioner and academic research publications within public administration journals. The top public administration journals were nearly void of publications from practitioners. While *Public Administration Review* added a “Theory in Practice” section in 2006, Bushouse et al. (2011) found it difficult to establish whether or not practitioners ever read this research. Conversely, while practitioner based publications such as *Governing*, *The Public Manager*, and *Public Management* are aimed at a practitioner readership, these periodicals are seldom connected with the public administration academic community (Bushouse et al., 2011).

The implications within the findings of this study could be extremely helpful to guide the practice of public administration in addition to support further theoretical considerations. If knowledge application is a function of engaged scholarship, then these findings should be integrated into the practitioner side of public administration. As such, this section reviews the implications to public administration practitioners.

The first major finding indicates that citizens who are predisposed to supporting the city are more likely to rate the city high in service delivery. Practitioners who review this relationship between political ideology and the role of government will be able to better assess whether or not new local government programs would be supported within their communities. For example, if a city manager within a very conservative city tried to implement new publicly funded after-school programs, given the community's view towards the role of government, the likelihood of success is very small.

The same holds true with respect to political culture within an area. Awareness of unique political cultures within an area may provide a new lens for practitioners to utilize in determining the likelihood of success or failure for particular services. For example, if a city has a moralistic political culture, citizen support for government supported social programs should exist. That said, new service that would support social programs would also be supported within that community. Fitzpatrick and Hero (1988), found that moralistic states demonstrated greater policy innovation along with greater economic equality

among its citizens – outcomes which are characteristic within the political goals of that culture.

Practitioner knowledge of Lieske's (1994) regional subcultures could provide context to better understand regional preferences for local government services. This has implications for local government at an organizational level, as well as the street-level.

Since the literature also establishes a linkage between citizen satisfaction and trust in government, it is important that local bureaucrats develop and support an environment of trust within the local community. This linkage can be supported within the daily transactions of street-level bureaucrats. Consider how a citizen interacts with employees of a motor vehicle department. Positive experiences embed a sense of trust within the local community, while negative experiences may leave doubt in the minds of citizens that city workers are not competent to perform efficiently within their jobs. Over time, these negative experiences can develop into a cynicism towards local government, which erodes the trust factor. Local government practitioners need to communicate to its employees the importance trust plays into the city's ability to carry forward services to its community. As the literature demonstrates, trust is a delicate variable that plays a vital role in holding local governments accountable. Additionally, trust takes time to establish, so repairing and re-establishing citizen trust with local government could become a complicated, time intensive endeavor.

The second major finding within the study presents the importance of customer service within local governments. The implications of this finding to practitioners are crucial to local government sustainability. First, city managers should promote an organizational culture that trains and supports this aspect of government interaction with its citizens. As with any organizational restructure, time and training become vital factors. However, customer service could be an integrated aspect to performance management outcomes within various governmental units which could help support organizational acceptance of treating citizens as customers.

Given the importance of customer service, this consideration may become an additional factor when reviewing services to be outsourced or privatized. Customer service accountability could be difficult to attain given the disconnection between private contractors and citizens. Ultimately, private companies hired to perform outsourced work ultimately work for the city, and not the citizenry. Placing this ‘middle man’ within the government –citizen relationship could have a negative impact in the development and maintenance of the customer service relationship. Within this model, the city becomes the customer and not the citizen.

The third discovery within the analysis speaks to the importance of context and shared experiences within neighborhoods. To some degree, the importance of context and shared experiences speaks directly to the importance of street level bureaucrats. Public administration practitioners should see this as an

opportunity to strengthen neighborhood community bonds with city employees. In practice the development of trust at the street level can further the overall efforts of the city, and promote civic engagement. It also can provide needed support to bear as the foundation for innovative programs.

On the flip side, practitioners should monitor service areas that are in need of additional attention. The results in Figure 1 demonstrate the value of visualizing geographical reference points. Practitioners who are able to utilize this type of information become powerful actors in resolving service deficiencies.

The fourth and final discovery within the results presents a challenge to practitioners. The finding yields a negative relationship between residential tenure and citizen satisfaction of city services. The literature suggests that the impact of time could be the key contributor in explaining this phenomenon. Boom and bust cycles within an economic timeframe will happen and we accept that assumption within a capitalistic economic model.

Given the recent literature that reviews local government and the challenges of ‘the great recession’ we know that factors such as health care and pension cost are contributing to overall citizen liability. Examples within the current literature highlight and propose several means to make changes. However, these changes have come from modifications gained through political means, and not bureaucratic.

Public administration practitioners could begin to instill measures that would help alleviate the problems associated with increased health cost of

government workers. Several practical examples exist, including the state of Alabama's 'fat tax' and various increases to medical co-pays for smokers. These types of reward and penalty practices to modify government employee behaviors are at best, controversial. Arguably, if government employees are agents of public stewardship, then imposing behavior modification tactics promotes public stewardship. Under this model, sanctions to those who choose not to comply are justly warranted. Many barriers lie within implementing such organizational changes, and thus the likelihood of transitioning to this type of model is unlikely, particularly without mitigating political support.

Chapter five has discussed the implications of the research findings framing the discussion around theoretical and practical considerations. This conversation is necessary. The practice cannot move forward without understanding and integrating the theory. New and existing theories cannot be developed unless scholars empirically examine what is truly going on at local, and other various levels of government. The marriage between the two needs to stay balanced and the discussion presented within chapter five underscores its importance.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Like all research, there are limitations within the data set. Based on the discussion within Chapter 5, it would be ideal if specific questions were integrated into the survey instrument that could encapsulate political ideology/

affiliation. The first major finding supports the view that citizen evaluations of government are derived in part from their general feelings of government. Capturing political ideology or party affiliation may lead to a better understanding of where association plays out, and could add to further theoretical considerations. As mentioned earlier, the City of Phoenix relies heavily on its volunteers to help curtail costs. Capturing this aspect within the survey instrument would yield a very unique opportunity to examine how aspects of volunteerism contribute to overall satisfaction of local government and local government services. It would be interesting to explore how this aspect contributes to the customer service model. Theoretically, volunteers are both consumers and customer representatives of their local government. The second major finding points to the importance of customer service within organizational cultures of local governments. Given the importance, from a practitioner lens, it would become vital to instill the customer service culture into the training and performance of its volunteers. This is an area that garners further empirical exploration. Arguably, local government has the most direct impact on citizens. Experiences that take place on the local level contribute to the overall political socialization process. The organic nature of local government permits change to occur more frequently and fluidly at this level. Continued empirical research that examines the bond between local government and citizens furthers our understanding of this relationship and allows for a more responsive form of government to develop.

REFERENCES

- Aberbach, J. D.; Rockman, B. A. (2000). *In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Aberback, J.D., & Walker, J.L. (1970). The attitudes of Blacks and Whites toward city services: Implications for public policy. In, *Financing the Metropolis. Public policy in urban economies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Alba, R.D., & Logan, J. (1991). Variations on two themes: racial and ethnic patterns in the attainment of suburban residence. *Demography*, 28, 431-453.
- Alba, R.D., & Logan, J. (1993). Minority proximity to Whites in suburbs: An individual-level analysis of segregation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1388-1427.
- Alvarez, M.R. & Butterfield, T.L. (2000). The resurgence of nativism in California? The case of Proposition 187 and illegal immigration. *Social Science Quarterly*, 81, 167-179.
- Ammons, D.N. (1996). *Municipal benchmarks: Assessing local performance and establishing community standards*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Arizona Department of Health Services. (2000). Advanced Arizona vital statistics for 2000. Accessed at <http://www.azdhs.gov/plan/report/ahs/ahs2000/toc00.htm>
- Arrow, K. (1950). A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. *Journal of Political Economy*, 58(4): 328-346.
- Antunes, G.E., & Plumlee, J.P. (1977). The distribution of an urban public service: Ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and bureaucracy as determinants of the quality of neighborhood streets. *Urban Affairs Review*, 12, 313- 332.
- Barlow, D.E., & Barlow, M.H. (2002). Racial profiling: A survey of African American police officers. *Police Quarterly*, 5, 334-358.
- Barnes, C., & Gill, D. (2000). *Declining government performance? Why citizens don't trust government*. Wellington, New Zealand: State Services Commission.
- Basolo, v., & Strong, D. (2002). Understanding the neighborhood: From residents' perceptions and needs to action. *Housing Policy Debate*, 13, 83-105.

Baxter, S. & Lansing, M. (1983). *Women and politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bayer, P., R. McMillan, and K. Rueben (2005). A equilibrium model of sorting in an urban housing market. NBER working paper 10865.

Beck, P.A., Rainey, H.G., and Traut, C. (1990). Disadvantage, disaffection, and race as divergent bases for citizen fiscal policy preferences. *The Journal of Politics* 52 (1) 71-93.

Behavior Research Center. (2002/2004). City of Phoenix Community Attitude Survey. Machine-readable data file. Phoenix, AZ: Behavior Research Center.

Belsky, E.S., Zhu, X.D., & McCue, D. (2006). Multiple-home ownership and the income elasticity of housing demand. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. W06-5.

Accessed at: <http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/w06-5.pdf>.

Berman, E.M. (1997). Dealing with cynical citizens. *Public Administration Review*, 57(2) 105-112.

Bickers, K.N., Salucci, L, & Stein, R.M. (2006). Assessing the micro-foundations of the Tiebout model. *Urban Affairs Review*, 42, 57-80.

Bish, R.L. and Ostrom, V. (1973). *Understanding Urban Government*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute.

Black, D. (1948a) On the rationale of group decision making. *Journal of Political Economy*, 56 (1) 23-34.

Black, D. (1948b). The elasticity of committee decisions with an altering size of majority. *Econometria*, 16 (3) 262-270.

Blau, P. M. (1977). *Inequality and heterogeneity: A primitive theory of social structure*. Free Press.

Blocker, T., & Eckberg, D. (1989). Environmental issues as women's issues: General concerns and local hazards. *Social Science Quarterly*, 70, 586-593.

Bloom, H.S., Ladd, H., and Yinger, J. (1983). Are property taxes capitalized into property values? In G.R. Zodrow (Ed.). *Local Provision of Public Services: The Tiebout Model after Twenty-Five Years*. New York: Academic Press.

- Bok, D. (2001). *The trouble with government*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bolotin, F.N., & Cingranelli, D.L. (1983). Equity and urban policy: The underclass hypothesis revisited. *The Journal of Politics*, 45, 209-219.
- Bolton, M.J., & Stolcis, G.B. (2003). Ties that do not bind: Musing on the specious relevance of academic research. *Public Administration Review*, 63, 626-630.
- Booms, B. (1966). City government form and public expenditure level. *National Tax Journal*, 19, 187-199.
- Borda, J.C-. de (1781). "On elections by ballot," in I McLean; A.B. Urken (eds.) *Classics of Social Choice*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Bouckaert, G., & Van de Walle, S. (2003). Comparing measures of citizen trust and user satisfaction as indicators of "good governance." Difficulties in linking trust and satisfaction indicators. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 69(3), 329-344.
- Boyer, E.L. (1996). The scholarship of engagement. *Journal of Public Service and Outreach*, 1, 11-20.
- Boyne, G.A. (1998). Bureaucratic theory meets reality: Public choice and service contracting in U.S. local government. *Public Administration Review*, 58(6), 474-484.
- Bozeman, B. (2002). Public value failure: When efficient markets may not do. *Public Administration Review*, 62(2), 145-161.
- Bradbury, M.D., & Waechter, D. (2009). Extreme outsourcing in local government: At the top and all but the top. *Review of Public Personnel Administration*, 29, 230-248. DOI: 10.1177/0734371X09332572.
- Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. *American Political Science Review* 89 (2), 271–94.
- Brown, K., & Coulter, P.B. (1983). Subjective and objective measures of police service delivery. *Public Administration Review* 43 (1), 50-58.

Brown, T., & Potoski, M. (2003). Transaction costs and institutional explanations for government service production decisions. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 13(4), 441-468.

Browning, R.P., Marshall, D., & Trabb, D. (1986). *Protest Is Not Enough*. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.

Brudney, J. F., Ryu, J. E., & Wright, D. S. (2005). Exploring and explaining contracting out: Patterns among the American states. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 15, 393-419.

Buchanan, J. M. (1949). The pure theory of government finance: A suggested approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 57(6), 496-505.

Buchanan, J.M. and G. Tullock (1962). *The Calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy*. University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor: MI.

Burns, E., & Schumaker, P. (1987). Gender differences in attitudes about the role of local government. *Social Science Quarterly*, 68, 138-147.

Burns, E., & Schumaker, P. (1988). Gender cleavages and the resolution of local policy issues. *American Journal of Political Science*, 32, 1070-1095.

Burrell, B. (1997). The political leadership of women and policymaking. (Symposium: Women and public policy). *Policy Studies Journal*, 25, 565-568.

Bushouse, B.K., Jacobson, W.S., Lambright, K.T., Llorens, J.J., Morse, R.S., & Poocharen, O. (2011). Crossing the divide: Building bridges between public administration practitioners and scholars. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21, 99-112.

Carr, J., & Karuppusamy, S. (2010). Reassessing the link between city structure and fiscal policy: Is the problem poor measures of governmental structure? *The American Journal of Public Administration*, 40(2), 209-228.

Carroll, S.(ed).(2003). *Women and American politics: new questions, new directions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Carroll, S., Dodson, D., & Mandel, R. (1991). *The impact of women in public office: An overview*. New Brunswick: Eagleton Institute of Politics.

Cavalcanti, H.B, & Schleef, D. (2001). The melting pot revisited.” *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 23, 115-35.

- Cebula, R.J. (1974a). Interstate migration and the Tiebout hypothesis: An analysis according to race, sex, and age. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 69, 876-879.
- Cebula, R.J. (1974b). Local government policies and migration: An analysis for SMSAs in the United States, 1965-1970. *Public Choice*, 19, 85-93.
- Cebula, R.J. (1978). An empirical note on the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 92, 705-711.
- Cebula, R.J. (1979). A survey of the literature on the migration impact of state and local government policies. *Public Finance*, 34, 69-84.
- Cebula, R.J., and Kohn, R.M. (1975). Public policies and migration patterns in the United States. *Public Finance*, 30, 186-196.
- Cebula, R.J. (2005). Internal migration determinants: Recent evidence. *International Advances in Economic Research*, 11(2), 267-274.
- Cebula, R.J. (2009). Migration and the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis revisited. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 68, 2, 542-551.
- Cebula, R.J. and G. Alexander (2006). Determinants of net interstate migration, 2000-2004. *Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy*, 27(2) 116-123.
- Chavez, L. (1991). *Out of the Barrio*. New York: Basic Books.
- Chodorow, N. (1974). Family Structure and Family Personality. In Zimbalist, M., Rosaldo, M & Lamphere, L (eds.), *Women, culture, and society* (pp. 43-66). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2005). Trust in government: The relative importance of service satisfaction, political factors, and demography. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 28, 487 - 511.
- Clark, D.E., & Hunter, W.J. (1992). The impact of economic opportunity, amenities, and fiscal factors in age-specific migration rates. *Journal of Regional Science*, 32(3), 349-365.
- Clark, W.A.V. (1991). Residential preferences and neighborhood racial segregation: A test of the Schelling segregation model." *Demography*, 28, 1-19.
- Clark, W.A.V. (1992). Residential preferences and residential choices in a multiethnic context. *Demography*, 29, 451-466.

- Clark, W.A.V. (2009). Changing residential preferences across income, education, and age. *Urban Affairs Review*, 44, 334-55.
- Clark, W.A.V., & Blue, Sarah A. (2004). Race, class and segregation patterns in U.S. immigrant gateway cities. *Urban Affairs Review* 39 (6), 667-688.
- Claassen, R.L. (2004). Political opinion and distinctiveness: The case of Hispanic ethnicity. *Political Research Quarterly*, 57, 4 609-620.
- Condorcet, M. J. [1785] (1972) *Essai Sur L'application De L'analyse A La Prbabilite Des Decisions Rendues A La Pluratie Des Voix*. New York: Chelsea Publishing Company. Facsimile reprint of original published in Paris by the Imprimerie Royale.
- Connerly, & Marans, R.W. (1988). Neighborhood quality: A description and analysis of indicators. In Hutteman, E., and van Vliet, W. (Eds). *The U.S. handbook on housing and the build environment*. Westwood, CO: Greenwood Press.
- Craw, M. (2008). Taming the local leviathan: Institutional and economic constraints on municipal budgets. *Urban Affairs Review*, 43, 663-690.
- Crecine, John (Ed.). (1970). *Financing the metropolis: Public policy in urban economies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Culter, N., & Harootyan, R. (1975). Demography of the aged. In Woodruff, D. and Birren, J. (Eds). *Aging: scientific perspectives and social issues*. New York: Litton.
- Cushing, B.J. (1993). The effect of the social welfare system on metropolitan migration in the US by income group, gender, and family structure. *Urban Studies*, 30, 325-338.
- de la Garza, R.O. (2004). Latino Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7, 91-123.
- de La Garza, R.O., Polinard, J., Wrinkle, R., & Longoria, Jr., T. (1991). Understanding intra-ethnic attitude variations: Mexican origin population views of immigration." *Social Science Quarterly* 72, 379-387.
- Deno, K., & Mehay, S. (1987). Municipal management structure and fiscal performance: Do city managers make a difference? *Southern Economic Journal*, 53, 627-642.

- DeSantis, V., & Renner, T. (2002). City government structure: An attempt at clarification. *State and Local Government Review*, 34, 95-104.
- Dowding, K., & Biggs, S. (1994). Tiebout: A survey of the empirical literature. *Urban Studies* 31 (4/5), 767-98.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Duncan, O.D. & Duncan, B. (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation indices. *American Sociological Review*, 20, 210-217.
- Durand, Roger. (1976). Some dynamics of urban service evaluations among Blacks and Whites. *Social Science Quarterly* 56 (4), 698-706.
- Dutwin, D., Brodie, M., Herrmann, M., & Levin, R. (2005). Latinos and political party affiliation. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* 27, 135-60.
- Duvall, J. (1999). Contemporary choices for citizens. In R. Kemp (Ed.), *Forms of local government: A handbook on city, county and regional options* (pp. 63-68). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
- Dye, T. (1969). Inequality and civil rights policy in the states. *Journal of Politics* 31, 1080-1097.
- Dye, T., & Garcia, J. A. (1978). Structure, function, and policy in American cities. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 14, 103-122.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley.
- Elazar, D.J. (1984). *American Federalism: A view from the states* (3rd ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
- Epple, D. & Sieg, H. (1999). Estimating equilibrium models of local jurisdictions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107 (4), 645-681.
- Erevelles, S., & Leavitt, C. (1992). A comparison of current models of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction. *Journal of Consumer Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction, and Complaining Behavior*, 5, 104-114.
- Farley, Reynolds, & Frey, W.H.. (1994). Changes in the segregation of Whites from Blacks during the 1980s: Small steps toward a more integrated society. *American Sociological Review* 59 (1), 23-45.

- Farley, Reynolds, Schuman, et al. (1978). Chocolate city, vanilla suburbs: Will the trend toward racially separate communities continue? *Social Science Research*, 7, 319-344.
- Farley, R., Fielding, E.L., & Krysan, M. (1997). The residential preferences of Blacks and Whites: A four-metropolis analysis. *Housing Policy Debate*, 8, 763-800.
- Fernandez, S., Ryu, J. E., & Brudney, J. L. (2008). Exploring variations in contracting for services among American local governments: Do politics still matter? *The American Review of Public Administration*, 38(4), 439-462.
- Fitzgerald, M.R. & Durant, R.F. (1980). Citizen evaluations and urban management: Service delivery in an era of protest. *Public Administration Review* 40 (6), 585-594.
- Fitzpatrick, J.L., & Hero, R.E. (1988). Political culture and political characteristics of the American states: A consideration of some old and new questions. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 41(1), 145-153.
- Fraga, L.R., Garcia, J.A., Hero, R.E., et al. (2006). Su casa es nuestra casa: Latino politics research and the development of American political science. *The American Political Science Review*, 100, 515-521
- Frederickson, H. G., Johnson, G.A., & Wood, C. (2004). *The adapted city*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
- Frey, W.H., & Farley, R. (1996). Latino, Asian, and Black segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas: Are multi-ethnic metros different? *Demography* 33 (1), 35-50.
- Fox, W.F., Herzog, H.W. and Schottman, A.M. (1989). Metropolitan fiscal structure and migration. *Journal of Regional Science*, 29, 523-536.
- Fogette, R., King, M. & Dettrey, B. (2008). Race, Hurricane Katrina, and government satisfaction: Examining the role of race in assessing blame. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 38, 671-691.
- Forbes, H.D. (1997). *Ethnic conflict*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Fox, J. (2001). Patterns of discrimination, grievances and political activity among Europe's Roma." *Journal of Ethnopolitical and Minority Issues in Europe*. Winter/2

- Gamson, W. (1968). *Power and discontent*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gimenez, M.E. (1998). Latino politics – Class struggles: Reflections on the future of Latino politics. *New Political Science*, 20, 475-485.
- Gimpel, J.G. & Kaufman, K. (2001). *Impossible dream or distant reality? Republican efforts to attract Latino voters*. Center for Immigration Studies.
- Githens, M., & Prestage, J. (eds.), (1977). *A portrait of marginality*. New York: McKay.
- Glaser, M.A., & Hildreth, W.B. (1999). Service delivery satisfaction and willingness to pay taxes. *Public Productivity and Management Review*, 23(1), 48-67.
- Gober, P. (2006). *Metropolitan Phoenix: Place making and community building in the Desert*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Goldscheider, C. (1966). Differential residential mobility of the older population. *Journal of Gerontology*, 21, 103-108.
- Gory, M., Ward, R., & Juravich, T. (1980). The age segregation process: Explanation for American cities. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 16, 59-80.
- Greene, J.D. (2002). *Cities and privatization: Prospects for privatization in the new century*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Grubb, W.N. (1982). The dynamic implications of the Tiebout Model: The changing composition of Boston communities, 1960-1970. *Public Finance Quarterly*, 10, 17-38.
- Gurr, T.R. (1969). *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
- Hagan, J. & Albonetti, C. (1982). Race, class, and the perception of criminal injustice in America. *American Journal of Sociology*, 88, 329-355.
- Hamilton, B.W. (1975). Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local Governments. *Urban Studies*, 12, 205-11.
- Hatry, H. (1980). Performance measurement principles and techniques: An overview for local government. *Public Productivity Review*, 4(4), 312-339.

- Hatry, H. (1999). *Performance management*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
- Hatry, H., Blair, L., Fisk, D., M., Greiner, J.M., Hall, J.R. & Schaenman, P.S. (1992). *How effective are your community services?* (2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Urban Institute, International City/County Management Association.
- Hayes, K., & Chang, S. (1990). The relative efficiency of city manager and mayor-council forms of government. *Southern Economic Journal*, 57, 167-177.
- Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. (2004). Privatization and its reverse: Explaining the dynamics of the government contracting process. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 14(2), 171-190.
- Hero, R. E. (1986). Explaining citizen-initiated contacting of government officials: Socioeconomic status, perceived need, or something else? *Social Science Quarterly* 67, 626- 35.
- Hero, R.E. (1992). *Latinos and the U.S. political system: Two-tiered pluralism*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Hero, R.E. (2005). Crossroads of equality: Race/ethnicity and cities in American democracy. *Urban Affairs Review*, 40, 695-705.
- Hero, R.E., & Durand, R. (1985). Explaining citizen evaluations of urban services: A comparison of some alternative models. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 20, 344-354.
- Hero, R.E., & Tolbert, C.J. (1996). A racial/ethnic diversity interpretation of politics and policy in the States of the U.S. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3), 851-871.
- Hirschman, A.O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hispanic Business. (2006). A year after Katrina, Hispanics more common in the Big Easy. Available at: www.hispanicbusiness.com.
- Hoene, C., & Pagano, M. (2009). *Research brief on American's cities: City fiscal conditions in 2009*. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.
- Holcombe, R.G. and D.J. Lacombe (2004). The effect of state income taxation on per capita income growth. *Public Finance Review*, 32 (3), 292-312.
- Huntington, S. P. (2004). *Who Are We?* New York: Simon & Schuster.

- Ihlanfeldt, K.R., & Sjoquist, D.L. (1991). The role of space in determining the occupations of Black and White workers. *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, 21, 295-315.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2003). *Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Islam, M.N. (1989). Tiebout hypothesis and migration impact of local fiscal policies. *Public Finance*, 44, 406-418.
- Jakubs, J.F. (1977). Residential segregation: The Taeuber index reconsidered. *Journal of Regional Science*, 17, 281-303.
- Jakubs, J.F. (1981). A distance-based segregation index. *Journal of Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, 15, 315-321.
- James, O. (2009). Evaluating the expectations disconfirmation and expectations anchoring approaches to citizen satisfaction with local public services. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 19, 107-23.
- Jennings, K., & Farah, B. (1981). Social roles and political resources: An overtime study of men and women in party elites. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 462-481.
- Jeong, M.-G. (2007). Local political structure, administrative capacity and revenue policy choice. *State and Local Government Review*, 39(2), 84-95.
- Johnson, P. (1993). *Frames of deceit: A study of the loss and recovery of public and private trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, R. Poulsen, M. & Forrest, J. (2007). Ethnic and racial segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1980-2000: The dimensions of segregation revisited. *Urban Affairs Review*, 42, 479-504.
- Jones- Correa, M. (2005). Language provisions under the Voting Rights Act: How effective are they?" *Social Science Quarterly* 86, 549-564.
- Jung, C. (2006). Forms of government and spending on common municipal functions: A longitudinal approach. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 72, 363-376.
- Kampen, J., Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2006). Assessing the relation between satisfaction with public service delivery and trust in government. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 29(4), 387-404.

- Kaufmann, K.M. (2002). Culture wars, secular realignment, and the gender gap in party identification. *Political Behavior*, 24, 283-307.
- Kaufmann, K.M., & Petrocik, J.R. (1999). The changing politics of American men: Understanding the sources of the gender gap. *American Journal of Political Science*, 43, 864-887.
- Kelleher, C. & Lowery, D. (2002). Tiebout sorting and selective satisfaction with urban public services: Testing the variance hypothesis. *Urban Affairs Review* 37 (3), 420-431.
- Kelly, J. M. (2003). Citizen satisfaction and administrative performance measures: Is there really a link? *Urban Affairs Review* 38 (6), 855-866.
- Kelly, J.M. (2005). The dilemma of the unsatisfied customer in a market model of public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 65(1), 76-84.
- Kelly, J.M. & Swindell, D. (2002). Service quality variation across urban space: First steps toward a model of citizen satisfaction. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 24 (3), 271-288.
- Kerner Commission (1968). Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- King, A.T. (1977). Estimating property tax capitalization: A critical comment. *Journal of Political Economy*, 85, 425-431.
- King, M. (2003). Race riots and black economic progress. *The Review of Black Political Economy* 30, 51-66.
- Krueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent seeking economy. *The American Economic Review*, 64(3) 291-303.
- Lagory, M., Ward, R., & Juravich, T. (1980). The age segregation process: Explanation for American cities. *Urban Affairs Review*, 16, 59-80.
- Lasswell, H. (1948). *The analysis of political behavior, an empirical approach*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Leal, D., Barreto, M., Lee, B., and de la Garza, R. (2005). The Latino vote in the 2004 elections. *PS*, January, 41-49.
- Levine, C. (1979). More on cutback management: Hard questions for hard times. *Public Administration Review*, 39, 179-182.

- Levine, H., and Scorsone, E. (2011). The great recession's institutional change in the public employment relationship: Implications for state and local governments. *State and Local Government Review* 43 (3), 208-214.
- Lewis, J.H., & Hamilton, D.K. (2011). Race and regionalism: The structure of local government and racial disparity. *Urban Affairs Review*, 47(3), 349-384.
- Lieberson, S. (1980). *A piece of the pie: Blacks and White immigrants 1880*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Lieske, J. (1993). Regional subcultures of the United States. *The Journal of Politics* 55, 888-891.
- Lieske, J. & Kincaid, J. (1991). *Political subcultures of the American states: State-of-the-art and Agenda for Research*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Lineberry, R. (1977). *Equality and urban policy: The distribution of municipal public services*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Lineberry, R., & Fowler, E. (1967). Reformism and public policies in American cities. *American Political Science Review*, 61, 701-716.
- Lineberry, R., & Welch, R. (1974). Who gets what: Measuring the distribution of urban public services: A preliminary model. *Administration and Society*, 119-142.
- Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Logan, J.R., & Alba, R.D. (1993). Locational returns to human capital: Minority access to suburban community resources. *Demography*, 30, 243-267.
- Lovrich, N.P., & Taylor, G.T. (1976). Neighborhood evaluation of neighborhood services: A citizen survey approach. *Urban Affairs Review*, 12, 176-222.
- Luckingham, B. (1989). *Phoenix: the History of a Southwestern Metropolis*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
- Lyons, W. (1978). Reform and response in American cities: Structure and policy reconsidered. *Social Sciences Quarterly* 59, 118-132.

- Lyons, W. and Lowery, D. (1989). Governmental fragmentation versus consolidation: Five public choice myths about how to create informed, involved, and happy citizens. *Public Administration Review*, 49, 533-543.
- Lyons, W.E., Lowery, D., & DeHoog, R.H. (1992). *The Politics of Dissatisfaction: Citizens, Services, and Urban Institutions*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lu, M. (1999). Determinants of residential satisfaction: Ordered logit vs. regression models. *Growth and Change*, 30, 264-287.
- Malone, N.K., Baluja, K.F., Costanzo, J.F., & Davis, C.J. (2003). *The foreign-born population: 2000*. Census 2000 brief. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
- Manza, J. (2000). Race and the underdevelopment of the American welfare state. *Theory and Society*, 29, 819-832.
- March, J.G., & Olsen, J.P. (1989). *Rediscovering institutions: The organizational basis of politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Marlowe, J. (1985). Private versus public provision of refuse removal service: Measures of citizen satisfaction. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 20 (3), 355-363.
- Martin, R. (1997). Job decentralization with suburban housing discrimination: An urban equilibrium model of spatial mismatch. *Journal of Housing Economic*, 6, 297-317.
- Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1985). Spatial assimilation as a socioeconomic outcome. *American Sociological Review*, 50, 94-106.
- Massey, D.S., & Denton, N.A. (1987). Trends in the residential segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970-1980. *American Sociological Review*, 52, 802-825.
- Massey, D.S. & Denton, N.A. (1988). The dimensions of residential segregation. *Social Forces*, 67, 281-315.
- Massey, D.S. & Denton, N.A. (1993). *American apartheid: Segregation and the making of the underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Massey, D.S. & Mullan, B.P. (1984). Processes of Hispanic and Black spatial assimilation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 89, 316-326.

- Massey, D.S., White, M.J., & Phua, V.C. (1996). The dimensions of segregation revisited. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 25, 172-206.
- McGuire, M. (2004). Relating to other organizations. In C. Newell (Ed.), *The effective local government manager* (3rd ed., pp. 181-208). Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
- McVeigh, R., & Smith, C. (1999). Who Protests in America? *Sociological Forum* 14, 685-702.
- Meier, K., & Stewart, Jr., J. (1991). *The politics of Hispanic education*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Melkers, J., Willoughby, K.G., James, B. & Fountain, J. (2002) *Performance measures at the state and local levels: A summary of survey results*. Norwalk, CT: Governmental Standards Accounting Board.
- Miller, G. (1981). *Cities by Contract*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Miller, T.I., & Kobayashi, M.M.(2000). *Citizen surveys: How to do them, how to use them, what they mean*. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
- Miller, T. I., & Miller, M.A. (1991). Standards of excellence: U.S. residents' evaluations of local government services. *Public Administration Review* 51 (6), 503-514.
- Mills, K.E., Percy, M.B. and Wilson, L.S. (1983). The influence of fiscal incentives on interregional migration: Canada, 1961-1978. *Canadian Journal of Regional Science*, 6, 207-229.
- Montjoy, R.S. & Watson, D.J. (1995). A case for reinterpreted dichotomy of politics and administration as a professional standard in council-manager government. *Public Administration Review*, 55 (3), 231-239.
- Moore, Adrian, Nolan, James, & Segal, Geoffrey F. (2005). Putting out the trash: Measuring municipal service efficiency in U.S. cities. *Urban Affairs Review* 41 (2), 237-259.
- Moran, R.F. (1997). What if Latinos really mattered in the public policy debate? *California Law Review*, 85, 1315-1345.

- National Performance Review (1993). *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Neiman, M. (1976). Communication: Social stratification and government inequality. *American Political Science Review*, 70(1), 149–180.
- Niskanen, W. (1971). *Bureaucracy and representative government*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
- Norrander, B., & Wilcox, C. (2008). The gender gap in ideology. *Political Behavior*, 30, 503-523.
- Norris, P. (2003). The gender gap: Old challenges, new approaches. In Carroll, S (ed), *Women and American politics: New questions, new directions* (pp. 146-170). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Oates, W.E. (1969). The effect of property taxes and local public spending on property values: An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis. *Journal of Political Economy*, 77, 957-971.
- Oliver, R. (1997). *Satisfaction: A behavioral perspective on the consumer*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Orbell, J. and Uno, T. (1972). The theory of neighborhood problem solving: Political action vs. residential mobility. *American Political Science Review*, 66, 471-489.
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Ostrom, E. (1983). The social-stratification-government inequality thesis explored. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 19(1), 91–112.
- Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C.M., & Warren R. (1961). The organization of government in metropolitan areas: A theoretical inquiry. *American Science Review*, 55, 831-842.
- Pack, J.R. and Pack H. (1977). Metropolitan fragmentation and suburban homogeneity. *Urban Studies* 14, 191-201.

- Parks, R.B. (1984). Linking objective and subjective measures of performance. *Public Administration Review*, 44,
- Percy, S.L. & Hawkins, B.W. (1992). Further tests of individual –level propositions from the Tiebout model. *Journal of Politics*, 54, 1149-1157.
- Percy, S.L. (1993). Revisiting Tiebout: Moving rationales, exiting behavior, and governmental responses to metropolitan mobility. Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 15-17, April.
- Peterson, S., & Runyan, A. (1999). *Global gender issues*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Pickus, J. & Gober, P. (1988). Urban villages and activity patterns in Phoenix. *Urban Geography* 9, 85-97.
- Poister, T.H., & Henry, G.T. (1994). Citizen ratings of public and private service quality: A comparative perspective. *Public Administration Review*, 54(2), 155-160.
- Poister, T.H., & Streib, G. (1999). Strategic management in the public sector: Concepts models and processes. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 22(3), 308-325.
- Pomper, G. (1975). *Voters' choice: Varieties of American electoral behavior*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
- Posner, R.A. (1975). The social cost of monopoly and regulation. *Journal of Political Economy*, 83, 807-827.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Quigley, J.M., & Weinberg, D.H. (1977). Intra-urban residential mobility: A review and synthesis. *International Regional Science Review*, 2, 41-66.
- Rampell, C. (2009). "Great recession:" A brief etymology. The New York Times, March 11.
- Reiss, Jr., A. J. (1970). Servers and Served in Service. *In Financing the Metropolis: Public policy in urban economies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

Reschovsky, A. (1979). Residential choice and the local public sector: An alternative test of the Tiebout hypothesis. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 16, 501-520.

Rich, R.C. (Ed.) (1982). *The politics of urban public services*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.

Roch, C., & Poister, T.H. (2006). Citizens, accountability, and service satisfaction: The influence of expectations. *Urban Affairs Review*, 41 (3), 292-308.

Rondinelli, D. A. (2003). Partnering for development: Government-private sector cooperation in service provision. In D. A. Rondinelli & G. S. Cheema (Eds.), *Reinventing government for the twenty-first century: State capacity in a globalizing society* (pp. 219-239). Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian.

Rosentraub, M.S., & Thompson, L. (1981). The use of surveys of satisfaction for evaluations. *Policy Studies Journal*, 9(7), 990-999.

Rossi, P.H., R.A. Berk, & Eidson, B.E. (1974). *The roots of urban discontent: Public policy, municipal institutions, and the ghetto*. New York: John Wiley.

Rossi, P.H. (1972). Community social indicators. In A. Campbell & P.E. Converse (Eds.), *The human meaning of social change* (pp. 87-126). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Rubin, I. (1998). *Class, tax, and power: Municipal budgeting in the United States*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.

Rumbaut, R.G. (2006). On the past and future of American immigration and ethnic history: A sociologist's reflections on a silver jubilee. *Journal of American Ethnic History*, 25, 160-167.

Samuelson, P. (1954). The pure theory of public expenditure. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 36, 387-389.

Samuelson, P. (1955). Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 38, 350-356.

Samuelson, P. (1958). Aspects of public expenditure theories. *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 40, 332-338.

- Santiago, A.M., & Wilder, M.G. (1991). Residential segregation and links to minority poverty: The case of Latinos in the United States." *Social Problems* 38, 492-515.
- Sapiro, V. (1983). *The political integration of women: Roles, socialization, and politics*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Savas, E. S. (1987). *Privatization: The key to better government*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Savas, E. S. (2000). *Privatization and public-private partnerships*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Savas, E.S. (2005). *Privatization in the city: Successes, failure, lessons*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.
- Schlesinger, M., & Heldman, C. (2001). Gender gap or gender gaps? New perspectives on support for government action and policies. *Journal of Politics*, 63, 59-92.
- Schneider, M. & Phelan, T. (1993). Black suburbanization in the 1980s. *Demography*, 30, 269-279.
- Schuman, H., & Gruenberg, B. (1972). Dissatisfaction with city services: Is race an important factor? In H. Hahn (Ed.), *People and politics in urban society* (pp. 369-392). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Scorsone, E., & Plerhoples, C. (2010). Fiscal stress and cutback management amongst state and local governments: What have we learned and what remains to be learned? *State and Local Government Review*, 42(2), 176-187.
- Shadbegian, R. (2003). Did the property tax revolt affect local public education? Evidence from panel data. *Public Finance Review*, 31(1), 91-121.
- Shapiro, R., & Mahajan, H. (1986). Gender differences in policy preferences: A summary of trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 50, 42-61.
- Sharp, E.B. (1984). Exit, voice and loyalty in the context of local government problems. *Western Political Quarterly*, 37, 67-83.
- Sharp, E.B. (1986). *Citizen Demand-making in the Urban Context*. Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama.

- Siegelman, L., & Welch, S. (1993). The contact hypothesis revisited: Black-White interaction and positive racial attitudes. *Social Forces*, 71, 781-795.
- Smith, V.K. (2007). Reflections on the literature. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 1 (1) 152-165.
- Stein, R.M. (1987). Tiebout's sorting hypothesis. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 23, 140-166.
- Stein, R.M., Post, S.S., & Riden, A.L. (2000). Reconciling context and contact effects on racial attitudes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53, 285-303.
- Stipak, Brian. (1977). Attitudes and belief systems concerning urban services. *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 41 (1), 41-55.
- Stone, R. & McQuillan, J. (2007). Beyond Hispanic and Latino. *Social Science Research* 36, 175-200.
- Svara, J. H. (1985). Dichotomy and duality: Reconceptualizing the relationship between policy and administration in council-manager cities. *Public Administration Review*, 45, 221-32.
- Svara, J.H. (2005). Exploring structures and institutions in city government. *Public Administration Review*, 65, 500-506.
- Svara, J.H. (2006). The search for meaning in political-administrative relations in local government. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 29, 1065-1090.
- Taeuber, K.E. & Taeuber, A.F. (1965). *Negroes in cities: Residential segregation and neighborhood change*. Aldine.
- The Rose Institute of State and Local Government. (1983). *A Districting Plan for the City of Phoenix*. CA.: The Rose Institute of State and Local Government.
- Tiebout, C.M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. *The Journal of Political Economy* 64 (5), 416-424.
- Tiebout, C.M. (1957). Location theory, empirical evidence, and economic evolution. Regional Science Association, Papers & Proceedings, III, 74-86.
- Timberlake, J.M., Howell, A.J., & Staight, A.J. (2011). Trends in the suburbanization of racial/ethnic groups in U.S. metropolitan areas, 1970-2000. *Urban Affairs Review*, 47, 218-255.

- Tullock, G. (1971). Public expenditures as public goods. *Journal of Political Economy*, 79(5), 913-919.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2000). *Census of population, Summary file 3*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census (2005). *American Community Survey*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. (2010). *State and Country Quick Facts*. Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office. (1989). *The report on the national commission of public service*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Van de Walle, S., Kampen, J., & Bouckaert, G. (2005). Deep impact for high-impact agencies? Assessing the role of bureaucratic encounters in evaluations of government. *Public Performance & Management Review*, 28(4), 532-549.
- Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2003). Public service performance and trust in government: The problem of causality. *International Journal of Public Administration* 26 (8&9), 891-913.
- Van Ryzin, G. (2004). Expectations, performance and citizen satisfaction with urban services. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 23 (3), 433-448.
- Van Ryzin, G., Gulick, L. & Martinez, E. (2004). Drivers and consequences of citizen satisfaction: An application of the American consumer satisfaction index model to New York City. *Public Administration Review* 64 (3), 331-341.
- Van Ryzin, G., Muzzio, D., & Immerwahr, S. (2004). Explaining the race gap in satisfaction with urban services. *Urban Affairs Review* 39 (5), 613-632.
- Vedder, R.K. (1995). State and local taxation and economic growth: Lessons for federal tax reform. Joint Economic Committee of Congress Staff Report, December.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Waldo, D. (1968). Scope of the theory of public administration. In *Theory and practice of public administration: Scope, objectives, and methods*, ed. J.C. Charlesworth, 1-26. Philadelphia, PA: American Academy of Political and Social Science.

Warner, M., & Hefetz, A. (2008). Managing markets for public service: The role of mixed public-private delivery of city services. *Public Administration Review*, 68(1), 155-166.

Warren, M.E. (1999). (Ed). *Democracy and trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weitzer, R. & Tuch, S. (2006). *Race and policing in America: Conflict and reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Welch, S. (1977). Women as political animals? A test of some explanations of male-female political participation differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, 21, 711-730.

Welch, S. (1985). The more for less paradox: Public attitudes on taxing and spending. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49, 310-316.

West, C. (1993). *Race matters*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Williams, O.P. (1971). *Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach*. New York: Free Press.

Wilson, L.A. (1983). Preference revelation and public policy: Making sense of citizen survey data. *Public Administration Review*, 43(4), 335-3342.

Wilson, W.J. (1987). *The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass and public policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woldoff, R.A. (2002). The effects of local stressors on neighborhood attachment. *Social Forces*, 81, 87-116.

Yi, Y. (1990). A critical review of customer satisfaction. In V.A. Zeithaml (Ed.), *Review of marketing* (pp. 68-123). Chicago: American Marketing Association.

Yinger, J., Bloom, H.S., Borsch-Supan, A. & Ladd, H.F. (1988). *Property taxes and house values: The theory and estimation of intra-jurisdictional property tax capitalization*. London: Academic Press.

Zelinsky, W. (1966). Toward a geography of the aged. *Geographical Review*, 56, 445-447.

Zhang, Y., & Feiock, R. (2009). City managers' policy leadership in council-manager cities. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 20, 461-476. doi:10.1093/jopart/mup015

APPENDIX A

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES

Frequency Distribution for Police Services Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	17	1.2	2.4	2.4
2	18	1.3	2.6	5.0
3	28	2.0	4.0	8.9
4	27	1.9	3.8	12.8
5	89	6.3	12.6	25.4
6	55	3.9	7.8	33.2
7	102	7.3	14.5	47.7
8	153	10.9	21.7	69.5
9	93	6.6	13.2	82.7
10	122	8.7	17.3	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Garbage & Recycling Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	19	1.4	2.7	2.7
2	11	0.8	1.6	4.3
3	16	1.1	2.3	6.5
4	18	1.3	2.6	9.1
5	55	3.9	7.8	16.9
6	38	2.7	5.4	22.3
7	70	5.0	9.9	32.2
8	162	11.5	23.0	55.3
9	115	8.2	16.3	71.6
10	200	14.2	28.4	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405			

Frequency Distribution for Street Cleaning Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	20	1.4	2.8	2.8
2	22	1.6	3.1	6.0
3	30	2.1	4.3	10.2
4	34	2.4	4.8	15.1
5	83	5.9	11.8	26.8
6	66	4.7	9.4	36.2
7	115	8.2	16.3	52.6
8	130	9.3	18.5	71.0
9	71	5.1	10.1	81.1
10	133	9.5	18.9	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Parks & Recreation Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	22	1.6	3.1	3.1
2	10	0.7	1.4	4.5
3	27	1.9	3.8	8.4
4	39	2.8	5.5	13.9
5	78	5.6	11.1	25.0
6	71	5.1	10.1	35.1
7	103	7.3	14.6	49.7
8	127	9.0	18.0	67.8
9	75	5.3	10.7	78.4
10	152	10.8	21.6	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Youth Programs Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
--------	-----------	---------	---------------	--------------------

1	22	1.6	3.1	3.1
2	16	1.1	2.3	5.4
3	28	2.0	4.0	9.4
4	46	3.3	6.5	15.9
5	95	6.8	13.5	29.4
6	57	4.1	8.1	37.5
7	100	7.1	14.2	51.7
8	84	6.0	11.9	63.6
9	31	2.2	4.4	68.0
10	225	16.0	32.0	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Countering Gang Activities Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	33	2.3	4.7	4.7
2	19	1.4	2.7	7.4
3	43	3.1	6.1	13.5
4	54	3.8	7.7	21.2
5	109	7.8	15.5	36.6
6	75	5.3	10.7	47.3
7	78	5.6	11.1	58.4
8	90	6.4	12.8	71.2
9	31	2.2	4.4	75.6
10	172	12.2	24.4	100.0
Total (n)	704	50.1	100.0	
System Missing	701	49.9		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Fire Protection Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	6	0.4	0.9	0.9
2	7	0.5	1.0	1.9
3	6	0.4	0.9	2.7
4	4	0.3	0.6	3.3
5	32	2.3	4.6	7.8

6	22	1.6	3.1	11.0
7	52	3.7	7.4	18.4
8	156	11.1	22.3	40.7
9	123	8.8	17.5	58.2
10	293	20.9	41.8	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution of Crime Prevention Effort Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	39	2.8	5.6	5.6
2	33	2.3	4.7	10.3
3	31	2.2	4.4	14.7
4	33	2.3	4.7	19.4
5	99	7.0	14.1	33.5
6	73	5.2	10.4	43.9
7	114	8.1	16.3	60.2
8	124	8.8	17.7	77.9
9	54	3.8	7.7	85.6
10	101	7.2	14.4	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution of Street Repair Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	35	2.5	5.0	5.0
2	23	1.6	3.3	8.3
3	26	1.9	3.7	12.0
4	41	2.9	5.8	17.8
5	85	6.0	12.1	30.0
6	66	4.7	9.4	39.4
7	95	6.8	13.6	52.9
8	163	11.6	23.3	76.2
9	68	4.8	9.7	85.9

10	99	7.0	14.1	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Housing for Poor Rating

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	52	3.7	7.4	7.4
2	41	2.9	5.8	13.3
3	41	2.9	5.8	19.1
4	56	4.0	8.0	27.1
5	119	8.5	17.0	44.1
6	47	3.3	6.7	50.8
7	73	5.2	10.4	61.2
8	61	4.3	8.7	69.9
9	25	1.8	3.6	73.5
10	186	13.2	26.5	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Attracting New Employers Rating

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	22	1.6	3.1	3.1
2	17	1.2	2.4	5.6
3	18	1.3	2.6	8.1
4	26	1.9	3.7	11.8
5	110	7.8	15.7	27.5
6	78	5.6	11.1	38.7
7	114	8.1	16.3	54.9
8	110	7.8	15.7	70.6
9	37	2.6	5.3	75.9
10	169	12.0	24.1	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Ambulance Service Rating

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	6	0.4	0.9	0.9
2	5	0.4	0.7	1.6
3	6	0.4	0.9	2.4
4	10	0.7	1.4	3.9
5	36	2.6	5.1	9.0
6	25	1.8	3.6	12.6
7	56	4.0	8.0	20.5
8	154	11.0	22.0	42.5
9	101	7.2	14.4	56.9
10	302	21.5	43.1	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution of Art and Cultural Events Rating

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	23	1.6	3.3	3.3
2	12	0.9	1.7	5.0
3	20	1.4	2.9	7.8
4	27	1.9	3.9	11.7
5	91	6.5	13.0	24.7
6	66	4.7	9.4	34.1
7	103	7.3	14.7	48.8
8	150	10.7	21.4	70.2
9	58	4.1	8.3	78.5
10	151	10.7	21.5	100.0
Total (n)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Providing Job Training Rating

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	37	2.6	5.3	5.3
2	23	1.6	3.3	8.6
3	31	2.2	4.4	13.0
4	43	3.1	6.1	19.1
5	104	7.4	14.8	34.0
6	52	3.7	7.4	41.4
7	79	5.6	11.3	52.6
8	61	4.3	8.7	61.3
9	15	1.1	2.1	63.5
10	256	18.2	36.5	100.0
Total (N)	701	49.9	100.0	
System Missing	704	50.1		
Total	1405	100.0		

Frequency Distribution for Library Service Ratings

Rating	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	25	1.8	2.4	2.4
2	16	1.1	1.5	3.9
3	23	1.6	2.2	6.1
4	19	1.4	1.8	7.9
5	63	4.5	6.0	13.9
6	58	4.1	5.5	19.4
7	110	7.8	10.4	29.8
8	224	15.9	21.3	51.0
9	141	10.0	13.4	64.4
10	375	26.7	35.6	100.0
Total (n)	1054	75.0	100.0	
System Missing	351	25.0		
Total (N)	1405	100.0		

APPENDIX B

2002 Survey

BEHAVIOR RESEARCH CENTER, INC.
1101 North First Street
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 258-4554

CITY OF PHOENIX
COMMUNITY ATTITUDE SURVEY
May 2002

JOB ID 2002065

Hello, my name is _____ and I'm with the Behavior Research Center of Arizona. We're conducting a survey among Phoenix residents on city services and I'd like to speak with you for a few minutes.

A. Is your residence located within the Phoenix city limits?

IF YES: CONTINUE

IF NO: THANK AND TERMINATE

B. And are you the (male/female) head of your household?

IF YES: CONTINUE

IF NO: ASK TO SPEAK WITH MALE/ FEMALE HEAD, REINTRODUCE YOURSELF AND CONTINUE. IF NONE AVAILABLE, ARRANGE CALLBACK.

Male...1
Female...2

CALLBACK INFO: _____

Throughout this interview I will be asking you questions which deal ONLY with the City of Phoenix -- NOT the overall metropolitan area which includes Scottsdale, Tempe, Glendale and other Valley cities. Please keep this in mind when answering the questions.

1. To begin, would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement, "Overall, Phoenix is a good place to live."

Strongly agree...1
Agree...2
Disagree...3
Strongly disagree...4
Not sure...5

2. On the whole, would you say that the quality of life in the City of Phoenix is excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor?

Excellent...1
Good...2
Fair...3
Poor...4
Very poor...5
Not sure...6

3. Next, what do you feel is the single most important problem the City should be working to solve in your neighborhood? (IF CRIME MENTIONED, PROBE). And what is the next most important problem?

4. (SQ) As you know, the City of Phoenix provides various services to the community ranging from fire protection to street maintenance. On a scale of one to ten where one means you think the city is doing a poor job and ten means you think the city is doing an excellent job, how would you rate the City of Phoenix on each of the following? Remember, one means a poor job and ten means an excellent job. (ROTATE A-AA)

4a. (SQ) Now I'd like to quickly read the list again, but this time please tell me if each service is one you would or would not be willing to pay more for to improve. (ROTATE)

City Service	Q4 Service Rating	Q4a Pay More		Not Sure
		Would	Not	
A. Police protection in your area	1	2	3	
B. Fire protection in your area	1	2	3	
C. Enforcing traffic laws on city streets	1	2	3	
D. Crime prevention efforts in your area	1	2	3	
E. Garbage and recycling collection	1	2	3	
F. Collection frequency of uncontainerized trash such as yard clippings	1	2	3	
G. Preventing illegal dumping	1	2	3	
H. Providing drinking water which meets health and safety standards	1	2	3	
I. Operating wastewater plants in a way that protects the environment	1	2	3	
J. Street repair and maintenance	1	2	3	
K. New street construction	1	2	3	
L. Preserving our mountains and deserts	1	2	3	
M. Providing regular scheduled bus service in your area	1	2	3	
N. Handling street flooding during rains in your area	1	2	3	
O. Providing parks and recreation programs in your area	1	2	3	
P. Providing services and housing for the poor and homeless	1	2	3	
Q. Providing programs for youth	1	2	3	
R. Attracting new employers to the community and helping existing employers to grow	1	2	3	
S. Requiring property owners to maintain their properties to minimum standards and enforcing cleanup ordinances	1	2	3	
T. Ambulance and paramedic service	1	2	3	
U. Preserving residential neighborhoods	1	2	3	
V. Providing art and cultural events and programs	1	2	3	
W. Providing services for the elderly such as housing and meals at home	1	2	3	
X. Providing job training and placement services for the unemployed	1	2	3	
Y. Countering gang activities	1	2	3	
Z. Controlling cut-through traffic in your neighborhood	1	2	3	
AA. Providing citizens with computer access to city information and services	1	2	3	
BB. Library services in your area	1	2	3	

5. Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the overall performance of the City in providing services to Phoenix residents?

Very satisfied...1
Satisfied...2
Dissatisfied...3
Very dissatisfied...4
Not sure...5

6. Next, would you say the following things are major problems, minor problems, or not problems in your neighborhood?
(ROTATE)

	Major	Minor	Not A Problem	Not Sure
A. Graffiti	1	2	3	4
B. Juvenile crime	1	2	3	4
C. The random shooting of guns	1	2	3	4
D. Air pollution	1	2	3	4
E. Bus service	1	2	3	4
F. Traffic cutting through neighborhood streets	1	2	3	4
G. Houses and yards that are not well maintained	1	2	3	4
H. Traffic congestion	1	2	3	4
I. Signs on utility poles for things like yard sales or model homes	1	2	3	4
J. Drug activity	1	2	3	4
K. Interference from industrial or commercial operations	1	2	3	4
L. Vacant lots	1	2	3	4

7. (SQ) During the past 12 months, did you contact any city employee, official or department to seek service or information, or to make a complaint?

(GO TO Q7a) Yes...1
(GO TO Q8) No...2

7a. (SQ) Was your most recent contact conducted in person, over the phone, by mail, or electronically by computer?

In person...1
Phone...2
Mail...3
Computer...4

7b. (SQ) What was the reason for your most recent contact?

7c. (SQ) Thinking about your last contact with the City, would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following statements (ROTATE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Not Sure
A. I was treated in a professional and courteous manner	1	2	3	4	5
B. My needs were handled in a timely fashion	1	2	3	4	5
C. I was promptly directed to the individual who could best respond to my needs	1	2	3	4	5

8. (SQ) Next, on a ten point scale where 1 means you think the Airport is doing a poor job and 10 means you think the Airport is doing an excellent job, how would you rate Sky Harbor International Airport for. . . (ROTATE A-J)
- RATING
- A. Clear and understandable directional signs _____
- B. Convenient bus service between terminals and parking lots _____
- C. Convenient parking facilities at reasonable prices _____
- D. Quality merchandise at reasonable prices _____
- E. High quality food and beverages _____
- F. Clean and well-supplied restrooms _____
- G. Overall cleanliness of Airport terminals _____
- H. Courteous and knowledgeable Airport employees _____
- I. Customer-friendly taxi, limousine, and shuttle service _____
- J. A convenient Airport location _____
- K. Overall rating of Sky Harbor International Airport _____
9. (SQ) Next, for the past several years the Phoenix Police Department has been operating under a community based policing philosophy. Under community based policing, the Department, in partnership with other City departments, residents and businesses, assists the community in enhancing the quality of life. Such programs as Block Watch are a result of this effort along with in-school programs for children. As far as you're concerned, is the Phoenix Police Department doing an excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor job of operating this philosophy in your neighborhood?
- Excellent...1
Good...2
Fair...3
Poor...4
Very poor...5
Not sure...6
10. (SQ) Next, were you aware that the City of Phoenix has an ordinance to help neighborhoods fight blight and require owners to keep up their property, or not?
- (GO TO Q10a) Yes...1
(GO TO Q11) No...2
Not Sure...3
- 10a. (SQ) How well would you say these ordinances are working in your neighborhood -- very well, fairly well, not to well, or not well at all?
- Very well...1
Fairly well...2
Not to well...3
Not well at all...4
Not Sure...5
11. (SQ) Do you think downtown Phoenix is much better now than it was a few years ago, a little better, about the same, or worse?
- Much better...1
Little better...2
About the same...3
Worse...4
Not sure...5
12. (SQ) Would you say that the City of Phoenix is growing too fast, growing at about the right rate, or not growing fast enough?
- Too fast...1
About right...2
Not fast enough...3
Not sure...4
13. (SQ) Would you rate the quality of new development in the City of Phoenix as excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor?
- Excellent...1
Good...2
Fair...3
Poor...4
Very poor...5
Not sure...6

14. (SQ) Have you ever used the City's web site to obtain information or conduct business with the City? (GO TO Q14a) Yes...1
(GO TO Q15) No...2
Not sure...3

14a. (SQ) On a 10 point scale where 1 means poor and 10 means excellent, how would you rate the City's web site? RATING: / / /

15. (SQ) Next, do you rely a lot, some, only a little, or not at all on each of the following for information about the City of Phoenix? (ROTATE)

	A Lot	Some	Only A Little	Not At All	Not Sure
A. Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5
B. Television news programs	1	2	3	4	5
C. Radio news programs	1	2	3	4	5
D. The Internet	1	2	3	4	5

16. (SQ) Would you say that Phoenix's economy is better, about the same, or worse compared to other cities its size? Better...1
About same...2
Worse...3
Not sure...4

17. Now before I finish, I need a few pieces of information about yourself for classification purposes only. First, which of the following categories comes closest to your age? (READ EACH EXCEPT REFUSED)

Under 25...1
25 to 34...2
35 to 49...3
50 to 64...4
65 or over...5
(DO NOT READ) Refused...6

18. How many years have you lived in the City of Phoenix? YEARS _____

19. Which of the following categories best describes your ethnic origin? (READ EACH EXCEPT REFUSED)

White...1
Black...2
Hispanic...3
American Indian...4
Asian American...5
(DO NOT READ) Refused...6

20. And finally, was your total family income for last year, I mean before taxes and including everyone in your household, under or over \$50,000?

UNDER \$50,000
Was it under \$25,000...1
or over \$25,000...2
Refused...3

OVER \$50,000
Was it under \$75,000...4
or \$75,000 or over...5
Refused...6
REFUSED OVERALL.....7

Thank you very much, that completes this interview. My supervisor may want to call you to verify that I conducted this interview so may I have your first name in order that he/she may do so? (VERIFY PHONE NUMBER)

NAME: _____ PHONE #: _____
TIME END: _____ TOTAL TIME: _____

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:
INTERVIEWER NAME: _____ #: _____
VALIDATED BY: _____ #: _____
CODED BY: _____ #: _____
FROM SAMPLE: _____ ZIP CODE _____

APPENDIX C

2004 SURVEY

BEHAVIOR RESEARCH CENTER, INC.

1101 North First Street
Phoenix, AZ 85004
(602) 258-4554

CITY OF PHOENIX
COMMUNITY ATTITUDE SURVEY
June 2004

JOB ID 2004029

Hello, my name is _____ and I'm with the Behavior Research Center of Arizona. We're conducting a survey among Phoenix residents on city services and I'd like to speak with you for a few minutes.

A. Is your residence located within the Phoenix city limits?

IF YES: CONTINUE

IF NO: THANK AND TERMINATE

B. And are you the (male/female) head of your household?

IF YES: CONTINUE

IF NO: ASK TO SPEAK WITH MALE/ FEMALE HEAD,
RE INTRODUCE YOURSELF AND
CONTINUE. IF NONE AVAILABLE,
ARRANGE CALLBACK.

Male...1
Female...2

CALLBACK INFO: _____

Throughout this interview I will be asking you questions which deal ONLY with the City of Phoenix -- NOT the overall metropolitan area which includes Scottsdale, Tempe, Glendale and other Valley cities. Please keep this in mind when answering the questions.

1. To begin, would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement, "Overall, Phoenix is a good place to live."

Strongly agree...1
Agree...2
Disagree...3
Strongly disagree...4
Not sure...5

2. On the whole, would you say that the quality of life in the City of Phoenix is excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor?

Excellent...1
Good...2
Fair...3
Poor...4
Very poor...5
Not sure...6

3. Next, what do you feel is the single most important problem the City should be working to solve in your neighborhood? (IF CRIME MENTIONED, PROBE). And what is the next most important problem?

4. What do you feel the City could do to make Phoenix a more liveable city in the future? (PROBE:) What else?

5. (SQ) As you know, the City of Phoenix provides various services to the community ranging from fire protection to street maintenance. On a scale of one to ten where one means you think the city is doing a poor job and ten means you think the city is doing an excellent job, how would you rate the City of Phoenix on each of the following? Remember, one means a poor job and ten means an excellent job. (ROTATE)

5a. (SQ) Now I'd like to quickly read the list again, but this time please tell me if each service is one you would or would not be willing to pay more for to improve. (ROTATE)

City Service	Q5 Service Rating	Q5a Pay More		Not Sure
		Would	Not	
A. Police protection in your area	___	1	2	3
B. Fire protection in your area	___	1	2	3
C. Enforcing traffic laws on city streets	___	1	2	3
D. Crime prevention efforts in your area	___	1	2	3
E. Garbage and recycling collection	___	1	2	3
F. Collection frequency of uncontainerized trash such as yard clippings	___	1	2	3
G. Preventing illegal dumping	___	1	2	3
H. Providing drinking water which meets health and safety standards	___	1	2	3
I. Operating wastewater plants in a way that protects the environment	___	1	2	3
J. Street repair and maintenance	___	1	2	3
K. Keeping our streets clean	___	1	2	3
L. Preserving our mountains and deserts	___	1	2	3
M. Providing regular scheduled bus service in your area	___	1	2	3
N. Handling street flooding during rains in your area	___	1	2	3
O. Providing parks and recreation programs in your area	___	1	2	3
P. Providing services and housing for the poor and homeless	___	1	2	3
Q. Providing programs for youth	___	1	2	3
R. Attracting new employers to the community and helping existing employers to grow	___	1	2	3
S. Requiring property owners to maintain their properties to minimum standards and enforcing cleanup ordinances	___	1	2	3
T. Ambulance and paramedic service	___	1	2	3
U. Preserving residential neighborhoods	___	1	2	3
V. Providing art and cultural events and programs	___	1	2	3
W. Providing services for the elderly such as housing and meals at home	___	1	2	3
X. Providing job training and placement services for the unemployed	___	1	2	3
Y. Countering gang activities	___	1	2	3
Z. Controlling cut-through traffic in your neighborhood	___	1	2	3
AA. Providing citizens with Internet access to city information and services	___	1	2	3
BB. Library services in your area	___	1	2	3
CC. Preserving historic Phoenix houses and other historic buildings	___	1	2	3
DD. Providing more police to arrest repeat and violent offenders	NA	1	2	3
EE. Providing more police and fire resources dedicated to homeland security	NA	1	2	3

6. Would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the overall performance of the City in providing services to Phoenix residents?
- Very satisfied...1
Satisfied...2
Dissatisfied...3
Very dissatisfied...4
Not sure...5

7. Next, would you say the following things are major problems, minor problems, or not problems in your neighborhood?
(ROTATE)

	Major	Minor	Not A Problem	Not Sure
A. Graffiti	1	2	3	4
B. Juvenile crime	1	2	3	4
C. The random shooting of guns	1	2	3	4
D. Air pollution	1	2	3	4
E. Traffic cutting through neighborhood streets	1	2	3	4
F. Houses and yards that are not well maintained	1	2	3	4
G. Traffic congestion	1	2	3	4
H. Signs on utility poles for things like yard sales or model homes	1	2	3	4
I. Drug activity	1	2	3	4
J. Interference from industrial or commercial operations	1	2	3	4
K. Vacant lots	1	2	3	4

8. (SQ) During the past 12 months, did you contact any city employee, official or department to seek service or information, or to make a complaint?
- (GO TO Q8a) Yes...1
(GO TO Q9) No...2

- 8a. (SQ) Was your most recent contact conducted in person, over the phone, by mail, or over the Internet?
- In person...1
Phone...2
Mail...3
Internet...4
- 8b. (SQ) What was the reason for your most recent contact?

8c. (SQ) Thinking about your last contact with the City, would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following statements (ROTATE)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Dis-agree	Strongly Disagree	Not Sure
A. I was treated in a professional and courteous manner	1	2	3	4	5
B. My needs were handled in a timely fashion	1	2	3	4	5
C. I was promptly directed to the individual who could best respond to my needs	1	2	3	4	5

9. (SQ) Next, on a ten point scale where 1 means you think the Airport is doing a poor job and 10 means you think the Airport is doing an excellent job, how would you rate Sky Harbor International Airport for... (ROTATE A-J)
- | | <u>RATING</u> |
|--|---------------|
| A. Clear and understandable directional signs | _____ |
| B. Convenient bus service between terminals and parking lots | _____ |
| C. Convenient parking facilities at reasonable prices | _____ |
| D. Quality merchandise at reasonable prices | _____ |
| E. High quality food and beverages | _____ |
| F. Clean and well-supplied restrooms | _____ |
| G. Overall cleanliness of Airport terminals | _____ |
| H. Courteous and knowledgeable Airport employees | _____ |
| I. Customer-friendly taxi, limousine, and shuttle service | _____ |
| J. A convenient Airport location | _____ |
| K. Overall rating of Sky Harbor International Airport | _____ |
10. (SQ) Next, for the past several years the Phoenix Police Department has been operating under a community based policing philosophy. Under community based policing, the Department, in partnership with other City departments, residents and businesses, assists the community in enhancing the quality of life. Such programs as Block Watch are a result of this effort along with in-school programs for children. As far as you're concerned, is the Phoenix Police Department doing an excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor job of operating this philosophy in your neighborhood?
- | | |
|--|---------------|
| | Excellent...1 |
| | Good...2 |
| | Fair...3 |
| | Poor...4 |
| | Very poor...5 |
| | Not sure...6 |
11. (SQ) Next, were you aware that the City of Phoenix has an ordinance to help neighborhoods fight blight and require owners to keep up their property, or not?
- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| | (GO TO Q11a) Yes...1 |
| | (GO TO Q12) No...2 |
| | Not Sure...3 |
- 11a. (SQ) How well would you say these ordinances are working in your neighborhood -- very well, fairly well, not to well, or not well at all?
- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| | Very well...1 |
| | Fairly well...2 |
| | Not to well...3 |
| | Not well at all...4 |
| | Not Sure...5 |
12. (SQ) From what you know or have heard, is your neighborhood safer than other neighborhoods in Phoenix, about the same as other neighborhoods in Phoenix, or not as safe as other neighborhoods in Phoenix?
- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| | Safer...1 |
| | About the same...2 |
| | Not as safe...3 |
| | Not sure...4 |
13. (SQ) Does your neighborhood participate in a Block Watch or other similar crime reduction program?
- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| | (GO TO Q13a) Yes...1 |
| | (GO TO Q14) No...2 |
| | Not Sure...3 |
- 13a. (SQ) Do you feel it is effective in reducing crime in your neighborhood?
- | | |
|--|--------------|
| | Yes...1 |
| | No...2 |
| | Not Sure...3 |
14. (SQ) Do you think downtown Phoenix is much better now than it was a few years ago, a little better, about the same, or worse?
- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| | Much better...1 |
| | Little better...2 |
| | About the same...3 |
| | Worse...4 |
| | Not sure...5 |
15. (SQ) Would you say that the City of Phoenix is growing too fast, growing at about the right rate, or not growing fast enough?
- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| | Too fast...1 |
| | About right...2 |
| | Not fast enough...3 |
| | Not sure...4 |
16. (SQ) Next, do you feel that the availability of affordable housing is a major issue, a minor issue or not an issue in the City of Phoenix?
- | | |
|--|------------------|
| | Major issue...1 |
| | Minor issue...2 |
| | Not an issue...3 |
| | Not sure...5 |

17. (SQ) Have you ever used Phoenix dot Gov, the City's web site to obtain information or conduct business with the City? (GO TO Q17a) Yes...1
(GO TO Q18) No...2
Not sure...3

17a. (SQ) On a 10 point scale where 1 means poor and 10 means excellent, how would you rate the City's web site? RATING: / / /

17b. (SQ) For what purpose did you last visit the City's web site? _____
 17c. (SQ) Were you able to find what you were looking for on your last visit? Yes...1
No...1

18. (SQ) Next, do you rely a lot, some, only a little, or not at all on each of the following for information about the City of Phoenix? (ROTATE)

	A Lot	Some	Only A Little	Not At All	Not Sure
A. Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5
B. Television news programs	1	2	3	4	5
C. Radio news programs	1	2	3	4	5
D. The Internet	1	2	3	4	5

19. Now before I finish, I need a few pieces of information about yourself for classification purposes only. First, which of the following categories comes closest to your age? (READ EACH EXCEPT REFUSED)

Under 25	1
25 to 34	2
35 to 49	3
50 to 64	4
65 or over	5
(DO NOT READ) Refused	6

20. How many years have you lived in the City of Phoenix? YEARS _____

21. Which of the following categories best describes your ethnic origin? (READ EACH EXCEPT REFUSED)

White	1
Black	2
Hispanic	3
American Indian	4
Asian American	5
(DO NOT READ) Refused	6

22. And finally, was your total family income for last year, I mean before taxes and including everyone in your household, under or over \$50,000?

UNDER \$50,000	
Was it under \$25,000	1
or over \$25,000	2
Refused	3
OVER \$50,000	
Was it under \$75,000	4
or \$75,000 or over	5
Refused	6
REFUSED OVERALL	7

Thank you very much, that completes this interview. My supervisor may want to call you to verify that I conducted this interview so may I have your first name in order that he/she may do so? (VERIFY PHONE NUMBER)

NAME: _____ PHONE #: _____
 TIME END: _____ TOTAL TIME: _____

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA:
 INTERVIEWER NAME: _____ #: _____
 VALIDATED BY: _____ #: _____
 CODED BY: _____ #: _____
 FROM SAMPLE: _____ ZIP CODE _____