

Untying the Hands to Tie the Feet: A Qualitative Look at the
Vulnerabilities of Post-earthquake Haiti and the Transformative Processes

Necessary for National Refoundation

by

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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved November 2010 by the
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ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

December 2010

ABSTRACT

Great disasters can often serve as birthing grounds for national transformation. As communities work to recover and rebuild, opportunities to reassess of prevailing development theories and programs may arise. As traditional development programs, supported by top-down development theories and billions in foreign aid, have not changed Haiti's impoverished status, such an opportunity has been presented to the Caribbean nation. Just a few months removed from the devastating 7.0 earthquake of Jan 12, 2010, this study identified the emergent thinking about development as expressed by key informants (N=21) from six entity types involved in Haiti's rebuilding efforts – government agencies, social ventures, grassroots, diaspora, foreign, and hybrid nonprofits. Findings were supplemented by participant observation of a civil society meeting in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) Framework was used as a lens with which to understand the causes of Haiti's social, institutional, environmental, and economic vulnerabilities. Modified grounded theory was used as the qualitative data analytical method from which five themes emerged: Haitian government, rebuilding, aid work and its effects, Haitian society, and international interference. Participants called for a refoundation, the building a nation from the ground up, of Haiti. Based on these findings, four transformative processes were identified as fundamental to Haiti's refoundation: 1) communication and collaboration with the Haitian government, 2) engagement of the Haitian people and the Haitian diaspora in the redevelopment work, 3) a broad vision of development for the nation, and 4) coordination and collaboration among NGOs.

DEDICATION

To my loving and prayerful parents Dr. Josué and Marie-Elsie Innocent.

To my dear brothers Jelsen and Andrew Innocent.

To my Haitian people whose strength continues to amaze me.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writing of this dissertation has been one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever had to face. This dissertation would not have been possible but for the help of the following:

I praise my Creator, Savior, and Lord, Jesus Christ, who gives wisdom, understanding, and knowledge to those who ask (James 1:5). I am thankful to Him for the opportunity to research a topic so close to my heart and for the strength to finish this monumental task.

I will forever be grateful for the guidance and mentorship of the members of my committee: Richard Knopf, Rhonda Phillips, Rimjhim Aggarwal, and Lili Wang. My understanding of this topic and the research process has been tremendously expanded and I thank you all for the many hours you have invested in me.

My sincerest thanks and appreciation to my dissertation committee chair, Richard Knopf. Thank you for your kindness, godly spirit, deep insights, unmatched dedication, and friendship. I couldn't have finished without you. This formative and life transforming experience is one I will never forget.

My deepest appreciation goes to the participants of this study who shared so much of themselves and their experiences with me. Their passion was palpable and I wish them much success in their endeavors.

I am thankful to these three women whom I very much admire and respect: Dorothy Kennedy, Janie Jeffers, and Lenora Freeman. Thank you for your encouragement and prayers over the years.

I am blessed to call Sheris Poisson, Mary Ellen Hollon Coursey, and Eh Moo Carr dear friends. Their prayers, sense of humor, home cooking, and encouragements were indispensable during these past years.

Lastly, I offer my regards and blessings to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of the project, including those who made my time in Haiti such an incredible one.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

Rebuilding after a great disaster, whether man-made or natural, reminds us that development is a process, not a destination. While disasters are undoubtedly among the most tragic of occurrences, survivors of these communities find themselves free to think differently about development, define development as it suits their needs, and approach development work in a way in which their vision of community can come to life. Such is the case in Haiti. This research seeks to delve into the minds and missions of government agencies, social ventures, grassroots, diaspora, and foreign organizations as post-earthquake Haitian society works to stabilize, rebuild, and improve itself.

Historically, traditional development programs have been driven by Western capitalist models (Hancock, 1989) which emphasized increasing income or financial capital as their goal. This narrow vision of development often increases a community's vulnerabilities, whether economic, social, political, or environmental. When the human, social, physical, and natural capitals inherent in communities are sacrificed in the attainment of financial capital, an imbalance is created. Traditional development projects, which often follow a one-size-fits-all model, have also largely been oblivious to the unique livelihood risks and vulnerabilities of communities and countries alike. Such oversight can be both disastrous and deadly in nations such as Haiti, left without a strong buttress of human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals. Furthermore, development

as it has been known does not largely respect or make use of traditional livelihoods and knowledge (DFID, 1999)

Exogenous (originating externally rather than internally) development models more often cripples rather than strengthens nations. As evidenced in Haiti, this nation's political and economic decisions are often made "offshore", crafted by individuals and/or nations that do not understand the real needs, problems, and particularities unique to Haiti. Whether deliberate or just an unfortunate consequence, this historical undermining of the vision and voice of the Haitian people is now, as a result of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, being called into question. So then, where does Haiti go from here? Will development efforts in Haiti simply be more of the same? Or will the opportunity for reflection and redirection recently afforded them by the disaster be grasped?

This study purposed to catch a snapshot of organizational thinking or approaches (i.e. emerging frameworks) as the monumental task of redeveloping Haiti is undertaken. For this study an emerging framework is defined as a new approach in thought regarding the quality of life, livelihoods, and the processes by which optimum levels of each are defined and reached.

Pertinence of Study

Financially born in the red, this Black republic was born in the red and has for decades been the focus of development research and discussion.

Depending on the reporting source and their political affiliation, the blame for Haiti's economic and development failures have either been laid squarely on the feeble, corrupt Haitian government or on the exploitative, manipulative

international aid institutions (Buss & Gardner, 2008). The complicated truth lies somewhere in the middle. No matter who is to blame, the January 12, 2010 earthquake that decimated the island nation's capital and destroyed surrounding areas has provided a long-awaited opportunity for re-examining development failures and making a drastic directional change in development schemes. This work is the first to look at a cross-section of entities currently on the ground in Haiti and involved in the rebuilding efforts. Using key informant interviews supplemented by participant observation at a civil society meeting in Port-au-Prince, the transformative processes critical to Haiti's refoundation are explored.

An assessment of the types of institutions involved in development work in Haiti revealed six entity types:

- (1) grassroots – Haitian created and led organizations
- (2) diaspora – organization led or funded by members of the Haitian diaspora
- (3) government – Haitian government agencies
- (4) foreign – organizations founded, funded, and headquartered outside of Haiti
- (5) hybrid – a mix of two or three entity types
- (6) social ventures – organization using a business model to address economic, social, or environmental issues

A recent article published by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) lists the major short term and long term priorities that should drive Haiti's rebuilding efforts: food, water, health, shelter, rebuilding (building infrastructure), Port-au-Prince (facilities and city planning), transportation and telecommunication infrastructures, security, economy, funding, agriculture, and

government (BBC, 2010). However, no studies have looked at the new frameworks being developed and adopted to address these priorities on an organizational level. This is the endeavor of this work. These priorities will hereafter be referred to as vulnerabilities to be addressed.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Window of Opportunity

In its 2004 global report, the United Nations Development Programme's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery ranked Haiti as having high relative vulnerability to natural hazards. In recent years, Haiti has been battered with both natural and man-made disasters causing an overlapping of crises that have left the state and its people overwhelmed in more ways than one.

By its sheer magnitude, devastation, and location (urban, i.e. the capital, rather than rural area) the 2010 earthquake centered international attention on Haiti, creating a unique window of opportunity for national transformation. Immediately following a disaster of such magnitude, communities affected are left at a development crossroads. A community can 1) seize the window of opportunity created by catastrophe and build back better; 2) build back to their former state; 3) stagnate (Rotmans & Loorbach, 2009); or 4) undergo a combination of all three (some sectors in society recovering while others falter; Hogg, 1980). In the case of a national disaster, the fourth option is likely to occur. In her study of Italy's Friuli region following its 1976 earthquake, observed that communities that were geographically and politically best connected with capital and assistance rebuilt quicker than their lesser connected counterparts. In Haiti's case, how to build a better nation dominates the discussion (Farmer, 2010; de Córdoba & Forelle, 2010; Richards, 2010).

The window of opportunity for national transformation following a

disaster is brief and once it has past, will not again present itself save another disaster. That said, rebuilding or redeveloping the nation is an extremely complex endeavor. This sobering reality is not lost on those who seek the betterment of Haiti. There are also those who see the earthquake as an opportunity to exploit Haiti's less fortunate (a phenomenon known as *disaster capitalism*; Klein, 2007).

"Freedom is not Free" - Anonymous

Understanding Haiti's present situation, as with any other nation, first calls for an understanding of its history. Particularly important to understanding Haitian society's vulnerabilities, laid bare for the world to see by the earthquake, is an appreciation of Haiti's 600+ year recent past. Haiti occupies the western one-third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. On the eastern two-thirds of Hispaniola lies the Spanish speaking country of the Dominican Republic. Prior to the arrival of Spanish explorer Christopher Columbus, Hispaniola was inhabited by the peaceful Taino Arawak Indian tribe (Dupuy, 1989). On December 5, 1492 Christopher Columbus happened upon this large island in the Caribbean Sea, named it *La Española* (from which the Latinized *Hispaniola* is derived) and claimed it for the Spanish crown (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010). After years of raiding, counter-raiding, and pillaging between the Spaniards, British, and French (James, 1963), France officially took control of the western one-third of the island under the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 (Haggerty, 1989). The French and Spaniards named their colonies Saint-Domingue and Santo Domingo respectively (James, 1963).

By the 1700s West Africans were brought to farm the fertile lands and

the colony underwent rapid expansion. The "Pearl of the West Indies" (Girard, 2005) exported tobacco, cacao, cotton, raw sugar processed from sugar cane, (Knight, 2000) and indigo to France. Saint Domingue became one of the richest colonies in the French empire at that time (James, 1963). In 1804, under the leadership of runaway slaves Toussaint L'Ouverture, Henri Christophe, and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the island populated predominately by African slaves won their independence. Fifteen years of bloody struggle wearied Napoleon Bonaparte's forces and Haitians secured their freedom (Knight, 2000). The 205 years of French occupation on the island effectively ended and *Ayiti* became the first independent Black republic in the Western Hemisphere (Kelley, 1999). January 1, 2004 marked Haiti's bicentennial anniversary (Forsdick, 2008).

The successive years following independence proved both turbulent and violent. European colonizing powers as well as the United States sided with France in refusing to recognize Haiti's political sovereignty (Katz & Boscov-Allen, 2010). In 1825 France's King Charles X ordered former French slaves to pay 150m francs – equivalent to 21 billion dollars – before France would grant diplomatic recognition to Haiti. This was an enormous sum. By comparison, in 1803, France sold the Louisiana Purchase to the United States for 60 million francs, in addition to 18 million francs worth of cancelled French debt. The Louisiana Purchase however, was a territory 30 times the size of the entire island of Hispaniola (Katz & Boscov-Allen, 2010). Recognition of Haiti's sovereignty by the powerful European empire meant Haiti, a nation dependent on its export-oriented economy, could trade its goods freely. Blockading Haitian ports with

dozens of naval vessels carrying upwards of 20,000 troops, France gave the then Haitian president Jean-Pierre Boyer no choice but to concede. Repaying this substantial annual indemnity to France for the success of the Revolution was a heavy burden. The embargo, supported by the United States remained in place until 1825. Over the years Haiti sent 80% of its wealth to France annually, leaving little to develop the country but it was not enough. When French president François Mitterrand took office in 1981, Haiti's debt had still not been fully repaid (Farmer, 2003).

In an effort to assist, the United States loaned Haiti funds but the accumulated debt became impossible to repay. By the early 1900s, Germany controlled nearly 80% of Haiti's international trade and both France and Britain had made their own investments on the island. Haiti's key geographical position allowed for access to the Windward Passage, a significant shipping route to the Panama Canal, made it a coveted location for international investment and foreign political interests. On July 28, 1915 the United States Marines landed in Haiti to protect U.S commercial interests and stay Germany's increasing presence in Haiti (Farmer, 2003). A U.S.-chosen Haitian President of the Senate and a treaty legalizing U.S. occupation for the next twenty years placed Haiti's finances and administration under U.S. control (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010).

Although several revolts by nationalist peasant militias attempted to oust the Americans, it wasn't until nearly two decades later, in mid-August 1934, that the U.S. Marines withdrew. U.S. Marine-trained local military were left as the only cohesive and effective institution in a position of power. The result was a

sequence of military-backed, United States and multi-lateral agency supported dictatorships that defined the following 50 years of Haiti's history (Suggs, 2002). Historically, however, the Haitian government and elite were no less exploitative of the Haitian people than international interests. Governmental mismanagement of funds coupled with the growing wealth of the elite, thanks to overtly preferential treatment of elite-owned businesses from the government, increased the number and plight of Haiti's poor (Buss & Gardner, 2008).

Constant internal struggle for power and international economic, political, and military interference left little time or funds to build and maintain government infrastructure. Loans from bilateral and multilateral institutions offered investment capital, but at a price. Programs such as the International Monetary Fund's structural readjustment loans (called "death plans" by Haitians) popular in the 1970s and '80s birthed a culture of industry hyperprivatization and accelerated Haiti's increasing debt and decreasing standard of living. Now enslaved economically, Haiti's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped steadily from around \$750 in the '60s, to approximately \$600 in 1990, and then down to \$500 in 1994 (Katz & Boscov-Ellen, 2010).

After the re-instatement of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's government in 1994, an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to lower trade barriers rendered imported staple products such as milk, fish, sugar, rice, and corn much more inexpensive. Subsidized American produce flooded Haitian markets and Haiti's agricultural sector was decimated. With the majority of the Haitian population involved in agriculture, the move to reduce tariffs effectively

extinguished livelihoods of many farmers and increased unemployment and was a major catalyst for the daily migration of rural dwellers to the city (Heyde, 2007; Katz & Boscov-Allen, 2010). Leaving their land for the city streets, rural migrants took a gamble on their next meal. The phenomenon of "push" and "pull" where hard economic conditions push peasants off rural land and elusive promises of higher income pull them into the city (Marks, 1989) was evidenced by the capital's swelling population. Port-au-Prince was the destination of the large majority of rural migrants and became home to 60% of Haiti's urban population (Eberlee, 1999). Migrating to the cities, the new city dwellers further stressed the weak infrastructure of these struggling urban communities (Foster & Valdman, 1984): overcrowded slums bred disease and violence (Willman & Marcelin, 2010), shoddy construction claimed the lives of school children (Klarreich, 2008), and escape from poverty proved difficult, if not impossible.

In May 2000, U.S. Congressional Republicans, opposed to the reinstatement of Jean-Bertrand Aristide as Haitian president, suspended all direct U.S. aid to Haiti. Dr. Paul Farmer, an American Harvard professor who has worked tirelessly for decades to bring health care to Haiti's Artibonite region noted that "the cuts in bilateral aid and the diversion of monies to the opposition [of Aristide's government] meant there could be, in a country as poor as Haiti, little effort to build schools, health care infrastructure, roads, ports, telecommunications, or airports" (Chomsky, Farmer & Goodman, 2004, ¶23.). In 2001, the Bush administration, working secretly, persuaded the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to institute a funding freeze to Haiti. Notwithstanding,

the IDB required Haiti to pay interest on their loans although no new funds would be disbursed (Chomsky, Farmer & Goodman, 2004).

The world's most powerful nations joined forces and blocked humanitarian assistance and aid to Haiti, worsening the nation's situation. In July 2003, Haiti sent over 90% of all its foreign reserves to Washington to pay these arrears, with no new aid coming their way. The effect of the freeze, at last lifted in 2004, had a huge impact on the nation, not the least of which was an increasingly unequal society in which a small group of elite owed a disproportionate share of the country's wealth (Farmer, 2004; Goodman & Goodman, 2006).

Haiti Today

From 1492 to 1697 Haiti, then Saint Domingue, was under Spanish rule. From 1698 to 1803 Haiti was under French rule. The year 2009 marked Haiti's 205 years of (somewhat) independent rule. This reoccurrence of a 205-year change of power cycle in Haiti's history has not gone unnoticed (Fountain, 2010). Could January's earthquake be yet another turning point?

The death toll of 230,000 people (Huffington Post, 2010), as a result of the January 12th earthquake would not have been as high nor the structural devastation of Port-au-Prince so crippling were it not for the steady, decades-long internal migration of rural dwellers to the capital and lax (if not entirely nonexistent) building code enforcement. Any redevelopment effort that focuses solely on rebuilding the structures that had collapsed in the earthquake will be met with minimal success. The lifeblood of Haiti is found in its rural regions. When the needs of rural dwellers are unmet, the stress will be felt throughout the nation

- economically, institutionally, socially and environmentally.

While the earthquake made dire situations worse, it is hoped that Haiti's the future is brighter than its past. Presently however, the nation is still drowning in foreign aid debt, its government seems to be unable to become independent of international involvement, and its economy along with its related structures are fragile at best. Despite these difficulties, Haiti aims to move forward (Farmer, 2010; de Córdoba & Forelle, 2010; Richards, 2010). This work will document the new thinking surrounding re-development plans for this resilient Black republic. Additionally, policy implications for Haiti's development, as identified by both the researcher and key informants, will be explored.

Men Anpil Chay Pa Lou -When the Hands Are Many the Burden is Light

Following the January earthquake a glimpse into the *thinking* that drives exactly *how* entities are planning to tackle the enormous task of rebuilding Haiti is of great importance. It has been estimated by the Inter-American Development Bank that the cost of post-earthquake reconstruction in Haiti could reach \$14 billion (IDB, 2010) The international community has pledged \$9.9 billion to assist in the effort (Moore, 2010) and much of that aid will find itself in the hands of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Haitian government agencies. For this reason, NGOs, the Haitian government agencies, social ventures, diaspora and grassroots organizations comprised the entities of choice for the focus of this study. The differing histories, missions, and programs of these six entities will now be discussed.

Grassroots Organizations

L'union fait la force (unity is strength or in union there is strength) is more than just the motto stitched under the emblem on Haiti's flag, it is, for the participants in the Haitian grassroots movement, their aim. At its strongest, Haitian grassroots organizing resulted in the ousting of French colonizers a little more than two centuries ago. The "Big Sister" of the Caribbean became the only slave colony in history to ever successfully win their independence (James, 1963). Haitian grassroots organizations in recent history, however, haven't obtained the level of efficacy that birthed the nation.

Every Haitian, no matter how many generations removed, comes from the countryside. Traditionally an agricultural people, Haitian grassroots organizing in its most historic form can still be witnessed today in the vast "mountains beyond mountains" (Kidder, 2004) that is the Haitian landscape. In her book, *When the Hands Are Many: Community Organization and Social Change in Rural Haiti*, Jennie Smith (2001) describes the many activities of the organized *paysan* or country dwellers in rural Haiti. Historically, outsiders have believed the Caribbean to have a "weak sense of community cohesion" with local communities "but loosely organized" (Wagley, 1961, p199). Mintz (1966) noted "many research workers in Caribbean societies have been struck by the relative absence of community-based activity in daily life (p932-3). These cultural biases are exposed by Wilson (1969) when he states in a rather tongue-in-cheek manner that "in spite of this non-community aspect of communities, most ethnographers have carried out their research in communities, which one assumes are not figments of their imagination" (p80). These self-run social organizations provide voice,

structure, and community to Haiti's rural dwellers. Activities range widely - social service projects, business meetings, *combite* or agricultural work parties, religious ceremonies, and song sessions are just a few. The concept of *yonn ede lòt*, reciprocal sharing and cooperation, is at the core of rural life.

Grassroots efforts in urban areas of the island are a natural extension of what Haitians have been doing for centuries. Haitian grassroots organizations have sprouted up in a wide number of sectors within Haiti: education, agriculture, technology, and microfinance to name a few. As such grassroots organizations are a vital part of Haitian society and the nation's rebuilding efforts. Due to their relatively low level of international visibility however, they have often been overlooked or marginalized in development efforts. Melinda Miles, co-founder and executive director of the grassroots organization Konbit Pou Ayiti (KONPAY) traveled to the United States to testify before the U.S. Congress in hopes of shedding light on the ineffective practices that were handicapping distribution of earthquake aid in Haiti. Miles believed the international distribution system lacked the community building characteristic that has allowed Haitian community organizers (known as animators) to effectively participate in relief efforts (Charlotin, 2010). Haiti's grassroots organizations, with their hand on the pulse of Haitian communities, will no doubt have much to share by way of emerging thinking on Haiti's redevelopment.

Diaspora Organizations

Wyclef Jean, Grammy-award winning musician and producer turned philanthropist, is probably the most famous member of the several million strong

Haitian diaspora. Yéle Haiti, co-founded by Jean, provides Haiti's poor with access to education, sports, and the arts (Piazza, 2010). The Haitian diaspora have accomplished much in the areas of business, sports, public service, the arts and academia (Vilsaint & Heurtelou, 2008). Jean is just one of many Haitian diaspora who, after achieving success abroad, are giving back to their native land.

Haitian expatriates send over \$1 billion annually in remittances to Haiti along with an estimated \$400 million in goods such as clothing, food items, and electronics in higher proportion than any other national group anywhere in the world. Eighty-one percent of Haitians living in the United States and Canada send money home on a regular basis. Remittances also come from diaspora living in France, Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Martinique, Guyana, and Spain. These remittances figures are truly impressive when comparatively only 60% of Mexican expatriates and 30-34% of Europeans regularly send money home to relatives (Delva, 2007).

So strong is the tie between Haiti and the Haitian diaspora that in 1991, then Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide created a cabinet-level ministry called the "Tenth Department" (Haiti is divided into nine departments) that would formally coordinate the assistance received from diaspora hometown associations and other diaspora groups. Efforts to create dialogue between the diaspora and the government about Haiti's economic development were halted when Aristide was overthrown (Perito & Maly, 2006).

Some members of the diaspora, not content with just sending funds and goods to family members, have started nonprofit organizations and foundations to

assist Haiti's poor through a variety of projects and programs. Diaspora nonprofits have built churches, schools, hospitals, orphanages, clinics, and homes. Other nonprofits are working to bring alternative energy technology to the island, create youth camps, strengthen and expand education, send aid and other goods, organize mission trips, and support public sanitation efforts among other projects. Yet still others work as advocates of Haiti-related causes.

The invested interest of the Haitian diaspora in the future of Haiti and its people is undeniable. This group's vision of a better Haiti is no doubt fueled by a personal attachment to their place of birth. A long list of studies has realized that the immense potential for diaspora to be development partners (Newland & Patrick, 2004; Merz & Dunn, 2006; MacLaren, 2010). Identifying and documenting the emerging redevelopment frameworks of diaspora organizations in the aftermath of Haiti's largest natural disaster is then of high importance.

Government Agencies

Newly freed in 1804, Haitian revolutionary leaders found themselves completely daunted by the monumental task of ruling an independent state of ex-slaves and mulattos. The Haitian government never gained a firm political footing within in its own shores or abroad. The history of Haitian heads of state is succinctly summarized Buss and Gardner (2008, p21):

"...there have been fifty-five “presidents” of Haiti since 1804, when the country gained its independence. Of these, three were assassinated or executed, seven died in office (one by suicide), and twenty-three were overthrown by the military or paramilitary groups. Two—Henri Namphy and Jean Bertrand Aristide—were overthrown twice. Only nine completed full presidential terms. Thirty-one held office for

two years or less. In 1946 and again in 1988, a military junta ruled without a president. Nearly all presidents either were military officers or were closely affiliated with the military. Throughout Haiti's history, many presidents have attempted to become rulers for life. Every president has exploited Haiti's impoverished people and its resources, for political gain or personal aggrandizement or both. There have been very few months in its history when Haiti went without a revolt, uprising, riots, political murders, or mass killings. During the twentieth century, the United States compelled five presidents to leave office."

According to Transparency International's latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Haiti ranks a low 168th of 180 countries (2009). Haiti's government history of poor financial management practices, together with the blind eyes of international aid institutions have encouraged corruption. Ironically, the very accounting practices international aid donors helped to instill in the Haitian government is later used as their reason for their hesitation in giving the government control over aid financing. International aid therefore often bypasses the Haitian government entirely, going directly to foreign NGOs. Additionally, endemic to the Haitian government structure are vacancies in some key government posts. The Haitian government has been largely left out of the development equation. According to Buss & Gardner (2008), the Haitian government shirks its responsibility to meet the needs of Haitian citizens and leaves the duty instead to the Haitian diaspora (through remittances) and NGOs (through aid).

A longstanding lack of political will on the part of government officials and a tendency to protect the interests of the Haitian elite and foreign investors at

the expense of the people has greatly injured government/constituent relationships. A corrupt judiciary and ineffective police force also mar relations (World Bank, 2007). Notwithstanding, it is not lost on the Haitian people that foreign forces have worked and are working behind the scenes to bring about political changes in the Haitian government that would benefit their foreign agendas. The Haitian musical group Carimi in their popular song *Ayiti (Bang Bang)* sing these words:

FBI... CIA... *m zanmi...*
(FBI... CIA... have mercy)
Peyi mwen tounen toukou yon fim koboy...
(My country has turned into a western) □
Peyim pa yon jwt sispan jwe av...
(My country's isn't a toy, stop playing with it)
Sakap Pase CIA...
(What's up CIA?) □
Yo pran peyi mwen, men yo controle mwen...
(They took my country, their hands control me) □
Sak gen lakay FBI...
(What's up FBI?)
Yo pran peyi mwen, men yo controle mwen...
(They took my country, their hands control me)

(Carmi, 2002, track 2)

While there are civil servants and even entire government agencies that shirk their duties, there are many who solemnly undertake their responsibilities and genuinely seek the well-being and betterment of their constituents and the nation. Although the shortcomings of the Haitian government are numerous, history lacks an instance in which a nation developed independent of the support and inclusion of the central government.

Foreign Organizations

For the past half-century thousands of NGOs have been established in Haiti. Their mission is to help. As time has proved, "help" came in varying degrees and in some cases, *who* was being helped - the Haitian people or the NGOs- themselves was not quite clear. Before the earthquake there were approximately 10,000 NGOs on the island (Fatton, 2010), the highest number of NGOs per capita in the world. Dubbed "a republic of NGOs" (O'Neill, 2010), the nation nonetheless has been steadily getting poorer. Haiti has long been in need of aid and thousands of foreign NGOs have entered the country with the intent to be of assistance. These well-meaning entities have been doing "development work" (Fatton, 2010) for the last several decades. Yet for all their work, a stronger, more self-sufficient Haitian nation has not emerged.

It has been established that the greater the number of NGOs in a country, the less developed the country is (Global Policy Forum, 2010). However, a more accurate observation might lie in the type of aid rendered and not necessarily the number of NGOs present. The majority of NGOs in Haiti are working to assist Haitians to obtain basic goods and services such as health care, education, housing, and employment. This fact is most telling about the day-to-day struggle of many Haitians. In this light the rise in the number of NGOs in Haiti is then to a large degree understandable.

As deep-seated as Haiti's needs are, heavy NGO presence may help in the short term but "aid" turns crippling in the long term when there are no exit strategies for these organizations. There are several drawbacks of a strong NGO involvement in Haiti. First, NGO presence indirectly encourages learned

helplessness not only on the part of the indigenous government but also on the part of communities that are receiving direct assistance. Second, an inundation of free care or goods can drastically diminish, if not effectively put an end to, local industry, as has recently been evidenced in Zambia. Zambia was recently inundated by second hand clothes, which put its clothing factories out of business and brought to an end the local clothing industry (Bloemen, 2001). Third, NGO presence in all aspects of society creates parallel state-like structures that, to a large extent circumvent rather than work with the Haitian government. Today, NGOs are involved in every sector of Haitian society with budgets that dwarf governmental counterparts by comparison (Barry-Shaw, 2008). NGO hyper-presence in Haiti have some thinking that "the cure has become worse than the disease" ("Unthinkable? Curb Aid in Haiti", 2010, Conclusion section) since their presence seems to have the net effect of actually hindering development and thwarting the nation's efforts to become self-sustaining (Global Policy Forum, 2010).

The exasperation and frustration of some Haitians at the presence of NGOs is palpable. Haitian businesses and aspiring business owners find themselves as "outsiders to NGO-land" (Cave, 2010, n.a. ¶14), and have no organized structures within which to operate. Animosity towards foreign NGOs has arisen when Haitians witness the work of NGOs causing more damage than good. Tales of unfinished projects that leave Haitians hanging are not rare (Davidson & Joffe-Walt, 2010). In his exposé of the international aid business, twenty years ago, Graham Hancock (1989), wrote that "the ugly reality is that

most poor people in the most poor countries most of the time never receive or even make contact with aid in any tangible shape or form" (p190). It is not gone unnoticed by the Haitian people that the majority of aid funds work their way back into the pockets of foreign donors by way of staff salary and associated personnel costs, contracts awarded to foreign firms, and purchase of foreign materials such as supplies and parts (Davidson & Joffe-Walt, 2010).

Conversely, in some Haitian communities, outside aid and aid workers are better received and at times overtly preferred to any assistance from fellow Haitians (Fountain, 2010). This dependence on foreigners or *blan* is worrisome to those who want so desperately for Haiti to be independent.

Due to the sheer amount of funds raised, received, and managed by foreign NGOs in the redevelopment of Haiti, it is of special interest to ascertain what development frameworks are emerging among this group.

Social Ventures

Social ventures are entities that use a business model to address economic, social, or environmental issues. Borrowing skills and techniques from the private sector, these entities pursue mission-related goals through income-generating activities (Larson, 2002). Social ventures are increasingly filling market gaps between private enterprise and the public sector (Haugh, 2007) in the developing and developed world alike. Bypassing the conventional funding strategies for nonprofits allows social ventures to have more flexibility in their finances. Should competition arise, needs change, or new service opportunities arise, social ventures are not dependent on outside sources of funding as are traditional

nonprofit organizations (Larson, 2002).

Hybrid Organizations

Hybrid entities are comprised of two or more of the aforementioned entities. The globalization of nonprofit work has naturally pulled together people from various backgrounds to create hybrid organizations in an effort to help Haiti.

Understanding Haiti's Vulnerabilities

The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SL), the research framework for this study, identifies four key dimensions of sustainability – economic, institutional, social, and environmental sustainability – needed for development (Carney, 1999). In the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake, these areas constitute the major overarching areas of vulnerability for the nation.

Additionally, these areas of vulnerability are also highly interrelated with the improvement or degradation of one affecting the others. In order for the redevelopment efforts to be successful, Haiti's vulnerabilities must be addressed. This section will explore the operationalization of the four vulnerabilities in the context of Haiti.

Economic Vulnerability

Haiti's economic vulnerability is made obvious regardless of the economic indicator used whether gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production figures, minimum wage, or similar measures. Eighty percent of the population is living under the poverty line and 54% are in abject poverty (CIA, 2010). As previously discussed, foreign aid has helped alleviate poverty for some Haitians but the nation remains impoverished. Much like the inundation of secondhand

clothing has put an end to the clothing industry in Zambia, (Bloemen, 2001).

Also, the vast supplies of free foreign rice (Haiti's staple food) after the earthquake have caused the price of Haitian rice to plummet, further exacerbating the already poor Haitian farmers (Davidson & Kenney, 2010).

Traditionally, interventions to move Haitians out of poverty have focused on the privatization of services and foreign investment by way of factories and plants. Both methods have proved a failure, yet even now, some in the international community believe these methods are viable solutions to Haiti's economic slump seek their re-implementation (Ives, 2010). The privatization of sanitation services, education, and health care put these services out of the reach of the majority of the Haitian population. As a result, the standard of living has decreased and the gap between the poor and the rich (who can pay for such services) has increased (Kidder, 2004).

The latest move to increase foreign investment has emerged from the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Acts (HOPE I of 2006 & HOPE II of 2008) aimed to revive the Haitian garment industry (Seelke & Hornbeck, 2008). Haiti has had a somewhat long history of factory assembly. Foreign apparel (Collier, 2009), sporting equipment, shoes, leather goods, furniture, and electronics (Arthur, 2007) industries have all profited from the capable hands of Haitians. HOPE I & II were patterned after the Africa Investment Incentive Act of 2006 which allows preferential treatment to apparel articles produced in developing countries. Via Export Processing Zones (EPZs), HOPE I & II open US markets duty free to Haitian textiles produced from any

third country (namely Asian) fabrics.

Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are direct beneficiaries of the HOPE II Act and it has been argued that their numbers should be increased in Haiti in order to establish a market economy, eliminate barriers to US trade and investment, create policies to reduce poverty, create a system to combat corruption, and implement internationally recognized worker rights (Collier, 2009). According to The World Bank EPZs have three primary goals: 1) provide a country with foreign exchange earnings by promoting nontraditional exports, 2) create jobs and generate income, and 3) attract foreign direct investment, technology transfer, knowledge spillover, demonstration effects, and backward linkages.

Shamsie (2009) studied such interventions and has come to the conclusion that EPZs are “unlikely to decrease poverty in any significant way or alleviate the country’s socioeconomic inequalities” (p649). Products from EPZs would serve only one trade partner - the United States. Should relations sour and a trade embargo takes place (which happened as recently as the 1990s; Katz & Boscov- Ellen, 2010), Haiti’s economic situation may suffer.

The fallacies of both privatization and EPZs are their focus on increasing Haitians' incomes, rather than increasing wealth. Income is defined as the “amount of money or its equivalent received during a period of time in exchange for labor or services, from the sale of goods or property, or as profit from financial investments” (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 2009). Income differs from wealth. Wealth is defined as “all goods and resources having value in terms of exchange or use” (The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language, 2009). Wealth, then, is more than purchasing power since purchasing power simply moves money between individuals or businesses (which is what income affords). Guatemalan-based nonprofit As Green As It Gets (AGAIG) proposes that increase in wealth, not simply income, is what pulls individuals out of poverty (Voorhes, n.a.).

AGAIG proposes that economies based on native undervalued industries and assets are more offer a much more culturally sensitive and sustainable approach to economic development. The key process in such an economy is to keep the value-generating manufacturing steps on home soil and have complete control of the production processes (see Appendix D).

Native industries that do exist are plagued by the lack of infrastructure and maintenance which is seriously hindering economic progress. Entrepreneurs from both the island and the diaspora feel their businesses would grow if the government would build and maintain roads, shipping ports, and airports. One such individual, a diaspora vetiver producer and exporter from Haiti's southern city of Leys Cayes, is frustrated with the Haitian government's "lack of entrepreneurial vision" (Pierre, 2009, ¶8). Vetiver grass is cultivated in Haiti for its oil that is used in perfumery. He and others feel Haitian government officials, both past and present, have contented themselves with pursuing international aid rather than making real efforts to promote national production. "You need to have infrastructure before inviting people to invest in your country, even if it is entrepreneurs from the Haitian diaspora" (Pierre, 2009, ¶8).

Fifty-three percent of the Haitian government's budget is dependent on

foreign aid dollars (Bigg, 2010). Also, the Haitian economy is very integrated with that of the U.S. (Dupuy, 2010). As such, foreign entities seem to have more say in government affairs than do the Haitian people. A change in these conditions must quickly take place if Haiti is to have a sovereign and economically strong future.

Institutional Vulnerability

Without reiterating the shortcomings of the Haitian government, it is reasonable to posit that an honest assessment of Haiti's situation would reveal that the nation's history and future is in large part in the hands of its government. A fragmented, crippled, and dependent government begets a fragmented, crippled, and dependent society. That being said, their formidable task of redeveloping Haiti is no easy process.

Haiti's redevelopment should be spearheaded by the Haitian government and informed by the needs and wants of the Haitian people. At present, this is not the case. Educated Haitians have been invited to participate in meetings on Haiti's redevelopment held by foreign governments and NGOs but feels their inputs are neither heeded nor welcomed, "They just want a couple of Haitians at the table for decoration. To quote one Port-au-Prince ophthalmologist, "We're there so they can keep on getting their money" (Fountain, 2010, 51:00). The business of aid, its agenda, its state-undermining policies, and some of its racial undertones have been expertly documented in works such as Hancock's (1989) *Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business* and Perkins' (2005) *Confessions of an Economic Hit*

Man. These implications, touched upon somewhat earlier, will be further discussed later in this study.

Haiti's institutional vulnerabilities can only be addressed when its central governing system is strengthened. A crucial element to achieving this is government fiscal sustainability. To fund government operations and provide public services the government needs to find innovative ways in which to generate taxes. And once taxes have been collected they should be invested in the improvement of Haitian society. Additionally, these improvements must be visible and tangible to the average Haitian – not to mention that they should also be maintained.

The World Bank's (2007) assessment of Haiti's judicial system found it to be in need of immediate reform. The ministry of justice has been plagued by collapsing physical infrastructure, poor court records, weak case filing systems, often lost court documents, and accusations of fraud and human rights violations. Most of Haiti's population is excluded from the formal justice system since 40% lack civil identity documentation needed to have legal standing in court. A barely operating *état civile* or civil registry is to blame. For those able to even receive a court hearing there are long delays in the administration of justice (World Bank, 2007). As a result, victims or their family members have been known to take justice into their own hands. The state of the island's judicial system illustrates how Haitians are not really provided for by the judiciary.

Serious growing pains are no doubt on the horizon, should the Haitian government change its course. Such is the path however, towards a sovereign and

united state. Building Haiti's institutional capacity is the cornerstone to Haiti's redevelopment.

Social Vulnerability

Dupuy's (1989) study of Haitian society revealed chasms between the Haitian black majority, the Haitian government, and the Haitian mulatto bourgeoisie. Since colonial times, ruling powers on the island have used differences in skin color to pit the inhabitants of the island against each other. The U.S. military occupation of Haiti in the early 1900s was no different. Dupuy found that U.S. society's own racist ideals led them to favor mulattoes for presidency, cabinet, administrative and military posts under their supervision. In response, the black middle class and black elite presidential candidate, Dumarsais Estimé, won elections in 1946 giving birth to black nationalism or *noirism*. Under the François "Papa Doc" Duvalier dictatorship, mulattoes were removed from all key government, state, and army posts. However, the Duvaliers did not attempt to transform the class structure of Haiti or readdress the economic dominance of mulatto and diaspora elite (Dupuy, 1989) setting the stage for Haiti's present system of social stratification that ascribes preferred status on the basis of family of origin, skin color, and the ability to speak French (Perito & Maly, 2006).

Racism has also been the cause of division between Haiti and its Latin neighbor the Dominican Republic. Some economic interventions, such as the EPZ in Ouanaminthe, Haiti, have capitalized on this unfortunate strained relationship. This garment factory sitting close to the Haitian-Dominican border employs Haitians as laborers and Dominicans as supervisors (Duvillier, 2004; Demaret,

1999). Insensitivity to the island's history increases animosity between these neighbors.

According to the World Bank (2007), Haiti's social vulnerability is also increased due to its corrupt judicial system. Mutual trust in society is discouraged since wrongdoing often goes unpenalized threatening security and welfare.

Any redevelopment approach in Haiti must be a socioeconomic one since these two areas are so closely related. Interventions must be culturally sensitive, community-building focused endeavors that draw upon Haitian's inherent strengths.

Environmental Vulnerability

The Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) points to Haiti as the second most vulnerable nation to climate change. The Maplecroft's 2009-2010 Climate Change Risk Report rates nations on their capacity to mitigate risks and the resulting effects on ecosystems of natural hazards, such as floods, droughts, storms and sea level rises. Haiti's rising risk of food and energy insecurity and declining water quality contribute to its very poor rating (Maplecroft, 2009).

While Haiti and the Dominican Republic may share one island geographically, the environmental wealth is not evenly shared. Hispaniola's rains come mainly from the east offering the Dominican Republic with more rain which supports higher rates of plant growth. Hispaniola's highest mountains are on the Dominican side and the rivers from those high mountains mainly flow eastwards into the Dominican Republic. The Dominican side has broad valleys, plains and plateaus, as well as much thicker soils.

In contrast, the Haitian side is much drier due to the barrier of high mountains blocking rains from the east. Compared to their neighboring country, a higher percentage of Haiti is mountainous with thinner, less fertile soils create lower capacity for recovery. By the mid-19th century, the French had largely stripped Haiti's lowlands and mid-mountain slopes. All the French ships that brought slaves to Haiti returned to Europe with cargos of Haitian timber. In its early history, Haiti was the wealthiest colony of the French empire (1525-1844) and boasted a rich agricultural economy early in its history. Such high national production came at the expense of Haiti's environmental capital of forests and soils (Diamond, 2006).

By 1978, Haiti has been reduced to a forest cover of 6.7% due to agricultural clearing and the use of wood for fuel (Stevensen, 1989). Today, that figure has dropped to an estimated 3% (Dolisca, McDaniel, Teeter & Jolly, 2007). Deforestation has caused a reduction in the soil's capacity to absorb water therefore despite steady rainfall; water runs off the hillsides which offer little benefits to crops and doesn't replenish groundwater supplies (Kreimer & Munasinghe, 1991).

Two-thirds of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector for their livelihoods, not to mention the wellbeing of the nation as a whole is tied to the success of its rural areas. Haiti's countryside remains vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters which, as previously discussed, are exacerbated by the country's widespread deforestation (CIA, 2010). After decades of neglect by the Haitian government, the influx of displaced Port-au-Prince residents to the

countryside following the earthquake will no doubt further stress the fragile ecosystem. The increase in natural disasters is a worldwide phenomenon, a trend that by all appearances will continue. Strategies focused on staying and reversing Haiti's environmental degradation are urgently needed.

Chapter 3


RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Figure 1) was created by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development in 1997 to assist in the elimination of poverty in poorer nations (Carney, 1999). This framework offers a holistic means from which we could understand why traditional development has not yielded broad, positive and sustainable results. The basic structure of the framework and its components is presented in Figure 1. The SL Framework places people, not just their income, at the center of development. At the core of this framework lies an Asset Pentagon, which recognizes and takes into account the human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals inherent in all communities. Additionally, this approach recognizes that poverty is multidimensional and uses community-identified indicators of poverty to cooperatively create development initiatives. The SL framework also offers a more culturally sensitive approach to community development.

For this study, the SL framework provided an understanding of the possible implications of the emerging thinking or approaches on the vulnerabilities of Haitian society. In this regard, the first three elements of the framework (vulnerability context, livelihood assets, and transforming structures and processes) were used as the guiding constructs for this work. Lastly, the SL framework principles and inferences were used as guidelines in the creation of the research instrument.

According to this framework “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets... both now and in the future (Carney, 1998, p4), or... while not undermining the natural base (Scoones, 1998, p5).

Figure 1. Sustainable Livelihoods Framework



Note. From *Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets* (Section 1.1) Department for International Development, 1999, London, England: Author.

The SL framework in particular focuses on increasing the well-being of individual or household livelihoods but recognizes that community and national well-being is determined by that of individuals and households. The SL framework stresses that local livelihoods are acknowledged and respected. Local “buy in” of development projects is critical as is having development success indicators determined by the locals themselves. Thus, within the SL framework it is understood that the higher the levels of commitment on the part of the community, the higher the rates of success.

Of particular note to this study is the framework's more comprehensive measurement of sustainability that includes income as well as wealth. Increase in income has typically been the de-facto means of determining if an economic intervention has been successful. This has historically been the case with economic interventions in Haiti. Many economic development programs in targeted at developing nations claim to be "increasing the income of the target group," "raising persistently low incomes," or some similar income-denominated objective (Wright, 1999; Dreze and Sen, 1989) despite the fact that increase in income does not necessarily mean a reduction in poverty.


Poverty is the result of diminished capital and income poverty is only one type of poverty (Reardon & Vosti, 1995). The SL framework's Asset Pentagon (also referred to as Livelihood Assets) illustrates that human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals are a key component for sustainable development. Human capital encompasses individuals' health, their ability to work, and the knowledge and skills acquired from observation or passed down from previous generations. Additionally, education can improve the capacity of individuals to better use existing assets and create new ones. Social capital refers to the way in which people work together. Social obligation, trust and mutual support, and reciprocal exchange can all play a critical role in sustainable development – particularly in times of crises. Physical capital includes access to tools, equipment, and infrastructure such as ports, roads, airports, market facilities, water supply, and health care facilities that will influence the one's ability to earn an adequate livelihood. Financial capital, as previously mentioned, is often the

focus of development interventions. While financial capital is an important dimension of sustainable development, it is just one of many. Financial capital is derived from a conversion of production into cash. Additionally, financial capital may include use of formal or informal credit to supplement other financial resources. Natural capital includes the land, water, forest resources, and livestock key in food production and income generation. Access to and health of these natural resources is also important. A diminished capital, whichever it might be, impoverishes that individual, household, community, or nation not only in that particular regard but may have implications for other capitals as well. It must be noted, however, that robustness and/or depletion of capital varies in definition depending on the individual, household, community, or nation. A simplified example would be a city dweller trading some natural capital (such as land in a rural area) for more financial capital (higher income in the city) whereas a rural dweller might find the converse ideal.

Flanking the Asset Pentagon on either side is the Vulnerability Context and Transforming Structures and Processes. A community's transforming structures and processes (government, private sector, and other institutions) have a direct influence on that community's vulnerability context (link highlighted in red, Figure 2) which in turn affects the strengthening or depletion of one or more assets. The six entity types included in this study (social venture, government agency, foreign, diaspora, grassroots, and hybrid organizations) were asked to share their perspectives on how the transforming structures and processes, as well as on whose roles, responsibilities, and processes, can either augment or

(preferably) decrease Haiti's vulnerability context as it relates to the rebuilding efforts.

Figure 2. Transforming Structures and Processes Linked to Vulnerability Context



Note. From *Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets* (Section 1.1) Department for International Development, 1999, London, England: Author.

In the SL framework, structures represent entities and processes. Processes include policies, societal norms, incentives, and laws. Access, control, and use of assets are greatly influenced by structures and processes in a society. These structures and processes link micro (that is individuals, households and communities) to macro (such as government, private enterprises, or nonprofit groups) levels. The vulnerability context of a community is increased when livelihoods are threatened by shocks, trends, and seasonality. Conversely, vulnerability contexts can be decreased through strengthening assets and increasing the ability of communities to bounce back (Carney, 1999).

This framework was chosen as a guide for this study because it allows for

a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in that Haiti currently is experiencing Haiti's vulnerabilities (economic, institutional, social, and environmental) are a direct result of the neglect and depletion of Haiti's assets. These assets, for one reason or another, were not safeguarded or their growth encouraged by the various entities in Haiti (transforming structures and processes) throughout its history.

Several alternative SL frameworks have been created for various projects such as the Agrisystems SL Framework, the Khanya SL Framework, Brazilian SL Framework, and the Imperial College Framework (Carney, 1999). The original SL framework was the model of choice for this study because of its more universal application. Additionally, the SL framework has been used extensively in planning, assessments, and programs around the world. Carney (1999) lists some examples of the variety of projects that have used this framework:

- National-level planning (e.g. Uganda's)
- DFID country program preparation (e.g. Cambodia)
- Development of large-scale poverty eradication strategies (e.g. South Africa)
- Input into participatory poverty assessments (e.g. Indonesia & Vietnam)
- Structuring a large-scale living standards survey in Mongolia
- Responding to an emergency (e.g. DFID's response to the Orissa Cyclone)
- FAO vulnerable group profiling
- Development of multi-country sectoral partnership (25 West African countries)

- Project planning (e.g. Bangladesh & India)
- Community-based planning (e.g. South Africa & Nepal)
- Monitoring and evaluation (e.g. India, Bangladesh & Kenya)
- Review of existing programs (e.g. Pakistan)
- Institutional analysis (e.g. Southern Africa)
- Structuring research and teaching (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Kenya, South Asia & Southern Africa)
- Policy process analysis (e.g. Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia, & Zimbabwe)
- Sectoral reform (e.g. Uganda & Indonesia)

The types of entities included in this study represent the institutions that, in some way or another, have a say in Haiti's future. The SL framework reflects the fact that institutions that govern and/or are involved in impoverished societies are complex. It is no wonder then that the issue of poverty and its related vulnerabilities is also complex. What isn't addressed directly by the framework is whether the presence of vulnerability brings about the creation of these institutions or if the presence of institutions creates vulnerabilities in a society. Both scenarios are no doubt correct. What is clearly discerned from the framework is that dysfunctional institutions increase a society's vulnerability context (Cahn, 2002).

Chapter 4

METHODS

Instrument

Instrument creation was informed by the SL framework principles and inferences. Appendix A illustrates and summarizes how research questions were derived from the framework.

In essence, this study sought to answer the following eight research questions:

- (a) What are the redevelopment frameworks or thinking emerging in your entity?
- (b) To what degree are traditional development frameworks or thinking being abandoned or reframed?
- (c) To what degree are new frameworks or thinking being created in other entities?
- (d) How are new frameworks or thinking focused on helping to minimize the vulnerabilities of Haitian society?
- (e) What are some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between entities?
- (f) What do organizations perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti's re-development?
- (g) What do organizations believe are Haiti's greatest strengths and how do they envision these strengths playing a role in the re-development effort?

(h) What implications do these new frameworks have on development policy-making?

The research questions were first written in English and then translated to French by a Haitian contact in the field. The research instrument (Appendix C) consists of three sections. The first section asked participants about their organization/agency's characteristics. Examples include mission, length of service in Haiti and date of establishment (questions 1-5). The second section consisted of 13 questions (questions 6-18), some with sub-components. Two of the questions in this section asked participants to identify the degree which they see old development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti (question 7) and the degree to which they see new thinking or approaches to development being created (question 9). The third section consisted of demographic questions. Examples include participants' age, organizational role, and place of birth (question 19a-19f). These items yielded the capacity to document the diversity of the participants in this study.

Sampling Strategy

Snowball sampling, also known as chain referral sampling or participant-driven sampling, is a nonprobability purposive sampling strategy. This strategy was utilized to build the sample of key informants representing each of the 6 entities that were to be explored in this study. Key informants are "knowledgeable individuals who can supply valuable information" (Padgett, 2008, 89). The snowballing methodology entails first identifying individuals with the targeted characteristics and interviewing them or asking them to fill out a questionnaire.

These participants are then asked for referrals of other individuals that they considered to have common attributes and are perceived as potentially willing to participate in the study (Berg, 2009).

Purposive sampling or nonprobability sampling is the "deliberate process of selecting participants based on their ability to provide the needed information" (Padgett, 2008, p53). Purposive sampling, like other qualitative studies, does not seek to represent a larger population but rather to understand the sample itself (Coyne, 1997). Of the various purposive sampling techniques, snowball sampling best suits this study due to its referral component.

The researcher served as data collector and resided in Haiti from July 6, 2010 to September 30, 2010. The initial pool of key informants was identified via family contacts in Port-au-Prince. These participants in turn provided referrals to other individuals. The goal of the researcher goal was to interview at least one individual from each of the six entity types (social venture, government agency, diaspora, grassroots, foreign, and hybrid organizations).

A total of twenty-one entities were interviewed for this study (Table 1). Of the 21 entities interviewed, six were foreign nonprofits, five were grassroots nonprofits, three were Haitian government agencies (two former employees and one current employee), one was a diaspora nonprofit, two were diaspora social ventures, and four were hybrid nonprofits.

The researcher was also able to attend one community meeting in Port-au-Prince, Haiti where several civil society organizations met weekly. Haitians and foreigners alike attended this meeting.

Table 1. Entity Types and Distribution

| Entity Type | Entity Distribution |
|-------------------------|--|
| Hybrid Nonprofit | 2-diaspora/grassroots 1-diaspora/grassroots/foreign 1-diaspora/foreign |
| Grassroots Nonprofit | 5 |
| Foreign Nonprofit | 6 |
| Government Agency | 3 |
| Diaspora Social Venture | 2 |
| Diaspora Nonprofit | 1 |
| | 21 Entities Total |

The researcher chose to key informants from organizations rather than community members for two reasons. First, organization key informants represent a whole, in this case, an organizing body, with a fixed mission with resources and a structure by which to fulfill that mission. Interviewing individuals in the community who have no organizational affiliation would no doubt be just as insightful, however, they would be speaking for themselves (rather than a whole community) and their viewpoints therefore, would not have as broad of an implication for Haitian society. Second, according to the SL framework, the work of transforming structures and processes, represented in this study by the four organizations, are directly linked to the reduction or increase of a community's vulnerability context. As such, it is of great interest to the researcher to see if the emerging re-development frameworks include or exclude measures to address vulnerabilities (i.e. shocks, trends, and seasonality; Carney, 1999).

Four methods were used to invite participants to take part in this study: email, telephone, face-to-face, and “cold” visit (Table 2). Through the assistance of family contacts in Port-au-Prince, a list of possible key informants were identified, none of which (save one former government official), upon the researcher’s arrival in Haiti were able to participate in the study. An Internet search yielded several lists of government agencies, grassroots, foreign, and diaspora organizations. Entities with email information listed were then contacted. Electronic invitations to participate in the study were sent in either French, English, or both depending on the organization. Emails included the interview consent statement and interview questions in the appropriate language. A search on facebook® for organizations working in Haiti was also an avenue through which possible study participants were recruited. In all, approximately 250 entities were contacted via email. Through another family contact in the Haitian capital, some nonprofit offices were located and four were “cold” visited. Approximately eight nonprofits were contacted via telephone. One government agency was asked in a face-to-face conversation to participate in this project. Of those contacted, twenty-one in all were interviewed.

Table 2. Study Invitation Methods

| Entity Type | Study Invitation Method | Referred |
|---|-------------------------|----------|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | email | no |
| grassroots nonprofit | email | no |
| grassroots nonprofit | email | no |

| | | |
|--|--------------|-----|
| grassroots nonprofit | telephone | yes |
| community meeting | N/A | yes |
| government agency | face-to-face | no |
| foreign nonprofit | telephone | yes |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | email | no |
| foreign nonprofit | email | no |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | email | no |
| diaspora social venture | email | yes |
| diaspora social venture | email | yes |
| foreign nonprofit | email | no |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | email | no |
| foreign nonprofit | telephone | yes |
| foreign nonprofit | email | no |
| government agency | telephone | yes |
| diaspora nonprofit | telephone | no |
| grassroots nonprofit | email | no |
| grassroots nonprofit | email | yes |
| government agency | email | no |
| foreign nonprofit (x2) | “cold” visit | no |

Entity Demographics

The dates of organizational establishment varied widely among the nonprofits and social ventures varied widely (Table 3). The oldest entity, a foreign nonprofit, had been in operation since 1982. The youngest entity was a diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit which was birthed in March 2010 in response to

the earthquake. Entities were headquartered in the U.S., Haiti, or Europe.

Table 3. Entity Headquarters and Dates of Establishment

| Entity Type | Entity Headquarters | Date of Establishment |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | United States | 1999 |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti | 2004 |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti | 1995 |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti | 2006 |
| foreign nonprofit | United States | 1982 |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | United States | 1994 |
| foreign nonprofit | United States | 1997 |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | United States | 2008 |
| diaspora social venture | United States | February 2010 |
| diaspora social venture | United States | 2009 |
| foreign nonprofit | United States | 2000 |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | United States | March 2010 |
| foreign nonprofit | United States | 2008 |
| foreign nonprofit | United States | 1974 |
| diaspora nonprofit | United States | January 13, 2010 |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti | 2005 (2009 official registration) |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti | 2001 |
| foreign nonprofit (x2) | Europe | 1994 |

Note: Table excludes government agencies and community meeting

Entity missions varied considerably, encompassing a variety of issues

and concerns (Table 4). Three organizations (a diaspora/grassroots hybrid, a diaspora social venture, and a foreign organization) focused on connecting and encouraging collaboration between organizations. Three grassroots nonprofits sought to prepare Haiti’s next generation of civil servants through education and/or youth leadership training. Several grassroots as well as one grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit worked to strengthen Haiti’s civil society as a whole by supporting democratic processes and political auto-determination. Three entities interviewed (two foreign and one diaspora/grassroots hybrid) identified themselves as faith-based Christian organizations. One nonprofit (a diaspora/foreign hybrid) sought to promote Haitian arts and culture as a means for social, cultural, and economic development. Several others focused on improving Haiti’s economic situation through a variety of means, namely entrepreneurship, job creation and job training. Two foreign nonprofits addressed the educational and security needs of Haitian children. See Table 4. The missions of the government agencies that participated in this study were not included to protect the anonymity of the participants and ensure the confidentiality of their responses.

Table 4. Entity Types and Missions

| Entity Type | Entity Mission |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | advocate for and connect Haitian diaspora organizations |
| grassroots nonprofit | educate Haitian youth to be civil servants and Haiti’s future leaders |
| grassroots nonprofit | fight foreign political interests (neo-liberalism) that eclipse Haiti’s own |
| grassroots nonprofit | work to establish peace and |

| | |
|--|---|
| | development of the nation by organizing and empowering Haiti's civil society |
| community meeting | provide a weekly open forum in which members of Haiti's civil society can meet, discuss and address issues pertaining to the well-being and advancement of the nation |
| foreign nonprofit | Christian resource organization for individuals working in agriculture and development |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | support the democratic movement in Haiti by strengthening it's civil society |
| foreign nonprofit | partner with Haitians in building and maintaining community initiated development projects |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | provide jobs, training, and business start-up funds for communities in Haiti using Christian values and principles |
| diaspora social venture | strengthen and expand Haiti's middle market entrepreneurial ventures |
| diaspora social venture | facilitate collaboration between organizations, business, or other entities in Haiti |
| foreign nonprofit | facilitate coordination between various Christian groups in Haiti; publish reading material in Creole |
| diaspora/foreign nonprofit | promote Haitian arts and culture as a means for social, cultural, and economic development |
| foreign nonprofit | provide education and security for disadvantaged children in Haiti |
| foreign nonprofit | provide Christian education for children in Haiti |
| diaspora nonprofit | collaborate with existing organizations to address the educational and developmental needs |

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| | of Haitian society |
| grassroots nonprofit | improve Haiti's socio-political situation through youth leadership training and mobilization of civil society |
| grassroots nonprofit | support and empower Haiti's next generation of farmers |
| foreign nonprofit (x2) | improve community well-being through community health, peace-building, and education |

Note: Excludes government agencies' missions to maintain anonymity

Participant Demographics

Data on gender and age of the study participants are reported in Table 5. The majority (18 out of 22) of study participants were male. Similarly, more males than females (5 out of 6) participated in the interviews conducted in Haiti. Of the 22 participants, the average age of participants was 44 years of age. The average age of male participants was 41 years old. The oldest male participant was 60 years old. The youngest male participant was 28 years of age. The two individuals from the diaspora social ventures were 31 and 33 years of age. The average age of female participants was 36 years of age. The most mature female participant was 47 and the two youngest female participants were 26. See Table 5.

Table 5. Participant Gender and Age

| Entity Type | Participant Gender | Participant Age |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | female | 44 |
| grassroots nonprofit | male | 37 |

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|--------|
| grassroots nonprofit | male | 45 |
| grassroots nonprofit | male | 58 |
| community meeting | more males than females | varied |
| government agency | male | 55 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | 56 |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | female | 26 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | 60 |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | female | 26 |
| diaspora social venture | male | 33 |
| diaspora social venture | male | 31 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | 57 |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | male | 46 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | 45 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | 56 |
| government agency | male | 53 |

| | | |
|----------------------|--------|-----|
| diaspora nonprofit | female | 47 |
| grassroots nonprofit | male | 28 |
| grassroots nonprofit | male | 50 |
| government agency | female | 37 |
| foreign nonprofit | female | 39 |
| foreign nonprofit | male | N/A |

Table 6 illustrates participant length of time employed and position within entity. Study participants varied in the length of time employed at their respective organization, agency, or venture. The longest serving individuals were a former government official (25 years), a foreign nonprofit (20 years), and a diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit (11 years). The participant who was most recently employed, as of May 2010, was from a foreign nonprofit. Four entities were created in 2010: two diaspora social ventures, one diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit, and one diaspora nonprofit.

Position or titles of participants were broad in range (see Table 6). Seven individuals were a founding member, founder, co-founder, owner, or managing partner. Five participants were president or executive director of their nonprofits. Two individuals served as board or executive committee members in addition to other duties.

Table 6. Length of Time Employed and Position within Entity

| Entity Type | Length of Time Employed | Position or Title |
|--|----------------------------|--|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | 11 years (co-founder) | executive director |
| grassroots nonprofit | 9 years (founding member) | president |
| grassroots nonprofit | 4 years | program director |
| grassroots nonprofit | 4 years | general coordinator |
| government agency | 5 years (elected official) | * |
| foreign nonprofit | 5 1/2 years | agricultural consultant and technical writer |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | 3 years | digital outreach manager |
| foreign nonprofit | 20 years | executive director |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | 2 years | president and founder |
| diaspora social venture | since February 2010 | 1 of four managing partners |
| diaspora social venture | less than 1 year ago | founder and webmaster |
| foreign nonprofit | 10 years | owner |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | since March 2010 | cultural executive director |
| foreign nonprofit | 2 years | country program director and board member |
| foreign nonprofit | 6 years | administrator |
| government agency | 25 years | * |
| diaspora nonprofit | since January 2010 | co-founder |

| | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|---|
| grassroots nonprofit | since January 2009 | member coordinator and non-voting member of executive committee |
| grassroots nonprofit | 25 years | technical consultant and member of project planning committee |
| government agency | almost 3 years | * |
| foreign nonprofit | May 2010 | emergency coordinator |
| foreign nonprofit | N/A | N/A |

*Not reported to maintain confidentiality

Participant place of birth and citizenship reveal some predictable patterns in relation to the entity they were affiliated with (Table 7.) As expected, the majority of participants from grassroots nonprofits, 4 out of 5, were born in Haiti. The one exception was born in Paris, France. Similarly, two out of three government agency participants were born in Haiti while the third was born in Belgium. Both diaspora social venture participants, now American citizens, were born in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Of the participants from foreign nonprofits, 5 out of 6 were born in the United States. The lone exception was born in Haiti.

Table 7. Participant Year of Birth, Place of Birth, and Citizenship

| Entity Type | Place of Birth | Citizenship |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | Gonaïve, Haiti | American |
| grassroots nonprofit | Jacmel, Haiti | Haitian |
| grassroots nonprofit | Haiti (northeast) | Haitian |
| grassroots nonprofit | Cap-Haïtien, Haiti | Haitian |
| government agency | Jacmel, Haiti | Haitian |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------|
| foreign nonprofit | St. Louis, Missouri | American |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | Las Vegas, Nevada | American |
| foreign nonprofit | Akron, Ohio | American |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | USA | American |
| diaspora social venture | Port-au-Prince, Haiti | American |
| diaspora social venture | Port-au-Prince, Haiti | American |
| foreign nonprofit | Macon, Georgia | American |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | Haiti | American |
| foreign nonprofit | Cap-Haïtien, Haiti | American |
| foreign nonprofit | N/A | American |
| government agency | Jacmel, Haiti | Haitian |
| diaspora nonprofit | Tiburon, Haiti | American |
| grassroots nonprofit | Paris, France | Haitian |
| grassroots nonprofit | Les Cayes, Haiti | Haitian |
| government agency | Belgium | Haitian |
| foreign nonprofit | Chicago, Illinois | American |
| foreign nonprofit | Haiti | Haitian |

Table 8 lists the participant's field of study in which they received a

college degree. Twenty out of 21 interviewees reported a field of study. Of those 20 participants, all had received formal education and had, at a minimum, attained a university degree.

Table 8. Participant Field of Study

| Entity Type | Field of Study |
|--|--|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | Macro social work |
| grassroots nonprofit | Communication, law, and administration |
| grassroots nonprofit | Political science |
| grassroots nonprofit | Philosophy and Social communication |
| government agency | Agronomy |
| foreign nonprofit | Horticulture and plant breeding |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid nonprofit | International development |
| foreign nonprofit | Political science and marketing |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | Business management |
| diaspora social venture | Biology |
| diaspora social venture | Business |
| foreign nonprofit | Electronic engineering and accounting |
| diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | Art, painting and fine arts |
| foreign nonprofit | International economics, business education and instructional technology |
| foreign nonprofit | Divinity |
| government agency | Computational linguistics and educational planning |
| diaspora nonprofit | Nursing |

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| grassroots nonprofit | Law |
| grassroots nonprofit | Agriculture |
| government agency | International affairs and political science |
| foreign nonprofit | English literature and art history |
| foreign nonprofit | N/A |

Data Collection

The primary data collection method used was a semi-structured, in-depth interview of key informants. Semi-structured interviews require the use of a set of open-ended questions to be asked in sequence. However the interviewer can typically deviate from the prescribed set in order to pursue other topics of interest that were situational to the interview. Thus, the interviews were more dialogic in nature than interrogative (Padgett, 2008).

Consent to participate in the study (Appendix B) was obtained in writing or verbally for each participant. Verbal interviews were audio-recorded to facilitate transcription and translation. Of a total of 22 interviews, seven were face-to-face interviews. Five of the seven face-to-face interviews took place in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All interviews took place in locations relatively free of distractions. Of the interviews done in Port-au-Prince, 3 took place at the organization’s headquarters, one took place in a business office, and one took place in a restaurant. The remaining 2 face-to-face interviews took place in the state of Florida. One took place at the organization’s headquarters, the other in a private home. Two interviews were conducted by telephone. The remaining 10

interviews took place via Skype®. Interviews ranged from just under 30 minutes to a little over two hours.

Three participants chose to reply in writing (one in print and one via email). Of the three, one also agreed to a telephone interview. Two participants supplemented their interviews with additional information in writing on their organizations. One set of documents was received via email, the other furnished at the time of the interview.

The participant who offered responses in print form chose to answer only questions 8 through 17, omitting information about organizational characteristics and participant demographics. This participant offered responses through a coworker with whom the researcher conducted a face-to-face interview. The lone participant who responded exclusively via email sent his responses in segments. Three separate emails were received, each addressing one of the three sections of the instrument (Appendix C). One participant, a former government employee, requested to skip questions 9 through 15 (second section) because he felt a bit too out of touch with his former employer to respond well to these particular questions.

Interviews were conducted in English, Haitian Creole, and/or French, as the participants preferred (Table 9). The majority of interviews (17 of 22) were conducted in English, either partly or entirely. Of the five interviews that took place in Haiti, three were conducted in French, one was done in English, and one was done in both English and French. Of the two face-to-face interviews that took place in Florida, one was conducted in English, the other in French, English, and

Creole. Of the two participants who chose to reply in writing, one replied in English, the other in French. One Skype interview was conducted entirely in French while the other 10 Skype interviews were conducted partially or entirely in English. Individuals who participated in the community meeting attended in Port-au-Prince switched often between French and Creole.

Table 9. Language Used in Interviews

| Entity Type | Language used in Interview | Data Collection Method |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | English, Creole, French | Skype® |
| grassroots nonprofit | French | face-to-face |
| grassroots nonprofit | French | face-to-face |
| grassroots nonprofit | French and English | face-to-face + additional information in writing |
| government agency | French, Creole, English | face-to-face |
| foreign nonprofit | English | face-to-face |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign nonprofit | English | telephone |
| foreign nonprofit | English | telephone |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | English | Skype® + additional information in writing |
| diaspora social venture | English | Skype® |
| diaspora social venture | English | Skype® |
| foreign nonprofit | English | Skype® + email |

| | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| diaspora/foreign nonprofit | English | Skype® |
| foreign nonprofit | English and Creole | Skype® |
| foreign nonprofit | English | Skype® |
| government agency | French | Skype® |
| diaspora nonprofit | English | Skype® |
| grassroots nonprofit | French | Skype® |
| grassroots nonprofit | French | email |
| government agency | English | Skype® |
| foreign nonprofit | English | face-to-face |
| foreign nonprofit | English | in writing (print) |

Note: Table excludes community meeting attended.

The face-to-face individual interviews as well as telephone/Skype® interviews took place in a private, quiet location where the researcher and participant could dialog free of interruptions. As anticipated, specific interview locations varied due to a number of unforeseen factors. One participant in Port-au-Prince, for instance, asked to have the interview in a restaurant. Individual interviews, rather than focus groups, allowed the researcher to best capture the stories of each participant.

Data Management

Data was managed using Google Docs®, a digital IC Recorder®, and a Skype Call Recorder®. The IC Recorder® was used to record, store, and facilitate transcription of audio-recorded interviews. The recordings on Skype Call Recorder® served only as backup should the IC Recorder® fail for whatever reason. Interviews on Skype Call Recorder® can only be accessed on the

researcher's laptop which is password secured. Interview transcriptions were saved to separate Google Docs® documents using pseudo names as identifiers and which can only be accessed by the researcher. While most participants indicated their names could be used, the researcher has chosen to assign pseudo names to all participants.

Data Analysis

A modified grounded theory analysis was used for this study (Padgett, 2008). Grounded theory entails cycling between data collection and analysis of interview transcripts, comparing text to literature and theories, and contrasting data across participants, settings, and situations in order to create a conceptual framework. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, grounded theory methods will only be used to analyze data and not create theory and as such, was considered “modified”.

Several stages were involved in data analysis. The first stage involved the collection of raw data, which included the digital recordings of interviews and whatever documentation was supplied by participants. The second stage consisted of partially processed data, which included interview transcripts, translations, field notes, and interviewer observations. The third stage involved developing themes and codes from the raw and partially processed data.

Themes are defined as broad concepts derived from the data. They break the data in “analytically relevant ways” (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996, p31) allowing for text interpretation. Codes are smaller units of concepts within larger, overarching themes. Parallel to these three stages of data analysis, memo writing

was done to keep to record personal reactions, concerns, and biases as well as to keep track of data analysis progress. Interviews done in French and/or Haitian Creole were transcribed directly into English by the researcher although key phrases, idioms, and expressions were kept in French or Creole to preserve the tone and expression of participants' responses.

Data analysis focused more heavily on manifest rather than latent content of interview transcripts. Manifest content refers to surface descriptions or face-value information supplied by participants. Latent content refers to the interpretation of hidden or underlying meaning(s) that go beyond face-value information (Boyatzis, 1998). To accomplish this, *open coding* was used where chunks of text (ranging in length from a short phrase to a paragraph) were assigned labels during the first reading of the transcripts (Ryan and Bernard, 2000). Several strategies were used to identify codes and develop themes. The transcripts were read line-by-line and key-words-in-contexts (KWIC) or words that frequently emerged in various contexts were coded. The main question asked using this technique was "What's the context?" The second technique used was the compare and contrast technique in which the question "What does this remind me of?" was repeatedly asked to tie relevant text from transcript to transcript. The third technique was searching for connectors such as *because*, *since*, and *as a result* or *if*, *then*, *rather than*, and *instead of* which indicate relationships such as cause and effect. The last coding technique used was pawing where transcripts were re-read several times to make sure nothing was overlooked. The question driving this technique was "Was anything missed?" (Bernard & Ryan, 2003).

Focused coding was then applied to winnow down the codes (Charmaz, 2006) and then group like codes into themes. For example, open coding yielded a list of text that mentioned the Haitian government in several contexts. Using focused coding, those texts were then categorized into narrower, more specific codes such as “government efforts”. Where possible, *in vivo* codes, words or word-for-word phrases used by participants were used as code labels. Several rounds of focused coding resulted in the final edition of the codebook. Saturation, when no new codes or themes emerge, was reached after the first 12-14 interviews (Guest, Bunce & Johnson, 2006).

After three or four transcripts had been coded, a codebook was created where short but detailed descriptions of each theme, subthemes, and underlying codes from the narratives were compiled (Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Table 10 provides an illustration of a codebook entry.

Table 10. Codebook Excerpt

| |
|---|
| <p>HAITIAN GOVERNMENT (Theme)</p> <p>Encompasses perception of the roles and responsibilities of the Haitian government before, during, and after the January 12th earthquake. Includes areas in which the Haitian government has made efforts to better Haitian society in the past and present as well as its failures in addressing key needs of the Haitian people. Also includes references to the upcoming presidential elections, the Rebuilding commission, and Haiti’s overall political culture.</p> <hr/> |
|---|

•HAITIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS (Sub-theme)

Includes descriptions of the work the Haitian government has undertaken to move the nation forward economically and socially. These include the government’s priorities and strategic plans either before or after the earthquake.

•FAILURES OF THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT (Sub-theme)

References to the participants’ perceptions of the Haitian government’s failures to think and act on behalf and in the best interest of the Haitian people. Includes references to neglect of nation’s education system.

Strategies for Rigor and Trustworthiness

Four research strategies were applied to enhance the rigor trustworthiness of this study from the perspective of the researcher, participants, and audience. They were: reflexivity, negative case analysis, peer debriefing/support, and audit trail (see Table 11). These strategies were used to limit researcher bias and increase credibility of findings.

Table 11. Strategies for Rigor and Trustworthiness

| Strategy | Lens of Researcher | Lens of Study Participants | Lens of Audience |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| Reflexivity | X | - | - |
| Negative Case Analysis | X | - | - |
| Peer Debriefing/Support | X | - | |

| | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|
| Audit Trail | - | X | X |
|--------------------|---|---|---|

Trustworthiness connotes the credibility, transferability, auditability, and confirmability of the researcher, the research procedures, and the subsequent findings. Credibility refers to a harmony between the participants' views and that which the researcher has described and interpreted. Transferability speaks to the generalizability of the research findings. Auditability refers to the documentation trail of the study's procedures. Lastly, confirmability of a study can be demonstrated by a strong link between the findings and the data (Padgett, 2008).

To enhance rigor and trustworthiness of this study, the author left an audit trail, a detailed written account of procedures including the raw data collected which will be open to review by the academic community. Due to the researcher's potential bias as a Haitian-American, exercises in reflexivity were undertaken. To achieve this, accountability checks were done. Accountability checks challenged how the researcher came to know what she knows and interpretations of the data were corroborated and verified by the narratives rather than relying on memory or assumptions (Berg, 2009). Negative case analysis entails giving "equitable attention to differing points viewpoints and avoiding favoritism and lopsided interpretations" (Padgett, 2008, p191; Morrow, 2005). Peer debriefing and support was sought from the author's committee members with whom the researcher met independently to discuss the study's methods and findings to ensure the author's observations and conclusions make sense and are self-reflective.

Limitations

Face-to-face interviewing is the most common data collection method for qualitative researchers as it is generally understood that face-to-face rather than telephone interviews may yield better results. Jordan et al. (1980) found that qualitative research, telephone interviews had more response bias and evasiveness than interviews conducted face-to-face. Other research, however, concludes that telephone interviews can be used just as productively in qualitative research (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Miller, 1995). Nonetheless, it must be noted that there is a potential for participant bias to emerge in telephone as opposed to face-to-face interviews.

Chapter 5

NARRATIVE OF FINDINGS

Five themes or overarching categories emerged from this study: Haitian government, rebuilding, aid work and its effects, Haitian society, and international interference. Under each theme are several sub-themes with supporting participant observations. Table 12 summarizes the five themes and their sub-themes emerging from the study.

Table 12. Themes and Subthemes

| Themes | Subthemes |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. Haitian Government | a. Haitian Government Efforts b. Failures of the Haitian Government c. Working with the Haitian Government d. A Call for Strong Leadership e. Haiti's Political Culture |
| 2. Rebuilding | a. Earthquake a Watershed Moment for Haiti b. Haitian Responsibility c. Diaspora d. Shaping Haiti's Future e. Translating Talk Into Action |
| 3. Aid Work & Its Effects | a. Paternalism of Aid and Culture of Dependency b. Counteracting the Culture of Dependency |

| | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. Aid and Its Effects on Haiti's Economy d. True Aid |
| 4. Haitian Society | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Haitian Culture and Psyche b. Haitian Civil Society |
| 5. International Interference | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The Hand that Gives is Always Above the Hand that Receives b. NGOs: Une Cacophonie la Plus Totale c. You Untie the Hands to Tie the Feet |

The dialogic nature of the interviews allowed participant narratives to be woven together into a storyline form. What follows is a narration of participant thoughts and observations formatted in a way that gives the impression participants were conversing with each other and were observed by, rather than speaking to, the researcher. As if they were characters in a storybook, participants have been assigned pseudo names and details such as age, place of birth, field of study, the entity they worked for and profession have been inserted to add richness and multi-dimensionality to the characters. In some instances tone of voice, facial expressions, and body language add emotion to what participants shared and have been included in the narrative. Words or phrases that were stressed by the participant were italicized for emphasis. Table 13 lists the cast of characters and their entity affiliation.

Table 13. Entity Types & Participant Pseudo Names

| Entity Type | Participant Pseudo Names |
|-------------------------|---|
| Hybrid Nonprofit | 2 diaspora/grassroots Marie Elsie 1 diaspora/grassroots/foreign Virginia 1 diaspora/foreign Leo |
| Grassroots Nonprofit | 5 Josué Jelsen Andrew Jean Raul |
| Foreign Nonprofit | 6 Able Tom Daniel Paul Martine Raymond |
| Government Agency | 3 Jude Samuel Josette |
| Diaspora Social Venture | 2 Maxime Bernel |
| Diaspora Nonprofit | 1 Esther |

Theme 1. Haitian Government

The theme “Haitian Government” encompasses entities’ perceptions of the roles and responsibilities of the Haitian government before, during, and after the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The themes included comments about areas in which the Haitian government has made efforts to better Haitian society in the

past and present as well as its failures in addressing key needs of the Haitian people. Also included in this theme are references to the upcoming presidential elections, Haiti's Rebuilding commission, and Haiti's overall political culture.

Participants from nearly every entity (only two exceptions: one foreign organization and one diaspora social venture) commented in one way or another, on the Haitian government. Grassroots nonprofits, diaspora nonprofits, and members of the community meeting were particularly vocal about the performance of the government.

1a. Haitian Government Efforts

Of the 20 participants who commented on the work of the Haitian government, only two (a foreign nonprofit and a Haitian government employee) noted that efforts on the government's part to move ahead with reconstruction efforts were commendable. These two participants described some of the work the Haitian government has undertaken to move the nation forward economically and socially. Participants noted in particular the Haitian government's expressed priorities and strategic plans both before and after the earthquake.

Employed at her current government post for almost 3 years, Josette shared that when it comes to development, "the Haitian government knows what should happen. It has at least since the Préval administration." She outlined the three main policies of focus for the government:

"Rebuild the infrastructure [so] that you can provide roads to the rural areas so that commerce can flourish and people get access to market. Energy. There was a lot of work being done on energy. And agriculture. It's the international policy towards Haiti that killed our agriculture. [Working

to] regain food security.”

Martine, an emergency coordinator from the foreign nonprofit noted that the Haitian government has been working to sort out zoning, a difficult task and one of the reasons for stalled rebuilding projects. Her organization manages several tent camps, explaining that their proliferation 6 months after the disaster was due to the tremendous undertaking of discerning what land belonged to whom, ascertaining if the land owner was still alive, and finding the landowner before the government can purchase and then build on the lot(s). She shares that “the biggest thing is territory adjustment” and notes that these issues have to be addressed and “approved before moving forward”.

Josette also pointed out that the government, already weak before the earthquake, needs time to get its bearings. She shared,

“The center of the country was destroyed so I think it’s going to take some time for the government itself to get back on it’s feet because literally it’s building[s] were destroyed, its records were destroyed but its workforce also perished. They were not immune to the earthquake. Many civil servants, high ranking, low ranking perished in the earthquake so the capacity of the government which was already weak is even weaker now... We’re at a point where we’re trying to get back standing up... but it’s not easy because a lot of the funds that are already there are in the hands of the NGOs... ”

1b. Failures of the Haitian Government

The majority of participants and several community meeting attendees expressed their observations of the Haitian government’s failure to think and act on behalf and in the best interest of the Haitian people.

Participant complaints concerning the government centered stemmed from the perception that the Haitian state had long failed. Leo, from a diaspora/foreign nonprofit believed “we’ve had a history of pretty much nongovernance.” The Haitian state was “an institution... that was already broken down. Therefore you have a government that wasn’t governing,” said Andrew, a 58-year-old grassroots participant. He did not, therefore, expect a different type of government after the earthquake. He went on to share that “the government is absent” and missed an opportunity for “rallying everyone under the flag” immediately after the disaster. Furthermore, he believes all three branches of government perform poorly. “The judicial system has gone bankrupt [an expression meaning failed] in Haiti. The executive branch isn’t doing anything serious. The Parliament... you know what they’re about,” he shared with a tone of disappointment. Raymond, a Haitian working with a foreign nonprofit, wrote, “The weakness of the justice system is a major obstacle (no security of human being[s], private wealth and investment; no concern to better redistribute the wealth of the nation).” Jude, a former elected government official noted that the “internal strife between the executive and legislative branches of the government at this particular time has left the bulk of the rescue and reconstruction work to the nonprofits.”

Another grassroots participant, Josué, whose organization educates Haitian youth to be civil servants and Haiti’s future leaders noted that “the state doesn’t really take charge. Yes, the population wants to change their situation. They look and look and look, but don’t find. It’s the leaders [who are missing]”

He also shared that the state may be “thinking, but they’re not thinking of action.”

Similarly, Esther, a 47 -year-old nurse, said that the Haitian “leadership has no vision, but even if they had vision, they don’t know how to implement.

Leadership skills are lacking in that they cannot take the people from A to Z.”

“The Haitian government is just not up to the task,” concludes Jude.

“It’s not that we’re a poor country,” he continues, “it’s that we’re a country that isn’t properly managed.” Three other individuals, a former government employee,

a participant from a diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization, and a 31 - year-old diaspora social venture webmaster, identified lack of government

structure as the real problem. Bernel from a diaspora social venture could not

envision progress without “good government structure that’s going to make sure

that things happen smoothly.” Virginia, a 26 -year-old digital outreach manager

noted, “pretty much everyone’s aware of the very weak structure of the

government. It’s pretty volatile.” Tom, a foreign nonprofit executive director saw

economic and social progress as being “very difficult when government is as

weak as it is.” For him, the absence of government structure was evidenced in the

lack of “urgency to get the right structures in place to make sure that the country

is rebuilding the right way.”

Jude believes that “had development of the country advanced the way it

should have, there would not have been as many deaths as there were the 12th of

January.” Paul, whose work entails providing education to Haitian children, also

noted the lack of infrastructure in the nation, and the way in which “the Haitian

government has done nothing for the Haitian people.” For Daniel, a Haitian

diaspora who formerly worked for the Haitian government but is currently working for a foreign nonprofit, this was explained by the

“tendency for the government not to plan on a long term basis. In Haiti, this is obsolete. This is a rare commodity. Severe lack of planning turns government employees into machines. They perform daily *routined* actions. People are evaluated, assessed on how well they perform these little things, these basic tasks as opposed to rewarding them for their thinking, their intelligence, their efforts, like project management skills for instance... You go to work, you do what your boss asks you to do, and you go home and you have a job. They don’t care about future promotion. They don’t care about efficiency, productivity, this is not their concern. Their concern is to perform these little tasks on a daily basis...”

Samuel, another former government employee also attests to these observations saying, “There was no defined plan for the country... I’ve never come across a defined, outlined plan. Which is why the country hasn’t developed. They haven’t given it much thought.” Josette, a current government employee contests that indeed they have, citing the government’s “push for key elements” in redevelopment. Josué noticed the government’s difficulty in communicating its intentions, particularly on the topic of redevelopment, to their constituents. He observed, “The Haitian people don’t know about it. The government doesn’t know how to sell its plan.”

Jude is of the opinion that the “government should be the intermediary between the nonprofits and the private sector, in the interest of the nation.” The government seems to have lapsed in this role according to Paul, a 6-year foreign nonprofit administrator, most notably in that “there’s not really any oversight among these thousands of ministries in Haiti.” Andrew also spoke to that point,

noting that when the international community arrived after the earthquake, there was no response or direction given to them by the government. This amounted to a “governmental blockage” as Jean, a 28-year-old Haitian, called it. He went on to share that the Haitian government has “never had a plan, a vision for themselves. So when they were faced with this natural catastrophe, they were not capable to even react in the most minimal of ways,” which for him, explained why after the earthquake “the current government was unable to respond. Everyone was destabilized [but] as a leader you should have risen above that and made decisions.”

Elise, from a diaspora/grassroots organization, believes the Haitian government needs “to go back to being what a democratic government is supposed to be about which is to be the voice of the people.” Andrew, whose work entails organizing and empowering Haitian civil society, could not understand why the Haitian government has not engaged the Haitian people nor sought their input after the earthquake. He said, “We’re here! We’re available, we offered our help to them. I’ve gone on the airwaves and said ‘You have but to call us. We’re here and we don’t even need to be paid!’”

Tom, from a foreign nonprofit, pointed out the Haitian government has a reputation for instability and corruption. Jude, himself a former civil servant, concurred that government corruption was an issue. With ten years of service under his belt, Peter, from a foreign nonprofit, didn’t foresee great steps forward in development “while the corruption remains and there is every evidence that rather than being rooted out, it’s becoming more entrenched.”

Several participants were of the opinion that the Haitian government had especially neglected the nation's educational system. "We don't know how to value the human being. If we did, we would never allow, ever, ever, not one single Haitian government would allow for children to not go to school and have access to education," said Marie. "The budget that they give the National Ministry of Education, you can't do anything with. Our government is showing us that education is not a priority," shared Josué. "The public schools system is weak but we feel [it's] not possible for a developed country not to have a public school system where people who are the poorest can still send their kids to school," said 60-year-old executive Tom. "Education empowers," said Able emphatically and was seen as the cornerstone of Haitian progress. "Education is the foundation of everything to start development in this country," continued Jacmel, Haiti native Josué, "There must be a revolution in the educational system of Haiti. That is important. If we don't have that, we'll be in this situation for much longer." Jude, a former government employee added, "There must be a system of education so that they [Haitian people] can be qualified and assist in the redevelopment effort. We have [...] educational structures but they need to be strengthened with the help of national and international assistance. We have to revamp our education system." He went on to say that "university systems should be incubators for new innovations and solutions that can be used by the public."

1c. Working with the Haitian Government

Several participants shared their experiences in trying to collaborate with the Haitian government on a few projects. Nine participants mentioned working

with or expressly avoiding collaborating with the Haitian government.

Participants spoke of some successes and the difficulties they encountered in building relationships with the government.

Of the nine participants who commented on working with the Haitian government, four were from grassroots nonprofits, three were foreign nonprofits, and two were hybrids (diaspora/grassroots and grassroots/diaspora/foreign). Six of the nine participants have made attempts to work with the government and of the six only two reported successful collaborations or positive relationships with the Haitian government (Table 13).

Table 13. Attempts to Work with the Haitian Government

| Entity Type | Entity Mission | Attempt to Work with Government | Successful Collaboration or Positive Relationship with Government |
|----------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|
| grassroots nonprofit | educate Haitian youth to be civil servants and Haiti's future leaders | Yes | No |
| grassroots nonprofit | fight foreign political interests (neo-liberalism) that eclipse Haiti's own | No | No |
| grassroots nonprofit | improve Haiti's socio-political situation through youth leadership training and mobilization of civil society | No | No |
| grassroots nonprofit | work to establish peace and development of the nation by organizing and empowering Haiti's civil society | Yes | No |
| foreign nonprofit | facilitate coordination between various Christian groups in | No | No |

| | | | |
|--|--|-----|-----|
| | Haiti; publish reading material in Creole | | |
| foreign nonprofit | partner with Haitians in building and maintaining community initiated development projects | Yes | Yes |
| foreign nonprofit | improve community well-being through community health, peace-building, and education | Yes | N/A |
| diaspora/grassroots hybrid nonprofit | advocate for and connect Haitian diaspora organizations | Yes | No |
| grassroots/diaspora/foreign hybrid nonprofit | support the democratic movement in Haiti by strengthening it's civil society | Yes | Yes |

Josué and his organization believed progress “can only happen through relationships” with the government. However, his attempts to collaborate with the state have, thus far been unfruitful. A bit frustrated by it all, he said, “If you have a project and you go and share it with them, it just sits there. If you have an event and you invite a government representative, they don’t come.” Marie, from a diaspora/grassroots organization, has a similar experience. Some years ago she visited Haiti and had an opportunity to visit the Ministry of Education where she proposed helping to set up a national internship program for Haitian students. She says with dismay, ‘They didn’t take it seriously! They didn’t take it seriously! And I travelled for just that reason, I paid for my airfare... this work is so hard.’

Jelsen, from a grassroots organization bent on curbing the tide of foreign political interests in Haiti, said outright “we don’t collaborate with the government.” His reason was that the Haitian “government has integrated policies that support

neoliberalism” a philosophy opposed to that of their organization’s mission.

Peter, a 57 -year-old American, shared that “we do everything we can not to touch the political state because we realize that it’s just so corrupt and there’s no working with it in terms of helping the Haitian people themselves.” Similarly, Jean, from a grassroots nonprofit doesn’t “really work with the current government.” However, his reason differs from that of Peter in that he believes “what they’re doing is mostly demagoguery more than anything else, whereas we’re not about flattering words and speeches but *action*.”

Andrew, a general coordinator for a grassroots organization focused on empowering civil society, said that

“As an organization we reacted very quickly following the earthquake... and we made recommendations for our government... what frustrates me to no end is that while the physical infrastructure of the government has been flattened, the government thought to continue functioning as before with it’s clique. While in the meantime we’re here [civil society]! We’re available, we offered our help to them.”

Virgina, from a grassroots/diaspora/foreign nonprofit, noted their struggle in “just working with the government as a whole” but concedes that “everyone kind of understands that there needs to be that communication with the government and some sort of trust with the government.” This has been a change of heart for the organization since “in the past ——— has has taken the stance of really distancing itself from the government because it’s so volatile.”

Tom’s foreign organization has had the most success in collaborating with the Haitian government. This organization has strong grassroots ties in Haiti’s rural communities and as a rule of thumb they’ve “always kept the

government informed of what we're doing." They have partnered with the government to address education and potable water needs in several communities where, upon project completion, they "turn it over to the community or the national Haitian government." Some of their projects have been so successful that the government has "declared that future [project] should be done according to the model we've created." Raymond's observation mirrored Tom's experience in which organizations "through clusters and partnerships with government organizations... could impact policy making."

1d. A Call for Strong Leadership

Seven participants made comments addressing the absence of leadership within the Haitian government. This subject also came up a few times by attendees of the community meeting. The bulk of references spoke to the lack of leadership capabilities of the state as understood either through conversation with government officials or government action (or the lack of it).

One the community meeting attendee said, "before the 12th of January, during the 12th of January, after the 12th of January, we didn't have a leader." Martine, an American who moved to Haiti just months after the earthquake also noted Haiti's "lack of political leadership." Marie who heads a diaspora/grassroots organization noted that "the leadership in Haiti is extremely weak." Esther linked weak leadership, particularly that of the president, to the nation's lack of progress saying, "there has not been a leader with any purpose in mind... no real decision maker. Lack of leadership. Since the beginning we were in that position. That is why Haiti has not progressed." The co-founder of a diaspora

organization, she traveled to Haiti soon after the earthquake and met with several government officials.

“When I asked, ‘Well, where do we go from here?’ Their response was ‘We’ll talk about it next year’. I replied that ‘I don’t have next year put down [in my calendar] therefore I want to talk about it now.’ And they said, ‘Well, if next year is not good enough for you, what about 2013?’ That was the answer that I got. It’s not because those that I spoke with were not involved and did not have the will to help, it’s because they are waiting on a leadership that is nonexistent.”

Marie felt the Haitian government voice was missing at the international level. To counteract this, she believes the “Haitian leadership must be at the table where policies were enacted for Haiti.” Adding that “there must be true, real leadership within that [reconstruction] committee to do that.” However, she believed the office of president was a disturbing distraction for Haitian leaders. She says they are “more concerned about becoming president rather than seeing, understanding, and working towards what must be changes.” Esther, echoing similar sentiments believes Haiti needs “a leadership that is conscious of the fact that they are put in place to serve the people of Haiti primarily- not for their own games, not for the sake of having power.”

Esther returned from her trip to Port-au-Prince with the impression that the leadership was “literally oblivious to the people’s needs.” Leo, a 46 -year-old cultural executive director was very vocal about his definition of political leadership. According to him, “the leader has to delegate, give people the resources and authority to do their work. Have a plan going forward.” He went on

to add that Haiti needs “a very dynamic leader. One who is not selfish, who doesn’t have a huge ego, who can lead!” In his email correspondence, Raul, a 50 - year-old Haitian with 25 years of grassroots movement experience expressed a similar opinion saying, “we need leaders who inspire confidence.”

Grassroots nonprofit member coordinator Jean considered the Haitian government devoid of leadership even “in the most minimal of measurements.” He went on to say that “in any country you have to have strong leadership, capable of making tough decisions” and the capability to make tough decisions should extend to the state’s international dealings. He believes its “the same thing with going out and borrowing funds. The government was always afraid of upsetting the electorate. But that’s not the way to govern. You need capable individuals, competent, honest, and able to make good decisions for the Haitian people.” Raul likened Haiti to “a bus being driven very slowly” because its chauffeurs “are wicked, lousy, and incompetent.”

Maxime, a 33 -year-old who started a diaspora social venture, was a little less harsh in his view on the matter. There is a “shortage of leadership but I can imagine the amount of stress upon them [government] so I understand its very, very challenging,” he said.

1e. Haiti’s Political Culture

The participants reported deep divisions in Haiti’s social and political spheres that somewhat explained the nation’s complex political culture. Participants also mentioned Haiti’s presidential elections, scheduled to take place on November 28, 2010, and their impressions of its implications on the

reconstruction efforts. Perceptions of the function and legitimacy of Haiti's Rebuilding commission was also discussed, including whether or not the committee is usurping the Haitian government's role, excluding the voice of Haiti's civil society, and the implications for development following the installation of a new government administration.

Nine participants mentioned the complicated nature of Haiti's political scene. Interestingly, of them, a former government official, a current government employee, a diaspora/grassroots nonprofit, a diaspora social venture, three grassroots organizations, and two foreign nonprofits. Several members at the community meeting were particularly vocal about the upcoming November elections.

Marie, a macro social worker, could not understand why Haiti, a

“tiny country like that [had] over 50 parties trying to have power and they cannot show you one single proof of their ability... their experience... You're not just saying, 'Look at me, I'm tall' or 'I'm light skinned' or 'I'm beautiful' or 'I speak English' or 'I speak Spanish.' It's not about what you look like and what you speak. It's what's your *parcourt* [platform]. What have you *done*? And why do you think your party can do it [lead the nation]? And so this is a huge defect that we have in that society. And for me I would like to see all that to be changed. Totally changed, totally revamped. From the perspective of 'What I would like to do' to '[Look] at what I have already done'... a party is going to be based on what's your worth. What is your worth? What is your history of creating jobs, of creating schools, of solidifying clinics and health centers? What is your history of making community development grow? Of creating the arts, the culture? As a group, what is your history of talking to people in terms of knowing your rights and values as citizen[s]? And then at the end, what is your ideology?”

What she witnessed instead was a political climate where those who lost were “very, very, very committed to making sure that whoever wins, fails.”

Samuel observed that “if you’re not from a certain political party [that in power] and you are educated, you’re competent, you have experience [...] they put you aside.” Similarly, at the community meeting, one member stated “there are sectors of power in this country that may [decide], ‘In order for the elections to be in my favor, people can’t be allowed to vote.’”

“What you’re seeing are competing factions trying to take over rather than [say] ‘Ok, let’s put our heads together and figure out how we’re going to solve these problems.’ So when, *if* the money comes through we can rebuild a stronger nation,” said Bernel, founder and webmaster of a diaspora social venture. An example of competing factions was supplied by a member of the community meeting who noted the tendency for the bourgeoisie in Haiti to block certain reforms, such as raising minimum wage. Samuel, a 53 -year-old Haitian, added that the elites had also blocked an education reform that he believes “would have been a good reform but it was boycotted.”

Marie shared that she was starting to see “a number of parties trying to bundle up and see how they can strengthen and becoming just one party. But it’s a slight beginning. It’s a little thing that they must start building on and doing much, much, much more of that.”

The process and outcome of the upcoming November elections were at the forefront of many individuals’ minds at the community meeting. “How can we expect people to come out and vote when they don’t have documentation? That is

the first problem... The majority [of people] have lost their *cartes électorales*,” said one. Another was adamant that “we’re not ready. The nation isn’t ready to speak about elections.” One member foresaw that “we’ll have even deeper division in the country because elections will divide the people... Elections divide the people. Before and after an election the people are more divided than ever.” He went on to predict that “the coming political earthquake can surpass [in damage] the natural earthquake.”

One grassroots participant lamented the missed opportunity for dialogue between the state and the people in this year’s election process.

“We should have the type of election process where each running party has an opportunity to present to the Haitian people their plan of reconstruction. But that isn’t an option now since the reconstruction plan has already been decided and there’s already in place a commission in charge of it. And that is why we have the imperialist and humanitarian strategies dominating”

in Haitian society. According to him, imperialist models of development were “known for their neoliberalism and dependent capitalism that rely heavily on *zones franches* [export processing zones], on export agriculture, and on tourism” and the humanitarian strategies of development he equated to the proliferation of NGOs on the island. Neither of which, he concluded, are sustainable.

Similarly, attendees at the community meeting saw the upcoming elections as a time to educate the public on the election process. One member shared, “this is a process [educating public about elections] of not only global reflection on the country but also of transformation of consciences.” Another member exclaimed, “Not voting is voting! And the masses may not realize that!

When you don't vote, you've voted!" Someone else added,

"We live in a society where people don't know what voting really signifies. People just hear of person X, person Y and they put up a billboard for them [supporting their candidacy]. It is our imperative to shed light on the history of the vote and stress that it's an ideology in and of itself because [...] they don't really fully understand the significance of the vote. We also need to do this work of education [on the topic]... Thing is, the discussion surrounding the elections should not be a political one, nor does the discussion belong to politicians - elections are a civil society matter. It's the citizens not the political parties that really matter. The political parties are only vying for power. Those that really have the deepest interest to have fair elections are the citizens."

In regards to Haiti's Rebuilding Commission, three participants offered their diverse opinions. Daniel, a 45 -year-old diaspora from Cap-Haïtien, shared, "We have a majority of Haitian technicians on board such as the prime minister, Jean-Marc Bellerive. These are the types of things we need to start seeing." Jelsen, who studied political science and now serves as program director for a grassroots organization, did not speak well of the commission.

"There's a [reconstruction] committee that has to approve all the decisions made by the Haitian government. [...] This interim committee never existed before. They're the ones who decide where the money goes, what the projects are, what gets done, etc. They are here for 18 months. The implication is what does the government itself do? What is its role? We're about to have elections shortly, what will the new administration's stance be on this committee and reconstruction efforts as a whole? A new government arrives and there's already an entity that calls the shots? Either way this commission is illegal and unconstitutional."

Josette, who also studied political science in addition to international affairs, was more diplomatic in her opinion of the commission. "People are

saying, ‘Well, we’re giving away our nation. This is something that is headed by Clinton.’ But its headed by Clinton and the prime minister. It’s better than just foreigners heading the reconstruction. You have to look at it in the flip side. Usually, we’re not at the helm of development [initiatives].”

Theme 2. Rebuilding

The theme of rebuilding encompasses Haiti’s social, economic, and environmental situation before and after the earthquake and the crossroads in which the nation finds itself after the disaster. Participants shared what they perceived to be the strengths and barriers to redevelopment as well as the key players and industries considered necessary for national advancement.

2a. Earthquake a Watershed Moment for Haiti

Participants took account of the losses Haiti suffered in the earthquake – such as whether life, physical infrastructure, institutions, and economic systems – and the crossroads in which the nation now finds itself. Several participants also shared their insights on debates that exist between the use of the terms redevelopment, reconstruction, and refoundation when discussing Haiti’s future.

Quite a number of participants noted the critical juncture at which Haiti found itself after the earthquake. “A collective awakening took place just after everyone lost everything in just seconds,” said Jean, a 28 -year-old Haitian. Diaspora/grassroots nonprofit executive director Marie likened this time to a “cornerstone” in Haiti’s history. Similarly, Able, a 56 -year-old agricultural consultant and technical writer, saw this moment as “a new birth for Haiti.” Virginia, of the diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization called it “a

watershed moment for Haiti.” Esther, who co-founded a diaspora nonprofit a mere 24-hours after the earthquake said it was “a wakeup call for a lot of people.” Sharing the same sentiments, Josué, a Jacmel, Haiti native added that the rebuilding strategy should include the youth, teaching them “that they have a responsibility to take another path. Not simply because our grandparents or our parents have gone down a certain path that we need to follow.”

In terms of rebuilding the nation, Josué remembered that

“for me, the 12th of January was a time to think, to rethink, to *build* a country - at all levels. Reconstruction, the term I don’t like. Why? Because when talking about reconstruction, look, we can simply reconstruct what we had before. We need to build. That’s the word we should be using. When you look at it, it’s a country that needs to be changed altogether, remade - *completely*. Completely.

Jelsen’s views followed the same vein.

“We can either reconstruct what we had or construct completely differently. And not just about physical reconstruction but economic reconstruction, in addition to social reconstruction. The reconstruction should encompass restoring all of that. Not to mention the public administration has also been gravely affected. Refoundation goes farther. It demands us to go deep. And in our inner-most being, it’s the nation. In our inner-most being, it’s the history of this country. In our inner-most being, it’s the birth of this nation. In our inner-most being, it’s the values that our people contribute. So we have to humbly do an evaluation of what lies in our inner-most being. That is what national refoundation entails. We cannot build the same things... our brothers and sisters who have passed away. For their honor we need to build another Haiti.”

Similarly, members at the community meeting expressed that

“refoundation is the key, not reconstruction... rather than build how we have in the past, let’s reevaluate and build better.” In addressing this topic, Raul, who

works to support and empower Haiti's future generations of farmers, said, "I must reject the emerging redevelopment thinking. Let's talk instead of 'the redefinition of a strategic plan for development.'"

2b. Haitian Responsibility

The most pointed references to Haitians' responsibility in the nation's problems came from Haitian and diaspora participants. "We don't really have the will. Because if we did, we'd get things done. Before having money, you need the will," said 37-year-old Josué. When asked if the "we" referred to the Haitian government or the Haitian people he replied, "Since the state is the result of the population, it's the people." Andrew, who has been working for four years to organize and empower Haiti's civil society concluded, "It's the division that ruins us. So the first thing we need to do in terms of development is to *cut down* divisions. *Put at an end* division." Similarly, Josué noted that "our problem is coming to a consensus, working together toward one goal. Working together is key."

Diaspora Marie wanted to know "how can you ask people not to enact policies for Haitians, wanting Haitians to do it when the Haitians themselves cannot sit together at the same table and talk? They're in contention with each other everywhere, for anything, and about everything." Esther, also a member of the diaspora said,

"Change starts at home. We can't expect the other people not to take advantage of us, we can't expect them not to use us to gain unless we are, ourselves, stopping that within our own country. When you are oppressing your own people, what do you expect [from] other people that come? No

matter what happens here, at the end of the day, this is a *Haitian* problem.”

Josette, employed with the Haitian government for nearly three years, echoed Esther’s observation and believes that Haitian disrespect of self was an obstacle to be overcome before development could take place.

In reference to Haitians’ roles in shaping their future, Jean believed his people were “ready now to have a new life, a new way of thinking. This is a key moment to make a fresh start, whether it’s economical or social.” Andrew adds that Haitians aren’t incompetent. On the contrary, “we have competence in Haiti. We have it in *abundance*.”

Virginia, an American whose hybrid organization works mainly with rural Haitian communities, said,

“I hopefully don’t sound too cliché but I find it to be incredibly true to its people. They have such a brilliant strength to them and perseverance and desire to see Haiti in a vision that I don’t think many people outside [Haiti] can envision. They see Haiti to be strong and powerful and doing amazing things. They’ve got the hopes, and the dreams, and the desires and that’s really the power of it all.”

Whatever the future path of the nation, Jelsen was insistent that “it has to come from the people and it has to be in the interest of the people. By and for the people.” Marie noted that, these days, “everyone is having the same discourse anyway - ‘*nous besoin met tête ansanm*’ [Creole call for solidarity].” Jean recalled how

“*L’union faisait la force* [unity was our strength]. That came back [after the earthquake]. That type of community action needs to continue. If we become

divided again into the groups rich, poor, mullato, black... After the earthquake we didn't see that. There was perfect unity between Haitians. We can't always depend on foreigners. They help tremendously where we can't do it ourselves but as a people we have to be able to come together and get it done ourselves and not wait for someone in the international community help us. We won't survive as a people if we do. It comes down to Haitians coming together with the aim of moving forward in a spirit of honesty, of real development, in a collective to try and redistribute the wealth. So from there with the help of the international community we can move forward."

2c. Diaspora

As with the previous theme, Haitians and Haitian diaspora participants were most vocal about the will and work of the diaspora as it relates to the advancement of Haiti. One foreign nonprofit did also share an observation about the diaspora.

Marie, who works chiefly with diaspora nonprofits, believed the diaspora had "a legitimacy in terms of 'this is my home country, that's where I grew up, now I feel like it's time to give something back.'" Similarly, Able, an American, observed how the diaspora felt "God is calling me back" to work on behalf of their native land. Haitian-American Maxime is convinced that the diaspora "gotta start taking care of our own." He shared his experience prior to the earthquake of being

"on the conveyor belt to be assimilated into the American culture. That was my destiny. Along with millions of other Haitian entrepreneurs. Following the earthquake there is a vibrant, resonating fiber - everything within me says, 'I can't walk away from this. I must go through that process

to help my people so I've embarked on the journey to do that."

He wasn't alone in feeling a call to help Haiti. "Pretty much every single person that I've come across in one way or another have decided to go back or put in some extra work... so they could do more back home [Haiti]," shared the 33-year-old Haitian-American Bernel.

"The huge majority of Haitians living outside of Haiti are working - whether in the financial, educational, or something else - in a different society toward the good of that different society," laments Marie. Likewise Jude, a former government employee made the observation that "Haiti is a country that finances other countries. Every year, we lose many of our young people by way of immigration to other countries. So we invest in them only to have them leave and go help find solutions to the issues that trouble these other countries."

"How can a country be developed if all its doctors, nurses, professionals, engineers, everybody coming out and leaving the country?" continued Marie. An active member of Haiti's civil society, Andrew noted "84% of [Haiti's] educated population live abroad. We have professionals outside of the country. That is why I believe we should extend dual citizenship to the Haitian diaspora." Leo, a Haitian-American artist agreed saying, "Give the diaspora what they've been asking for which is the dual citizenship."

In terms of rebuilding the nation, Leo was of the opinion that "we should be counting on *our* people. We have the capacity to do it." The Haitian government should "immediately enlist the Haitian diaspora," he added. Cap-

Haitian native Daniel agreed stating, “I don’t think we should run the risk of leaving the diaspora out of the picture again. That’s a big mistake. They can be a major part in the development of Haiti.” Grassroots organizer Raul considers the Haitian diaspora partners in development saying, “They have to participate. Israel has called upon their diaspora. India does the same thing.” For Marie, the diaspora have skills useful to the rebuilding efforts. “The country needs different expertise, different abilities, different strengths to come together to that one purpose,” she shared.

The diaspora want to help and are “wanting to give back” as Marie put it but run into difficulties when it comes to collaborating. “A lot of people are saying ‘What about the diaspora?’ But the diaspora was not necessarily an organized group before [the earthquake]. People are talking about the diaspora as though it is an organization that should react, it’s people who have their own individual lives,” expressed government employee Josette. “We could organize and make an impact, but I’m sorry to say it, *we’re not doing it*. We want to do it, we are dreaming of doing it, we are talking of doing it, but we have a long way to do it,” shared Marie woefully. “They want to see better for the country.

Unfortunately, we’re not good at working together,” observed 26 -year-old Elsie. Leo had similar views, “We in the diaspora need to organize better. When you look at Haitian organizations, we’re all small. We’re like 1-4 people, we’re not well organized, we’re not well funded. The current way we’re working is not going to work long term.” When it came to foreign organizations, Esther had this to say, “Are they doing work? Yes. Are they helping? Yes. But Haiti is not their

number one priority.” As such, she was of the opinion that “the diaspora need to *stop funding other organizations*. They need to start funding their *own* organizations to take care of their own people.” As a result of the earthquake however, the “Haitian diaspora is realizing more and more the importance of collaborating, of working together, of pulling resources,” remarked Leo.

2d. Shaping Haiti’s Future

This subtheme contains a compilation of participants’ descriptions of what is needed to ensure Haiti has a promising future. Participants shared what they perceived as the barriers to redevelopment and Haiti’s greatest strengths. Participants noted the need for unity among Haitians, a decentralization of the capital, increased measures toward self-sufficiency, increased use of Haiti’s resources and strong political leadership. Participants also suggested that patience was imperative while conducting the work of development.

The international community’s solidarity with Haiti after the earthquake was especially moving for some participants. “When I see how the entire world showed its solidarity with Haiti, I said, ‘There’s hope,’” shared grassroots program director Jensen. The “illustrations of deep benevolence that surfaces in the face of cataclysmic events and crises” did not go unnoticed by one community meeting attendee. Leo observed that “there are people who really care and love Haiti and they’ve been giving for a long time so they are a part of this as much as Haitians are.” Josette remarked how “especially after the earthquake a lot of Americans were *truly* moved and really and truly wanted to help and donated *a lot* of money. Really a lot of money. I think it’s the highest level of private donations

[to such a cause].” Similarly, Jean noted that “we have an international community that wants to help. Is able to help.”

Twenty-six -year-old Elsie, however, believed the international community “miss[es] a huge opportunity when they come in with their mentality that ‘I know you problem and I know your solution’ instead of actually working with the people in the area to come up with a solution to their problems.” Able had similar sentiments.

“The Haitian people, they are the ones that best now their situation. They are the ones to have input as to what should be done. Then when you have experts from the outside of Haiti, then they can say, ‘Yes, but to build this house we need to do this to the cement to make it stronger. We need to make it in this type of construction.’ And then they [Haitians] can see, ‘Ok, we can do that.’ And you’re given those options. But they, the Haitians, had the initial input. ‘Ok, this is our problem, we can fix this, but we need this resource from the outside.’ If they can feel that they have the ownership and they are the managers, then they’d be more open to suggestions from the outside. When you’re the manager, you’re the one with the power.”

Elsie, a Haitian-American, insisted on the fact that “most people know their problems better than anyone from the outside does and they have the best solutions. People *know* what to do. They just need the resources and the support to get there.” Leo, who co-founded a diaspora/foreign organization, believed “foreign assistance should come in terms of money, at the beginning, and resources that we don’t have like equipment, for example. As for the intellectual capital, we have that. In terms of human capital, we have that.”

Diaspora/grassroots/foreign organization employee Virginia pointed out that foreigners aren’t the only ones to blame.

“There’s the government and the people with a lot of money, the ones that say where the money gets to go. They’re really overlooking the Haitian voice and forgetting to ask the questions of ‘What do you need?’ and ‘What do you want for rebuilding?’ and more kind of dictating what needs to be done.”

Three participants perceived the inclusion of the Haitian voice was key to a promising future for Haiti. “Allow them to have a chapter in the history that is currently being written,” is Jelsen’s petition. “Haiti has to have its voice. The neoliberal dynamics that pervade policy are driving us straight into a wall. We need alternatives,” he concluded. “It’s about how they [the Haitian people] want to build their country,” observed Virginia. In that vein, her hybrid organization is “working to really advocate for the Haitian voice and what the Haitians’ needs are and what they envision for rebuilding.” Daniel, a foreign nonprofit country program director recognized “the beneficiaries themselves... have to be able to fashion their reality and their futures.” Key for his organization’s work, he said, was to “make sure that we have a heavy participation [of] the beneficiary community in the planning process of *all* our projects. That’s the most important thing. That has been absent from the picture [in the past]. We [foreigners] just decide for them. We don’t even know what they want.”

A number of participants pinpointed areas of importance in redevelopment efforts. “First, its education, health and environment, and then community development,” listed Jelsen. “The people need to be self-sufficient in terms of growing their own food and maintaining their own political community,” said 57 -year-old Peter from a foreign nonprofit. For Daniel, self-sufficiency and

sustainable development went hand in hand. His organization “strongly believe[s] in self-sufficiency and sustainable development and targeted interventions.” He went on to say that “Self-employment... [is] a part of the Haitian culture. They don’t *like* to be dependent on somebody else. They don’t *want* to be dependent on jobs [provided by foreigners].” Self-sufficiency in food production was key for grassroots technical consultant Raul. “Haiti has the ability to produce enough to feed its inhabitants and export the excess,” according to him. Diaspora social worker Marie also believed Haitian agriculture to be of fundamental importance considering it “the basic value, the cornerstone of the economy to feed your people and to grow from there.” Likewise, Jelsen shared, “We need to work to be able to feed ourselves. We have to be autonomous when it comes to agriculture and what we eat. We have the resources to do it.” Former Haitian government elected official Jude said, “We have enough land to produce what we need and fill the gaps. But agriculture is not as valued as it should be.” In Jelsen’s mind, “we’ve got to change that and make use of our agricultural production.” For Raul it was imperative for Haiti “to improve the performance of our agricultural sector.” Peter, a 57 -year-old from a foreign nonprofit, asserts that “if things were properly cared for and watched over, it could be the breadbasket of the Caribbean just like it was a hundred years ago.”

In regards to Haiti’s economy, one diaspora social venture owner said people are “starting to realize that we need to engage the locals and source things from them to support the local economy instead of buying things from somewhere else and dumping down [in Haiti].” Similarly, Daniel believed “sustainable

development requires that all sectors of a society be in sync. You can't say, 'Well I'm going to go to tourism because that's where the money is, [forget about] education. [It's a] fallacy to rely on just one sector.'" He went on to say the emphasis should be to "create financial and social development from below in Haiti... just the opposite of the trickle down economy. We want to empower the base by providing them with access to investment and cash and loans," such as through micro-credit. He was happy to report that "we see people embracing more holistic approaches of Haiti's redevelopment."

Thirty-three-year-old entrepreneur Maxime sees a possible new development funding strategy that can be used in Haiti. The "different approach is to allocate profits from these various companies [local ventures] to social efforts," he shared. Social entrepreneurship "creates innovation" on a larger scale, something Bernel hopes to encourage through his social venture. Cultural executive director Leo is in agreement and supports the push for social businesses as a way of "eradicating a lot the problems that Haiti has" further insisting that we need to "talk about the economy from a cultural perspective."

A few participants expressed the need for Haiti, namely her capital of Port-au-Prince, to be decentralized. Marie thinks "a huge decentralization movement" is necessary "because after the breakdown of Port-au-Prince, everything started to shift toward the Dominican Republic because there was not even one single other town that could serve as [or] take the place of Port-au-Prince"- a real loss for the Haitian economy. One community meeting attendee pointed out that "the centralized schema of Haiti makes it difficult for many and

hampers true development.” Likewise, Leo, a Haitian-American couldn’t understand “why they haven’t decentralized Port-au-Prince all these years.”

Change and progress however, are not only going to take time but some getting used to according to foreign nonprofit executive Tom and country program director Daniel. “There are no magic wands... I see this all over the place... People believe in magic. There is no magic wand, there is no silver bullet, there is no simple solution. It’s going to take time. Things just aren’t going to happen overnight. And there are going to be mistakes because nobody’s got *the* answer,” said Tom. There has been an “overall acceptance of change that we’re seeing now. Even if we are a society that is really resistant to change but at least people are talking about change. People are talking about doing things differently. It’s like a kumbaya moment, you know?” Daniel, a Haitian-American, shared laughing.

Also mentioned was the need for unity among Haitians. An attendee of the community meeting stated, “The one thing we need to combat in this nation is exclusion.” Moving forward as a nation requires Haitians to work “together, not an elite of intellectuals and specialists deciding the agenda but all Haitians who want to have a say. So that the country can advance, together, not just a select group advancing,” according to grassroots member coordinator Jean.

Haiti has a wide a variety of resources that participants felt should be at the core of the nation’s redevelopment. “Haiti does have resources that people can work with,” said Able. “We should look into ways in which Haiti can be viewed differently by the world and Haitians themselves by focusing on her potentials,”

offered Jacmel, Haiti native Jude. Leo's organization was looking at ways in which they could "export [Haitian] culture so that we can even make it into an economy... the arts and our culture. Those are the things we really need to pay more focus on that [and reverse] the loss of cultural assets in Haiti." Along the same line, Raymond, a Haitian working for a foreign nonprofit wrote, "The Haitians are very popular for their arts, particular[ly] paint[ings], sculpture, etc." Andrew, an active member of Haiti's civil society, said Haitians had a facility with art "that one can only dream of [including] have Haitian dance, Haitian culture, Haitian music, [and] Haitian cuisine."

Gonaïve, Haiti native Marie called for "knowing what our resources are and how we can build on what we already have to push to make those resources grow." Raymond included "bauxite, copper, calcium carbonate, gold, marble, and hydropower" as natural resources that were not to be overlooked.

No surprise since Haiti is located in the Caribbean, participants noted how Haiti's natural resources could be used to increase tourism. "Haiti's coastal and marine environment... and good climate [...] could be used to develop the tourism industry," wrote Raymond. "Our beaches. We have a great resource right there. We [also] have a sunny climate," shared Marie with a sigh of nostalgia. Andrew, spoken with equal sentimentality, said, "We have beautiful beaches. We have extraordinary climate." Peter, an American who first visited Haiti ten years ago remarked, "The charm of Haiti is like no other country in Caribbean." "We have many advantages in Haiti but we need to figure out how to use them and apply them," concluded Josué.

Josué, president of a grassroots nonprofit that educates Haitian youth to be civil servants and Haiti's future leaders, was insistent that redevelopment thinking be big.

“Our vision needs to be much larger. We've got to start thinking about constructing zones and communities. We've got to stop thinking about itty bitty houses. We've got to think big. That's what I think. If we're going to build a road, we should think big. We shouldn't think of building for structures that last 20 years but we should be thinking 50 years, 100 years. Therefore building a two lane road, it's doesn't make sense. In Haiti we need 4 lane, 5 lane roads. That's how we should think. We've got to change the way we think and reflect. What I see in terms of how things are going here in Haiti, whether looking at the ONGs, the State, the civil society, and all that, their thinking is very limited. Very limited. We've got to see the way in which to construct... Even those [organizations] with money, when they go to build, they're talking about building small homes. Everything is 'ti' [small in Haitian Creole]. So we've got to get that out of our thinking.”

Thinking ahead and rebuilding with the future in mind was important to several participants. Jacmel, Haiti native Samuel pointed out, “We need to not only look at short term goals but also longterm goals.” Leo asked of the reconstruction taking place, “Are we building because we have a vision for the country? What does Haiti look like 5 years from now, 10 years from now, 50 years from now? What is it going to be known for?” Jean shared, “Apparently there will be other earthquakes to hit Haiti and we don't want to be caught unprepared.”

“What we need is the political will. We need political reform and modernization of the State... that's needs to be our fundamental priority, political reform. We need to reestablish the authority of the State. Development depends on political, social, and economic stability that must be safeguarded by the State,”

shared grassroots activist Raul. For Esther, a better future for Haiti means having leadership “with vision and the power to accomplish that vision. We are resilient and right now if we have a leadership that is going to take that and work it in the favor of the people we will go forward.” For artist Leo, progress meant a “government that will keep things stable” and at times say no to foreign aid. “New government needs to make the decisions for ourselves. ‘We thank you, but this is how we’re going to do it. If you want to help, here’s how you can help,’” he commented. In that same vein, former government employee Samuel wants to see “Haitians support their country [by] limiting the role of NGOs and backing up the various ministries of the government responsible for the development of the country in different domains.” He added,

“if reconstruction is to take place in Haiti, we think to redefine and *well* define the duties and roles of the ministry with funds and a well-defined mission. If we are to reconstruct, we have to strengthen these four ministries: agriculture, public services, health, and education. We must reinforce them and give them a well-defined mission if we plan to reach a particular level of development in this country.”

When it came to identifying Haiti’s greatest barriers to redevelopment Marie, who founded a diaspora/grassroots nonprofit 11 years ago, observed, “You cannot say it’s one thing is the greatest barrier to Haiti’s development because it’s a whole set of things that’s very intricate. They are mixed together. They are woven together. You can’t disconnect them.” Table 15 lists the greatest barriers to redevelopment shared by participants.

Table 15. Greatest Barriers to Redevelopment

| Entity Type | Participant | Greatest Barriers to Haiti's Redevelopment |
|-------------------------------|------------------|--|
| diaspora/grassroots nonprofit | Marie (diaspora) | "It's the history of the people. There you have it. Do not forget. We are great, great, great grandchildren of slaves" |
| foreign nonprofit | Tom (American) | <p>*"Internal:</p> <p><u>corruption</u> - [The] inertia of existing power structure. dealing with people who have power and it serves them and whatever power relationships they are in, financial or ego power.</p> <p><u>cultural dysfunctions</u>- [I] attribute most of this to inherited culture of slavery that Haiti had to initially deal with and that the people had dealt with.</p> <p><u>consequences of poverty</u>- All sorts of consequences of poverty including lack of infrastructure itself. It's like catch 22. You can't have development until you have good roads, but you can't have good roads because you can't afford to tax people enough to pay for the good roads and pay for the maintenance of them. The chicken or the egg? All consequences of poverty.</p> <p>External: [I'm] talking about us [Americans] basically, people that aren't in the country [of Haiti]</p> <p><u>impatience</u>- when you can't quickly use your money or you quickly get a solution well it looks good to accomplish something so you give stuff away. Do it and then walk away.</p> <p><u>cultural ignorance</u>- we don't speak the language, know the culture, get in the mindset and really get [them].</p> <p><u>prejudice</u>- various forms of racism in one form or another. I've known missionaries that say, 'here's the Haitian bathroom and here's ours'. And they're <i>missionaries!</i></p> <p><u>imperialism</u>- 'we know better', 'here, let me show you how to do it'. Sort of throwing your weight around, throwing your money around, being insensitive and superior.</p> <p><u>inadequate</u>- so there's an inadequate commitment to being there for the long haul.</p> |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| | | There's inadequate oversight on projects, so things don't get done." |
| diaspora/grassroots nonprofit | Elsie (diaspora) | "Greatest barriers are 1) the people, 2) the government, 3) I'd also say nonprofit organizations. Everyone has a blame in this. It's not one party." |
| diaspora/foreign nonprofit | Leo (diaspora) | "Greatest barrier is [...] the government." |
| foreign nonprofit | Daniel (diaspra) | "Number one is absence of long term planning. No shared vision, too much individualism. And that's killing Haiti. If we can go one notch up that step, we have a better chance to be successful. But now we are in a ditch. [Need] of shared vision [where] all Haitians see themselves not only being beneficial to myself but to a whole society. Lack of partnership. In all areas - private/private, public/public, etc. Lack of effective leadership. That's one thing that missing there. We need people who can <i>do</i> things. People who have the know-how. Bottom line is we lack organization. We need to be better organized." |
| foreign nonprofit | Paul (American) | "Two hundred years of voodoo has been bad for the country. For two hundred years its been their mother's milk. For two hundred years its created a certain ethic, a certain worldview of our problems, and solutions to our problems... spiritual heritage of [...] nation is fundamental." |
| government agency | Samuel (Haitian) | "Obstacles are the lack of objectives for the country. The biggest handicap is the multiplication of NGOs. It seems like the NGOs have replaced the State in Haiti. Whether national or international. They're everywhere, addressing education, social issues, health, agriculture, everything, absolutely everything. But we don't see any results." |
| foreign nonprofit | Raymond (Haitian) | "[Barriers are] multidimensional, but they [are] mainly dominated by the lack of political leadership that should normally create an appropriate environment to attract investments. [The] diminished capacity to develop a comprehensive development |

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | | <p>framework that should govern agencies and private sectors, and develop sustainable projects that bring nationwide changes. The weakness of the justice system is a major obstacle. In addition [to] secondary constraints including lack of human and financial resources, political instability and lack of basic infrastructures such as roads, electricity, safe water system, sanitation facilities, crop productivity factors, etc.”</p> |
|--|--|--|

* *Underlined emphases added.*

Fourteen participants, representing all entity types, listed the Haitian people as Haiti’s greatest strength in the redevelopment efforts. “We have a history of an extremely proud people... we are people we believe in what we can do,” said Marie. “We have [...] well-educated people in Haiti. A number of them,” that should be put to use at this time, pointed out Daniel. Josué brought attention to the fact that “the majority of the population is young. These are advantages. We also have people who love this country, who want to work, who are willing to sacrifice themselves for this country. We need to call upon them.” Former elected government official Jude likewise noted that “Haiti has a very young population.” Jelsen determined that “the Haitian population is very courageous. They showed their courage after the earthquake when they used their bare hands, without equipment to pull survivors out of the rubble. They also took it upon themselves to organize transportation out of the city.” Andrew was no less generous in his praise of the Haitian people. “Haitians are assiduous. Very, very, very assiduous. Haitians are intelligent. Haitians are artistically gifted. Haitians are hard workers. Haitians will go anywhere, risk anything, dying at sea [...] all to look for work.” Bernel was of the same opinion saying,

“The greatest strength are the people. No where else will you find - and I am biased I guess, I can say no where else [but even partners, when they go to Haiti or see Haitians they say that too - that Haitian people they work really hard. They’re really hard workers... A lot of people here in this country [United States] or elsewhere, you can’t say that about. Haitian people work hard, that’s one thing I can say.”

Jude remarked,

“Haiti has capacity. She’s used her capacity to help liberate others. She’s filled ships with her people and sent them to help a significant number of Latin American countries to win their independence. Haiti is bold. Even when the only other independent nation in the region, the United States, refused to help them out of cowardice, Haiti defied the powers that be anyway.”

“The Haitian people themselves, particularly through the church,” were seen as Haiti’s greatest strength in Able’s eyes. Tom observed,

“The people themselves are very resilient... they do what is in their best interest intuitively and they do it well, given their resources and given their opportunities which are very limited. Very hardworking, very committed to their children. [They] have a lot more patience and forbearance for sure, having lived through tough times from day to day, so they are highly motivated.”

He went on to say, “Haitians are great entrepreneurs and great problem solvers with the limited resources that they have so, they do really well.” Paul, a 56 -year-old administrator in a Christian foreign nonprofit noted with a sense of awe,

“Look at how the people [Haitians] handled it [the earthquake]. *If* that happened here in America, where one third were crushed in a moment, you’d find out how violent we could be and how ruthless we could be. We think we’re not capable of doing things but we’re more capable than we think. To have the patience with government that the Haitian

people have had...If Americans were placed in the same position, there would be rioting in the streets, there wouldn't be enough UN troops to stop us. I wouldn't do it, but I'm telling you what the American people would do. They would burn down Washington, DC. They would never remain as patient or long-suffering as the Haitian people have remained not just since the earthquake but for [...] centuries."

Esther, whose family moved from Haiti to the United States when she was 17 years old, remarked that Haitians "have a lot of dignity." She also commented, "I have never been in a country where I had so many entrepreneurs. I have never seen so many people - you give them \$20 and they start a business. The sense of 'I can help myself' is there."

Government employee Josette shared, "I think we are very proud. I think our key strength is that we just won't give up." She was however, forthright of her dislike of the word 'resilient' being applied to Haitians.

"I don't like the term [resilient] and I'll tell you why. A donkey is resilient. I don't think we're donkeys. [laugh] I'm really sick and tired of that term resilient. Every time I hear it I feel like we're donkeys or cows making it through the storm. Because it sort of weakens the human dimension of our people. Resilient. What does that mean? Does that mean you can keep beating us with a stick and we'll still keep plowing along? I don't really like that."

2e. Translating Talk into Action

Josué, president of a grassroots organization said, "If we're just dealing with development 'thinking' there is no shortage. [But what] we don't see concrete action on the part of the government -not on behalf of men, or women, and even less on behalf of the youth." He continued,

“Yes, it’s true that we have to think first but it’s been 200 years that we’ve been thinking. It’s time that we move on the action. If it were solely for new thinking or new approaches, listen, Haiti would have already been developed... We have so many projects filed away, Haiti would have already been developed. So if it were up to just thinking, Haiti would be a world power. The problem is how to switch over to the doing phase. There were some things they government said they would have done in March and here we are in July and it hasn’t been done.”

Marie, a diaspora in the field of social work saw “a lot of *talk* of change” and wants to see more work being done. “No matter what the amount of good or money that have been polled together for Haiti, that has to be translated into reasonable movement, action, toward fixing the country,” she shared. She does appreciate the talking phase of development, but to a point. “Beautiful talks are important, research, study, they are necessary. But they are only the first step toward determined, specific action toward change,” she emphasized.

Virginian, a 26-year-old American, saw both sides of the coin, “I’ve heard a lot people complain that there have way too many meetings and not enough action. I think with that complaint there is a little bit of validity in that there really is a great need for collaboration and working to assess what is being done in Haiti and what needs to be done, who can to do what, etc.” Josué, however, seems tired of waiting. The “population awaits many things. Development that is. There’s a lot of hope but we’re still waiting,” he said. “We can talk about change,” he said with slight sarcasm, “we were better off before the earthquake so we can talk about change - negative change. The Haitian society, the professors, the students, are waiting for what’s next but don’t find anything.

They are thirsty. Thirsty for a new life, thirsty for everything new, but they're left hanging."

Jelsen, a grassroots political activist, points the finger at "NGOs that haven't appropriately used the funds, given in good faith by the international community. Because today, the 9th of July, there are still people living in tents in the conditions you see. That's scandalous. When you calculate all the donations given to Haiti to help these people. It's scandalous. It's dishonest." A full transition from relief work to development work hasn't yet taken place. Raymond, working for a European organization, noted in his correspondence received in July 2010, that "most of the organizations are doing relief and early recovery." Andrew lays the blame for long talks and little action by way of development at the feet of his nation's government saying, "After 6 months the impression you get [from looking around] is that the earthquake took place yesterday. That shows the government is incompetent." Josué, however, doesn't know who's at fault. "In terms of development, there's nothing happening. Since the 12th of January there's nothing. I don't know if it's the government or the international community that is keeping the Haitian population in concentration camps," he remarked bitingly.

Theme 3. Aid Work and its Effects

In this theme participants shared their perception of the paternalistic system of international aid, past and present, and its effects on Haitian economy, Haitian psyche, and Haitian politics. This theme also includes the lessons learned regarding a growing culture of dependency and ways in which it can be

countered. Participants also expressed clear distinctions between relief and true aid.

3a. Paternalism of Aid and Culture of Dependency

Eleven participants shared their observations on the paternalistic attitudes, policies, and activities of NGOs that have routinely disregarded the Haitian culture and the Haitian voice(s). They noticed a shift in Haitian collective psyche towards passive reception of assistance due to the traditional top-down approach of aid. Of these eleven, some participants shared their experiences of witnessing learned helplessness in the Haitian community. In this sub-theme, participants were comprised of three hybrid (two diaspora/grassroots and one diaspora/grassroots/foreign), four foreign, one grassroots, one diaspora, and two diaspora social ventures.

“Paternalism in development is disastrous. What it is, paternalism is giving to somebody or community or doing something for somebody or community without their official permission and causing them to develop a dependency,” said Able, an American agricultural consultant and technical writer.

To illustrate, he related this story:

“We went to evaluate an irrigation program that was done by one of our networking organizations. Visited three communities and inspected their systems and we talked with the people to see how they were doing, if there were any problems, what they were doing to alleviate the problems and such. One thing that stood out for us when we went is that when we asked about their situation -and each community had a different situation- but in each case when I asked ‘What are you doing to prepare or to resolve a problem’, each one said ‘We’re poor, we can’t do it, its up to the organization.’”

He considered this a red flag.

“This organization had gone in and said ‘Yes, we need to help you out’ so they put in the wells, they put in the well pumps, they put in the systems to help it irrigate. And the problem was that those systems never belonged to the people. The people didn’t take ownership. They always felt ‘this belongs to the organization’. So when it came down to providing fuel for the pumps, they called on the organization. When it came down to building cisterns for water storage and pressure, they called on the organization.”

Marie defined culture of dependency this way: “Culture of dependency there is an element of ‘I’m going to be there waiting for you Miss Élise and Mrs. ——— to come and show me the way,’” she said imitating a helpless voice. “And that is a big, huge hindrance. How are people going to be fully the leaders they want to be if they are just the small, little child that is waiting for that help to come? This is not a good thing,” she said and equated it to “a form of subordination.”

Maxime, a Haitian-American entrepreneur remarked, “There is the mentality of ‘We’re waiting for the Americans to come and do this for us’. The model of development is ‘Ok, the foreigners to come and do it for Haiti’, they owe it to us. Or ‘Venezuela will come do it for us.’ And nothing gets done unless a large sum of money comes in.” Similarly, Marie noted the “wave of giving to Haiti or helping the people of Haiti, those things basically cripple Haiti, literally. [So now] we’re always looking for somebody else to do those roads for us, those bridges, those huge infrastructures that we can’t do.”

Daniel, a Haitian working for a foreign organization focused on

education saw paternalistic approaches of aid influence even the Haitian government. “This mentality has affected even government itself. It has crippled the drive and effort to become less dependent on foreign aid. These paternalistic approaches of the donating countries [have] perpetuated the problem [of poverty],” he said. Bernel, another Haitian-American entrepreneur made similar observations saying,

“Pretty much [its] the international community that is shouldering a lot of things. Even if you read their [Haiti’s] development plan, it pretty much says ‘We’re gonna rely on people giving us money’. It’s not a plan where they say ‘We’re going to do X, Y, Z that’s going bring revenue to recreate the country and make us stronger where we can produce and do things for ourselves.’ That’s a major problem area.”

“When you give someone \$500 to do something, they feel that, to say that they are your slave is too strong, but they feel like you are the boss, you are the parent, and they are just a child. And in a sense that is dis-empowerment at best,” shared Marie, a member of the diaspora. She linked this disempowering “culture of giving” to “the neocolonialism framework whereby Haiti was mostly in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries like a child of the French. We were basically there, the slaves where there doing what the masters wanted, when they wanted, how they wanted.”

Tom, an American who studied political science and marketing was convinced that, “When you stop and think about it, even though they [NGOs] are trying to be helpful it’s like borderline insulting in the sense that is not allowing them to do things on their own.” He thought part of the problem was that relief

work has long been disguised as development work. He says “a distinction between relief and development” needs to be made. “Relief work is more top down. People give things away and do things for people involved.” It should be “done in an *emergency* but in Haiti the majority of organizations operate like that,” he continued, “[They] go in and do the stuff for the people and the people just sort of receive it [and] it creates a dependency actually.” He related his organization’s hard-learned lesson,

“We learned this, it’s not that we’re smarter than other people, we just paid attention to what the impact was from what we first did. We drilled a well and ignorantly assumed that people will maintain it on their own, not realizing that first of all, they don’t know how to do it; second of all, they don’t know where to get the parts; third of all they don’t have the money to do it. We started to address the whole picture, before we were just addressing the fact that ‘Oh, water. We can do that. We can drill wells’ and ‘Here you go, here’s your well.’ Then it becomes our well, not theirs. It breaks down in 6 months and we’ve done surveys and most wells done that way, within a year 40% of them would be broken. So all the resources that went into drilling the well and the cost that went into drilling the well was completely lost and people go back to the river or whatever.”

Marie noted that often, paternalistic aid did not allow for Haitians to make the big decisions. “*We need to build institutions. Period.* We don’t have that. So an organization like _____ and anybody that is working in Haiti, if they don’t build institutions with full legitimacy to operate with their own [Haitian] directors, their own [Haitian] managers, and [instead] they keep them as babies, they [foreigners] are the one leading the game.... it won’t work,” she lamented. She believed “the foreigners helping in Haiti are tailoring their

[Haitians'] own clothes to their [foreigners'] own size and 'They should do it this way.' I don't want the Haitians to tell them 'Papa, mama, *blan* [foreigner], come and do what you want.' Sadly, Elsie observed just that taking place. She shares,

“People view them [nonprofits] as ‘Oh, you’re my savior’ and yes, they’re coming to help you but at the same time you also have to look at it a different way. In the long run, how are they helping the system? How are they helping the economic system? How are they helping the social system? Other than giving you a piece of bread, are they helping you and your family to buy bread, or make bread, so you can earn?”

Maxime, a 33-year-old entrepreneur, also noticed the encroaching culture of dependency in Haiti. “The international community does it [and] the mentality is [...] ‘It must be created for us,’” he said and added that “historically, I’ve looked at Haiti and for every single development that takes place where we didn’t sweat for it, it does not last long.”

“When we think we’re helping, what we are really doing is development a culture of dependency whereby all of Haiti, everybody has their eyes outside, looking for support, for donations, for gifts, and its horrible,” said Marie, a Gonaïve, Haiti native. She also pointed out that good intentions were sometimes behind these negative results. “The culture of dependency, I think, is more a byproduct of goodness and of good intentions,” she admitted, citing the Haitian diaspora’s generosity as an example of good intentions gone bad. “[The diaspora] just giving, giving, giving [and] people are just waiting to get more and more. The more they are getting, the more they’re getting impoverished. Because all of a sudden, you’re not learning to really rely on yourself.” Paul, an American

minister, noted similar incidents with his congregations. When his group makes a trip to Haiti,

“everybody wants to bring their used clothes to me and I tell them ‘No’. Reason being our container is full of lumber, metal and things we’re needing for our schools. Number two is it’s a lot of work to fool with that but everybody wants to empty out their closets and send their used clothes to Haiti. [There’s a] Haitian man, a principal of one of our schools. [His] wife is trying to build a sewing shop to make clothes. We have a sewing lab in our school, to teach folk to make clothes, but again, just about the time maybe this man’s wife gets a little business, here comes the Christians pushing off a load of clothes off the back of the truck. Well, who’s going to buy her clothes when they can get all the free clothes they need from the Christians?”

Martine, an American emergency coordinator, saw dependency manifested as “social jealousy” and saw her share of it in the tent camps particularly - “A lot of it. ‘Somebody gets a distribution, I didn’t get a distribution. Somebody got two tarps, I don’t have any tarps.’” A reason why grassroots organizer Josué is ready to see work opportunities take the place of handouts.

“I am not in agreement with the thinking and practice that people should be given free food every day. That’s not good at all. To me, it seems like it’s just another way of keeping people enslaved. It’s not good at all. Yes, unfortunately we’ve lost people, we’ve lost all that we own, and ok, they’ve given us free food for a month or two and that’s great. But now what needs to be created is work. It’s should now be about teaching people to how building themselves. It shouldn’t be that, ‘Oh, stay here and we’ll bring you water, food. Just stay here.’ That’s ridiculous.”

When it comes to the rebuilding effort, Virginia wants these paternalistic attitudes and policies to change. “Let’s not implement these policies that have

really been detrimental to Haitian society in years past. You can look back and see where they've been unsuccessful and they've done things to really just further perpetuate the chain of poverty versus develop and empower," she said. Marie believes the culture of dependency has created a mentality that "has to be totally revamped. And unfortunately, it won't be easy because... the mindset is so much into receiving." Likewise Able shared, "There have been people that have shared that Haiti is the hardest place for them to work. And I think that's partially due to the past, where organizations have come in and said 'Yes, we want to help, we want to give' and they give. 'We want to do this for you' and they do that for them.'"

3b. Counteracting Culture of Dependency

Several participants shared their personal and organization's observations, suggestions, and efforts to offset the philosophy, practices, and effects of dependency in aid work.

Able found that working with grassroots organizations helped curb dependency. "USAID created lots of dependencies. That was hard work to work through the scars left by USAID. We're now working with NGOs with grassroots approach and are now doing much better," he reported. For Marie, a Haitian-American social worker it was about "how can the people grow based from a strengths perspective?" She notes however, that "it is very difficult" and "it's extremely hard." Tom also believed counteracting the culture of dependency would be difficult saying, "Sustainable development is not easy, it takes time, it doesn't always work, not textbook, no formula."

Martine believed that “When you [do for people,] people don’t learn. When you leave, the skills aren’t there,” adding that at her European-based nonprofit, “We’re very much about capacity building.” Able, who works with an agriculture nonprofit, shared his organization’s philosophy:

“When I work with NGOs that work in Haiti I encourage them to never give anything away. Encouraged dependency encourages a entitlement mindset. Going to encourage people to plant trees? Sell it. Even if for a few pennies. Cause the people will say ‘Why are they giving me this tree? If it’s of no value to them, it’s of no value to me’. They may plant it, they may not plant it. It may grow, it may not grow. *But* if the people are educated to see what those trees are for and they’re put up and say ‘Ok, these trees are 5 gourdes [Haitian currency] a piece but we’re going to sell it for 1 so you can buy them and afford them.’ Then they’ll buy them. If they spend a piece on it to buy it, they’re going to make sure it’s planted, it’s fertilized and it grows. They’re going to make sure the goats don’t eat it and they’re going to take care of it because they want their investment back.”

Tom’s organization also employed an empowering philosophy in their work where they “enable people themselves to carry [the project] on” and tries to “have [the] community be as self-sustained in this regard as possible” because “you can’t keep relying on all these [outside] people to come in and do stuff.” He shares,

“Our activity is different, our intention is to work with the communities to help materialize projects that they think their communities need. Haitian people [are] intricately involved from the beginning to the end. When it’s done it turned over to Haitian people that are able to maintain it”

Key for his organization’s work is to enable people themselves to carry it on from that point.”

Elsie, a 26 -year-old president and founder of a diaspora/grassroots

organization, said, “I’m trying to work against the degrading type of aid where people are always waiting and having their hands open waiting to receive instead of giving people a form...of working for their living, working to be able to save money to build homes, to send their children to school.” Bernel, a Haitian-American, saw that there was a “cascading effect when you put money in somebody’s hands - by giving him a job, not through welfare...”

Virginia’s diaspora/grassroots/foreign hybrid organization looks to their Haitian partners for direction.

“We really do see that we have nothing to provide but resources and training. Basically we just let the grassroots come to us and say ‘This is what we need- this, this and this’ or ‘We need a new boat to improve our fishing productivity’ so it’s really using them. They’re the ones. They know their communities. They know the people they’re working with and they know their names. We’re not the people that come in and dictate that. It’s really truly just to help and kind of an assistant. ‘Here’s your resources, here’s your training’, and let the Haitians do what they will with it.”

3c. Aid and Its Effects on Haiti’s Economy

Several participants, including two community meeting attendees, gave examples in which aid and international policies have adversely affected Haiti’s economy. Two grassroots, two hybrid (one diaspora/grassroots and one diaspora/foreign), and three foreign organizations shared their views on this topic.

Haiti’s dependency on foreign aid, whether through NGOs or bilateral/multilateral corporations, has decimated her economy. From an NGO perspective, Tom, an American, saw that

“some of this [benevolence] has really screwed up the economy. How can the rice farmer expect to make money and grow rice and sell it if people are constantly bringing it in and dumping it on the market for free or on the black market and people don’t have to buy his rice when someone else is giving it away. From an economic standpoint it keeps it from developing when this kind of thing goes on and it goes in many different areas.”

Haiti’s economy fairs no better from the angle of bilateral or multilateral aid. Jelsen, a grassroots political activist, is part of an organization which

“fight[s] against Haiti’s indebtedness. The external public debt. You’ve heard of the movement to forgive the debt of countries in the developing world through the program PPPE or HIPC [Highly Indebted Poor Countries]. So each country that wants to benefit from this initiative has to submit a plan for a strategy to reduce its debt. Haiti has done that and a portion of her debt has been forgiven. We’re fighting that. It’s a debt we’ve already repaid a thousand times and we continue to pay. We call that an odious debt.”

At the community meeting, one attendee said, “We’re an *état mendiant* [state dependent on charity]. You don’t produce anything, you don’t do anything, everything comes from abroad.” Another added, “The production system of Haiti has always been to take from the land and then ship it out elsewhere.” Jelsen noted the same trend -and the effect it’s had on the nation. He shared,

“Today the rhetoric is that Haiti has two principle resources, tourists and agriculture. So all the projects about Haiti focus on that. So when you look at agriculture and the push to have this sector grow, do the plans stress agriculture for national consumption or exportation? It’s always for exportation. So that means that this model of economic growth is one based on extroversion. That is, it’s not about strengthening the services here in the country, that serve national interests but rather, an economy that works to satisfy the needs of foreign nations. And these models are

neoliberal. Since the 80s there has been a huge push to have countries, particularly in the south privatize their industries. This was done under the guise that the government of these developing nations were corrupt. So there was a call for industries to move out from under direct government control and that privatization would encourage free economics and result in development. And that explains all the privatization in Haiti. So all the services are privatized. Where are the public services? So now the market controls everything. The government has been put out. That's the model we've been proposed for development. A neoliberal model - a dependent capitalist extrovert model. So that's where we are now."

Marie observed that Haiti's economy was mostly one of "consumption [since] we do not produce." But that wasn't always the case. Paul, a 56 -year-old American remarked,

"During Papa Doc time, Haiti produced 80% of their food. After all the political problems, there was an embargo that the US did in early 90s that was very difficult for the country. Things have not improved much since then. My understanding now is that Haiti is only producing 20% of their food needs. That has inverted completely."

This is why Raul believes we should "boost agricultural production... we're still too dependent... a good part of our imports are food products." Marie had a similar point of view, saying, "When we finish feeding our people, and we have excess, we can export."

Daniel, who holds a degree in international economics, identified two old ways of thinking about development that have stalled economic progress in Haiti. He said,

"The trickle down economy- the belief that if you make the people that are already rich, richer because they are the ones who create jobs, they are the ones who invest,

[therefore] the richer they become the more likely you will have an injection of cash into the economy. [This] trickle down economy where the richest should get a break as an incentive for them to create jobs, that way the poorer members of society will be exposed to better opportunity... over time it has proven to be false. The type of business class we have in Haiti, *la bourgeoisie*, they don't have any intention to invest in Haiti. They're sitting on cash but they believe it's too risky for them to invest in Haiti so they invest in other countries, like the DR, and other Caribbean countries."

Echoing Jelsen's thoughts on the two pronged sector approach to development, he added that there is the

"belie[f] that key sectors such as agriculture and tourism... are sufficient to generate the type of revenues the State relies on to execute viable development programs and that's not true. Some people even use the analogy of the Middle East like Dubai and Saudi Arabia and think that these countries rely totally on revenues from oil, one natural resource, petroleum. But sustainable development requires that all sectors of a society be in sync. It's a comprehensive execution, when one sector should be the enabling factor for the other... For instance if you invest heavily in tourism but neglect security and national defense, no investor is going to come for your tourism if you lack security. Nobody will take you seriously. Its a fallacy to rely on just one sector."

Haiti's economy, already barely performing, was dealt another huge blow by the earthquake and doesn't seem to be improving. While street markets are full, they are no indicator of growth as Josué points out. "What I see... are people buying in bulk from the US, the D.R., or elsewhere and reselling them. So with such an economy, it won't budge." An entrepreneur himself, Maxime took issue with microlending as it is often the means market vendors secure start-up funds.

“One of the things that people don’t realize is that the microcredit/microlending only allows the individual entrepreneur to enter a very finite market- retail or selling food or selling mangoes. If you have forty mangoes, you sell what’s there. Within the Haitian economy, it is chopped up into three: you have top market which is crowded by monopolies, you have mid-market, and you have lower market which is microfinancing efforts. The top market [is] crowded by monopolies and whatever they do they have a major ripple effect throughout the entire economy. The only body of the economy that was lacking funding and attention was the middle market. The middle market is very important, [representing] small to median sized companies, [and] middle market companies can bring in new talent and new services that encourage monopolies to alter the way they provide or do business.”

Jelsen noted, “We’re in a situation of sorrow because everything that we consume comes from abroad. That’s not good for the economy of the country, it’s not good for those that work.” Projects that create industries in Haiti tailored only for U.S. consumption hasn’t worked in Haiti either.

“The American plan for Haiti: that is, every time the Americans have projects for the entire region, their project, that respond[s] to their foreign policy interests, [and] stretch over their vast zone of control which would be Latin America and the Caribbean. So there isn’t a shortage of plans for Haiti drawn up by the States. [For example] we have the American occupation where foreign investment is introduced, this well before 1915, and this started in the middle of the 19th century. The Civil War caused a drop in cotton production in the States. The then gov’t of Haiti used foreign funds, notably that from North America, to finance Haiti’s cotton production that fed American industries. This benefited Haiti but once the war was over, there wasn’t a demand for Haitian cotton anymore.”

He went on to say that “J.E. Charles believed that the problem of the nation was that we were a feudal nation. Or neofeudal because he took account of all the interference of foreign capital.” Jelsen himself, however, preferred the terms

“satellite capitalist” or “dependent capitalist” to describe nations such as Haiti.

3d. True Aid

This sub-theme captures comments that pertains to the culturally sensitive, empowering, and holistic philosophy, roles, and work of their organizations in assisting Haiti in its redevelopment efforts.

Marie emphasized that for her diaspora/grassroots organization, it's all about the grassroots movement. “They would be what they are with or without [us], you understand? So basically, what we do, we see ‘How can we help them be a little better?’” Tom, whose organization has very close ties with people in Haiti, believes true aid “requires that on-the-ground experience to do it, to *get* how to do it.” His organization’s “long term goal [is] to be a resource to all areas that are basic to community development and have that available and support community and bring forth those aspects of their development and infrastructure,” for which “sustainability is key.” He said that’s the “difference between development and aid.” Haitian-American entrepreneur Bernel believed what was needed were projects that focused on “developing local economies and creating jobs and things like that to *really* help the locals.”

Grassroots civil society animator Andrew believes that

“If the international community wants to really help us and if the Americans really want to help us, they would, instead of going through the Haitian politicians, look to get in contact with the Haitian civil society. The people who think everyday, who write, who work for the country, they [foreigners] should seek to meet with those people and ask them questions.”

In his work in agriculture, Able went to great lengths to be “sensitive to

local economies, cultures, and climates” and didn’t allow his organization’s “seeds... to undermine the local economies.” He shared an illustration of what he meant:

“A colleague came back just after the earthquake and he said that the UN was going and they had food distribution programs. The sad thing is that he saw the UN truck distributing free food and right next to the truck were Haitians were trying to make a living selling food. You see the paradox there. And this really wreaks havoc when it comes to development. Support the local economy [instead].”

It’s all about enabling communities that have “a development mindset and not an entitlement mindset” for this foreign organization. They want to “become a resource for the people to build on and not just something they depend on.” Able is also very cognizant of the fact that “the Haitian people, they are the ones that best know their situation. They are the ones to have input as to what should be done.” Elise agrees. “...People in Haiti are very smart they just need the help, the education, they need the tools to do it. And a little bit of training and they’ll be fine,” she said confidently. Her 2 -year-old diaspora/grassroots nonprofit aims to “really work with the people that are in Haiti and try to do what they want to do.” Likewise Daniel shared,

“...the new thinking approaches that we embrace sincerely [are] self-sufficiency, delegate, [and] opportunities to the beneficiaries themselves. We cannot keep catering to them, they have to be able to fashion their reality and their futures themselves. We’re not just being paternalistic like some organizations do, we provide our beneficiaries with the opportunity to replace us in the future, being empowered and do things for themselves.”

This Cap-Haïtien native, who now works for a foreign nonprofit in the

U.S., shared his strategy of true aid. “I personally became an active listener. As opposed to going to Haiti in *gran pan pan* [great flair and arrogance] you know?” he said with a laugh. Which leads “people [to] understand that you are the one, you are the messiah, to solve all your problems. [Rather] we became active listeners of the people we’re supposed to serve. And we make room for their involvement and participation in the process.”

In Able’s work, in an effort to be sensitive to local livelihoods if introducing new plant varieties in a community, the “practitioner”, usually a foreigner, “takes the risk not the farmer. The practitioner uses new seed first, then if it grows and does well, then the practitioner devises equitable ways in which to distribute to community.” Furthermore, Able’s organization is a faith-based Christian nonprofit which practices “holistic development, dealing with the whole person, not just the socio-economic aspect of the person but also the health of the individual. The spiritual aspect of the individual as well. That’s what makes a complete person.”

Paul, an American minister said,

“[the] nature of Christian ministry is to do the easy thing and the easy thing is to give a man a fish. And we feel good about ourselves and we go home. The harder thing is to teach a man to fish and it takes the investment of a lifetime. At my organization, that’s what we’re engaged in the better half, to teach a man to fish. Our ministry goes through great lengths to not continue to cultivate the dependency and the welfare mentality because it’s damaging in the long run.”

He conceded that “there are places in Haiti where the people are malnourished. You *have* to give a man a fish or he will die. But somehow there has to be a

balance of the equation.”

Theme 4. Haitian Society

This theme encompasses the culture, mentality, and activities of Haitian society and their implication on the redevelopment efforts. Participants also shared their observations of helpful and harmful cultural and thinking practices and the role of Haitian civil society.

4a. Haitian Culture and Psyche

Some participants, all Haitian or Haitian American representing a mix of entities including the community meeting, were quite vocal about the hindrances in aspects of the Haitian culture and psyche. The entities they represented were two diaspora social ventures, two hybrid (diaspora/grassroots and diaspora/foreign), two grassroots, one foreign, and one diaspora organization.

Maxime, a Haitian-American entrepreneur said, “One of the biggest things we have to do is change the mindset of people. Mindset change is very hard and very expensive to do.” Josué, a Jacmel, Haiti native who studied communication, law, and administration, related that one of his organization’s main purpose was “to change a bit the mentality, the way of thinking, the way of acting, being responsible, being more of a citizen” in the youth that he worked with. At the community meeting, one attendee noted that “we fight [each other] we fight, we fight, but we don’t accomplish anything.” When discussing creating a congress of Haiti’s civil society, one attendee wanted the group to “stick close to the media. The congress is not necessarily only what takes place in the meeting hall but it’s about a transformation of the Haitian psyche. And a change in

thinking can't take place without the media.”

Two participants, Josué and Andrew, noted a phenomenon they observed pertaining to Haitians collaborating together. Said Josué, “Two people come together to start a business. They come together on emotional basis- a shared excitement for starting a venture. But when it starts to grow and be successful, each thinks ‘I could have done this myself.’” Along the same vein, Andrew related, “two Haitians come together to do something. Wait a while and you'll hear that they've then destroyed it.” Both see this tendency as a huge problem. In response, Andrew's grassroots civil society organization has

“worked a lot in terms of changing the Haitian mentality. Before, I noticed that Haitians were very petty, they only spoke to certain people, but now we hear each other out, we communicate, and everyone wants change, they all say that we have to come together. But I wasn't the only one to say this, there are quite a few organizations [who say the same].”

The expression “*marron*” was also twice applied in describing the Haitian psyche. Andrew explained,

“It means someone who leaves an area and hides. The Haitian hides all the time. He does not tell you what he thinks. The Haitian is a *marron*. *Marronage* comes from the colonial days. The slaves - that's why they won the war - the slaves lived with the French but you could have the woman that cooks for you today be a member of the slave army. And *marronage* had many meanings. For example, I'm on the plantation and you make me work, one day I escape and I go live in the mountains - a free man. You will come and pursue me but you have to find me. And he was not content to just hide themselves in the mountains, he would descend from the mountains at night and burn the plantations and attack the white plantation owners. But there is a *marronage* that's psychological. That is, when the Haitian tells you ‘Yes’, sometimes he really means ‘No’. When he

says ‘Yes, yes, yes, yes’ you can be sure that he’s really telling you no. [laughing] So *marronage* has been brought down through the culture. They don’t tell you what they think.”

Marie, a member of the diaspora, spoke similarly saying *marronage* was serious problem, the result of deep mistrust that is hampering progress.

“Haitians do not trust other Haitians. At the core, it’s us. It’s us Haitians that are the problem.... Put the ailment on the Haitian, the person itself, with our own flaws. The flaws that are embedded in us, the lack of trust. The Haitian is a *marron*. So you don’t know what they’re thinking, what they’re feeling, so you should be ready.”

Bernel, a young Haitian-American, echoed something akin to Marie’s perceptions. “Haitian people are very suspicious of things. Very non-trusting kind of deal,” he said. When asked why this was so he replied, “It’s pretty much a culture thing. If you present something they’re ‘Yeah, ok. What are you trying to get from me?’ kind of deal. It’s a cultural thing that we need to work on.”

For Josué it came down to the fact that “we need to stop being hypocrites, being fake.” One attendee at the community meeting believed it stemmed from Haitians not knowing their history well. He believed Haitians would “...learn to love their country more. If we knew our history *well*, we’d love each other more. And I’m not talking about the fables and legends they like to retell, I’m talking about our *real* history. We’d have more solidarity amongst us. We’d have a solidarity of thought.”

Division was seen in several areas of Haitian society. “*Tête ensemble* [putting our heads together]. Division hampers us. Everyone thinks it has to be their project that has to work, be applied. We have to come together. If we don’t,

there will never be a refoundation of the state,” said Josué. Esther bemoaned the fact that “we have not had a unified Haiti for several decades.” Maxime saw a generational gap in politics causing some problems. “A lot of older minds tend to be polarized. ‘Follow me, follow me’ and not looking at the bigger picture,” he shared. In the socio-economic sphere, Leo was emphatic stating, “What we have to stop thinking is that the pie is only this big. There is no limit to the pie... We can share ideas because we can’t do it all on our own.” Maxime shared his observations,

“One of the biggest things that is going to happen and people are going to realize is, its going to awaken everyone, or open up the eyes of the elites in Haiti. Because the elites feel that ‘Well, the business model has to work where if we are in competition [then]...we’re going to be squeezed out. In reality what will end up happening is - they are not going to be pushed out and get a small piece of the pie. Instead the pie is going to get bigger because Haitians will have more disposable income to consume your products. This is going to be a *major* social change that’s going to take place in Haiti.’”

He explained his social venture’s dual approach to this problem:

“[O]n the elites’ end we want to show them that they can increase the pie... We want to show them that a lot of the same companies just like them were doing the same things in China and now that more families in China have disposable income, now they’re buying more stuff and as a result of this, they’re [Chinese companies] making more money. At the same time parallel, changing the mindset of the Haitians in Haiti. For the longest they have been dependent on family members sending them money back home. Now they must start working. That’s one. And two, teaching people the importance of following through with a contract. It’s like teaching them Chinese or Japanese because it’s not part of the culture.”

Similarly, social venture founder and webmaster, Bernel noted that

Haitians have to tendency to think,

“if ‘I know something, I don’t want to share it with you’ type of deal and in the 21st century, there’s not of that anymore. [laughing] But that’s the way, it’s a cultural thing. Its just this idea that if I do share with you then you’re going to figure out how to profit from me. It’s a mentality. It’s a backwoods way to think because when I hang out with the Indians, they are always sharing. They’re like ‘Ok, I have this, this this, and this is how I’m doing it, this is what’s going on.’ They’re *always* sharing... They are sharing, they talk to each other. They run things as a family and they run things as a group. But Haitians, ‘if I’m doing this, I don’t want you to [know]’. If you succeed, somehow it affects me. It’s just a mentality, a cultural thing, that is why the country is in such a state.”

When asked where this mentality came from he replied, “[It] goes back from where it was, in slavery and things like that. It’s a slave mentality.” Leo likewise believed it was the Haitian mindset of fear “that keeps us grounded in the colonial mentality. In fear of each other and in fear of everything around us.”

Leo and Bernel likened this mentality to crabs in a barrel. “[The] thing that plagues us is the idea of not allowing one of our kind to advance. Crabs in a bowl. That’s what happens in any developing country - not just Haiti,” remarked Leo. Bernel conveyed,

“The idea that if you’re succeeding... it’s the crab in the barrel type of deal. If you’re succeeding then I need to pull you down in my level. I don’t want you to go farther than I am. It’s that culture that killing us, really. Until that changes it’s very hard to see improvement in anything else - in politics or... Things [must] change down there of not caring for the other, and not wanting the other to go anywhere.”

Marie was tired of seeing Haitians stand on the sidelines critiquing those that were trying to make a difference. “You cannot sit and just watching me

and maybe hoping that it will fail to show me that I'm an idiot because I can't do it," said she. "We're fake," said Josué matter-of-factly. "We'll say 'That's not good, that's not good, that's not good.' But when it comes time to act, we don't come through. That's our problem."

Of some contention among participants was a supposed language snare on the island and its effects on Haiti's cultural fiber. Haitian Creole and French are the official languages however, Creole is more widely spoken on the island but French is used in the education system and for official government business. In our interview in Port-au-Prince, Andrew, an author and educator who himself spoke four languages, asked rhetorically,

"You know that French is a snare to development in Haiti? The French language. English or Spanish [should be] the language of orientation for Haiti. I propose that even if we don't remove French as the official language, that we use English or Spanish as the language of orientation. If we chose English, we'd be in a different situation. Because we are surrounded by nations that either speak English or Spanish. With English, we'd have a different rapport the United States and with Spanish [inaudible]."

He continued, clearly passionate about this topic,

"All this put in your dissertation, these are barriers to development. Both the French language and the French are hindrances to development. Because they finagle their way to be here. I would say English for sure, because of the States, but Spanish would be even better. The idea behind choosing a language of orientation is to in fact choose a country or countries with which you will partner for the sake of your nation's development."

Peter, an American whose organization translates educational and faith-based material into Creole, was of the opinion, "education in the Creole language

is the key piece,” he said laughing. “I think that is one of the major pieces that’s got to be done before anything else can happen.” Leo, a Haitian-American artist said with noted exasperation,

“One thing that hasn’t been working and will never work if we continue on this path is our language. We are so set on keeping French as *the* official language in which we conduct our affairs, in which we write our laws and it’s a disadvantage for the rest of population! If you have 20% of the population speaking French, even in that 20%, I’m sure there’s a lot less because there are some who don’t even write it well and there are those who don’t even speak it well. So *why* are we insisting on keeping French as our official language?”

He went on saying,

“[I’m] not to say it’s not nice to know French or that we should dismiss it altogether. Only thing is that let’s really be honest with ourselves. We have a population that speaks practically 100% Creole. This would be the easiest way to get the people educated and really advance the culture and we should be proud of it. Creole is an incredible language. This is the language we use in our music, this is the language we use when we joke, this is the language we use when we’re in small informal group to really connect and interact. When you’re walking in the streets in the US, in NY or Miami or elsewhere, you hear people speak Creole and automatically, wow, you’re so connected. Now with French I don’t get this kind of connection. In poetry, you read Creole in poetry. It’s an incredible language and I think this is where we need to begin. If we start there and you want to *include* everybody so you can have everyone participating in this development then you have to use the language people are comfortable with, that they understand, that they know. [Yet] now you’re passing laws, you’re making business decisions [in French]. Who do we do business with mostly now? The US! So why are we still with French. English is better than French in terms of our [inaudible]. The majority of the diaspora is in the US. If it’s not going to be Creole it’s going to be English more-so than French. Language is a big issue and we have to really face

that.”

Esther, who’s lived in the United States since she was 17 years old, was in agreement saying,

“From within, we can’t reconcile it from within. Our children who are learning right now, their school books are still in French but we are trying to teach them in Creole. They develop a real complex about it because there are certain environments where when they go in they will expect them to speak French but we were telling them that they should only speak Creole. We really need to reconcile it at home. Are we going to have French as our official language or are we going to go ahead and [inaudible]?”

4b. Haitian Civil Society

Haitian civil society was considered by participants to be the lifeblood of the nation. They expounded on the purpose and role of civil society in relation to the Haitian government and nonprofit organizations. They also shared examples of Haitian civil society’s successes and challenges in participating in the redevelopment discussion.

In his correspondence, Raul, a grassroots activists focused on agriculture wrote, “It needs to be the Haitians who help the country advance.” That meant using allowing Haitians to guide the rebuilding efforts, which wasn’t being seen by Jelsen. “We can still do an evaluation and we’ll see that the population is rejecting the projects currently underway. They don’t have a voice, they don’t see themselves. Eleven billion isn’t for them, it’s for the multinationalists and international entities. You’ll see almost nothing of that will stay in the country,” he remarked, adding, “ when you see the way in which these plans were created, they left no place for the Haitian population to participate and

have a say.” Daniel, a Haitian-American noted something similar. “[Haitian] people are voicing their support for less outside government in the formulation of the national redevelopment plan. They say ‘We want Haitians to be leading that effort’ They insist that such plan has to reflect the real needs of the masses. Therefore Haitians should lead the initiatives.”

Part of the problem is “despite all their efforts, the way that Haitian organizations work together is not really satisfactory.” Josette, a government employee shared, “Haitians have a lot of their own associations, like youth associations, and a lot have their own nonprofits. It’s not like its a society that doesn’t *gather* as a community.” Meeting was one thing though, being unified was another. Marie said, “We need to know how to speak from one organ, with one voice.” Andrew shared a similar assessment, “For organizations [of civil society] it’s been a wake up call. But we find that there are parts of civil society that there isn’t any exchange between them, there isn’t any cooperation between them, there isn’t direction, there isn’t a common vision.” He concluded, “It’s the division that ruins us. We are not poor.” He reiterated, “Let’s start from the fact that Haiti isn’t poor. Rather, its division that keeps us back.” His organization therefore appeals to Haitian civil society to “choose the path to peace, put yourselves together rather than fight each other, put aside violence, stop the political violence that just brings about destruction rather than building up the nation.” He firmly believes in “organize[ing] the civil society to be the force of change. Change in Haiti will come from the civil society.”

Andrew said regrettably of Haiti’s past, “If we had a strong civil

society, one that thinks, we would have resolved the problem that I've already talked to you about - the failure of traditional powers, that is, the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government." And "that is the problem," said Josué, "...we're never aware of what they're [government] doing. And since we're never aware, we don't do anything and we can't hold them accountable. That's definitely a problem. The public should be in the know in order to offer support; the population must be a part of it." Attendees at the community meeting wanted to "have a vision, have an organized civil society, and have a civil society that has recommendations/propositions so that we can then influence the actors that make the decisions [whoever takes office]."

Former elected government official Jude commented, "Developing the nation doesn't have to come from the top, it could also come from *la base* [society itself]." He believed vulnerabilities in Haitian society were "exacerbated by society's stifled voice." Virginia said her organization, a diaspora/grassroots/-foreign hybrid, considered it their purpose to "strengthen civil society in Haiti as a necessary foundation for democracy and development." Her assertion was that Haitian society isn't helpless she asserted. Through their work in rural areas she noted how immediately after the earthquake,

"they [rural Haitians] were the first ones to give them [Haitians from affected areas] food, water, shelter, all of those things. And they recognized that their being organized is what empowered them to help their fellow citizens. And then on top of that they see that getting more organized can only strengthen their movement and their desires for the future."

"If you are going to bring change to Haiti," said Marie, "you have to

look at the civil society.” According to Elsie, “They [Haitians] want to take the country in their own hands. They want to show government that they can and they have power to and they can do something when they [government] don’t respond to their needs when they should be responding to their needs.”

Daniel relayed from his time on the ground in Haiti, “They [Haitians] think that the spreading, or proliferation of NGOs should be slowed down. At least a little bit in exchange for more partnerships among them to avoid duplication of services and waste of resources.” As for this concern about NGOs, Elsie said, “I think it’s up to the people to create the mechanisms to hold NGOs accountable.” Josué listed the key players for Haiti’s redevelopment saying, “Its with Haitians and investments and Haitian government, and the civil society, and the private sector and the help of the international community, [that] yes, we’ll have development. Not with the NGOs. With them we’ll just get a school, a health clinic, things that won’t last very long.”

Josué is convinced that “when we have a problem, we should solve them together.” For Jean, a Haitian lawyer, his grassroots organization was “always working to find out how we can better the situation of the nation and Haitians in general.” Having brought diverse groups of people together, they’re now “trying to come up with a list of key solutions... And those ideas that are still in the reflection stage we are working to finalize and will be ready to be presented and discussed at the congress [being planned]. We hope that that will spur movement and change.”

Marie couldn’t see Haitians coming together unless people put aside

their egos. “*Le moi?* Like a deep ego? It’s like, ‘It has to be me and if it’s not me, it won’t happen.’ How can that *be?* How can that *be?* In the face of so much *suffering*, so much *hunger*, so much *despair?* Who are *we?* Who can we pretend to be that we would support all of these things? To me it’s just a big puzzle” She continued, “There is no point of denying you your strength and your ability because it has to be me, me, me, me, me, me, me. It can be *us.*” Andrew agrees. “What Haiti needs aren’t chefs,” he said. Likewise Bernel stated,

“A lot of people here or abroad... they think the way they can help Haiti is by becoming president or having a top job. You don’t necessarily need to be in the top job to do that kind of stuff. Because Haiti needs help everywhere, at every level. Too many chiefs and not enough Indians. You don’t need to be a chief to do something. You can be an Indian and do your part. If you do it well, you can share it and help those down. Take orders and know how to do what you do very well. I guess that’s one thing that comes to mind. We all don’t have to be in charge to have a significant impact.”

Theme 5. International Interference

Participants discussed incidences of international interference, for better or worse, in Haiti’s social, economic, environmental, and political arenas. Some spoke directly to the “messiah” complex of some NGOs and the friend/foe relationship between Haiti and the United States. Other participants verbalized the need for NGO accountability to the Haitian government and the Haitian people.

5a. The Hand that Gives is Always Above the Hand that Receives

Several participants addressed the international policies that promise economic development but leave Haiti worse off than before. Interviewees also

highlighted the tendency to shape development projects to fit the needs of international markets rather than Haiti's best interests. Comments represented in this subtheme came from one government employee, three hybrid (diaspora/-grassroots, diaspora/foreign, diaspora/grassroots/foreign), three foreign, and two grassroots organizations. Statements from community meeting attendees are also captured by the sub-theme.

Jelsen, program director for a political grassroots organization said, "In all the American plans, what we do find? We have outlined uses of Haiti that would respond to and feed the American market." Marie, a Haitian-American, noted with sadness, "[There has been] United States policy that ha[s] not been really good toward Haiti. The pig thing, the embargo, and even their fruit company in the early 20th century in Haiti, maybe even sooner. There was a lot of abuse. In fact, you know what happened? It's like people see their interest first, no matter what they do." Josette, who previously worked for a big NGO and is currently a government employee, said,

"It's the international policy towards Haiti that killed our agriculture. That was the big purpose so that [the U.S. could] regain food security. How is it that in a country like Haiti, we're importing rice from [the U.S.]? President Clinton apologized for that. If you boost your own farmers with subsidies after subsidies and flood a country with your middle market price products, this is going to kill the economy in the host country. And that's what happened to Haiti. With the pigs in the 80s and the rice in the 2000s."

Tom, an American, noted with disappointment, "Our government has done this. Sometimes its with the best of intentions and sometimes - I get a little cynical sometimes and think that they're also propping up like the American rice

market or whatever it is, these different markets by buying these things and turning around and essentially giving it away, artificially pumping the American market.” He added, “We also have trade barriers on importing things that keep them from selling some of these basic food products in the US market... Our government and its policies are contributing to keeping Haiti from developing by doing these kinds of things.”

Tom went on to say,

“That’s what keeps happening and its no surprise then that things don’t change. Here’s billions of dollars coming in, why don’t things change? Well, how is it being spent, you know? You gotta pay attention to that. We’re [American public] just mostly ignorant is what it comes down to and so it requires an educational element.”

Marie was upset that “it’s not Haitians leading Haiti, it’s the international community.” Jensen said, “There are no shortages of projects from the UNESCO, the U.S. government, multilateral corporations - all these projects were failures which explains why the situation in Haiti is the way it is today.” Leo shared that Haiti “spend[s] so much time in talks with foreign people who want to take Haiti in a different direction, develop Haiti in their own way with no clue what the culture is about and in every instance it doesn’t work. What we’re going to end up doing is tear it all down to rebuild it again.” Foreign policy-makers don’t really know Haiti, argues Marie, yet policies

“are being enacted *on behalf of* Haiti. And that is such a huge loss for the country. Because if you don’t know me, if you don’t know where I’m aching, if you don’t really know what’s going on with me, how can you decide you’re going to treat me? You understand? If you’re going to make a diagnosis of what my ailment is to make a prescription, I

don't say no, but how are you going to do it if you're not...you understand? There is so much that has to be done in the place of those policies.”

In Jelsen's view, “Today there is a [development] model that is in place, not because the Haitian population has chosen it, but [because] the actors that push the neoliberal model of development are powerful.” Neoliberalism also came up in Josette's interview. She elaborated how it was applied in Haiti:

“Through Latin America and through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, there has been a big push for lowering trade barriers and import tariffs. Because the free market for others is god in [the U.S.], [however] the free market for U.S. farmers does not exist, ok? So you lower your trade barriers, there is no barrier to enter into your market. Parallel to that farmers in Arkansas, Louisiana, wherever get *huge* subsidies to keep producing. So they keep producing although the cost of production of their rice is unmarketable if they don't have assistance and they're able to export it. So the exporting rice countries... have no barriers to that export and so it floods the market.”

Running alongside multilateral efforts were U.S. policies disguised as

“so-called foreign assistance [and] gets in through nonprofits and their food security programs. Food security programs are oftentimes through USAID and Food for Peace, financed by a mechanism called monetization... Basically taking rice for instance or wheat, produced in the U.S, selling it and using that money to finance development projects. It's all about supporting the farm industry in the U.S.... Look into Department of Agriculture website, their foreign assistance services, it's called SAS and it's all about supporting U.S. agriculture, which makes sense, but when you pretend that you're helping another country when your clear goal and clearly stated goal is to support US farmers, it doesn't fully equate. You can't have both. The only way to have both is to have a really free market or have a fair market. When you say you have a free market but your own market is completely subsidized, that's not free.”

Contrary to popular perception, as far as 37-year-old Josué is

concerned, “The NGOs aren’t here for that [develop the nation] and will never be. The NGOs are not here to develop the country and create any type of development. Never.” Also a grassroots organizer, Jelsen’s organization

“believe[s] in order for a country to develop freely, it must be independent of other countries. Sadly we have a country that, our Haiti, is a country that is controlled by a number of powerful countries. But this has been the story of our nation, actually. Since colonization, down through several different occupations, notably like the US occupation in 1915, then again in 1991 after the *coup d’etat*. And a number of missions and occupations from the UN, 1911 - 1916 and you’ll see sadly, another occupation by the MINUSTAH, that we’re under even today.”

Leo isn’t a fan of the UN either. “Forget about the UN. Get the UN outta there... Current UN have been there for enough years and we’re still experiencing problems with security,” he said decisively.

Jelsen isn’t impressed with the international pledges of financial assistance for Haiti’s reconstruction effort. “When they announce 11 billion to help Haiti, those funds are not intended for the Haitian people through socio-politico-economic movements,” he contends. The funds would somehow find their way into the pockets of American contractors as Tom noted, “There are for-profits that can build homes and build schools and do this kind of thing. They come from the States and they’re looking for business in this economic downturn.” At the community meeting one attendee remarked, “What the international community would never do in their own nations, they come and do it here. And all the while we continue to have the international community call the shots we’ll have these sorts of problems.” Another shared, “All I know is, when the international

community gets involved, [inaudible]. The international community plays a role in the division of the country.”

Virginia, a 26 -year-old American noted, “It’s been kinda the idea that you can go into Haiti, especially the international organizations that don’t necessarily have these Haitian ties, they’ll come in and think ‘Oh, we can build a school,’ or ‘We’ll give some people some money,’ or ‘We’ll supply them with clothes’ or whatever it is and ‘That will be the fix.’ And that’s not really been developing the country or the community as a whole.” Tom shared,

“You have to get that you’re interfering. No matter what. Just being present and opening your mouth and doing something, you’re kind of interfering. There is sort of a ying-yang to all of that. It’s not however, positive [as] you might think it is. We’re unconscious to the other aspect of how we’re received, what we think is a great idea [has] impact on people. And they are in a place where it’s not the same language, not the same culture, you think it’s simple and they don’t think that way, because they are of a different mindset.”

But the problem, he says, is that “people are motivated so selfishly. ‘I know better’ and ‘I want the power because I know better’ and its so ego-driven, it’s pathetic. Rather than saying ‘Ok, so what would you do’ and if you think that’s a good suggestion let’s discuss it.” He concludes, “The motivation as far as I’m concerned is nothing other than pure ego in various forms. Whether its money, power, being right, or whatever. It has no contribution whatsoever to making it a better situation.”

Forty-six -year-old Haitian-American Leo points out fervidly,

“If you look at who’s involved in this thing, you have an international community, you have the Clintons in this

thing, so who's making decisions for Haiti? Even with the structure of this co-chair development, I mean, what kind of crap is that? How can you, you are an independent country, *free* for all these years, and then you have a co-chair for development? This is like saying, 'You can't take care of your own affairs'... And then of course, it's because the international community is promising to give Haiti all this money, but where is the money? Up to date a very small amount has been collected... [then] what's going to happen? They're [international community] going to lose faith in Haiti. They're going to say 'Well, these Haitians can't do anything for themselves' But the money is not really coming to Haiti, you see?"

Daniel, a Haitian-American, left one foreign nonprofit for another because he "wanted to divorce from the routine where people just go there and do business as usual without taking into consideration they have to change their strategies in the ways of doing things. We see results don't get me wrong, we see results but most of the time these results that we see, they are accidents," he said laughing, "...it's not an actual result of vision in the beginning."

He continued,

"For instance, when they lend some money to Haiti or [other] developing countries, they send technicians from nationalities all around the world to *come and dictate to you* how to spend the money, which program it should go to, and they will tell exactly who you should hire to do the job. Is that sustainable development? I don't think so. The initiative carries its own germs of degeneration."

Along those same lines, Bernel, a Haitian-American, shared,

"One thing that's been going on in the past and a lot of people are starting to get wise about it - someone just goes down there and starts doing their own thing without any kind of local input and once their money runs out they pack up their stuff and go back to where they came from."

Paul, an American minister also noted that "there are still prejudices in

America that are deep-seated” toward Haiti. Daniel likewise noted this fact saying, “U.S. foreign policy is tainted with racism.” The “ethnocentrism” of aid Able considered just as disastrous as paternalism. “We go in, we do everything according to what my ethnicity is used to. I look through my rose-colored glasses and do things according to what I’m used to. And we do that without asking the people ‘How would you like to see it done?’”

According to Josette, the purpose of “foreign policy is to keep a state weak so that you can have an influence and a say in what happens there and you can distort trade [to] comparative advantages to benefit your own [country]... We often look at the NGOs as the culprits but they are getting USAID money for a reason. Foreign bilateral aid goes to private entities for a reason. It’s not out of the blue.” Andrew believes aid isn’t the issue but the degrading *type* of aid offered to Haiti which he feels exemplifies “the arrogance of the international community.” He added, “You know that the hand that gives is always above the hand that receives.”

5b. NGOs: Une Cacophonie la Plus Totale

Here, participants describe the good works and intentions of many NGOs as well as the shortcomings and pitfalls of Haiti’s NGO-heavy society and their effects on redevelopment.

The proliferation of NGOs, specifically international NGOs, in Haiti was considered the island’s conundrum. While there were many more comments about the negative results of NGOs in Haiti, there were a few that acknowledged the helpful assistance they’ve offered. Josué, who was one of the founding members

of his 9 -year-old grassroots organization, admitted,

“We can’t say that there haven’t been relief of some situations for certain families, particular people, some sectors of the population or *en province* [rural areas], particularly after the earthquake. Yes, they brought their support in a time when we as a Haitian society did not have the capacity. If it weren’t for the international community we don’t know where we would be following the earthquake. So yes, they definitely helped. They can bring help. Aid, yes, can do some things.”

While thankful, he was clear “that with this type of aid one cannot develop Haiti.”

He went on to further clarify that “there are NGOs who are really helping but there are fictitious NGOs who are purely virtual. But the ones that do good work are few.” Equally cautious about his praise of NGOs was Able, an American whose organization focused on agricultural development. “There are some solid rock programs going that are working with the people. Getting the people to do their own evaluating and resolving the problems,” he shared.

Josué noted how there were many “mafia” in the nonprofit world. He explained that a mafia nonprofit is “an institution that puts together projects just to get funds but do nothing.” He added that “those that are really doing something have a hard time getting funding because funding is taken up by mafia institutions.”

Andrew, a 58 -year-old civil society activist, could hardly contain his indignation,

“First of all, don’t tell me that the NGOs are going to develop the country. Don’t tell me that. And no, that was neither the Haitian thought nor their reality, don’t tell me that either. That’s a flat lie. And don’t think either that Haitians believe foreigners will come and develop the

country. That's not true either... The NGOs have destroyed the nation. They have, in some cases, helped Haitians to survive but they are also stumbling blocks that keep the people from progressing. When they come, they come to make a lot of money... I worked in the department of the Ministry of ——— [and] I have to tell you, that the typical Haitian salary cannot compete with that of the NGOs. NGOs pay Haitians 5X more to do less. And the NGOs work in *une cacophonie la plus totale* [total cacophony].”

He couldn't decide which was worse, giving funds to the Haitian government or giving funds to the NGOs.

“The international community's response is to bypass the Haitian government, and maybe they're right about that, and [instead] give the funds to NGOs. [But] you give the funds to NGOs who work in isolation and in a cacophonous manner. If you work in the country and I don't talk to you, I don't know what you're doing, and there's a government in place, the result is as if there is a multiplicity of governments in one country! So you can imagine...”

Andrew had much more to say on the topic. “The foreigners also come here with an arrogance. For example, they take Bill Clinton and they propel him to the summit of an organization,” he noted, visibly insulted. He explained his objection. “I believe Bill Clinton could have been a tremendous help if he had accepted to be within the organization and not the chief. He's taken a huge risk. Knowing my country, he's going to fail. Knowing my country, he will fail. And I know he has good intentions,” he said and repeated with certitude, “He will fail. He will fail because he doesn't have the culture.”

Tom, an American, believed the “major faults in existing aid work is that it falls into relief work. Without continual funding from originating sources the project dies.” He noted how “a lot of them, lucky for them, have a lot of money

but they have a commitment to spend this money and its not always a commitment to spend it in a way that they [Haitians] perceive that this development works because they need to tell their funders ‘Look at all the good things we’ve done.’”

Peter, an American publisher, was puzzled at the short-sightedness of some NGO work. “They just say ‘We’re going to fill up these 100,000 houses and they last for 5 years and then the people deal with it from that point forward.’ It won’t last five years. It’ll last until the first big storm and then it’s a disaster again,” he said perplexed. Josette, a government employee offered an explanation.

“The government says, ‘The size of the new houses should be’ and I forgot, but let’s say ‘16 square feet or 20 square feet’, I don’t have the exact figures, but the NGOs want to make it 12 square feet. Well, why do you want to cram? Why not do it well now? Why do you want to cram people in the one room house they had before? And the reason is then they can say ‘We built 10,000 houses’ as opposed to ‘We built 7,000 houses,’ which is what a bigger size would mean.”

She added that funds go

“to nonprofits which do not have the capacity to spend it, do not necessarily want to spend it where it needs to be spent according to government plans, who do not want to cooperate, and who just want to replenish their coffers so that they can stay in business in Haiti. Because it is a business. It’s a business of helping, but it’s a business. They want to stay afloat; they want to stay alive as well.”

Former 25-year civil servant Samuel saw no results for which so much funding has been disbursed. “Those that give funds don’t ask for results, they money is spent but what are the results?” he asked. Likewise Jean, a 28 -year-old Haitian, observed, “There were a lot of NGOs here with tons of money but were

not at all effective in their work.”

Participants gave examples of how aid was insensitive to the local economies and needs. “There should have been a time when the government says, ‘Enough with distributing free goods because it is destroying national production...’ NGOs brought tons of imported rice, namely *Diri Tchako* [U.S. rice] which competes with national production,” said former government employee Jude. “...When I was on the ground I saw for the most part... in my times driving in the city or touring other cities, [that] there were nonprofits stationed everywhere. They rented out the nicest homes, they paid top dollar for them, paid top dollar for the best rental cars, which caused a hike in housing, a hike in transportation. So people who couldn’t afford homes or transportation [before] now can’t afford a mortgage because of these nonprofits,” shared Haitian-American Elsie. Josette shared similar observations,

“[NGO presence is] completely distorting the local markets. Haitians cannot find housing. There is already no housing and the little housing that is left is rented out to nonprofits at exorbitant prices. And you can’t blame the house owner who have lost a bunch of stuff already in a devastat[ed] country to want to rent their house for \$5,000, ‘cause that’s all they can get *but* it crowds out the Haitian middle class, as tiny as it is already.”

Faith-based organizations did not escape criticism. Paul, whose faith-based ministry has been working in the education sector in Haiti for six years related this story:

“[There was a] man I saw cultivating rice in ———. All *by hand*. Tremendous amount of intensive labor, no machinery, by hand. About a 2 acre rice field. That’s great! The man works all season. And he’s almost ready to bring in his crop

[when] a tractor-trailer comes to his village. It's a Christian group and they push 10 tons of rice off the back of the truck. Now that man who's been working to try and feed himself and his nation, you just killed his crop because he's not going to be able to sell his crop to *anybody*. Why would anybody buy his rice when they can get it free from the Christians?"

Faith-based or not, Josette couldn't envision progress while all the NGOs, in such great numbers, were in Haiti. "I defy anyone to name a country that doesn't have a strong public institution. A country is not developed by NGOs, a country is developed by the State! And the State fosters civil society, but if there are no State services and there is no government, you don't have a developed country. Ever. That's where we are."

Participants also noted a lone ranger culture of sorts among NGOs.

Martine, an American foreign organization employee who moved to Haiti shortly after the earthquake, said

"Some organizations work in their own silos. Every organization has a different mandate, different vision, different mission. Depending, a lot of them are very similar. Some are a little different and their ways of working are different. Sometimes you don't have an agency coordinating with you. So if there is an [another] agency working where you're working, that lack of collaboration causes a problem."

She shares an example of the complication that can occur. "So let's say if they're building latrines but it's not to [inaudible] standards to how latrines should be built. They have to be decommissioned and then people don't have latrines," she said. Marie has seen a similar problem saying, "Everybody is separate and everybody is reinventing the wheel." Virginia, a 26-year-old American who

works for a diaspora/grassroots/foreign nonprofit, shared, “[On the] organizational level of the NGOs and governments and the UN – [there has been] disorganization and really not knowing what the right and left hand are doing,” she relayed. Jensen felt organizations had the tendency to “build a fort around their project” rather than work in collaboration with others. Tom, another American, admitted that his organization didn’t “interact with a lot of organizations” - foreign organizations, that is. He works exclusively in close partnership however, with grassroots organizations and at times also with the Haitian government.

Peter, whose organization facilitates coordination between various Christian groups in Haiti said, “Most are one man operations when you get to looking at it.” He wishes they would collaborate more but finds that a “number of NGOs [are] working on their own, doing their own little thing, trying to help in one little area of expertise or geographical area, but no interaction between the various groups or cross-pollination.” He said their “overall mentality was ‘whatever we’ve mapped out as our ‘beach front’, sorta speak, we’re going to do it all ourselves.’”

Some participants offered two possible explanations for the “silo” mentality of NGOs. Peter was of the opinion that NGOs “are all very jealous of their membership and their funding base and so forth” which is why they don’t collaborate more often. Marie agreed, “It is *extremely* difficult to do serious fundraising” and so the competition is fierce. Due to the difficulties of securing funding, Maxime opted to create a social venture instead of a nonprofit. “There are 10,000 nonprofits in Haiti. We looked at the donation movement in Haiti and

we looked at the way they make money... [we] opted not to be that type of company waiting.” Likewise, Bernel, another Haitian-American entrepreneur noted “aid, grants, or donations are really uneven. One year you might get \$10,000 and you’re very happy but the next year you might get one or two dollars and you cry and say ‘How are we going to keep this going?’”

5c. You Untie the Hands to Tie the Feet

Participants voiced their discontent with the false benevolence offered to Haiti. They shared how the personal interests of donor countries and aid corporations came masked in public displays of solidarity and condition-laden financial assistance.

“State entities are not forthcoming despite pledges in the billions. Only 10-15% pledged have been dispersed to the government of Haiti so far,” said government employee Josette. “[It] is fake assistance when you say ‘We’re going to help you’ but you untie the hands to tie the feet,” she remarked. Jelsen, a Haitian who studied political science, expressed that the pledged “11 billion have nothing to do with newer strategies [of development],” rather, most of it will return to donor countries. “The Americans are said to have spent more than 1 billion in Haiti to date [after the earthquake]. But more than 65% goes to their own troops. All these are obstacles [to development],” he pointed out. Josué, a Jacmel, Haiti native, similarly shared,

“When they give 1 million dollars to Haiti, they say Haiti has a million dollars. And they send experts, foreigners - sometimes it’s not even real, good experts... they’re not really experts, because at times we find Haitians who are truly the experts compared to those they send us here in

Haiti. And these people, they have maybe, out of the million, they receive 30-45,000 per month. So the million arrives and returns to the donors. And there may be \$200,000, that actually stays, for Haiti. And that's a reality."

Daniel, a Haitian-American, was bothered by the strings attached to aid. "When they give you the donation, it's aid, it comes with a bunch of these tricky obligations that you're supposed to go with," he said. Raul, a grassroots animator, who once worked for a foreign NGO, wrote, "he that gives [the funds] determines the use [of funds]. And aid is always tied to conditions." He called it "masked aid" in which industrialized nations "give with the left hand only to take with the right" through logistics costs such as salaries for foreign experts and supplies.

It came down to foreigners making money, expressed some participants. Andrew, a civil society activist said, "There are a lot of people who come to make money [in Haiti]." After the earthquake, Andrew shared that he met an Italian who came from the Italian branch of an NGO already present in Haiti. "Imagine that an Italian comes from ——— Italy after the earthquake. There is already ——— Haiti [branch] and other ——— [branches]. And he comes with his wife, two children, in a country that is in the shape that Haiti is in now?!" he asked incredulously, "Why?" He was sad to report, "there is money being made on the back of Haitians' misery. And they make even more money because the government has not taken up their leadership role. At the community meeting, one attendee made the observation that "Foreigners come to take from Haiti, not to develop it." Josette feels the same way. "As foreigners are looting us, we have to look to our own [diaspora] to help."

Old and New Development Thinking

Two interview questions were used to ask participants to identify on the degree to which they see old development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti (Appendix C, question 7) and to what degree they see new thinking or approaches to development being created (question 9). Due to the small sample size, only descriptive statistics were performed. Table 16 depicts responses to question 7. Many participants, 9 of 22, across entities believed old development thinking or approaches were “not at all” being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti. Six of the 22 participants replied they “haven’t noticed” whether or not old development thinking or approaches were presently being abandoned or reframed.

Table 16. Entity Type and Old Approach/Thinking Being Abandoned/Reframed

| Entity Type | not at all | not so much | some-what | large degree | haven’t noticed | did not respond | Total |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| diaspora/grassroots nonprofits | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| grassroots nonprofit | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 |
| government agency | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| foreign nonprofit | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 7 |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign nonprofit | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| diaspora social venture | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| diaspora/foreign nonprofit | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| diaspora nonprofit | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 9 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 22 |

Table 17 depicts responses to question 7 based upon whether participants

were Haitian, Haitian-American, or American. Haitian-Americans most often replied “not at all.” Six participants say they “haven’t noticed.”

Table 17. Participant and Old Approach/Thinking Being Abandoned/Reframed

| Haitian, Haitian-American, American | not at all | not so much | somewhat | large degree | haven’t noticed | did not respond | Total |
|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------|----------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| Haitian | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 9 |
| Haitian-American | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 7 |
| American | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Total | 9 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 22 |

Table 18 reveals responses to question 9. Most participants (8 of 22) across entities believed new development thinking or approaches were “somewhat” being created. One interviewee responded “between 3 and 4”.

Table 18. Entity Type and New Development Thinking or Approach

| Entity Type | not at all | not so much | somewhat | 3.5 | large degree | haven’t noticed | did not respond | Total |
|---------------------------------------|------------|-------------|----------|-----|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| diaspora/grassroots nonprofits | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| grassroots nonprofit | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 |
| government agency | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| foreign nonprofit | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| diaspora/grassroots/foreign nonprofit | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| diaspora social venture | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| diaspora/foreign nonprofit | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| diaspora nonprofit | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total | 3 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 22 |

Table 19 shows responses to question 9 based on whether participants were Haitian, Haitian-American, or American. Haitian-Americans most often replied “somewhat” to new development thinking or approaches being created.

Table. 19. Participant and New Development Thinking or Approach

| Haitian, Haitian-American, American | not at all | not so much | somewhat | 3.5 | large degree | haven't noticed | did not respond | Total |
|-------------------------------------|------------|-------------|----------|-----|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------|
| Haitian | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| Haitian-American | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| American | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Total | 3 | 4 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 22 |

Chapter 6

DISCUSSION

Assisted development is the process that helps individuals within a community gain the skills necessary to help themselves and to become self-sufficient without relying on the support of outside helping organisms, which are ultimately destined to depart from the community. Assisted development, not charity is the answer to Haiti's development crisis. Since the birth of the island republic, the foundation for nation-building – human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals – have been exploited by the Haitian elite, political officials, and foreign policies toward Haiti. This groundwork not having been firmly established, Haiti has been made increasingly vulnerable in ways that do not permit the country to absorb shocks resulting from financial, institutional, environmental, and social instabilities. Therefore, the call for a refoundation of the Haitian State by some participants in this study is fundamentally essential, urgent, and overdue.

In this study, discussions surrounding the vulnerability of post-earthquake Haiti varied by participant but not necessarily by entity. Participants from all entities (grassroots, diaspora, hybrid, government agency, social venture and foreign entities) found common ground on a number of themes that emerged from the analysis of interview transcripts. That being said, some participants representing certain entities shared more on certain topics than participants from other entities. For example, Josette, being a government employee, offered a more balanced take on the Haitian government's performance. Likewise, participants

who were members of the Haitian diaspora had more to relate regarding the diaspora's role in Haiti's redevelopment than other participants.

One explanation for the relative harmony of participant perspectives might be that the focus of this study attracted volunteers to participate that held similar perspectives in reference to Haiti and its development issues, regardless of place of birth, nationality, or organizational affiliation. Additionally, several participants had previous experience working for more than one entity type, adding multidimensionality to their perspectives. Raul, a Les Cayes, Haiti native, once worked for a foreign NGO but now works for a grassroots organization. Josette, who currently works for the Haitian government, used to work for a large international NGO. Daniel, although now employed with foreign nonprofit, used to work for the Haitian government. Also to be recognized was the potential influence of partner organizations upon participant perceptions. For example, some foreign nonprofits, like Tom's, worked exclusively with grassroots organizations. By virtue of being founded, funded, and headquartered outside of Haiti, Tom's nonprofit was classified as a foreign nonprofit. However, because of the close ties with grassroots organizations in Haiti, Tom had very similar views to some Haitian grassroots participants.

Some diaspora participant responses, perhaps because of the years they have spent in the United States, may have at times reflected a very American perspective on development. For example, one diaspora participant from a hybrid organization said education should be made available to all Haitians so they "can compete at any level that they want so that they can reach their full potential. So

they can own their own homes, drive their own cars, and be a modern place, very eco-friendly...” After hearing these comments, the researcher was prompted to record in a journal entry that said it is “impossible to have everyone driving their own car and have the society be eco-friendly. Diaspora superimposing American development views on Haiti?”

While participant opinions concerning redevelopment were in many ways similar, their unique backgrounds gave a singularity to their perspectives. Several lessons for moving the nation toward a refoundation can be extracted from the participant interviews. What follows are the insights that answer the study’s eight research questions (see Appendix A).

Research Question A

In response to the first research question, “What are the redevelopment frameworks or thinking emerging in your entity?” the majority of participants believed that the way their organization approached development worked well. They believed there was no need to change either their thinking about how to approach development or the way they proceeded with their projects. Some participants noted their organization were still in relief mode. Occupied principally with providing basic needs and services to those displaced by the earthquake, there were no redevelopment frameworks emerging from their organization.

Of the entities in this study, one, a social venture created shortly after the earthquake, was applying a new redevelopment model. This venture focused on expanding Haiti’s overlooked and undervalued middle market as a way of

strengthening the nation's financial, social, and human capitals. According to this participant, a narrow understanding of Haiti's markets exacerbated Haiti's economic and social vulnerabilities. Presently, the economic pie is dominated by elite-owned monopolies with a small sliver representing small microfinance/microcredit-funded businesses. To augment the number of mid-size business entrepreneurs, increase disposable income, and provide a new source of funds for social projects, this social venture organization is providing start-up capital, business education, access to networks, and mentorship for aspiring Haitian entrepreneurs. Couched within their model is the active participation of the Haitian diaspora to "reverse the onset of brain drain virtually" in the hopes that one day "we're going to see a lot of these diaspora going back to Haiti physically and starting their business."

Research Question B

When asked "To what degree are traditional development frameworks or thinking being abandoned or reframed?," many participants replied that traditional development frameworks were still being applied and were not at all being abandoned or reframed. One participant noted that there was a pervading emphasis on having market vendors sell foreign-produced goods rather than expanding local production of goods and services. He believed that with such heavy reliance on foreign products, the Haitian economy "won't budge." Other participants noted that as was its custom before the earthquake, the Haitian government was waiting for donations and directions from the international community before taking action. According to one participant this was the most

significant and prevailing traditional development framework. He was of the opinion that the “belief that the injection of a major donation in the billions for instance, will solve all the problems in Haiti... [is a] mentality [that] has affected the government itself [and] has crippled the drive and effort to become less dependent on foreign aid.” Other participants observed past development projects that created industries that served international markets (such as garment assembly) were being reintroduced as viable development options. Such emphasis on feeding external markets rather than bolstering local markets to meet local needs makes Haiti vulnerable to external market shocks well outside of Haiti’s control.

Research Question C

Many participants replied “somewhat” to the third research question, “To what degree are new frameworks or thinking being created in other organizations?” Of those participants who responded “somewhat”, some said other organizations were still in relief mode and their primary focus at the moment was to provide basic needs and services to those displaced by the earthquake. Other participants thought the repackaging of old development projects could itself be considered as new redevelopment frameworks or thinking being created. Several participants said new frameworks or thinking were “not at all” being created or “not so much.”

One participant wants those in charge of rebuilding to “think big” and have a “much larger” vision when it comes to the “building – not rebuilding” of the nation. He believes planning should reflect a long-term development strategy

and not just simply meet the immediate needs of the people. Others wanted the government in particular to have a grand vision for Haiti and to communicate that vision clearly to the Haitian masses. Many participants wanted to the government to outline what they envisioned Haiti to be in the next 5, 10, 50 years and how they propose to meet these short and long term development goals.

Research Question D

In response to the question “How are new frameworks focused on helping to minimize the vulnerabilities of Haitian society?,” most participants reported there were no truly new frameworks to speak of. One social venture participant’s work, as previously discussed, did seek to address Haiti’s social and economic vulnerabilities through the creation of mid-market entrepreneurial ventures.

Research Question E

The SL framework recognizes that sustainable development happens as a result of relationships. In this light, this research question asked participants to share some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between entities. Challenges to collaboration included organizational “silo” mentality, lack of follow-through, and difficulties working with the Haitian government. Participants noted a “silo” mentality among many nonprofits where collaboration with others was avoided. One participant said nonprofits were in the habit of “carving out their own little areas” and “working on their own, doing their own thing, trying to help in one little area of expertise or geographical area but [there is] not interaction between the various groups or cross-pollination.” This lack of collaboration and lack of communication between organizations causes a

duplication of services and lends to the unnecessary proliferation of NGOs on the island. Several participants noted that even when collaboration between nonprofits was agreed upon, lack of follow-through brought an end to the collaborative effort. The third challenge, working with the Haitian government, was one that especially frustrated several participants – particularly those from grassroots nonprofits. One participant from a grassroots nonprofit believed change in Haiti could “only happen through relationships” which is why his organization continues to reach out to the government despite little success. “If you have a project and you go and share it with them, it just sits there. If you have an event and you invite a government representative, they don’t come.”

Conversely, some organizations have had success collaborating with the Haitian government. One participant, from a grassroots/diaspora/foreign hybrid organization who has had success in collaborating with the Haitian government admitted that it was a struggle, but one worth fighting for. This organization made it a part of their policy to keep local government officials informed of the projects they were undertaking in the region. This show of respect for the sovereignty of the local government’s jurisdiction was rewarded in the form of open communication and collaboration with this local government office. Another victory of collaborative efforts between entities was evident in the growing inter-entity partnerships that seemed to be springing up, albeit not in large numbers. Some participants conceded they did not know if this was a trend that was going to stay or if it was being used as a strategy to share resources in a tight global economy.

Research Question F

Responses to the sixth research question, “What do entities perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti’s redevelopment?” fell into one of two categories: internal and external barriers. Internal barriers are those found within Haiti itself. External barriers are those that stem from the international community and have implications in Haiti. Participants considered government corruption as being a major internal barrier to Haiti’s redevelopment. Much of Haiti’s future is dependent upon the creation of a strong and sovereign national government. Cultural dysfunctions, some with roots reaching as far back as Haiti’s colonial times, were another internal barrier. Participants noted how social distrust and division, for example, hampered progress. Trust and mutual support play critical roles in development according to the SL framework. If there is to be a refoundation of Haiti, cultural dysfunctions that gnaw away at the nation’s social capital must be addressed. Several participants noted their entity’s efforts to “change the mindset of the people” and to bring about a “transformation of the Haitian psyche” in this regard. Lack of political leadership was also cited as an internal barrier to redevelopment as was the absence of a shared vision for the nation. Lastly, the lack of a comprehensive development framework leaves Haitians with no idea of what is to come of their nation’s future.

Impatience on the part of the international community with the Haitian development process was identified by participants as an external barrier to redevelopment. This phenomenon was closely related to lack of commitment, another barrier cited by participants. Development is a process, not a destination

and as such will take time. Impatience and lack of commitment to projects hinders the change process of change and discourages rather than encourages development. Yet another external barrier cited was cultural ignorance. While assistance from the international community is welcome, their use of development models that attempt to superimpose their values in Haiti and on Haitians lack the cultural sensitivity and cultural relevancy that makes for national progress. One participant from a grassroots nonprofit showed sympathy for Bill Clinton, co-chair of Haiti's Rebuilding Commission by saying, "I believe Bill Clinton could have been a tremendous help if he had accepted to be within the organization and not the chief. He's taken a huge risk. Knowing my country, he's going to fail. Knowing my country, he will fail. And I know he has good intentions [but] he will fail. He will fail because he doesn't have the culture."

Another external barrier identified by the participants is prejudice towards Haitians. One participant from a U.S.-based organization shared how he was often having to dispell the myths some American have concerning Haiti. He says, "I bristle when I'm in church when I speak [about the work I am doing in Haiti]. I will warn them 'Don't say to me, 'They're this way because they are lazy, or they're Black.''" He shared that, "there are some prejudices in America that still believe they are lazy and that's why the country is the way it is." This sentiment can also be evidenced in some of the foreign policy drafted for Haiti. As one participant noted, "US foreign policy is tainted with racism."

Lastly, paternalism, the tendency for the international community to do for Haitians rather than to empower them to do for themselves, was seen as a

counterproductive development method. According to the SL framework, development must be responsive, participatory, empowering and conducted partnership if it is to have any chance of success. One participant said she thought the international community “miss[es] a huge opportunity when they come in with their mentality that ‘I know your problem and I know your solution’ instead of actually working with the people in the area to come up with a solution to their problems.” At its birth in 1804, Haiti was subject to isolation, hostility, and racism from the world’s most powerful nations. Haiti’s refoundation is an opportunity for the international community to express their solidarity with the Black republic. Solidarity with Haiti was expressed in the international community’s outpouring of donations following the earthquake but that is not where it should end. Solidarity with and good will towards Haiti must be evidenced also in the foreign policies, international trade agreements, and development programs created for the island nation.

Research Question G

This two-part question asked “a) What do entities believe are Haiti’s greatest strengths and b) how do they envision these strengths playing a role in the redevelopment effort?” A consistent and pervading theme emerging from the participants was that the Haitian people were the nation’s greatest strength. Haitians were described as being bold, creative, intelligent, artistically gifted, hardworking, highly motivated, entrepreneurially minded, having a lot of dignity, patient, proud, courageous, and dedicated to their children and their country. Participants believed Haitians should be called upon to take a central role in the

planning process and execution of redevelopment projects. A refoundation of a nation can only take place if the real needs of the citizenry are acknowledged and the citizenry is engaged.

Research Question H

Participant responses pertaining to the research question “What implications do these new frameworks or thinking have on development policy-making?” again reiterated the lack of truly new frameworks emerging and therefore having insignificant implications on development policy-making. Some participants attributed the lack of new frameworks to the repackaging of old development projects while others perceived that it was a bit too soon after the earthquake to ascertain whether new redevelopment frameworks or perspectives were emerging. As a result, there was a concern that the changes needed to move the nation forward were not taking place, and perhaps not take place in the near future.

Chapter 7

TOWARDS A REFOUNDATION

The theoretical thinking driving traditional development has often focused on increasing income or financial capital as the means of raising people out of poverty. The method of choice for these poverty alleviation models have been top-down approaches that were not people-centered, sustainable, nor empowering. Such has been the case for Haiti. This research, which studied perceptions of representatives from a cross-section of entities dedicated to Haitian development revealed the kind of transformative processes that should be taking place if a refoundation of the nation is to occur. Participants described refoundation as relaying the groundwork of the country and then building from the bottom up. Refoundation demands that Haiti's inherent human, social, physical, financial, and natural capitals be safeguarded and strengthened. These capitals would serve as the core for the nation's development and buffer the nation against the risks and vulnerabilities (social, institutional, environmental, and economic) to which it has been –and will continue to be – exposed.

Haiti's current condition illustrates three things: 1) a narrow focus on accumulating financial capital does not pull a nation out of poverty 2) the depletion of other capitals in favor of financial capital increases, rather than decreases, vulnerabilities, and 3) trade-offs should be decided upon by the people they directly affect (bottom-up, rather than top-down approach). It is well understood that a world free of vulnerabilities does not exist but heightened exposure to them weakens a community's ability to recover from shocks such as

the earthquake experienced in Haiti. The assumption behind traditional models propelled financial capital as supremely important in development rather than recognizing it is just one of several important components of sustainable development. Just as important in Haiti's case is understanding that Haitians themselves should decide which capitals they would like to invest in more than others. This trade-off is unique to every community and is the key to managing vulnerabilities.

The goal of development should be to improve the capacities of a nation. In summary, four transformative processes emerged from participant reflections that are deemed essential to the refoundation of Haiti. The first is that of communication and collaboration with the Haitian government. Despite the government's weak structure, poor history of governance, reports of corruption, and overall instability, it must be the starting point for any refoundation effort. As stated by one participant, "I defy anyone to name a [developed] country that doesn't have a strong public institution." And indeed, there are none to speak of. The groundwork for a refoundation of Haiti, therefore, must start with the strengthening of the Haitian government. Without this new foundation of a strong public institution, government instability will continue to derail any development interventions implemented. In the past, traditional aid projects did one of two things: (1) bypassed the government all together or (2) when the government was included, there wasn't a strong focus on strengthening government capacity. Communication and collaboration with the Haitian government would signify the acknowledgement of and respect for the sovereignty of the nation, a key element

for refoundation. On the government's end, officials must work to establish their credibility as a public institution and win the confidence and respect of their constituents and the international community.

The second transformative process is the engagement of the Haitian people and the Haitian diaspora in the redevelopment work. "We're here. We're available. You have but to call [on] us!" exclaimed a Haitian participant. A symbiotic relationship exists between these two groups that has neither been officially recognized nor fully appreciated. Yet, both yearn for a better future for Haiti. The Haitian people through their civil society organizations should set the agenda for any redevelopment plans. Sustainable development requires that policies and projects be people-centered and engage the direct beneficiaries. A development plan of action that is representative of the people curbs paternalistic tendencies of international aid, reduces the culture of dependency of the host country, and because there is local buy-in, increases long-term commitment on the part of the people. The Haitian diaspora, because of their invested interest in Haiti, their skills, and their networks and other resources, stand as one of Haiti's most undervalued assets. Their role is to collaborate with the Haitian people and bolster the nation's progress toward self-sufficiency by providing resources to facilitate that quest.

Broad vision of development is the third transformative process necessary for refoundation. According to participants, long-term planning was absent from both government and NGO work. Entities worked to meet the needs and demands of the present and neglected to set up systems and infrastructure in preparation for

the future. A refoundation of the nation calls for a new development culture that builds with future generations in mind. To achieve this, participants outlined three development measures that need to be implemented. The first is an investment in Haiti's education system. Participants regarded education as an essential ingredient for development that has no equal or substitute. Second, participants made it clear that efforts must be made to bolster all sectors of the Haitian economy, not just one or two (such as tourism, agriculture, or garment assembly). A sustainable model of development necessitates growth in multiple sectors recognizing that one sector can be the enabling factor for others. The third component is an investment in the expansion of Haiti's middle market. This would entail educating those who hold monopolies in Haiti that the economic pie increases rather than decreases with the introduction of competition. This measure would also do away with the so-called "trickle-down economy where the richest should get a break as an incentive for them to create jobs [so that] the poorer members of society will be exposed to better opportunities," as one participant stated. It is believed that an augmentation in the number of mid-size business entrepreneurs would increase disposable income, generate more taxes, as well as provide a new source of funds for social projects.

The fourth and final transformative process calls for a coordination and collaboration among NGOs. This process is critical to Haiti's refoundation. The presence of thousands of NGOs working in isolation of each other results in the duplication of services, waste of funds, and use of valuable resources that could otherwise be made available to the Haitian people (such as housing, for example).

NGOs in Haiti have been likened to parallel state-like institutions that circumvent the Haitian government's expressed wishes and take over their responsibilities. One participant described the work of NGOs as being "cacophonous" in nature, which has very real and devastating implications on the Haitian people. Coordination and collaboration among NGOs, or "cross-pollination" as one participant viewed it, would be an important first step in addressing such problems.

Within each transformative process is found the means to identify, acknowledge and strengthen Haiti's inherent assets – the building blocks for refoundation. Taken together and should they be applied, these transformative processes have the potential to transform Haiti into the strong, self-sufficient nation the Haitian people hope for it to be.

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APPENDIX A
INSTRUMENT CREATION

SLF Framework Principles

P1. Responsive & Participatory: Outsiders need processes that enable them to listen and respond to the poor. Is new thinking a result of communication with Haitian citizens?

P2. People-centered: External support focuses on what matters to the people. Does new thinking make the priorities of the Haitian people the organization's priority?

P3. Multi-level: Poverty can only be overcome by working at several levels. New thinking should incorporate multi-level actors and mechanisms.

P4. Conducted in Partnership: Key to success are transparent partnerships between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Partners should be united by shared goals. Does new thinking reflect multi-sector collaboration and communication?

P5. Sustainable: Economic, institutional, social, and environmental sustainability are fundamental.

P6. Dynamic: External support must develop long-term commitments and be flexible to changes.

P7. Empowering: New thinking should result in amplified voice, opportunities, and well-being for the Haitian people.

P8. Disaggregated: Realization that the poor are not a homogenous group. New thinking must take into account the vulnerabilities unique to subgroups (such as women, children, elderly, urban slum dwellers, rural dwellers; Carney, 1999).

Framework Inferences

Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by helping people to become more resilient in the face of shocks, changes in trends, and seasonality (DFID, 1999).

Ib. Take advantage of unique opportunities/leverage points presented by current situation.

Ic. Note the operational context and development factors that determine what is feasible (Carney, 1999).

Research Questions

- (a) What are the redevelopment frameworks emerging among organizations in Haiti?
- (b) To what degree are traditional development frameworks being abandoned or reframed?
- (c) To what degree are new frameworks being created?
- (d) How are new frameworks focused on helping to minimize the vulnerabilities of Haitian society?
- (e) What are some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between organizations?
- (f) What do organizations perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti’s redevelopment?
- (g) What do organizations believe are Haiti’s greatest strengths and how do they envision these strengths playing a role in the redevelopment effort?
- (h) What implications do these new frameworks have on development policy-making?

Table 1.1

*P = Framework Principle; I = Framework Inference

| Research Question A | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|---|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;">What are the redevelopment frameworks emerging among organizations in Haiti?</p> | <p>P1. <u>Responsive & Participatory</u>: Outsiders need processes that enable them to listen and respond to the poor. Is new thinking a result of communication with Haitian citizens?</p> |
| | <p>P2. <u>People-centered</u>: External support focuses on what matters to the people. Does new thinking make the priorities of the Haitian people the organization’s priority?</p> |
| | <p>P6. <u>Dynamic</u>: External support must develop long-term commitments and be flexible to changes.</p> |
| | <p>P7. <u>Empowering</u>: New thinking should result in amplified voice, opportunities, and well-being for the Haitian people.</p> |

Table 1.2

| Research Question B | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|---|---|
| <p style="text-align: center;">To what degree are traditional development frameworks being abandoned or reframed?</p> | <p>P5. <u>Sustainable</u>: Economic, institutional, social, and environmental sustainability are fundamental.</p> |
| | <p>P6. <u>Dynamic</u>: External support must develop long-term commitments and be flexible to changes.</p> |

Table 1.3

| Research Question C | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|--|--|
| To what degree are new frameworks being created? | P6. <u>Dynamic</u> : External support must develop long-term commitments and be flexible to changes. |
| | Ib. Take advantage of unique opportunities/leverage points presented by current situation |

Table 1.4

| Research Question D | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|---|--|
| How are new frameworks focused on helping to minimize the vulnerabilities of Haitian society? | P6. <u>Dynamic</u> : External support must develop long-term commitments and be flexible to changes. |
| | P7. <u>Empowering</u> : New thinking should result in amplified voice, opportunities, and well-being for the Haitian people. |
| | P8. <u>Disaggregated</u> : Realization that the poor are not a homogenous group. New thinking must take into account the vulnerabilities unique to subgroups (such as women, children, elderly, urban slum dwellers, rural dwellers) |
| | Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by helping people to become more resilient in the face of shocks, changes in trends, and seasonality |

Table 1.5

| Research Question E | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|--|--|
| <p>What are some challenges to and victories of collaborative efforts between organizations?</p> | <p>P3. <u>Multi-level</u>: Poverty can only be overcome by working at several levels. New thinking should incorporate multi-level actors and mechanisms.</p> |
| | <p>P4. <u>Conducted in Partnership</u>: Key to success are transparent partnerships between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Partners should be united by shared goals. Does new thinking reflect multi-sector collaboration and communication?</p> |
| | <p>Ib. Take advantage of unique opportunities/leverage points presented by current situation</p> |
| | <p>Ic. Note the operational context and development factors that determine what is feasible</p> |

Table 1.6

| Research Question F | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|--|--|
| <p>What do organizations perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti's redevelopment?</p> | <p>P3. <u>Multi-level</u>: Poverty can only be overcome by working at several levels. New thinking should incorporate multi-level actors and mechanisms.</p> |
| | <p>P4. <u>Conducted in Partnership</u>: Key to success are transparent partnerships between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Partners should be united by shared goals. Does new thinking reflect multi-sector collaboration and communication?</p> |
| | <p>Ic. Note the operational context and development factors that determine what is feasible</p> |

Table 1.7

| Research Question G | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|--|---|
| <p>What do organizations believe are Haiti's greatest strengths and how do they envision these strengths playing a role in the redevelopment effort?</p> | <p>P1. <u>Responsive & Participatory</u>: Outsiders need processes that enable them to listen and respond to the poor. Is new thinking a result of communication with Haitian citizens?</p> |
| | <p>P2. <u>People-centered</u>: External support focuses on what matters to the people. Does new thinking make the priorities of the Haitian people the organization's priority?</p> |
| | <p>P7. <u>Empowering</u>: New thinking should result in amplified voice, opportunities, and well-being for the Haitian people.</p> |
| | <p>Ia. Manage the vulnerability context by helping people to become more resilient in the face of shocks, changes in trends, and seasonality</p> |
| | <p>Ib. Take advantage of unique opportunities/leverage points presented by current situation</p> |

Table 1.8

| Research Question H | SLF Principles/Inferences |
|---|--|
| <p>What implications do these new frameworks have on development policy-making?</p> | <p>P3. <u>Multi-level</u>: Poverty can only be overcome by working at several levels. New thinking should incorporate multi-level actors and mechanisms.</p> |
| | <p>P4. <u>Conducted in Partnership</u>: Key to success are transparent partnerships between public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Partners should be united by shared goals. Does new thinking reflect multi-sector collaboration and communication?</p> |

Table 2. Research Questions & Interview Questions Informed by Framework

| | | <i>SLF Framework</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------|----|----|
| | | Principle | | | | | | | | Inference | | |
| Research Questions | Interview Question(s) | P1 | P2 | P3 | P4 | P5 | P6 | P7 | P8 | Ia | Ib | Ic |
| A | 8 | x | x | | | | x | x | | | | |
| B | 6 | | | | | x | x | | | | | |
| | 7 | | | | | x | x | | | | | |
| C | 9 | | | | | | x | | | | x | |
| | 10 | | | | | | x | | | | x | |
| D | 12 | | | | | | x | x | x | x | | |
| E | 13 | | | x | x | | | | | | x | x |
| | 14 | | | x | x | | | | | | x | x |
| F | 15 | | | x | x | | | | | | | x |
| G | 16 | x | x | | | | | x | | x | x | |
| | 17 | x | x | | | | | x | | x | x | |

APPENDIX B
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF THE QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW

The Emerging Redevelopment Frameworks in Post-earthquake Haiti

Date

Dear _____:

I am a graduate student under the direction of Dr. Richard Knopf in the School of Community Resources & Development in the College of Public Programs at Arizona State University. I am conducting a research study to catch a snapshot of organizational thinking or approaches for redevelopment as reported by grassroots, diasporan, Haitian government, and foreign organizations.

I am inviting your participation, which will involve an interview lasting about 1 hour or so. Our interview will consist of three parts. The first will consist of your organization/agency's demographics – such as its mission, length of service in Haiti, and date of establishment.

The second part will consist of 13 questions, some with several parts. There are no right or wrong answers. It would be helpful if you could answer each question with as much information and details as possible. Examples and even stories are very much welcome. I am interested in understanding the emerging redevelopment frameworks among organizations in Haiti through your organization's experiences. After you answer a question, I may ask you to say more on the subject or to clarify something if I don't fully understand and I may also take some notes.

The third part will consist of demographic questions - your age, position at your organization, and place of birth. This will help me to document the diversity of the participants in this study. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time.

Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty.

There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation.

Your confidentiality would be protected. You will be assigned a pseudo name and this interview and all the information you provide will be identified by that pseudo name and not your real name. No one will have access to your identity or the identity of your organization so feel free to share openly concerning this topic. Your responses will be anonymous. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications but your name will not be used.

I would like to audiotape this interview and record your consent to participate. The interview will not be recorded without your permission. Please let me know if

you do not want the interview to be taped; you also can change your mind after the interview starts, just let me know.

Data will be managed using Microsoft Word and Digital Voice Editor software. The Digital Voice Editor will be used to store the audio-recorded interviews and facilitate the work of transcription. The transcriptions of the interviews will be saved to separate Microsoft Word documents using psuedo names as identifiers and which can only be accessed by the researcher. Identifiers will be separated from the data once a pseudo name has been given to you, the participant and your organization. I plan to keep the data indefinitely since no identifiers or master list will be kept.

If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the research team:

Richard Knopf, Ph.D - 602.496.2148; Richard.knopf@asu.edu

Darlye Elise Innocent – 305.600.2432; darlyelise@gmail.com

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. Please let me know if you wish to be part of the study.

APPENDIX C
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

Section A. Organization Demographics

1. What organization/gov't office do you work for?
 2. Is [organization name] a
 - a. grassroots - Haitian created and led organization
 - b. diaspora - organization led or funded by members of the Haitian diaspora
 - c. government - Haitian government agency
 - d. foreign - organizations founded, funded, and headquartered outside of Haiti
- *Note where org/gov't office is headquartered
3. How long has [organization name] been working in Haiti? OR When was this gov't office established?
 4. What is the mission of [organization name/gov't office]?
 5. What are the major programs or activities at [organization name/gov't office]?
 - a. Can you give me an example?

Section B. Interview

6. What are some of the old ways of thinking about developing Haiti?
7. To what degree are you seeing old development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti?
 - a. On a scale of 1 to 5 – 1 being not at all; 4 being to a large degree; and 5 being haven't noticed- to what degree are you seeing old development thinking/approaches being abandoned or reframed in the current work of redeveloping Haiti?
 - b. Can you give me an example?

| | | | | |
|------------|-------------|----------|--------------|-----------------|
| Not At All | Not So Much | Somewhat | Large Degree | Haven't Noticed |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

8. To what degree do you see new thinking or approaches to development being created?
 - a. Can you give me an example of that?
9. Have you seen changes in the development thinking or approaches of other organizations/agencies?
 - a. On a scale of 1 to 5 – 1 being not at all; 4 being to a large degree; and 5 being haven't noticed- - to what degree do you see new thinking or approaches to development being created?
 - b. Can you give me an example?

| | | | | |
|------------|--------|----------|--------------|---------|
| Not At All | Not So | Somewhat | Large Degree | Haven't |
|------------|--------|----------|--------------|---------|

| | | | | |
|---|------|---|---|---------|
| | Much | | | Noticed |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

10. What implications do you think this new thinking or these new approaches will have on development policy-making?
 - a. Within your organization?
 - i. Can you give me an example?
 - b. As it relates to international aid policy-making?
 - i. Can you give me an example?
11. How do you see this new thinking or these new approaches minimizing the vulnerabilities – whether economic, institutional, social, or environmental – of Haitian society?
 - a. Can you give me an example?
12. What are some of the successes of collaborative efforts between other organizations/agencies and [org/agency name]?
 - a. Can you give me a few examples?
13. What are some of the challenges of collaborative efforts between other organizations/agencies and [org/agency name]?
14. What does [org/agency name] perceive as the greatest barriers to Haiti’s redevelopment?
 - a. How so?/Why is that?
 - b. Tell me a story about that...
15. What does [org/agency name] believe are Haiti’s greatest strengths in the redevelopment efforts?
 - a. Tell me a story about that...
16. How has [list of strengths identified by participant] guided [org/agency name]’s new thinking about redevelopment in Haiti?
 - a. Tell me more...
17. What else can you tell me about the emerging redevelopment thinking or approaches in your organization that we haven’t discussed so far?

Section C: Informant Demographics

18. For the purposes of getting a picture of the diversity of this study’s participants I’d like to ask you a few questions about yourself:
 - a. How long have you worked for [org/agency name]?
 - b. What is your position or title at [org/agency name]?
 - c. How old are you?
 - d. What is your place of birth?
 - e. Do you hold citizenship outside of Haiti? Where?
 - f. Have you received formal education? Where? What was your field of study?

APPENDIX D
AS GREEN AS IT GETS 4 ECONOMIES MODEL

