

"The Drugs Must Be Fought"

Guatemala's Drug Trade Securitization

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to build upon the empirical use of the Copenhagen School of security studies by evaluating and investigating speech-acts in recent Guatemalan newspaper media as they relate to drug trafficking within the geopolitical borders of Guatemala, particularly induced by Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel. The study attempts to engage a critical theoretical framework to study securitization within the country and thereby build upon the theory by conducting real-life analysis. Using a research program that is made up of content and text analysis of national press and presidential speeches, I test several hypotheses that pertain to the processes of Guatemala's current drug trade and drug trafficking securitization. By coding securitizing speech-acts and discursive frames in the national print media, I identify the national elite, the power relations between the national elite and citizenship, and attempts to dramatize the issue of drug trade. Upon analyzing the findings of such securitization, I propose several hypotheses as to why the national elite seeks high politicization of drug trade and the implications that rest on such drastic measures. This thesis itself, then, has important implications: it uses empirical tools to help further the theoretical foundations of the Copenhagen School, it examines the process of securitization study from a real world context outside the developed world, and it presents important information on the possible consequences of securitizing drug trade.

DEDICATION

For my parents: Connie, Lee, and Sylvia Brinkmoeller.

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CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW AND INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to critically engage how security studies identify securitizing speech-acts in Guatemalan newspaper media and presidential discourse as they pertain to drug trafficking along the Mexico-Guatemala border. With much criticism toward the Copenhagen School's applicability in real life as a research program, this study attempts to add to the scarce literature of placing the theoretical framework of the school into real-life context. In doing so, this thesis will test several hypotheses. (1) As the Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, crossed into Guatemala, the Guatemalan national elite will seek to dramatize and frame drug trafficking as a security measure, necessitating direct, immediate, and often military action outside less dramatized actions by the state which can include social programs, economic adjustments or programs, or political legislation. (2) As a tool of legitimating securitization, national media outlets' coverage of drug trade and trafficking along with government verbal responses will increasingly host security discourse. (3) The discursive practices will limit state action pathways and allow for others not normally justifiable by a democratic state, such as using military personnel to violently counter non-state actors/citizens within its own political borders.

Literature Review

The Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies derives its theoretical foundations from a lineage of critical international relations theory, which in itself stemmed from deviating frameworks of mainstream IR. Critical IR, and more specifically, critical security studies research precipitates as a reaction to the assertions provided by traditional scholars. Realist theories follow several key assumptions that allow the theoretical framework of the realist subsets to maintain predictive power.¹ States serve as the unit of analysis and remain the actors of the world system. Additionally, states are rational, unitary actors that produce actions based on their own national interest.

¹ For a general, though not comprehensive, introduction to realism and its subsets see the following: Classical Realism: Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue," *The History of the Peloponnesian War*; and E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Year Crisis, 1919-1939*. These authors provide the foundations of realist theory in which the world system is made up of states in an anarchical environment all seeking to survive against one another. Neorealism: Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*; Waltz, Summer 2001, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol 25, No 1; and Robert Jervis, Autumn 1998, "Realism in the Study of World Politics," *World Politics*, Vol 52, No 4, 971-991. The basic tenets of neorealist theory establish themselves from a need to deal more systematically with the debate between classical realism versus idealism. Beginning with Waltz, they argue that balances form between state powers and if such balances deconstruct, interstate wars occur. A shortcoming of this argument is that it hardly explains the causes of war and states have little choice in their own behavioral patterns. Neorealist Variants: Stephen Walt, Spring 1985, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power," *International Security* Vol. 9, No. 4; John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*; and Stephen van Evera, 1998, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *International Security*, Vol 22, No 4, 5-23. Contemporary realism has now been divided between two camps: offensive (championed by John Mearsheimer) and defensive (championed by Waltz and Jervis). Although Waltz and Jervis contend that states are not penchant to attack each other except by miscalculation, others, like Mearsheimer, describe states as expansionistic in nature, and thus, more inclined to promote such behavior.

There exists no actor above states capable of regulating their (states') interactions (Waltz 1979).

In a similar vein, neoliberal theorists, though they debate with (neo)realists on several points, maintain much of the same theoretical foundations, which keeps neoliberalism streamlined for traditional research. Championed by Robert Keohane and his seminal work, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, neoliberalism grew out of reaction to neorealist perspectives. Still resting on game theory and rational actors, neoliberal scholars seek to explain cooperation amongst states, even without a hegemonic power present (Keohane 1984). Similarly, both realism and neoliberalism, as Robert Jervis discusses in his "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," start from the assumption that states seek to cooperate with one another through the absence of a sovereign which can "make and enforce binding agreements" (1999, 43).² Concerned more with states' interests for absolute gains rather

² Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, often considered the first and most prominent proponents of neoliberalism. See, Keohane and Martin, January 1999, "Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation," Working Paper 1999-2007, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. p3. For other works emphasizing either neoliberal institutionalism or the differences and similarities between neoliberal and neorealist theories, see Robert Axelrod, June 1981, "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists," *American Political Science Review*, Vol 75, 306-318; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, Autumn 1998, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization*, vol 52, No 4; Stephan Krasner, 1985, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; and Kenneth Oye, ed, 1986, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

than relative gains,³ the neoliberal theory concentrates around institutionalism, arguing not only that institutions matter, but how they matter. For neoliberal institutionalists, mutually beneficial arrangements exist but states forgo them because they fear others will take advantage of them.

Soon, the IR subfield of political science began to question some basic assumptions provided by the two domineering camps. Constructivism, first seen as critical, has now generally been accepted into mainstream IR theory. As Alexander Wendt (1992), a champion of constructivism, states in his seminal piece, “Anarchy is What States Make of it,” neoliberals and neoliberalists share a common commitment to rationalism (391). He goes on to state that, when committed to specific theoretical approaches, some research questions are allowed to be pursued while others are not (391). From this rationalist approach, agents’ identities and interests are treated as given exogenously and thus, offers a behavioral conception of process and institutions to make identities and interests immutable (391). Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) claim that this focus on material capabilities of states as defining environments makes researchers take the important attributes of identity and interest, established through norms and broadly

³ According to Robert Jervis (1994) in “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation,” this difference should not be overemphasized. Neoliberals have soon acknowledged that it is dangerous for one state to seek absolute gains, as it would put the state as a relative *disadvantage* with an adversary.

construed institutions, for granted (43).⁴ For constructivists, the story of state action differs. Instead of behavior solely changing, the interests and identities of the states change, resulting in permitted and unpermitted behaviors.⁵

Where, then, does critical IR fit in with these theories? Beginning with two seminal articles, critical theory, began with Robert Cox's (1981) "Social Forces, States, and World Orders" and Richard Ashley's (1981) "Political Realism and Human Interests." Contesting the problematic of positivist IR—that is, empirical, scientific IR—Cox discusses two purposes of theory. The first enlists a direct, conventional form, and that is to be a "guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms of the particular perspective which was the point of departure" (1981, 128). In essence, theory as traditional IR implements it is tainted by a perspective that allows

⁴ Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein (1996) in "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" do, however, state that neoliberalists view norms and institutions (how identity and interests are viewed) do matter on domestic and international levels, but that for the most part, attention to *varying constructions of actor identities* is not given. For examples of this, see, Uday A. Mehta, 1990, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," *Politics and Society*, Vol 18. No. 4, 457-454; Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds, 1993, *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Cambridge: Harvard University.

⁵ For a thorough introduction to constructivism in international relations theory see: Alexander Wendt, Spring 1992, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Boston: MIT Press, 391-425; Peter Katzenstein, ed, 1996, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press; Ted Hopf. Summer, 1998, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations," *International Security*, Vol 23, No. 1, 171-200; and John Ruggie, Autumn 1998, "What Makes the World Hang Together: International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*. Vol 54, No. 4, 855-885.

researchers to only research what their theory permits. The second purpose, reflecting on the process of theorizing, is to become aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing, and its “relation to other perspectives” (Cox 1981, 128). This ‘perspective on perspective’ forms the basis of critical theory as this realization helps open up the possibility of choosing a different, valid perspective. Cox (1981) delineates this critical aspect by declaring this second purpose as standing apart from the prevailing order (129). It does not take institutions or power relations for granted but calls them into question by investigating the origins of such relations and how or whether they might be changing.

Although surviving a battery of criticisms to its lack of empirical means to determine and examine power relations, critical theory does not seek the common goals of empiricism: to delineate patterns and maintain predictability through theoretical frames. Instead, this postpositivist regime concerns itself with investigating “how-possible” questions in International Relations. For example, Roxanne Doty (1993) asks how it was possible for the subjects of the Philippines to be subjectively constituted so as to allow the United States’ to pursue an interventionist policy in the 1950s in spite of state sovereignty claims by the Philippines (299). Instead of asking why the U.S. would act accordingly, or why the Philippines allowed such action, Doty instead sought to identify the mechanisms at play that allowed for anomalous action. This is an essential point for critical theory.

Robert Cox (1981) and Andrew Linklater (1990) both expertly clarify this point of divergence from positivist functions. Because the critical frame allows for a normative choice in favor of a social and political order, the principal objective, then, is to clarify this range of *possible alternatives*. Critical theory can represent a coherent picture of an alternative order, but historical processes restrict, limit, and constrain this ‘picture’ (Cox as cited by Linklater 1990, 28). This alternative order shows itself through power relations as perceived through discourse. As Linklater (2001) suggests,

judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political community which break with unjustified exclusion . . . [it] envisages the use of an unconstrained discourse to determine the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine the possibility of post-sovereign forms of national life.

Heavily influenced by Jürgen Habermas,⁶ critical theory for International Relations contest the current system not as immutable, but as a changing tapestry of power relations where these “social arrangements” form through “open dialogue” to permit and prohibit various types of action in an arrangements of environments. Through discourse, then, does critical theory find the foundation of power. How do actors make objects of others? How

⁶ Jürgen Habermas has made significant contributions to IR by the development of the concept and theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than in the structure of either the knowing subject. This social theory advances the goals of human emancipation, while maintaining an inclusive universalist moral framework. This framework emphasizes “speech-acts” in which words are used for an end result — the goal of mutual understanding, and that human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about such understanding. See, Habermas, Jürgen, 1981, *Theory of Communicative Action*, Boston: Beacon Press.

does the powerful or dominant group refer to those outside the group? And how do those referent groups now act as part of the roles they play as objects? These questions, and many more, critical theorists can now investigate through a postpositivist lens that permits them to ask other research questions and to look outside the traditional theoretical frames to view what others within the mainstream cannot.⁷

Similarly, critical security studies scholars now seek to answer traditionally excluded questions from the research program. Viewing security as a process embedded into social interactions and purposive discourse, critical theorists have moved away from analyzing state action and military armament and movements. Instead, critical theory seeks to uncover how actors choose what topics deserve military attention, and how the words used in discussing those political issues provide alternative pathways of action to be followed.

Keith Krause (1998) provides a great delineation of contemporary critical theory research regimes for security studies. In his work, he breaks scholarship into three main components. The first departure for critical studies inquires how threats are defined and constructed, which opposes the mainstream conceptualization of threat as arising from the material capabilities of possible opponents (Krause 1998, 306-309). He moves

⁷ For an updated and thorough discussion on the origins and current direction of critical theory in International Relations see Regger, Nicholas and Ben Thirkell-White, 2007, "Introduction: Still Critical After All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations," *Review of International Studies*. Vol 33, British International Studies Association, 3-24.

onward to delineate how the object of security itself is constructed and is inextricable from the discourse of threats (Krause 1998, 309). We will see how this process occurs later on in our conversation about the Copenhagen School of security studies and the speech-act procession. This departs from rationalist perspectives in a critical way by the traditional assumptions and 'given' that the object of national security is the state. The state is the primary locus of security and authority and has an obligatory responsibility to protect the state (which is equivalent to protecting the citizenship). Those outside of the state can present the threats to the state, making relations between countries on strategic terms (Grieco 1988, Mearsheimer 1994, 1995; 9-13).

The final departure of critical theory for security studies retaliates against the mainstream axiomatic supposition that the security dilemma; that is, states in a system of anarchy will always be seeking to survive and protect themselves from ever-present threats to security (Jervis 1978, Lynn-Jones 1995). The response to ameliorating or overcoming the security dilemma has deviated from any particular path by critical theory. Some propose transcending the dilemma through security networks of states in which states consciously participate (Deudney 1995, Adler and Barnett 1998). Others like Chilton (1996) and Chilton and Llyin (1993) rework the concept of security by examining the underpinnings of Cold War discourse. By investigating the formulation and implications of the containment doctrine and the conceptualizations of a "common house" for post-Cold War

security in Europe, he concludes that “an important consequence of the emphasis on language and communication in the construction of policies and realities is the fact...that political policies take place within political cultures and within particular languages” (Chilton 1996, 6). Subsuming these deviations from conventional IR assumptions, the Copenhagen School of security studies has comprehensively advanced the methodological and theoretical arguments presented by critical security researchers by opening up the study to a variety of ‘non-security’ security issues.

The Copenhagen School (CS) won wide acclaim as one of the most thorough and continuous exploration approaches to the “widening agenda in Security Studies” (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). More traditional Security Studies delineate the field as focusing mainly on the phenomenon of war by assuming a possible conflict between states, using the state as its unit of analysis, and arguing that although topics of interest unrelated to military power may affect security, their inclusion remains unnecessary (Bull 1968; Martin 1980; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Walt 1991). Traditionalists have berated critical focus by stating, in the words of Nye and Lynn-Jones (1998), “a subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral” (7). It remains clear that mainstream scholars have intentionally marginalized and excluded critical theorist work.

Reacting to what Walt (1991), and many others, labeled as the “Golden Age” of security studies in the 1970s, the Copenhagen School,

championed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, sought to expand the fixed boundaries of this traditional perspective. And, although Walt acknowledges that nonmilitary phenomena can threaten states and individuals (Buzan 1983), Walt states that this “prescription” runs the risk of expanding security studies excessively, and can include such issues like pollution, disease, and economic recessions—a severe detriment to the field by way of destroying its “intellectual coherence” (1991). The School argues otherwise.

In his “Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations,” Barry Buzan discusses the need for widening the definition of security studies (1984). He asserts that the main problem with International Relations is the polarization of research around anarchy and peace, and that a proper security-based approach allows for a more balanced perspective than either of the two paradigms and would help recover obscured middle ground by bridging the two concepts (1984, 17). Buzan, along with Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde expanded on this assertion with their work, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. This seminal work lays the groundwork for the Copenhagen School by providing a more critical lens to security’s scope by identifying four sectors beyond the military sector of security: environmental, economic, societal, and political (1998, see also Buzan 1991). By expanding the types of issues and conflicts that fall under the label of “security,” CS fundamentally changed the way to study security. Instead of analyzing state action, military funding, arms races, and violent

moves of one military against another military, academics should now analyze security through the process of “securitization” (1998, 23-26).

Theoretically, in this perspective, any public issue can be located on a spectrum that ranges from nonpoliticized (not touched by the state) to politicized (dealt by the state in public policy or some form of communal governance) to securitized (requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure, and not necessarily through the means of the state) (1998, 23-24). In this practice, any public issue can move between the three conditional phases of being, and thus, any issue can undergo securitization under certain conditions.

In this approach, the meaning of a concept lies in its usage—the discursive practices behind the concept. As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998) put it, “the meaning lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they implicitly use it in some ways and not others (24). For example, this paper presents the issues of Mexican drug cartels and drug trade inside the state of Guatemala. Does drug trade necessarily constitute a security issue for Guatemala? Could it be framed as an economic issue? A public policy issue? An issue that can be taken care of through social program? The power, then, rests in discursive actions that attempt to dramatize and, as a result, securitize issues beyond the realm of normal politics. In several instances, Ole Waever (1988, 1995) shows that textual analysis suggests something is designated as an international security issue

because “it can be argued that this issue is more important than other issues and should take absolute priority” (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998).

Michael Williams (2003) labels these securitizing moves as “speech acts.” According to Williams and CS, securitization describes security as having a particular discursive *and* political force and is, as Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum (2009) describe it, a concept that does something rather than an objective condition. Through specific authoritative actors, known as the national elite, certain issues are placed in a discursive framework or rhetorical structure where an issue is dramatized. And thus, by labeling it as *security worthy* an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Williams 2003). From this perspective, the School counters the argument that this framework for analysis allows anything to be securitized. As Williams (2003) describes, labeling an issue as security-worthy defines something as threatening and in need of urgent response, making the process of securitization studied through discourse. Thus, this conceptualization of security places security within a framework of *communicative action* that links the topic to a discursive ethic that “seek[s] to avoid the excesses of a decisionist account of securitization.” Specifically, this communicative action forces securitization in a discourse of legitimization with a possibility of argument, presenting evidence, etc to prevent an overabundance of threats (Risse 2000, Williams 2003).

Harkening back to Habermas (1981), this theory of communicative action and power in discourse has a long line of research in critical studies.

In seeking to identify the discourses of resistance to the dominant actors of society, Richard Terdiman (1985) shows how language has not only been a tool of power by the dominant but also that at such heightened times of dominant discourse penetration, discourses of resistance are at equal play, though oblivious by dominant discourse (38-40). This allows for a “self-reproduction” of dominance (Terdiman 1985, 40). Terdiman ultimately draws an equation between this critical aspect of power relations through language and more materialist models by finding a point of convergence through a hierarchized struggle between dominant and subdominant. This recalls the often-cited philosophical arguments of Michel Foucault, in which he states, “What then is at stake, unless it be desire and power.”⁸ Language is power, and one can analyze power by researching what language is used by whom and how.

The final important aspect of CS is the intersubjectivity of securitization. The national elite may framing an issue under the umbrella of security does not guarantee success (Waeber 1995). Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the speech act: does the audience accept that something is an existential threat to a shared value by the national elite? The audience must believe and accept the security framing as true and valid in order for securitization to take place and for extraordinary means to be utilized and legitimized (Buzan, Waeber, and de Wilde 1998). Critical investigations of securitizing will need to include some

⁸ Cf. Foucault, *L'ordre du discours*, 22.

sort of measure or assessment of how the non-dominant group of potential actors receives the language frames in their own understanding of the politicized issue and its effective maintenance or abatement. Critical theorists concede that this measurement, like all subjective measurements in a critical or traditionalist study, is often difficult to capture and remains open to interpretation of the 'correct,' though critical theorists would seem to assert there can be no correct, manner in which to conduct this attribute to securitization.

By outlining the defining aspects of the Copenhagen School securitization theory, it becomes clearer how securitization can be studied in the context of Guatemala and why it is important. Some previous works have successfully included CS into the realm of real-life situations from both statist and non-statist perspectives. Didier Bigo (2006) studied post-9/11 discourse by the United States and its allies which put forth assertions necessitating a globalized security with unprecedented intensity and reach. These states justified themselves by propagating the idea of global (in)security, attributed to the development of threats and mass destruction, thought to derive from terrorist and criminal organizations and their supporting governments. Similarly, Campbell (1993) and Aradau (2001) have shown that some issues rose and faded in the public imagination through the discourse of securitization largely independent from the "actual" or empirical degree of threat.

Although the number of studies incorporating CS theory into their research programs remains more limited than the positivist body (one of the aims of the paper is to add to the literature), the current situation occurring in Guatemala allows for an opportune time to study the processes of securitization and add theoretically and fundamentally valuable information to the framework. With a thorough and timely study to capture the rich environmental and contextual reality at work in this underdeveloped country, this study can remove the body of literature from the dominant focus on core states to the outlying periphery in hopes to track any changes or alterations in the politicization procedures at play. As a sort of test to the Copenhagen School, this study will seek to further develop the theoretical conditions and aim to contribute to its generalizability. With a new address to the developing world, we can outline new research avenues that observe more drastic implications on the securitization process of dominating actors, how Third World countries react to (non-)state agitators within and without territorial borders, and how this changes the overall political stability of the state. Specifically looking at Guatemala will also permit a chance to move away from purely theoretical and scientific discussion and provide a genuine policymaking implication to the state of Guatemala and its current state of affairs.

Studying the case of Guatemala with a critical lens proves pertinent and beneficial in investigating the mechanics behind securitization. It answers the how-possible question that needs to be answered. In his

inaugural speech in January 2008, newly elected President Alvaró Colom interwove socially focused rhetoric to “overcome intolerance, inequality, discrimination, and lack of solidarity” as Guatemala moves in a new direction.⁹ In essence, he campaigned on and continued discourse on providing and building social programs in order to develop Guatemala. However, just two short months afterward, the social directives on the agenda were placed on the backburner of indefinite postponement as the drug-trafficking tale took a new turn. On March 28, 2008, a ferocious gun battle between Guatemalan and Mexican cartels broke out in La Laguna, which left 11 people dead, including Juan "Juancho" León, the Guatemalan leader of the Sayaxché cartel (Reynolds 2008). Los Zetas, Mexico’s most technologically advanced, sophisticated, and violent paramilitary drug cartel, appears to have intended to displace local Guatemalan cartels and take control of the country’s major drug routes (2008).

Over the past two and a half years, scarce reports and news stories have indicated that Los Zetas have increasingly infiltrated a limited geopolitical space through often violent measures as a result of the crackdown the Mexican government has placed on its drug cartels (Reynolds 2008; Roplogle 2008; and International Crisis Group 2010). As Marcela Sanchez of the *Latin American Herald Tribune* wrote, “Just as eradication and interdiction efforts have largely pushed coca production from country to country, cracking down on drug cartels seems to be moving them into more

⁹ Inés Benitez, 2008, “New President Pledges ‘Privileges for the Poor,’” InterPress Service News Agency.

permissive countries.”¹⁰ From there, news reports of arms building including military helicopter purchases, military units moving into the conflicted areas, and international security initiatives with bordering states began to immediately develop from the state of Guatemala. Guatemala, from a traditional security sense, was responding to a security threat as presented by drug trafficking.

How was it possible, then, to move the country away from the promised social democracy and welfare state creation to a military-focused, security-driven nation? By looking at the rhetoric and speech-acts created by the national elite, I was able to examine the seminal attempts and processes of securitizing drug trafficking along the Mexico-Guatemala border. Using the research design delineated in the next section and the theoretical framework of CS, I can test the hypotheses in the overview. Once the how-possible question has been answered can a student of security studies then ask the why-possible question in which the investigations of why Guatemala would want to securitize the issue can be answered. Because this lies beyond the bounds of this study, I can only offer hypotheses, centered on both international and domestic factors, as to why the state would seek such action. And, in the concluding remarks, it would seem responsible to engage desecuritization theory, which states that desecuritization is always more desirable than securitization (Waever 1995; Taureck 2006; Stritzel 2007).

¹⁰ Marcela Sanchez, 2010, “Guatemala’s Drug Threat in a Post Drug-War Era,” *Latin American Herald Tribune*, <http://www.laht.com>, accessed November 1, 2010.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design for this project consists of two main parts. The first tests the hypotheses related to purposive speech-acts by the government to dramatize and highly politicize drug trade through government sponsored media. Because there were limitations with accessing all of the archived media for the length of time in which the Colom administration has been in office, I also looked at a variety of presidential addresses and speeches to the public at large from Alvaró Colom's inaugural year.

Because the Mexican drug cartels have only recently moved across the Mexico-Guatemala border, much of the official government documents produced by the internal security, military, and intelligence agencies of the Guatemalan state remain classified. However, by using content analysis to investigate the *Diario de Centro América (Central American Daily)*, I can identify the purposive measures enacted by the national elite. *Diario de Centro América* is the public record of the Guatemalan government¹¹ provided in both physical print and online forms. The online source is an exact, digitized copy of the printed source, meaning that one can similarly identify the news sections, pages, and formatting as one would with a printed paper. Because the newspaper is a government sponsored venture as opposed to other highly circulating sources, like *La Prensa Libre (The Free*

¹¹ *Diario de Centro América: El Diario Público de Guatemala*, 1880, <http://dca.gob.gt>, Accessed November 3, 2010.

Press) or *Nuestra Diario (Our Daily)*, I claim that examining this news source will allow for proper analysis of the government's intentions and purposes. *Diario de Centro América* will provide elite opinion and intent first by providing news it deems proper to provide to the citizenship of the country (drugs) and second by slanting or framing the news pieces provided in positive or negative tones. This purposive framing will elicit the intentions of the national elite, thus indicating the role of authority and power over the general public in creating highly politicized space to deal effectively with drug trafficking.

These tones will be derived through content analysis of the provided articles, which will fit the design as content analysis is the “study of recorded human communications” (Babbie [2007] 2010, 333). Using a code sheet (Appendix A) developed specifically for this research program, I will identify securitizing features in the articles related to drug trade and trafficking. For the purposes of this design, I have used the theoretical literature to break purposive framing into three attributes: threat perception creation, “us versus them” perception creation, and high politicization or, dramatization. Threat perception creation, as opposed to the threat perception integrated into the citizenship's perspective of the situation, relates to the framing of drug trade, in this case, by the state as a situation that requires immediate and powerful attention and action by the state itself because drug trade risks the well-being or existence of some ‘object’ of Guatemala.

The research design for this program stresses the incorporation of the five security sectors outlined by the Copenhagen School, which both broadens and refines the subfield to include more potential realms in which security issues can surface but with the process of securitization only specific issues deemed by both elite and common audiences can be included within the subfield. The most common sectors for security are the military and political theatres. The military sector includes the actors that most attribute to traditional security studies. Largely, the state serves as the securitizing actor toward external or internal threats to the state's sovereignty. For external threats, military security outcomes precipitate from a two-level interplay of manifest militarization and latent militarized perceptions and intentions, that is, initiating the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state and, heightening and militarizing the other's *perceived* capabilities and intentions, respectively (Buzan et al 1998). Political security refers to the "organizational stability of social order(s)" (141). Although theoretically less coherent from its sector counterparts, political security refers to issues receiving high politicization that would not fall into the four remaining sectors (140-142). The political threats aim at the organizational stability of the state with targets possibility related to the idea of the state, its national identity, ideology, and its institutions (Buzan 1991).

Economic, environmental, and societal security sectors complete the set as less traditional security realms but also more defined. Economic security positions itself in the debates about international political economy

concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market (Buzan 1991, 230). Actors could include states, international organizations, classes, firms, or any arrangement threatened economically by the current condition of affairs. The environmental sector relates to the interweaving of environmental and political agendas usually embedded in non-governmental and scientific organizations and governmental and media outlets, respectively (Buzan et al 1998). This sector can and does include issues such as ecosystem destruction, energy and population problems, food shortages or limitations, and degradation of natural landscapes. The societal sector's conceptual organization centers on identity (119). The identity could be of the nation as a whole, or any group cleaved along religious, ethnic, political, gender, educational, or socioeconomic lines. If a group of individuals maintain a collective identity and that identity is threatened by an object, securitization can begin to take place.

In every sector, some form of elite seeks to dramatize and highly politicize issues that threaten them. For this study, the elite take issue with drug trade and trafficking, in which the only coping path of action is immediate and extreme. By breaking down the "threat" attribute into six sectors outlined by *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, I can see which sectors are at threatened and at play in the securitization of trafficking. The sectors are all broken down with the specific details of the articles to be noted to record, clarify, and justify which sectors are in play.

The development of this threat perception creation is contingent on the national elite's engagement of the audience's "us versus them" ideational perception, or objectification. By clearly dividing the identities between some sort of inside grouping and outside force(s), in this case, the powerful Mexican drug cartel, Los Zetas, the Guatemalan elite creates mutually exclusive groups to segregate and isolate such clusters, allowing for the creation of a referent object. This, in turn, allows for an appeal of 'logical' justification for authorities to respond severely because the threatening force appears unnatural and inorganic to the familiar system driving the Guatemalan sectors. The referent objects are the entities that are seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998, 36). My analysis breaks down the dichotomous concept by potential groups: "Guatemalans," "citizens," "communities or towns," "political or social groups," or "families" for the Us factor, and "drug users," "drug lords," "drug cartels," "Los Zetas," "Mexicans/foreigners" for the Them. By identifying such features, students of security studies can accurately determine what needs protecting, what does the threatening and also understand which security sectors are at play. Does the culture need to be preserved? Does the environment need protection? How about the citizenship? Here, the referent objects the national elite seek to protect are the state, and more importantly, the nation of Guatemala. The exclusivity of the groups also identifies the threatening object(s)—drug trade.

The final attribute of securitization efforts on behalf of the elite is high politicization or dramatization of politically charged concerns. In a similar function as the Us v Them conception, high politicization offers the audience a justified explanation of how X is threatening Y and Z is needed to close the threat. These efforts then make it possible to put words as action and help answer the how-possible question of securitization. Extreme politicization takes place once the former two attributes have been established (i.e. validated through mentioning and perhaps logical explanation) and occurs through discourse relating to at least one of the security sectors in one of two ways: a call to action or a report on action. Either the quoted or paraphrased actor(s), or article author call for drastic, extreme, or otherwise non-normal political action to relieve the stress from trafficking. In the report on action, the article reports in a support fashion on drastic changes or attempts to change either ideology or structure relating to one of the sectors in response to drug trade and trafficking.

I do not differentiate within my data collection the two modes of high politicization within the printed media, because one mode is not necessarily more powerful or significantly different from the other. They are developed by time. Although one may argue that reporting on action would indicate actual securitizing action taking place in the physical realm, the truth in this study still remains founded in the discursive patterns of the text. If an out-of-the-ordinary incident took place by municipal politician-activists but received a denunciatory backlash, would the audience receive and process

the incident as good news? Would the issue be seen as a security measure or an extremist move made irrelevant by the national elite?

Through this process of hierarchical securitization, Guatemala, I hypothesize, will seek to inevitably infuse the advent of Los Zetas with drug trafficking, surveying the former as the embodiment of the latter. By inextricably linking the drug cartel along with additional discourse on the larger picture of drug trade and trafficking, and thus the political woes of Guatemala, the elite's call for immediate and acute action will seem all the more paramount for the public.

Because the three attributes are hierarchical in their theoretical formulation, that is, one cannot create an Us versus Them perception without labeling the Them a threat first. And one cannot seek ulterior, irrational, or extreme behavior without first establishing a threat and separated identity. For analytical purposes then, this relationship translates smoothly into a securitization scale where each article undergoes the same systematic categorization of 'how much securitizing' it does. This scale can then also be implemented and expanded in the same system if comparing multiple media outlets or securitizing over time.

To cover both latent and manifest content, each article will be placed on a scale ranging from 0 to 4, where a "0" article will have no evidence of securitization and a "4" article will have all evidence of securitization—threat perception creation, Us versus Them perception creation, high politicization/dramatization, and the overall emotional evocation

sympathetic to security labeling which will be determined by the analyzing the tone of the article through latent content analysis, with each variable receiving equal weight (i.e. 1 point per category) . On average, securitization would incorporate the majority of these qualities. When the articles are coded, aggregated means can be placed on the scale shown in Table 1, which delimits the strength of the securitization attempts. The scale, then, develops as such:

Table 1: Securitization Score Ranges for Averages

<u>Score</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
0 - .99	No securitization attempts
1 - 1.99	Weak securitization attempts
2 - 2.99	Securitization attempts
3 - 4	Strong securitization attempts

Once the entirety of the sample is coded, simple descriptive statistics will be used to provide information on the sample population of the articles. *By looking at descriptive statistics, I determined actors—which subset, if not all, of the national elite—seeking to securitize drug trade along with clues as to what objects and the objects’ sectors are threatened.* Implementing the developed scale, I also tracked the progression of securitization and determine that if the averaged scale ranks above at 2 or above, securitization has happened from the projecting end to a national audience. Additionally, looking at the aggregate data, I can determine that purposive speech-acts are occurring in both a quantitative manner—by evaluating the counts of traits

and tone in each article—and a qualitative manner—by investigating tone and feeling behind the article. Overall, I expect to find that the national elite seeks to use the news source, *Diario de Centro América*, to dramatize and securitize drug trade(rs), like Los Zetas, entering into Guatemala from the Mexico-Guatemala border in order to allow for and legitimize intensive action.

The data collection will only span of available documents provided by the news source itself, January 2009 to December 2010, or, two years. Because the number of articles on the subject can be extensive from just the amount of news produced every day, sampling is in order to cull a representative sample of all available stories. Looking only at the first news section, *Nacional*, I will randomly sample the days ranging from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010. Of the available 520 days of news produced by the media outlet,¹² approximately 150, or just under 30% of the population, were sampled. On the whole, this offered 64 articles relating to drug trade and trafficking that were then coded.

This sampling system will occur for two main reasons. First, the front section hosts the most prevalent news about the state, according to the newspaper at least, and it is in this section that I expect to find the most pertinent, relevant, and sensational articles about drug trafficking and violence should securitization be occurring. In this vein, if the national elite aim to dramatize the drug cartels, it will seek to place the news in the first

¹² *El Diario de Centroamerica* is only produced on a Monday through Friday basis, thus limiting the amount of days available for sample.

section. Second, this process allowed a broad and practical glimpse of securitization discourse over time without biasing select news days or running into periodicity by selective sampling patterns. A benefit for this stretch of time is that the sampled section will allow a month-to-month view on the rise and continuation of security discourse within Guatemala.

This first design of the research program presents several advantages and disadvantages in regards to reliability and validity. Reliability, the quality of measurement method that suggests that the same data would have been collected each time in repeated observations of the same phenomenon, remains high in the case of context analysis. With printed materials, the articles can be coded and coded time again in terms of manifest content. In the case of studying securitization of drug trade in Guatemala, this code sheet allows for paragraph analysis of news content in a government-sponsored newspaper. As the code sheet accounts for specific sources and enumerates the times certain words are used, reliability remains high as any researcher can tabulate the number of times certain words are used. However, because I am also looking at the tones of each section for the attributes along with the overall article, I am coding for latent content, the underlying meaning of the communication. This remains a small threat to reliability as I alone evaluated to negative, positive, and neutral feeling environments each author imbued into the article. This cost, though, does not outweigh the benefits.

Latent material helps contextualize and give real meaning to the tallied words that comes with manifest material.¹³

The inclusion to measure latent content as perceived as intonation from the news articles, and thus, from the national elite, several threats to invalidity remain at bay. With producing a more contextual investigation in the content analysis, the design remains more grounded in the reality of discursive dramatization rather than being artificial by just tallying up how many times certain words are used and by whom. Had this study just quantified words used, we would not be able to grasp how exactly those words are being used and in what context. This design also permits higher content validity as the three attributes used for securitization analysis are exclusive and encompassing for this research program. Potential threats to external validity would deal with the extrapolation and generalization of the discursive frame patterns found in this publication as opposed to what is being used/said at press conferences of the elite, in national legislative bodies, in national legislation, and in international organization forums. Do the patterns match up? If so, then this study remains externally valid, but if they do not, there exists a threat to validity. However, such investigation is beyond the scope of this program.

¹³ The best way to neutralize a threat to inter-coder reliability would be to train one or more coders on the researcher program and have them code the same articles used in the sample. This allows for a simple average of the manifest and latent content analysis and helps eliminate the bias produced by having one coder. For this project, unfortunately, time, money, and willingness did not allow for the training and participation of another researcher.

To not solely rely on the media to provide an insight on the discursive patterns of the state, this study also looked at several speeches given by President Colom, as the chief and spokesman of the state. See Appendix B for a complete list of the sampled speeches. Speeches, as opposed to government law or reports, were used because 1) they are intended for public audiences (that is not to say law and reports are not accessible by the public, but speeches are more easily heard, seen, and accessed by the general people and 2) as the representative of the state to its people, the President's *discursive patterns and power* will be evident in his attempts to politicize drug trade and legitimize action against it. This analysis is a supplement and reinforcement to the data found in the public records of *El Diario*. They were analyzed for its content at large and did not undergo the same numerical scrutiny as the news articles but the same evaluative technique in searching for securitization patterns as the articles were applied.

From here, this paper will attempt to show both verbally and pictorially the securitization attempts produced by the elite actors of Guatemala (or beyond) toward drug trade and trafficking. The results of the newspaper and speech analyses will be shown and, hopefully, adequately explained. The paper will then conclude with additional research opportunities, hypotheses as to why Guatemala would or could securitize drug trafficking, and a theoretically nested illustration of why securitization may not be the best path for Guatemala.

CHAPTER 3

NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS

An analysis of the government daily reveals high levels of securitization attempted by appendages of the state producing the publication. With the analysis of the dataset created by coding sixty-four articles sampled from a total of 150 of 520 (29%) possible days. With this information, I attempt to show and explain the actors at play by investigating who implemented speech-acts and proposed high politicization, identify the referent object(s) that became existentially threatened by drug trade with the arrival of Los Zetas, and search beyond the 'numbers' the coding produced by elaborating more on specific articles. This will also help illustrate how exactly the articles were coded. Additionally, I will look at the significance and role that images play in reporting and conveying the news to the public.

Description of the Sample. As mentioned, 64 articles presented discourse on drug trade and trafficking from the sampled 150 days. This datum alone says something powerful. Only on five rare occasions did the two articles, as opposed to one, come from the same day. Thus, 59 of 150 days, or approximately 40% of the days in which the news published a story on drug trade/trafficking. Considering the potential news-worthy stories that make day-to-day news, especially for Guatemala which experienced huge economic downturns and significant natural disasters such as flooding, mudslides, and tropical storms throughout the sampled timeframe, having

40% of the daily news signifies the subject as a hot, consistent topic in for the state. This point is further illustrated by the fact that the small publication only produced on average 7.57 stories a day in the *Nacional* section.

Additionally, the articles ranged from three to seventeen paragraphs, but average to 8.1 paragraphs. Because paragraphs in news stories can consist of one or two sentences, the seemingly wide range in length may have only made negligible difference in content and discourse. Moreover, with the articles coded with a final, discourse-based score, and those scores averaged across time, the need to control for paragraphs was not necessary for this study.

Referent Object(s): Part of the analysis sought to identify the referent object(s) that are existentially threatened by drug trade and trafficking; at least, that is how they are made out to be by the elite. In many cases, a state, as a political unit, is often the referent object to security threats, especially those emanating from other states. In others, referent objects could sift into the security sectors the Copenhagen School outlines—state (political), society (societal), environment (environmental), etc—or can represent myriad other choices like citizens, the political elite, institutions, and more.

In this case, I determined the referent objects by both framing them into the aforementioned security sectors and then further detailing them specifically within the sector(s). Expanding on the previous examples, if the referent object is “the formal institutions of the government,” the political sector would umbrella the term. In the case of Guatemala, the threatened

objects fall into political and societal realms. Buzan and Waever (1997) and Buzan et al (1998) identify *what* exactly is threatened when the state and society are at risk—sovereignty and identity, respectively. For a state, having the authority and autonomy to govern and rule a geographic area remains the core and purpose of a state. It is why it exists. On the other hand, identity as a nation, as a community, as a group of people signifies the existence of society. Identity composes society.

According to the published discourse, drug trade and its manifestations reckon hazardously against state sovereignty and societal identity. Of the instances in which threat perception creation occurred in the news, 65% of the discourse remarked on political sovereignty either to the state as a whole, or to geographic region(s) of Guatemala. For example, reports of the ‘loss of governance’ and authority in areas where drug trafficking exists along with threats to the democratic political institutions from cartel pervasion allow readers sympathetic development toward the government in an effort to legitimize government actions. If the public desired the continuation of democratic governance provided by the current regime, the use of discourse about threats toward the administration would reinforce such sympathetic resonance.

Additionally, this threat perception to the government paralleled threat perception to the Guatemalans as a nation and community. The analyzed sample portrayed drug trade as a threat to the community and social fabric of Guatemala, and particularly its youth. With just under half

(44%) of all mentions of threat regarding communal and solidarity threats, the discourse appeared to activate the close-to-home and in-my-backyard perception of drug trade to all Guatemalans. Again, this perception disseminated toward the general public presents drug trade as an immediate, proximal and potential destruction of the societal base in which citizens operate.

Other threats mentioned include danger to the macroeconomic stability of Guatemala (12%) along with harm to the biosphere and environment of the natural Guatemalan landscape in areas with high drug trade activity (5%).¹⁴

Actors at Play. A goal of this study is to determine which elite actors are actually securitizing drug trade. Although *El Diario* is essentially directed by the national government at large, by quantifying the quoted and mentioned actors that have pushed the Us versus Them and threat perceptions along with highly politicized discourse, one can assume the actors as part sources of securitization. For this research, no emphasis or weight was placed on the actors according to which step of securitization in which they participated; so, an actor instigating rapid and dramatic military recourse was counted equally to another actor depicting drug cartels as a high, valid threat to the state.

Of the quoted and referenced actors that played a part in the securitization discourse, two primary 'actors' surfaced. The first 'elite group'

¹⁴ Percentages total more than 100% as some articles featured more than one type of perceived threat.

playing an active role in drug-trade framing appears as the national government. Each sampled article was more than twice more likely to feature security speech from a representative of the national government as than anywhere else.¹⁵ Broken down further, this observation developed from the executive office, represented by President Colom, along with other office holders, particularly from the *Ministerio de Gobernación*, with 20% and 35% of the total speech-acts. This information, then, suggests that the national government, playing the role of the national elite, purposefully propagated news stories of dramatization in order to securitize drug trade to the national public.

Additionally, international statesmen, particularly from the United States and Mexico were featured largely as supporting securitization of trafficking for Guatemala. Despite much of Guatemala's concern and resulting action has taken place within the confines of its own geopolitical borders, the analysis suggests international pressure and corroboration with drug trade securitization. On a level equal to that of the President's communication (20%), *El Diario* illustrated an international elite actor as well. Curiously, it remains to be analyzed the role in which an international actor can help securitize this matter via a domestic outlet! This remains a point of interest as Guatemala remains a developing state whilst Mexico and

¹⁵ This may be confounded with the implication that interviewing government officials is easily accessible to a government-sponsored newspaper.

the United States, both of which issued their own ‘wars on drugs,’ come from core positions in the world system.¹⁶


Securitization Patterns and Analysis. The analysis of discourse provided by the national government in *El Diario* uncovers strong speech-act patterns that are displayed in multiple formats. The first prospect at illustrating and identifying speech-acts and securitizing discourse looks at the actual rhetoric implemented. The language exercised throughout the newspaper depicts drug trade for Guatemala from a dramatized perspective in which drugs are something to be physically fought and combated. Ronaldo Robles, the secretary of Social Communication of the Presidency, ascribed the need for “extreme measures” (*medidas extremas*) in the capture of traffickers (*El Diario de Centroamérica*, 10 February 2009). Additional rhetoric included aggressive and warlike positions against trade. One reporter claimed the “drugs must be fought” (*el narcotráfico debe ser combatido*) while others accounted Guatemala as a nation-state must “fight against drug trafficking and crime” (*combato al tráfico y a la delincuencia*) because the state is “caught in a crossfire of the major drug flows” (*encuentra atrapada en el fuego cruzado de los grandes flujos de droga*) (*El Diario de Centroamérica* 22 March 2010, 10 September 2010, 6 March 2009).

This point is furthered by the fact that most of the news reports featured only discourse and coverage sympathetic to securitization. Of the

¹⁶ This is not to equate Guatemala’s situation to those of the United State or Mexico, as Guatemala, given its domestic political history, may be more nuanced.

sampled articles, only three stories featured ‘anti-politicization’ perspectives either through journalistic reporting or through quoting individuals against high politicization. All, though, were not strictly anti-dramatization, but were at best embedded in reports to neutralize securitizing efforts. For example, in a July 2009 article, journalist Agustín Ortiz reported on the community reactions to “national terror” along the border. He includes quotes from a military officer advancing securitization speech, but juxtaposed the quote with those of Agustín Tebalán, an activist of Frente Nacional Contra las Represas: “They say that the reactivation of detachments is to fight drug trafficking, but that has meaning, which is seeking to strengthen the viability of large military projects, reinforcing military force to counter a social struggle”¹⁷ (*El Diario de Centroamérica* 22 July 2009). Although this article does well to present another voice and perspective on the matter, I did not determine this article as anti-politicization, as the discourse by the author and his inclusion of other pro-high politicization proponents. The other two articles featuring such perspectives were also embedded into high politicization articles. Therefore, the usage of negative discourse did not stand out on its own, but by sheer number of mentions and sentiments became overshadowed.

¹⁷ Translated from: ‘*Dicen que la reactivación de los destacamentos es para combatir el narcotráfico, pero eso tiene su sentido, lo que buscan es viabilizar los megaproyectos reforzando la fuerza military para contrarrestar la lucha social.*’



The coded results also reflect these efforts. Using the threshold scale of securitizing attempts, the aggregate means show Guatemala’s moves. Figure 1 shows the analyzed results over the two years of coded content. Within the sample, the article scores were averaged over the two-month increments in order to help even out the sample break-up and establish a more representative distribution of the articles. The means come from a range of three to ten articles in the two-month period with an average of 4.8 articles. As can be seen, over two years *El Diario* issued discursive practices securitizing drug trade and raising the issue out of the realm of normal politicization to an issue of high politicization in which the government can face drug trade with measures beyond the status quo. Only one time did the mean dip below the securitization threshold of 2.0 and not by much. Additionally, the overall mean of all coded articles is 2.99, which is

well above the threshold and borderline high securitization. This descriptive statistic illustrates that almost half of the sample featured high securitization discourse pushed out to the readership.

With this language, the government painted drug trade as an object that can be physically countered by extreme methods. This metaphor helped legitimize the government's 'extreme measures,' by having the public sympathize, connect, or in some way identify with the government's (potential) action. In doing so, the national government opens up new action pathways that would not have been otherwise acceptable to the general public of the democratic state.

The Power of Images. Finally, I attempted to understand the usage and role visual, graphic material played in securitization through the news. Psychological and behavioral studies (Paivio and Foth 1970; Childers and Houston 1982, 1983) have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to remember visual images clearer (impact) and longer (duration) than text, I suspected that *El Diario* would feature main images along with the drug trade texts.¹⁸ This was coded as a dummy variable in which 1 = image present and 0 = no image. Performing a simple measure of association between present images and the security scale via Gamma test, I found a strong, positive

¹⁸ For another study on the relationship between International Relations and imagery, see Cori Dauber, Winter 2001, "Image as Argument: The Impact of Mogadishu on U.S. Military Intervention," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 205-229. Here, Dauber discusses the use of visual imagery in reporting and its effects on the American public, its approval of U.S. military operations, and the resulting changes in U.S. military action.

correlation (.75) between the securitizing discourse (evinced through the final score of the article) and pictorial publication.¹⁹ This means that as securitizing discourse becomes stronger, the presence of an image is more likely to be alongside the story. This would suggest that readers would more likely absorb the content of the highest securitizing reports as they come with images to mentally store, thus facilitating the efforts of the actors.

¹⁹ There was no significant correlation or statistic that differentiated the type of image (separated into a dyad of ‘violent/graphic’ and ‘non-violent’) and higher securitization scores as was originally suspected.

CHAPTER 4

SPEECH ANALYSIS

Although the speeches by Álvaro Colom analyzed in this study only reach across one of his three years in office, the brief scope outside of the analyzed discourse of *El Diario* and provides an accurate glimpse into how the President uses discourse to securitize drug trafficking across many different audiences and platforms. The speeches were selected on the basis that they substantively discussed drug trafficking in Guatemala and that, as a whole sample, they maintained a variety of factors: different audiences and occasions, televised/non-televised.²⁰ With this broad scope, I was able to develop a simple sketch with how the government, as personified by Colom, painted a drug trade picture to (inter)national audiences.

On a whole, the speeches relay a colorful message of the threat that drug trade and drug trafficking presents to the Guatemalan public. Table 1 displays the language and discourse that President Colom offered to military, international, and citizen audiences. In all of his discourse, Colom connected to the general public and appeals to broad audiences through emotional discourse protecting the citizens of Guatemala, as opposed to the state or government. He conveyed a threatening image of a “scourge” (*flagelo*)—the cause of great trouble or suffering—in many of his speeches to provoke a threat that drug trade has on the entire nation. He also went beyond just threats with his discourse to dramatize the situation.

²⁰ See Appendix B for a complete list of 2008 speeches translated and analyzed for this study.

Table 2: Speech-Acts and Discourse by President Álvaro Colom

Audience	TV	Referent Object(s)	Threat	Dramatization
Military	No	Citizens Economy Environment	“scourge of drugs” (2) (<i>flagelo de la droga</i>)	“The Naval Force...needs a serious and profound strengthening” (<i>La Fuerza Naval...necesita de un fortalecimiento serio y profundo</i>)
Public	No	Guatemalan youth (<i>nuestra juventud</i>)	“scourge” “activities rotting society” (<i>actividades...en que están pudriendo nuestro sistema</i>)	“supernatural effort” (<i>esfuerzo sobrenatural</i>) “[cartels have] no limits in violence, terrorism” (<i>no límites en violencia, en terrorism</i>)
Public	Yes	Citizens	“border of problems” (<i>frontera de problemas</i>)	“fighting the drug war” (<i>dándole la guerra al narco</i>)
International Statesmen (UN)	No	Citizens (youth)	“scourge” (3)	“attacking drug trafficking” (<i>ataque al narcotráfico</i>) “battle” (<i>enfrentamiento</i>)
Public	Yes	Citizens		“monster with many heads” (<i>un monstruo con un montón de cabezas</i>)

Interestingly, it is here that his use of language altered given the audience at large. For specific audiences, such as the officers and military personnel at the naval base, he implemented more sober language, but evoked dramatization nonetheless in the build-up and intensification of the branch of the armed forces the audience represents. For the international arena, he exhibited strong, war-like speech that showed the other states of the active, aggressive stance Guatemala took on this international issue. He equated countering drug trade efforts with a “battle” and object in which they “attacked.” But for the lay public, we can see the language shift to

general, colorful, and highly dramatized speech in which drug trade is depicted as a “monster” and connected to “terrorism,” against which Guatemala as a nation must take “supernatural effort[s].”

On a whole, Colom, on behalf of the Guatemalan state, has issued multiple speeches that develop upon and detail the drug trade situation and the efforts the state has made against it. In these instances, the government sought to dramatize drug trade to lift the situation beyond the everyday problems like education, healthcare, economic recession, etc and attempt to convince many audiences that direct action must be taken to neutralize trafficking. To do so, Colom has developed speech-acts in which the “war on drugs” can now be militarized and politicized to counter by means equal to that of an actual war from a threatening state. Additionally, the state compounded this effort not by the continuous issuance of dramatized discourse, but in the absence of such discourse in other talks.

In addition to the given talks for this analysis, I also looked at speeches by Colom that dealt with the social programs and with efforts to develop society and state at large (see Appendix B). In these speeches that deal with state and social building, not one mention of drug trade, trafficking, or even abuse was mentioned. In doing so, Colom explicitly chisels drug trafficking from the other forms of state control, building, and development. By removing the issue from the crowd of other problems, the government can then proceed to politicize and justify extreme action.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This paper seeks to explore the writing and speech frames used to relay the current issues of drug trade and trafficking within Guatemala. By investigating the discursive practices published by the national government towards its public, we can see that with the experience of drug trade, the government is actively trying to 'securitize' the issue as a way to implement drastic, dramatic, or even unprecedented counteraction to the phenomenon. This dramaturgical persuasion allows the government to foster legitimization and approval from the general public, so as to not produce large opposition to government securitization.

These efforts are captured in two forms. First, the discourse would portray drug trade as a fantastical, destructive, and scary 'other' in which the general public would not only view drug trafficking as an immediate threat about to pounce on the individual, but also as something distinct and separate from the daily life of Guatemalans. This would effectively allow drug trade to move away from civil, normal political operations and be swooped up into the arms of the government to effectively and instantly neutralize. Second, the discourse also illuminated sympathetic intonations of the physical, military efforts that were occurring at the time. This helped the civilians see militarization and high politicization as acceptable for the government to be facilitating despite the fact that peace accords from just over a decade ago are still in effect to minimize the armed forces.

Although the “why-question” of Guatemala’s securitization preference lies beyond the bounds of this paper, one can hypothesize several factors that may have led to such discourse dissemination. As was already mentioned, international diplomats from the United States and Mexico played a large part in providing the security speech-acts for *El Diario*. It would appear, then, that Guatemala faces international pressures to securitize and, as a result, militarize drug trade within its borders. But there are also domestic factors at play. The most recent report of the International Crisis Group (2010), which produces case studies to ‘prevent conflict worldwide,’ found that Guatemala continues to face large swaths of impunity within law enforcement and that inequality may help push civilians to complicity with drug cartels as a means of employment. Thus, it may appear easier for the government to divert funding and opportunity away from the local police forces and into the military in order to sidestep impunity issues and immediately curb drug trade activity. Although one may question the validity over improving the state over time with these measures.

Beyond these action-based conveniences for Guatemala to securitize drug trade, the theoretical underpinnings of securitization suggest the opposite. Ole Waever (1995) treats securitization as a constant negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics.²¹ With this, Waever advocates for strategic desecuritization in which securitization is reversed and issues are shifted from high politicization. In doing so, the actor(s) can deal with

²¹ This perspective is also shared in Buzan et al. 1998: 29.

the topic in the 'rules' of a democratic political system. Waever, and later Buzan et al (1998) treat desecuritization as political acts and thus achieved through normal political processes. Although securitization theory only seeks to answer what security does and is nothing beyond a "theoretical tool to facilitate practical security analysis" (Taureck 2006), this analytical tool suggests Guatemala re-moves drug trade and trafficking into the scope of normal politics in order to stabilize the domestic situation at hand. By presenting drug trade as a political issue to be taken care of through the embedded political avenues in Guatemala's democratic institutions, the state can desecuritize the issue and handle the preceding problems through legislative and programmatic means.

In addition to this practical policy-making implication, this paper also adds to the literature by implementing another empirical study under the Copenhagen framework. Uniquely, this paper moves beyond stable, established democratic states and applies the analytic framework to a developing state in Central America to produce consistent results for variable states. In this case, one can see how Guatemala, like other states, can use discourse to securitize an issue such as drug trade through media and government outlets. This would help CS on a generalizable dimension as the national elite as actors respond similarly in framing their dramatized concerns.

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APPENDIX A

NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS: GUATEMALA SECURITIZATION

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION

CODE

Article Number	___	___	___		
Number of Paragraphs	___	___	___		
Date	___	___	___		
Coder	___	___			
# of Articles in Section	___	___			
Type of Article	___				
1=News Story					
2=Editorial/Opinion					
3=Other					
Drugs/Drug Trade Mentioned in Headline	___				
1=Yes, 0=No					
Tone of Headline about Drug Trade	___				
1=Positive, 2=Negative, 3=Mixed, 4=Neutral, 0=Not about drugs					
Tone of Article about Drug Trade	___				
1=Positive, 2=Negative, 3=Mixed, 4=Neutral, 0=Not about drugs					
<hr/>					
Number of Mentions about Us v Them	___	___			
Number of Quotes about Us v Them	___	___			
Source of Quotes about Us v Them	___				
1=President	___				
2=Military Personnel	___				
3=National Office Holder	___				
4=Local Office Holder	___				
5=Newspaper					
6=Citizen					
7=Interest Group/NGO					
8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official					
9=Other _____					
Traits of Us v Them (Number of Mentions)					
Guatemalans	___	___	Drug Users	___	___
Citizens	___	___	Specific Drug Lords/Bosses	___	___
Communities/Towns	___	___	Drug Cartels	___	___
Political Groups	___	___	Mexicans/Foreigners	___	___
Families	___	___	Los Zetas	___	___
Social Groups	___	___	Criminal	___	___
<hr/>					

Dehumanizing Features: _____

“Outsider” Features: _____

Number of Mentions of Threat _____

Number of Quotes about Threat _____

Source of Quotes _____

1=President _____

2=Military Personnel _____

3=National Office Holder _____

4=Local Office Holder _____

5=Newspaper _____

6=Citizen _____

7=Interest Group/NGO _____

8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official _____

9=Other _____

Referent Sector of Quotes

1=Military

2=Political

3=Societal

4=Environmental

5=Economic

Particular of Sector 1: _____

Particular of Sector 2: _____

Particular of Sector 3: _____

Traits of Threat (Number of Mentions)

Safety (-)	___	Aggression	___	Threat	___
------------	-----	------------	-----	--------	-----

Safety (+)	___	Killing/Murder	___	Illegal	___
------------	-----	----------------	-----	---------	-----

Violence	___	Destruction	___	Other	___
----------	-----	-------------	-----	-------	-----

Menace	___	Harm	___		
--------	-----	------	-----	--	--

Number of Endorsements for High Politicization _____

Number of Quotes about High Politicization _____

Source Endorsements for High Politicization _____

1=President _____

2=Military Personnel _____

3=National Office Holder _____

4=Local Office Holder _____

- 5=Newspaper
- 6=Citizen
- 7=Interest Group/NGO
- 8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official
- 9=Other_____

Number of Criticisms for High Politicization _____

Number of Quotes against High Politicization _____

Source Criticisms for High Politicization _____

- 1=President _____
- 2=Military Personnel _____
- 3=National Office Holder _____
- 4=Local Office Holder _____
- 5=Newspaper _____
- 6=Citizen _____
- 7=Interest Group/NGO _____
- 8=International (Non-Guatemalan) Official _____
- 9=Other_____

Traits of High Politicization (Number of Mentions)

- | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-------|---|-------|
| Call for State Legislation (P1) | _____ | Call for National Movement/Action (S2) | _____ |
| Call for New Leadership (P2) | _____ | Call for City/Town High Action (S3) | _____ |
| Call for Pol. Restructuring (P3) | _____ | Environmental Awareness (En1) | _____ |
| Funding for Military (M1) | _____ | Environmental Pol. Responsibility (En2) | _____ |
| Arms/Technology Bldg (M2) | _____ | Environmental Action Call (En3) | _____ |
| Call to Action for Military (M3) | _____ | Call for Economic Reform/Change (Ec1) | _____ |
| Community Armaments (S1) | _____ | Call for Firm/Business Action (Ec2) | _____ |

P=Political Sector; M=Military Sector; S=Societal Sector; En=Environmental Sector; Ec=Economic Sector

Mention of Federal Actions Against Drug Trafficking

Type: 1=Military, 2=Law Enforcement, 3=Social Program, 4=Economic Program, 5=Educational Program, 6=National Legislation, 7=Other

Specify_____ Type: _____ Number of Mentions: _____
 Specify_____ Type: _____ Number of Mentions: _____
 Specify_____ Type: _____ Number of Mentions: _____

Mention of Symbolic Actions Against Drug Trafficking

Type: 1=Speech, 2=Conference, 3=Visit, 4=Photo Opportunity Economic Program, 5=Educational Program, 6=National Legislation, 7=Other

Specify _____	Type: ____	Number of Mentions: ____
Specify _____	Type: ____	Number of Mentions: ____
Specify _____	Type: ____	Number of Mentions: ____

Use of Image

1=Yes _____
 0=No _____

of Images in Section _____

Drugs	_____	Political Leader	_____
Drug Cartels	_____	Community Leader	_____
Violent Scene During	_____	Community Scene	_____
Violent Scene Aftermath	_____	Human Scene	_____

Securitization Scale Score: ____
 Non-Drug Related Articles in Section: ____

APPENDIX B

ÁLVARO COLOM SPEECHES 2008

Listed chronologically.

1. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. January 18, 2008. “XLIX ANIVERSARIO DE FUNDACIÓN DE LA MARINA DE LA DEFENSA NACIONAL.” Fundación de la Marina de la Defensa Nacional, Guatemala.
2. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. March 3, 2008. The Inauguration of “Consejo de Cohesión Social. Guatemala.
3. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. March 25, 2008. “DISCURSO DEL PRESIDENTE ALVARO COLOM EN LA INAUGURACIÓN DE LAS FUERZAS DE INTERVENCIÓN AEREA ANTIDROGA Y TERRORISMO.” Guatemala City, Guatemala.
4. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. April 12, 2008. Lanzamiento “Mi Familia Progresá.” Guatemala.
5. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. April 25, 2008. Huehuetenango, Guatemala.
6. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. September 6, 2008. The Inauguration of the “Gobernando con la Gente” program. Totonicapán, Guatemala.
7. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. September 24, 2008. “DISCURSO DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE GUATEMALA INGENIERO ÁLVARO COLOM CABALLEROS PRONUNCIADO DURANTE EL 63º PERÍODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS.” United Nations, New York City, New York.
8. Speech by President Álvaro Colom. October 20, 2008. “CONMEMORACIÓN.” Guatemala City, Guatemala.