

Arizona's Anti-immigration Legislation and
Latino Political Participation: An Examination of the Latino Response

by

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ABSTRACT

Over the past twenty years, the state of Arizona has increasingly become a key location for the debate surrounding immigration and border policy in the United States. Its geographical position within the Southwest North American Region (SWNAR) of the United States and shared physical border with México has forged an extensive history of complicated interconnectedness for the Latino community residing in this borderland (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2017). This dissertation examines Arizona’s anti-immigration legislation, focusing on the years between 2000 and 2018, and how, or if, this legislation affected the political participation of Latinos in the state. This research argues that Latinos, both citizen and undocumented, have galvanized across citizenship lines in response to the anti-immigration legislation aimed at criminalizing Latinos, marginalizing their families, and hindering their access to education, public services, and employment opportunities (Philbin & Ayón, 2016). Using theoretical foundations of political mobilization, this work explores the use of anti-immigration legislation as a mobilizing factor for Latino political participation. Further, the findings suggest that the traditional definition of *political participation* is not sufficient for the wide-ranging activities of the Latino community. This work, therefore, re-contextualizes the term political participation and establishes *Latino political participation* by incorporating the concept of “funds of knowledge” to account for Latino political practices that have previously been ignored by the traditional definition. For this study, a series of observations of trends in Latino voting and registration and a descriptive historical analysis of Latino political practices led to the creation of questions for the qualitative interview process. Interviews were

conducted with fifteen key Latino informants, and their *testimonios* provide an explanation for the noted trends in Latino political participation during the election years, highlight the political mobilization that incorporated both the undocumented Latinos and Latino citizens, and provide clarification for a recontextualization of *Latino political participation*.

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CHAPTER 1

Immigration has been a salient topic of debate for the United States since its founding and the drafting of the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. During that time, the creators of the Constitution deliberated for some time regarding the “relative merits of immigrant admissions and rights” that would eventually set regulations on who would be eligible to serve in federal elective offices; yet, when it came to immigrant entry, their decision was to allow state and local authorities to decide (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). Not too long after, this was changed, and the Nationality Act of 1790 was enacted by the first American Congress. This restrictionist policy was the first law to define eligibility for citizenship for immigrants, only allowing “free white persons,” or white, male property owners, the possibility of citizenship. Women, nonwhite persons, and indentured servants were not eligible for citizenship through this law, which at the time, predominantly affected Asian immigrants and limited their rights. The implementation of racial restriction would not be completely eliminated until the mid-1900s (Nationality Act of 1790, 2019).

Since its founding, the United States has ebbed and flowed in its treatment, acceptance, and rejection of immigrants from across the globe. Most notably, and of particular relevance to contemporary American society, the continual relations with immigrants from México and other Latino western hemisphere nations have caused the most fervent political debate (Park & Norpoth, 2016). Although the United States has multiple borders, within the past twenty to thirty years, the southern border region shared with México on the western United States, and coined the Southwest North American

region (SWNAR) by Vélez-Ibáñez (2017), has been a hotspot of strong sentiment regarding immigration and border policy (p. 11). Positioned within the SWNAR is the state of Arizona, where the debate surrounding immigration has frequently been a prominent and controversial topic, and where fierce anti-immigration legislation, both proposed and passed, has set the stage for the rest of the nation. If, or how, this type of legislation has affected Arizona's Latino participation in political processes has not yet been well established.

STUDY PURPOSE

This research examines anti-immigration legislation in Arizona beginning in the year 2000 and continuing to the 2018 mid-terms, and how, or if, this legislation has affected the political participation of Latinos in this state. This study explores if, and by what causal mechanisms anti-immigration legislation in the state of Arizona has prompted or deterred Latino political participation amongst both the undocumented Latinos and the Latino citizens within the state. Specifically, the focus of analysis is on the presidential election years of 2008, 2012, and 2016, as well as the 2018 midterm elections. Additionally, using theoretical foundations of political mobilization, this work explores the use of anti-immigration legislation as a mobilizing factor in Latino political participation. The theories of ethnic mobilization, reactive mobilization, and proactive mobilization are used to rationalize the various mechanisms incited by anti-immigration legislation in Arizona.

The research seeks to answer the following: What is political participation for Latinos and what represents their participation beyond the traditional definition of

political participation? What do U.S. citizen Latinos have to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented? Does the plight of the undocumented give them focus and energize them? How so? It is hypothesized that the increases in anti-immigration legislation invigorated the undocumented population: to seek citizenship for voting purposes, to join in the engagement and mobilization efforts to encourage the vote of Latino citizens, to use non-traditional ways of political participation, such as joining in grassroots organizations or attending marches, and through the sharing of their personal stories, or *testimonios*, in order to raise awareness of their circumscription, which in turn has galvanized the Latino community as a whole. It is also hypothesized that Latinos who are U.S. citizens were also galvanized by the legislation in similar ways such as by: joining in the engagement and mobilization efforts of grassroots organizations, attending marches or protests, sharing their testimonios and the testimonios of their undocumented family and friends, and through traditional political means such as voting.

Furthermore, I go beyond previous work focused on Latino political participation by questioning the efficacy of the traditional definition of *political participation* in the identification and reporting of Latino political activities. I venture to recontextualize the traditional understanding of the term political participation and to establish it as *Latino political participation* using the concept of “funds of knowledge,” introduced by Carlos Vélez-Ibáñez in 1988, to explain the various non-traditional political methods that Latinos, both citizen and undocumented, use to engage in political participation within the United States.

With the considerable increase in anti-immigration legislation in Arizona since the turn of the century, it is important to examine how national, state, and local-level legislation affects Latino political participation, because all Latinos, regardless of their immigration status, are disproportionately affected by these policies (Saldívar, 2015, p. 53; Vargas et al., 2017, p. 313). Overall, analyzing how anti-immigration legislation affects Latino political participation in Arizona is significant because the findings generated by this investigation: 1) contribute to the understanding of the path that Latinos in the Southwest U.S. have taken to become politically engaged within the last twenty years, 2) inform future political strategy aimed at galvanizing the Latino electorate, and thus the political and social systems of the state of Arizona, where Latinos have faced systemic subjugation aimed at denying them a place in mainstream American society, and 3) explain Arizona's current political climate, and therefore serve as a basis for expanding the knowledge of similar political processes that have either already occurred, as in California, or, as is the case in Texas, are concurrently happening.

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

This work necessitates an explanation of the terminology to be used throughout this dissertation that could otherwise be unclear if not stated outright. For the purpose of this work, the terms *Latino* or *Latinos* will be used to describe all people of Latino descent, whether citizen of the United States or undocumented, male or female. This term also encompasses people with origins of descent from México, Puerto Rico, Cuba, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, etc. Latino for purposes of this dissertation also incorporates any genetic mixing of these origins within each other and/or with

ethnicities or races outside of the Latino descent. Additionally, I use the term *anti-immigration legislation* in this work to discuss legislation that is intended for immigration in a negative purpose. Further, the term “anti-immigrant” denotes hostility toward immigrants and those who wish to immigrate, the dislike of foreigners, and efforts to reduce the rights of immigrants (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014, p. 281). For example, immigration legislation that is enacted as an intimidation tactic to the undocumented population, including “policies of attrition” which are intended to encourage the Latino population to self-deport due to their harsh provisions, are considered anti-immigration legislation.

POSITIONALITY

An advantage that I have as a researcher of this community is my positionality as a partial insider. Being a person of Latino origin who is fluent in both English and Spanish permits me to gain access to key Latino community members with greater ease than other non-Latino outsiders. Having lived the majority of my life within this population and having family who is currently a part of this much maligned populace allows me to have a “head start” on a sense of trust and rapport from the members of this community during the interview process. Due to this shared “vulnerability” between us, community members may feel that they can be more open and truthful with their answers to my interview questions, therefore producing an increased validity of the research. This is also important because the research produced from this study adds to the academic literature regarding the political participation of Latinos, and in doing so, increases the community’s value in the overall political discourse in the United States.

WHY ARIZONA? HISTORY OF AZ: A TRANSBORDER EXISTENCE

The U.S.-México border region is filled with a deep history of peoples whose culture, language, and ideologies have been challenged since the early 16th century. The SWNAR, is made up of five U.S. states in the southwest United States and six Mexican states in northern México (Vélez-Ibáñez & Heyman, 2017). This area, though separated into two different nations, shares a common ecological system of “deserts, valleys, rivers, mountain ranges, marine zones, and flora and fauna” (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2018). Although the United States has many borders, in recent times, this area has simply been best known as “the border,” but it has not always been this way. Often lost in the contemporary discussion of immigration and Latino politics in Arizona is the historical fact that a number of Latinos in the state can trace their family roots to pre-Arizona statehood, when Arizona was still part of México. There is a historical, physical, and cultural connection to México that is unique to Arizona (Sheridan, 2012).

Dating back to the 15th and 16th centuries, the Spanish conquest brought the beginnings of what would to this day continue to affect class and racial inequalities within the SWNAR. At that time, the region was deeply changed due to the unceasing Spanish search for wealth and their subsequent colonization of what is now known as México (Wolf, 1997). The Native Americans of the region were, in short, overtaken by the Spaniards who intended to impress on them their language and culture without complete success. Migration spurred by Spanish greed for resources followed a south to north path, bringing residents into the SWNAR. Following this, the rise of the American empire during the mid-19th century introduced the indigenous of the region to a new

obstacle, the east to west expansion of English speaking “Americans” who would also attempt to inflict a “linguistic and cultural hegemony of an east coast prism of immigration, identity, monolinguality, and cultural singularity” on the peoples of the SWNAR (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2018, p. 330).

Within the shifting tides, the most important transition, contemporarily speaking, to SWNAR came in 1848 with the bifurcation of the region following the Mexican American war and with signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (Vélez-Ibáñez & Heyman, 2017). The treaty ended the Mexican American War and led to México being forced into giving up one third of its land to the United States. Included in this ceded land were the Californian and New Mexican territories which contained the present-day U.S. states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and Colorado. This new division of México immediately affected nearly 300,000 residents, who overnight became citizens of the United States (Sheridan, 2012). The introduction of a physical political border created a “shock culture, a border culture, a third country, a closed country” where Mexican and American societies merged culture and language (Anzaldúa, 2007).

In addition to creating a merged culture along the borderlands, the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo caused a change in the dynamics of its social culture, where former Mexican citizens, now newly American, in the new U.S. territories were almost immediately relegated to second-class status (Magaña & Mejia, 2004). After the signing, Anglos quickly migrated to the SWNAR in search of land and other economic opportunities in a region with a wealth of untapped resources. These first generations of immigrants to the Arizona area came from the Midwest, and as the Anglo presence in the

SWNAR grew, so did its domination over some of the Mexican-origin people living in the area. It mattered little to some Anglo settlers that the region's previous inhabitants had been here for centuries—or as was the case for Native Americans, thousands of years. Backed officially by the government, including law enforcement, Anglo settlers began to deny Latinos their property and their civil and social rights as promised by the Treaty (Magaña, 2014). Further expansion of the Anglo population in Arizona into the 19th and early 20th century resulted in the first laws passed that limited the rights of Mexican Americans in schooling, housing, public gatherings, and even marriages (Magaña, 2014). This was the beginnings of what has continued to be a complicated co-existence of the merged peoples of the Arizona borderlands.

In the many years following the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Arizona continued to have ties with its Mexican origin roots. Between the years of 1910 and 1930, the population of Mexican nationals living in the U.S. significantly increased from 100,000 Mexicans in 1900 to nearly 1.5 million by the 1930s, bringing professionals such as artists, teachers, and architects, (Powers, 2013). During this time, the four states bordering México on the American side—Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and California—increased substantially in population while the other side in México declined (Magaña, 2014). It is of importance to note that although there was a “line in the sand” dividing the U.S. and México after the time of the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe in 1848, crossing the border was relaxed and unchecked with no border guards, no customs controls, and no checkpoints until around 1920 (Payan & Vásquez, 2017, p. 231). The large influx of Mexican nationals to the U.S., which was prompted by the Mexican

Revolution, brought a change to the lax border crossings, and in 1924, the United States created the Border Patrol and customs and immigration personnel were placed at checkpoints along the border (Payan & Vásquez, 2017).

Around this same time, during the 1920s and 1930s, Arizona had become a popular winter vacation destination for Americans from the north who wanted to leave their homes for a temporary stay in Arizona to flee from colder weather. The growing population meant that the state needed more laborers, which in turn led to Arizona farmers recruiting Mexican immigrants by setting up stations near the border inviting them over to work. When the Great Depression caused one-third of all Americans to be unemployed in the mid-1930s, this all changed (Sánchez, 1993). President Herbert Hoover insisted that Mexican immigrants took away American jobs and were responsible for the depression (Sánchez, 1993). Eventually popular sentiment against the Mexican national resulted in mass repatriation, or deportation, of over one-third of the U.S. Mexican community (both citizens and non-citizens). Estimates of the total number of Mexican nationals and Mexican American citizens that were deported were around 500,000 during the “Great Repatriation” (Sánchez, 1993). This event would serve as one of the first instances in Latino U.S. history characterized by the United States’ demonstration of dominance and their back and forth acceptance and refusal of Latino immigrants into the nation.

The United States once again needed immigrant help in the 1940s when the rapidly expanding post–World War II economy produced a substantial manpower shortage in the United States and as a result, the United States and México instituted a

contracted worker system in 1942 called the Bracero Program (Sheridan, 2012; Ramós, 1998). This initiative allowed agricultural employers in the United States to recruit and hire low-cost Mexican laborers, who were granted temporary worker status, on a seasonal basis. Critics have described the Bracero Program as a virtual slave labor system because of its legacy of widespread worker and human rights abuses. As a result of the substandard labor conditions often endured by the Braceros in Arizona, some immigrants sidestepped the program and entered the country illegally to avoid maltreatment (Ramós, 1998; Navarro, 2005). In the early 1950s, an economic recession once again turned popular sentiment against Mexican immigrants. As a result, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began expelling Mexican nationals, some of them in the country legally, through a program known as “Operation Wetback” beginning in 1954 (Sheridan, 2012). According to the INS, apprehensions and deportations reached 1,300,000 that year. During the next five years, the INS deported approximately 3.8 million Mexican nationals and Mexican American citizens (Magaña, 2014). A second example of the U.S. dominance and exploitation of the immigrant, specifically the Latino immigrant, this pattern would continue to repeat itself through the years based on economic shifts and the popular sentiment being sewn throughout the American public regarding Mexicans and Latinos.

Essentially, with the creation of the Border Patrol and customs checks in 1924 and through 1980s, the United States government steadily increased its regulation and restriction of economic and cross-border immigration and mobility, primarily focused on customs management. Although this was the case, border life continued to be fluid and

border residents on both sides of the boundary adapted in order to continue with their normal border culture routines of crossing the divide and living interconnectedly (Payan & Vásquez, 2017). Even today, it is estimated that there are more than 24 million border crossings that take place every year through the Nogales, Douglas, San Luis, Sasabe, Lukeville and Naco ports of entry (Latino Decisions, 2018). Between 1980 and 2001, however, there was another shift in border life with border regulations that were more focused on law-enforcement. During this time, the U.S. focused on illegal immigration, illegal drugs, and contraband. Laws became more restrictive and penalties for violating these laws were more severe (Payan & Vásquez, 2017). The final shift in the U.S.-México border culture came in 2001 with the terrorist attacks of September 11. After this, security of the border became the primary focus driving border activity and regulations. What had once been an informal border with open mobility and merged life transformed into a region of highly regulated and monitored trade, immigration, and cross-border interaction based on the U.S. desire to increase national security (Payan & Vásquez, 2017).

History has reflected the interconnectivity between Arizona's economic conditions and the relevant immigration legislation of the time, and that the health of the economy, whether prosperous or ailing has been a significant influence on immigration legislation. Namely, when Arizona's economy is healthy and prosperous, politicians have advocated for less restrictive measures for immigrants and even participated in vehement recruitment and outreach for guest workers, especially in the hospitality and construction industries. Yet, when the economy has collapsed or faced adversity, this sentiment

reverses, resulting in rigid measures such as the Great Repatriation of the 1930s, Operation Wetback in the 1950s, Proposition 187 in the 1990s, and finally, with the increase in anti-immigration legislation in the mid-2000s due to the Great Recession (Magaña & Silva, 2021). This, then brings us to the issue of policy formation and how this process, along with agenda setting, has shifted Arizona immigration legislation through the years.

DISCUSSION OF POLICY FORMATION

It is known that legislation plays a large role in the circumscription of certain segments of the American populace, and to better understand how policy formation is significant to anti-immigration legislation and this research, it is helpful to have a quick overview of policy formation. According to Kingdon and Thurber (2011), public policy making, policy design, or policy formation, is a complex set of processes that consists of: 1) setting an agenda, 2) specifying alternatives from which a choice can be made, 3) an authoritative choice from the alternatives that were decided (such as a legislative vote), and then 4) the implementation of that decision (pp. 2-3). Although the ‘steps’ in this process appear to be straightforward, there are many working parts and variables involved, and in the process of “agenda-setting, the development of alternatives, and choices among those alternatives,” there are different forces at work that influence what eventually is proposed in the legislature, making the process more involved than what is seen on the surface (Kingdon & Thurber, 2011, p. 230). Further, agenda setting is primarily based on every day “conditions” that progress to “problems” that government officials then deem worthy of concern enough to be placed on the governmental agenda

(Kingdon & Thurber, 2011, p. 198). This is where we now begin to see legislative proposals aimed at ‘fixing’ or ‘correcting’ a public problem.

Agenda setting, and subsequently, policy formation is meant to correct public problems, but it does not always suit all sectors of the populace. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), this process has proven to disproportionately work to the advantage of some groups, or target populations, over others (p. 334). Furthermore, their theory of the social construction of policy design explains why “public policies sometimes fail to meet their purposes of solving public problems, supporting democratic institutions, or producing greater equality” (Pierce et al., 2014, p. 3). Their theory explains that the policy agenda is strongly influenced by and caters to the target groups that are viewed as “worthy” versus groups that are “negatively construed,” tying back to the complexities of public policy making and agenda setting as discussed by Kingdon and Thurber (Schneider & Ingram, 1993, p. 334). Baumgartner and Jones (2009) explain that “policymaking is characterized by change in public understandings of policy problems and in the institutions that vie for policy control” (p. 39). In a similar fashion to social construction theory, they disclose that the same group of “privileged elites,” or rather, those who are considered worthy, tend to be catered to by the American political system (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).

Another discussion of policy formation by Stevens and Bishin (2010), reinforces the previous statements of Baumgartner and Jones and Schneider and Ingram that policy makers focus their efforts and listen most to those who participate in the democratic system of voting (p. 114). Based on this realization, those segments of the population

who do participate improve their standing in the policy making process and therefore affect public policy outcomes in their favor. Further evidence that the political participation of historically disadvantaged groups is imperative for their voices to be heard to advance their political standing. Although it appears that this is a known fact by many researchers, “political participation among racial and ethnic minorities is both lower than for the majority white population and also substantially lower than can be explained by socio-economic status or socialization alone” (Stevens & Bishin, 2010, p. 114). They also disclose that the United States “has often acted in a manner that systematically disenfranchises ethnic and racial minorities” (Stevens & Bishin, 2010, p. 114). This leads to the next explanation of the policy process which further reveals that policy formation is not so straightforward and that those with the monetary means directly influence the policy process, purposely depriving certain segments of the population, namely, ethnic and racial minorities, of their equal right to the policy formation process.

It is concluded that the policy process is largely based on policy entrepreneurs, or those who are willing “to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future return” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Kingdon & Thurber, 2011). Policy entrepreneurs come from various outlets, including elected officials, research organizations, interest groups, and large corporations with the sole intent of influencing policy outcomes to increase their self-interests, an important issue that will be discussed in a later section of this work (Kingdon & Thurber, 2011). Once the agenda is set and the solutions to the public problem are agreed upon, a bill can then be

proposed that includes multiple provisions aimed at remedying the “public issue” (Sullivan, 2007, p. 4-5). Proposed or introduced bills may or may not be passed, but their existence provides a glimpse into what political entrepreneurs and in part, the greater public, deem as important social problems that need to be corrected. Two political entrepreneurs that are vitally important to this dissertation’s discussion because of their role in the proposal and funding of salient Arizona anti-immigration legislation are the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). These organizations will be discussed in more detail later in this work. This basic understanding of the agenda setting and the policy formation process now sets the stage for the discussion of anti-immigration legislation across the United States and specifically within Arizona, which has been a central setting for the gradual shift in restrictionist immigration policies beginning in the 1920s and peaking throughout the 2000s.

ESCALATION OF IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION

Within the past twenty years, immigration to the United States, especially from México and Latin American countries, has become a widespread ‘social problem’ based on the increase in the amount of political agendas surrounding immigration legislation across the United States. Starting in 2005, 300 bills and resolutions relating to immigrants and refugees were introduced by state legislators across the U.S. and Puerto Rico and of this 300, 45 were passed (Meyer et al., 2011, Table 1). That number increased dramatically in 2007 with 1,562 bills and resolutions introduced/proposed and 252 passed, and in 2010, it increased even more with the number of passed legislation

reaching a total of 346, with 208 enacted laws and the adoption of 138 resolutions, while it was estimated that 1,400 bills were proposed (Meyer et al., 2011). After 2010, the number of enacted state immigration laws and resolutions peaked in 2013 totaling 437 (184 enacted laws and 253 resolutions adopted) (Morse, Mendoza, Lam, & German, 2014). Increasing once again in 2015, 216 laws were enacted, and 274 resolutions adopted, for a grand total of 490 legislative actions across forty-nine states and Puerto Rico, with Alaska being the only state to not enact immigration related legislation (Morse, Mendoza, & Mayorga, 2016). After 2015, enacted legislation related to immigration held steady with approximately 170 – 200 laws passed yearly until 2019 which passed 181 laws (“State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,” 2020). The large increases in the numbers of immigration legislation being proposed and passed throughout this time period signal a change in the social construction of immigration and/or the focus of political entrepreneurs in pushing for legislation aimed at benefitting their well-being in some way (discussed further in Chapter Two). These statistics also provide evidence of the salience in researching immigration legislation throughout the political agenda in Arizona during the last twenty years.

It is in 2010, one of the main peak years of immigration legislation for states, that Arizona proposed and passed the well-known and highly publicized Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) and House Bill 2162 (HB 2162) which “added state penalties for trespassing, harboring and transporting illegal immigrants, not carrying alien registration documents, employing illegal immigrants, and smuggling humans” (“State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,” 2020). SB 1070 acted as a catalyst for other states, five in

total, to create their own anti-immigration omnibus laws in that same year (“State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,” 2020). Today, over thirty states have either proposed, passed and/or implemented legislation that calls for “omnibus” immigration laws, or laws that contain multiple subsections aimed at “controlling” immigration in various ways. Allen and McNeely (2017) define these laws as “single bills combining three or more provisions related to immigration [...] that increased state and local immigration enforcement, decreased undocumented immigrants’ access to employment, and decreased undocumented immigrants’ access to public and private services and benefits” (p. 19). These draconian and punitive anti-immigration policies that Arizona and many other states have proposed, passed, and implemented in the last two decades have contributed to the “marginalization of Latino families and the rise of Latinos’ experiences with discrimination,” and has impacted their “access to education, public services, and employment opportunities as well as criminalize[d] Latino immigrants” (Philbin & Ayón, 2016, p. 128).

As mentioned before, agenda-setting and policy formation has historically accommodated the elite and the advantaged populations of the American populace, and importantly, the political entrepreneurs who have the political persuasive power to make legislative changes that benefit them in some way. The criminalization of immigrants in Arizona was by design. One organization that has had a major role in pushing anti-immigration legislation in Arizona is the American Legislative Exchange Council, or ALEC. ALEC is a non-profit organization that also flaunts itself to be a non-partisan membership association, yet the organization is made up of conservative, right-wing

activists and corporate executives who design model legislation to their benefit that is then pushed to the state legislatures to be passed into law (Cooper, Heldman, Ackerman, & Farrar-Meyers, 2016; Center for Constitutional Rights, 2019). In 2010, ALEC helped design and propose SB 1070 in a strategic maneuver that victimized immigrants so that members of ALEC who operated privately-run immigration detention centers would benefit (CCR, 2019). In an interview with Laura Sullivan of NPR (2010), the city manager of Benson, Arizona, Glenn Nichols, recalls how, in 2019, he was approached by a man who wanted him to welcome “a prison for women and children who were illegal immigrants” to his town because it would generate revenue for the city, and that that man could assure that the prison would continue to remain full for decades, but Nichols declined the offer (para. 4). A year later SB 1070, legislation that would assure that privately owned detention centers would have “full beds,” was brought to the Arizona state floor by Arizona state Sen. Russell Pearce (Sullivan, 2010). In a closed-door meeting at a hotel conference room, with the direction of ALEC and officials from the Corrections Corporation of America, the organization that would benefit hundreds of millions of dollars in profits for housing the detainees, Pearce sat in on the creation of the model bill that would be famously known as the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” or SB 1070, and that would act as a model for similar legislation to be passed in other states throughout the U.S. that same year (Sullivan, 2010).

Much of the available research regarding anti-immigration legislation in Arizona has focused primarily on Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), which at its proposal had numerous

provisions including, to name a few, mandating that police officers demand documentation from anyone that they believed to be “illegal,” charging undocumented immigrants with trespassing, and making it unlawful for undocumented immigrants to apply for work or to work in Arizona (Quiroga, 2013, p. 581). There is little research that discusses the history of Arizona’s plight with anti-immigration legislation in detail. Additionally, there is a need for research that analyzes how, or if, anti-immigration legislation affects the Latino community’s political participation. Most specifically, analyzing how Latino political participation has been shaped or mobilized by the proposal and the enactment of anti-immigration legislation throughout the years is a needed area to add to the academic literature surrounding Latinos and immigration legislation. Research in Latino politics has offered an examination of Latino political participation and how socioeconomic status, grassroots mobilization, and the media have shaped this process, but the response of Latinos to anti-immigration legislation, and whether or not it galvanizes or discourages the population’s political participation, is an area that warrants further study (Jones-Correa et al., 2018, p. 222).

THEORIES OF POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Upon review of the literature surrounding the theory of political mobilization, there is no single definition for the overall theory that can encompass all that term political mobilization can encompass. In most reviews, this phenomenon is described as a “social process” or even a “social movement” as a “result of mobilized public support on behalf of contentious issues and claims, advocacy groups and voluntary associations, their needs and campaigns” (Lahusen, 2013, p. ix). In the simplest definition, political

mobilization is the result of “activists to commit people to action” (Lahusen, 2013, p. ix). Further, it is explained that “self-interest is the motivational 'push' that galvanizes individuals into action and this 'passion' for the self is an asset which mobilizing groups instrumentalize” for political mobilization (Lahusen & Kieser, 1996, p. 12). For the purpose of this research, it is important to explore more specific subsets of political mobilization to examine Latino political participation. Ethnic mobilization, reactive mobilization, and proactive mobilization are most closely tied to the examination of the mechanisms involved when viewing anti-immigration legislation as a mobilizing factor.

Ethnic mobilization can be defined as the “process by which groups organize around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin color, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends” (Olzak, 1983, p. 355). In this sense, racial and ethnic identity are important because they offer a “psychological foundation for group identification and are central to an intimate sense of peoplehood” with which to connect to associations, organizations, businesses and institutions within their racial and ethnic group (Barreto, 2010, p. 25). For the Latino population, this type of mobilization was evident in the collective stance against HR 4437 in 2006 with the organization of protests and marches. During this time, a sense of solidarity, or *solidaridad*, unified Latinos around the issue of immigrant rights (Barreto et al, 2009).

Further, research has consistently shown that individuals who are asked to participate in political activities are more likely to do so, especially if both parties share the same ethnicity. For Latinos, if direct mobilization is undertaken by a coethnic, Latinos are more likely to participate in both the electoral process and political protest

(Barreto et al, 2009). Based on ethnic mobilization, Latino public protests that were organized by Latino organizations, media, political elites, and activists have had the greatest turnout by the Latino community (Barreto et al, 2009). Matt Barreto (2010) explains that:

Shared ethnicity is an important component of Latino political incorporation for five reasons: (1) Latinos share a Latin American heritage and culture, including the prevalence of Spanish; (2) they draw on a shared immigrant experience; (3) continued discrimination against Latinos highlights their commonality; (4) ethnic candidates typically focus on co-ethnics as their base, reinforcing the bond; and (5) the presence on the ballot of a candidate with a Spanish surname cues known traits. (p. 2010)

This is important to discuss because the increase in anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona set the stage for ethnic, or coethnic, mobilization of Latinos by allowing them to connect via their shared immigrant experience and through the continued discrimination that they were experiencing. Further, it is important to note that beyond mobilization spurred by anti-immigration legislation, ethnic mobility can be used to examine Latino political participation based on the mobilizing potential of co-ethnic political candidates who may entice the Latino community to mobilize in support of their election into office.

Currently, there is not much research regarding the ethnic mobilization of Latinos for a coethnic candidate because there have not been a sufficient amount of Latinos running for office as there has been for the African American community and the study of their ethnic mobilization (Barreto, 2010).

Beyond the theory of ethnic mobilization and also important to this research, work by Gabriel Sanchez (2015) reveals that Latinos can also be mobilized in two other salient forms: reactive and proactive mobilization (p. 22). Reactive mobilization is defined as, “political activity in response to a perceived or actual political threat (e.g., legislation or political rhetoric)” (Sanchez, 2015, p. 22). The political threat can have both a significant impact on the political landscape and set the context for Latino civic participation in reaction to the problem. Similar to the ethnic mobilization above, the introduction of HR 4437 in 2006 and SB 1070 in 2010 are both examples of historical events that have led to reactive mobilization of the Latino community. In both instances, protest politics was one way that Latinos mobilized in reaction to the threat to their daily well-being. Further, in reaction to the threat, Latinos have also turned to naturalization as a political act in which they become a part of the eligible voters and can participate in the electoral process to stop or change threatening policy (Pantoja et al, 2016). This was the case in California in response to the anti-immigrant legislation that was seen as an attack on Latinos and Latino immigrants. In opposition, Latinos residing there have decided to naturalize, creating a substantial increase in eligible Latino voters who can vote against the discriminatory legislation (Pantoja et al, 2016). Other sources of reactive mobilization were developed in response to Donald Trump’s executive orders that he enacted when taking office. In response, Latinos and immigrant rights groups mobilized in the “form of protests, vigils, and marches, as well as more sustainable creative projects that sought to prevent deportations and reduce the social impacts of deportation on immigrant families and communities” such as through the development of sanctuary cities, rapid response

teams to attend to deportation attempts, and the development of case management services to advocate for immigrants affected by deportation (Kocher, 2017, pp. 166-67).

Finally, proactive mobilization can also be utilized in the discussion of mechanisms utilized by Latinos in Arizona in response to the anti-immigration legislation. This type of mobilization is defined as “the coordinated effort of nonpartisan civic institutions— and in some cases with support from philanthropic organizations— to reduce the barriers to engagement and encourage long-term, sustained political participation” (Sanchez, 2015, p. 22). This type of mobilization encompasses the efforts of tactical mobilization where grassroots organizations take a look at the long-term, big-picture and enact a plan aimed at expanding the Latino electorate in order to “get out the vote.” Most often, the grassroots organizations target Latino voters who are newly registered or who do not typically vote or have irregular voting patterns and attempt to encourage their participation through the vote. Organizations that are typically involved in proactive mobilization are nonprofit organizations and Spanish-language media outlets (Sanchez, 2015).

These three main facets of political participation theory set the foundation for the discussion of if, and how, anti-immigration legislation affects Latino political participation. These theories provide a sound basis with which to further explain the political actions of Latinos, both citizen and undocumented, in the state of Arizona. Although these theories cannot provide “proof” per se, of the link between anti-immigration legislation in Arizona and Latino political participation, understanding their characteristics and looking at how they overlap can help shape the argument that the

mobilization and participation of Latinos politically was sparked or catalyzed by the introduction of harsh anti-immigration legislation.

ARIZONA'S SHIFTING DEMOGRAPHICS

Since its establishment as the 48th state in 1912, Arizona's population has expanded at a rapid pace. Beginning with only 200,000 people in 1912, the state's population now totals around 7.3 million people, with much of that growth happening since 1970 when there were less than 2 million residents ("Arizona Population 2020," 2020). In addition, the Native American population in Arizona is one of the largest in the U.S., behind California and Oklahoma ("Arizona Population 2020," 2020). Arizona has twenty-one federally recognized American Indian reservations and is home to more speakers of Native American languages than any other state, with Navajo and Apache being the most commonly spoken ("Arizona: Basic Information," 2018; "Arizona Population 2020," 2020). This is representative of the history of the region and the connection that Arizona continues to have with its indigenous ancestry.

Arizona reached two million residents in 1980, and from that time forward, the total population increased tremendously up to 3.6 million residents in 1990 and 5.1 million in 2000 (United States Census Bureau, 2020). The large population increase between 1990 and 2000 was attributed to a record population growth in 1996 which resulted from in-migration of people from other states to the Maricopa County metropolitan area (Arizona State Library, Archives, and Public Records, ...). In addition, the 1990s brought border enforcement policy changes by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that resulted in blockades being placed in California and

Texas in an effort to avert the entry of immigrants there, and in turn shifting their entrance to Arizona instead (Saenz, 2010). Within the next decade, Arizona's population rose again, making it the second fastest growing state during the period between 2000 and 2010 (Mackun & Wilson, 2011). In Arizona between 1990 and 2010, Latinos more than doubled their numbers. Among the reasons for the Latino population boom was immigration, primarily from México and Latin America, and the demographic shift of U.S. Latino births, which had made Arizona one of the fastest growing states in the country (Magaña & Silva, 2021). In 2010, Latinos made up approximately 2 million of the 6.3 million residents in Arizona at that time (United States Census Bureau, 2012). Although most Latinos living in Arizona were born nationals of the United States, the percentage of foreign-born Latinos had increased to 33 percent by 2008 (Saenz, 2010).

Over the following years, Arizona continued its steady growth, and in 2019, it had the third fastest growth in population in the nation, behind Idaho and Nevada (Arizona Commerce Authority, 2020; Rice, 2020). The concentration of this growth was centered in Maricopa County where Phoenix, the state capital, is located. This county, by population, is the largest in the state and accounts for more than half of the state's total population with approximately 4.5 million residents (QuickFacts Maricopa County, 2020). Currently, Maricopa is the fastest-growing county in the United States, and it ranks as the fourth most populous county in the United States (Maricopa County, 2020). One of the most significant factors in this population growth has been the steadily increasing Latino population in Arizona and throughout the United States.

Overall, people of Latino-origin are the largest minority group in the United States, and the U.S. Census Bureau reports that by 2020 the Latino population will have reached approximately 62.3 million, or 19% of the total U.S. population (Hispanic Population, 2018). In 2019, the Latino population reached a record high of 60.6 million, an increase of 930,000 in one year and an increase of 50.7 million in 9 years (Noe-Bustamante, Hugo-López, & Manuel Krogstad, 2020). Between the years of 2010 and 2019, the Latino population accounted for a little more than half of all of the U.S. population growth, with an increase of 16% to 18% of the population, making them the second largest racial or ethnic group behind white non-Hispanics in the U.S. (Noe-Bustamante, Hugo-López, & Manuel Krogstad, 2020).

Maricopa County, Arizona is the fourth largest Hispanic county in the United States with approximately 1.4 million Latinos making up approximately 31 percent of the county's population (United States Census Bureau, 2020). In the state of Arizona, 90 percent of all Latinos are of Mexican origin and are U.S. citizens. Despite the narrative that Arizona has a large proportion of unauthorized immigrants, this is not the case. The expansion of the Latino population in Arizona has not occurred solely via immigration. As discussed earlier, the residents of both Arizona and México are closely intertwined due to the 370 mile-long border that runs between the two, but more so because Latinos are native to the region, which offers an explanation for their notable presence in Arizona in comparison to the national trends (Latino Decisions, 2014). The majority of the Latinos in Arizona were born in the U.S. and their families have been there for generations, dating back to pre-Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo enforced boundaries

(Saenz, 2010). According to the Migration Policy Institute, there are approximately 226,000 unauthorized immigrants in the state. Researchers estimate that there has been a decrease of 70,000 unauthorized individuals since 2009, when there was an economic recession. Furthermore, much of Arizona's growth has come from the migration of Latinos from other states who are in search of Arizona's recent economic development and job opportunities rather than from the undocumented community (Magaña & Silva, 2021).

THE LATINO ELECTORATE

Along with their population growth, Latinos are also the fastest growing minority group among eligible voters in America. In 2016, roughly 27 million Latinos were eligible to vote in the United States, making up approximately 11% of all voters (Bell, 2016). Only two years later, in 2018, the numbers increased to more than 29 million Latinos were eligible to vote nationwide, making up 12.8% of all eligible voters. Most recently, research conducted by the Latino Vote Project in 2019 predicted that 32 million Latinos will be eligible to vote in the 2020 elections, or 13.3% of all eligible voters, marking the first time in American history that Latinos will be the largest racial or ethnic minority in a U.S. presidential election (Latino Vote Project, 2019; Bustamante, Budiman, & Hugo-López, 2020). Helping this increase in voting power is the foreign-born eligible voter population, made up mostly of Latinos and Asians who, since the year 2000, have almost doubled their population making up 23.2 million eligible voters this year. In just the past 10 years, from 2009-2019, there was a spike in numbers with 7.2 million immigrants who naturalized and became citizens (Budiman, Noe-Bustamante, &

Hugo-López, 2020). Interestingly, in this year's 2020 presidential election, one-in-ten eligible voters are immigrants who are now naturalized citizens. Further, most of the 23 million naturalized citizens live in the following five states (not Arizona): California, New York, Florida, Texas, and New Jersey (Noe-Bustamante & Budiman, 2020). Although 32 million Latinos are projected to be eligible to vote in the 2020 presidential election, and this is record setting, 60 million Latinos live in the U.S. making the proportion of eligible Latino voters the smallest share of any racial or ethnic group (Bustamante, Budiman, & Hugo-López, 2020). This is because of the breakdown of the Latino population. Latinos in the U.S. are young, with 18.6 million under the voting age of 18. Additionally, there are 11.3 million non-citizen adults who are also unable to vote (Bustamante, Budiman, & Hugo-López, 2020).

In Arizona specifically, the number of eligible Latino voters has had a steady increase since the year 2000, when the Latino population was just under one million and 616,000 Latinos were eligible to vote (United States Census Bureau, 2002). Each year following this, the population of eligible voters increased as the overall Latino population increased (see Table 1) and for the 2018 midterm elections, the total Latino population in Arizona was around 1.6 million with 1.2 million eligible voters, or 24 percent of all eligible voters (United States Census Bureau, 2019; Igielnik & Budiman, 2020). In 2020, it is estimated that one-third of the Latinos in Arizona will be eligible to vote in the presidential election, making it an important battleground state that could be a deciding factor in the election (Igielnik & Budiman, 2020). Further, the population of the Latino

electorate in Arizona is expected to continue to rise into the future, making this state even more important to campaign to during election cycles (PEW Research Center, 2020).

Although the pool of eligible Latino voters has shown a steady growth in recent years, evidenced in the fact that an estimated eleven percent of the people who voted in the 2018 presidential elections were Latino (Krogstad et al., 2018), their overall low voter participation rates starkly contrast their surging growth. Latinos consistently do not reach their voting potential (Richomme, 2017). This is in part due to the youthful characteristics of this voting bloc, since currently, “millennials represented the single largest cohort of eligible voters for the Latino community” (Richomme, 2017). Historically, younger voters are less likely to cast a vote than older voters, leading to a barrier in the Latino vote since the overall population is young (Krogstad, Hugo-López, López, Passel, & Patten, 2016). This has also been the case in Arizona where, in 2018, “voters between 18 and 29 years of age comprised nearly 22% of the electorate in Arizona but only 8% of cast ballots” (Bergad, 2018).

Table 1

Arizona Latino Registration and Voting: 2000 - 2018

Election Year	Total Latinos	Citizen	% Citizen	Total Registered	% Registered	% Citizen Registered	Voted	% Voted	% Citizen Voted
2000	910,000	616,000	67.7	304,000	33.4	49.4	247,000	27.1	40.1
2004	1,160,000	629,000	54.2	354,000	30.5	56.3	296,000	25.5	47.1
2008	1,227,000	796,000	64.9	410,000	33.4	51.5	291,000	23.7	36.6
2012	1,396,000	989,000	70.8	516,000	37	52.2	400,000	28.7	40.4
2016	1,613,000	1,145,000	71	654,000	40.5	57.1	543,000	33.7	47.4
2018 (midterm)	1,624,000	1,205,000	74.2	757,000	46.6	62.8	588,000	36.2	48.8

Data obtained from United States Census Bureau.gov

Further, going back to the 2016 presidential election, Latino voters participated at a rate of 47.6%, showing significantly lower numbers than any other major American racial/ethnic group (Epstein, 2018). In comparison to the 2016 election averages of black voters (59%) and white voters (67%), this number is markedly low, but not very different from the 2008 or 2012 presidential election results where only 50% and 48% of the Latino electorate cast ballots (Epstein, 2018). In other words, Latinos have turned out to vote at around 50 percent from 2008-2018, a percentage that can considerably be improved upon. This is especially true in the state of Arizona where it is estimated that 31% of the population in 2020 is of Latino-origin, and where 1.2 million Latinos, or 24% of the state's total electorate, will be eligible to vote in the 2020 presidential election, (United States Census Bureau, 2019; Noe-Bustamante et al., 2020). One way that may be useful in remedying this is through outreach and engagement of the young Latino population. PEW research in 2016 revealed that the average age of the 35 million U.S. born Latinos at that time was only 19 years old, highlighting the importance of Latino youth as a source of eligible voter growth (PEW Research Center, 2016). Furthermore, Latino youth will be the principal factor adding to the total Latino electorate over the next fifteen years with an estimated 803,000 U.S.-born Latinos reaching adulthood every year (PEW Research Center, 2016).

OUTLINE

Keeping a strict focus on Latino voter turnout, as indicated in the statistics above, and as guided by the traditional definition of political participation, does not completely

reveal the ways in which Latinos contribute to the political process within the United States. Furthermore, these numbers propose that Latinos are not engaged in the political process, whether true or not, and in turn, has led to their dismissal by policy stakeholders in the agenda setting process, hindering their political opportunities based on the understanding of policy formation discussed earlier. In the following chapters, I will examine Latino political participation and anti-immigration legislation in the state of Arizona and analyze if, and how, these two are interconnected. Chapter Two will provide a historical overview of anti-immigration legislation in the United States and in the state of Arizona. This chapter will also review the causal mechanisms previously identified by the existing literature that have influenced the political participation of the Latino community, including a discussion regarding political entrepreneurs who have had an important role in shaping Arizona's anti-immigration legislation. Chapter Three provides a discussion of the methodology utilized in this research. Additionally, I will establish the use of the concept of funds of knowledge to recontextualize *Latino political participation* and how this can identify Latino political phenomena not previously acknowledged by the conventional definition. In Chapter Four, I examine the results and key findings of the research. Finally, in Chapter Five, I reflect on the research process and conclusions and offer my recommendations for future research and activism focused on Latino political participation.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

To examine the literature surrounding the relationship between anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation, I analyzed peer reviewed articles, books, trusted statistical websites, and news outlets that provided relevant content that discussed past and present salient anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation practices for both the national level and at the state level for Arizona. From this analysis, the following major areas of importance will be discussed: 1) a review of salient anti-immigration legislation nationally and in Arizona throughout time, 2) a review of Latino political participation (including historical trends and types of participation), and 3) variables affecting Latino political participation.

A BRIEF HISTORY: ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION

This section will briefly cover major anti-immigration legislation patterns throughout history of the United States and Arizona. To note, an in-depth review of Arizona's anti-immigration legislation, including sponsors and proponents of the bills, whether or not they were passed, and what exactly was proposed, will be included in Chapter 4 for the analysis and discussion of a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in the legislation in relation to Arizona's Latino political participation.

National anti-immigration legislation. Since its founding, the United States has had racialized immigration policies that tend to exclude people of color based on who is most useful to the U.S. at the time. The U.S. has essentially had a history of picking and choosing when to benefit from the immigrant existence and when to drive the population

out based on beliefs that the native-born citizen is being negatively affected by their presence. Further, there is evidence which shows that throughout U.S. history, whenever economic recession coincides with high levels of immigration, the result is a surge in Nativist¹ sentiment with retaliation against both the government and immigrants, consequently leading to “major reformulation of immigration controls” (Michalowski, 2013, p. 176). According to Michalowski (2013), this phenomenon has happened four times since the 1880s: “the Asian exclusion movement in the 1880s, deportations and the creation of ethnic quotas favoring Northern Europeans in the 1920s, ‘Operation Wetback’ in the 1950s to deport braceros back to México, and the current wave of anti-immigration politics targeting Latinos that began in the late 1990s” (p. 176).

In the 1920s, the United States Congress passed what is collectively referred to as the national-origins quota system, known as the most comprehensive, restrictive immigration laws in U.S. history (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014). The legislature passed during this time slowed the flow of immigrants into the United States dramatically. Further, the laws, such as the Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act), also known as the National Origins Act of 1924, were based on cultural and racist ideology which favored the entrance of immigrants from northwestern Europe. Xenophobic and racist opinions were prominent during this time period, and the lobbying efforts by prominent legislators who held eugenicist ideology led the push for the passage of the immigration act. Upon its signing, Vice President Calvin Coolidge state, “America must

¹ A *nativist* is a person who fears or resents immigrants to the United States and wants to take action. Actions include violence, restrictive immigration policy, and limiting the rights of legal immigrants already present. *Nativism* refers to ideologies, groups, and social movements that support restrictions on immigration. (Warner, 2009, p. 2)

be kept American,” revealing the popular sentiment of the time (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014, p. 211). Meanwhile, in the SWNAR, “the eugenics social science paradigm of the 1920s” also extended its reach over the Mexican-origin communities (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2017, p. 146). In this region, the Anglo hegemonic belief that Mexicans and Mexican children were “intellectually inferior” led to their circumscription in schools and hindered their educational development and attainment, creating decades long damage and forever scarring the Latino community (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2017). Further, the restrictionist laws complicated the naturalization process and made it almost impossible for the foreign-born to become citizens of the United States. This struggle, as well as the decrease in global migration slowed the amount of admissions into the U.S., “while critically shaping the destinies of immigrants and refugees who did make it into the United States” (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014, p. 208). Consequentially, these laws advised American immigration policy until 1965, when it was replaced with a less restrictive policy, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). This act removed regulations which based immigrant admission on their national origins and had given preference to western and northern European immigrants, which had been the case for more than 40 years, and opened the country for an influx of immigrants by allowing family reunification (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014).

Interestingly, in the years before World War I, immigration from México, other Latin American countries, and countries from the Western Hemisphere represented less than two percent of the United States’ immigration (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014). That would soon change and by the 1950s, Latino immigrants would make up nearly twenty-

five percent of all immigrants. Various factors in both the United States and in the Latin American countries encouraged the Latino community to migrate to the states. War and instability in a growing number of Latin American countries coupled with the United States' increasing labor market offered promise for Latino migrants. Additionally, "a vibrant Mexican American community in the American Southwest provided a familiar culture for newcomers" (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014, p. 224). The Quota Acts from the 1920s did not impose restrictions nor refuse entry of immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, due to the American need for cheap labor and at that time, the United States' aim to keep civil relationships with their neighboring countries (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014).

As discussed in Chapter One, the U.S. government's public sentiment regarding immigrants and Latinos, and the anti-immigration legislation of the 1920s – 1950s, largely affected the Latino-origin community residing in the United States during that time. Economic progress in the United States in the 1920s enticed Mexican immigrants into the workforce, taking jobs in the mining, transportation, construction, manufacturing, and even industrial industries of the Midwest. Throughout all of this, the Mexican origin community faced severe discrimination, mostly centered in the SWNAR, and when the Great Depression struck, so too did the increased anti-Mexican sentiment spread by U.S. policy makers and citizens to place blame on the Latino population: "Government prejudice and sensationalism in the press fanned the flames of anti-Mexican xenophobia," allowing for violence against Mexican Americans to occur without restraint, highlighting the marginality of Chicanos in American society (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014, p. 227).

During the decade of the Great Depression, immigration from México dropped from the previous decade's 460,000 to only 22,000 (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014, p. 226).

Furthermore, the negative social construction of the Mexican origin community by the government spurred the "Great Repatriation" which deported around 500,000 Mexican nationals and Mexican Americans (Sánchez, 1993).

The U.S. economy again recovered in the 1940s and the U.S. again was focused on making civil alliances with their neighboring countries. In 1942, this led to the development of the Bracero Program, a treaty between the U.S. and México in which contracted guest workers from México crossed the border to fill the industry and agricultural jobs that assisted the U.S. in filling its labor needs and keeping peace with México (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014). Amid the continued racism and the farm industry's exploitation of Mexican cheap labor, illegal immigration escalated in response to the Bracero Program's advertisement of employment opportunities in the U.S. This led to the United States' concern with "undocumented aliens," and between the years of 1954 – 1958, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) raids deported nearly 3.8 million people, both citizen and undocumented, to México in what was known as Operation Wetback (Radzilowski, & Ciment, 2014).

In the 1960s, the United States introduced new immigration policies that affected Mexicans and other Latin Americans and made it more difficult for them to enter the country *legally*. Before the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Latinos, and especially Mexicans, were able to easily enter the U.S. legally because there had been no limit placed on the amount of immigrants that could enter the states from the Western

Hemisphere. Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 placed a 120,000-person limit on immigrants from the Western hemisphere. This directly impacted the Latino immigrant community because they continued to enter the country, but now they were entering as undocumented immigrants, shifting the immense immigration flow from a legal one to an enormously illegal one. Thus, setting the stage for the subsequent framing of Latinos as lawbreakers and criminals, the creation of anti-immigrant hostility aimed at Latinos, and the rise of the “Latino threat narrative” which “portrayed immigration as threatening or alarming” (Massey, 2013, p. 262). The Latino community’s persistent population growth and visibility, even after the implementation of immigration policy modifications that were meant to suppress this group’s existence, was met with “a systematic process of racialization—a dedicated campaign of psychological framing and social boundary construction intended to position them as a stigmatized out-group in American social cognition,” marking a beginning of the demonization of Latinos that has continued to present times (Massey, 2013, p. 257).

Fast forward to the 1990s, and in 1996, two salient sections of immigration regulation at the federal level were enacted, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (also known as the Welfare Reform Act, WRA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (also known as the Immigration Reform Act). The WRA, labeled as the “new politics of immigration,” amended the eligibility of poor families to receive welfare benefits and social services, limited the eligibility of “legal” immigrants to receive services, and continued to deny services to undocumented immigrants (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014,

p. 267). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) established measures to manage the United States' borders by "strengthening U.S. immigration laws, adding penalties for undocumented immigrants who commit crimes while in the United States or who stay in the U.S. for statutorily defined periods of time" (Cornell Law School, n.d.). Cornell Law School further explains:

The Act was designed to improve border control by imposing criminal penalties for racketeering, alien smuggling and the use or creation of fraudulent immigration-related documents and increasing interior enforcement by agencies charged with monitoring visa applications and visa abusers. The Act also allows for the deportation of undocumented immigrants who commit a misdemeanor or a felony. (para. 2)

This policy added restrictions on benefits for immigrants while expanding the grounds of exclusion and deportation of immigrants and it also limited and eliminated other discretionary waivers of deportability that also affected legal residents. It broadened the ability of state and local law enforcement involvement in deportation and made 'removal' proceedings more streamlined. It also implemented restrictions on legal immigrants that limited them from receiving social services such as food stamps and social security (Magaña, 2013). Its main purpose was to decrease the movement of undocumented immigrants into the United States as well as the number of unauthorized persons already there (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). Essentially, the overall purpose of the bill was the intent to protect legal workers through worksite enforcement and to remove criminal and deportable immigrants (Magaña, 2013). Future provisions of this law enacted in 2006

would prove detrimental to the immigrant population—this will be discussed in the forthcoming paragraphs. Additionally, both sets of legislation were aimed at curtailing illegal immigration by creating barriers that would “encourage” the Latino population to return to their perspective country of origin.

Moving into the twenty-first century, anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States was once again heightened, this time by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a new class of immigration policies were mandated. Issues with immigration which were primarily focused on economic and cultural concerns changed to focus on the issue of national security. Public sentiment against immigrants grew as a result of the attacks and expanded from negative sentiment against unauthorized immigration across our borders to include immigrants overall. In response, President George W. Bush introduced the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) which made immigration and border regulation policies more strict in an effort to prevent further attacks (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). Consequently, immigrants entering the United States after that time underwent more rigorous standards to prove their identity and legal status and in 2003 were subjected to the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System where they were fingerprinted, photographed, interrogated, and made to notify the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) about their plans/reasoning for being in the country (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014).

In 2003, a policy was passed that disbanded the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and reallocated its two functions, enforcement and immigration services, to be supervised under the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, DHS. The premise of this change was the idea that this move would “prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation” (Koulish, 2009, p. 6). Further, the INS’s previous responsibilities for regulating immigration shifted, reinforcing a new emphasis on national security and the deterrence of terrorism. As a result, the new mandate increased scrutiny of foreign visitors, shifting the view of immigrants as sources for the labor market to plausible threats to be scrutinized under security measures. In 2005, another policy focused on national security, the REAL ID Act, was enacted in reaction to fear surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks and based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, or The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Koulish, 2009). One provision of this policy allowed the federal government to reestablish the guidelines for issuing sources of identification like driver’s licenses. This policy also “precluded judicial review of all discretionary decisions and removed an entire level of review for immigrants in removal proceedings” (Koulish, 2009). Operation Streamline was also enacted in 2005, as a joint initiative of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, this legislation enforced a “zero-tolerance” approach to unauthorized border-crossing and allowed the criminal prosecution of those engaging in it. This devolution of immigration enforcement from federal to local, or as a “multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” (MJP) of enforcement authority, facilitated the “streamlining” of the criminalization of immigrants,

subsequently promoting an even deeper-rooted negative connotation of this population (Getrich, 2013, p. 465; Varsanyi et al., 2012, p. 139).

Also, in 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437), also known as the Sensenbrenner Immigration Bill (National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), n.d.). This legislation was proposed in order to seek “to address illegal immigration by strengthening interior enforcement of immigration laws and enacting additional border security measures” (NCSL, n.d.). This bill charged unauthorized immigrants with a felony, criminalizing what had previously been a purely civil offense (Magaña & Silva, 2021). This was especially punitive, because if an immigrant is charged with a felony, he or she can never gain naturalized status or become a US citizen. In response, immigrant rights’ groups nationwide organized mass protests involving hundreds of thousands of people (NCSL, n.d.). Most alarming is that this legislation expanded the number of detainees held indefinitely in private prisons or detention centers by overturning two Supreme Court rulings that mandated “the fair treatment and due process for immigrants held indefinitely by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)” (Youmans, 2005, para. 2). It was ultimately passed by passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 239 to 182, but did not pass the Senate (NCSL, n.d.).

In 2006, provisions to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 were proposed. Significant in drastically changing the lives of immigrants and Latinos in general was the largely unnoticed provision—287(g)—which was passed into law. This provision authorized state and local police officers to

collaborate with the federal government to carry out immigration policies. The 287(g) program, as it was called, deputized and trained police departments to conduct raids for illegal immigrants (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). Radzilowski and Ciment (2014) explain that:

State and local patrol officers, detectives, investigators, and correctional officers working in conjunction with ICE gained the resources and authority to pursue investigations relating to violent crimes, human smuggling, gang or organized crime activity, sexual-related offenses, narcotics smuggling and money laundering, and received more support for investigation activities in remote geographic locations. (p. 288)

This provision gave local law enforcement, after a short training with federal agencies, the legal capacity to target entire communities, spurring anti-immigrant campaigns and to workplace and neighborhood canvassing by the local police, which magnified the sense of distrust and vulnerability amongst the undocumented and native born Latino communities (Magaña, 2013). Some sections of this bill are still in effect nationwide and continue to authorize the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to work with local law enforcement agencies to allow federally trained officers to implement local immigration policies, blurring the lines between federal and state responsibilities and permitting the facilitation of civil rights abuses, which was the result in Arizona during the reign of Maricopa County Sherriff Joe Arpaio (Department of Homeland Security, 2009).

Overview of Arizona anti-immigration legislation. While the federal government was enacting changes nationwide, at the state-wide level, states were carrying out federal anti-immigration laws while also enacting their own specific anti-immigration legislation. As mentioned before, over thirty states have turned to “omnibus” immigration laws aimed at subjugating immigrants and their movements. Without going into specific detail about Arizona’s anti-immigration legislation, the following summarizes the intent of the anti-immigration legislation and how, in some ways, it has affected the Latino community of Arizona. It in no way summarizes the totality of the legislation or its effects on the Latino population, both undocumented and documented, but provides a context for an understanding of the timing of the legislation and the surrounding historical and political environment. A more detailed look at the legislation can be seen in Appendix B and will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

It is first important to note that the state of Arizona did not “all of the sudden” begin to target immigrants with stringent anti-immigration legislation as may be decisively portrayed through the media. In actuality, the onslaught of anti-immigrant related policies enacted by the Arizona state legislature began at slow pace and with small measures. Over time, the amount of legislation increased while concurrently becoming more punitive (Manzano, 2013). This strategy, put in use by the anti-immigrant policy entrepreneurs, was “designed to grind away at immigrant communities through the denial of services until they felt so unwelcome they would decide to return en masse to home countries” (Bada, Fox, Donnelly, & Selee, 2010, p. 63). This tactic of “legislation of attrition,” as it is known as, is based on the military strategy of attrition warfare—“the

sustained process of wearing down an opponent so as to force their physical collapse through continuous losses in personnel, equipment and supplies or to wear them down to such an extent that their will to fight collapses” (Murray, 2016, para. 1). This strategy is attributed to the First World War and ironically is often used when, “accusing generals of lacking imagination and simply throwing soldiers at their opponents in the hope that greater numbers would provide victory,” a tribute that can be applied to the purveyors of the legislation, as well as the copycat legislature that began to spread uncreatively through the United States (Murray, 2016, para. 2).

The start of the legislation of attrition in Arizona began shortly before the year 2000, when in response to increased border crossings in the area, due to the 1994 passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—an agreement that created an increase in the people and goods crossing between the U.S. and México border, resulted in the creation of the program “Operation Safeguard” in Arizona which intended to regulate immigrants crossing the border (Lybecker, 2008). This program attempted to deter illegal crossing of the border through unregulated paths by encouraging passage through designated points of entry, thus increasing the number of patrols monitoring the border, implementing stricter management of the region, and attaching a stigma of “illegal” to the immigrants attempting to cross (Lybecker, 2008). Private landowners and small towns along the Arizona border, frustrated with the new influx of people, began to spread their negative sentiment of the Latino immigrants who came through the region. This was detected by the local and national government and categorized as a “problem that needed a solution” by policy entrepreneurs seeking to benefit from new policy

formation. Their desire for anti-immigration policies funded anti-immigrant media messaging and fueled negative stereotypes of the Mexican immigrant and Latino community. Construing the argument that the safety and security of employment for U.S. citizens would be achieved by border reinforcement and immigration control, many Arizonians agreed with and even promoted government funding of the anti-immigration push (Jensen, 2013). The popularized narrative of the criminalization of the Mexican/Latino would dissipate throughout the border region, resulting in the onslaught of anti-immigrant targeted legislation that would shape the state and the Latino community of the SWNAR.

In 2000, Arizona legislature passed Proposition 203, or a type of “English-only” legislation, that stated that all public schooling, kindergarten through grade 12, was required to be instructed in English only (Águila, 2013). This anti-bilingual education ruling ended native-language instruction for children who had limited English proficiency, hindering their educational potential, and imposing a statewide English-only mandate (Manzano, 2013; Águila, 2013). This culturally targeted proposition was passed with a staggering 63 percent approval by the Arizona legislature. Although this legislation appeared to only be a small change, targeting communities outside of the Anglo monolingual population, it has caused irreparable damage to the educational achievement and progress of the Latino community to this day (Vélez-Ibañez, 2017). Furthermore, the strong support of this kind of legislation demonstrated to Arizona candidates and policymakers, as well as to national anti-immigration groups who were diligently observing, that voters would support policies that targeted “outsider” cultures.

To the policy entrepreneurs, political parties, and candidates, the details and implementation of the legislation was less important than the understanding that they could pass immigrant-targeted ballot measures in Arizona, indicating that the state electorate could be used to try out politically divisive ballot initiatives (Manzano, 2013). The success of these types of policies in Arizona in the years to follow (discussed in the next few paragraphs), would demonstrate the normalization of racist policies to the rest of the United States.

In 2004, Proposition 200, the Arizona Taxpayer Citizen Protection Act, also called “Protect Arizona Now” (PAN) by its supporters, was brought to the ballot. Proposition 200 was subsequently passed, which made it mandatory for people to verify their identity in order to receive government subsidies, and it also charged government employees with misdemeanors if they provided services to anyone believed to be undocumented (Bada et al., 2010). The rationale for this policy was that there were too many unauthorized immigrants in the state of Arizona that were unlawfully using welfare benefits and voting illegally (Magaña, 2013). As a result, Proposition 200 was developed to block unauthorized immigrants from receiving government-funded services in Arizona and voting, even though unauthorized immigrants cannot vote or receive welfare or social services in Arizona. Supporters of the act believed, inaccurately, that immigrants were coming to Arizona to vote illegally, and part of Proposition 200 ensured that immigrant voter fraud would be deterred by placing more restrictions on the types of identification that can be shown in order to vote—a voter in Arizona must show proof of US citizenship when registering to vote or voting at polling places, voter registration cards would no

longer be accepted. This voter suppression tactic is effective because for individuals that do not have a birth certificate, passport, or license, which is sometimes the case if it was misplaced or if someone cannot afford to travel, drive, or own a car, or pay for a license or passport, this policy excluded them from being able to vote (Magaña, 2013). This was the beginning of a wave of legislation aimed at targeting immigrant communities through the denial of services in an effort to drive them back to their home countries (Bada et al., 2010).

In 2005, the passing of A.R.S. § 13-2319, or the “Coyote law,” made “smuggling undocumented persons across the border a felony, authorized local police to enforce immigration law, and classified persons being smuggled as co-conspirators” (Szkupinski-Quiroga et al., 2014, p. 1726). Following this, the increased anti-immigrant sentiment that had been spreading across Arizona became more profound with the enactment of Proposition 100, Proposition 102, Proposition 103, and Proposition 300 in 2006 (Szkupinski-Quiroga et al., 2014). Proposition 100 denied bail for immigrants who were unlawfully in the United States on the premise that “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that the person is guilty of the offense charged (Téllez, 2015, pp. 202-203). Proposition 102 denied unauthorized immigrants from bringing and receiving monetary compensation from civil cases (Magaña, 2013). This policy excluded immigrants from filing claims of wrongdoing against them in the workplace and beyond. Proposition 103 built upon the previous “English-only” schooling legislation and was known as the “English-only Law” (Téllez, 2015, p. 202). This legislature made English Arizona’s official state language and required all official state business, including court

activities and government departments that work to protect workers' rights, to be completed in English (Téllez, 2015).

One of the most undeserved laws to be passed in 2006 was Proposition 300. This legislation made any unauthorized immigrant immediately ineligible for in-state college tuition, government grants, scholarships, or financial aid. This policy banned undocumented immigrants and those who were born out of the country, from receiving funding for higher education, even if they had otherwise lived in Arizona their whole life (Magaña, 2013). At community colleges and universities across Arizona, immigrant students were forced to drop their courses because they could no longer afford their now costly tuition since they were banned from their own hard-earned scholarships, as well as government grants and financial aid (Magaña, 2013). This legislation received major backlash from Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipients, also known as DREAMers, who were granted exemption from deportation based on an executive order that former President Obama signed in 2012, which called for the deferred action of unauthorized young people who came to the United States as children (Radzilowski & Ciment, 2014). Their activism in the battle against anti-immigration legislation in Arizona will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

In 2007, Governor Janet Napolitano signed House Bill 2779, or the "Legal Arizona Workers Act," an Arizona employers sanctions law that required employers to verify that their employees are in the country legally (Magaña, 2013). This policy stated that if an employer knowingly hires an unauthorized worker, he or she is subject to a 10-day suspension of a state business license, and if found guilty for a second offense, the

employer could face permanent revocation of a state license (Magaña, 2013). In January 2008, this law was set in motion, and all employers were required to utilize the identity and immigration status verification system to verify a worker's status via the Employment Eligibility Verification System (EEV), commonly known as E-Verify with all new hires (Télez, 2015; Feller, 2009). Based on this system, if an employee is in the country illegally or their status cannot be verified, the employer receives a "Notice of Suspect Documents," and are then considered informed and must terminate employment as well as not rehire the employee in the future. Although this policy appeared to target the employers rather than the employees, evidence throughout time has shown that it has predominantly been used to target undocumented employees. Since the time that this policy was enacted, thousands of workers have been fired and hundreds of arrests of workers have been executed while only three employers have been prosecuted (Szkupinski-Quiroga, 2014; Télez, 2015).

In 2010, House Bill 2281, the ban on ethnic studies was passed. This bill came in response to controversy surrounding the Mexican American studies program in the Tucson, Arizona public school system that originally occurred in 2007 (Gershon, 2017). At an even at Tucson High School in 2007, Dolores Huerta, Chicana activist, gave a speech "covering a broad range of contemporary political issues including women's rights, queer inclusion, race, im- migration, and global capitalism," and during the speech, she made a comment that Republican hate Latinos (Jensen, 2013, p. 87). Offended by this comment, former State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Tom Horne, retaliated by authoring HB 2281 specifically targeting the Mexican American

studies program. In an open letter posted to Arizona's Department of Education website, he wrongly portrays ethnic studies programs as entities that, "teach kids that they are oppressed, that the United States is dominated by a white, racist, imperialist power structure that wants to oppress them" (Jensen, 2013, p. 87). Making this statement as a state public official was very impactful in shaping the public opinion of ethnic studies, as discussed in Chapter One regarding policy formation, and essentially led to the passage of the legislature banning ethnic studies and his appointment as state attorney general in 2010 (Jensen, 2013). Horne's work to deface the Mexican American studies program by "falsely uniting ethnic studies programs with racial exclusivity, racism, and fanaticism" promotes the negative propaganda of the Latino people and guarantees hegemonic Anglo "colonial" practices for the future (Gershon, 2017).

While the Latino youth of Arizona were fighting for their rights to access a culturally appropriate study of history, the basic civil rights of the entire Latino community in Arizona would be placed in jeopardy. In April of 2010, one of the most impactful and stringent laws negatively impacting the Latino community, both citizen and undocumented, in Arizona was proposed and passed. Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), co-sponsored by State Senator Russell Pearce and Representative John Kavanagh, was designed to slow immigration rates through intimidation tactics (Magaña, 2013). Kavanagh, another public official spreading the agenda of the criminalization of Latinos, widely shared his blatant disdain for the immigrant community and his anti-immigrant sentiment, his actions repeating history in another cyclical backlash of the Latino immigrant community. He construed and spread a negative construction of the Latino

community by saying that “Illegal immigration brings crime, kidnapping, drugs—drains our government services” (Rodríguez, 2017). The legislation was approved by the Arizona Legislature on Monday, April 19, and signed into law on Friday, April 23, 2010. With its passing, “Senate Bill 1070 was implemented allowing law enforcement officers to question an individual’s immigration status if reasonable suspicion was present that an individual may be undocumented” (Rubio-Hernández & Ayón, 2016). This omnibus law, or multifaceted law, called the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” was signed into law by then Arizona Governor Jan Brewer. It later became known as the “Papers Please,” or “show me your papers” legislation and authorized state and local police officers to assume federal immigration responsibilities by checking the immigration status of anyone they arrested or suspected was in the country “illegally.” SB 1070 criminalized Arizona residents and citizens, basing arrests and stops on those people who were deemed to “look illegal” (Téllez, 2015, p. 204). This bill was considered as an “attrition through enforcement” policy aimed at decreasing the numbers of undocumented immigrants in Arizona by taking them into custody and then deporting them (Téllez, 2015).

Due to concerns about the law’s possible racial profiling raised by the Arizona Legislature, HB 2162 was created to include provisions that would address these concerns by specifying that law enforcement officials cannot consider race, color or national origin when implementing the provisions of the original law, except as permitted by the U.S. or Arizona Constitution (Morse, 2011). The house bill intended to clarify SB 1070’s language around “reasonable suspicion” by requiring state and local law

enforcement to determine the immigration status of a person only while in the process of a lawful stop, detention or arrest, whereas the original language referred to any “lawful contact” (Morse, 2011). HB 2162 also required that the lawful stop, detention, or arrest must be due to the enforcement of any other violation of law in the state of Arizona. In other words, in theory, a person could no longer be stopped based on their physical attributes, they must have been stopped for violating other laws (Magaña, 2013).

Although this house bill aimed to remedy the blatant racial profiling and racism toward the Latino community, damage to this community from the targeting of Latinos “who appear “reasonably suspicious” of being undocumented” had already been carried out, and negative ideology surrounding this community had already been perpetuated and promoted by Arizona’s political leaders (Saldívar, 2015, p. 53).

THE ACTIONS OF ALEC AND FAIR

ALEC. Briefly introduced in Chapter One for its role in developing Senate Bill 1070, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is an organization that has been responsible for numerous “policies of attrition” that lack imagination which have spanned the nation. This “nonpartisan,” conservative political entrepreneur is known to have supplied fully drafted bills to state legislators in an effort to influence their laws for the betterment of their wealthy corporate funders (America’s Voice, 2012). Many of ALEC’s bills focus on conservative objectives, such as overturning environmental protection, weakening unions, and implementing tax breaks for corporations and the wealthy. Not surprisingly, what appears to be ALEC’s vested interest is privatization, or taking funding for public services and giving them to for-profit corporations (America’s

Voice, 2012). Since its founding, ALEC has developed and perfected a “highly organized and sophisticated machine” that pushes the interests of its corporate funders, and Arizona is known to have one of the highest concentrations of ALEC legislators of any state (Cooper et al., 2016, p. 384; America’s Voice, 2012). What has been the most influential in the state of Arizona is this organization’s relationship with prison contract companies, lobbyists, and politicians who benefit from the passing of anti-immigrant laws that imprison immigrants and in turn increase their profits (America’s Voice, 2012). This is what encouraged the development and passing of SB 1070 in Arizona in 2010. Since some of ALEC’s beneficiaries of privatization are made up of for-profit prisons, such as the Corrections Corporation of America and Geo Group, the passing of SB 10 70 was a strategic move to keep their prisons full (America’s Voice, 2012; Elk & Sloan, 2011). Through the increase in criminalization of immigrants, which extended the state’s ability to put them in prisons and detention centers, SB 1070 led to “hundreds of millions of dollars in profits to private prison companies responsible for housing them” (Lacayo, 2011, p. 2). Additionally, ALEC has worked on a long term strategy of fear, both creating and manipulating the “fears” of the public sector to encourage the popularity of the “Latino threat narrative” and other issues aimed at fabricating a public problem that the public sector then feels needs to be fixed (as discussed in Chapter One’s explanation of policy formation) (America’s Voice, 2012). Over the years, ALEC has quickly been able to change public sentiment to include the spread of racist ideology, such as the criminality of Latino immigrants. Thus, providing the public sector with “evidence” that anti-immigration legislation *needs* to be implemented to keep Americans safe. This,

among other strategically formulated beliefs that benefit their corporate funders, dominate their political messages and marketing. Due to this, the ideas and policies that ALEC promotes disproportionately affect people of color, the elderly, poor Americans, and students (Center for Constitutional Rights et al., 2019; Cooper et al., 2016).

FAIR. The concoction of SB 1070 was not solely contrived by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Another large political entrepreneur also joined efforts to put the legislation in place—the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and its legal division, the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), played a large role in authoring the bill (Lacayo, 2011). FAIR, which was established in 1979, is focused on the nativist agenda and progressing immigration restriction policies at all levels of government, such as “ending birthright citizenship (using the phrase “anchor babies” often), banning bilingual education and implementing official English laws” (Manzano, 2013, p. 329). Part of their approach is influencing immigration legislation at all sectors of government by providing financial, strategic and organizational support for anti-immigrant campaigns throughout the United States (Manzano, 2013). The Southern Poverty Law Center states the following regarding FAIR: The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) is a group with one mission: to severely limit immigration into the United States. Although FAIR maintains a veneer of legitimacy that has allowed its principals to testify in Congress and lobby the federal government, this veneer hides a considerable amount of ugliness. FAIR leaders have ties to white supremacist groups and eugenicists and have made many racist statements. Its advertisements have been rejected because of racist content. FAIR’s founder, John Tanton, has expressed his wish that

America remain a majority-white population: a goal to be achieved, presumably, by limiting the number of nonwhites who enter the country. One of the group's main goals is upending the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which ended a decades-long, racist quota system that limited immigration mostly to northern Europeans. FAIR President Dan Stein has called the Act a 'mistake' (2016).

The plan of FAIR from the beginning was to single out the states where concern and anger regarding immigrant population growth had been felt and where they believed that political support for attrition legislation would be passed. Based on this, Arizona was the first state to be targeted for their trial of aggressive anti-immigration legislation (Michalowski, 2013). The President of the Arizona State Senate, aggressive anti-immigration activist, and tenured member of IRLI, Russell Pearce, would quickly agree to the proposal and drafting of SB 1070 in coordination with FAIR, which would later be passed and implemented.

In addition to backing SB 1070, the organization also helped to fund proposition 187 in California in 1994 and Proposition 200 in 2004 in Arizona, as well as many other anti-immigrant proposals in Arizona and across the country (Lacayo, 2011). The goals of these and other right-wing group legislation include increased federal law enforcement on the border (which critics classify as "militarization"), major decreases or a moratorium on legal immigration, the mass deportation of unauthorized immigrants, and a concerted opposition to so-called "amnesty" proposals or immigrant guest-worker programs (Magaña & Silva, 2021). The combined efforts of ALEC and FAIR in Arizona politics has been vital to the rise in anti-immigration legislation, as well as to another specialty of

these organizations, silencing the efforts of Latinos through voter suppression legislation and other tactics historically known to affect Latino political participation (Cooper et al., 2016).

LATINO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

History of Latino political participation. Scholars argue that, “the field of Latino politics should be understood as an integral part of, rather than an appendage to, the study of American politics as a whole” (Jones-Correa et al., 2018, p. 214). Neglect of the existence of the Latino community within the political science realm had an impact on understanding, at the very least, Latino political behavior or interest (Orr et al., 2014). There was no published literature or interest in studying the Latino population’s political behavior, policy interests, or political leadership until 1970 (Orr et al., 2014). Just as the era of the 1930s to 1970s socially and politically excluded the nation’s people of color, Latino Americans and African Americans to name two, through institutional structures, such as the Jim Crow segregations and voter suppression laws, so too did social science research exclude them from existence (Orr et al., 2014).

In his work, DeSipio (2006), provides an insight into the history of Latino politics and the “institutional structures that lead to differential levels of mobilization and compositional differences between Latino and non-Latino populations” (p. 459). DeSipio (2006) notes that Mexican Americans and Latinos and their political participation have been impacted by years of political manipulation and neglect beginning from the time of the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 (p. 450). At that time, Mexican Americans were included as citizens within the United States and were allowed to

participate in electoral politics. They even had a continuous representation in parts of the Southwest, but this Latino experience was one built on manipulation and neglect by the non-Latino white population (DeSipio, 2006). The Anglos at the time controlled the Mexican American political machines that were intended to “serve the interests of the local economic elites” (DeSipio, 2006, p. 451), and to continue their manipulation, urged and guaranteed that certain chosen Mexican Americans continued to hold office (DeSipio, 2006). This continuous manipulation from “long-term machine politics” has resulted in “passivity” and a “commensurate sense of political incapacity” amongst Mexican Americans (DeSipio, 2006, p. 451) that is still evident in the lack of Latino political participation today.

In addition to the longstanding “passivity” that was instilled through Anglo manipulation and hegemony, were the processes put in place that led to the delayed emergence and weak development of a Latino civic infrastructure (DeSipio, 2006, pp. 452-453). One important reason for the slow advancement of the Latino civic infrastructure was the fact that Latino community elites participated in electoral and partisan activities and were able to shape policy implementation based on their needs. This façade of power held by Latino elites coupled with a rural and dispersed population lessened the perceived need to create a community-based civic infrastructure, which led to the inability of Latinos to provide a cohesive voice to Congress in 1975 when the discussion of how to increase Latino voting rates came about (DeSipio, 2006, pp. 452-453). This was in stark contrast to the African American community who, due to being

denied political rights, prioritized civic organization with the inclusion of all class levels and quickly worked to gain a political voice (DeSipio, 2006, p. 452).

Types of Latino political participation. Generally, the most prevalent types of Latino political participation throughout the Latino community consist of “voting, organizational activity, charitable activities, and school-based activities” (DeSipio, 2006, p. 456). Latino civic and political engagement is wide-ranging and can include “volunteering in neighborhood associations to involvement in parent-teacher associations, and from marching in protests to voting in elections” (Jones-Correa et al., 2018, p. 215). In addition to these modes of participation, Latinos also engage in circulating petitions, demonstrations, contacting their local representatives, attending public meetings/forums, affiliating with political or community-based organizations, contributing to electoral campaigns, protests, lobbying, and working for political campaigns, etc. (DeSipio, 2006; Saldívar, 2015).

Further, it is not only the adults who have chosen to politically participate in innovative ways, adolescent Latinos are likewise partaking in activist groups and activities which have shown to increase their likelihood of political participation in future elections (Terríquez, 2017). Additionally, in 2006, in response to the Sensenbrenner Bill, which, as discussed earlier, charged unauthorized immigrants with a felony, both high school and college students stretched their political muscle by staging walkouts, marches, and protests in solidarity with their friends and families as a stand against Latino racial profiling and other anti-immigrant sentiments (Bada et al., 2010). The young Latinos that helped to organize these political movements were made up of “U.S.-born citizens,

permanent residents, foreign-born naturalized citizens, and unauthorized residents” who all shared the intent of commanding respect for all, regardless of citizenship (Bada et al., 2010, p. 38).

Coalitions have also been valuable in drawing Latino political participation from multiple groups based on a common goal; “a Latino national political coalition can be defined as an alliance among different Latino subgroups for joint political action” (Rodríguez, 2002, p. 2). In recent times, coalitions between traditional and non-traditional labor organizations aimed at increasing civic engagement, including participating in get-out-the-vote campaigns, amongst all Latinos has been implemented by Latino immigrant organizations in Los Angeles, San José, Chicago, and Las Vegas (Bada et al., 2010). New advancements in technology have seen the development of social media as a tool for sharing political agendas and messages, as well as for advocating for political mobilization. This new tool may have “a mobilizing effect that can help reduce the existing participatory divides among individuals with lower socioeconomic status,” having the ability to stimulate the previously inactive lower SES segment of the Latino community and “reverse the patterns of political inequality” (Velásquez & Quenette, 2018, p. 764; Xenos et al., 2014, p. 151). Multiple studies on political participation and social media have reflected that an individual’s social media network and behaviors correlate with their political participation online and offline (Conroy et al., 2012; Velásquez & Quenette, 2018). Further, increased online political group membership was related to increased offline political participation and engagement, but it did not necessarily increase their levels of political knowledge due to the algorithms that only

allowed for the viewing of overemphasized partisan news (Conroy et al., 2012; Velásquez & Quenette, 2018; Silva et al., 2018). Positively, Latino youth leaders involved in the 2006 immigrant rights rallies, who had not had previous organizing experience, utilized their social media and mobile devices as a means for organizing the community due to their useful online social networking skills (Saldívar, 2015).

As discussed earlier, all segments of the Latino population are involved in political participation, “Immigrants, even the undocumented, engage in political coalitions, movements, mobilizations, and other practices that would constitute political citizenship in their communities” (Chávez, 2013, p. 14). Therefore, it is evidenced that Latino citizens are not the only part of the Latino community who participate in political activity. Depending on citizenship status, Latino immigrants “may be more likely to participate in unconventional politics” that are “lower-risk” (Martínez, 2005, p. 138). Yet, they continue to participate, joining in “grassroots organizing and advocacy efforts to address community concerns, public outreach and mobilization through social media and online venues, and protest activity” (Terríquez, 2017, pp. 315-316). An example of this is seen through the political participation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) activists, who oftentimes are undocumented youth, and their numerous allies who are a combination of unauthorized and authorized citizens (Seif et al., 2014). DACA activists “actively and very visibly led the fight for the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act,” which was aimed at providing many of the undocumented youth with a pathway to citizenship (Terríquez, 2017, p. 315). Although this segment of the Latino populace is not allowed to vote, they continue to be widely

known for their relentless activism, grassroots organizing, and high levels of civic engagement overall (Mendoza, 2016).

VARIABLES AFFECTING LATINO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Just as Latino political participation is multifaceted, so too are the variables that affect this community's ability to participate. There is evidence to suggest that historical hegemonic practices have played and continue to play a role in Latino political participation. The long history of the "marginalization and stereotyping of Latino immigrants," that dates back to the 1960s when Latinos were portrayed as a "grave threat to the American culture, society, and the economy" and were subjected to "increasingly harsh and repressive enforcement actions" by public policy, can be used to explain the Latino sentiment of social exclusion and the "political disengagement" of this marginalized community (Massey, 2013, p. 258; Orr et al., 2014, p. 25). The treatment of the Latino community as the "other" has not shown a marked improvement contemporarily and neither has the concurrent sentiment of social exclusion eluded to this community, and both of these factors have a role in influencing Latino political participation. The support and promotion of racist ideology and the scapegoating of the Latino community by political entrepreneurs, like ALEC and FAIR, can be attributed to this phenomenon (Michalowski, 2013).

The literature revealed that the continued "othering" of the Latino population by Anglo socio-cultural and economic hegemonic practices, put in place by organizations like ALEC and FAIR, and the harsh sentiment and rhetoric regarding Latinos and undocumented immigrants, tended to deter Latinos from political participation because

they, “felt deliberately targeted and that their citizenship and civil rights were debased” (Saldívar, 2015, p. 71). Additionally, Latino citizens reported feeling like ““second-class citizens’ with diminished faith in American democracy,” and as a result, they did not want to participate in formal political activities (Saldívar, 2015, p. 71). More recently, the political discourse shaped by the Trump administration which “manipulates political images and rhetoric” and creates the social standard that “Latinos are “criminals and rapists” and, therefore, undeserving of state resources and in need of discipline and punishment” has resulted in depressing Latino political participation (Moreno, 2018, p. 89). This implementation of “othering” did “deter individuals [Latinos] who are already vulnerable and marginalized from engaging in political processes, thwarting their civic engagement” (Moreno, 2018, p. 102).

The introduction of voter suppression tactics like “English only” legislation has also contributed to the traditionally depressed voting participation of the Latino community. Research has shown that language ability (being able to speak English at a certain proficiency level) and social network diversity (interconnecting with citizen and non-citizen, Latino and non-Latino segments of the population) as being further key indicators of Latino political participation (Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012). Language and language ability have played an important role in political access and engagement for Latinos in the United States due to the Spanish language that many speak. Throughout history, Latino barriers to political involvement have centered around the extensive discrimination of their Spanish tongue and English illiteracy (De La Garza & Yang, 2015). This is one important part of history that continues to impact Latino political

behavior and participation. The ability to speak fluent English has been critical to engaging in the electoral process and many Latinos who live in the U.S. do not speak English fluently, whether newly immigrated or generationally planted (Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012). For example, research on students with limited English skills revealed that “over half of the Spanish-dominant student population was born in the United States (Pearson-Merkowitz, 2012). Subsequently, the enactment of the federal Voting Rights Act in 1975 attempted to remedy this issue by providing ballot materials and voting assistance in other languages for non-English speakers (Hopkins, 2011, p. 814).

In addition to language fluency creating a barrier to willingness to participate politically, a review of the literature also indicated a recent shift in support for the implementation of restrictive voting laws in many states. In the 1990s and early 2000s, expanded access to voting and political participation was part of a reform to encourage increased participation in elections (Bateman, 2016). These progressive national and local reforms “moved to facilitate registration, to establish and expand early voting, to relax requirements for absentee balloting, and in a few states to mandate that most voting be conducted by mail (Bateman, 2016, p. 42). As discussed earlier for policy formation, placing a vote and having a voice politically allows a population to have a fair chance at legislation passed that is in their favor. The states that had expanded access to voting and participation in turn had a greater turnout from the ethnic and minority populations, leading to Democrat wins at the ballot. Huge Republican defeats were credited to these measures, threatening the Republican party and leading to their assault on equal political participation through their proposal and support of a shift to more restrictive voting laws

which would once again limit ethnic and minority access to the polls and silencing their voice.

Since that time, Republican leaders have made a push for more restrictive requirements for political participation, with a specific interest in voting restrictions by re-introducing Voter ID laws (Bateman, 2016). These laws require citizens to show proof of identity in various forms in order to vote. Their reemergence is aimed at suppressing the minority, poor, and elderly voters since they are most likely to lack this identification or have the means to acquire it (Bateman, 2016). In addition to Voter ID laws, an increase in broad restrictive voting legislation has also been implemented. According to Bateman (2016) these recent changes include:

Curtailing early voting, reducing the number of polling booths, ending same-day voter registration, imposing a financial penalty on families of students who register to vote where they go to college, eliminating pre-registration of teenagers in high school, opening up polling precincts to partisan activists entitled to challenge a voter's qualifications, placing restrictions on organizations conducting registration drives, eliminating "wrong precinct" provisional ballots, and requiring proof of citizenship for new, but not already registered, voters. (p. 44)

In order to address these barriers, activists have looked to grassroots organizations to oppose anti-immigrant strategies by addressing the legislation head-on and by organizing the greater community and equipping them with the knowledge they need to stand against the legislation.

ARIZONA'S GRASSROOTS GROWTH

In the mid-2000s, Arizona Latinos, in an effort to respond to the anti-immigrant legislation that was being passed, and to address the lag in formal mobilization of the Latino community in comparison to other racial/ethnic groups, began to turn to the use of community-based grassroots organizations (Reny et al., 2018). According to Britannica (2016), grassroots are a:

type of movement or campaign that attempts to mobilize individuals to take some action to influence an outcome, often of a political nature. In practice, grassroots efforts typically come in two types: (1) efforts to mobilize individuals either to turn out to vote or to vote a certain way in an upcoming election and (2) efforts to mobilize individuals to contact a policymaker or other individual with influence to take a particular action (also called ‘outside lobbying’). The distinguishing features of grassroots movements or campaigns are that (1) they mobilize masses to participate in politics (such as contacting their legislator or turning out to vote) or some other cause and (2) they are conducted through narrow communications such as mail, e-mail, phone calls, or face-to-face visits rather than broadcast media such as television or radio. (para. 1)

These grassroots organizations, who encouraged civic engagement for communities on the local level, played a vital role in organizing the Latino community through conventional and unconventional forms in Arizona. Research by Moreno (2018) found that Latinos in Phoenix, Arizona “were the most optimistic about participation [in efforts to demonstrate against anti-immigrant initiatives] because they were more likely

to be affiliated with community-based organizations that helped educate and mobilize the Latino community” (p. 101).

Nationally, the proposal of the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (Sensenbrenner Bill) prompted national pro-Latino organizations and their funders to be creative and organize under a united mission in the fight for immigration reform (Nicholls et al., 2016). With the help of local grassroots organizations, national rallies were held to protest the legislation, developing a nationwide pro-immigration movement. Grassroots organizations in Arizona “used multiple strategies to recruit people to attend the rallies, including mass distribution of flyers, door-knocking, phone banking, and word of mouth” (Barreto et al., 2009). Arizona grassroots organizations organized some of the largest street protests in the state’s history. To prompt participation, at least sixteen immigrant advocacy groups, about sixty evangelical churches, and a weeks-long Spanish and English media campaign was used to galvanize the demonstrators. One important group, Unidos en Arizona, directed by Roberto Reveles, mobilized demonstrators, called for a boycott of businesses, and was pivotal in generating the attention of more established leaders and lawmakers nationally (González, 2006). Latino youth, including many high school and university students, participated in the event as well. Many of them “DREAMers,” or undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as small children. On March 24, 2006, more than 20,000 protesters, mostly Latinos, gathered in downtown Phoenix, marching and chanting “Somos America,” or “We are America.” The protestors called for an end to anti-immigrant legislation and for support for a national comprehensive

immigration reforms that would legalize the millions of undocumented immigrants living in the country. The demonstration made national headlines (Magaña & Silva, 2021).

The grassroots mobilizations ended successfully, and the bill was not passed into law. After this, national organizations wanted grassroots organizations to focus their efforts on national legislation but sadly, their attempts to challenge immigration reform at the national level did not end well, and local grassroots organizations began to go their own way. One national organization that had a stake in Arizona's fight was the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), who had aimed to help to build a local activist infrastructure in Arizona. They helped local activists create Puente Arizona, who offered a range of services for the Latino community in Arizona, including English as a Second Language courses, legal aid workshops, and community defense courses that aimed to provide immigrant communities with methods to exercise their rights when confronted by local police (Nicholls et al., 2016). Three years later, with the introduction of SB 1070, the founding of local grassroots organizations in Arizona would expand rapidly in response to the legislation (see Appendix A).

Anti-Latino sentiment and SB 1070 would lead to the maturation of the Phoenix-based Latino grassroots protest movement (Szkupinski-Quiroga, 2013). In response of this legislation, grassroots organizations successfully organized “a coalition of immigrants, students, religious believers, artists and others to hold Dignity Marches and consistently be a vocal presence at the State Capitol demanding the repeal of SB 1070” (Szkupinski-Quiroga, 2013, p. 584). One particular non-partisan organization that has had a focus on increasing the political participation of the Latino community is One Arizona.

This coalition of community-based organizations joined forces with the goal of increasing “civic engagement, power, and safety for the state’s vulnerable Latino and immigrant communities” (Teng & Wong, 2016, p. 2). Their outreach proved successful when, in 2016, they shared their report of the following:

A detailed year-by-year analysis of voter data reveals that, as hoped, One Arizona’s voter engagement efforts—more than three million attempted voter engagements or contacts between 2010 and 2015—have consistently increased turnout, particularly among low-propensity Latino voters. Latino voters are overrepresented among demographic groups with lower voter turnout—those who are young, poorer, and with less formal education. (p. 3)

To reach their goals, One Arizona has modernized community outreach, using research based civic engagement strategies, and “moving away from robocalls and toward door-to-door canvassing” to expand the Latino electorate (Teng & Wong, 2016, p. 3). It was first formed with the aim of promoting full electoral participation of Latino citizens, especially infrequent and first-time voters, and now has adapted to include the new important electorate, young citizens and unmarried women, with the continued focus on voter registration, voter mobilization, and election protection (Teng & Wong, 2016).

The work of grassroots organizations throughout the history of Arizona has been vital to the battle for Latino civil rights, but even more so in the past 20 years, both nationally with the organized protest marches in 2006 and locally with the fight against SB 1070 and similar legislation. Their ability to organize the Latino community has resulted in many changes throughout the state and in stopping legislature aimed at

continuing the subjugation of Latinos (Pantoja et al., 2008). It is important to reiterate that the work of grassroots organizations, although focused on promoting the vote for legislative change, does not solely rely on individuals who can vote to create that change, as evidenced in the 2006 marches. Their successful initiatives include the participation of citizen and non-citizen alike. Furthermore, undocumented Latinos and Latinos who may be in fear of voting, for whatever reason, may be highly politically active, just in different forms of political activity that are not recognized through traditional frameworks of participation (Pantoja et al., 2008). The question of what constitutes Latino political participation and how it can, or should, be measured to incorporate all aspects of participation will be discussed in Chapter Three. What is important to discuss next is how political motivation theory can be used as a foundation with which to examine the political actions of the Latino community during the time period of increased anti-immigration legislation.

GUIDANCE OF THE LITERATURE

The literature surrounding anti-immigration legislation reveals that the history of the United States is riddled with instances of anti-immigrant and immigration policies, and that “foreigners have been derided in almost every period of the nation’s history,” with the most recent focus placed on the Latino community (García-Hernández, 2013, p. 1462). Latino political participation, based on the traditional definition, appears to be a popular topic of research due to this population’s continued low voter turnout. Further, it is not clear what actions contributed by the undocumented Latino community are considered participation when discussing the entirety of Latino political participation. In

reviewing the literature, there is lack of discourse regarding the effects of anti-immigration legislation on Latino political participation and what, or how, this may contribute to the subjugation of the Latino community. Analysis and discussion regarding whether or not, or how, the Latino community is mobilized, or galvanized, in response to anti-immigration legislation is needed to expand the literature and to incorporate the undocumented community's participation. In my research, I offer an in-depth analysis of how mobilization through grassroots organizations and the political participation of the undocumented Latino population in Arizona has been affected by anti-immigration legislation. I also examine how Latino Americans and citizens also react to the legislation and how it may affect their modes of political participation. This research adds value to the literature by providing discourse incorporating funds of knowledge to examine Latino political participation, an approach that has, to my knowledge, not been provided at this time.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

LATINO-CENTERED APPROACH

It is of importance to discuss that to conclusively examine the Latino community; I must use a Latino-centered approach. This is evidenced by the misrepresentation of Latino voters after the 2016 presidential election. At that time, Edison Research blamed Latino voters for the election of Donald Trump (Barreto et al., 2017). The nation initially believed that America's Latino population had supported Donald Trump (R) over Hillary Clinton (D) at the rate of 61 percent for Trump and 31 percent for Clinton. Barreto et al., (2017) explained that these results were skewed due to the use of inadequate methods to examine Latino political participation beyond the traditional narrow definition. It revealed that "the Edison Exit Poll was never designed to capture sub-populations, like Latinos or African Americans. Instead, it was designed to offer one national estimate and to help news organizations predict outcomes. Because it does not oversample with sub-populations in mind, it falls short on a number of fronts" (Barreto et al., 2017, pp. 216-217). The authors also state that Edison Media Research went so far as to admit that "its sampling 'is not designed to yield very reliable estimates of the characteristics of small, geographically clustered demographic groups'" (Barreto et al., 2017, pp. 217-218).

The methods that I utilized in my research to gauge the political participation of Arizona's Latino community encompassed the Latino-centered description presented by the Latino political opinion research firm, Latino Decisions as: "a culturally competent and rigorous social science approach to polling US Latinos, taking care to ensure a

representative sample of this population” (Barreto et al., 2017, p. 218). In the development of my framework, I considered the alternative methods of political participation that Arizona’s heterogenous Latino community engages in outside of the scope of traditional forms of political participation, which most times simply counts if people vote or do not vote. Emphasis was not placed on voter turnout but it was used to aid in the analysis of historical events on participation that was then clarified by the qualitative data collection via interviews.

To develop the research plan for this study, it was also important to delineate “how” Latino political participation in Arizona is examined. For this, I re-defined political participation as it has been conventionally defined by scholars, public opinion researchers, political pundits, and elected officials in order to incorporate all Latinos and their “funds of knowledge” when participating politically. I modified the traditional meaning of political participation toward a more comprehensive meaning that is inclusive of the “non-traditional” political participation avenues that the Latino community partakes in. It was important to move beyond the traditional definition and to embrace and examine a more “Latino-centered approach,” specifically for my research, but also because it reflects the rapidly changing demographics countrywide, as well as the budding electorate power of the Latino population in Arizona (Barreto, Reny, & Wilcox-Archuleta, 2017, p. 211).

RECONTEXTUALIZING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS LATINO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

As discussed earlier, throughout the history of Latino political participation, Latinos have regularly had lower rates of political participation than non-Latino whites and blacks (DeSipio, 2006; Jones-Correa et al., 2018). Further, there has been abundant data that confirms that “marginal individuals, including race and ethnic minority populations, are less involved in conventional political activities such as voting” (Martínez, 2005, p. 137). Various studies have attempted to determine why this phenomenon exists, and most agree that there are specific predictors that influence whether or not a person engages politically, but part of this gap may be explained by the fact that studies regarding political participation center heavily on electoral voting as the primary measure of participation (Saldívar, 2015). In Barreto’s (2010) discussion of this phenomenon, he makes a valid point when he explains that most studies of Latino politics are based “on a history of elections that typically featured two Anglo candidates who ignored the Latino community. How might our understanding change given the presence of a viable Latino candidate” or even a candidate who sought to engage with the Latino community (p. 38)? Further, he suggests that a new model should “view Latinos as actively engaged where ethnic candidates are present” in order to gauge the participation of Latinos when the candidates reflect their interests (Barreto, 2010, p. 40).

In order to propose a change, it is helpful to know the traditional definition of political participation before moving forward. According to Conge (1988), political participation is traditionally defined as “behavior designed to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies,” and more broadly as “any action (or inaction) of an individual or a collectivity of individuals which intentionally or unintentionally

opposes or supports, changes or maintains some feature(s) of a government or community” (p. 242, 246). This broad definition appears that it would encompass all aspects of political participation, yet, “the questions of who turns out to vote and why do they turn out are at the core of political science inquiry” (Ocampo et al., 2018, p. 96). Due to the fact that voting is indicated as the main form of civic participation, “there may be an overemphasis on the ballot box among native-born and naturalized citizens at the expense of other forms of participation, such as volunteering for a campaign, donating money to a political organization, and attending a meeting or rally” (Barreto & Muñoz, 2003, p. 443).

Using a focus on the vote to understand Latino political participation reveals that historically, “socioeconomics, citizenship, generation, group consciousness, national origin, and political and electoral contexts are some of strongest predictors of Latino political participation,” but taking into account other forms of political participation by Latinos may change this understanding (Ocampo et al., 2018, p. 98). As stated by Saldívar (2015), most research investigating the political participation of Latinos has, “concentrated on traditional models of citizen participation, grounded on individual socio-economic characteristics and political resources as the main explanatory variables for patterns of participation” (p. 63). This traditional view is, in principle, complicated for the Latino community due to the fact that it is a heterogenous population with members who are citizens or immigrants, or who fall anywhere on a spectrum of “legality” with the potential to participate in a wide variety of political functions, excluding the vote. For example, population subsets, such as Americans of Latino-origin, do not necessarily fit

into the conventional practices of political participation due to a large part of the population that is made up of noncitizens that include, “legal residents and the undocumented population that are ineligible to vote and excluded from existing voting analyses” (Saldívar, 2015, p. 64). Barreto and Muñoz (2003) explain that “traditional forms of participation such as registration and voting are not adequate tests of civic engagement for a population including 7 million noncitizens” (p. 427). Highlighting the reality that, voting, though important, does not constitute the entirety of what political participation or civic engagement encompasses, and if we move beyond voting as the central degree of Latino political participation, we may be able to understand the larger political involvement of Latinos.

This is where the recontextualization of Latino political participation proves valuable. Redefining the term, Latino political participation, to be inclusive of all Latinos, regardless of citizenship status, and incorporating the concept of “funds of knowledge” to provide credit to the political actions of Latinos that do not traditionally fit the definition of political participation is important when completing a study focused on analyzing the entirety of Latino political participation. Originally described by Vélez-Ibáñez in 1988, and traditionally applied to education and teaching, funds of knowledge refers to the “historically accumulated and culturally developed bodies of knowledge and skills essential for household or individual functioning and well-being” (Martínez-Roldán & Quiñones, 2016; Moll et al., 2009). Latinos use personal learned experiences in conjunction with cultural experiences to create bodies of knowledge that “represent dynamic networks of productive exchange and active knowledge production among

families and communities,” which they then can use to explain and understand their role in society, and in this case, within the political realm (Martínez-Roldán & Quiñones, 2016).

Using funds of knowledge to delineate Latino political practices can then assist, politically, to indicate and validate the political practices of Latinos. Therefore, providing an “unbalancing” of the antiquated beliefs that Latinos do not participate because they do not vote. As explained by Vélez-Ibáñez (2017), and in regard to education, teachers and administrators who understand and develop the “funds of knowledge” that their Spanish speaking students and parents bring within the classroom by incorporating them into lessons can, “counter the continued secondary stratification of Spanish-dominant students without denigrating the resources the children bring to the classroom and further alienating Spanish-dominant students from what could be an advantageous educational experience” (p. 235). The “unbalancing process” of Latino political participation can work in much the same way, beginning with the recognition and incorporation of the community’s funds of knowledge as a basis for political events and/or framing can aid in removing the stigma of non-participation and ignorance from the Latino community. Furthermore, the identification and discussion of the true range of Latino political participation can work to remove the negative effects of the secondary social stratification of Latinos within the political process that has traditionally worked to further alienate them from a process that would be advantageous to them politically and personally.

Further, Vélez-Ibáñez (2017) explains that for the linguistic programs, they must ensure that whatever program is developed, “that home is not alienated from school” (p. 236). In other words, programs must build upon the previous cultural knowledge of the students and that “their actual experiences, potentials, achievements, skills, talents” are praised as valuable and not a detriment to their learning (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2017, p. 239). This is also the case for Latino political participation. Political efforts must be focused on “successfully” engaging and encouraging the Latino electorate by acknowledging the accumulated bodies of knowledge of politics and policy that they bring from their collective experiences, because just like the students, they too have actual experiences that are valuable to the political process that are outside the understanding of “normal” political participation. This also includes their participation in ethnic mobilization, reactive mobilization, and proactive mobilization which also incorporate citizen and undocumented Latino alike.

Additionally, recontextualizing Latino political participation with funds of knowledge and acknowledging the Latino experience is an important way in which political activists can create “relations of *confianza*,” or mutual trust between the Latino community and political actors (Vélez-Ibáñez, 2017, p. 239). Using *confianza* can, therefore lead to Latinos participating in higher numbers through the traditional vote count. Finally, what is true in the classroom for funds of knowledge according to Vélez-Ibáñez can also be translated to be true of Latino political participation. That is:

Unless Spanish-dominant parents are involved in substantive ways, such as in the very construction of the cultural underpinnings of the classroom, and are

integrated through the mechanisms of training and development characterizing the funds of knowledge process, then teachers and administrators will more than likely contribute to the continued stratification of Spanish-dominant students, denigrate the resources the children bring to the classroom, and further alienate Spanish-dominant students from what could be an advantageous educational experience. (pp. 241-242)

Similarly, if Latinos do not have representation at higher levels of government or in the engagement and grassroots organization of Latinos, the racist, hegemonic processes of the Anglo political elite will continue to “further alienate” the Latino community and halt the community from having “what could be an advantageous” political experience. In Arizona, the work of grassroots organizations and activists have taken up this directive, and more Latinos have begun to be involved in the engagement of Latinos and to serve as leaders in the political sphere at the legislative level. Chapter Four includes a further discussion of funds of knowledge and types of Latino political participation.

OVERVIEW

This study is centered on the Latino community in Arizona who have historically been marginalized from the political participation arena. In Arizona, approximately 1.1 million Latinos are eligible to vote in the upcoming 2020 election. Further, one out of every three residents are now of Latino origin, and the state will be a majority/minority state by 2030 (Armstrong, 2018). Bearing in mind the current potential of Latinos in the rapidly changing local political landscape and redefining what constitutes political

participation is a salient topic for analysis. Additionally, being cognizant of the tools needed to research the Latino community is of dire relevance to the analysis of this work.

For this study, qualitative methods were utilized to investigate anti-immigration legislation and mechanisms of Latino political participation in Arizona. In order to analyze the relationship between anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation, I first deduced a series of observations and trends based on secondary data collected from the *New York Times* elections database and from statistics provided by the *United States Census Bureau*. These findings provided statistics of Latino voter registration and voter turnout rates for the selected focus of election years, the rates and types of anti-immigration legislation proposed and/or passed from 2000 - 2018, and the frequency of grassroots organization establishment over the same time period. Based on the observed trends of the voter data, the anti-immigration legislation, grassroots information, and the descriptive historical analysis of previous Latino political practices, interview questions were formed that focused on explaining the uncovered trends.

Completing this analysis before creating interview questions and conducting the interviews allows the qualitative findings from the interviews to “explain significant (or nonsignificant) results, outlier results, or surprising results” that were identified in the descriptive analysis of the secondary data (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 72).

It was important to conduct interviews for this research for a variety of reasons, but most importantly, as a social researcher, the firsthand account, or *testimonio*, given by an interviewee provides the evidence needed to explain the social patterns of Latino political participation in Arizona and provides a voice and historical account of this

community's experiences. Simply looking at the observed data regarding Latino voter turnout does not give a complete cultural perspective of Latino political participation during each of the election years and what that may encompass. It merely provides a pattern of participation based on the vote count or legislation proposed. The interview is vital for explaining what was happening on a personal level for the Latino community during these times and surrounding the proposed and enacted anti-immigration legislation, making the findings more valuable to the literature regarding Latinos in Arizona and their political participation (Schoonenboom, 2017, p. 110).

This research focused on the qualitative analysis of the interviews that were used to examine anti-immigration legislation in Arizona beginning in 2000 and continuing to the 2018 midterm elections, and how, or if, this legislation affected the political participation of Latinos in this state. Further, this study explores if, and by what causal mechanisms, anti-immigration legislation in the state of Arizona has prompted Latino political participation amongst both the undocumented Latinos and the Latino citizens within the state. I relied on collection of secondary data sources of Latino voter turnout for the state of Arizona for descriptive analysis. I then compared these trends to the Arizona anti-immigration legislation that correlated to the time frame of the voter data. I then supplemented these findings with the semi-structured narrative interviews conducted via virtual visits with key political and grassroots leaders of Arizona's Latino community. The timing of the data collection allowed for the consideration of the effects of anti-immigrant policies on Latino political participation from 2004 to the 2016 presidential primaries and continuing to the 2018 midterm elections.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA

Population, citizenship, and voting data was analyzed for evaluation of significant trends in each election year, as well as for comparison to legislation that was being proposed or addressed at that time. Results of this data gathering are summarized in Table 1. Inspecting the increases or decreases in real voting data for the Latino community in Arizona compared to the timeline of notable anti-immigration legislation assisted in suggesting a possible relationship within the data that was further explained with the interviewing process. Further, the anti-immigration legislation year, grassroots organization foundation year, and Latino voter registration and turnout data were cross analyzed for trends and plausible relationships.

Information containing the anti-immigration legislation year, name, and included provisions was collected from the *National Conference of State Legislatures, Arizona State Legislature (Legislative Tracking)*, and *Ballotpedia* and is provided in Appendix B. Further, based on the findings of the literature review which indicated the importance of the grassroots organizations in the recontextualization of Latino political participation, I also gathered data for grassroots organizations and their founding years and functions in order to analyze their role in Latino political participation, proactive mobilization and their impact on voter turnout. A summary of these organizations and their year of establishment can be seen in Appendix C.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Interview questions were designed using example questions from the PEW Research Center database as well as from the Latino Decisions database to build upon

and further clarify the trends discovered through the descriptive analysis. I chose to use guidance from Latino Decisions' developed questions because their data is most trusted when researching the Latino community. Their organization recognizes that the Latino community is not homogenous, and that the need for culturally appropriate English and Spanish-language interviews and surveys is paramount when accurately representing Latinos throughout the United States (Barreto et al., 2017). Further, questions for the semi-structured interviews for this research were created in English and in Spanish and are included in the Appendix.

The semi-structured bilingual virtual interviews took place with fifteen Latino participants who were located in Arizona. This phase investigated the lived experiences of Latinos in relation to the anti-immigration legislation and political participation of the selected years, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2018. The use of semi-structured interviews with leaders of the Latino community brought depth to the statistical trends and aided in examining the relationship between anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation.

Fifteen interview participants were chosen from a nonprobability sample of key community participants, or "people who know a lot about their culture and are, for reasons of their own, willing to share their knowledge" (Bernard et al., 2017, p. 56). Namely, in order to understand the possible relationship between anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation, the participants selected were Latinos who could "offer expert explanations about the cultural norm and about variations of that norm" (Bernard et al., 2017, p. 39). Specifically, Latino organizational leaders from

grassroots organizations, such as Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA), Mi Familia Vota, One Arizona, Chicanos Por La Causa (CPLC), Promise Arizona (PAZ), Mijente, etc., were contacted and asked if they would be able to participate: (1) due to their positionality within the Latino community; and (2) due to the perceived difficulty in identifying Latinos who would be willing to participate in the study because of issues surrounding trust/lack of trust and fear of community outsiders.

An advantage of using expert, or key informants, for my interview process was that, as a researcher, I had the opportunity to collect rich, personal narratives, or *testimonios*, detailing the Latino community's experiences. Additionally, these key informants also connected me with other members of the community, including undocumented persons, that might have otherwise been off limits to outsiders due to fear or concerns of retaliation based on their immigration status. This is an advantage of chain-referral sampling, also known as snowball sampling.

Interviews were conducted via the online video conferencing platform, Zoom, and they were recorded with the consent of all interviewees. Participants were asked to interview from the safety of their own home, or a safe location of their choosing. The interview questions focused on the participants experiences with Latino political participation both personally and witnessed, Latino participation during the specified election years, anti-immigration legislation from the year 2000 to 2018, and their knowledge of the political participation practices of the undocumented community. Interviews were approximately one hour in length with 2-3 participants needing more than one, one-hour session to complete their interview. After each interview was

completed, it was transcribed using an online transcribing system, Otter, and then the text was analyzed for themes (<https://otter.ai/>). The extensive interviews provided insight into the organizational dynamics of the grassroots organizations and Latino political practices of the leaders, as well as the Latino community as a whole.

Of importance to note is that I was able to communicate in the preferred language of the participant (either English or Spanish, or both) during the semi-structured interviews. Due to concerns with trust and fear within the Latino community, it was necessary to utilize network sampling, or snowball sampling, to gain contact with more participants that would not have otherwise participated. Initial interviewees/organizational leaders were able to refer me to other organizational leaders who were open and willing to discuss their experiences with the political process, their type of political participation, or known participation by others in their personal groups.

CHALLENGES OF THE RESEARCH

One challenge of utilizing this research for the dissertation was the increased amount of time that was needed to complete the study (McKim, 2017). This occurred because I needed to collect and analyze the secondary data for trends before actually conducting the interviews, as opposed to just analyzing the secondary data or just completing interviews. Another challenge to discuss involves the understanding of variables. Although the research was intended to determine if anti-immigration legislation had an effect on Latino political participation in Arizona, it is important to keep in mind that there are other factors or variables that exist that may have also had an important role in the outcome of Latino political participation. What this research has

discerned as a major factor, are not the only factors involved in the influence of Latino political participation. In the investigation of causality, “we can never be absolutely certain that variation in one thing causes variation in another” (Bernard, 2018, p. 47). It is understood that other variables can be, and likely are, involved in affecting the political participation of Latinos in Arizona. As indicated in the literature review, their participation or lack of participation politically is capable of being altered by variables such as their socialization into the American polity, language, literacy, gender, religion, documentation status, transportation factors, education, socioeconomic status, etc., and that is where the qualitative interview process of this research seeks to provide a more tangible connection between anti-immigration legislation and Latino political participation (Len-Ríos, 2017; De La Garza & Yang, 2015, p. 659).

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

The goal of this study is to understand how anti-immigration legislation affects Latino political participation in Arizona. Further, results of this study examine and answer the following: What is political participation for Latinos and what represents their participation beyond the traditional definition of political participation? What do U.S. citizen Latinos have to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented? Does the plight of the undocumented give them focus and energize them? How so?

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA

Upon examination of the collected secondary data, trends in the reports disclosed a number of observable and interesting trends based on the traditional framework of political participation for Latinos in the state of Arizona during the presidential election years between 2008 – 2016 and the 2018 midterms. Utilizing the *United States Census Bureau* and the *New York Times* election databases, the following was collected concerning the Arizona Latino community: the total growth of the Latino population, number of Latino citizens per year, number of Latinos registered to vote per year, and the number and percentage of Latinos that voted per year (indicated in Table 1). Based on this data, Arizona's Latino population trends and voter data trends per year were scrutinized against key anti-immigration legislation within the same timeframe. Using the *National Conference of State Legislatures, Arizona State Legislature (Legislative Tracking)*, and *Ballotpedia* online databases, a chart of Arizona's anti-immigration

legislation by year and the organizations or individuals who backed or funded them was created.

The population dataset was first reviewed for key shifts in trends of the Latino population data, whether in total population size, number of Latino citizens, number and/or percentage registered to vote, or number and/or percentage that voted. This analysis led to the identification of three main time frames of interest—pre-2008, pre-2012, and voter registration post-2008. Once these were identified, a comparison of the statistics to the number and kinds of legislation passed during, preceding, and/or in subsequent years of the data in question was completed. The following is an analysis of the findings.

Pre-2008. Latino voter participation data collected from 2000-2018 overall shows a trend in the increase of Latino population size, as well as in the percentage of Latino citizens who voted. This increase is true for each year of a presidential election year except for one. The outlier to this growth in Latino population is observable in the data when looking at the statistics from one election cycle prior, the 2004 – 2008 election data. These statistics reveal that there is in fact growth in total Latino population from 2004 – 2008, as well as to the total number of Latinos that were American citizens and registered to vote in these years (U.S. Census Bureau). Yet, the outlier to the steady increase in Latino civic engagement and voter turnout rates in the past 20 years is observable in when inspecting the raw number of Latinos that voted (including the percentage of citizens that voted) between the years 2004 and 2008. Although the number of Latinos registered to vote in Arizona grew from 354,00 in 2004 to 410,000 in 2008,

approximately five thousand less Latinos voted in the 2008 presidential elections than did in the 2004 general elections, decreasing the voter percentage points from 47.1% in 2004 to 36.6% in 2008, a double digit decline. This is in contrast to the steady growth that the general data shows from 2000 to the 2018 midterm elections, where in 2000, 247,000 Latino citizens voted (40.1%) compared to 588,000 Latino citizen votes (48.8%) in 2018.

To clarify what variables may be responsible for this change in the voting trends for Latinos in 2008, a review of salient anti-immigration legislation was completed (see Appendix B). A look at the legislation enacted between the election years of 2004 and 2008 indicates, what appears to be, that the 2004 voter ID-related voter suppression legislation and the increase in anti-immigration propositions/referendums in 2006 greatly impacted the 2008 general election statistics of Latino voter turnout. As discussed in Chapter Two's *Overview of Arizona Anti-immigration Legislation*, 2004 was significant to Arizona anti-immigration legislation because it was in this year that Proposition 200, or the "Arizona Taxpayer Citizen Protection Act," was passed. This legislation not only required evidence of U.S. citizenship to register to vote, if a person went to the voting booth, they would also need to show proof of citizenship, the long-time accepted voter registration card was no longer accepted. The aim of this legislation, which was proposed and funded by the organizations "Protect Arizona Now" and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), two widely outspoken anti-immigration organizations, was to ensure that immigrant voter fraud would be deterred by placing more restrictions on the types of identification that could be shown in order to vote. This measure also ensured

that Latino citizens (and other ethnic and minority populations) would have a difficult time voting, therefore restricting their vote and voice in the political sector.

Further, in Arizona, citizenship is required in order to obtain a driver's license. These provisions disproportionately affect people of color, specifically Latinos (whose participation is important to this analysis), because this population commonly has higher rates of poverty and does not have access to their birth certificate or the means to purchase a passport or a license. Likewise, if they do not have the means to buy a car, they most likely will not be able to invest in the purchase of a driver's license. It appears, then, that this policy worked successfully to exclude the Latino population from voting as evidenced by the voter turnout data. This can be further evidenced by the fact that there was an increase in the number of registered Latinos in 2008 (410,000) compared to 2004 (354,000), indicating that they were primed to vote, but that their participation was likely deterred due to the voter suppression tactics of the Arizona Republicans and their funders. Records filed with the Arizona State Secretary of State indicates that the policy entrepreneur, Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), contributed half of all of the campaign funds for Proposition 200 (Manzano, 2013). The proposition, strengthened by national fear surrounding the post-9/11 terror attacks, used the imposed public fear of immigration, Latino identity, and national security concerns to pass this legislation and jump start Arizona's anti-immigration legislation that would later serve as an example for the whole nation (Manzano, 2013).

In the years between 2004 and 2008, there was exponential growth in the numbers of anti-immigration legislation being proposed and passed in Arizona. In 2007 alone,

fifteen laws were passed targeting the Latino immigrant population, and by result, the Latino community as a whole (National Conference of State Legislatures.org, “State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,” March 2020). Paired with the eight laws passed in 2006, and it can be deduced that political participation as a Latino in Arizona would be difficult during that time period. As discussed earlier regarding policy formation, public sentiment and popular discourse influences politics, which then generates policy, that will then come back around to influence more politics (Manzano, 2013). For the Latino community, the purposeful mislabeling of the Latino community as criminals and illegals to fear continues to maintain the hegemonic status quo and support the proposal and implementation of anti-immigration legislations in a cyclical manner.

In Arizona during the early 2000s, state-level anti-immigration and Latino-targeted policy was proposed and implemented in small waves, while promoting Latinos as dangerous and a threat. This then led to the implementation of more anti-immigration legislation, thus keeping Arizona and the nation in a cycle of anti-immigrant sentiment fed by political entrepreneurs for their advancement and the advancement of their private funders (Manzano, 2013). How did Latinos respond to this attack on their identity and culture? This may be evidenced within the next frame of interest, Pre-2012.

Pre-2012. In this second time frame of interest occurring between 2008 and 2012, data shows that the number of Latino citizens that voted during the 2012 general election once again returned to the original trajectory with a steady increase in voter turnout between the 2008 and 2012 election, with 36.6% in 2008 and 40.4% in 2012, of Arizona’s Latino electorate casting a vote (United States Census Bureau). This rise in the

voter turnout percentage may be due to the opposition or resistance and reactive mobilization by the Latino community to the continuous passing of increasingly stringent anti-immigration legislation in the years before 2012. Of particular importance during this time period was the passing of Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” in 2010.

Just as the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) helped to propose and fund Proposition 200 in 2004, sparking the fire that led to the enactment of 27 anti-immigration laws in just three years (2006, 2007, 2008), the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a political entrepreneur discussed earlier in this dissertation, in conjunction with FAIR, arranged secret meetings to draft what would be the most malicious and infamous anti-immigration legislation to be passed in the state of Arizona and in the nation (Elk & Sloan, 2011). Although the bill was introduced by Senator Russell Pearce, the primary author has been accredited to Kris Koch, a lawyer associated with FAIR (Lacayo, 2011). This bill includes provisions which add state penalties related to immigration law enforcement including trespassing, harboring and transporting undocumented immigrants, alien registration documents, employer sanctions, and human smuggling. SB 1070 gives police officers in Arizona the latitude to ask anyone about their immigration status and has been seen by many as a way to racially profile Latinos through intimidation tactics.

SB 1070 was immediately challenged by a broad coalition of groups, including the national American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Latino Legal Defense Education Fund, National Immigration Law Center, National Association for the Advancement of

Colored People, ACLU of Arizona, National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center. The lawsuits charged that the Arizona law interferes with federal authority over immigration, violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, invites racial profiling, and infringes on the free speech of immigrants in Arizona. Most importantly, in response to SB 1070, Arizona grassroots political activist groups, such as Promise Arizona, LUCHA, and Mi Familia Vota, began organizing against SB 1070 and those who supported the anti-immigration agenda. This work by grassroots organizations is what may have driven Latino voters back to the voting booth in 2012 and to a return to their previous presidential election year trend increases. This brings the data to the next notable phenomenon of the data: voter registration.

Voter Registration Post-2008. As noted in the first discussion regarding the data for voter registration and voter turnout, Latino voter registration continued to increase through each election cycle although voter turnout was decreased for the year 2008. One notable trend of the data involves the data for the number of “total registered” Latinos in Arizona. Using the data provided in Table 1, it is evident that before 2008, the total registered Latinos was slowly increasing by roughly 50,000 people each cycle. Then, after 2008, the numbers of Latino voters registered each year vastly increases to approximately 100,000 or more per cycle thereafter. It is not quickly evident what mechanisms could account for such a large increase in the amount of registered Latino voters, but on closer inspection, and using the data collected regarding the grassroots organizations a connection can be hypothesized. Comparing the number of grassroots organizations founded in this time period to the voter registration increases exposes a

possible positive relationship between the data. Further, when analyzing the salient legislation that was passed within this time period, one significant piece of legislation stands out, SB 1070. Taking these three different factors into account conjointly, it appears that the passage of SB 1070 spawned an increase in the establishment of grassroots organizations in opposition of the law, and consequently, through the reactive mobilization of Latinos by the grassroots organizations, an uptick in voter registration and Latino voter turnout resulted.

The passage of SB 1070 inspired a powerful reaction from political progressives, civil rights and human rights groups, and immigrant activists. Further, national civil rights groups and civic engagement organizations boosted funding for local grassroots organizations. Liberal grassroots groups, angered by what they perceived as an all-out assault on immigrants and their families, began to step up mobilization efforts through reactive mobilization tactics. The efforts of groups such as Promise Arizona (PAZ), Team Awesome, Citizens for a Better Arizona, Unite Here, Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA), and Mi Familia Vota played a significant role, particularly at the grassroots level, in turning the tide back against Arizona's anti-immigrant leadership.

Grassroots organizations in Arizona have been credited with creating a successful collaborative format on civic engagement efforts in statewide, off-year and odd-year (municipal) election seasons, focusing on voter registration, voter engagement, voter mobilization, election protection, and issue advocacy, characteristics of proactive mobilization aimed at planning for long-term, sustained political participation. One Arizona, formed in 2010 as a direct response to SB 1070, has, in a short time, been able

to accomplish many important political tasks, such as enhancing inter-organizational collaboration, minimizing duplication of efforts, developing best practices for data management and voter engagement, coordinating volunteer management and joint field efforts, improving evaluation measures, building rigorous accountability systems, and utilizing economies of scale to reduce costs (Teng & Wong, 2016). Their strategies focus on ensuring a strong grassroots program that meets voters where they are. Of most significance is that they have fostered and convened a unified, coordinated front of allies and organizations focused on improving civic engagement efforts in Arizona and centered on Latinos in Arizona (One Arizona n.d.). A list of grassroots organizations and their year of founding is seen in Appendix F.

Historically, there has been a major political backlash by a wide range of traditional and nontraditional political players to the decades-long wave of anti-immigrant and, more generally, anti-Latino proposals. The traditional power players among Latinos include a mix of new and longstanding elected officials and community leaders, while nontraditional constituencies include high school students, working-class Latino voters, church members, and a diverse array of grassroots organizations.

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS

Interview Discussion. In order to better understand and interpret the trends uncovered during the data analysis of the election information from the *New York Times* and the *United States Census Bureau* and the legislative analysis of national and state-level immigration-related legislation from the online databases *National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL)*, *Arizona State Legislature*, and *Ballotpedia*, semi-structured

interviews with key members from the Latino grassroots organizations in Arizona were completed. By conducting interviews with members of Arizona's Latino community, I was able to further substantiate the patterns observed in the analysis of the secondary data. Interviewing influential members of the Latino population in Arizona led to greater clarity of the important events that were taking place during the key time frames of interest. Their accounts led to new perspectives regarding the political participation of Latinos in Arizona, namely the participation of the undocumented population. Further, the analysis of these interviews answered the proposed research questions specific to the presidential election years of 2008, 2012, 2016, and the 2018 midterm elections:

- 1) Has anti-immigration legislation in the state of Arizona prompted Latino political participation amongst both the undocumented Latinos and the Latino citizens within the state, and if so, by what causal mechanisms?*
- 2) What do U.S. citizen Latinos have to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented?*
- 3) Does the plight of the undocumented give them focus and energize them? How so?*
- 4) What is political participation for Latinos and what represents their participation beyond the traditional definition of political participation?*

The following sections provide an analysis of the interviews and how they pertain to the trends of the secondary data, as well as how they answer the research questions.

RESEARCH QUESTION 1

Has anti-immigration legislation in the state of Arizona prompted Latino political participation amongst both the undocumented Latinos and the Latino citizens within the state, and if so, by what causal mechanisms?

Pre-2008: Latino political participation and anti-immigration legislation.

Between the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections in Arizona, data reveals that less Latinos voted in the 2008 election, even though their rate of voter registration was higher than it had been in 2004. When compared to Arizona anti-immigration legislation, it was noted that a possible connection could be placed between the passing of Proposition 200, a Republican led legislation intended to suppress the vote of the Latino electorate in Arizona, the increased numbers of anti-immigration legislation passed in 2006, and the downturn in Latino votes contrary to the previous election year's trend which had indicated an increase in Latino voting. The connection between the passing of the 2004 and 2006 anti-immigration referendums, such as Propositions 200, 100, 102, 103, and 300 (explained in Appendix B), and the significant drop in the Latino voter turnout during the subsequent 2008 presidential election can be surmised, but not verified without the insight of those who were directly impacted by the stated measures. Data from the semi-structured interviews supports the inference that the passage of these propositions had a part in decreasing the Latino vote in 2008. The impact of these referendums, or ballot initiatives, were not only visible in the secondary data, but they were discussed during the interviews as well.

For example, in an interview with Luis Heredia, Executive Director of the Arizona Education Association, former campaign manager for Mayor Kate Gallego and

U.S. Representative Rubén Gallego and former Executive Director for the Arizona Democratic Party, he explained that the explosion in anti-immigration sentiment and legislation could be explained by the events that took place within the walls of the Arizona State Legislature. He clarified that between the years 2004 and 2006, the Republican party was able to attain more power, specifically in the “right-wing” sector of the party (L. Heredia, personal communication, October 2020). With this newfound legislative power and under the direction of Russell Pearce, the Republicans began to push “really extreme anti-immigrant legislation” (L. Heredia, personal communication, October 2020).

The new legislative power and move further to the party’s ideological right, or into the “right-wing,” for the Arizona Republicans, led to the passing of more anti-immigration legislation that resulted in the further subjugation and marginalization of the Latino community and the ensuing suppression of their electorate in Arizona. This clearly anti-immigrant legislative movement, whose main sponsor was State Representative Russel Pearce, caused the Latino community to have fear and distrust of the state’s institutions with which they may have normally interacted with, such as the police, medical professionals, teachers, and not surprisingly, the elected officials and political organizations enacting the legislation. The consequences of this fear and distrust became evident in the resulted decrease of Latino voters during the 2008 general elections. Due to this, the anti-immigration legislation affected Latino political participation in a negative way, altering it by preventing Latinos from reaching the voting polls.

Additionally, Petra Falcón, a well-respected and longtime Arizona activist and founder and Executive Director of Promise Arizona (PAZ), illuminated a key fact that is often overlooked regarding the existing Latino community based civic engagement organizations during the years before 2008; that missteps by the organizations early on ultimately permitted the enactment of anti-immigration legislation measures like the ones passed in 2004 and 2006. In reflection, Falcón shared that although the grassroots organizations were able to utilize reactive mobilization to galvanize the Latino community across the nation in opposition of the federal anti-immigrant legislation proposed by the Sensenbrenner Bill, there was not a move for proactive mobilization that would have prompted a long-term plan of political participation to prevent future anti-immigration legislation. Organizations were able to successfully organize the Latino immigration reform marches that took place in 2006, with both citizen and undocumented Latinos. Falcón shared, “there were a half a million Latinos in the streets, Mexican Americans, citizens, and we only registered 100 people. We didn’t take advantage of organizing those people” (P. Falcón, personal communication, October 2020). Their mistake would result in the ripple effect that was felt a few years later during the forthcoming 2008 presidential election.

Falcón lamented the fact that even though hundreds of thousands of Latinos were united physically and based on their same beliefs while marching against this anti-immigrant legislation, the Arizona local grassroots organizations were not proactive in their movement for social justice and equity long-term for Latinos in Arizona. They failed to take advantage of the event in a few different ways. Organizations faltered when

it came to using the event to mass register Latinos to vote, to bringing them into their organizations as long-term members by obtaining their contact information, and when it came to engaging them for the future or asking them to participate in the movement against future punitive anti-immigration legislation in other kinds of ways for later dates. According to multiple research participants, it was simply a lapse in judgement and a regrettable mistake that played a large part in the decrease in Latino voter turnout numbers in Arizona during the 2008 general election.

Falcón goes on to explain that, inadvertently, Latinos had shown their community power to the world through their presentation of hundreds of thousands on the streets of the major cities across the United States to protest the proposed (and passed in the U.S House of Representatives) extreme and punitive immigration reform. According to Falcón, the potential of their sheer numbers alone, “scared the bejesus out of non-Latino people in Arizona and they said, ‘hey, we got to stop this brown wave in Arizona as it is now pushing back’” (P. Falcón, personal communication, October 2020). Arizona State Representative Raquel Terán also shared similar views about the fear that was felt by some portions of the non-Latino community in Arizona. In her interview, she asserted that the non-Latinos in Arizona had shown a “fear that the state is changing and the fear...that Latinos are going to be the majority” (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020). This fear ultimately prompted a “needed” change that was eventually imposed by the Republican government leaders in their attempt to halt the Latino movement through the passing of anti-immigration legislation in the years surrounding the marches.

Effects of the legislation. Consequently, the initial wave of anti-immigration legislation resulted in a downturn of Latino voters during the 2008 presidential election for a variety of reasons related to the 2004 and 2006 referendums that were passed. For one, former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, began to utilize 287(g) around the year 2007 to set up “crime suppression sweeps” and “stop-and-detention” checkpoints in predominately Latino communities (Varsanyi, Lewis, Marie-Provine, & Decker, 2012). This legislation was intended to pursue investigations relating to various criminal offenses, not immigration enforcement as used by Arpaio. His implementation of the law led to the Latino community’s fear of being “rounded-up” while completing day to day tasks (and whether citizen or not), and combined with the stringent voter laws, vastly impacted the voter turnout by the Latino community in 2008.

During the activities condoned by Arpaio through 287(g), officers would stop Latino residents for minor traffic violations—such as rolling through a stop sign or driving with a broken taillight—and question them regarding their status, and then detain them for an indeterminate amount of time, despite the fact that 287(g)’s provisions stipulate that individuals cannot be targeted for minor offenses (Magaña & Silva, 2021; Varsanyi, Lewis, Marie-Provine, & Decker, 2012). As a result of these crime suppression sweeps that began in the early 2000s, the fear within the Latino community grew exponentially. This resulted in, “a societal dilemma that was not going to be easily alleviated during that time because there was no political operation that would get Latinos engaged in the election process” (T. Robles, personal communication, October

2020). Latinos, citizens and undocumented alike, were afraid to engage politically due to their fear of being unjustly imprisoned indefinitely based on their physical traits.

Second, voter suppression strategies, as seen in the number, or lack thereof, of polling stations in the predominantly brown and black communities across the greater Maricopa County valley also led to a decrease in voter turnout based on inability to vote or to wait for hours in line to vote. This tactic deters minority voters who are typically unable to spend hours in line waiting to vote due to work obligations and/or family obligations. Further, these overt suppression strategies along with actions by elected officials and the state's institutions also impacted Latino voters and their ability to vote through other, more long-term and systemic processes. According to Randy Pérez, the democracy director at LUCHA, "the hurdles that folks have to jump just to vote are so wrong. It's just... it's just fundamentally wrong to the core" (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020). These long-term, systemic, and less blatant actions consist of having citizenship questions on the voter registration forms, not offering language assistance at the polls, and not providing clear instructions on how to fill out the mail in ballot. These measures all played a role in the downturn of Latino voters in the 2008 general election in comparison to the 2004 election (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020).

As foreseen by Falcón post the 2006 immigration reform marches, the Anglo fear of Latino mobilization manifested not only in the mechanisms that were set in place to directly and indirectly decrease the turnout of Latinos during the 2008 election, but in the increase in anti-immigration legislation proposed in the years surrounding the marches.

Political actions have repercussions, and the fear of the state's changing demographics by some segments of Arizona's hegemonic Anglo community led to the growth in the number of proposed, passed, and implemented draconian anti-immigration legislation in an effort to suppress the large numbers of Latinos that were seen during the marches. After that time, the number of anti-immigration legislation enacted grew exponentially until reaching its apex in 2010 with the passing of the highly controversial Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070). Falcón summarized this time in Arizona's legislative history in the following way: "they came up with all of these little bills, and then they came up with SB 1070. And so, we've been fighting ever since. We've been fighting these bad policies that really create barriers for immigrants" (P. Falcón, personal communication, October 2020). The findings from the interviews in this case, supported and reaffirmed the findings indicated by the analysis of the secondary data, and according to the interviewees who lived through and confronted the 2000 - 2006 ballot referendums, the anti-immigration legislation requiring "English only" in the classrooms, requiring proof of citizenship and ID to vote, and denying bail to anyone who is undocumented, did indeed greatly impact the Latino voter turnout of the 2008 general election.

Rise in anti-immigration legislation. The reason conservative elected officials were able to pass such extreme anti-immigration legislation that negatively impacted the everyday lives and presumably the civic engagement levels of Latinos living in Arizona at this time is because, according to Pérez, during this time there was a limited number of social justice groups organizing Latinos; and the power and influence of these groups was very limited. Contrastingly, the Arizona Republican party was ahead of the curve during

this time and were able to, “make sure that these things were ingrained, playing off anti-immigrant sentiment” (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020). The Arizona Latino advocacy and engagement groups were not able to fight back nor build a counter-narrative against the anti-immigrant sentiment of the time or the anti-immigration legislation. Further, the Latino community based grassroots organizations were also not organized on the ground and therefore not able or capable of showing the state’s conservative legislators that they had sizable power or influence to defend themselves and their community (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020).

Further, Edmundo Hidalgo, Vice President for Outreach and Partnerships within ASU’s Educational Outreach and Student Services, and former Chief Executive Officer of Chicanos Por La Causa (CPLC), shared that the other reason referendums such as the ones passed in 2004 and 2006 is also in large part due to the fact that Latinos also voted for these anti-immigration bills at high rates. Hidalgo stated that approximately 60-70 percent of Arizona’s Latino community voted in favor of the 2004 and 2006 propositions because: “you felt like you had to vote that way to feel ‘Americanized,’ to feel like you were part of the American dream, without thinking about the consequence of the bill itself” (personal communication, October 2020).

Additionally, the Republican party’s deviation to embrace the party’s far right-wing ideology and the subsequent anti-immigration legislation that they proposed and enacted on this basis directly impacted the life of a young Mexican American research participant who will be called Anonymous #1 for the purposes of this study, since they did not want to be named. Anonymous #1, a current grassroots organizer and employee at

one of Arizona's largest and most impactful community-based organizations, experienced the extreme anti-immigration legislation in a very real way. They explain that specifically Proposition 103 had the most direct impact for them while they were in school, and that it greatly changed their life in a negative way:

I feel like my Spanish wasn't developed as much ... it pisses me off because I feel like they took a part of our culture, you know, with that law, like I should have had, and all of my peers, we should have had the privilege or the opportunity to learn another language and to be able to develop that language, but I feel like that was stolen from us. (Anonymous #1, personal communication, October 2020)

Latino political participation in response. Although voter suppression tactics and anti-immigration legislation from 2004-2006 were successful in reducing the Arizona Latino vote in 2008, locally and nationally it did not bring Latino political activism to a complete stop. During 2006, there were massive immigration reform protests taking place across the United States in opposition to the Wisconsin state Representative Jim Sensenbrenner's Bill, H.R. 4437, also known as The Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. The Latino community of Phoenix, Arizona also participated in the march against this punitive anti-immigration legislation and leaders organized marches of upwards of 250,000 attendees, most of whom were Latino, and which consisted of both documented and undocumented Latinos.

Roberto "Bobby" Reveles, a man once described as a "living democracy" for his extraordinary contributions to helping empower, organize, and engage the Latino populace of Arizona, as well as for his endless contributions to the betterment of the

Latino community in general, led the way in building and maintaining the coalitions necessary to organizing the large Latino community of Arizona. Mr. Reveles, a former longtime Washington, D.C. congressional aide, mining executive, and former president of the ACLU, was also a co-founder of Unidos en Arizona and the founding President of Somos America/We Are America, two of the principle organizations which assembled and coordinated the 2006 immigration reform protests in Arizona. Mr. Reveles shared that his part in the organization of the marches was a proud moment in his life and in the history of Latino political participation in Arizona. He stated that, “after the 2006 mega march of Somos America. [...] we attracted over 250,000 attendees, the largest gathering ever in the history of Arizona, has not been surpassed since then” (R. Reveles, personal communication, October 2020).

It was the Sensenbrenner national bill and the state-level ballot initiatives that initially galvanized the Latino community in Arizona and mobilized them into action in reaction to the cruel legislation. The Latino community’s reaction to these bills also allowed them to gain the necessary experience that they would need in order to combat what was to come at the end of the decade—Senate Bill 1070; “my first protest in Arizona was with a Sensenbrenner Bill. And not only that, I think it was everybody’s first real, real, involvement politically” (Anonymous #2, personal communication, October 2020), but “by the time SB 1070 came around, like I had already had all these experiences” (Anonymous #1, personal communication, October 2020). In other words, SB 1070, for them, was the “cherry on ...well, no, that’s not a good way to say it, but it

was, you know, the topping on top for them” (Anonymous #1, personal communication, October 2020).

At the early stage of the Latino population’s movement for social justice and equity in Arizona in the early and mid-2000s, the proposal, passing and implementation of more “extreme” immigration-related legislation by Arizona’s Republicans led to the lack of engagement, mobilization, and organization of the Latino electorate, both documented and undocumented. Lack of Latino serving organizations also resulted in the noticeable decrease in Latino voter turnout; a fact that both Latinos on the ground at that time and their advocacy and engagement organizations themselves saw as problematic. Learning from this, these organizations worked to fill the void in response to the 2008 elections:

We saw that there was just, you know, nobody was really registering Latinos to vote or not engaging them. Latinos traditionally are not engaged politically, or not politically, they’re not engaged in the electoral process. So, we saw there was a gap. So, we organized a coalition of a bunch of organizations. (Anonymous #2, personal communication, October 2020)

Another participant, Karina Ruiz de Diaz, Executive Director of the Arizona Dream Act Coalition and a former DACA recipient, stated that the laws passed during that time period also greatly altered her life and negatively impacted the Latino community around her for both documented and undocumented Latinos. Diaz states that when Proposition 300 was passed she was a sophomore in college, working as an undocumented student, paying for her tuition out of pocket, and then seemingly overnight

her tuition tripled, forcing her to drop out of school (K. Diaz, personal communication, October 2020). Ruiz de Diaz was able to return to her university sometime later but only after being confronted with behavior that she labeled as “insulting.” She states that she did not understand why men and women whom she had never before met were so adamantly opposed to her existence and to her advancement in society. Due to the newfound reality that she had to face, Ruiz de Diaz stated that she began to fight back. She utilized reactive mobilization to lead to proactive mobilization aimed at encouraging sustained political participation. She built coalitions with like-minded people and ultimately began her work to fight back against anti-immigration legislation, like Proposition 300, and reclaimed her power and agency through advocacy work (K. Diaz, personal communication, October 2020).

Pre-2012: LPP and anti-immigration legislation & post-2008 voter registration —grassroots initiatives. Curiously, the interview data grouped the phenomenon of the pre-2012 vote increases, or the return to “normal” trends in Latino voter turnout, with the post-2008 increase in the founding and establishment of community-based Latino engagement grassroots organizations and the subsequent substantial increases in Latino voter registration and turnout. The interviewees confirmed that the Latino community in Arizona retaliated against the actions of Sheriff Joe Arpaio concerning the Latino populace, and against the enactment of SB 1070 in 2010, by creating community-based grassroots organizations focused on engaging and mobilizing the Latino community with the intention of increasing voting, and political participation

overall, and most importantly, galvanizing and organizing the entire Latino community, citizens or not.

Galvanizing the Latino Community. Between the 2008 and 2012 general elections the state of Arizona passed the punitive Senate Bill 1070. SB 1070 instantly impacted the quotidian lives of the entire Latino community of Arizona. According to the data analyzed, this overtly and extreme anti-immigrant legislation appeared to work to greatly galvanize the Latino community of Arizona, greatly differing from the visible patterns in the statistics regarding Latino voter turnout in 2008 as a consequence of the 2004 and 2006 legislation.

SB 1070, or the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” was the broadest and strictest anti-immigrant measure passed, disproportionately targeting Latinos (undocumented and documented) and other immigrants of color and allowing state law officers to determine the immigration status of an individual during any lawful stop (Morse, 2011, para. 1, 3). Due to the ambiguity of the bill’s language regarding what constituted a “lawful stop,” or as defined by the National Conference of State Legislatures, “where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present” (“State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,” March 2020), both American citizens and undocumented men and women of Latino-origin were largely impacted due to the law’s allowance for legalized racial profiling. For example, one participant, a key member of a community-based grassroots organization, explained that the ambiguous nature of this law allowed for documented Latinos to feel that they too were targets of this legislation:

They were targeted at Mexicans, like ‘Mexicans we want to get you out of here.’ It wasn’t like, ‘we only don’t like undocumented Mexicans.’ It was just another way they can legally get us out. I think whether you’re a citizen or not a citizen, you just being of Mexican descendant or just being a Latino you know... these policies and laws were specifically targeted at you and wanting to get you out of this country, because you were a threat to the American way of life. (Anonymous #1, personal communication, October 2020)

The true magnitude and all-encompassing impact of SB 1070 on the Latino population of Arizona cannot be conveyed by only analyzing the voter data statistics, but instead is better understood and described by qualitative data gathering which allows for the sharing of rich narratives, or *testimonios*, of the first-hand experiences of the men and women who lived through this legislation and its repercussions. There is no greater evidence of the impact of SB 1070 on the Latino families of Arizona than the tragic events that Zaira Emiliana-Livier, director and co-founder of People’s Defense Initiative and Latinas for Bernie Sanders (among numerous other projects), and her family were forced to live through after the passing and implementation of SB 1070. She shared that her younger brother, who was a permanent resident, was sent to jail, and due to SB 1070, the officers placed a retainer on him, essentially detaining him for further processing through immigration, this is only allowed in states with legislation like SB 1070. She shared:

And as soon as he got out of prison and did his time there, by law, he was then taken into detention and custody in Florence. Where, you know, we fought his

deportation and lost. My brother actually was murdered when he was sent back home to México. So, SB 1070, has destroyed my family to levels, to the worst level, we've been affected by it. And we're not even, we're not even...likely a rarity. The deportation system in the SB 1070 system is incredibly harmful to our community. (Z.E. Livier, personal communication, September 2020)

This type of unimaginable hardship experienced by Emiliana-Livier and her family due to SB 1070 was undoubtedly faced by other Latino community members as well. The words that Emiliana-Livier boldly shared when she discussed her tragic loss, “we're not even...likely a rarity,” are supported by the words and experiences of other Latino community leaders interviewed for this dissertation (September 2020). In one interview, Anonymous #1 discussed how SB 1070 led to one of the most difficult events that neither they or their family had, or have, ever been faced with. In their interview, they discussed two problematic experiences that they encountered with SB 1070. First, they stated that their family's struggle began with the deportation of their cousin, stating, “...my cousin, she was deported” (personal communication, October 2020). More specifically, they stated that their cousin had gone to the local convenient store for gas and was stopped for having a rear brake light that was not functioning. After a quick back and forth discussion between their cousin and the officers, the police confiscated the automobile and then made them walk home in the middle of the night in an unsafe neighborhood in west Phoenix (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020). The officers had informed the cousin that they were required to take their parents with them to the precinct in order for them to be able to pick up their car. When the

cousin and their parents followed these instructions, the police officers arrested everyone for having an alleged forged Mexican ID. Soon thereafter, the authorities deported the family to México (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020). Nearly as tragic for Anonymous #1's family was the fact that their cousin was their high school's valedictorian and had recently just received news that she had been awarded a full scholarship to attend Arizona State University in the following fall semester.

Shortly after that occurrence, Anonymous #1 stated that tragedy struck yet again when another loved one was forced to face the real-life repercussions of punitive and extreme anti-immigration legislation, such as SB 1070: "my best friend, ICE just showed up at her parents' house. And they, you know, they lied to be able to get inside. And then they basically kidnapped them and, deported them" (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020). Anonymous #1's experiences and the suffrage faced by them and their family at the hands of the discriminatory SB 1070 legislation in a lot of ways resembled the events that Emiliana-Livier and her family unfortunately faced. Anonymous #1 also acknowledged that the hardship that their family endured was something that Latinos, documented and undocumented, across Arizona were faced with, and that they too believed that it was not a rarity:

SB 1070 tore people's lives apart and separated so many families. That trauma is still very much present in our daily lives, even though it's been 10 years. I know we've grown and we're really resilient, but it was just really bad. (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020)

Beyond the discriminatory and overtly racist implications of SB 1070 toward the Latino community (documented and undocumented), another important repercussion of this anti-immigration bill was the impact that it had on the Latino community and their interaction with members outside of their community. This bill made many Latinos in Arizona call into question their societal standing due to the ability of police officers to question all “Latino appearing” men and women, and this greatly impacted inter-societal relationships and led to mistrust by the in-group members of the out-group members. Emiliana-Livier stated that she witnessed firsthand how numerous Latino families were driven further underground than they had already been during the enforcement of this legislation. She stated, “a lot of families stopped driving and stopped gathering with one another, and even went as far as outright leaving Tucson” (personal communication, September 2020). Emiliana-Livier further expounds on this matter and how this bill fomented even further distrust between members of the same communities when she stated:

The distrust that we had in the institutions that we had to deal with, had to interact with, like schools, hospitals, and most specifically police, SB 1070, in its inception, made it even worse. It just made it even worse by turning your counselors against you, your doctors against you. (personal communication, September 2020)

These similar lived experiences forged a recurring theme throughout the interviews for this research, that the passing of SB 1070 served as a catalyst to unite the Latino community. Many of the Latino leaders interviewed firmly believed that it was the

passing of SB 1070 that served to galvanize the Latino community into building upon the foundation of community cohesiveness and alignment that had been established during the 2006 national immigration reform marches and the stand against Sheriff Joe Arpaio's anti-immigrant actions in 2007. The previously established relationships between the Latino leaders helped to catapult the creation of more Latino community-based organizations across Phoenix and the greater valley, and subsequently set the precedent for proactive mobilization aimed at sustained Latino political participation and the building of Latino legislators with which the Latino community can connect with. In 2010, in direct response to SB 1070, Arizona experienced the founding of some of its largest, most organized, well-funded, and influential Latino engagement community-based grassroots organizations that are still in existence today. This proactive mobilization through the organizations has worked to turn the tide in the Latino voter registration and turnout for the 2012 general election and beyond.

Organizations such as One Arizona, Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA), Arizona Center for Empowerment (ACE), and Promise Arizona (PAZ) got their start during the initial years of the anti-immigration push from the conservative Republican polity, with the determination to end years of racial injustice by engaging and organizing the Latino community in general, but more specifically, the Latino electorate. According to Anonymous #2, these organizations largely developed due to the fact that SB 1070 served as a catalyst for a massive uprising from the Latino community with large protests between ten thousand and twenty thousand people. Further, Anonymous #2

observed that beyond the large protests, Latinos in Arizona also began to establish social justice organizations in response to the passing of SB 1070:

Prior to 2010 there's probably like one or two Latino organizations, like advocacy community, like social justice organizations. After 2010, there's probably like 15 to 20 organizations that focus on Latino issues and social justice. And I would say it was all because of SB 1070. (personal communication, October 2020)

One of the leading and most influential and innovative organizations in Arizona today is led by Tomás Robles and Alejandra Gómez. Robles, co-executive director of LUCHA and ACE, states that LUCHA was founded in 2010 and was designed to ensure that Arizona's families and communities are treated with the dignity and respect that they deserve (personal communication, October 2020). Further, he stated that the organization's goals "had always been not just to bring up the Latino vote, but to also build out the organizing mechanism [to] ensure that our families keep communicating and engaging [in] the political system year-round" (T. Robles, personal communication, October 2020). This proactive mobilization, or "future planning," by Robles has become commonplace amongst the other grassroots organizations—the push to plan for the future. In other words, Latino advocacy organizations are now "building proactive spaces" instead of only being reactive (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020).

Instead of negatively impacting the percent of total citizen voters, as was seen between 2004 and 2008, the passing of SB 1070 resulted in the increase in the total number of grassroots organizations that were founded or established in order to engage

and organize Latinos in Arizona. This fact, subsequently led to an increase in registered Latino voters and the overall Latino voter turnout between the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. To reiterate the findings discussed above, in 2008, there were 410,00 registered Latinos, and 291,000, or 36.6%, that turned out to vote. In 2012, the number of Latinos registered to vote was 516,000, with 400,000, or 40.4% casting a vote (United States Census Bureau). This resulted in an increase of about 3.3% of total citizens voting, signifying a large transformation in the turnout of Latinos over one election cycle after there had been a dramatic drop off of approximately 10% between the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections (United States Census Bureau).

Latino leaders in government. Lastly, as a result of the proliferation of the community-based grassroots organizations throughout Arizona after the passing of Senate Bill 1070 in 2010, a new phase of Latino politics in Arizona has emerged; a phase surely not foreseen by ex-State Senator Russell Pearce when he, and other proponents of the limitation or elimination of immigration of any kind (legal or illegal) from countries with communities of color, concocted the discriminatory and punitive anti-immigration legislation that began at the turn of the century. The new phase of Latino political action consists of Latinos being elected as government officials to act as a voice for their communities. Those same grassroots activists that opposed the initial anti-immigration statutes have now themselves become prominent players in Arizona politics.

Today, several of these political players have worked for mayors, city council members, and congressional members, as well as on gubernatorial and presidential campaigns (Magaña & Silva, 2021). A growing number of activists have “switched their

megaphones for microphones” and have gone on to win office for themselves, such as Arizona State Senator Otoniel “Tony” Navarrete and Arizona State Representative Raquel Terán, both of whom took part in the 2006 immigration reform marches as young adults and then worked with and alongside community based organizations such as Promise Arizona (PAZ) and Mi Familia Vota (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020).

RESEARCH QUESTION 2

What do U.S. citizen Latinos have to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented?

Through the interviews, research participants shared examples of what they had to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented. Several interviewees, who are U.S. citizens, were firsthand witnesses to the punitive nature of SB 1070 and its subsequent repercussions. They saw the lives of their undocumented family, friends, acquaintances, classmates, neighbors, and significant others greatly impacted in a negative way after the passing of SB 1070. For instance, Dominique Medina from the Fuerte Arts Movement, stated that after the passing of the bill he witnessed the constant harassment by the police toward someone that he was dating, simply based on their phenotypic appearance. He stated:

I saw them getting pulled over a lot for any reason and being let go with a warning and shit like that started to happen a lot. It was clear that it was racial profiling, and it was clear that it was because of SB 1070. (personal communication, October 2020).

Further, Medina stated that observing this behavior by local authorities toward people who “looked like him” led him to believe that the bill was not only targeting the undocumented Latino community but the Latino community overall, documented or not.

Likewise, Anonymous #2, who is someone with more than fifteen years of experience with advocacy work, as either an employee or volunteer, with several of the most influential and impactful local grassroots organizations, stated that they too were a witness to the ramifications of SB 1070 on the everyday lives of the Latino populace of Arizona. Not only did they see their immediate family members and friends suffer at the hands of the police due to this and other immigration policies, but they themselves were victims of SB 1070. First, they were forced to live through the consequences of people they knew and loved getting deported. Then, they themselves began to face discriminatory behavior by the police for nothing more than “looking illegal.” After the passing of SB 1070 Anonymous #2 began to be regularly pulled over by local police and ICE officers and they would always ask them questions regarding their citizenship:

The police talk to me in a particular way. They always asked you for identification and things like that, I know they were probing to see if I was here illegally or not. So, one is like, my family and friends suffer, people that you know suffer, but you also felt that discrimination. And you felt that you were a target whether you’re a citizen or not. (Anonymous #2, personal communication, October 2020)

It was these types of firsthand experiences and the witnessing of their family and friends’ suffering due to this legislation that helped them to understand that SB 1070 and the

ambiguity in the bill's language allowed for the discrimination and harassment of not only undocumented Latinos, but all Latinos living in Arizona.

Further, Anonymous #1, a young, bright, and extremely motivated organizer for a major local grassroots organization, discussed some of the things they had to gain by picking up the cause of the undocumented. Similar to Medina and Anonymous #2, they also had firsthand knowledge of what it was like to face the consequences of having family and friends harassed, discriminated against, and even deported, but beyond these reasons, this interviewee chose to pick up the cause of the undocumented because they stand firm in the belief that by fighting for Arizona's undocumented community to be treated with dignity and respect also means that they are fighting for their own right to be treated with dignity and respect. Their strong belief in this began in their youth when they witnessed firsthand, numerous times, how the police and anti-immigration and anti-immigration legislation supporters treated Latinos harshly. For instance, Anonymous #1 attended one the immigration reform marches of 2006 in downtown Phoenix with their family and thousands of other protesters. Although the protesters were peaceful and were made up of people of all ages, including families and their young children, they described how the police suddenly sprayed pepper spray into the crowd in order to disperse them: "the police, they maced a bunch of people. Some of them were little toddlers and stuff. It was bad" (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020).

Another instance where Anonymous #1 learned that fighting for the rights of the undocumented also meant fighting for their own rights was when, in response to SB 1070, they attended a school walkout and protest. During this protest, anti-immigration

supporters arrived and began to yell racist insults at all of the high school students who were participating in the walkout: “I’m not gonna lie, as a kid, it was a little bit scary. Um, especially when you had a grown ass man shouting horrible insults, you know” (Anonymous #1, personal communication, September 2020). The behavior carried out by the police and anti-immigrant and anti-immigration legislation supporters allowed for Anonymous #1 to conclude at a very young age that the anti-immigration legislation and racist sentiment was not only directed at those who were not citizens, but also at Latinos who were American citizens. The insults, harassment, bodily harm, and racist insults were not lobbied specifically at only undocumented Latinos, but instead were hurled at anyone who phenotypically appeared to be of Mexican origin. In other words, Anonymous #1 understood at a young age that they needed to demand better treatment and respect for the undocumented, because they were her family and friends, but also because they too were personally affected negatively by this sentiment. They learned that there was no difference between citizen and non-citizen of Latino origin when it came to discrimination.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3

Does the plight of the undocumented give them focus and energize them? How so?

Within the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research, participants discussed the ways that the plight of the undocumented community gave them focus and energized them and their goals within the movement. The large majority of the interviewees stated that the undocumented very much motivated and galvanized them

through a variety of ways to work toward attaining social equity for all Latinos in Arizona. Overall, the research participants stated that the undocumented community was able to energize and motivate them due to their extraordinary and very palpable commitment to stopping the passing and implementation of draconian and extreme anti-immigration legislation, while simultaneously working toward passing comprehensive immigration reform that offered a path toward citizenship for the millions of undocumented men and women living in Arizona and throughout the United States. Almost collectively, the participants stated that they were firsthand witnesses to the numerous contributions of the undocumented population in the Latino community's push for socio-economic equality and equity in Arizona, a grassroots movement that has blossomed since the beginning of the 21st century in response to the growth of the extreme anti-immigration legislation.

For instance, Emiliana-Livier, executive director of the People's Defense Initiative, stated that the undocumented have been able to galvanize and serve as a source of motivation to their documented Latino allies in their movement to mobilize the community, overturn punitive anti-immigration legislation, and protect the states most vulnerable populations by not simply taking part in the activism, but oftentimes leading the way. She stated, "in so many ways here locally, a lot of the mobilization that we've had on the ground ... was in large part led by undocumented youth" (Z. E. Livier, personal communication, September 2020). Additionally, she stated that her organization, and others that she has worked for in the past, have had undocumented youth at the forefront of all of their events and activities. She stated:

They were the speakers that out of our events, they were the ones that we get feedback from on everything. They play such a key role. They're some of the strongest, I believe, leaders that we have in Tucson. I'm in awe of them constantly. So, I think they play such a pivotal role in in politics as we know it. (Z. E. Livier, personal communication, September 2020)

Further, Emiliana-Livier states that it's not only the youth that have made major contributions and many times have lead the way, but that undocumented men and women of all ages contributed to the mobilization and engagement of the Latino populace in Arizona. She shared that "there are those that are moms and dads and tíos and tías, who've organized themselves and support each other and do this amazing mutual aid work" (personal communication, September 2020).

Raquel Terán, Arizona State Representative for district 30 and former state director for the civic engagement organization Mi Familia Vota, believes that the undocumented community, also occasionally referred to as DACAmented and unDACAmented, have been pivotal to the success of some of the leading organizations in the state of Arizona such as One Arizona, Arizona Wins, and the Coalition of Mi Arizona. Terán asserts that in her nearly two decades of experience with working and volunteering in Arizona's political activism and civic engagement scene, she has personally witnessed the numerous contributions to Latino serving political engagement and advocacy organizations offered by the undocumented community. She shared, "they are very active. And they are absolutely part of the equation of the success of these of these organizations" (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020). Representative

Terán shared that during her time, she has seen these young people work and/or volunteer in nearly every position and with nearly every organization. They have served everywhere from critical senior leadership roles, to volunteer positions that canvass neighborhoods, to registering people to vote:

The undocumented community were the ones who were registering people to vote. They're the ones who work the hardest in the frickin 115-degree weather. They're the ones who have been able to have the courage to go out into the community and say, I can't vote, you vote for me. (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020)

The undocumented community's hard work and commitment to their fight for social equity and immigration reform served and continues to serve as motivation and to help bring into focus to the urgency of the movement for documented Latinos. Terán shared, "they're not doing it to be cool, because it's cool to vote, it's doing it for survival and to make sure that their lives change for the better" (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020). For the many documented Latinos, such as State Representative Terán, working and/or volunteering with the state's community based grassroots organizations right alongside many of the above discussed undocumented young men and women, and being able to witness firsthand their drive, fearlessness, and sense of urgency for legislative change has served to galvanize and really sharpen the initiatives and goals regarding the passing of comprehensive immigration reform and the defeat or overturning of punitive anti-immigration bills.

Likewise, Anonymous #2, has also witnessed the contributions and actions of the undocumented in their plight for comprehensive immigration reform and social equity. They stated that in their organization a large part of their staff were and still are DACA recipients. They stated that the particularly tough circumstances faced by their coworkers serves as motivation for them to continue to fight against anti-immigration legislation. She shares that, “they were not gonna be able to work and didn’t have a future. A lot of it was motivating. It motivated me because of their circumstances” (Anonymous #2, personal communication, September 2020). Similarly, Dominique Medina, creative digital organizer at Fuerte Arts Movement, states that a large part of the staff at his organization have also been undocumented at one time. Specifically, Medina states that, “a huge number of our volunteers, our team leaders, our organizers, our, you know, leadership, our executive directors, like, I would say, half or more have been undocumented people” (D. Medina, personal communication, October 2020). Medina believes that many of the stories of the undocumented people involved in Arizona’s civic engagement and political activism sphere are so incredibly inspiring to Latinos, both authorized and unauthorized, that he labels these young people as “influencers” in the movement and outside of it (D. Medina, personal communication, October 2020). These clear examples of the large amount of undocumented people working and/or volunteering with these community based civic engagement organizations and their important contributions to the movement that were offered by Anonymous #2 and Medina serve as motivation and as a reminder of just how important the plight of the undocumented is for all Latinos.

Additionally, Pérez states that those who are on DACA, or are simply undocumented, are not only key contributors but are actually some of the most powerful and politically active people in the Arizona grassroots movement. For instance, Pérez states that in his own organization, one of their key members (who will not be named for privacy reasons) and someone he very much admires was at one time undocumented. He states that this person played a crucial and indispensable role in the building up of LUCHA to the very powerful and influential organization that it is today in Arizona politics. He elaborates on the importance of this key member of his organization and states that without this person, “I don’t know where we would be.” Further, Pérez laments over the fact that the incredible and inspirational stories of people such as his coworker are regrettably not more publicized throughout the Latino community. He stated:

It’s those kinds of people whose stories will not always be told on the news. They will not always be understood by textbooks or folks that are in class. That’s, I think, really like the core of our movement is always those folks have been most impacted (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020).

Being a firsthand witness to his undocumented coworker’s leadership skills and unwavering will to build up a key institution in Arizona, Pérez and other documented Latinos have the ability to harness their exemplary behavior as motivation and become even more focused than before.

RESEARCH QUESTION 4

What is political participation for Latinos and what represents their participation beyond the traditional definition of political participation?

We have discussed what Latino citizens gain by taking up cause of the undocumented and we have also discussed how the undocumented are capable of motivating and galvanizing their documented brethren in their mobilization and engagement efforts of the Latino community of Arizona. What we have not discussed is the way that the work/contributions of both U.S. citizens of Latino origin and undocumented Latinos have not always been recognized and credited by political science when defining what political participation is under the traditional context:

the unique experiences of Latinos in terms of discrimination, racialization, immigration, national origin, ethnic ties, and political context all lead us to expect that explaining Latino voting turnout requires going beyond the effects of demographic and political characteristics identified as central factors in traditional models of Anglo voting behavior (de la Garza, 2008. p. 95).

Due to this, it is important that Latino political participation be recontextualized by incorporating funds of knowledge, or the understanding that it is pivotal to “build upon the previous cultural knowledge” of the Latino community to discuss how “their actual experiences, potentials, achievements, skills, [and] talents” are valuable to their civic engagement and in explaining the entirety of their participation. In this way, the contributions of all Latinos, documented and undocumented, and their previous experiences with discrimination, racialization, immigration, and the political process can be acknowledged when examining the many ways that Latinos participate politically.

The completion of the interviews led to the discovery that the grassroots leaders and their successes were linked to the funds of knowledge that they brought to their political activism and engagement. After analysis of the fifteen interviews, it was noted that five themes regarding funds of knowledge were common among them. The following themes further solidify the understanding that recognizing a person's previous cultural knowledge is vital to capturing the entirety of their political participation that reaches beyond the act of voting. Analysis of the interviews revealed the following common themes among the participants: 1) firsthand experiences, 2) insider knowledge, 3) impact of SB 1070, 4) historical lessons, 5) the participation of the undocumented community, and 6) their account of Latino political participation.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION RECONTEXTUALIZED

Throughout this work, Latino political participation has been discussed as it has been traditionally defined within political science. One repetitive thematic outcome observed in the analysis of the semi-structured interviews is the call for redefining and recontextualizing of the conventional definition of Latino political participation. Expanding on the traditional and more circumscribed definition of Latino political participation, I utilized a Latino centered approach and a more culturally aware definition that was posited throughout the interviews of numerous community leaders from Arizona's grassroots organizations. The men and women interviewed for this research offered a myriad of perspectives of how they believe political participation for Latinos in Arizona should be defined, redefined, or recontextualized. The clearest example of why what has traditionally constituted Latino political participation needs to be redefined and

recontextualized is best expressed by the words of Luis Heredia. Heredia presents an example from the experiences faced by his own family as to why the traditional definition of Latino political participation cannot provide credit to the political actions of Latinos that do not traditionally fit the definition of political participation. In his explanation below he attempts to clarify and expand on why the traditional definition of political participation is not capable of accurately gauging the Latino civic engagement levels:

My mom would wake up in the morning at 4:35am in the morning, prepare breakfast for more lunch, and for my dad to go to work and, and we would get to the school at 6:00am. She would come back home at around 3:30 or so 3:30-4:00pm. And then sleep until around 5:30pm. So, she can get the energy for the rest of the evening. And, you know, my mom's not gonna wake up and volunteer in a campaign, right? This is what white people don't understand. Latinos don't participate in the same way because they're fucking cooking your food. I mean, they're, they're, they're doing so many other things. (personal communication, October 2020)

In other words, Heredia's mother very much participates indirectly in the politics of Latinos, but due to her unavailable leisure time she is not able to participate within the traditional parameters of what political participation is. In many ways, she serves as the ideal example of Latino political participation because of the current socioeconomic reality of many, if not most Latinos (documented or undocumented) living in the United States. The hard work and sacrifice of Heredia's mother for what she believes is best for her family is what many would describe as a cultural norm for Latinos living in the

SWNAR. The only problem with this willingness to put her family first is that the antiquated definition/s of political participation do not and cannot credit the work and participation that she and numerous other Latino parents do in order to support their loved ones that have the privilege of politically participating within the set parameters of the definition.

Offering a different perspective as a political operative whose definition of Latino political participation varies greatly from the majority of my other research participants due to his long and successful career in electorate politics in the state of Arizona, Luis Heredia, states that the definition of political participation should be broken down into the following three categories: civic awareness, civic participation, and civic engagement. First, he states that civic awareness, the first phase, “is knowing who your state representatives, city council members outside of just the president and maybe members of Congress, but layers of government, and you start to connect the dots of school boards” (personal communication, October 2020). The second phase, civic participation, is defined by Heredia as “attending, listening to political, voting, of course, and participating” (personal communication, October 2020). Lastly, the third phase, civic engagement, can be described as “volunteering in a campaign, and asking others to do the same” (L. Heredia, personal communication, October 2020). Undocumented men and women, especially undocumented youth, have long participated in this form of civic engagement at extremely high levels, according to numerous research participants: “I think some of the most powerful people that I know who are politically active and participating, are folks who cannot actually vote” (R. Pérez, personal communication,

October 2020). Furthermore, undocumented Latino youth in Arizona have taken part in all of the above definitions of political participation, except for voting, because, as non-citizens they are not allowed to and it is against the law for them to do so. The reasons for such high civic engagement by undocumented youth involved with organizations that engage and mobilize Latinos throughout Arizona varies across a range of answers. But the most commonly stated reason is the need to take back their power and control over their own lives (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020; T. Robles, personal communication, October 2020). In other words,

being involved politically offers a person who doesn't have power some type of agency over their life, when they don't have any agency. So, I think being involved politically does that to a lot of people and that's why a lot of folks choose to do that. (Anonymous #2, personal communication, September 2020)

Building on Heredia's definition of Latino political participation, , and based on her extensive experience working with Latinos in Arizona and being a community insider who has faced similar trials and tribulations, Zaira Emiliana-Livier believes that:

“Voting, is just the very bare minimum that folks can do. [...] voting is really a privilege for a lot of folks. [...] For me, as a migrant and as a person that just recently became a citizen, political participation really meant getting involved in the day to day issues that affect you” (Z. E. Livier, personal communication, September 2020). Further, she believes that overall, for Latinos in Arizona, “The best thing that they can do is take care of themselves and take care of their family to the best of their own ability. And that might

mean not being involved in any way, because they don't have the capacity to do so" (personal communication, September 2020).

Additionally, Emiliana-Livier utilizes the funds of knowledge she has acquired from her years of working with the Latino community to best engage and mobilize the population. For instance, she states that they have learned that through conversation, in person forums, and cultural events they are able to best reach the Latino populace of the state. Further, she shares that one of the strongest tools that organizers have at their disposal to bring Latinos into the movement is simply having one on one conversations, or having/sharing coffee with the community members that they are hoping to engage and mobilize to participate politically in whichever way they are able to participate (Z. E. Livier, personal communication, September 2020).

Similarly, Petra Falcón, executive director of Promise Arizona (PAZ), also believes that that political participation for the Latino community in Arizona is about more than just voting. From Falcón's point of view, true Latino political participation, "means that you are part of this decision-making process in your community whether it's at the school board level or to the church level, or, at the legislative level. Whether it's local or national, but it's, it's about being at the table where decisions are being made" (personal communication, September 2020). She does not mention voting whatsoever and instead more simplistically and seemingly more attainable for many Latinos, she calls for Latinos (documented and undocumented) to make sure to be in the room or "table" where the decisions impacting them and their communities are being made.

Falcón utilizes her experience, or funds of knowledge, working with and alongside Arizona's Latino population in order to best engage the community and galvanize them into politically participating. In her time working in Arizona, she has learned about the pivotal role family play within the Latino community. With this in mind, Falcón, whose organization, PAZ, was formed in 2010 in response to the passing of SB 1070, and has registered Latinos in Arizona ever since, is today basing their registration efforts based on cultural insider knowledge. She has launched a voter engagement campaign she calls the "Nana Campaign," or "analyzing how to get their children and their grandchildren out to vote" (P. Falcón, personal communication, September 2020). Falcón states that in the engagement world they also refer to this strategy as "relational organizing." In other words, in understanding how important familial ties are to the Latino culture, you can best engage this community by not only aiming to just get one individual to be civically engaged, but also engaging their immediate family and friends through those familial ties (P. Falcón, personal communication, September 2020). Further, this year, PAZ is also engaging in what Falcón called "you plus one" (personal communication, September 2020). For instance, if "person X" chooses to politically participate by voting, the goal of Falcón and her organization is to make sure that "person X" takes at least one person with them.

Building on the traditional definition of Latino political participation, Pérez, democracy director for Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA), defines political participation in two different phases: 1) the act of being political/politicized and, 2) Participation, with or without being politicized.

First: whether by an event or an issue, or something happening to you and your family, then becoming a political person realizing that there's consequences to elections, and realizing that the folks who are in office actually make a serious impact on your life. Second: A lot of voters who would turn out in this election, you know, I wouldn't say they're politicized. They might just know that it's their civic duty, or they might vote for "XYZ" reason. But they might not be politicized the way that I am, where I interact with the world around me as a political person. (personal communication, October 2020)

Pérez states that utilizing this definition of political/politicized and participation allowed LUCHA to build towards some of their organizational goals. He believes, as does his organization that by defining "Latino political participation" in this way it allows for the best opportunity for them to make progress with their intended community. Pérez stated that LUCHA aimed for its members to be politicized and also know how to participate. The organization worked towards building a wave of people who not only cared about the issues but also understood them: "and organizations like ours can actually create avenues for them to participate and make a difference and make a change" (R. Pérez, personal communication, October 2020).

Co-executive director of LUCHA and ACE, Tomás Robles, succinctly defines political participation in the following way: "engaging in an activity that helps to try to drag your community forward through policy" (personal communication, October 2020). Robles expands on this definition and elaborates that there are numerous other ways to politically participate as Latinos and that this non-monolithic, heterogeneous community

does not fall into a straightforward and neat definition of what their political participation is and how it can be defined. Additionally, as someone who is a part of and is a member of the community that he is engaging and mobilizing, he has accrued pivotal insider knowledge that not many others are able to. Robles' utilizes these funds of knowledge when defining and describing the methods that he believes best encapsulates the ways Latinos have politically participated, and how to best engage and mobilize the Latino community:

by simply talking to your family about what's happening today [...] get to being politically engaged by going to organizations like ours and volunteering [...] And finally, of course, calling your representatives doing all the traditional things that people see as political engagement. (personal communication, October 2020)

Arizona State Representative Raquel Terán believes that Latino political participation cannot only be clearly defined but that the definition itself can be based on observable and repetitive qualities that this electorate exhibits. She defines the political participation of this community in the following ways: registering to vote and then voting, engaging with community organizations that are building a movement and making policy, or simply sharing your story and having difficult conversations within your families (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020).

Furthermore, while working as the regional director of Mi Familia Vota - Arizona, a national civic engagement organization, State Representative Terán saw firsthand the way that Latinos were being registered at high numbers to vote, be a part of the Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL), and also participating in large numbers in key

political events in the history of the state of Arizona such as the recall of Arizona State Representative Russel Pearce, the defeat of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and the push to increase the minimum wage in 2016, while simultaneously having to constantly hear about the common misconception of Latinos civically engaging at low rates. She clarified: “Latinos are not given credit for passing XYZ proposition. We’ll get Russell and then we’ll got Arpaio out of office, and the credit is still not given to the increase of Latino participation” (R. Terán, personal communication, October 2020). In her approximately fifteen years of grassroots work throughout the state of Arizona, Terán has been a firsthand witness to the civic engagement levels of Latinos, documented and undocumented, throughout the state. She expresses that contrary to what people persistently describe as “low Latino political participation,” Latinos in Arizona have and continue to be very politically engaged. Similar to Anonymous #2’s conclusion regarding Latino civic engagement, “I would say they vote at low rates, but they don’t participate at low rates” (personal communication, September 2020), Terán too has seen a long history of these uncredited forms of engagement. Further, she believes that one of the main reasons for this higher than credit participation is the engagement and advocacy work that Latino community-based grassroots organizations have done, continue to do, and will keep doing in the future of organizing and engaging the community:

We see this trend of people just participating and getting registered to vote and the gradual increase yet, every single election, it’s like is this a year that Latinos are going to come out of vote...is this a year that we’re going to see that Latinos make a difference. And at the same time, I’m like, we’re talking to Latinos, we’re

going and knocking to their doors, we're making sure they're registered, we're making sure that they're part of the of the PEVL. (personal communication, October 2020)

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this study, I analyzed the political mobilizing effect of anti-immigration legislation in Arizona on Latino political participation in that state. This study is important to Latino politics because it adds to the previous research on Latino political participation by beginning a discussion regarding how to approach and recognize the multifaceted practices of Latino political participation in this multilayered population. My analysis of both the Latino vote statistics and the qualitative interview data revealed how Arizona's anti-immigration legislation affected all segments of the Latino population, and shed light on the importance of the undocumented population's role in galvanizing the Latino community as a whole to stand against the racially charged legislation.

A NOTE REGARDING THE RESEARCH.

The discrimination against non-Anglos in Arizona did not begin in 2010 with the passing of SB 1070. Latinos have long suffered at the hands of racist ideologies and behaviors in the state of Arizona and throughout the United States. For instance, Roberto

Reveles, longtime revered political activist and grassroots organizer, former founder and executive director of Somos America/We are America and numerous other grassroots organizations in Arizona and throughout the US, shared that when he was a young boy growing up in Miami, Arizona, he remembers being punished by his Anglo teacher for speaking Spanish while in school. His teacher first began by hitting him with a ruler across the tops of his hands numerous times. Then, the teacher would proceed to further embarrass and degrade him by requiring that for the remainder of the day he would write on the chalkboard, “I will only speak American,” while wearing a baby’s diaper across the top of his head and around his cheeks (R. Reveles, personal communication, September 2020). This memory of this treatment during the interview brought back deep emotions for Reveles, but he also shared that he worked to unite and stand against anti-Latino policies because he did not want any other Latinos to experience the embarrassment that he had to endure.

Additionally, a second distinguished and influential longtime activist in Arizona, Petra Falcón, executive director of Promise Arizona (PAZ), also revealed her childhood experience with discrimination while growing up in Arizona. Falcón too was confronted with harassment and was berated for speaking Spanish in a public space:

I grew up being made fun of because of my accent. I was in a grocery store and I was talking to a friend in Spanish and this white woman came up all disturbed. I mean, she was frantic. ‘Don’t speak Spanish, speak English.’ I mean, so I grew up being mistreated because I was brown and because I spoke Spanish. So that’s how

it impacted me. I mean, I was an American. I'm a fourth generation American. (P. Falcón, personal communication, September 2020).

The experiences of Reveles and Falcón occurred at a time much before the passing of SB 1070, yet their treatment was very similar to the treatment supported by modern-day anti-immigration legislation.

While this work is making a case for the incremental growth of discrimination and suffrage amongst the Latino community of Arizona after the passing of anti-immigration legislation starting at the turn of the century, it is in no way minimizing the longtime suffrage of non-Anglo Arizonians at the hands of the hegemonic Anglo populace before that time. Instead, this research shows that Latinos have faced discriminatory behavior whether it is simply an ideological norm and accepted behavior, or whether it is engendered throughout the state via the passing of anti-immigration legislation such as SB 1070, the “English only” and “Voter ID” laws, and the numerous other referendums and anti-immigration laws passed since the year 2000.

LATINO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION EVOLVED

There are obvious demographic reasons to explain why immigration agendas mobilize all Latinos. First, Latinos within the SWNAR are very likely to either be immigrants or to have family members or friends affected by immigration. This has a large part to do with the long history of the U.S.-México border and that Arizona used to be part of México with the physical border “crossing” many Mexicans who lived in the region before the split. Generations of Latinos of Mexican origin who live on the U.S. side after the separation of the countries continue to keep close contact with their

relatives across the border, and vice versa. Therefore, the proximity of the border and the ancestral historical connection to México in this region helps to galvanize the Latino population as a whole when it comes to immigration.

Further, studies have shown that anti-immigrant rhetoric has politically rallied Latinos, because anti-immigration policies often manifest themselves as anti-Latino (Barreto, 2013). Latinos from various backgrounds, when faced with discrimination, generally are being discriminated against because they are being labeled as “illegal immigrants,” regardless of their citizenship status (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 2015). In other words, anti-immigrant rhetoric causes damage to all Latinos of all ethnic backgrounds. One study has shown that, the “Mexicans are rapists” comments by President Trump when he announced his candidacy in 2015 also served to galvanize Latino voters (Newman, Shah & Collingwood, 2018). Furthermore, anti-immigrant agendas have not only energized Arizona’s Latino community, but also its non-Latino allies both across the state and nationwide (Nuño-Pérez, 2018). The connection between immigration and discrimination may also explain why Latinos with diverse backgrounds—such as Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Colombian—organize to oppose policies. It is important to understand that, in a political context, immigration is much more than a talking point it is personal (Barreto, 2013). Due to this, Latinos with U.S. citizenship have found it important to pick up the cause of the undocumented immigrant, especially in Arizona where the actions of previous leaders, such as Sheriff Joe Arpaio, unjustly racially profiled Latinos and led to their maltreatment, physically and emotionally.

The steadily changing demographics of Arizona is also of important interest politically for Arizona. The *Arizona Republic* reported that since 2010, Maricopa County has taken in approximately 148,000 people from other states and 53,000 from other countries (Hansen, 2016). Historically, this change in demographics has responded well to Latino voter mobilization efforts driven by Latino-driven advocacy groups such as Promise Arizona (PAZ) and Puente Human Rights Movement. It was through the changing Maricopa County demographics, coupled with grassroots organizations that were aimed at increasing the minority vote that led to more than 100,000 new voters for the 2016 election that Arizona was able to successfully remove Sheriff Joe Arpaio from office in the 2016 election (Ballesteros, 2017, pg. 32). Additionally, One Arizona and other organizations focused on increasing the Latino community's vote in response to the 2016 presidential race. Their concentration on the Latino community was due to the negative effects that the Trump election would have on this community, and although Trump won the election, these organizational efforts have created a strong and growing political movement that continues today.

Latinos are the youngest and fastest growing segment of Arizona's population and their improved political organization and participation by grassroots civic engagement organizations and the increased accessibility for eligible voters to vote on or before election day, led to an improvement in their voter turnout by 22 percent from 2014 to 2018 with 75 percent of their vote going to Democratic candidates (Reuters, Smith & Ledur, 2019). Further, the increased political participation of Latinos has already resulted in a new wave of Latino politicians in Arizona who entered politics to oppose the Brewer

and Arpaio era which was encompassed by tough jail policies, a strong anti-immigrant posture, and the passing of the draconian immigration bill, SB1070. These vital new additions to the Arizona government address the need for Latinos in positions of power that can eventually act to disassemble the ongoing hegemony within the state. They ran and were elected with the intention of not only entering the halls of power, but according to Santos et al. (2019), of utilizing their newfound positions to “infiltrate these systems and do something radically different” to ultimately, “dismantle this system that was created to hurt our people and to get rid of us...” (para. 12). This is in stark contrast to the history of Latino political leaders in which, as previously discussed, were held in office to continue the hegemonic manipulation and neglect of the Latino community.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE POLITICAL STRATEGY

What is the best way to politically engage Latinos in Arizona in the future? The response to this question is in no way simple and straightforward, but it is of grave importance to the state of Arizona, specifically to the Latino electorate. The number of factors that must be considered and possibly implemented to comprehensively answer this question are numerous and complex. The simple answer would be that there is no “magic pill” to engage and mobilize the Latino electorate in Arizona. The more correct answer I will attempt to answer below.

The question of how to best politically engage Latinos of Arizona is salient to the not just the Latino population of the state, but the entirety of Arizona due to the current and expected demographics of the Latino population: “Census data shows 31% of Arizona’s population is Latino [...] if nothing changes, Arizona actually could change

from a red conservative state to a blue progressive state by 2030” (12News, Armstrong, 2018). Further, Eric Hershberg, director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University in Washington, states: “In a place like Arizona, and I would add elsewhere, substantial success in efforts to promote Latino turnout could lead to a remarkable outcome” (Mendoza, 2016, para. 10).

The most pressing factor to consider when discussing political participation of Latinos in Arizona is how to best combat the seemingly never-ending legislative attempts at voter suppression by the state’s conservative politicians who are keenly aware of the gradual but noticeably changing demographics. It is a well discussed reality that Latinos in Arizona are “disproportionately met with obstacles when casting ballots compared to white voters. If those obstacles are dismantled, the state’s vote could change from red to blue” (12News, Armstrong, 2018). Arizona elections have long been known for the institutional mechanisms that are in place and meant to keep communities of color from voting. These mechanisms and the state agents, “who act in response to rules, procedures, and law” in order to maintain the status quo, were put in the spotlight in 2012 when the Maricopa County recorder, Helen Purcell, reduced the polling places during the 2012 presidential primary (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000, p. 329). During that election, she reduced the number of locations from 400 in 2008 down to 60 in 2012, leaving Phoenix with one polling place for every 108,00 residents, while Cave Creek, a predominantly white suburb had one polling place for every 8,500 residents (Phoenix New Times, Farzan, 2018). This decision disproportionately impacted the communities

of color in Maricopa county, being that the vast majority of the polling places closed that day were in majority Latino neighborhoods.

Further, research has found that blatant acts like these of voter suppression and other more subtle forms such as Voter ID laws and the passing of purposefully confusing legislation are largely successful in reducing voter turnout of Latinos and other groups of color. This can be seen when viewing national election data from 2008-2012, which found that Latino turnout was 10.3 percent lower in states with strict photo identification requirements than Latino turnout elsewhere. This research also found that the participation gap between eligible Latino and white voters doubled in states with strict photo identification requirements, from 5.3% to 11.9% (The Role of the Latino Vote in the 2016 Elections, 2016, p. 16). These attempts at voter disenfranchisement continue today as Arizona's conservative politicians respond to the gains made by Democrats in the 2018 midterm election.

Arizona State Senator Michelle Ugenti-Rita has proposed new laws that would "purge" Arizona's voter rolls and also keep voters from enrolling in the Permanent Early Voting List (PEVL), a form of voting that has contributed to the Latino community being able to vote at higher rates than ever before. Specifically, Ugenti-Rita proposed Senate Bill 1046, requiring:

voters who receive early ballots in the mail to return them only by mail, rather than bringing them to polling places before or on Election Day. People who don't mail in their ballots would be able to vote at a polling place but would have to

wait in line and go through the same process as other in-person voters. (AZ Mirror, Duda, 2019)

This would defeat the purpose of the PEVL, which was enabled so that minority voters, who may have to work and may not be able to wait in line for long hours, could have a fair chance at casting their vote, either by mail or by a quick drop off at the polling location. The same senator also proposed two other pieces of legislation that were meant to deter voters and complicate their voting experience: Senate Bill 1072 and Senate Bill 1054. SB 1072 would require early voters to provide an ID and SB 1054 required that counties verify signatures within five days or have their votes “cured” (AZ Mirror, Duda, 2019). This is not only a local problem; it is a problem that must be confronted and minimized nationally if the following recommendations are to be of any use when considering how to best engage Latinos to participate politically.

The literature on traditional Latino political participation offers some overt and covert suggestions on how to best improve Latino political participation. I make my suggestions only after synthesizing the previous literature and the research from this study, while also taking into account the specifics of the Latino electorate in Arizona, such as utilizing culturally competent Latino-centered methods that allow for Latinos to have their voices and stories heard through testimonios. Additionally, the large numbers of young Latinos make them key when considering how to improve the political participation of all Latinos. The Latino voting bloc in Arizona is very similar to the national Latino electorate in that they are young, “each month, 67,000 Latinos turn 18, [...] In 2016, almost half of eligible Latino voters were millennials, born between 1981

and 1996,” but they vote at lower rates than non-white Hispanics and African Americans (12News, Armstrong, 2018). Furthermore, statistics have shown that, “those under the age of 30 vote at a lower rate compared to voters who are older. Even more so, young Latinos vote less than young white voters” (12News, Armstrong, 2018). Latino age is important for voter outreach in this community, because similar to their peer groups, young Latinos are highly competent with technology and have deeply adopted social media into their daily lives. Therefore, it is recommended that one of the most efficient ways to engage Latino millennials and Generation Z is through innovative uses of social media and its many platforms. According to a study by Velásquez and Quenette (2018), the following is key regarding young Latinos and the use of social media to increase political participation:

Results discussed suggest five key mechanisms that either directly or indirectly influence offline political participation among this demographic group: (a) one’s general social media use, (b) observation of how users’ own social network use social media for political purposes, (c) one’s successful experiences using social media for political purposes, (d) perceptions of social media political self-efficacy, and (e) social media political expression. Together, these constructs compose a picture of how interacting within an online social network and individuals’ social media political behaviors influence offline engagement—demonstrating a positive influence on participation in an increasingly fragmented political environment. (p. 776)

Additionally, when considering the best forms of improving political participation by young Latinos, research has shown that civic participation rates increase across the board when people are exposed to politics and are indoctrinated into the political process in general at a young age (Terríquez, 2017). Terríquez (2017) states that if youth are involved in associations such as activist groups or grassroots organizing groups, it strongly impacts the rate of that adolescent being involved at a later age (p. 318). When looking at young Latinos specifically, the positive impact of involving children in the political process at an early age is evident in the Terríquez (2017) study which states, “Latinos (including participants of the undocumented youth movement) who joined adolescent activist organizations, such as youth organizing groups, exhibit especially high levels of political participation in young adulthood” (pp. 331-332). This has been extremely important for the Latino youth in Arizona in the past ten to fifteen years with the growth of grassroots organizations in their state. As recognized in the results, the grassroots organizations have incorporated Latino youth within the infrastructure to educate them and to prime them for future political roles as elected officials of the state.

Another point of interest when seeking to improve the vote of young Latinos is that attaching other “big ticket” items to the ballot entices young voters to participate because they care more about contemporary movements than the standard tax-related proposals of the older population. For instance, young Latinos have shown to vote at higher rates when a vote to legalize marijuana or a policy related to climate change is attached to the ballot. By informing young Latino voters of these items through various

marketing platforms such as social media, and engaging their interests, the participation rates of Latinos overall will increase.

Further, I recommend that the Latino groups who are mobilizing and registering voters engage intersectionality and tailor their strategies to better serve the subsections/subgroups within the Latino heterogeneity. For instance, Latinas vote Democrat at higher rates than Latinos. Yet, they continue to be mobilized at even lower rates than Latinos in general. I would recommend that organizations embrace more gender specific voter engagement approaches. These organizations should utilize the technologies that their people on the ground are using while canvassing, such as the available analytics that can instantly pull up potential voter's information and history on the spot, and focus it on engaging Latinas of all ages in their usual places of congregation, work, school, etc.

When truly engaging with the Latino political participation literature, one pattern is visible throughout the majority of the works, namely, what the past and present organizations and groups have done has and is working. Therefore, my last recommendation is for those grassroots organizations to continue the techniques that they have been using, because the literature shows that there is not an instant "fix" to overcome the hundreds of years of colonial and imperial hegemonic forces that have led Latinos to the position that they currently hold in society. I utilize the words of DeSipio to make my final recommendation for improving Latino political participation: "Personal outreach, whether by candidates or their supporters, has been shown to spur Latino

turnout, even when controlling for the effects of age, education, and income” (Shaw et al., 2000, p. 462).

LEARNING FROM CALIFORNIA, BUILDING UP TEXAS

In 1994, California, facing an influx of undocumented immigrants entering the state via the México border, proposed and passed Proposition 187, legislation focused on: services such as public education and health care that would be denied to undocumented immigrants while Arizona’s brought state and local police into the process by requiring them to attempt to check the immigration status of any detainees they have reasonable suspicion that the individual is an undocumented immigrant. (Robinson et al., 2016, p. 580)

Similar in nature to Arizona’s 2010, Senate Bill 1070, California’s Proposition 187 was proposed by conservative Republicans who were fearful of the Latino change in population, just as the Arizona Republicans in 2010 were. The former Republican governor of California, Pete Wilson, used this legislation as a tactic for re-election and was able to win by a large margin. Former Arizona governor, Jan Brewer, followed suit, also using SB 1070 as political leverage for her re-election in 2010 and also won by a comfortable margin. In both instances, their success proved the strength of the immigration issue and that targeting undocumented immigrants and using and feeding the ‘fears’ of the public regarding the danger of immigrants was an acceptable strategy. Further, in both states, both Prop 187 and SB 1070, inevitably negatively impacted all members of the Latino community (Robinson et al., 2016, p. 580).

The subsequent story in California post Prop 187 in 1994, may prove to be a foretelling of what could be in Arizona when and if the Latino electorate continues to grow in power. In California, the Latino community believed that the proposition was a direct attack. This sentiment caused a large shift in partisanship by Latinos away from the Republican party. In addition, Latino growth in population and their increased voter turnout in the years following Prop 187, transitioned the state from a battleground state to Democrat control (Robinson et al., 2016). The large increase in Latino Democratic votes coupled with an Anglo population that had already been swaying toward the Democratic party pushed the state blue.

In California, post Wilson, Latino turnout surged resulting in a statewide Democratic movement (Robinson et al., 2016). Acknowledging this shift is vital in understanding how the passing of SB 1070 could potentially affect Arizona's political landscape. Arizona can be said to be a vastly different state than California, but post SB 1070, Latinos have stepped up measures and united to oppose Arizona's discriminatory anti-immigration legislation. Arizona is slowly following the path that California took in the late 1990s, but it is not clear if Arizona will completely shift to a Democrat controlled state. This is in part due to the Anglo population of the state. While California's white, non-Latinos also supported Democrat nominees for office, Arizona's white, non-Latinos did the opposite post SB 1070 (Robinson et al., 2016). As discussed earlier, if the young Latino electorate is swayed into voting, Arizona will likely face great changes and may turn from a "battleground" state to a blue, Democrat-run state. When looking across the nation, California has been the only state with a large Latino population to consistently be

Democratic. Other states with large Latino populations tend to either be “battleground” states or Republican controlled. Other Latino heavy states, like Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico, could be considered “battleground” states leaning Democratic (Orchowski, 2012). Texas, Utah, and Florida are consistently Republican, with Texas having enough of the Latino vote to possibly become battleground or Democratic if Latinos make it to the ballot box. If Texas were to face legislation such as California’s Proposition 187 or Arizona’s SB 1070, it is uncertain how the Latino population would respond, but it may be likely that they are already responding without a push from highly racialized legislation. With the close race between Beto O’Rourke and Ted Cruz in 2018 for Texas Senate, the closest Senate race in Texas since 1978, it appears that Texas may be undergoing similar changes as California and Arizona, leaving the possibility for Texas to become a “battleground” state at the least (Svitek & Livingston, 2018). To note, there is a healthy portion of the Latino population that is conservative Republican, which complicates the belief that a rise in Latino population and votes will miraculously lead to a Democratic swing for states.

FINAL NOTE

With the upcoming 2020 presidential election, there is much anticipation to see what the Latino electorate has to offer, especially in response to Trump’s continued xenophobic rhetoric and vilification of Latino immigrants (Moreno, 2018). What has been the common theme throughout history is that Latinos have consistently been:

chosen for punitive policy because they lack social and political clout and economic resources; then, because of this oppressive process, the group is

hindered from advancing to a social position in which increased levels of social, political, and economic support are possible. This dysfunctional cycle is a serious problem; it perpetuates inequality because it lacks self-correcting mechanisms, it deceives and discourages active citizenship, and, ultimately, results in long-term policy failures that are detrimental to democracy. (Moreno, 2018, p. 90)

With the continued work of the grassroots organizations in Arizona and nationally, it is with optimism that Latinos are able to fight these oppressive processes and gain seats in the Senate and the House that will allow for their voice to be heard. Organizations like FAIR and ALEC continue to fight social progress for all minority populations and instill false anxiety and panic in the public sphere to continue feeding anti-immigration legislation, as well as legislation aimed at keeping minority populations circumscribed. While “equal and fair policy designs are critical in a democratic society because policy designs continue to play a significant role in shaping the identities, beliefs, political interests, and political actions of disadvantaged populations” (Schneider & Ingram, 2005). Lastly, just as Vélez-Ibáñez (2018) states that no hegemony is ever complete, “ideological, linguistic, cultural, economic, social, or economic,” [we](#) must understand that despite the longstanding repressive systems, people have survived and continue to fight back through their acts of discontent (pp. 139-140).

Finally, beyond the vote, it is important to utilize funds of knowledge to connect with the Latino community to continue the deeper lessons connected with Latino political participation. Building confianza and sharing the testimonios of the community to the world is a strategy that does not employ the vote, but which is just as important.

Reversing the negative ideology surrounding Latinos and immigrants is vital in reversing the damage imposed by the hegemonic Anglo populace. More than pushing the vote, it is important to engage Latinos on a personal level. A known commodity that is being utilized with success by local organizers such as Emiliana Livier, “we know, as organizers, that having one-on-ones in person, having coffee with someone, having a conversation, and bringing them into your movement is one of the most... one of the strongest tools that we have in our toolbox as organizers” (Emiliana Livier, personal communication, October 2020). As indicated by this study, the grassroots organizations have been successful at reaching Latinos individually for a public Latino collective and galvanizing them. For future success, this must continue.

Continuing the research on the Latino community and the value that they bring to the political process is also vital in tapping in to the funds of knowledge that will work to stand against the subjugating ideology that has been circulated. Reassuring the Latino community that their experiences and funds of knowledge are valid and important to the U.S. as well as changing the narrative of the greater public in the U.S. to understand the importance of the immigrant community to the nation as a whole is another vital action that needs to be taken to take strides in correcting the damaged vision of Latinos and immigrants alike.

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APPENDIX A

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LATINO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT/GRASSROOTS

ORGANIZATIONS IN ARIZONA BY YEAR

The Establishment of Latino Civic Engagement/Grassroots

Organizations in Arizona by year

2019: RAZE ||| Fuerte Arts Movement

2018: All Voting is Local ||| People's Defense Initiative ||| Arizona Coalition for Change

2017: Our Voice, Our Vote Arizona ||| AZ Coalition for Change

2016: ALIENTO ||| Trans Queer Pueblo

2015: Mijente

2014: Chispa Arizona

2013: Poder in Action

2011: Central Arizonans for a Sustainable Economy (CASE) ||| Arizona Wins

2010: Arizona Center for Empowerment (ACE) ||| Living United for Change in Arizona (LUCHA) ||| Promise Arizona (PAZ) ||| One Arizona

2009: Arizona Dream Act Coalition

2007: PUENTE Human Rights Movement

2006: Progress Now Arizona ||| Amistades ||| Justa Center ||| Somos America Coalition

2002: Las Adelitas Arizona ||| Arizona Advocacy Network ||| AZAN Foundation

2001: Protecting Arizona's Family Coalition (PAFCO)

2000: Mi Familia Vota

1994: CAIR Arizona

1981: Hispanic Women's Corporation (HWC)

1974: Arizona Students' Association

1970: Valle Del Sol

1969: Chicanos por la Causa

1952: Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona

1934: Planned Parenthood Arizona

APPENDIX B

ARIZONA ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION (2000-2018)

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
2000	Proposition 203 “English-only” legislation Structured English Immersion	Partially sponsored by Ron K. Unz (R)	Ended native-language instruction for children with limited English proficiency. Imposed a state-wide English-only mandate.
2004	Proposition 200 Arizona Taxpayer Citizen Protection Act	“Protect Arizona Now” (PAN) committee Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)	Made it mandatory for people to verify their identity in order to receive government subsidies, and it also charged government employees with misdemeanors if they provided services to anyone believed to be undocumented Required that evidence of United States (US) citizenship be presented by every person to register to vote
2005	A.R.S. § 13-2319 Coyote Law		Smuggling undocumented persons across the border a felony, authorized local police to enforce immigration law, and classified persons being smuggled as co-conspirators
	H.B. 2592	Rosati (R) (11 sponsors)	Prevents cities from constructing day labor centers if the centers assist unauthorized immigrants
	S. 1372	Jarrett (30 sponsors)	Gave local law enforcement the ability to arrest smugglers and to penalize human trafficking.
	H.B. 2259	Gray (R) McClure (R) Pearce (R) Pierce (R)	Allows immigration status to factor into sentencing
2006	HB 2448/SB 2738	Knaperek (R) (9 Sponsors)	Requires U.S. citizenship or legal immigrant status to receive health benefits. An unauthorized immigrant can receive emergency medical services only (section 1).
	SB 1137	Leff (R)	Limits eligibility for the Comprehensive Care for the Elderly program to citizens and those with legal alien status (section 1).
	HCM 2018 (resolution)		Urges Congress to include an agriculture commuter worker permit program as part of immigration reform legislation to allow foreign workers to commute across the border daily to work if they fulfill certain security-related requirements.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	HJR 2001 (resolution)		Requests the United States Congress and the United States Department of Homeland Security to supplement ICE with state auxiliary reserve units under the Coast Guard.
	Proposition 100 HCR 2028 Bailable Offenses Act	Russell K. Pearce (R) (12 Sponsors – 12 Reps)	Denied bail for immigrants who were unlawfully in the United States on the premise that “the proof is evident or the presumption great” that the person is guilty of the offense charged
	Proposition 102 SCR 1001 Standing in Civil Actions Act	Jack Harper (R)	Denied unauthorized immigrants from bringing and receiving monetary compensation from civil cases Excluded immigrants from filing claims of wrongdoing against them in the workplace and beyond.
	Proposition 103 HCR 2036 English as the Official Language Act	Russell K. Pearce (R) (5 Sponsors – 5 Reps)	Made English Arizona’s official state language and required all official state business, including court activities and government departments that work to protect workers’ rights, to be completed in English
	Proposition 300 SCR 1031 Public Program Eligibility Act	Dean Martin (R) (5 Sponsors – 5 Reps)	Made any unauthorized immigrant immediately ineligible for in-state college tuition, government grants, scholarships, or financial aid. Banned undocumented immigrants and those who were born out of the country, from receiving funding for higher education, even if they had otherwise lived in Arizona their whole life
2007	H.B. 2202	Mark Anderson (R) Andrew M. Tobin (R)	This law establishes a division of adult education within the department of education. In relation to immigrants the department must adopt rules for the establishment and conduct of classes for immigrant and adult education, including the teaching of English to foreigners. The department is also tasked to stimulate and correlate the Americanization work of various agencies.
	H.B. 2474	Russell K. Pearce (R) Linda Gray (R)	The act relates to overtime compensation including certain aliens and minors permitted to work for hire.
	H.B. 2779 “Legal Arizona Workers Act”	Russell K. Pearce (R)	This law prohibits employers from knowingly or intentionally hiring undocumented workers and requires all employers to use the Basic Pilot Program to determine employees’ legal status. It forms a committee to study employer-sanctions laws in Arizona and provides penalties with respect to business licenses.
	HB 2391 - Act 187	Rich Crandall (R)	This law requires spirituous liquor licensees to be a citizen of the United States and a bona fide resident of this state or a legal resident alien who is a bona fide resident of this state.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	S.B. 1291	Barbara Leff (R)	This legislation specifies that a member of the Arizona Board of Appraisals must be a U.S. citizen or “qualified alien” as defined by federal law
	HB 2016 - Act 178	Marian McClure (R)	This act provides for the detention of a material witness if testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena because of the immigration status of the person.
	HB 2181 – Act 255	Eddie Farnsworth (R)	The law provides funds for immigration law enforcement in the state of Arizona.
	HB 2781	Tom Boone (R)	This law directs the Department of Corrections to work with the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team to combat gang activity. The law also allocates \$10 million to the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team.
	HB 2787 – Act 261	John McComish (R)	This legislation amends Arizona law to deny release on bail for a felony if there is probable cause that the individual is an illegal alien.
	SB 1265	Linda Gray (R)	The law relates to the determination of an individual’s country of citizenship after that person has been brought to the agency for incarceration; requires the agency to transmit any information regarding the individual's country of origin and criminal record to the court and the prosecuting agency for the purpose of determining whether that person is lawfully present in the United States and whether that person should be given the option of bail.
	HB 2467	Russell K. Pearce (R)	This law requires citizenship, permanent residency, or lawful presence in the United States to receive state public benefits. It also requires a person who applies for public benefits to submit documentation proving his or her lawful presence in the United States.
	HCM 2012 (resolution)	Warde V. Nichols (R)	This memorial requests that the rules of engagement for National Guard troops on the Mexican border be changed to allow soldiers to defend against, engage, pursue and apprehend illegal entrants and that the National Guard should be placed in a primary enforcement role until the Border Patrol receives its full complement of officers as approved by Congress.
	HCR 2007 (resolution)	John Kavanagh (R)	This resolution expresses support for the placement of Poland on the Visa Waiver Program list.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	SM 1003 (resolution)	Ron Gould (R)	This memorial urges the Congress of the United States to enact legislation repealing the privacy violations contained in the Real ID Act of 2005. This memorial requests that the U.S. Congress take immediate action enacting legislation to amend the REAL ID Act or repeal segments.
	SM 1004 (resolution)	Timothy S. Bee (R)	This memorial requests that the Congress continue funding and completion of SBI-net a program that assists in the apprehending and processing of people who cross Arizona's border illegally; facilitates legitimate cross-border travel and commerce by the target date of 12/31/08.
2008	HB 2745	Russell K. Pearce (R)	This Act adjusts the prohibitions against knowingly or intentionally employing an unauthorized alien and eliminates independent contractors from the definition of employee. It provides for the Arizona Attorney General to establish a Voluntary Employer Enhanced Compliance Program. After September 30, 2008, the law prohibits an agency from issuing a license to an individual who does not establish legal presence and prohibits government entities from awarding a contract to any contractor and subcontractor that fails to use E-Verify. The Act establishes the crime of knowingly accepting the identity of another person or entity and expands the definitions of identity theft. The Act also provides that companies can be punished only for unauthorized workers they hired after January 1, 2008 and that a violation at one location of a company shuts down only that location, not the entire corporation. Effective May 1, 2008
	SB 1125	Debbie McCune Davis (D)	This law provides for additional employer penalties and the payment of compensation benefits to an employee or to the employee's estate if an employee injury results in permanent disability or death. An employee is defined as every person in the service of any employer subject to this chapter, including aliens and minors legally or illegally permitted to work for hire.
	HB 2842	Adam Driggs (R)	The law expands the existing definition of smuggling of human beings to include the use of property ("drop houses") by a person or an entity that knows that the person or persons transported or to be transported are not U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in this state.
	HB 2486	Jim Weiers (R) Bob Robson (R)	This law states that an undocumented alien or a nonimmigrant traveling with or without documentation is a prohibited possessor of a deadly weapon. This does not include nonimmigrant aliens with valid hunting licenses or those who enter to participate in hunting trade shows, competitive shooting events, or have received a waiver from the U.S. Attorney General.
2009	SB 1001	Robert "Bob" Burns (R)	This Act appropriates \$10 million for the multi-jurisdictional task force known as the gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission (GIITEM)
	SB 1281	Jonathan Paton (R)	Expands the classification of sex trafficking by including a sexually-explicit performance and knowingly trafficking a minor with the knowledge that they will engage in any prostitution or sexually-explicit performance, expands the definition of forced labor or services to include the classification of trafficking of persons, relates to destruction of a person's identification, passport, government document or immigration document, relates to extortion & financial harm

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	SB 1282	Jonathan Paton (R)	This act extends the definition of human smuggling to include those who have attempted to enter, entered, or remained in the U.S. in violation of law
	HB 2008	Kirk Adams (R)	Provides for general government budget reconciliation, identifies documents to demonstrate lawful presence for federal public benefits eligibility
	HB 2306	Michele Reagan (R)	This act requires that an applicant for a business license in the state provide documentation of citizenship or alien status prior to the issuance of such license, provides that documentation of citizenship or status is not required upon renewal or reinstatement of a license in certain circumstances
	HB 2426	Judy M. Burges (R)	This act prohibits participation by the State in any enhanced driver's license program established for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of the Federal Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative or the Real ID Act
	HB 2569	Adam Driggs (R)	This act increases the penalty for the offense of human smuggling across state and national borders involving the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument
2010	SB 1027	Russell Pearce (R)	This law requires the department of public safety to seek grants to implement a one-year pilot program that would use seismic sensors to monitor rural airport runways and other rural areas of this state where illegal drug traffic and illegal alien traffic or human smuggling are likely to occur
	SB 1043	Robert "Bob" Burns (R)	This law relates to the Children's Health Insurance Program. In order to be eligible, an individual must be a resident of Arizona and must meet requirements for U.S. citizenship or qualified alien status. Also, in determining eligibility for qualified aliens, the income and resources of a person who executed an affidavit of support for the individual and that of the sponsor's spouse will be counted at the time of application and for the redetermination of eligibility
	SB 1059	Jonathan Paton (R)	This law classifies sex trafficking as a felony in the state of Arizona. The law defines sex trafficking as knowingly and intentionally causing another person to engage in any prostitution or sexually explicit performance by deception, force or coercion. The definition of coercion includes knowingly destroying, concealing, removing, confiscating, possessing or withholding another person's actual or purported passport or other immigration document, government issued identification document, government record or personal property
	SB 1070	Russell Pearce (R)	This law covers multiple issues related to illegal immigration in the state of Arizona. The provisions include establishing state crimes and penalties for trespassing by illegal aliens, failure to carry alien registration documents, stopping to hire or soliciting work under specified circumstances, and transporting, harboring or concealing unlawful aliens

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	HB 2001	Judy M. Burges (R)	This law appropriates funds to state agencies in Arizona. It includes \$1,213,200 in funding to county attorneys for immigration enforcement in communities with a population over 1.5 million people. The law also includes \$4,110,300 to the Arizona Department of Education to provide English language acquisition services
	HCM 2005	Nancy K. Barto (R)	This resolution urges the U.S. Congress of the United States to reauthorize the Section 1011 program of the federal Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which allocates funds to reimburse states for providing emergency health care to undocumented aliens
	HB 2149	Steve Court (R) Nancy K. Barto (R)	This act gives the Physical Therapy Board the authority to waive a legal authorization requirement for applicants seeking a license who have been educated outside the United States, on receipt of written proof that the applicant cannot demonstrate legal authorization based on the citizenship requirements of the county where their professional education occurred
	HB 2162	Warde V. Nichols (R)	This law amends Arizona SB 1070 to specify that law enforcement officials cannot consider race, color or national origin when implementing the provisions of the original law, except as permitted by the U.S. or Arizona Constitution. Additionally, the law clarifies the original law's language around "reasonable suspicion" by requiring state and local law enforcement to reasonably attempt to determine the immigration status of a person involved only while in the process of a lawful stop, detention, or arrest. It lowers the fine for state or local entities sued by legal residents and found guilty of restricting the enforcement of federal law from \$1000 to \$500 for each day the policy is in effect. The law also lowers the fine for individuals that fail to complete or carry an alien registration document from \$500-\$100 for the first offense
	HB 2437	Adam Driggs (R)	This law allows the court system to appoint an adult as the guardian of a foreign citizen if the foreign citizen is under the age of 21. It requires that the foreign citizen under guardianship have a temporary visa issued by the United States or is a legal permanent resident
	HB 2469	Doris Goodale (R)	This law requires that those applying to practice as a medication assistant who were educated outside of the United States must provide evidence of completing at least 12 years of education in a foreign country and, if the language of that country was other than English, must receive a passing score on an English language proficiency examination as determined by the board
	HB 2725	Steve Court (R)	This omnibus education law includes a number of provisions including citizenship requirements for the issuing of loans for tuition, instructional materials and mandatory fees of the education of students who are pursuing a teaching degree in the state
2011	SCR 1006	Sylvia Allen (R)	This resolution voices Legislature support for the Arizona Cattle Growers' Association's plan to secure the US-México border

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	SB 1046	Don Shooter (R)	This act mandates that a youth held in state custody may be discharged if ICE enforces a detainer demanding custody of the youth for immigration proceedings.
	SB 1117	Russell Pearce (R)	This law allows the Speaker of the House and the Senate President to direct counsel to initiate a legal proceeding or appear on chambers' behalf regarding any challenge in a state or federal court to the immigration law SB1070
	SB 1225	Kyrsten Sinema (D)	Forgery is specified as a class 3--rather than 4--felony if the forgery instrument is used in connection with a drop house used for human smuggling
	SB 1398	Andy Biggs (R) Frank Antenori (R)	This law helps fund Arizona's Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team by levying a penalty assessment on every fine collected for a civil traffic or motor vehicle violation, and violations of other local ordinances
	SB 1406	David Burnell Smith (R)	This act allows the governor to enter a compact with other states to provide construction and maintenance for a secure fence along the Arizona-México border
	SB 1465	Senator Ron Gould (R)	The state of Arizona will not accept a consular identification card that is issued by a foreign government as a valid form of identification
	SB 1612	Andy Biggs (R)	This law appropriates \$9 million to Gang and Immigrant Enforcement for the enforcement of federal immigration law and implementing Arizona's immigration law
	SB 1621	Andy Biggs (R)	This budget Act establishes a Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission Fund. The bill stipulates access to the fund by County sheriffs, other county officials, and law enforcement agencies
	HCM 2003	Russ Jones (R)	This resolution requests that the President of the United States and the Labor Secretary recognize the authority of the federal Labor Department to establish a pilot program to address the H-2A commuter housing issue without legislative or regulatory changes. The resolution expresses opposition to the requirement that farmers provide free housing for workers. The reasoning is because the workers tend not to use the housing and farmers must still bear the burden

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	HB 2016	John Kavanagh (R)	This law requires a person applying for eligibility for health services to prove their U.S. citizenship or qualified alien status. It also requires the administration to report the number of individuals verified using the SAVE program, types and number of fraudulent documents used, and number of individuals referred for prosecution purposes
	HB 2102	John Kavanagh (R)	This act requires agencies to only issue a license, fingerprinting clearance card, or any state ID to a person who provides photo ID proof of citizenship or alien status
	HB 2191	Jim Weiers (R)	This law stipulates that a person unlawfully present in the United States shall not be awarded punitive damages in any court action
	HB 2353	Eddie Farnsworth (R) Cecil P. Ash (R)	This law labels a “prohibited possessor” as an undocumented alien or nonimmigrant alien traveling in Arizona or who is studying in Arizona and who maintains a foreign residence abroad. It also denies bail for a person committing the felony offense of being in the U.S. illegally
2012	SB 1523	Don Shooter (R) Andy Biggs (R) Steve Pierce (R)	This law appropriates \$1,213,200 to the county attorney immigration enforcement fund and \$2,390,000 to the gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission border security and law enforcement subaccount.
	SB 1531	Don Shooter (R) Andy Biggs (R) Steve Pierce (R)	This law funds the gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission fund and the county jail reimbursement costs relating to illegal immigration.
	HB 2286	David Burnell Smith (R)	This law allows a police officer to immobilize or impound a car that is being used to transport, harbor, or conceal illegal aliens.
	HB 2606	Javan “J.D” Mesnard (R)	This law provides an exemption to the citizenship and residency requirements for liquor licenses. A limited partner is not required to be a citizen of the United States, legal resident alien, or bona fide resident of the state.
	SB 1149	Adam Driggs (R)	This law makes it illegal for unauthorized aliens to be in possession of a firearm.
	SB 1184	Rick Gray (R)	This law prohibits the use of restraints on female prisoners and detainees during labor unless certain conditions persist.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	HB 2322	Nancy McLain (R) Russ Jones (R)	This law specifies additional boating safety infrastructure fees from nonresidents and defines a “nonresident” to mean both U.S. citizens or alien persons not domiciled in the state.
	HB 2639	Jerry Weiers (R)	This law defines a nonresident to mean both citizens and aliens not permanently residing in Arizona. This distinction applies to game and fish licenses, permits, tags and stamps.
	SB 1115	Steve Yarbrough (R) John McComish (R)	This law requires that loans or investment contracts entered into by the board of trustees of the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System do not involve investments in Sudan or Iran or otherwise provide support to terrorists or in any way facilitate illegal immigration into the United States.
	SCR 101 (resolution)		This resolution supports an increase in the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel in the Tucson sector along the border between the United States and México to further enforce immigration and drug laws and secure and facilitate trade.
2013	S1464	Gail Griffin (R)	This law, which modifies the membership of the Mining Advisory Council, requires that members of the Council be lawfully present in the United States.
	SCR1020 (resolution)	Gail Griffin (R)	This resolution honors the life of Cochise County Sheriff Larry Dever, a nationally recognized advocate for stronger and more diligent border enforcement. At the time of his death, Sheriff Dever served as chairperson of the Immigration and Border Security Committee of the National Sheriffs' Association.
2014	HB 2706	John Kavanagh (R) Adam Kwasman (R) Justin Olson (R) Michelle Ugenti (R) Paul Boyer (R)	This law requires the Department of Public Safety to submit the gang and immigrant intelligence team enforcement mission border security and law enforcement subaccount’s entire expenditure plan to the joint legislative budget committee for review, before spending any monies appropriated in the general appropriations act for fiscal year 2014-2015.
	HB 2708	John Kavanagh (R) Adam Kwasman (R) Justin Olson (R) Michelle Ugenti (R) Paul Boyer (R)	This law states that loans, guarantees, investment management agreements and contracts that are entered into by the board of trustees must not involve investments in Sudan or Iran or otherwise provide support to terrorists or in any way facilitate illegal immigration into the United States.
	HB 2050	Phil Lovas (R) John Allen (R)	This law makes persons who are nonresident aliens temporarily residing in the United States, who hold an F-1, J-1, M-1, or Q-1 visa when services are performed are ineligible for membership in the Arizona State Retirement System.
	HB 2667	Stefanie Mach (D)	This law prohibits any undocumented alien or a nonimmigrant alien from possessing a firearm, excluding nonimmigrant aliens who possess a hunting license from any state or those who are attending a competitive or sporting firearms event. This law also requires employers to verify prospective employees qualify for employment under Federal “alienage” standards.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	SB 1397	John McComish (R)	This law eliminates border crossing identification cards and voter cards issued by the government of México as acceptable forms of age verification when purchasing liquor.
	HB 2462	David Farnsworth (R)	This law changes language to allow for construction of both physical and virtual border fences, stipulates the location of a fence to be within one mile of the border, and allows for the use of technology to the maximum extent practicable.
	HB 2639	Kelly Townsend (R) Bob Thorpe (R) Carl Seel (R) Sonny Borrelli (R) Steve Montenegro (R)	This law classifies knowingly accepting the identity of another person and using it to verify their work eligibility as Aggravated taking identity of another person or entity, a class 3 felony.
	SB 1001a	Andy Biggs (R)	Law makes it is unlawful for a person who is in violation of a criminal offense to: 1. Transport or move or attempt to transport or move an alien in this state, in furtherance of the illegal presence of the alien in the United States, in a means of transportation if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come to, has entered or remains in the United States in violation of law. 2. Conceal, harbor or shield or attempt to conceal, harbor or shield an alien from detection in any place in this state, including any building or any means of transportation, if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that the alien has come to, has entered or remains in the United States in violation of law. 3. Encourage or induce an alien to come to or reside in this state if the person knows or recklessly disregards the fact that such coming to, entering or residing in this state is or will be in violation of law.
	HCR 2002	Catherine H. Miranda (D)	This resolution mourns the death of former Representative Benjamin R. Miranda, who passed away on November 15, 2013, and commemorates his life, including helping immigrant workers and low-income individuals get fair and equal treatment under the law.
2015	SB 1469	Andy Biggs (R) Don Shooter (R) Gail Griffin (R) Steve Yarbrough (R) John M. Allen (R)	This law appropriates \$2,390,000 to gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement, mission border security and law enforcement.
	HB 2064	Steve Montenegro (R)	This law requires the high school graduation requirements for social studies to include passing a test identical to the civics portion of the naturalization test used by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
	SB 1012	Nancy Barto (R)	This law requires an applicant to be a U.S. citizen or a resident alien to be licensed as an osteopathic physician by the State Board of Osteopathic Examiners in Medicine and Surgery.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
	SB 1271	Bob Worsley (R) Adam Driggs (R) Doug Coleman (R)	This law amends existing law permitting construction and maintenance of a secure fence as close as practical to the Arizona-México border, instead of within one mile of the border. The law allows private or public donations and eliminates the \$10 million appropriations from the General Fund. As of July 2014, the Border Security Trust Fund balance was \$264,362
2016	SB 1247	Steve Smith (R)	This law allows inmates to take part in the Community Reentry Work Program if the inmate meets certain conditions, including no detainers from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
	SCM 1012	Gail Griffin (R)	This resolution urges the U.S. Congress to direct appropriations to appropriate federal agencies to secure the border of the U.S.
	SCM 1006	Gail Griffin (R)	This resolution urges the United States Congress to act to increase the number of United States customs and border protection personnel at the ports of entry in Arizona.
	HB 2451	Darin Mitchell (R)	repealed a statute allowing eligible prisoners with an order of deportation to be released early to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
2017	SB 1350	Warren Petersen (R) Judy Burges (R) Sonny Borrelli (R) Eddie Farnsworth (R) Travis W. Grantham (R)	This law expands the State of Arizona’s meaning of “terrorism.” It clarifies that “foreign terrorist organization” should be defined as it is under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
	HB 2540	Javan D. Mesnard (R)	This appropriations law establishes the distribution of funds for criminal justice agencies in Arizona. Budgets have been established for agencies such as the Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission
	SB 1522	Steve Yarbrough (R) Debbie Lesko (R) Gail Griffin (R) Kimberly Yee (R)	This appropriations law establishes how funds will be distributed to different agencies in Arizona. The Gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission agency will receive funds so that it can fulfill its mission to enforce federal laws regarding illegal immigrants.
	HB 2515	Eddie Farnsworth (R)	This law requires that prospective candidates for appointment by the Arizona governor provide a full set of fingerprints in order to obtain state and federal criminal records prior to their appointment. This criteria applies to members of the board of since they are appointed by the governor. Members of the board are responsible for ensuring that no investment contracts contribute to illegal immigration in the U.S.

Year	Legislation Name(s)	Proposed By/Funded By	Intent
2018	SB 1263	Steve Yarbrough (R)	This law states that in order to graduate from high school or obtain a high school equivalency diploma, a student must correctly answer at least sixty of the one hundred questions listed on a test that is identical to the civics portion of the U.S. naturalization test.
	SB 1520	Steve Yarbrough (R) John Kavanagh (R)	This appropriations law includes funds for the gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission.
	SB 1523	Steve Yarbrough (R) John Kavanagh (R)	This appropriations law includes funds for the gang and immigration intelligence team and law enforcement missions.
	SB 1524	Steve Yarbrough (R) John Kavanagh (R)	This appropriations law creates a board of trustees and prohibits them from working with any entities that in any way facilitate illegal immigration into the U.S.
	SB 1444	Kimberly Yee (R)	This law requires students to correctly answer at least sixty out of one hundred question on a test similar to the civics portion of the U.S. naturalization test. A student who does not obtain a passing score on the test may retake the test until he obtains a passing score.
2019	HB 2747	Russell Rusty Bowers (R) Regina E. Cobb (R)	This general appropriations law includes funding for the gang and immigration intelligence team enforcement mission (GIITEM) for border security and law enforcement. Of the \$22,410,800 appropriated to the GIITEM line item, \$10,356,900 must be used for 100 department of public safety GIITEM personnel, 50 immigration enforcement and border security positions and 50 positions to assist GIITEM in various efforts. It also appropriates funds for the border support strike force. The department of public safety must submit an expenditure plan for the border strike task force line item for local support to the joint legislative budget committee and the governor's office of strategic planning and budgeting by Sept. 1, 2019.
	HB 2752	Russell Rusty Bowers (R) Regina E. Cobb (R)	This criminal justice budget includes a provision requiring the department of public safety to submit the GIITEM border security and law enforcement subaccount's expenditure plan to the joint legislative budget committee for review.

APPENDIX C

ARIZONA GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS AND FOUNDING YEAR

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
NEW AMERICAN LEADERS	National		Leading a movement for inclusive democracy by preparing first and second generation Americans to use their power and potential in elected office.	https://www.newamericanleaders.org/	501(c)(3)
PROGRESS NOW ARIZONA	Arizona		We expose the powerful for their misdeeds and promote a vision of our state that works for everyone – regardless of who you are, who you love, how much you make, or where you’re from. We work year-round to promote progressive issues and public policy solutions, to correct right-wing misinformation and to hold elected officials accountable.	https://progressnowarizona.org/	501(c)(4)
NATIONAL DAY LABORER ORGANIZING NETWORK	National		NDLON improves the lives of day laborers, migrants and low-wage workers. We build leadership and power among those facing injustice so they can challenge inequality and expand labor, civil and political rights for all.	https://ndlon.org/	501(c)(3)
OUR VOICE, OUR VOTE ARIZONA SISTER ORG: AZ COALITION FOR CHANGE	Arizona		A member-led organization committed to advocating for lasting progressive public policies, we are building power by mobilizing voters, training the next generation of leaders, electing champions into office, and holding elected officials accountable. By putting people first, we are working to develop and lift up voices of communities to take on our nations most pressing issues.	https://www.ourvoiceourvote.us/	501(c)(4)
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA	National Arizona	1934	Planned Parenthood Arizona promotes and protects every person’s freedom and right to enjoy sexual health and well-being, to make reproductive choices, and build healthy, strong families.	https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-arizona	501(c)(3)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA	Arizona	1969	believes that all people, without discrimination, should have the power to live a life of dignity. Our programs work to help individuals and families achieve self-sufficiency by providing accessible healthcare; affordable housing; a quality education; access to meaningful work; and political representation.	https://www.cplc.org/about/history.php	501(c)(3)
VALLE DEL SOL	Arizona	1970	Valle del Sol offers Primary Care Services in our <i>Mi Salud Clinics</i> for children and adults. Valle del Sol offers a variety of behavioral services for youth, families and adults.	https://www.valledelsol.com/	501(c)(3)
HISPANIC WOMEN'S CORPORATION (HWC)	Arizona	1981	HWC empowers Hispanic women through its commitment to the culture by promoting education, community involvement, and professional advancement and leadership development for the improvement of our cultural quality of life.	https://hispanicwomen.org/	501 (c)(3)
COALICIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS: NINGÚN SER HUMANO ES ILEGAL	Arizona	1993	Grassroots organization that promotes the human and civil rights of all migrants regardless of their immigration status. Consequently, we fight the militarization of our southern border home and combat the discrimination and human rights abuses of both our citizen and non-citizen brothers and sisters.	https://derechoshumanosaz.net/	
MI FAMILIA VOTA	Arizona California Colorado Florida Nevada Texas	2000	A national civic engagement organization that unites Latino, immigrant, and allied communities to promote social and economic justice through citizenship workshops, voter registration, and voter participation. Mission is to build Latino political power by expanding the electorate, strengthening local infrastructures, and through year-	https://www.mifamiliavota.org/	501(c)(4)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
			round voter engagement. We are also training the next generation of leaders by opening opportunities through our Youth Development Programs and through our Mi Familia Vota work.		
PROTECTING ARIZONA'S FAMILY COALITION (PAFCO)	Arizona	2001	PAFCO is an inclusive and <u>nonpartisan</u> alliance of health and human service agencies, faith-based communities, and advocacy networks that advocate for vulnerable populations.	https://www.pafcoalition.org/	??
ARIZONA ADVOCACY NETWORK	Arizona	2002	AZAN is devoted to defending and deepening Arizona's commitment to democracy. We believe the cornerstones of a vibrant democracy are meaningful voting rights and access to the ballot, political decisions driven by voters instead of money, and a fair and independent judiciary. We know that often the difference between a passive citizen and an engaged activist is simply lack of information. A core component of our work is educating voters across the state on issues affecting the integrity and vibrancy of Arizona's democracy.	https://www.azadvocacy.org	501(c)(4)
ARIZONA ADVOCACY NETWORK FOUNDATION (AZAN FOUNDATION)	Arizona	2002	non-profit that works for full civic participation, especially for underrepresented and marginalized constituencies	https://foundation.azadvocacy.org/voteaz101	501(c)(3)
LAS ADELITAS ARIZONA	Arizona	2002	To recruit, educate and mobilize Latinas to participate in the political process and support progressive issues of impact to Latinas in Arizona. A statewide political action committee (PAC)	https://www.lasadelitasarizona.com/	501(c)(4)
AMISTADES	Arizona	2006	Amistades is a Latino non-profit community development organization committed to providing culturally	http://amistadesinc.org/about/	501 (c) (3)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
			responsive services, advocacy for social justice, and community empowerment.		
JUSTA CENTER	Arizona	2006	Justa Center provides life-sustaining resources, services, and support to assist homeless seniors on their path back to housing, and supportive services to help prevent a return to homelessness.	https://www.justacenter.org/	501(c)(3)
SOMOS AMERICA - WE ARE AMERICA COALITION	Arizona	2006	We are America. Somos America partners with groups of community organizations, religious organizations, non-profits and individuals partnering to advocate for immigrant rights in our community.		501(c)(3)
PUENTE MOVEMENT	Arizona	2007	The Puente Human Rights Movement is a grassroots migrant justice organization based in Phoenix, Arizona. We develop, educate, and empower migrant communities to protect and defend our families and ourselves.	http://puenteaz.org/	501(c)(3)
ARIZONA DREAM ACT COALITION	Arizona immigrant youth-led organization; founded by undocumented students	2009	ADAC advocates for the rights of our undocumented immigrant communities socially & politically by organizing and mobilizing our constituency through the development and fostering of Arizona leaders, promoting civic engagement, promoting the attainment and equal access of higher education for immigrant youth, strengthening relationships with diverse inter-sectional communities and providing services that advance the integration of our families.	http://www.theadac.org/	501(c)(3)
ARIZONA CENTER FOR EMPOWERMENT	Arizona	July 2010	ACE is a member-led social justice organization that develops and mobilizes undocumented working youth and adults, students, and LGBTQ individuals to strategically take ownership and responsibility to advance economic, social, and racial justice.	https://www.empoweraz.org/	501(c)(3)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
PAZ PROMISE ARIZONA	Arizona	2010	Aims to unite the millions of Arizonans who reject the divisive politics of immigrant-baiting, millions who believe in treating their neighbors with fairness and dignity. These like-minded individuals share a common interest in good jobs, a robust economy, quality education, and safe communities in which to raise children. We help connect individuals who share similar goals so that they may work toward a better Arizona by investing in statewide infrastructure and training a new generation of leaders.	http://www.promiseaz.org/	501(c)(3)
LIVING UNITED FOR CHANGE IN ARIZONA (LUCHA)	Arizona	2010	a membership-led, grassroots organization that builds power with Arizona's working families to advance social, racial and economic justice for all. Through grassroots campaigns, leadership development, advocacy and civic engagement, we work to create an Arizona in which every person enjoys equal rights, opportunities and protections.	https://luchaaz.org/	501(c)(4)
ONE ARIZONA	Arizona	2010	To increase civic participation among Arizonans. One Arizona works to improve the lives of Arizonans, especially people of color and young people, by building a culture of civic participation.	https://onearizona.org/	501(c)(3)
CENTRAL ARIZONANS FOR A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY (CASE)	Arizona	2011	CASE is a movement of young people and working families committed to achieving economic, social and immigrants' justice in Arizona. We are a grassroots organization led by our volunteer leaders, the majority of whom are young people trying to build a future in a State that currently provides them too few educational and economic opportunities.	http://case-az.org/	501(c)(3)
ARIZONA WINS	Arizona	2011	Arizona Wins is a coalition of progressive advocacy organizations and labor unions, working together to improve public policy	http://az-wins.org/	501(c)(4)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
			for working families in Arizona. Our mission is to change the face of the Arizona legislature and achieve progressive policies on a state level. We are increasing awareness of progressive issues among our coalition members' constituencies and targeted voting populations to increase our political strength. We have an electoral strategy and infrastructure now capturing the energy and strength of Arizona progressives to effectively impact elections.		
PODER IN ACTION	Arizona	2013	We build power to disrupt and dismantle systems of oppression and determine a liberated future as people of color in Arizona.	https://www.poderinaction.org/	501(c)(3)
CHISPA ARIZONA	Arizona	July 2014	Chispa Arizona envisions an inclusive and reflective democracy that prioritizes communities' rights to clean air and water, healthy neighborhoods, and a safe climate for generations to come.	https://chispaaz.org/	League of Conservation Voters (LCV) is a 501(c)(4)
MIJENTE	Arizona	2015	We build power by organizing our impact around campaigns that amplify our collective voice. The voice that represents over 60 million Latinx (and growing). Building power for a campaign or an issue requires that our targets feel public pressure and see interest in our fight. Persistencia amplifies our resistencia.	https://mijente.net/our-dna/	501(c)(4) Mijente Support Committee is the 501(c)(3) sister affiliate of the 501(c)(4) advocacy organization Mijente. It is fiscally sponsored by Puente Arizona.
ALIENTO	Arizona	2016	We are a community organization that is DACA, undocumented, and youth-led. We are directly impacted people and allies who are invested in the well being, emotional healing, and leadership development of those impacted by the	https://www.alientoaz.org/	501(c)(3)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
			inequalities of lacking an immigration status.		
TRANS QUEER PUEBLO – SEMILLA DE LIBERACIÓN	Arizona	2016	In Arizona, as a migrant and LGBT + community we face racism, transphobia, homophobia and other types of discrimination. In this hostile environment we are a refuge for LGBT + migrants of color. In our organization we create community solutions to solve our basic needs, we cultivate the leadership of LGBT people and migrants of color to transform our needs into community power and fight for social justice for all.	https://www.tqpueblo.org/	501(c)(3)
ALL VOTING IS LOCAL	Arizona Georgia Nevada Pennsylvania Florida Michigan Ohio Wisconsin	2018	All Voting is Local stands at the forefront of today’s civil rights movement. We fight to remove discriminatory barriers to voting and the ballot by tackling problems before they silence voters on Election Day and to achieve a democracy that works for us all.	https://allvotingislocal.org	
ARIZONA COALITION FOR CHANGE	Arizona	2018	Empowers everyday people to transform their community through building civic power, just and equitable schools and safer neighborhoods. We are committed to advocating for lasting progressive public policies that change the dynamics for our communities. By putting people first, we are working to develop and lift up voices of communities to take on our nations most pressing issues.	https://www.azc4c.org/	501(c)(3)
PEOPLE’S DEFENSE INITIATIVE	Arizona	2018	A community-led grassroots organization dedicated to building a radically inclusive and transformative movement which uplifts and defends human rights.	https://www.peoplesdefenseinitiative.org/about-us/	501(c)(4)

ORGANIZATION	MEMBERSHIP	YEAR ESTABLISHED	MISSION/GOAL	WEBSITE	CATEGORY
FUERTE ARTS MOVEMENT	Arizona	2018	To empower our community to tell and share their own stories and move others to action toward a more prosperous future, using all available digital media. We fight year-round to counter misinformation, hold elected officials accountable and promote progressive policy solutions through digital organizing and through offering messaging and communications support to partner organizations	https://fuerte.org	501(c)(4)
RURAL ARIZONA ENGAGEMENT RAZE	Arizona	2019	RAZE's mission is to educate, advocate and coordinate in rural communities so they may gain access to civic education, engagement opportunities and voter registration.	https://www.raze.org/	501(c)(3)

501(c)(3):

<https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-501c3-organizations>

Nonprofit Tax Code Designation: 501(c)(3)

Defined as: Organizations for any of the following purposes: religious, educational, charitable, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering national or international amateur sports competition (as long as it doesn't provide athletic facilities or equipment), or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals (ProPublica.org – <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits>)

501(c)(4):

<https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/types-of-organizations-exempt-under-section-501c4>

Nonprofit Tax Code Designation: 501(c)(4)

Defined as: Civic leagues, social welfare organizations and local associations of employees, created to promote community welfare for charitable, educational or recreational purposes. (ProPublica.org – <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits>)

APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Would you prefer to be interviewed in English or Spanish?
2. What made you decide or led to your decision to participate in this study?
3. (If participant is part of a non-profit, political, or grassroots organization) Tell me a little bit about what you do or like about _____ organization.
4. I have a few background questions that I have to ask. All parts of the interview are confidential, but you can decline to answer a question if you do not want to share the information.
 - a. Just to confirm, are you, yourself of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent? (IF NECESSARY: such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Central or South American, Caribbean or some other Latin American background)
 - b. In what year were you born?
 - c. Where are you located in Arizona?
 - d. Are you a citizen of the United States?
 - e. Were you born in the US? (If not, where were you born?)
 - f. Are you a part of a mixed status household? In other words, do you live in a household where some members are citizens and some members are not?
 - g. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or something else?
 - h. How politically engaged do you consider yourself?
5. This study is intended to understand how and if legislation surrounding immigration has impacted Latino political participation, specifically in the presidential elections of 2008, 2012, and 2016. Will you share if, and how you were politically engaged in those years or within that timeframe?
6. This study is intended to understand how and if legislation surrounding immigration has impacted Latino political participation... Will you share with me some things that you know about immigration legislation in Arizona?
 - a. Did any of these laws or proposals affect you? How? (If needing more prompting, ask about the following legislation):
 - i. Proposition 203, or “English-only” legislation (2000)
 - ii. Proposition 200, or “Protect Arizona Now (PAN)” (2004)
 - iii. ARS 13-2319, or the “Coyote Law” (2005)
 - iv. Proposition 300, denied in-state tuition grants, scholarships, and financial aid to undocumented persons who lived in AZ for many years (2006)
 - v. Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) (2008)
 - vi. SB 1070, or “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (2010)
7. Overall, do you favor or oppose the new immigration legislation being considered in Congress, or don't you know enough about it to say?

8. In your opinion, what's the main reason that there has been an increase in the number of immigrant enforcement actions around the country and in Arizona aimed at undocumented immigrants in the past years?
9. Does the increase in the number of immigrant enforcement legislation in Arizona have an effect on your political participation? For example, did it make you want to participate more or less?
10. In 2008, Barack Obama and John McCain ran for president. Were you eligible to vote at that time, if so, did you vote?
 - a. There are a lot of different ways to vote. Did you vote early, vote absentee or by mail ballot, or did you vote in the polls on election day?
 - b. In the 2008 election for President, did you vote for Republican John McCain OR Democrat Barack Obama or some other candidate?
11. In 2012, Barack Obama and Mitt Romney ran for president. Were you eligible to vote at that time, if so, did you vote?
 - a. There are a lot of different ways to vote. Did you vote early, vote absentee or by mail ballot, or did you vote in the polls on election day?
 - b. In the 2012 election for President, did you vote for Republican Mitt Romney OR Democrat Barack Obama or some other candidate?
12. In 2016, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump ran for president. Were you eligible to vote at that time, if so, did you vote?
 - a. There are a lot of different ways to vote. Did you vote early, vote absentee or by mail ballot, or did you vote in the polls on election day?
 - b. In the 2016 election for President, did you vote for Republican Donald Trump OR Democrat Hillary Clinton or some other candidate?
13. What does political participation mean to you? How do you participate politically?
14. In 2008, 2012, and 2016, did you participate in any political organizations or political outreach?
 - a. For example, did you join an organization?
 - b. Did you participate in "get out the vote" events?
 - c. Did you talk to family or neighbors about political activities?
15. If you participated in any way in the 2008, 2012, or 2016, what year(s) and what motivated you to participate?
16. Is passing major legislation about immigration essential to do this year, something that can be done in the next few years, or should it not be done?
 - a. What do you think should be changed about immigration legislation in Arizona?

17. Now take a moment to think about all the people in your family, your friends, co-workers, and other people you know. Do you happen to know somebody who is an undocumented immigrant?
 - a. Have they spoken to you about their thoughts on the present political situation in the United States, if so, what have they shared?
18. Do you think that undocumented immigrants participate politically? If so, what are some ways that you have witnessed their participation?
19. Are you more interested or less interested in politics this year than you were in 2016 — the last presidential election year?
20. Over the past few months, did anyone from a campaign, political party, or a community organization ask you to vote, or register to vote?
21. **(If they are eligible)** Are you planning to vote this year?
 - a. What has motivated you to vote?
 - b. Who are you planning on voting for?
22. **(If they are not eligible)** Have you spoken to family, friends, or neighbors about voting this year?
 - a. How do you feel that you have or can make a difference in this year's election?
 - b. If you could vote, who would you vote for?
23. Do you have any last comments or information that you would like to share?

Thank you for your time and answers.

APPENDIX E
PREGUNTAS DE ENTREVISTA

1. Prefiere ser entrevistado/a en inglés o en español?
2. ¿Por qué decidió, o qué lo/a incline a participar en este estudio?
3. (Si el participante es parte de una organización política u organización sin lucros) Cuénteme un poco de lo que usted hace o lo que le gusta sobre la organización _____.
4. Tengo algunas preguntas sobre información personal que ocupo hacerle. Todas las partes de la entrevista son confidenciales, pero usted puede optar en no contestar si usted no quiere compartir la información.
 - a. Solo para confirmar, ¿usted es de origen o descendencia Hispana o Latina? (SI ES NECESARIO: por ejemplo, Mexicano/a, Puertorriqueño/a, Cubano/a, dominicano/a, centro o sur americano/a, caribeño/a, o de algún otro país Latinoamericano)
 - b. ¿En qué año nació usted?
 - c. ¿Dónde en Arizona está ubicado/a?
 - d. ¿Es ciudadano/a de los Estados Unidos?
 - e. ¿Nació en los Estados Unidos? (Si no, ¿dónde nació?)
 - f. ¿Usted es parte de un hogar mixto? En otras palabras, ¿vive usted en un hogar donde algunos de los miembros son ciudadanos y algunos no?
 - g. ¿Usted se considera un/a republicano/a, demócrata, independiente, o algo más?
 - h. ¿Qué políticamente invertido/a se considera usted?
5. Este estudio tiene la intención de comprender cómo, o si es que la legislación ha impactado la participación política de los Latinos, específicamente en las elecciones presidenciales del 2008, 2012 y 2016. ¿Puede compartir si participó, o cómo participó políticamente durante esos años o dentro de ese tiempo?
6. Este estudio tiene la intención de comprender cómo o si la legislación ha impactado la participación política de los Latinos... ¿Puede compartir conmigo algunas de las cosas que usted sabe sobre la legislación migratoria en Arizona?
 - a. ¿Fue afectado/a por alguna de estas leyes o propuestas? ¿Cómo? (Si ocupa más asistencia, preguntar sobre las siguientes leyes):
 - i. Proposition 203, or “English-only” legislation (2000)
 - ii. Proposition 200, or “Protect Arizona Now (PAN)” (2004)
 - iii. ARS 13-2319, or the “Coyote Law” (2005)
 - iv. Proposition 300, negó la matrícula estatal, becas y ayuda financiera a personas indocumentadas que vivieron en AZ durante muchos años. (2006)
 - v. Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) (2008)
 - vi. SB 1070, or “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” (2010)

7. ¿En general, usted está a favor o en oposición de las nuevas leyes inmigratorias que están siendo consideradas en el congreso? O ¿No está suficientemente informado/a para hablar sobre ello?
8. ¿En su opinion, cuál es la razón principal que ha habido un aumento en el número de acciones en cuanto a la seguridad inmigratoria alrededor del país y en Arizona, con enfoque a los inmigrantes indocumentados en los últimos años?
9. ¿Tiene el aumento en la legislación en cuanto a la seguridad inmigratoria en Arizona un impacto en su participación política? Por ejemplo, ¿le hizo querer participar más o menos?
10. En el 2008, Barack Obama y John McCain se postularon para presidente. ¿Usted pudo votar en esas fechas, si pudo, sí votó?
 - a. Hay muchas maneras de votar. ¿Votó temprano, ausente, por correo, o votó el día de la elección?
 - b. ¿Para la elección presidencial del 2008, votó por el republicano John McCain o demócrata Barack Obama, o por algún otro candidato?
11. En el 2012, Barack Obama y Mitt Romney se postularon para president. ¿Usted pudo votar en esas fechas, si pudo, sí votó?
 - a. Hay muchas maneras de votar. ¿Votó temprano, ausente, por correo, o votó el día de la elección?
 - b. ¿Para la elección presidencial del 2012, votó por el republicano Mitt Romney o demócrata Barack Obama, o por algún otro candidato?
12. En le 2016, Hillary Clinton y Donald Trump se postularon para presidente. ¿Usted pudo votar en esas fechas, si pudo, sí votó?
 - a. Hay muchas maneras de votar. ¿Votó temprano, ausente, por correo, o votó el día de la elección?
 - b. ¿Para la elección presidencial del 2016, votó por el republicano Donald Trump o demócrata Hillary Clinton, o por algún otro candidato?
13. ¿Qué significa para usted la participación política? ¿Cómo participa usted políticamente?
14. ¿Participó en alguna organización política o en la promoción política el el 2008, 2012, y el 2016?
 - a. Por ejemplo, ¿formó parte de alguna organización?
 - b. ¿Participó en eventos de “get out the vote?,” donde se promueve el acto de ir a votar.
 - c. ¿Habló con su familia o vecinas sobre actividades políticas?
15. Si usted participó en alguna forma en el 2008, 2012, o 2016, ¿qué años y qué lo/la motive a participar?
16. ¿Es esencial aprobar una legislación sobre inmigración este año, algo que se pueda hacer en los próximos años, o no debería hacerse?

- a. ¿Qué cree que debería cambiarse sobre la legislación de inmigración en Arizona?
17. Ahora, tómese un momento para pensar en todas las personas de su familia, sus amigos, compañeros de trabajo y otras personas que conozca. ¿Conoce a alguien que sea un inmigrante indocumentado?
- a. ¿Le han hablado de sus opiniones sobre la actual situación política en los Estados Unidos? Si, sí ¿qué han compartido?
18. ¿Cree que los inmigrantes indocumentados participan políticamente? Si es así, ¿de qué formas ha sido testigo de su participación?
19. ¿Está más interesado/a o menos interesado/a en la política este año que en el 2016, el último año de elecciones presidenciales?
20. Durante los últimos meses, ¿alguien de una campaña, partido político u organización comunitaria le pidió que votara o se registrara para votar?
21. **(Sí son elegibles)** ¿Está planeando votar este año?
- a. ¿Qué lo/la ha motivado a votar?
- b. ¿Por quién planea votar?
22. **(Sí no son elegibles)** ¿Ha hablado con familiares, amigos o vecinos sobre la votación este año?
- a. ¿Cómo cree que ha logrado o puede hacer una diferencia en las elecciones de este año?
- b. Si pudiera votar, ¿por quién votaría?
23. ¿Tiene algún último comentario o información que le gustaría compartir?

Gracias por su tiempo y sus respuestas.

APPENDIX F
ASU IRB EXEMPTION

EXEMPTION GRANTED

[Irasema Coronado](#)
[CLAS-SS: Transborder Studies, School of \(STS\)](#)

-
Irasema.Coronado@asu.edu

Dear [Irasema Coronado](#):

On 9/2/2020 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Consequences of Arizona's Anti-immigration Legislation on Latino Political Participation
Investigator:	Irasema Coronado
IRB ID:	STUDY00012355
Funding:	None
Grant Title:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consent - Consequences of Anti-immigration, Category: Consent Form; • Consent - Consequences of Anti-immigration - Spanish Translation, Category: Consent Form; • Interview Questions - Consequences of Anti-immigration Legislation, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions); • Interview Questions - Consequences of Anti-immigration Legislation - Spanish Translation, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions); • IRB Certification - Cesar Silva, Category: Other; • IRB Certification - Lisa Magana, Category: Other; • Protocol - Consequences of Arizona's Anti-immigration Legislation, Category: IRB Protocol; • Recruitment Email - Consequences of Arizona's Anti-immigration Legislation, Category: Recruitment Materials;

	• Translation Certification - CSS, Category: Translations;
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The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 9/2/2020.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

If any changes are made to the study, the IRB must be notified at research.integrity@asu.edu to determine if additional reviews/approvals are required. Changes may include but not limited to revisions to data collection, survey and/or interview questions, and vulnerable populations, etc.

Sincerely,

IRB Administrator

cc: Cesar Silva
Cesar Silva
Lisa Magana