

The Politics of Minority Group Control:
Assessing the Empirical Validity of the Minority Threat Perspective

by

Arynn A. Infante

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved May 2020 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Xia Wang, Co-Chair
Dustin Pardini, Co-Chair
Cassia Spohn

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

May 2020

ABSTRACT

Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective is one of the most empirically investigated theories of crime control in criminological literature. A large body of research has tested this perspective and established a link between minority context and increased criminal justice controls. The perceived threat mechanisms hypothesized to facilitate this link, however, have received relatively scant attention. In addition, no multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat has been developed. These oversights have significantly impeded the advancement of research testing the empirical validity and generalizability of Blalock's premises across racial and ethnic groups.

Against this backdrop, this dissertation extends prior work by conducting three separate but interrelated studies. The first study focuses on the development and validation of a multidimensional Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). The second study investigates how the PLTS can inform the relationship between Latino context and punitive border control sentiment. The third and final study assesses the psychometrics of another multidimensional scale of perceived threat—the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS), and examines the structural invariance and distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS.

Using data collected from two college samples, I relied on a variety of different methods across the three empirical studies, including confirmatory factor analyses, bivariate and partial correlation analyses, and ordinary least squares regression. Overall, the findings suggest that both the PLTS and PBTS are multidimensional constructs that are structurally invariant and empirically distinct. In addition, perceived Latino threat significantly influenced punitive border control sentiment, but did not surface as a

mediating mechanism linking ethnic context to immigration attitudes. Furthermore, whereas objective Latino population context did not demonstrate significant effects on either perceived Latino threat or punitive border control sentiment, the results emphasized *perceived* Latino context as a key moderator in the relationship between perceived Latino threat and punitive border control sentiment. Thus, the findings support the multidimensionality of perceived threat, as well as the hypothesized link between perceived threat and punitive controls, but raises key concerns about the generalizability of Blalock's perspective to explain the threat-control process of Latinos. Implications for theory and research are discussed.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Teresa Patin and Art Infante, without whom I would not be where I am today.

To my free-spirited mother, you have always been a source of love, light, and laughter in my life. Without your encouragement and support, I would have never loaded up my convertible Mustang that warm August day back in 2009, and driven it through the desert to begin my journey at ASU. I will never forget our beloved desert drives between El Paso and Phoenix together; feet up, windows down, and Dixie Chicks on the stereo. You inspired me to carve my own path in this life and taught me that no goal is out of my reach. Because of you, I reached for the stars and continue to aim for the moon.

To my father, your wisdom and strength has been the foundation of my own strength and determination throughout my graduate career. A simple phone call from you has provided me with so much solace and reprieve from the many difficult days I endured to get to this point. I could never begin to express what your consistent and reassuring presence in my life has meant to me. You have taught me to maintain a steady resolve in my own abilities and to always remain steadfast in my faith. I know my accomplishments are preceded by your countless thoughts and prayers, and for that I am forever grateful. I will always cherish the memories of our Old Mesilla trips, chatting about all of life's lessons and the bittersweet passage of time over our favorite chips, salsa, and margaritas.

I love you both very much. This is for you.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is a culmination of all the support I have received from countless faculty, staff, and graduate students during my time at ASU. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge my mentor, Xia. I could write an entire dissertation on your kindness, patience, and generosity as a mentor. You have equally encouraged and challenged me to always produce my best work, no matter what the circumstance—including during a global pandemic. You have taught me that no situation is impossible, and no dream is too big. When I came to you with the idea for this dissertation, you did not minimize my ambition or try to convince me to take an easier path. Instead, you listened. You never doubted me, even when I doubted myself. Your unwavering confidence in me has been empowering, and I am truly honored and thankful to have you as a mentor. Working with you has been the highlight of my graduate career, and I could only hope to be half the scholar and mentor that you are one day.

I would also like to thank my co-chair, Dustin, whose arrival at ASU shaped the trajectory of my graduate career and blew my research agenda wide open. Without your seminar on measurement development, I would have never honed the skills needed to carry out a project on this scale. Thank you for investing your time in me as your first student at ASU and inspiring the foundation of this dissertation. I will always look back on my time in the DEEP lab (and all the lab happy hours) very fondly. Finally, I would like to thank my committee member, Cassia, for inspiring my work on racial and ethnic disparities early in my graduate career. I feel very privileged to have been able to learn from you while at ASU and to have you be a part of this final milestone of my degree.

In addition to my dissertation committee, I have had the pleasure of working with a number of faculty and staff who significantly enriched my experience at ASU, including Scott, Kevin, Nancy, Callie, Travis, Regina, Karla, Jim, Brittany, and Betty. I would especially like to thank Scott for hiring me as an undergraduate student worker all those years ago and for believing in me more than I believed in myself. Kevin, working on the NIJ project was one of the most rewarding projects of my graduate career. Thank you for believing in my abilities and investing in me as a student.

I would also like to recognize all the graduate students who roamed the halls of CCJ with me. You are all brilliant scholars and I am truly lucky to have learned alongside you. I would especially like to thank my OG Hype Squad, D'Andre, Chant, and Maribeth. Some of my best memories in grad school were because of you. I would also like to personally thank Ally, Faith, Kara, Rachel, and Logan for being constant sources of support and friendship during my time at ASU. Any of my success is just as much yours because we have all been on this journey together. Caitlin and Travis, you made long prison drives enjoyable. Team Prison will always hold a special place in my heart.

Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my fiancé and forever taco date, Russ. There is nobody else I would rather write a dissertation in quarantine with but you. Your love and companionship have kept me afloat in even the hardest of days. Loving you has been the greatest adventure of my life. Thank you for choosing me and continuing to choose me as we embark on our next and biggest adventure (with the kitties) from the PHX to the PDX. I love you.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A string of recent mass shootings in places of worship in the U. S. and abroad has created a growing concern over the ramifications of rising white nationalist ideologies. The Charleston church shooting, Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, and Christchurch mosque shootings, while isolated acts of hatred, had one unifying feature: a white supremacist agenda legitimizing genocide as a vehicle for the social control of minority groups. In particular, online activities of the men involved in the three shootings came to light after the attacks, documenting their allegiance to white nationalism and illustrating their perceptions of nonwhite groups as “invaders” who threaten the racial hegemony of whites (Amend, 2018; Crilly & Sanchez, 2015; Miller, 2019). Indeed, one of the central conspiracies of the white nationalist ideology is that the white majority is “under assault” by “violent people of color,” threatening an impending “white genocide” (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). Thus, it appears that this narrative surrounding the looming criminal threat of a rising and “invading” minority population may have been used to justify the recent acts of violence in places of worship.

These far-right ideologies, however, are not just limited to the perpetrators. Instead, they may be interwoven throughout government institutions, with national leaders using language that may give validity to these groups and “help create a space for white nationalist politics” (Kwong, 2019). President Donald Trump, for example, has disseminated messages reminiscent of white nationalist ideologies about immigrants, referring to the recent Central American migrant caravans as an “invasion of our country”

(Paletta, DeBonis, & Wagner, 2019). Trump has further denigrated Latino immigrants by claiming that they are bringing drugs and crime across the border, they are rapists, and they are killing our people (Chiu, 2018; Lee, 2015; Lind, 2019). While the immigration-crime link has been largely unsupported in criminological research (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; Zatz & Smith, 2012), this anti-immigrant narrative still persists in national rhetoric, and may have given rise to support for punitive immigration control policies that disproportionately disadvantage immigrants of Latin American descent. In particular, some research suggests that support for harsh immigration policies may be a veiled expression of anti-Latino prejudice rooted in the desire to control the growth of the Latino population in the U.S., regardless of citizenship status, to maintain the white power advantage (Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016). Thus, in light of these anti-immigrant sentiments and other anti-minority narratives that have appeared in public discourse, research is warranted that seeks to understand the impetus for these racially prejudiced perceptions and what implications they have for the social control of minority groups in this country.

The crux of white nationalist ideology is the perception that nonwhite groups are “invaders” who threaten to “replace” and/or “destroy” whites as the dominant race (Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.), which motivates minority group control responses. This sense of group position as a motivator of prejudice is not a new concept in intergroup relations research (Blumer, 1958). Several group-based theories of prejudice feature the relative group status of dominant versus subordinate groups as an impetus for discriminatory reactions that seek to maintain the white advantage (Blalock, 1967;

Blumer, 1958; Sherif et al., 1954; Sidanius et al., 2004; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In particular, the notion of a growing minority population threatening the status quo of white power is the fundamental thesis of Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective. The problem, however, is that minority threat research is still in its infancy in terms of psychometric development; thus, key weaknesses in the measurement of threat constructs remain that impede our ability to adequately test empirical questions central to this perspective.

Accordingly, below I provide an overview of the key tenets of Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective, which may be used to understand the development of prejudiced ideologies and their implications for the mobilization of minority group controls. I will then provide a detailed discussion of several limitations in prior research that has tested this perspective and discuss the implications these limitations hold for the advancement of minority threat research. Finally, in light of existing limitations, I will identify several research gaps this dissertation seeks to address, followed by a discussion of the aims of the present research.

Background: Minority Threat Perspective

Born out of traditional conflict theory (Turk, 1969), the minority threat perspective argues that group competition over scarce resources may elicit prejudice and discrimination due to a set of underlying perceived threats associated with the relative size of the minority population, namely threats to the economic and political power of whites (Blalock, 1967). In other words, an increase in minority group presence may result in heightened perceptions of competition over available economic resources (e.g.,

jobs and welfare) as well a perceived political rivalry over the mobilization of competing group interests. To neutralize these threats, Blalock (1967) argues that whites may mobilize discriminatory responses to the extent that these actions effectively minimize economic competition and safeguard white political advantage.

Moreover, the “form” or “threat curve” of the relationship between minority population size and discrimination may vary by the type of threat predominantly elicited (Blalock, 1967, p.154). For power threat, given the intangible nature of power, it is difficult to assess when an adequate threshold of power has been reached so as to neutralize this type of threat. For this reason, Blalock (1967) posits that as the minority population increases, the mobilization of social control resources may also have to rise but at an accelerating rate to “maintain a constant power advantage” (Blalock, 1967, p.153). With regard to economic threat, these social control efforts can be quantified (e.g., the ratio of the black to white unemployment rate), and thus the majority group can more easily evaluate when they have achieved economic superiority over a rising minority group. Thus, in the case of economic threat, an increasing minority population may be related to discrimination at a decelerating rate to the extent that these discriminatory controls effectively reduce economic competition, and thereby decrease the need for the mobilization of controls.

In addition to demonstrating unique nonlinear relationships with discrimination, Blalock (1967) also maintains that economic and political threats are distinct and may have different implications for various forms of discrimination. For example, he posits that political threat should be an especially salient predictor for types of discrimination

with a “heavy emphasis on mobilizing resources through organizational and ideological techniques” (p.160), including control over minority group political rights (e.g., voter disenfranchisement), symbolic segregation (e.g., Jim Crow laws), ritualistic forms of violence (e.g., lynching), and threat-oriented ideological systems (e.g., white supremacy). This is not to say, however, that dominant groups do not rely on “political means to achieve economic ends, or vice versa” (p.155). Indeed, a seemingly political response may have roots in economic threats. Instead, Blalock (1967) suggests that certain threats are more important for inducing certain forms of social control. Blalock (1967) argues that while discrimination is a product of a “combination of motives,” an adequate test of the relationship between threat perceptions and discrimination may need to include a “composite” of both threats, wherein one can test the differing nonlinear forms to “locate relatively ‘pure’ instances in which motives can be linked to behavior in a one-to-one fashion” (p.144). Altogether, Blalock (1967) suggests that economic and political threats are theoretically distinct and have unique implications for different outcomes; thus, distinguishing the individual effects of economic and political threats on key outcomes (e.g., discrimination and social control) is essential to providing an adequate test of Blalock’s (1967) positions.

Notably, a number of theoretical advancements have been made since Blalock (1967) originally developed the minority threat perspective to explain discrimination against blacks. For example, research has extended Blalock’s (1967) conceptualization of key threat mechanisms to include threats to the valued social order of the white majority—that is, criminal threat (Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001; Jackson, 1989).

Further, scholars have extended the minority threat perspective to explain discrimination against other groups (e.g., immigrants and Latinos; Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2016). Indeed, the minority threat perspective has become one of the most empirically investigated theories of crime and social control. As such, there is an abundance of research documenting associations between static and dynamic indicators of minority population size, proxies for minority threat, and the increased social control of minority groups (e.g., Eitle, D'Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b).

Research Gaps

Although prior research has significantly advanced scholarship, three important issues remain to be addressed. First, little attention has been paid to the perceived threat mechanisms that Blalock theorizes underlie the relationship between minority population size and social control outcomes. Prior studies predominantly rely on aggregate-level (e.g., city, state, county, etc.) proxies for minority threat, such as racial composition and ratio of majority to minority group unemployment rates (see Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Eitle et al., 2002; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Stolzenberg, D'Alessio, & Eitle, 2004; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b, 2015), and rarely test the mechanisms of perceived minority threat directly. By testing individual-level mechanisms (i.e., perceived threat) using a macro-level approach, the majority of this research can only make *assumptions* regarding the micro-level mechanisms hypothesized to link minority population size with social control. Only recently has research begun to incorporate direct measures of perceived threat to provide

a more precise test of Blalock's conceptual model; however, this research still suffers from key methodological weaknesses surrounding the measurement of perceived threat. In particular, this small body of research often employs one or two items to measure each threat construct¹ (King & Wheelock, 2007), calling into question the reliability and validity of these threat measures. Overall, a "composite," multidimensional scale of perceived threat encompassing the multiple bases of threat (i.e., economic, political, and criminal threat), as often emphasized in minority threat literature, has yet to be developed (Blalock, 1967, p. 144).

Second, the bulk of minority threat literature focuses on the relationships between black threat and social control outcomes (Eitle et al., 2002; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Stults & Baumer, 2007); much less attention has been given to Latino threat. Consequently, the generalizability of Blalock's (1967) premises to Latinos remains unknown. This is an important oversight for at least two reasons. First, Latinos represent one of the fastest growing populations in the U.S., with statistics projecting Latinos to account for 29 percent of the population by 2060 (Colby & Ortman, 2015). Second, the current political climate and contentious debate surrounding illegal immigration in the U.S. have subjected Latinos to bear the brunt of harsh immigration control tactics. Indeed, given that a large portion of Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric has centered on Latino immigrants in particular, some have argued that support for immigration control may be motivated by the desire to control Latino population growth

¹ Two studies have introduced subscales with multiple items to measure perceived threats (economic and criminal threats); however, these scales are distinct to threats posed by "illegal" immigrants and not necessarily generalizable to all minority groups (see Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2016).

versus immigration in general (Pickett, 2016). Because citizenship status is not a tangible identifier of group membership whereas ethnicity oftentimes is, it is likely that people perceive Latino ethnicity as synonymous with an undocumented immigrant status. Consequently, support for punitive immigration policies might actually be a veiled expression of anti-Latino prejudice intended to combat the larger “Hispanicization of America” problem versus the immigration problem (Pickett, 2016, p. 125). However, this possibility has not been empirically tested.

Third, given the little attention existing research has dedicated to evaluating the psychometrics of perceived threat constructs, important issues in measurement development still remain. For example, little is known about whether the factor structure of perceived threat is consistent across eliciting minority groups (e.g., Latinos versus blacks), or whether each threat dimension is capturing the latent construct similarly across these groups. Unfortunately, the structural invariance of perceived threat is often assumed and rarely tested in minority threat literature. This is a significant oversight because it limits our ability to assess whether differences in respondents’ levels of perceived Black versus perceived Latino threat are due to true differences in the type of threat elicited by each group. Take for example an instance in which an individual reports high perceptions of Latino threat, but low perceptions of Black threat. In order to determine whether these differences in perceptions are due to true group differences between the *types* of threats elicited by Latinos versus blacks, a researcher may need to rule out the possibility that the differences in scores on each of these scales is not a product of differences in how the threat constructs are measured. The factor structures of

the perceived Latino and Black threat scales may differ in terms of the types of meaningful threat factors that emerge (i.e., economic, political, and criminal threat). Indeed, the threat dimensions that prove to be meaningful for the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) may not be the same dimensions that surface for the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS), which would suggest that the threat items are capturing perceived threats differently across groups. Thus, if we can rule out variation in measurement as a cause of differences in respondents' levels of perceived Black versus Latino threat, then we can attribute any differences in their effects on social control outcomes, for example, to true group differences in the type of threat elicited by different minority groups (e.g., blacks versus Latinos).

Furthermore, establishing the structural invariance of perceived minority threat also facilitates a test of whether perceived Latino and black threat constructs are *distinct* indicators of perceived minority threat, and thus should be tested as separate constructs with potentially unique effects in minority threat literature. To date, minority threat scholars have assumed that individuals can differentiate the nuanced threats elicited by different minority groups, and as such, they have tested indicators of perceived threat (e.g., Latino threat, undocumented immigrant threat, black threat, etc.) as separate constructs (see King & Wheelock, 2007; Chiricos et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016). However, it is likely that those who perceive Latinos as threatening may also perceive other minorities as threatening. This would imply that different minority threat constructs might not be all that distinct, but instead could be indicators of the same general, latent construct of perceived minority threat. Indeed, individuals may group all minority group

members together and perceive all minorities as collectively threatening. If individuals cannot differentiate threats elicited by different minority groups, this would suggest little utility for the development of unique perceived threat measures for different minority groups. Moreover, if minority group members are all classified into a generally threatening category, this might also imply that exposure to one particular minority group in the population could hold implications for the threats elicited by and the social control outcomes targeted toward other minority groups. Unfortunately, scientists have not addressed these key empirical questions that are central to how we conceptualize and operationalize perceived minority threat in minority threat research.

The Proposed Study

In light of the aforementioned research gaps in existing minority threat research, this dissertation seeks to address three interrelated research objectives. First, in Chapter 2, I investigate the multidimensional nature of perceived minority threat through the development and validation of the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). Structural equation modeling is used to determine whether the PLTS is a unidimensional or multidimensional construct. Bifactor analyses, in particular, are conducted to examine whether individual threat dimensions can account for unique item covariance above and beyond the variance explained by a general Latino threat factor. Bivariate and partial correlations are used to test the construct validity of the PLTS using several external criteria, including punitive attitudes toward crime and border control, the ethnic typification of crime, being a republican, being politically conservative, and voting for Donald Trump.

Second, in Chapter 3, I examine the relationship between the PLTS and punitive border control sentiment to evaluate the generalizability of Blalock's (1967) premises to Latinos. Doing so also allows me to shed light on whether support for immigration control is in part driven by threats posed by Latinos, in particular, and the desire to control the growth of all Latinos, regardless of citizenship status. A series of OLS regression models are conducted to determine how the PLTS can inform the relationship between objective and perceptual measures of Latino population size and immigration control.

Third, in Chapter 4, I test the structural invariance of two perceived minority threat scales, the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) that I develop in Chapter 2 and the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS) that I develop and validate in this chapter. Further, I assess whether perceived Latino and Black threat constructs, while demonstrating structural equivalence, can still be differentiated as distinct constructs. To do this, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models are estimated to test the factor structure of the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS). The factor structure and model fit of the PBTS are compared to that of the validated factor structure of the PLTS to see if they are comparable (i.e., invariant). Next, I assess the construct validity of the PBTS by estimating bivariate and partial correlations of the PBTS with theoretically relevant criteria, including being a republican and politically conservative, the racial typification of crime, and punitive attitudes toward crime and border control (similar to Chapter 2).

To assess the distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS as separate constructs, I estimate a series of CFA models for each threat dimension (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and

opportunity threat). Specifically, I run a series of correlated two-factor models² to test whether item-level variance in each threat dimension is better explained by a general threat construct or by specific Latino and black threat constructs. If a model allowing the PBTS and PLTS to uniquely explain variance in each of their respective threat dimensions provides a better fit than a model in which a general minority threat construct (not race or ethnicity specific) explains the variance in threat items, this would suggest that the PBTS and PLTS represent distinct constructs and have utility as separate measures. I also examine the intercorrelations between the PBTS and PLTS total and subscale scores to assess the shared variance across these constructs to determine to what degree they are interrelated.

Lastly, as an added test of distinctness, I estimate a series of partial correlations to examine the association between the PBTS and validating criteria controlling for the PLTS, as well as the association between the PLTS and these same criteria, controlling for the PBTS. This correlation analysis allows me to evaluate what proportion of variance in these key theoretical criteria is being explained uniquely by the PBTS once I account for the variance explained by the PLTS, and vice versa. Theoretically, the PBTS should maintain significant associations with race-based criteria (e.g., racial typification of crime) but not ethnicity-based criteria (e.g., ethnic typification of crime).

Data and Measures

² I compare the correlated two-factor models to single factor models using chi-square test of differences to determine whether the two-dimensional factor structure provides the best fit for the data.

Data for this dissertation were collected from two samples of students at a large Southwestern university. Participants were recruited from graduate (online) and undergraduate (online and in-person) students who were currently enrolled in criminal justice courses. The first round of data collection took place in the spring of 2016, wherein students were administered an online survey using Qualtrics. The second round of data collection was completed in the fall of 2016, also using Qualtrics, but with a different sample of students from the same university. Data collection lasted approximately one to two weeks for each sample and yielded a sample size of 606 students in the first round of data collection and 463 students in the second (after deleting careless/duplicate responses)³. Because the focus of the present research is to examine perceptions of minority threat as experienced by the majority group, both samples are restricted to non-Hispanic whites (Study 1: $N = 347$; Study 2: $N = 261$ ⁴).

These data are unique in that they took place during two politically charged times in American history, during the Republican primaries and one week prior to the 2016 presidential election. This allows me to examine negative perceptions of minorities, especially Latinos, as they took center-stage during President Trump's presidential campaign. Further, both sets of data collection include rich information regarding perceptions of Latino and black threat (economic, political, and criminal threat), voter

³ Upon completing the survey, students were directed to an external survey that was not linked to their survey responses to report their full name, course title, professor name, and school email address. This information was used to verify their participation for compensation purposes in the form of extra credit (which was dependent on the instructor) and/or to be entered in a raffle for a chance to win one of two cash prizes (\$50 and \$100).

⁴ Given that each chapter uses different variables (with unique frequencies of missing data), the sample sizes will slightly vary across chapters (Chapter 2: S1: $N = 332$, S2: $N = 259$; Chapter 3: $N = 249$; Chapter 4: $N = 260$).

preferences (for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton), political affiliation (republican, democrat, independent), political conservatism, racial/ethnic typification of crime, and punitive attitudes toward crime and border control policy. In addition, both samples are relatively diverse in terms of the geographic location. Specifically, respondents come from over 100 counties across as many as 40 states, and only about 40% of respondents from each sample reported living within the vicinity of the university. Thus, despite criticism surrounding the use of student samples due to concerns regarding their generalizability and restriction to one geographic location, the samples used in my dissertation are relatively diverse in terms of geography, thus increasing the generalizability beyond the location in which the university is located.

Since Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on the development and validation of a perceived minority threat scale, I use both samples, herein referred to as Study 1 and Study 2 (see Table 1.1 for a list of all study variables included in Chapter 2). Given that Study 2 incorporated a range of additional relevant external criteria (i.e., social dominance orientation and other personality characteristics that could serve as potentially important controls⁵), I only use data from Study 2 to test the PLTS in a full model in Chapter 3. Perceived black threat items were only administered in Study 2, thus I also only use data from this sample in Chapter 4 (see tables 1.2 and 1.3 for a complete list of

⁵ In Blalock's (1967) original formulation of the minority threat perspective, he emphasized the importance of personality traits as an impetus for prejudice when combined with perceptions of threat. Thus, personality measures could be central to influencing perceptions of threat that motivate prejudice and discrimination. Study 2 data included several personality measures that have been shown to be associated with prejudice, and could, by extension, be related to perceptions of threat, including indicators of narcissism, empathy, and social dominance orientation that could serve as key controls.

variables used in chapters 3 and 4, respectively). For analyses conducted in Chapter 3, I extracted data from the U.S. Census Bureau to collect 2010 and 2016 county-level indicators of minority threat for each respondent (i.e., percent Latino, percent Latino change, percent Black, percent Black change).

Table 1.1
Chapter 2 Variables (Study 1 & Study 2)

	<u>Study 1</u>	<u>Study 2</u>
	(<i>N</i> = 332)	(<i>N</i> = 259)
<u>Demographics</u>		
Age	x	x
Male	x	x
Married	x	x
Graduate Student	x	x
Household Income	x	x
Employed	x	x
<u>Perceived Latino Threat Scale</u>		
Total Score	x	x
Economic Threat	x	x
Political Threat	x	x
Criminal Threat	x	x
<u>Political Affiliation</u>		
Republican	x	x
Democrat	x	x
Independent	x	x
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	x	x
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>		
Trump	x	x
Cruz	x	
Clinton	x	x
Sanders	x	
Undecided		x
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>		
Agentic Extraversion		x
Antagonism		x
Cognitive Empathy		x
Affective Resonance		x

Social Dominance Orientation		X
Hostility	X	X
<u>Perceptions of Hispanics</u>		
Increase in Hispanics Living Near Home	X	X
% All Crime Committed by Hispanics	X	X
% Violent Crime Committed by Hispanics	X	X
% Hispanics in U.S. Illegally	X	X
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>		
Negative Attitudes Toward Hispanics	X	X
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	X	X
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	X	X
Denial of Racial Privilege		X
Denial of Institutional Discrimination		X
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem		X
Belief in Social Responsibility		X

Note: ^aDescriptives for indicators of voter behavior were presented only for those reporting that they plan to vote in the 2016 election (Study 1, $N = 262$; Study 2, $N = 209$).

Table 1.2

Chapter 3 Variables (Study 2; N = 249)

Dependent Variable

Punitive border control sentiment

Latino Threat

Perceived Latino Threat

Latino Population Context

Percent Latino

Percent Latino change

Perceived Latino undocumented

Control Variables

Age

Male

Married

Household income

Employed

Politically conservative

Ethnic typification of violent crime

Percent black

Percent black change

Perceived black undocumented

Percent unemployed

Table 1.3

Chapter 4 Variables (Study 2; N = 260)

<u>Demographics</u>	<u>Political Affiliation</u>	<u>Perceptions of Racial and Ethnic Minorities</u>
Age	Republican	Increase in Blacks Living Near Home
Male	Democrat	% All Crime Committed by Blacks
Married	Independent	% Violent Crime Committed by Blacks
Graduate Student	Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	Increase in Latinos Living Near Home
Household Income	<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>	% All Crime Committed by Latinos
Employed	Trump	% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos ^b
<u>Perceived Latino Threat Scale</u>	Clinton	% Latinos in U.S. Illegally
Total Score	Undecided	<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>
Economic Threat	<u>Personality/Disposition</u>	Negative Attitudes Toward Blacks
Political Threat	Agentic Extraversion	Negative Attitudes Toward Latinos
Criminal Threat	Antagonism	Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions
Opportunity Threat	Cognitive Empathy	Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection
<u>Perceived Black Threat Scale</u>	Affective Resonance	Denial of Racial Privilege
Total Score	Social Dominance Orientation	Denial of Institutional Discrimination
Economic Threat	Hostility	Denial of Racism as a Social Problem
Political Threat		Belief in Social Responsibility
Criminal Threat		
Opportunity Threat		

^aIndicators of voter intentions were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election ($N = 210$).

^bOne case was deleted for missing data on this variable ($N = 259$).

Organization

The remainder of the dissertation is organized into four chapters. Chapter 2 investigates the development and validation of the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). Chapter 3 examines how the PLTS informs the relationship between Latino context and punitive border control sentiment. Chapter 4 investigates the structural invariance and distinctness of two perceived minority threat scales—the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS) and the PLTS. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a summary of the findings from chapters 2, 3, and 4, and discusses the limitations and future directions of this research.

CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALE
OF PERCEIVED LATINO THREAT⁶

Introduction

Research has established that prejudicial attitudes toward minority groups exist, especially with regard to Latinos and undocumented immigrants in America (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Stewart et al., 2015). These attitudes are particularly salient in President Trump's political rhetoric. From the onset, his presidential campaign was founded upon negative perceptions of Mexican immigrants as stealing jobs from Americans, undermining the U.S. economy, and bringing drugs and crime across the border (Lee, 2015). These anti-immigrant sentiments have served as a foundation for President Trump's immigration-related policies and practices, such as increasing the policing of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. and his pledge to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Because 58 percent of the estimated 11.2 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. are reportedly Latino (Passel & Cohn, 2011), these perceptions have the greatest implications for Latinos living in the U.S.

Several group-based theories have offered explanations for the development of prejudicial attitudes and discrimination. Although the majority of these theories postulate that the source of prejudice is rooted in the relative social position of a dominant versus a subordinate group in society (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Sidanius et al., 2004; Sherif

⁶ This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article published as the version of record in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Available online: <http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1616539>

et al., 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the impetus for prejudice varies across theories. The minority threat perspective, in particular, argues that prejudice and intergroup hostility are largely defensive reactions to perceived threats that are elicited by a large or increasing subordinate group (King & Wheelock, 2007, p. 1255). Blalock (1967) specifies these perceived threats to be a product of group competition for coveted economic resources and political power (Quillian, 1995, p. 589). More recent work extends Blalock's (1967) positions to include threats to group safety and social order, given that minorities are often viewed as synonymous with crime (Bontrager, Bales, & Chiricos, 2005; Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004; Eitle, D'Alessio, & Stolzenberg, 2002). Together, the perception of minorities as posing economic, political, and criminal threats is theorized to function as the impetus for discrimination against minority group members.

Although a number of studies have tested and supported minority threat premises, two key limitations remain. First, despite its theoretical significance in minority threat theory, a multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat has yet to be developed. This oversight is significant given that the dimensionality of perceived threat is a central feature of the minority threat perspective and intergroup relations research. Without reliable and valid measures of perceived threat, minority threat research has only illustrated, and rarely tested and advanced, the threat hypothesis (Liska, 1992, p. 29).

Second, extant research examining minority threat has largely focused on Black threat (Eitle et al., 2002; King & Wheelock, 2007; Parker, Stults, & Rice, 2005; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Stults & Baumer, 2007); less attention has been paid to Latino

threat. This is a notable oversight given that Latinos represent one of the fastest growing populations in the U.S., with statistics projecting Latinos to account for 29 percent of the population by 2060 and non-Latino Whites being projected to lose their position as the nation's "majority" group by then (Colby & Ortman, 2015). Thus, in light of the growing Latino population, the current political climate, and the continuing debate on "crimmigration" (Stumpf, 2006; Light, 2014), research is warranted that investigates perceptions of Latinos that engender support for punitive policies and for Trump, both of which may function as vehicles for the social control of Latinos in the U.S.

Against this background, we seek to develop and validate a new multidimensional scale of Latino threat, which we call the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS), across two studies. Using a sample of students from a large Southwestern university, Study 1 tests the structural and construct validity of the PLTS as encompassing three dimensions of threat (economic, political, and criminal threat); Study 2 replicates and extends the findings from Study 1 using a separate sample of students from the same university. Overall, findings from both studies provide support for the validity of the PLTS and afford evidence for testing perceived Latino threat as a multidimensional construct.

Minority Threat Perspective

The foundation of traditional conflict theory is rooted in the group dynamics resulting from a large or increasing subordinate group and the threats they pose to the interests of the elite (i.e., the majority group; Turk, 1969). While threatening groups are largely conceptualized along racial, economic, and nativistic lines, studies examining these concepts frequently operationalize group threat as the percentage of non-Whites in

the population (see Liska, 1992), and further link minority population size to a number of outcomes conceptualized as tools to preserve the White advantage (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Liska, 1992). What lies at the heart of these arguments, however, are the threat perceptions that theoretically link minority population size with these outcomes. Specifically, in his theory of minority group relations, Blalock (1967) argues that an increasing minority population size is associated with prejudice and discrimination due to specific economic and power threats. In particular, growth in the minority population signals economic threats insofar as the majority group feels that their group position and capitalization of resources is in jeopardy (Blalock, 1967). Threats to power—conceptualized as a “fear of *political* power in the hands of the minority”—mobilize discriminatory behavior to maintain their political advantage over the rising minority group population (Blalock, 1967, p. 147). More recent work extended Blalock’s (1967) positions to include criminal threat, wherein threats to the safety and order of the majority group are evoked in areas where minority group presence has increased (Bontrager et al., 2005; Chiricos et al., 2004; Eitle et al., 2002). Accordingly, the majority group increasingly mobilizes social control apparatus to minimize perceived minority threat; thus, perceived economic, political, and criminal threats are hypothesized to theoretically underlie the relationship between minority population size and social control (King & Wheelock, 2007; Liska, 1992).

Measuring Perceived Minority Threat

The minority threat perspective is one of the most empirically investigated theories in criminological literature. Scholars have examined indicators of minority

threat (e.g., racial composition) and their associations with a wide range of outcomes, including negative racial attitudes and prejudice (Quillian, 1995, 1996; Taylor, 1998), punitive attitudes (King & Wheelock, 2007; Stewart et al., 2015, 2018), and formal social control outcomes, such as arrests (Eitle et al., 2004; Parker et al., 2005) and sentencing (Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b). While this body of work has significantly advanced scholarship and provided some support for the minority threat perspective, this research is characterized by key weaknesses surrounding the measurement of perceived threat. The majority of prior studies testing minority threat have relied solely on minority population size as a proxy for minority threat (e.g., Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2015), or have used aggregate-level data to calculate ratios of majority-minority group voters, unemployment rates, and arrest/crime rates to measure political, economic, and criminal threats, respectively (Eitle et al., 2002; Stolzenberg et al., 2004; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010b). Further, the limited number of studies employing direct measures of minority threat perceptions have often relied on one or two items to measure each form of perceived threat (Johnson et al., 2011; King & Wheelock, 2007; Stewart et al., 2015), thereby limiting content coverage, restricting the variability within each construct, and reducing the construct reliability and validity of threat perceptions. Moreover, studies have yet to develop a comprehensive measure of perceived threat that encompasses all core dimensions of threat (economic, political, and criminal), and as such, an assessment of its psychometric properties has yet to be conducted⁷.

⁷ Only two studies to date have introduced subscales with multiple items to measure perceived threats (economic and criminal threats). Though significant, these scales are predominantly

Importantly, the aforementioned weaknesses also extend to other theories of intergroup relations that focus on the salience of threat perceptions in relation to prejudice and discrimination. For example, Stephan and Stephan's (2000) integrated threat theory, also known as intergroup threat theory, argues that realistic and symbolic group threats are key predictors of intergroup attitudes across several different groups and contexts. Realistic group threats are conceptualized as "threats to a group's power, resources, and general welfare," while symbolic group threats encompass "threats to a group's religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview" (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016). Based on this conceptualization, both realistic and symbolic threat constructs could be comprised of multiple dimensions of threat that are, while interrelated, arguably distinct. However, prior studies often collapse multiple indicators of threat into unidimensional constructs without exploring the factor structure of each dimension (e.g., see Stephan et al., 1998), which may mask important variation in the types of threat represented within each general threat construct. Thus, the development and validation of a multidimensional scale of perceived threat is not only vital to minority threat research but is also of value to intergroup relations literature and more broadly to research that extends our knowledge of the more nuanced effects of perceived threat on intergroup attitudes and behavior.

Present Research

The focus of this study is to develop and validate a multidimensional scale of Latino threat, which we call the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS), across two

unique to threats posed by "illegal" immigrants and not necessarily applicable to minority groups in general (see Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2016).

studies. Importantly, we collected data during the Republican Party presidential primaries in April 2016 (Study 1) and one week prior to the presidential election in November 2016 (Study 2)⁸. Using data collected at these two time points provided us a rare opportunity to develop a measure encompassing negative perceptions of Latinos when these perceptions took center-stage during the 2016 presidential campaign. It also facilitated the only examination to date of whether these perceptions might have influenced voter preferences in the 2016 election.

Using a sample of college students from a large Southwestern university, Study 1 examines the structural validity and internal consistency of the PLTS as encompassing three unique dimensions (i.e., economic, political, and criminal threat). We further investigate the construct validity of the PLTS using measures capturing political affiliation, voting intentions, personality, perceptions of Latinos, and attitudes/beliefs. Using another sample of college students from the same university, Study 2 replicates and extends the findings from Study 1, providing further support for the validity of the PLTS by including additional measures capturing personality and attitudes/beliefs as external criteria.

Study 1: Development and Initial Validation

Method

Participants

⁸ Sample sizes were determined based on the suggested ratio of cases to items needed to assess the reliability and validity of a new scale (DeVellis, 2016; Gorsuch, 1983); in this case we aimed for 10 cases per item in the proposed scale ($N \geq 200$) (Nunnally, 1978, p. 276). *G*Power* 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) revealed that a sample size of $N = 84$ was needed to detect a moderate correlation ($r = .30$; $p < .05$; 80% power).

Participants, including graduate and undergraduate students⁹ who were currently enrolled in criminal justice courses, completed an online Qualtrics survey in April 2016. Data collection initially yielded a sample size of 606 students after screening for duplicate responses. Because the focus of this study was to examine perceptions of Latino threat by the majority group, the final sample was restricted to 332 non-Hispanic Whites¹⁰. The sample was predominantly female (63%), about 28 years old on average, and reported between \$30,000 and \$34,999 on average for their annual household income (see Table 2.1). Respondents came from 152 counties across 40 different states; thus, the sample is relatively diverse in terms of geographic location.

Measures

Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). This scale consisted of 20 items tapping three theoretically interrelated dimensions—economic, political, and criminal threat. Based on theoretical premises of what these constructs should represent, we included a mix of both new and existing measures of perceived threat (see Johnson et al., 2011; Stupi, 2013; Stewart et al., 2015, 2018). Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they personally agreed on a number of statements about Hispanics¹¹ (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”). Eight items assess *economic threat* that

⁹ For both studies, we recruited online graduate students and a mix of both online and on-campus undergraduate students.

¹⁰ After removing cases showing careless responding ($N = 1$ in Study 1 and $N = 3$ in Study 2), we used listwise deletion for missing data in Study 1 ($N = 15$; 4.3%) and Study 2 ($N = 2$; <1%).

¹¹ Respondents were advised throughout the duration of the survey that Hispanics include individuals whose ancestry can be traced back to Mexico, Central America, or South America. We recognize that this distinction does not include Hispanics whose ancestry can be tracked to Puerto Rico or Cuba; however, we anticipate that when asked about Hispanics, the majority of respondents likely conjured up perceptions of Hispanics of Mexican descent because it is the group with which they share the most contact given that about 70% of respondents in both studies come from the Southwest and Western regions of the U.S. (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 & 2 Measures

	Study 1 (N = 332)				Study 2 (N = 259)			
	%/M	N/SD	Range	α	%/M	N/SD	Range	α
<u>Demographics</u>								
Age	27.70	8.96	18 - 62		27.70	9.66	18 - 62	
Male	37.10%	123			35.10%	91		
Married	30.10%	100			26.60%	69		
Graduate Student	25.90%	86			32.00%	83		
Household Income	12.14	5.12	1 - 18		12.37	5.41	1 - 18	
Employed	78.30%	260			79.90%	207		
<u>Perceived Latino Threat Scale</u>								
Total Score	43.98	10.66	20 - 80	0.95	40.53	10.75	20 - 78	0.95
Economic Threat	11.87	3.64	5 - 20	0.93	10.54	3.59	5 - 20	0.94
Political Threat	9.79	2.58	5 - 20	0.84	8.75	2.54	5 - 18	0.85
Criminal Threat	14.76	4.06	7 - 28	0.91	14.14	4.05	7 - 28	0.90
Opportunity Threat	7.56	1.93	3 - 12	0.81	7.10	2.23	3 - 12	0.86
<u>Political Affiliation</u>								
Republican	37.00%	123			44.80%	116		
Democrat	21.10%	70			21.60%	56		
Independent	37.00%	123			28.20%	73		
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	56.90%	189			58.70%	152		
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>								
Trump	38.20%	100			44.50%	93		
Cruz	42.00%	110						
Clinton	22.50%	59			28.70%	60		
Sanders	41.20%	108						
Undecided					13.90%	29		
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>								
Agentic Extraversion					43.93	6.60	19 - 60	0.77
Antagonism					21.60	7.95	12 - 58	0.88
Cognitive Empathy					46.36	6.78	21 - 60	0.90
Affective Resonance					49.71	6.51	33 - 60	0.88
Social Dominance Orientation					21.29	9.03	8 - 51	0.83
Hostility	15.99	6.05	8 - 38	0.86	15.94	5.78	8 - 36	0.82
<u>Perceptions of Latinos</u>								
Increase in Latinos Living Near Home	43.70%	145			45.90%	119		
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	27.23%	10.88	0 - 62		32.21%	15.71	5 - 89	
% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos	27.30%	12.35	0 - 84		30.70%	15.54	3 - 85	
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	31.46%	20.87	0 - 100		31.95%	18.30	2 - 92	
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>								
Negative Attitudes toward Latinos	13.84	3.84	7 - 28	0.88	12.76	3.49	7 - 27	0.87
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	19.33	5.60	8 - 32	0.88	18.61	5.3	8 - 32	0.87
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	17.02	4.65	6 - 24	0.93	16.68	4.32	6 - 24	0.89
Denial of Racial Privilege					26.15	6.66	7 - 42	0.80
Denial of Institutional Discrimination					25.72	7.12	7 - 42	0.82
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem					15.19	4.92	6 - 29	0.76
Belief in Social Responsibility					30.95	7.13	11 - 49	0.75

Note. ^aDescriptives for indicators of voter intentions were presented only for those reporting that they plan to vote in the 2016 election (Study 1, N = 262; Study 2, N = 209).

included statements indicating that Hispanics were over-utilizing government resources and taking jobs that should go to Whites. Five items assess *political threat* that were designed to capture perceptions of Hispanics as threatening the political power of the White majority and seven items assess *criminal threat* that included statements capturing perceptions of Hispanics as endangering the safety of the White majority via criminal pursuits.

Validating Criteria

To investigate the construct validity of the PLTS, we also included a number of external criteria that should theoretically be associated with the PLTS (see Table 2.1).

Demographics. Several demographic indicators were included, namely *age* (in years), whether the respondent reported being *male* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), *married* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), a *graduate student* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), or *employed* (1 = “Yes, 0 = “No), as well as his/her annual *household income* (1 = “Under \$3,000” to 18 = “Over \$90,000”).

Political conservatism. Indicators of political conservatism include whether the respondent identified as a *Republican*, a *Democrat*, or an *Independent* (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”), and as *politically conservative vs. liberal* (0 = “Liberal”, 1 = “Conservative”).

Voting intentions. Respondents were asked to report the likelihood that they would vote for the following four candidates (1 = “Not at all likely” to 10 = “Very likely”): Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Hillary Clinton, and Bernie Sanders. Four

dichotomous measures were created¹², one for each candidate that reflects the respondent was likely to vote for *Trump*, *Cruz*, *Clinton*, and/or *Bernie* in the upcoming 2016 election (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”).

Personality/disposition. Blalock (1967) emphasized the importance of personality traits as an impetus for prejudice when combined with perceptions of threat (p. 28).

Thus, personality measures are central to influencing perceptions of threat that motivate prejudice and discrimination. One of the basic assumptions about group threat processes is that intergroup hostility is a motivator of perceived threat (Quillian, 1996). For this reason, we assessed levels of the respondent’s hostility in his/her interactions with others using an 8-item subscale ($\alpha = .86$) from the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992). Respondents were asked the extent to which each statement described how they interacted with other people (e.g., “Other people always seem to get the breaks” and “I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things”; 1 = “Not at all like me” to 5 = “Completely like me”). Because those individuals with a hostile disposition in general are also more prone to a hostile view of outgroups, our hostility measure could capture intergroup hostility.

Perceptions of Latinos. Several measures were used to assess perceptions of Latinos. *Increase in Latinos living near home* is a perceptual measure of ethnic composition (Pickett et al., 2012; Wang, 2012). Respondents were asked how the Hispanic population changed during the past five years in the neighborhood they lived for

¹² Based on the distribution of each variable, a meaningful cut-off point for dichotomization indicating the likelihood of voting for each candidate was 5; thus, responses greater than or equal to 5 were coded as 1 and responses less than 5 were coded as 0.

the longest time prior to moving out on their own. This measure was then dichotomized to indicate a perceived increase in Latinos living near home (1 = “Increased”, 2 = “Decreased/stayed the same”). *Percent crime committed by Latinos* and *percent violent crime committed by Latinos* measure the ethnic typification of crime, and respondents were asked to report what percentage of people who commit crime and violent crime they perceived to be Hispanic (Welch et al., 2011). In addition, *percent Latinos in U.S. illegally* asked respondents to report what percentage of Hispanics living in America they perceived to be undocumented immigrants.

Attitudes/beliefs. We included three measures capturing various attitudes and beliefs. First, *negative attitudes toward Latinos* ($\alpha = .88$) was slightly modified from a scale of prejudice used in prior research (Wagner et al., 2006). Respondents were asked how much they agreed on seven statements about Hispanics (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”), including items such as “Hispanics enrich American culture” and “There are too many Hispanics living in America”. Second, *attitudes favoring harsh criminal sanctions* ($\alpha = .88$) asked respondents to report how much they agreed (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”) on six suggested ways of dealing with crime in the U.S., such as “Making sentences more severe for all crimes” and “Using the death penalty for juveniles who murder” (see Chiricos et al., 2004). Third, *attitudes favoring heightened border protection* ($\alpha = .93$) asked respondents to report how much they agreed (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”) on six suggestions for dealing with undocumented immigration in the U.S., including support for “Increased

manpower for border patrol” and “Erecting a wall along the border” (see Stupi et al., 2016).

Data Analysis

The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, to assess the factor structure of the PLTS, we estimated a series of nested confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) models and used mean and variance adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimation, in Mplus 7, due to the ordinal nature of the items (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). A single factor model was estimated—allowing all the items to load onto a general threat factor—and compared¹³ to a three-bifactor model (see Figure 2.1). The bifactor model has an advantage over more common unidimensional, correlated, and higher-order factor models in that it allows the item covariance to be partitioned by both the general and individual threat dimensions (also referred to as domain-specific factors; Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006), which will facilitate a test of (1) whether a general minority threat factor or domain-specific threat factors (economic, political, and criminal threat) can best account for shared variance among threat items; and (2) whether domain-specific factors can account for unique variance in threat items above and beyond the variance explained by a general threat factor. Once identifying the best fitting model using absolute and relative fit indices¹⁴, the second stage of the analysis investigated the internal consistency of the PLTS total score and each of the subscale scores using Cronbach’s alphas ($\alpha > .70$). The

¹³ A corrected chi-square difference test was used to determine whether the three-bifactor model fit better than a single factor model (DIFFTEST procedure in Mplus 7).

¹⁴ For CFI and TLI, acceptable fit was determined using cut off values of .90 or greater, and .95 or greater to indicate a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA values between .05 and .10 indicate an acceptable fit, while values less than .05 indicate a good fit (McDonald & Ho, 2002).

third stage of the analysis assessed the construct validity of the PLTS by estimating bivariate and partial correlations between the PLTS total and subscale scores and theoretically relevant external criteria.




Fig. 2.1 Three-bifactor measurement model for the Perceived Latino Threat Scale.

Results

Structural Validity

The fit statistics for a series of CFA models are presented in Table 2.2. Results demonstrated that the single-factor model (Model 1) provided a relatively poor fit to the data. The fit indices improved in the three-bifactor model with three domain-specific threat factors (Model 2); however, the modification indices recommended the inclusion of parameters correlating residuals among three items tapping threats to occupational and educational opportunities, suggesting a possible fourth dimension that we called opportunity threat. Indeed, the inclusion of this fourth domain-specific factor in the bifactor model provided a significantly better fit, with the CFI and TLI indicating good fit and the RMSEA indicating acceptable fit.

Table 2.3 presents factor loadings for the four-bifactor model. This model demonstrates that the general factor (Latino threat) accounts for a greater proportion of item variance than the individual threat dimensions. All the items demonstrated strong standardized factor loadings on the general threat factor (range = .53 - .92), with some residual item variance also being accounted for by the domain-specific threat factors. This suggests that while the general threat factor explains item variance better than the individual threat factors, some unique variance within each of the threat domains is not explained by the general threat factor.

Table 2.2

Fit Indices Comparing Confirmatory Factor Models for Study 1 & Study 2

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	<i>p</i> -value
<u>Study 1 (<i>N</i> = 332)</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	1514.228	170	0.920	0.911	0.154	-	-	-
Model 2: Three-bifactor	634.115	150	0.971	0.964	0.099	643.851	20	0.000
Model 3: Four-bifactor	347.418	150	0.988	0.985	0.063	-	-	-
<u>Study 2 (<i>N</i> = 259)</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	1984.458	170	0.890	0.877	0.203	-	-	-
Model 2: Four-bifactor	396.372	150	0.985	0.981	0.080	913.088	20	0.000

Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

Table 2.3
Bifactor Models for Study 1 (N = 332) & Study 2 (N = 259)

Items	General		Economic		Political		Criminal		Opportunity	
	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2
Hispanics get too much help from government services.	0.85	0.88	0.24	0.38						
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for Hispanics.	0.74	0.86	0.55	0.46						
Hispanics use more than their fair share of government services.	0.82	0.82	0.46	0.44						
Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others.	0.84	0.84	0.31	0.28						
Welfare programs assisting Hispanics hurt the economy.	0.78	0.79	0.50	0.34						
Hispanic president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.	0.72	0.64			0.23	0.35				
There are too many Hispanics running for public office.	0.79	0.71			0.61	0.62				
Hispanics are taking more public offices than they need to.	0.73	0.66			0.33	0.74				
Hispanic politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.	0.76	0.81			<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.06</i>				
Hispanics are trying to dominate American politics.	0.69	0.68			0.37	0.50				
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of Hispanics.	0.79	0.77					0.25	0.19		
Hispanics pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.	0.83	0.87					0.22	<i>-0.05</i>		
Hispanics are more willing to break the law than whites.	0.83	0.87					0.29	<i>-0.06</i>		
Too many Hispanics are committing crimes.	0.85	0.76					0.43	0.53		
Hispanics don't care as much about public order compared to whites.	0.92	0.88					<i>-0.06</i>	<i>-0.20</i>		
When I see Hispanics in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.	0.78	0.78					<i>0.12</i>	<i>0.08</i>		
The Hispanic crime rate is a serious problem.	0.70	0.62					0.37	0.45		
Hispanics are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.	0.53	0.59							0.84	0.78
Hispanics are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.	0.65	0.72							0.39	0.34
Hispanics are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.	0.54	0.57							0.57	0.73

Note. S1 = Study 1; S2 = Study 2. Entries are standardized factor loadings.
 Non-significant factor loadings are italicized.

Internal Consistency

The Cronbach's alpha for the PLTS total score was .95; the reliability for each of the four subscales was .93, .84, .91, and .81 for economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threats, respectively (see Table 2.1).

Construct Validity

To establish construct validity of the PLTS and its components, we estimated correlations between these factors and relevant criteria (see Table 2.4). Indeed, the PLTS total and respective domain-specific factor scores were significantly related to a number of external criteria in theoretically expected directions. Specifically, the PLTS total score was positively associated with being a Republican and politically conservative as well as the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump or Ted Cruz. Conversely, the PLTS was negatively associated with being a Democrat and the likelihood of voting for Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders.

Furthermore, increased perceptions of Latino threat were associated with higher levels of hostility in the respondent's interactions with others and an increased percentage of Latinos perceived to be involved in crime and residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants. The PLTS also demonstrated moderate to strong associations with negative attitudes toward Latinos¹⁵ as well as attitudes favoring harsh criminal sanctions and heightened border protection. Overall, perceived Latino threat as a unidimensional construct demonstrates significant associations with a number of theoretically relevant criteria, supporting its construct validity.

¹⁵ See supplemental material In Appendix B for more information regarding this relationship and other supplemental analyses.

Table 2.4

Bivariate and Partial Correlations between the Perceived Latino Threat Total and Subscale Scores and External Criteria for Study 1 (N = 332)

	<u>Total Score</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Opportunity</u>
	<i>r</i>	<i>r (pr)</i>	<i>r (pr)</i>	<i>r (pr)</i>	<i>r (pr)</i>
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	0.01	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.00 (-0.06)	-0.05 (-0.08)
Male	0.02	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (-0.01)	-0.04 (-0.08)
Married	-0.01	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (-0.07)	-0.05 (-0.05)
Graduate Student	-0.12*	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.01)	-0.13* (-0.08)	-0.10 (-0.05)
Household Income	-0.01	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.06 (-0.11*)	0.07 (0.10)
Employed	-0.03	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (-0.03)	-0.04 (-0.04)
<u>Political Affiliation</u>					
Republican	0.28***	0.30*** (0.16**)	0.22*** (0.00)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.17** (-0.01)
Democrat	-0.32***	-0.35*** (0.20***)	-0.27*** (-0.06)	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (-0.04)
Independent	-0.02	-0.02 (-0.01)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (-0.05)	0.01 (0.04)
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	0.38***	0.41*** (0.23***)	0.31*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.24*** (-0.01)
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>					
Trump	0.47***	0.50*** (0.29***)	0.39*** (0.04)	0.41*** (-0.02)	0.31*** (0.02)
Cruz	0.34***	0.35*** (0.17**)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.21*** (-0.00)
Clinton	-0.36***	-0.33*** (-0.05)	-0.32*** (-0.06)	-0.36*** (-0.13*)	-0.22*** (0.01)
Sanders	-0.45***	-0.48*** (-0.28***)	-0.36*** (0.01)	-0.41*** (-0.06)	-0.25*** (0.05)
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>					
Hostility	0.23***	0.16** (-0.09)	0.25*** (0.11*)	0.24*** (0.10)	0.16** (0.06)
<u>Perceptions of Latinos</u>					
Increase in Latinos Living Near Home	0.09	0.14** (0.17**)	-0.03 (-0.17**)	0.06 (0.00)	0.13* (0.08)
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	0.38***	0.35*** (0.08)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.16**)	0.20*** (-0.03)
% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos	0.32***	0.28*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.32*** (0.13*)	0.15** (-0.05)
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	0.46***	0.47*** (0.23***)	0.43*** (0.16**)	0.39*** (-0.04)	0.29*** (0.02)
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>					
Negative Attitudes toward Latinos	0.81***	0.75*** (0.33***)	0.75*** (0.33***)	0.75*** (0.20***)	0.49*** (0.03)
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	0.48***	0.50*** (0.27***)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.03)
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	0.57***	0.60*** (0.34***)	0.45*** (0.01)	0.51*** (0.08)	0.36*** (0.01)

Note. *pr* = partial correlation between the indicated threat subscale and the target variable after controlling for the other three subscales.

^aIndicators of voter intentions were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election (*N* = 262).

****p* < 0.001, ***p* < 0.01, **p* < 0.05 (two-tailed test).

Does each domain-specific factor, however, have unique associations with these same criteria above and beyond the variance explained by the remaining factors, thus supporting the multidimensionality of the construct? To isolate the effects of each of the domain-specific threat factors, we estimated a series of partial correlations which allow us to test the association between each threat dimension and relevant criteria independent of the effects of the remaining three threat dimensions. When accounting for shared variance among the individual threat factors, several threat domains maintained significant associations with theoretically relevant criteria in the expected directions. Economic threat, in particular, demonstrated the strongest, most consistent associations with numerous external criteria. Increased perceptions of economic threat were associated with voting for Donald Trump or Ted Cruz, being a Republican and politically conservative, perceptions of an increasing Latino population and of a large percentage of Latinos as being undocumented immigrants, and more punitive attitudes toward crime and border control. Political threat was positively associated with greater perceptions of Latinos as being undocumented immigrants, while an increased percentage of Latinos perceived to be involved in crime (violent or otherwise) was significantly associated with criminal threat. These findings suggest that perceived Latino threat is a multidimensional construct, with meaningful dimensions of threat demonstrating unique associations with validating criteria.

Discussion

Findings from Study 1 provide initial support for the PLTS as an internally consistent and structurally valid multidimensional scale of Latino threat, encompassing

four dimensions: economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat. Results from the bifactor analysis provide evidence for the utility of both a general Latino threat factor and its components. While the general threat factor accounted for a greater proportion of the variance in the threat items, the individual threat dimensions, especially economic threat, explained unique variance in the threat items above and beyond the general factor. When analyzing the construct validity of the PLTS, the same pattern emerges as we observed strong associations between the PLTS total score and measures of voter intentions, perceptions of a large percentage of Latinos as being involved in crime and residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants, as well as punitive attitudes toward crime and border control. When examining the independent effects of each threat dimension, we see that all dimensions maintain unique associations with external criteria, and many of the associations between the PLTS and external criteria are largely driven by economic threat.

Study 2: Validation and Replication

Method

Participants

To replicate and extend the findings from Study 1, Study 2 collected new data from participants, including graduate and undergraduate students enrolled in criminal justice courses, who participated in an online Qualtrics survey in November 2016, one week prior to the presidential election. Data collection yielded a sample of 463 students after removing duplicate responses. Similar to Study 1, the final sample was restricted to 259 non-Hispanic Whites who were mostly female (65%) and about 28 years old on

average. Respondents, representing 132 counties from over 37 states, reported their annual household income, on average, between \$30,000 and \$34,999.

Measures

Validating Criteria

To further assess the construct validity of the PLTS, in addition to all the validating criteria from Study 1¹⁶, we included several new measures, discussed below, to examine whether the PLTS exhibits associations with different, theoretically-relevant external criteria in anticipated directions.

Voting intentions. Given that data collection for Study 2 occurred one week prior to the 2016 presidential election, we focused on voter preferences between the two presidential candidates. Respondents were asked who they would vote for if the election were held today, Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, or Undecided. Three dichotomous measures were created from this categorical measure, including *Trump*, *Clinton*, and *Undecided* (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”).

Personality/disposition. As mentioned previously, personality indicators are key moderators in Blalock’s (1967) conceptual model and are central to influencing perceptions of threat that motivate prejudice and discrimination. Indeed, the effects of perceived Latino threat on prejudice and discrimination may be most pronounced among individuals displaying certain personality dispositions; thus, an exploration of which personality dispositions are significantly associated with perceived threat is of theoretical importance. We included five additional personality measures, including indicators of

¹⁶ See Methods section of Study 1 for more details about these measures and see Table 2.1 for the descriptive statistics for all Study 2 variables.

narcissism, empathy, and social dominance orientation, all of which have been shown to be related to prejudice (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009; Schnieders & Gore 2011; Stephan & Finlay, 1999), and could, by extension, be related to threat perceptions. First, we included two measures, *agentic extraversion* and *antagonism*, created from the Five Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI) short form (Glover et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014; Sherman et al., 2015). Respondents were asked how much they agreed on several statements tapping various dimensions of a narcissistic personality (1 = “Disagree strongly” to 5 = “Agree strongly”). Items from the acclaim-seeking (e.g., “I am extremely ambitious”), authoritativeness (e.g., “Leadership comes easy for me”), and grandiose fantasies (“Someday I believe that most people will know my name”) subscales were summed to create the 12-item agentic extraversion subscale ($\alpha = .77$). Alternatively, items from the arrogance (e.g., “Others say I brag too much, but everything I say is true”), entitlement (e.g., “I deserve to receive special treatment”), and exploitativeness (e.g., “It’s fine to take advantage of persons to get ahead) subscales were summed to create the 12-item antagonism subscale ($\alpha = .88$). Second, we included two indicators of the Affective and Cognitive Measure of Empathy (ACME) (Vachon & Lynam, 2016). *Cognitive empathy* was a 12-item subscale ($\alpha = .90$) which asked respondents the extent to which they agreed on several statements describing how good they are at knowing what people are feeling (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”). *Affective resonance* was a 12-item subscale ($\alpha = .88$) in which respondents reported their level of agreement on several statements describing their empathic concern/compassion for others (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”). Last,

we included the 8-item *social dominance orientation* short scale ($\alpha = .83$; Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994) which asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they favored a series of ideas describing a preference for group-based dominance (1 = “Strongly oppose” to 7 = “Strongly favor”).

Attitudes/beliefs. First, we included three subscales of the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000). *Denial of racial privilege* was a 7-item subscale ($\alpha = .80$) asking respondents to report their level of agreement on several statements describing the unawareness of White privilege in America (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 6 = “Strongly agree”). *Denial of institutional discrimination* subscale included 7 items ($\alpha = .82$) which asked respondents to report their level of agreement on statements demonstrating an unawareness of the ill-effects of institutional forms of racial discrimination. *Denial of racism as a social problem* was a 6-item subscale ($\alpha = .76$) which asked respondents their level of agreement on statements describing the unawareness of widespread racial discrimination (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 6 = “Strongly agree”). Second, we included a *belief in social responsibility* scale ($\alpha = .75$) (Pratto et al., 1994) assessing respondents’ agreement on several statements about feeling a social obligation to help those less privileged (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree”).

Data Analysis

To replicate and extend Study 1, Study 2 followed a similar data analytic plan. Specifically, we began by investigating the structural validity of the PLTS using a series of nested CFA models comparing a single factor model to a bifactor model with four

threat dimensions. Once identifying the best fitting model, we proceeded to examine the internal consistency and construct validity of the proposed scale by examining Cronbach's alphas of the PLTS total score and subscale scores and their associations with theoretically relevant external criteria.

Results

Structural Validity

The fit statistics for a series of CFA models from Study 2 are also illustrated in Table 2.2. The four-bifactor model provided the best fit for the data, with the CFI and TLI demonstrating good fit and the RMSEA showing acceptable fit. In Table 2.3, we observe a similar pattern as Study 1 wherein all the items demonstrated strong standardized factor loadings on the general threat factor, ranging from .57 to .88, with each of the individual threat dimensions still explaining some unique item variance.

Internal Consistency

The coefficient alpha for the PLTS total score was .95; for each of the four subscales, the reliability was .94, .85, .90, and .86 for economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threats, respectively (see Table 2.1).

Construct Validity

Similar to Study 1, the PLTS total score demonstrated positive associations with being a Republican, politically conservative, and voting for Trump and negative associations with being a Democrat and voting for Clinton (see Table 2.5). The PLTS was also associated with higher levels of hostility and narcissism (mainly antagonism), lower levels of empathy (mostly cognitive), and a greater orientation for social

Table 2.5
Bivariate and Partial Correlations between the Perceived Latino Threat Total and Subscale Scores and External Criteria for Study 2 (N = 259)

	Total Score <i>r</i>	Economic <i>r (pr)</i>	Political <i>r (pr)</i>	Criminal <i>r (pr)</i>	Opportunity <i>r (pr)</i>
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	-0.00	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (-0.08)	-0.03 (-0.04)
Male	0.13*	0.12* (0.05)	0.12* (0.06)	0.10 (-0.02)	0.09 (0.01)
Married	0.10	0.06 (-0.04)	0.04 (-0.04)	0.09 (0.05)	0.16** (0.14*)
Graduate Student	-0.05	-0.05 (0.01)	-0.06 (-0.02)	-0.07 (-0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Household Income	0.04	0.03 (0.00)	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (-0.03)	0.08 (0.08)
Employed	-0.06	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08 (-0.06)	-0.06 (-0.02)	-0.06 (-0.03)
<u>Political Affiliation</u>					
Republican	0.27***	0.28*** (0.14*)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.20*** (-0.06)	0.20*** (0.05)
Democrat	-0.30***	-0.28*** (-0.11)	-0.33*** (-0.21***)	-0.20*** (0.12*)	-0.24*** (-0.09)
Independent	-0.01	-0.04 (-0.07)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06 (-0.05)
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	0.32***	0.30*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.08)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.24*** (0.06)
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>					
Trump	0.32***	0.35*** (0.22**)	0.30*** (0.12)	0.23*** (-0.12)	0.23*** (0.05)
Clinton	-0.31***	-0.31*** (-0.15*)	-0.34*** (-0.23***)	-0.21** (0.16*)	-0.24*** (-0.09)
Undecided	-0.00	-0.01 (-0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (-0.04)
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>					
Agentic Extraversion	0.13*	0.07 (-0.10)	0.09 (0.00)	0.16** (0.14*)	0.13* (0.07)
Antagonism	0.38***	0.34*** (0.06)	0.35*** (0.14*)	0.35*** (0.08)	0.24*** (0.01)
Cognitive Empathy	-0.14*	-0.17** (-0.13*)	-0.16** (-0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)
Affective Resonance	-0.27***	-0.28*** (-0.14*)	-0.31*** (-0.19**)	-0.20*** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.56***	0.51*** (0.12)	0.48*** (0.14*)	0.51*** (0.12)	0.42*** (0.12*)
Hostility	0.14*	0.13* (0.01)	0.12 (0.02)	0.15* (0.07)	0.08 (-0.01)
<u>Perceptions of Latinos</u>					
Increase in Latinos Living Near Home	0.15*	0.13* (0.02)	0.16** (0.11)	0.10 (-0.05)	0.13* (0.07)
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	0.29***	0.25*** (0.00)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.32*** (0.19**)	0.13* (-0.08)
% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos	0.26***	0.21*** (-0.04)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.29*** (0.18*)	0.10 (-0.08)
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	0.46***	0.45*** (0.16**)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.43*** (0.10)	0.27*** (-0.03)
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>					
Negative Attitudes toward Latinos	0.70***	0.69*** (0.34***)	0.66*** (0.31***)	0.62*** (0.08)	0.40*** (-0.08)
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	0.46***	0.49*** (0.30***)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.38*** (-0.05)	0.31*** (0.02)
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	0.51***	0.51*** (0.25***)	0.42*** (0.11)	0.41*** (-0.06)	0.42*** (0.16**)
Denial of Racial Privilege	0.28***	0.28*** (0.12)	0.27*** (0.12*)	0.21*** (-0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)
Denial of Institutional Discrimination	0.50***	0.52*** (0.30***)	0.32*** (-0.07)	0.40*** (-0.05)	0.49*** (0.28***)
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem	0.51***	0.49*** (0.19**)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.42*** (-0.00)	0.45*** (0.22***)
Belief in Social Responsibility	-0.44***	-0.46*** (-0.27***)	-0.38*** (-0.12*)	-0.34*** (0.10)	-0.31*** (-0.06)

Note. *pr* = partial correlation between the indicated threat subscale and the target variable after controlling for the other three subscales.

^aIndicators of voter intentions were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election (*N* = 209).

****p* ≤ 0.001, ***p* ≤ 0.01, **p* ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed test).

dominance. As in Study 1, increases in the percentage of Latinos perceived to be involved in crime and undocumented immigrants were positively associated with increased Latino threat perceptions. However, unlike Study 1, the perception of an increasing Latino population was positively associated with increased perceptions of Latino threat, which is consistent with what the minority threat literature suggests. Attitudinal/belief-based criteria were also significantly associated with the PLTS much in the same way as Study 1. Negative attitudes toward Latinos as well as attitudes favoring harsh criminal sanctions and heightened border control were positively associated with the PLTS. Increased perceptions of Latino threat were associated with a greater denial of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and racism as a current social problem as well as a lower belief in social responsibility. Overall, in addition to maintaining consistent associations with criteria from Study 1, perceived Latino threat demonstrates meaningful associations with additional criteria in Study 2, thus further supporting the construct validity of the PLTS total score.

When examining partial correlations to isolate the independent effects of each threat dimension, we found several dimensions maintained unique associations with relevant criteria. As in Study 1, economic threat demonstrated the strongest associations with external criteria among the four dimensions. Specifically, an increased perception of economic threat was positively associated with being a Republican, politically conservative, voting for Trump, perceptions of a large percentage of Latinos residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants, and punitive attitudes toward crime and border control. An increased perception of political threat was negatively associated with being

a Democrat and voting for Clinton. Additionally, greater denial of institutional discrimination and racism as a social problem were positively associated with economic and opportunity threats, while lower belief in social responsibility was associated with economic threat. Last, and similar to Study 1, an increased perception of criminal threat was positively associated with an increased percentage of Latinos perceived to be involved in crime (violent or otherwise). Therefore, while the PLTS total score demonstrated meaningful associations with external criteria, findings from both the factor analysis and correlation analyses support the PLTS as a multidimensional construct.

Discussion

Study 2 confirms the findings of Study 1, providing further support for the PLTS as a reliable and valid scale of perceived Latino threat comprised of four dimensions: economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat. Similar to Study 1, the bifactor analysis demonstrated that a general threat factor accounts for item-level covariation better than individual threat dimensions; however, all four of the individual threat dimensions still explain unique variance not accounted for by a general threat factor and maintain unique associations with external criteria, suggesting that there is utility in testing the effects of both a general Latino threat factor and its components on key outcomes. Economic threat, in particular, displayed the strongest independent associations with external criteria—much like Study 1. Specifically, while the majority of external criteria were strongly associated with the PLTS total score, economic threat was a driving force behind voter intentions, perceptions of Latinos residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants, and punitive attitudes toward crime and border control.

General Discussion

Overall, the findings of both studies established the reliability and validity of the PLTS. The CFA indicated that a four-bifactor model provided the best fit to the data, suggesting that a general Latino threat factor accounted for item variance better than unique dimensions of threat. While a general threat factor explains a greater proportion of variance in the threat indicators, the unique dimensions of threat (economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat) still explain a proportion of variance not accounted for by a general Latino threat factor. These findings indicate that individual dimensions of threat may exist apart from a Latino threat construct, which was further supported when we examined the associations between the total and individual threat scores and external criteria. While the general Latino threat factor consistently demonstrated the strongest associations with external criteria, the individual dimension of economic threat maintained significant associations with these same criteria, even after accounting for shared variance among the other dimensions of Latino threat. This suggests that threat perceptions shaping voter intentions, perceptions of the percentage of Latinos residing in the U.S. illegally, and punitive attitudes about crime and border control are largely economically motivated. Given this finding, one could speculate that perceptions of Latino illegality might give rise to perceptions of this same group as being over-reliant on government services and encroaching on the economic advantage of Whites, further perpetuating punitive attitudes toward crime and border control and voter support for Trump. Although beyond the scope of this study, this remains an important avenue for future research.

Interestingly, the PLTS was not consistently associated with demographic indicators, and the distribution of these perceptions in both samples was approximately normal, suggesting that perceptions of Latino threat were not exclusively held by a small, more radical subset of the White population. Instead, these perceptions are more widespread and commonplace, and thus may have much broader implications. If a large percentage of the White (majority) population holds these views, the majority group may influence outcomes on a large scale, such as a presidential election that can function as a vehicle for the social control of Latinos.

The findings from both studies support a significant association between heightened perceptions of Latino threat, economic threat in particular, and voter support for Trump. While prior research has found evidence of Whites becoming more politically conservative when they perceive an increasing minority population (Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major, Blodorn, & Blascovich, 2018), it has yet to focus specifically on Whites' perceptions of Latino threat and their voting preferences. Craig and Richeson (2018) found evidence of a relationship between growth in the Hispanic population and conservative political ideology, but among non-Hispanic racial minorities. Thus, our study is the first to highlight the association between perceived Latino threat mechanisms and Whites' voter preferences when these perceptions took center-stage during the 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries and election. Given Trump's focus on Latinos as being "bad hombres" and "rapists," one might speculate that perceived criminal threat was a driving force behind voter preference for Trump. Our findings, however, suggest that support for Trump and for punitive crime and border control policies was not driven

by a fear of Latino crime, but by a fear of losing an economic advantage to an increasing Latino population (either because Latinos are perceived to be directly competing for jobs, or overrelying on welfare to the detriment of White resources). Thus, our study suggests that the dimensions of perceived Latino threat are distinct, and the type of threat that is elicited may have unique implications for qualitatively different outcomes (e.g., voter preferences), which is an avenue not yet explored in minority threat research.

Our study was among the first to incorporate personality constructs into minority threat research. Specifically, we found that individuals who scored higher in narcissism and social dominance orientation reported increased perceptions of Latino threat, suggesting that Whites who hold a hierarchical view of society, wherein they consider themselves as superior, are more prone to perceiving Latinos as threatening to their power, status, and/or safety. Personality is a key factor in Blalock's (1967) conceptual model detailing how minority population size elicits threat which in turn facilitates prejudice and discrimination; thus, future research should continue to explore the role of personality in minority threat research, focusing specifically on whether personality differences affect individual susceptibility to minority threats.

This study is not without limitations. First, we recognize the weaknesses associated with using a student sample, namely the lack of generalizability to a nationally representative sample. However, the development of a more comprehensive measure of perceived Latino threat is warranted to facilitate an analysis of its psychometric properties, and subsequently increase the reliability and validity of these core concepts; as such, the use of a college sample to test and validate this proposed scale was essential

in measurement development. Furthermore, we sampled college students currently enrolled in criminal justice courses among both online and in-person, graduate and undergraduate students, who came from over 130 counties across 35 states in each study. Thus, the samples were not limited to individuals residing within the vicinity of the university (only about 40%), but rather were diverse in terms of geographic location. Nevertheless, future research should extend this work by testing the validity and reliability of the PLTS using a sample more representative of the general population.

Second, the testing of the PLTS was limited to threats elicited by a singular ethnic group, and thus questions surrounding its generalizability to other groups may arise. Indeed, while the PLTS was validated as a scale measuring threats posed by Latinos, each dimension of threat was intended to be general in nature and applicable to other groups. We posit, however, that while indicators of these threats could be applied to other groups, the types of threats that are most salient in influencing different outcomes may vary across groups. In particular, while economic threat for Latinos demonstrated the strongest associations with external criteria and thus accounted for the largest proportion of variance explained in such outcomes as border control, different findings may emerge when examining Whites' perceptions of threat posed by African Americans, for example. Given that race is often viewed synonymously with crime, especially in communities with a high percentage of African Americans (e.g., Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997), we might expect perceived criminal threat from African Americans to be a larger driving force influencing such outcomes as criminal justice sanctioning. Indeed, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) find that African Americans are perceived to largely pose threats to the

physical safety of Whites, which results in feelings of fear and anxiety, whereas Mexican Americans evoke threats to reciprocity, prompting greater anger/resentment and disgust. These findings suggest that different groups pose qualitatively different threats that prompt unique affective reactions. Future research should test the generalizability of the PLTS across groups and explore the unique dimensions of threat that may be more applicable to one group versus another, potentially resulting in distinct outcomes.

Third, our measure of perceived Latino threat was by no means exhaustive of all forms of threat discussed in the literature. Cultural threat, for example, represents perceptions of immigrants as compromising the social fabric of America by undermining the country's predominant "White" cultural identity (Zárate & Shaw, 2010; Zárate et al., 2012). Cultural threat perceptions have shown to be associated with punitive attitudes about border control (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016) and prejudice against Mexican immigrants (Zárate & Shaw, 2010; Zárate et al., 2012). Thus, future research should work to incorporate other relevant dimensions of Latino threat, and continue to refine, develop, and test the PLTS.

In conclusion, our study represents the only of its kind to examine White Americans' perceptions of Latinos during two significant, politically-turbulent times in modern American history: the 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries and the week leading up to the 2016 election. Therefore, it provides a rare opportunity to assess Latino threat perceptions when these perceptions were especially salient for voter decision-making and attitudes toward punitive crime and border control policies. Our findings also support the idea that Trump's political rhetoric surrounding undocumented

immigrants, particularly Latinos, and the accompanying economic threats they posed, may have fueled support for his candidacy and his anti-immigrant policies. As such, the PLTS shows promise as a valid and reliable multidimensional scale of perceived Latino threat, not only for the advancement of group threat research, but also for understanding its implications for large-scale collective outcomes that have far-reaching effects for the livelihood of Latinos in this country.

CHAPTER 3

PERCEIVED LATINO THREAT AND PUNITIVE BORDER CONTROL SENTIMENT

Introduction

Americans' attitudes toward immigration have become more positive over the last few years. Several recent reports have shown that a majority of Americans believe that immigrants strengthen the country, are "hard-working", have strong family values, and are good for America (National Immigration Forum, 2019). Furthermore, the percentage of Americans who wish to see a decrease in immigration levels is at its lowest point since 1965 (Norman, 2019), with only 40 percent of Americans supporting the expansion of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border (Gramlich, 2019). Despite this overall positive trend in immigration attitudes, the topic of immigration is still a highly contentious and politically divisive topic in American society (National Immigration Forum, 2019). Indeed, positive immigration attitudes are largely reserved for Americans who identify as more liberal in their political affiliation; Americans who identify as politically conservative more often report that immigration is a big problem in this country, and subsequently support more restrictive immigration policies, such as building a border wall and increased deportations (Daniller, 2019; Gramlich, 2019). Thus, while it seems that Americans are generally not in favor of decreasing immigration (National Immigration Forum, 2019) or expanding the wall along the U.S.-Mexico border (Gramlich, 2019), there remains a large portion of the American public who still favor restrictive immigration policies in this country.

Some scholars have argued that support for immigration control is not so much reflective of a desire to safeguard national security, but instead is a guise for the control of the Latino population, in general, regardless of immigrant status (Hartman et al., 2014). Indeed, according to the Pew Research Center, immigrants from Latin American countries make up over 50 percent of the immigrant population (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019) and 47 percent of the unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. (Krogstad, Passel, & Cohn, 2019). Immigration, in general, has brought about a rapid change in the racial and ethnic landscape in this country, but Latino growth has outpaced many other minority groups (Flores, Lopez, & Krogstad, 2019; Krogstad, 2017). In particular, as of 2018, Latinos accounted for 18 percent of the U.S. population and over half of all population growth in the U.S. between 2008 and 2018 (Flores, Lopez, & Krogstad, 2019). Therefore, Latino growth is a central “part of the nation’s overall demographic story” (Flores, Lopez, & Krogstad, 2019) and as such, some Americans may view the immigration problem as just one component of the larger “Hispanicization of America” problem (Pickett, 2016, p 125).

Following this logic, support for immigration control may actually be a veiled expression of anti-Latino prejudice intended to control the growth of the Latino population, and the threats posed by this group as a whole (Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016). Notably, a small body of research has tested the effects of ethnic context on immigration attitudes, finding that large or increasing Latino populations elicit more anti-immigrant policy preferences¹⁷ (Ayers et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2016; Ha, 2010;

¹⁷ That said, some research has reported null effects of Latino context on immigration preferences (Hood & Morris, 1997; 2000).

Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Unfortunately, this research is complicated by the heterogeneous nature of the Latino community in terms of nativity, making it difficult to discern whether immigrant-based or ethnicity-based threats drive the association between Latino context and anti-immigrant sentiment. In other words, it is difficult to distinguish whether Latino context is associated with immigration attitudes only insofar as Latinos are viewed synonymously with a foreign-born status, and thus linked to broader immigrant-based threats; or whether support for punitive immigration control is a guise for the control of Latino growth, as a means to neutralizing ethnicity-based threats.

Notably, some research has shown that the effects of ethnic context do vary depending on the segment of the Latino population being studied (i.e., foreign-born versus native-born Latinos), but the findings are mixed. For example, Rocha and colleagues (2011) find that only native-born Latino population context influences immigration attitudes, whereas Rocha and Espino (2009) find that foreign-born Latino population size matters more in influencing support for anti-immigrant preferences. Thus, while research finds support for immigration as an ethnicity-based issue (Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016), studies disentangling whether these sentiments are largely a reaction to Latinos as a group, regardless of immigrant status, is still inconclusive.

The lack of clarity surrounding the relationship between ethnic context and support for immigration control is, in part, due to weaknesses in the operationalization of key mechanisms in the threat-control process. Indeed, Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective has been used to explain how these population dynamics might give rise to

minority group control responses. Blalock (1967) argues that the desire to mobilize social control resources against minorities is in direct response to perceived threats elicited by an increasing minority population size. Thus, perceived minority threat is the intervening mechanism linking ethnic context to control outcomes. However, the intervening threat mechanisms that facilitate this causal link have rarely been tested¹⁸ (Campbell et al., 2006; Ha, 2010; Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Therefore, we still know relatively little about whether immigrant-based or ethnicity-based threats underlie the relationship between Latino context and immigration attitudes, and consequently, whether support for punitive immigration control is merely a guise to limit Latino population growth.

Altogether, there is an emerging body of research that supports the link between ethnic context and immigration policy preferences, suggesting an ethnic overlay to the immigration issue (Hartman et al., 2014; Lu & Nicholson-Crotty, 2010). The question that remains is whether perceptions of Latino threat can inform our understanding of the relationship between ethnic context and immigration preferences. Against this backdrop, the current study extends prior research by (1) testing whether Latino population context is associated with punitive border control sentiment; (2) investigating whether Latino threat perceptions influence punitive border control sentiment; (3) examining how Latino threat perceptions might explain the effect of Latino context on punitiveness; and (4)

¹⁸ Only two studies to date (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016) have incorporated direct, individual-level measures of perceived minority threat to test how macro-and micro-level threat process inform immigration policy preferences. While these studies find support for Blalock's (1967) conceptual model in predicting anti-immigrant preferences, they focus on threats posed by undocumented immigrants in general, without reference to ethnicity-specific threats.

assessing how the effect of Latino threat perceptions on punitiveness might be amplified in more threatening contexts (i.e., counties with a large Latino population size and a greater Latino population growth, and among respondents who perceive a larger share of the Latino population to be undocumented immigrants).

Background

Immigration as an “Ethnicity-Coded Issue”

Over the past half century, we have witnessed a significant demographic change in the U.S. where Latinos have become the largest minority group (Flores, 2017). Indeed, the Latino population has reached an all-time high as nearly 58 million Latinos reside in the U.S. (Flores, 2017), now accounting for 18% of the population (Flores, Lopez, & Krogstad, 2019). Latinos are considered the second fastest growing minority group in the U.S. (Flores, 2017), wherein Latino population growth alone has accounted for half of all the population growth in this country since 2000 (Flores, 2017). Importantly, much of this growth can be attributed to high rates of immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Despite recent decreases in illegal immigration from Mexico (Passel & Cohn, 2019), about 34 percent of Latinos in the U.S. are still foreign-born residents (Flores, 2017). Thus, in light of the influx of Latino immigrants into the U.S. and the subsequent ethnic diversification of the American landscape, Latinos have been at the center of the immigration debate. Certainly, issues of Latino population growth and immigration are highly conflated. Oftentimes when immigration control is discussed in public discourse, it is discussed as a response to managing the threats posed by

immigrants of Latin descent, which has led some scholars to question the role that anti-Latino prejudice might play in immigration policy preferences (Hartman et al., 2014).

Anti-immigrant sentiments directed at immigrants of Latin descent have been particularly salient in the rhetoric of President Donald Trump. During his campaign, President Trump propagated stereotypical messages about the criminality of Latino immigrants, referring to Mexicans, in particular, as “bad hombres” and “rapists”. Some argue Trump may have gained voter support for his presidency and, by extension, support for his restrictive immigration policies through the dissemination of this Latino threat narrative (Newman, Shah, & Collingwood, 2018). Indeed, a handful of studies have shown that antipathy toward Latinos is a key antecedent of immigration attitudes (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Hartman et al., 2014; Lu & Nicholson-Crotty, 2010; Valentino et al., 2013). For example, Lu and Nicholson-Crotty (2010) find that negative Hispanic stereotypes heighten fears about the economy, job loss, increases in crime, and changes in the racial and ethnic makeup of the country in response to immigration. Furthermore, Valentino et al. (2013) find that the more whites favor their own group over Latinos, the more negative their beliefs are about immigration and the more they support restrictive immigration policies. The effect of ethnocentrism on immigration preferences, however, is only significant when ingroup feelings are evaluated relative to Latinos as the outgroup; the effect was not significant when whites evaluated their feelings about African Americans or Asians. Thus, the authors conclude that “attitudes about Latinos dominate the contemporary immigrant schema in the minds of White Americans,” and as a result, “[w]hen whites think of immigration, they think of Latinos” (p.155).

Similarly, Hartman and colleagues (2014) question the “race-neutrality” claims of proponents of harsh immigration policies and the role that ethnic prejudice plays in support for anti-immigration preferences. Specifically, Hartman et al. (2014) assessed whether concerns about immigration are rooted in “ethnicity-based biases” (p. 148), wherein certain transgressions (i.e., residing and working in the U.S. illegally, not paying taxes, and rejecting American culture) are seen as more of a threat when committed by Latino immigrants. The authors find that white Americans perceive transgressions posed by Latinos immigrants as more threatening than those by non-Latino immigrants, and transgressions committed by Latino immigrants significantly increase respondents’ support for restrictive immigrant policy preferences (i.e., building a border fence and increased deportation). Hartman et al. (2014) subsequently conclude that support for general immigration policy preferences may conceal “a ‘hidden’ ethnicity-based group bias in public reactions to immigrants” wherein “prejudice is hidden under the surface because it is coded into the race-neutral language of concern over the threatening behavior of immigrants” (p. 161). Thus, support for immigration control may be a veiled expression of anti-Latino prejudice (Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016).

Altogether, extant research suggests the immigration debate may not be fueled by race-neutral, immigrant threats elicited by a broad foreign-born population, but rather is a reaction to the threats posed by Latinos. In light of the immense ethnic diversification of the American landscape due to Latino immigration over the past half century, the issue of immigration control may be viewed as just one facet of the broader diversity problem (Pickett, 2016). As such, support for harsh immigration policies may be a product of

perceived threats posed by Latinos, and consequently, reflective of a desire to control Latino growth as a whole, regardless of immigrant status. This possibility, however, has not been fully tested.

Minority Threat Perspective and its Application to Immigration Control

Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective can be used to explain how Latino context informs punitive immigration attitudes. Blalock (1967) argues that racial discrimination is a product of perceived threats to dominant group position in response to an increasing minority population. These threat perceptions largely encompass threats to the economic and political power of the white majority. More recent research incorporated criminal threat as a third salient threat dimension due to conflation of race and deviance (Chiricos, McEntire & Gertz 2001). Together, perceived minority threats (economic, political, and criminal) are hypothesized to link minority population context to discriminatory outcomes.

While originally developed to explain racial discrimination, the tenets of the minority threat perspective have increasingly been applied to explain the social control of minority groups via public support for governmental and criminal justice controls (Chiricos et al., 2014; King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016). Indeed, an emerging body of research has examined the relationship between ethnic context and public views on anti-immigrant controls, finding that respondents residing in areas with a larger Latino population are more likely to hold restrictive attitudes about immigration (Campbell et al., 2006; Ha, 2010; Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Extant research, however, is complicated by the heterogeneity unique to the Latino population,

which is often comprised of both foreign-born and native-born Latino groups. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to discern whether immigration attitudes are largely a reaction to Latinos as a group, due to an underlying anti-Latino prejudice (Hartman et al., 2014), or a reaction to their presumed foreign-born status (Chavez, 2013). If the former is true, then we would expect immigration attitudes to be largely influenced by Latino threat perceptions; if it is the latter, then Latino ethnicity functions merely as a proxy for immigrant status, and immigration attitudes are a response to a general immigrant threat schema elicited by all foreign-born groups.

Some scholars have attempted to disentangle the threat processes influencing immigration attitudes by focusing on how the effects of Latino context can vary by the segment of the Latino population being studied, such as foreign-born versus native-born Latinos (Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). This research, however, has produced inconsistent findings. For example, Rocha and Espino (2009) find that whites are more likely to believe that there are too many immigrants coming into the U.S. when they reside in highly segregated areas with a large Spanish-speaking, foreign-born Latino population. Latino population context did not matter, however, when predicting anti-immigrant sentiment for respondents residing in areas with a large English-speaking, U.S.-born Latino population (regardless of residential segregation). Thus, threats elicited by a foreign-born population appear to predominate the formation of anti-immigration attitudes. Alternatively, Rocha et al. (2011) report that whites' support for the construction of a border fence is influenced by the size of the native-Latino population, not the foreign-born Latino population size, further concluding that support for

immigration control may be driven more by ethnicity-based concerns about a growing Latino population (and the accompanying threats they pose) than broad immigration concerns rooted in threats posed by foreign-born populations in general. Together, Rocha and colleagues (2009, 2011) present an unclear picture regarding the processes underlying the link between ethnic context and immigration attitudes, which is largely due to the methodological weaknesses of these and other studies testing this relationship. In particular, extant research predominantly relies on Latino population size as a proxy for perceived threat (Campbell et al., 2006; Ha, 2010; Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011) and thus can only make assumptions regarding the individual-level threat processes facilitating this link. Doing so makes it difficult to effectively distinguish whether ethnic threats or immigrant threats are the impetus for the mobilization of punitive immigrant sentiment in areas with large Latino populations.

The Mechanism of Perceived Threat

Only a handful of studies to date have incorporated direct measures of perceived minority threat when testing the macro-micro level threat processes hypothesized by Blalock (1967), and these studies have found support for both perceived Latino and immigrant threats (Chiricos et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al. 2016). For instance, Chiricos et al. (2014) and Stupi et al. (2016) report that perceived cultural, economic, and criminal threats posed by undocumented immigrants surface as stronger predictors of anti-immigrant policy preferences than Latino context, and these perceived threats also partially mediate the effects of Latino context on border control preferences. In other words, respondents perceiving undocumented immigrants as a threat to national identity

and as endangering the economic welfare and safety of Americans are more likely to support a number of harsh immigration controls, including heightened border protection and limiting access to such opportunities as obtaining a driver's license and welfare assistance for undocumented immigrants. Thus, perceived undocumented immigrant threats, irrespective of ethnicity, increase anti-immigrant preferences.

Pickett (2016) alternatively argues that focusing on undocumented immigrant threats without reference to ethnicity is too narrow of a conceptualization of the perceived threat mechanisms hypothesized to influence immigration attitudes, especially if support for anti-immigrant preferences might be a guise to control Latino population growth (Hartman et al., 2014). To address this oversight, Pickett (2016) examines how perceptions of Latino threat influence support for the expansion of certain police powers that have the potential to result in the discriminatory treatment of Latinos. His findings suggest that whites' perceptions of economic and political threats elicited by Latinos increase support for more aggressive policing tactics, especially police profiling, which may lead to the detection and arrest of undocumented Latino immigrants, and simultaneously serve the goal of thwarting the perceived "Hispanicization of America" (Pickett, 2016, p. 125). Thus, it is the "ethnicity-coded" nature of the immigration issue that facilitates support for crimmigration as a tool for the control of the Latino population in general (Pickett, 2016, p. 104).

Altogether, previous studies examining the effects of ethnic context on immigration attitudes largely suggest an ethnic overlay to the immigration issue (Campbell et al., 2006; Ha, 2010; 2011; Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016; Rocha &

Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Although these studies have significantly advanced scholarship, they either solely focus on macro-level threat processes (Campbell et al., 2006; Ha, 2010; 2011; Rocha & Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011), have too narrow of a focus on the conceptualization of perceived threat mechanisms (i.e., testing undocumented immigrant threat without reference to racial or ethnic threats; Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016), or focus on an outcome that is immigration control adjacent (i.e., police profiling of Latinos; Pickett, 2016). Consequently, we still know relatively little about whether anti-immigrant sentiments are largely a reaction to threats posed by a growing Latino population in general due to an underlying anti-Latino prejudice. If so, this would suggest that support for punitive immigration controls may be less about a desire to secure borders to insulate citizens from general foreign-born threats (i.e., threats posed by all immigrants), but more about using punitive border control measures as a vehicle to neutralize ethnicity-based threats associated with an increasing Latino population. No study to date has tested whether perceived Latino threat can inform the relationship between Latino population context and immigration attitudes, which is the focus of the present study.

Hypotheses

Building on the minority threat perspective and extant research, the current study develops a series of hypotheses about the effects of Latino population context on punitive attitudes about border control. In particular, prior studies have focused on aggregate-level indicators of Latino threat (Latino context) using static and/or dynamic measures of Latino population size (e.g., Rocha et al., 2011). Further, scholars have also argued that

population dynamics are salient predictors of social control *only if* respondents are aware of and concerned about the actual minority population size (Chiricos, Hogan, & Gertz, 1997; Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001). Therefore, individuals' desire for control may be less influenced by the actual presence of minorities in their communities than by *perceptions* of a large minority presence (Alba et al., 2005). Several studies have found that perceived, not objective, minority composition has consequences for individual perceptions and attitudes (e.g., Chiricos et al., 1997; Semyonov et al., 2004; Wang, 2012). That said, the first set of hypotheses investigates the direct effects of static, dynamic, and perceived Latino population context on punitive border control sentiment.

Hypothesis 1. Respondents who live in seemingly more threatening contexts will express more punitive border control sentiment than those in less threatening contexts.

Hypothesis 1(a). Respondents residing in counties with a larger Latino population size will express more punitive border control sentiment.

Hypothesis 1(b). Respondents residing in counties experiencing greater growth in the Latino population will express more punitive border control sentiment.

Hypothesis 1(c). Respondents perceiving a larger share of Latinos as being undocumented immigrants will express more punitive border control sentiment.

The next set of hypotheses assesses the effects of objective and perceptual Latino population size on perceived Latino threat. Indeed, Blalock (1967) posits that minority population size mobilizes discriminatory controls via its effects on threat perceptions. Thus, perceived threat is the hypothesized mechanism through which population dynamics influence social control outcomes; and as such, minority population size should

have a direct effect on elicited threat perceptions as described in the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2. Respondents who live in seemingly more threatening contexts will perceive Latinos to be more of a threat than those in less threatening contexts.

Hypothesis 2(a). Respondents residing in counties with a larger Latino population size will perceive Latinos to be more threatening.

Hypothesis 2(b). Respondents residing in counties experiencing greater growth in the Latino population will perceive Latinos to be more threatening.

Hypothesis 2(c). Respondents perceiving a larger share of Latinos as undocumented immigrants will perceive Latinos to be more threatening.

Further, derived from Blalock's (1967) argument that perceptions of threat may function as the mechanism through which population dynamics influence social control, the third set of hypotheses investigates if perceptions of Latino threat mediate the relationship between static, dynamic, and perceived Latino population context and punitive border control sentiment.

Hypothesis 3. The effect of objective and perceptual measures of Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment will be at least partially mediated by perceptions of Latino threat.

Hypothesis 3(a). The effect of county-level Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment will be at least partially mediated by perceptions of Latino threat.

Hypothesis 3(b). The effect of county-level changes in the Latino population on punitive border control sentiment will be at least partially mediated by perceptions of Latino threat.

Hypothesis 3(c). The effect of the perceived size of the undocumented Latino immigrant population on punitive border control sentiment will be at least partially mediated by perceptions of Latino threat.

The fourth and final set of hypotheses tests whether the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment is conditional on objective and perceptual measures of Latino population size. Scholars often highlight the salience of racial and ethnic context in influencing social control outcomes only insofar as they produce minority threat perceptions, after which point their effects are diminished (Blalock, 1967). However, given the highly conflated topics of Latino growth and immigration, Latino population dynamics may play a vital role in shaping immigration attitudes *in conjunction* with Latino threat perceptions. Indeed, respondents' perceptions of Latino threat may actually be amplified in more threatening contexts to produce harsher anti-immigration preferences. Therefore, the final set of hypotheses anticipates the moderating effect of Latino context on the relationship between perceived Latino threat and punitive border control sentiment.

Hypothesis 4. The effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment will be more pronounced in seemingly more threatening contexts.

Hypothesis 4(a). The effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment will be more pronounced in counties with a larger Latino population size.

Hypothesis 4(b). The effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment will be more pronounced in counties experiencing a greater increase in the Latino population.

Hypothesis 4(c). The effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment will be more pronounced among respondents perceiving a larger share of Latinos as undocumented immigrants.

Data and Methods

The data for this study were gathered through an online Qualtrics survey in November 2016. Participants included graduate and undergraduate students¹⁹ from a Southwestern university who were currently enrolled in criminal justice courses. Data collection initially yielded a sample of 463 students after screening for duplicate responses. Because the focus of the present study is to examine perceptions of Latino threat by the majority group, the final sample is restricted to 249 non-Hispanic Whites²⁰. The sample is predominantly female (65%), 28 years old on average, and reports an average annual household income between \$30,000 and \$34,999 (see Table 3.1 for descriptive statistics). About 80% of the sample is employed, 25% is married, and 59% reported identifying as politically conservative.

¹⁹ For both studies, online graduate students and a mix of both online and on-campus undergraduate students were recruited.

²⁰ After removing cases showing careless responding ($N = 3$), I used listwise deletion for missing data ($N = 8$; ~3% of the sample).

In addition to basic demographics, respondents were also asked to report a five-digit ZIP code²¹ used to collect county-level information for each respondent. Specifically, using respondents' zip codes, county-level²² data were extracted from the American Community Survey (ACS) administered by the U.S. Census Bureau to capture objective measures of Latino population context and relevant controls. Respondents reported residing in 118 counties across 38 states, with about 68% of individuals residing in the Southwest and Western regions of the United States, and about 57% residing in states along the U.S.-Mexico border. With the concentration of respondents residing in border states, this dataset provides an ideal sample for assessing support for immigration control among those with whom border issues are most relevant.

²¹ Respondents were asked to report their current zip code. Because college students likely experience a change in residence to attend school (and it is unlikely that they have lived in these areas long enough for them to influence their perceptions), respondents were also asked to report whether they moved to attend the university, and if so, what their most recent zip code was prior to moving. Therefore, the analysis uses respondents' current zip code unless they reported moving to attend college, at which point their most recent zip code was used to collect county location.

²² Respondents were asked to report whether they moved to attend school; however, this question did not stipulate whether they moved across countries, states, counties, or zip codes. That said, some students reported living in the zip code in which the campus is located but did not report that they moved to attend the university, when in all likelihood they had. This may be because the student relocated zip codes within the same county to live on or near campus but did not consider this as a "move". Thus, these students' zip-codes may not accurately represent the areas that are most relevant to influencing their perceptions, which would significantly attenuate the anticipated contextual effects of Latino context on punitiveness and perceived Latino threat. For that reason, the analysis relies on county-level data to ensure that the most reliable aggregate-level data are drawn from areas that are most salient in influencing respondents' perceptions.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics (N = 249)

	%/M	N/SD	Range	α
<u>Dependent Variable</u>				
Punitive border control sentiment	16.73	4.31	6 - 24	0.89
<u>Latino Threat</u>				
Perceived Latino Threat	40.26	10.66	20 - 78	0.95
<u>Latino Population Context</u>				
Percent Latino	22.72	13.95	0.9 - 62	
Percent Latino change	1.40	0.76	-0.2 - 3.9	
Perceived Latino undocumented	31.33	17.95	2 - 92	
<u>Control Variables</u>				
Age	27.69	9.73	18 - 62	
Male	35.34%	88		
Married	25.30%	63		
Household income	12.33	5.42	1 - 18	
Employed	80.32%	200		
Politically conservative	58.64%	146		
Ethnic typification of violent crime	30.74	15.44	3 - 85	
Percent black	6.44	7.28	0.3 - 59.3	
Percent black change	0.29	0.64	-1.8 - 5.6	
Perceived black undocumented	11.62	12.17	0 - 97	
Percent unemployed	4.51	1.04	1.9 - 9	

Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation.

Dependent Variable

Following prior literature (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016), *punitive border control sentiment* measures respondents' level of agreement with six suggested ways of dealing with immigration in the U.S.: "1) Increased manpower for border patrol; 2) The use of military personnel to patrol the border; 3) Digging ditches in high entry areas to discourage crossing the border in a vehicle; 4) Constructing fences in high entry

areas to discourage crossing the border on foot; 5) Erecting a wall along the border; and 6) Increased electronic surveillance for monitoring the border.” Responses were coded so that higher scores indicate stronger agreement with each statement (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”). These six items were summed to create a single index of punitive border control sentiment ($\alpha = .93$), with higher scores reflective of higher levels of punitiveness.

Independent Variables

Perceived Latino Threat

Perceived Latino threat is measured using the 20-item Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) derived from and validated in prior literature (see Infante, Wang, & Pardini, 2019). Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they personally agreed (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”) on a number of statements about Hispanics²³ tapping four theoretically interrelated dimensions—economic threat (e.g., “Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others.”), political threat (e.g., “There are too many Hispanics running for public office.”), criminal threat (e.g., “The Hispanic crime rate is a serious problem.”), and opportunity threat (e.g., “Hispanics are more likely to get accepted in colleges because of their ethnicity.”). Items were

²³ Respondents were advised throughout the duration of the survey that Hispanics include individuals whose ancestry can be traced back to Mexico, Central America, or South America. I recognize that this distinction does not include Hispanics whose ancestry can be tracked to Puerto Rico or Cuba. That said, I anticipate that when asked about Hispanics, the majority of respondents likely elicited perceptions of Hispanics of Mexican descent because almost 70% of the respondents come from the Southwest and Western regions of the U.S. where they share the most contact with Hispanics of Mexican descent (Pew Research Center, 2014).

summed to represent a single index of perceived Latino threat ($\alpha = .95$), with higher scores reflecting higher levels of perceived threat.

Objective and Perceptual Measures of Latino Population Context

This study incorporates two objective measures of Latino population context. *Percent Latino*, a static measure of Latino population size, is operationalized as the county-level percentage of Hispanics in the population in 2016 as reported by the 5-year estimates of the ACS. Given the increasing emphasis on the dynamic measures of minority population size as more accurately capturing Blalock's (1967) depiction of group threat processes (Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Feldmeyer et al., 2015), this study includes a dynamic measure, *percent Latino change*, operationalized as the change in the county-level Hispanic population from 2010 to 2016 using the 2010 and 2016 5-year ACS estimates²⁴.

In addition, this study also examines whether the perceived size of the Latino population as undocumented immigrants mobilizes greater punitive border control sentiment. *Perceived Latino undocumented*, a perceptual measure of Latino context, is measured by responses to the following question: "What percentage of Hispanics currently living in this country would you say are living here illegally?". This measure captures respondents' perceptions of the percentage of Latinos residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants, and in turn, to what degree respondents associate Latinos as

²⁴ The 5-year ACS pooled estimates were used instead of the single-year ACS estimates for all contextual variables because the 5-year pooled estimates may be more reliable due to the pooled nature of the estimates over five time points. Further, single-year ACS estimates are only available for counties with larger than 65,000 residents, which results in missing data for counties with smaller populations (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d). Thus, the 5-year estimates provide more precise estimates across all counties, small and large.

synonymous with undocumented immigrants. On average, respondents reported that they perceived about 31% of the Latino population residing in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants. It is worth noting that respondents were asked about the Latino population perceived to be undocumented immigrants in the U.S. and not their respective communities. Since individuals tend to report perceptions that are reflective of their views of their local communities (Seymonov et al., 2004), their perception of undocumented Latino immigration in the U.S. might be largely influenced by these community perceptions (Alba et al., 2005; Wang, 2012).

Control Variables

Several demographic indicators are also included in the analysis as controls, namely *age* (in years), *male* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), *married* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), *employed* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), as well as their annual *household income* (1 = “Under \$3,000” to 18 = “Over \$90,000”). An indicator of political affiliation is included to indicate whether the respondent identified as *politically conservative* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”). Furthermore, a measure assessing the *ethnic typification of violent crime* is included that reflects respondents’ perceptions of the percentage of people who commit violent crime that are Hispanic (see Chiricos et al., 2004; Welch et al., 2011). On average, respondents reported that they perceived about 31 percent of violent criminals to be Latino.

The analysis also includes a series of relevant county-level controls. Similar to the Latino population context, this study also includes controls for objective and perceptual black population size. *Percent black* is operationalized as the county-level percentage of

blacks in the population in 2016 as reported by the 5-year 2016 ACS estimates. *Percent black change* is calculated by taking the difference between the 2016 and 2010 black population as reported by the 2016 and 2010 5-year estimates of the ACS. *Perceived black undocumented* is a perceptual measure capturing the percentage of blacks that respondents perceive to be undocumented immigrants. Specifically, this question asks respondents: “What percentage of African Americans currently living in this country would you say are living here illegally?”. Finally, following prior research, a measure of *percent unemployed* was included in the analysis (King & Wheelock, 2007; Quillian, 1995; Wang, 2012). This measure captures the county-level percentage of the civilian population, 16 years and older, that is unemployed in 2016 as reported by the 5-year 2016 estimates of the ACS.

Analytic Strategy

Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, I estimate a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test hypotheses 1 through 4. It is important to note that the data contain 249 respondents nested in 118 counties in the U.S. Most counties (92 percent) contain only one or two respondents and only six counties have three or more. Thus, the use of multilevel modeling may not be appropriate. Instead, to help correct for correlated error terms and provide the least biased estimates, I estimate a series of OLS regression models, with robust standard errors clustered at the county level, to assess the direct effects of objective and perceived Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment (Rogers, 1993).

Accordingly, the analysis proceeds in five stages. First, I assess the bivariate correlations between all of the study variables (see Table 3.2). Second, I investigate hypothesis 1 by assessing the effects of objective and perceptual Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment (see Table 3.3). Third, I examine hypothesis 2 by investigating how objective and perceptual Latino population size influence perceptions of Latino threat (see Table 3.4). Fourth, once establishing that perceived Latino threat is heightened in presumably more threatening contexts, as I would anticipate given Blalock's (1967) positions, the analysis moves on to test the mediating effect of perceived Latino threat (hypothesis 3). Specifically, I assess whether perceived Latino threat mediates the effects of objective and perceptual Latino population size on punitiveness (see Table 3.5). Finally, I test whether the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment is moderated by objective and perceptual Latino population size (hypothesis 4). In other words, I investigate whether the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment is stronger in contexts considered more threatening (i.e., larger Latino population size, greater change in the Latino population, and greater perceptions of Latinos as undocumented immigrants; see Table 3.6). Overall, it is worth noting that each hypothesis is comprised of three sub-hypotheses; therefore, each table presented in the analysis contains four models. Models 1 through 3 focus on the effects of the key independent variables on punitive border control sentiment, while Model 4 represents the comprehensive model testing the overarching hypothesis wherein all key measures are included.

Results

I begin the analysis by assessing the bivariate correlations between all of the study variables. Review of Table 3.2 indicates that perceived Latino threat has the strongest positive association with punitive border control sentiment ($r = 0.52, p < .001$), followed by political conservatism ($r = 0.47, p < .001$) and the perception that a larger share of Latinos are undocumented immigrants ($r = 0.37, p < .001$). Neither objective measure of Latino population context, however, is significantly associated with punitiveness or perceived Latino threat. On the other hand, respondents who perceive a larger share of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants are more likely to report greater perceptions of Latino threat ($r = 0.44, p < .001$), suggesting that Latino threat perceptions are, in part, associated with the perception of Latinos as undocumented immigrants.

Further, respondents residing in counties with larger Latino populations tend to perceive a smaller share of the Latino population to be undocumented immigrants ($r = -0.13, p < .05$) and a greater share of violent offenders to be Latinos ($r = 0.19, p < .01$). This could mean that respondents who live in counties with larger Latino populations may not associate Latinos with an undocumented immigrant status because they likely come into contact with the Latino population more frequently, and thus are not as prone to stereotyping Latinos as undocumented immigrants. These respondents, however, are still prone to typifying Latinos as violent, and thus are likely still susceptible to ethnic threat, but possibly not to undocumented immigrant Latino threat. Thus, it appears that objective measures of Latino population context may matter relatively less than perceptual measures of the percentage of Latinos believed to be undocumented immigrants and Latino threat in influencing punitive border control sentiment. Overall,

Table 3.2
Correlations between Study Variables (N = 249)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Punitive border control sentiment	-															
2. Perceived Latino threat	0.52***	-														
3. Percent Latino	-0.03	0.06	-													
4. Percent Latino change	-0.00	0.05	0.59***	-												
5. Perceived Latino undocumented	0.37***	0.44***	-0.13*	-0.03	-											
6. Age	0.21***	-0.01	-0.08	0.05	-0.03	-										
7. Male	0.21***	0.13*	-0.03	0.11+	-0.07	0.21**	-									
8. Married	0.19**	0.06	-0.11+	0.03	-0.07	0.58***	0.30***	-								
9. Employed	0.09	-0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.07	0.15*	0.03	0.13*	-							
10. Household income	0.08	0.01	-0.10	-0.02	-0.12+	0.40***	0.25***	0.43***	0.10	-						
11. Politically conservative	0.47***	0.32***	-0.00	0.06	0.12+	0.11+	0.16*	0.15*	0.12+	0.10	-					
12. Ethnic typification of violent crime	0.10	0.24***	0.19**	0.17**	0.22***	0.03	-0.09	0.05	0.06	-0.01	0.13*	-				
13. Percent black	0.06	-0.08	-0.18**	-0.07	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.11+	0.10	0.06	-0.05	-0.09	-			
14. Percent black change	-0.06	-0.08	-0.13*	-0.21***	-0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.15*	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.07	0.16*	-		
15. Perceived black undocumented	0.06	0.17**	-0.15*	-0.06	0.44***	-0.04	-0.08	-0.14*	-0.04	-0.11+	0.06	0.07	0.03	-0.03	-	
16. Percent unemployed	0.03	-0.01	0.49***	0.46***	-0.04	0.05	-0.08	-0.03	0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.08	0.26***	-0.21***	0.05	-

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$

these bivariate findings seem to support the notion that punitive border control policies may be rooted in more ethnicity-based concerns (Hartman et al., 2014).

Moving on to the OLS regression analyses, Table 3.3 reports estimates of the effects of objective and perceptual Latino population context on punitive border control sentiment, net of controls. Models 1 through 3 focus on the independent effects of Latino population context on punitiveness (testing hypotheses 1[a], 1[b], and 1[c]), while Model 4 represents the comprehensive model testing the overarching hypothesis 1 wherein all key measures are included. Two notable findings emerge. First, inspection of models 1 and 2 suggests that neither percent Latino nor changes in the Latino population are directly associated with punitive border control attitudes. Thus, objective measures of Latino population size do not demonstrate direct effects on punitiveness, and subsequently, hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b) are not supported. A second notable finding is that the perceived percentage of Latinos who are believed to be undocumented immigrants is significantly and positively associated with punitiveness (see Model 3). In other words, respondents are more supportive of punitive border control measures when they perceive a larger share of the Latino population to be undocumented immigrants. Thus, hypothesis 1(c) is supported. Overall, it appears that these findings only partially support hypothesis 1 and suggest that punitive border control sentiments are more influenced by the perception that a larger share of Latinos are undocumented immigrants as opposed to the actual representation of Latinos within respondents' respective counties.

To test hypothesis 2, which suggests that respondents report higher perceptions of Latino threat when they reside in presumably more threatening contexts (i.e., larger

Table 3.3
OLS Regression of Punitive Border Control Sentiment on Static, Dynamic, and Perceived Latino Population Size (N = 249)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent Latino	-0.01 (0.02)			0.02 (0.03)
Percent Latino change		-0.19 (0.39)		-0.51 (0.46)
Perceived Latino undocumented			0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Percent black	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Percent black change	-0.24 (0.45)	-0.26 (0.45)	-0.23 (0.43)	-0.29 (0.42)
Perceived black undocumented	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05+ (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Percent unemployed	-0.02 (0.28)	0.01 (0.26)	0.07 (0.19)	0.08 (0.23)
Age	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Male	1.10* (0.50)	1.06* (0.48)	1.14** (0.43)	1.03* (0.41)
Married	0.18 (0.66)	0.21 (0.67)	0.23 (0.71)	0.32 (0.75)
Employed	0.08 (0.59)	0.06 (0.59)	0.37 (0.66)	0.31 (0.62)
Household income	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Politically conservative	3.76*** (0.51)	3.77*** (0.51)	3.47*** (0.38)	3.51*** (0.38)
Ethnic typification of violent crime	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Constant	12.23*** (1.16)	12.24*** (1.18)	9.80*** (1.08)	9.83*** (1.07)
R ²	0.27	0.27	0.39	0.40

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$

Latino population, greater changes in the Latino population, and greater perceptions of Latino as undocumented immigrants), I regress perceived Latino threat on objective and perceptual measures of Latino context and the findings are presented in Table 3.4. Here again, Models 1 through 3 test the independent effects of objective and perceptual Latino population context on perceived Latino threat, and Model 4 is a comprehensive model with all key variables included to observe how the contextual measures perform net of each other. Review of models 1 and 2 indicates that contrary to hypothesis 2(a) and 2(b), the objective measures of Latino population context are not significantly related to perceptions of Latino threat. However, the perception that a large percentage of Latinos are undocumented immigrants is significantly and positively related to perceptions of Latino threat. Thus, consistent with hypothesis 2(c), perceiving more Latinos as undocumented immigrants is associated with higher levels of perceived Latino threat.

It is also interesting to note that the more respondents perceive blacks to be undocumented immigrants, the higher the levels of perceived Latino threat (see models 1 and 2), but only until the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population is included in the analysis (see Model 3). This could suggest that a general bias exists surrounding the perceived undocumented status of all racial groups that is associated with higher levels of perceived Latino threat, but it is the threat elicited by Latinos perceived to be undocumented immigrants, in particular, that drives this effect. Furthermore, percent Latino reaches statistical significance in Model 4 when controlling for changes in the Latino population and the perceived percentage of the Latino population that is undocumented. However, the perceived undocumented immigrant

Table 3.4
OLS Regression of Perceived Latino Threat on Static, Dynamic, and Perceived Latino Population Size (N = 249)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent Latino	0.05 (0.05)			0.11+ (0.06)
Percent Latino change		0.24 (0.86)		-0.99 (0.89)
Perceived Latino undocumented			0.24*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Percent black	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)
Percent black change	-0.64 (1.23)	-0.59 (1.29)	-0.59 (1.20)	-0.75 (1.14)
Perceived black undocumented	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)
Percent unemployed	-0.54 (0.66)	-0.21 (0.66)	0.18 (0.52)	-0.33 (0.60)
Age	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Male	2.54+ (1.35)	2.69* (1.35)	2.79* (1.09)	2.42* (1.09)
Married	1.31 (1.78)	1.21 (1.80)	1.34 (1.56)	1.61 (1.58)
Employed	-1.93 (1.49)	-1.79 (1.46)	-1.04 (1.28)	-1.31 (1.32)
Household income	-0.01 (0.16)	-0.02 (0.17)	0.05 (0.15)	0.07 (0.14)
Politically conservative	5.97*** (1.31)	5.89*** (1.33)	5.16** (1.63)	5.31** (1.61)
Ethnic typification of violent crime	0.14** (0.05)	0.14** (0.04)	0.09+ (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Constant	35.24*** (3.48)	34.88*** (3.52)	28.75*** (3.64)	29.21*** (3.53)
R ²	0.19	0.19	0.31	0.32

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$

status of the Latino population remains a much more robust predictor of perceived Latino threat ($\beta = .42, p < .001$) than Latino population size ($\beta = .15, p < .10$). Overall, these findings only partially support hypothesis 2 and suggest that Latino threat perceptions are elicited more by the perception that a large proportion of Latinos are undocumented immigrants than by their actual presence in the population.

To this point, I have assessed the direct effects of objective and perceptual Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment and perceived Latino threat. These first two steps have laid the groundwork for the remaining steps of the analysis which seek to explicate the relationship between Latino population context and perceived Latino threat in predicting punitive border control attitudes. More specifically, it remains less known about whether perceived Latino threat mediates the effects of Latino population context on punitiveness or whether Latino threat perceptions are amplified in more threatening contexts to produce punitive border control sentiment. Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit the theorized mediating and moderating effects described above and it is to these relationships that the analysis turns to next.

Table 3.5 assesses whether perceived Latino threat mediates the effects of objective and perceptual measures of Latino population size on punitive border control sentiment. Models 1 through 3 test the mediating effect of perceived Latino threat on the relationship between objective and perceptual measures of Latino context and punitive border control sentiment independently, while Model 4 provides a comprehensive assessment of the mediating effects of perceived Latino threat on both objective and perceptual measures of Latino context. That said, given that percent Latino and changes

Table 3.5
OLS Regression of Punitive Border Control Sentiment Testing the Mediating Effect of Perceived Latino Threat on Static, Dynamic, and Perceived Latino Population Size (N = 249)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent Latino	-0.01 (0.02)			0.01 (0.02)
Percent Latino change		-0.23 (0.36)		-0.37 (0.43)
Perceived Latino undocumented			0.06*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)
Percent black	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Percent black change	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.31)	-0.15 (0.33)	-0.19 (0.32)
Perceived black undocumented	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)	-0.05+ (0.02)
Percent unemployed	0.08 (0.26)	0.05 (0.23)	0.04 (0.18)	0.13 (0.23)
Age	0.08** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Male	0.65 (0.42)	0.59 (0.42)	0.76+ (0.40)	0.70+ (0.38)
Married	-0.05 (0.53)	0.00 (0.54)	0.05 (0.60)	0.10 (0.64)
Employed	0.42 (0.58)	0.37 (0.59)	0.51 (0.65)	0.49 (0.60)
Household income	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Politically conservative	2.71*** (0.47)	2.74*** (0.46)	2.77*** (0.37)	2.79*** (0.37)
Ethnic typification of violent crime	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Perceived Latino threat	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.02)
Constant	6.02*** (1.25)	6.12*** (1.30)	5.90*** (1.31)	5.89*** (1.26)
R ²	0.43	0.43	0.47	0.47

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$

in the Latino population did not demonstrate significant effects on punitive border control attitudes, there is no need to assess whether perceived Latino threat mediates these effects; nevertheless, I still run models 1 and 2 which include the objective measures of Latino context and perceived Latino threat. Thus, hypotheses 3(a) and 3(b) are not supported. In Model 3, however, the effect of the perception of more Latinos as undocumented immigrants is attenuated by perceived Latino threat, which is supportive of hypothesis 3(c). More specifically, perceptions of Latino threat mediate about 33 percent (standardized coefficients: $[(.40 - .27)/.40]$) of the effect of the perceived size of the undocumented Latino immigrant population on punitive border control sentiment. Indeed, when perceptions of Latino threat are included in the analysis in Model 4, these perceptions surface as the most robust predictor of punitiveness ($\beta = .33, p < .001$), surpassing the standardized effect of perceptions of Latinos as undocumented immigrants ($\beta = .27, p < .001$). Overall, I find that the perception that a larger share of Latinos are undocumented immigrants gives rise to more punitive border control sentiment, and this relationship is partly explained by perceiving Latinos, as a group, as threatening. Thus, I find partial support for hypothesis 3.

As noted above, another prediction involves the moderating effects of Latino population context on the relationship between perceived Latino threat and punitive border control sentiment. I test hypothesis 4—that is, the effect of Latino threat perceptions on punitiveness would be amplified when respondents reside in presumably more threatening contexts (i.e., larger Latino population size, greater changes in the Latino population, and perception of a larger share of Latinos as undocumented

immigrants), and present the results in Table 3.6. Similarly, models 1 through 3 assess the moderating effects of objective and perceptual Latino context on perceived Latino threat, while Model 4 includes all key moderators to provide a comprehensive test of hypothesis 4. Inspection of Models 1 and 2 show that the relationship between perceived Latino threat and punitiveness is not moderated by Latino population size or changes in the Latino population; therefore, hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b) are not supported. In Model 3, however, Latino threat perceptions are moderated by the perception of more Latinos as undocumented immigrants. To facilitate the interpretation of this moderating effect, I plot the predicted values of punitive border control sentiment across perceived Latino threat at three different levels of perceived size of the Latino population as undocumented immigrants (see Figure 3.1)²⁵. Inspection of this figure shows that perceived Latino threat is positively related to punitive border control sentiment overall, and this relationship is amplified for those respondents who perceive a relatively low percentage of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants. This interaction suggests that when respondents perceive a larger percentage of Latinos as undocumented immigrants, there may be somewhat of a “ceiling effect” created in influencing punitive attitudes (Chiricos, Welch, & Gertz, 2004). In other words, perceiving Latinos as synonymous with an undocumented immigrant status may be such a strong predictor of punitive border control sentiment that for those who are high on this perception, there is less of an opportunity for their punitiveness to be influenced by perceptions of Latino threat. Overall, I do not find support for hypothesis 4.

²⁵ Perceptions of Latinos as undocumented immigrants is graphed at its mean (31%), 1 standard deviation above the mean (49%), and 1 standard below (13%).

Table 3.6
OLS Regression of Punitive Border Control Sentiment Testing the Moderating Effect of Static, Dynamic, and Perceived Latino Population Size on Perceived Latino Threat (N = 249)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Percent Latino	0.03 (0.06)			0.06 (0.07)
Percent Latino change		0.06 (0.88)		-0.83 (1.07)
Perceived Latino undocumented			0.14** (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)
Percent black	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Percent black change	-0.10 (0.31)	-0.15 (0.32)	-0.17 (0.32)	-0.19 (0.31)
Perceived black undocumented	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05+ (0.02)	-0.05+ (0.03)
Percent unemployed	0.10 (0.26)	0.06 (0.24)	0.04 (0.18)	0.13 (0.24)
Age	0.08** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)
Male	0.66 (0.42)	0.60 (0.42)	0.86* (0.43)	0.79+ (0.41)
Married	-0.07 (0.53)	0.01 (0.54)	0.14 (0.57)	0.17 (0.62)
Employed	0.40 (0.59)	0.37 (0.58)	0.47 (0.68)	0.43 (0.64)
Household income	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Politically conservative	2.73*** (0.46)	2.74*** (0.46)	2.71*** (0.37)	2.76*** (0.37)
Ethnic typification of violent crime	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Perceived Latino threat	0.21*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)
Percent Latino X Perceived Latino threat	-0.00 (0.00)			-0.00 (0.00)
Percent Latino change X Perceived Latino threat		-0.01 (0.02)		0.01 (0.03)
Perceived Latino undocumented X Perceived Latino threat			-0.00+ (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	4.70* (2.19)	5.66* (2.19)	3.98+ (2.03)	3.33 (2.34)
R ²	0.43	0.43	0.48	0.48

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$




Fig. 3.1 Predicted values of punitive border control sentiment across perceived Latino threat at three different levels of perceived Latino context

Discussion and Conclusion

According to a recent Gallup poll, 27 percent of Americans mentioned immigration as the most important problem facing the U.S. today (Jones, 2019). This is an unprecedented statistic for this topic, with only five other issues having exceeded 27 percent of mentions in the past 20 years, including issues related to the economy, unemployment, the situation in Iraq, terrorism, and the government (Jones, 2019). Importantly, immigration is a key concern for Americans, especially as we enter a presidential election year. Indeed, the topic of immigration has become increasingly more politically divisive as of late (Daniller, 2019; National Immigration Forum, 2019). While views on immigration have become more positive (National Immigration Forum, 2019),

there still exists a large portion of the public who holds restrictive views on immigration control (Gramlich, 2019). As such, it is both timely and relevant to assess the antecedents of harsh immigration preferences.

Notably, when support for punitive immigration policy is discussed in public rhetoric, it is often discussed in the context of managing threats posed by Latino immigrants (Chavez, 2013). Indeed, Latinos make up over 50 percent of the country's immigrant population (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019) and almost half of all undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. (Krogstad, Passel, & Cohn, 2019). Furthermore, Latino immigration over the past half century has resulted in significant demographic changes in the racial and ethnic makeup of this country (Flores, Lopez, & Krogstad, 2019) and as such, Latinos have been placed at the forefront of the immigration debate. Given the highly conflated topics of Latino growth and immigration, some have argued that immigration control might just be a veiled expression of anti-Latino prejudice (Hartman et al., 2014; Lu & Nicholson-Crotty, 2010), wherein immigration is seen as just one tool to combat the larger "Hispanicization of America" problem (Pickett, 2016, p. 125). Research in this area, however, is underdeveloped and we still know relatively little about the role that ethnicity plays in immigration attitudes.

The present study builds on past scholarship by testing the relationships between Latino population context, perceptions of Latino threat, and punitive border control sentiment. The main findings of the study can be summarized as follows. First, the objective measures of Latino population context were not significantly associated with punitive border control sentiment or perceptions of Latino threat; however, the perceptual

measure of Latino context (i.e., perceptions of Latinos as undocumented immigrants) was significantly associated with punitiveness and Latino threat perceptions. Second, perceptions of Latino threat surfaced as the most robust predictor of punitive border control sentiment, net of the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population, objective Latino population context, and political conservatism. Third, perceptions of Latino threat only partially mediated the effects of perceived Latino undocumented status on punitiveness. Fourth, the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitiveness is strongest among respondents who perceive a smaller share of the Latino population to be undocumented immigrants.

Before discussing the implications of this research, three important findings warrant further elaboration. First, it seems that perceived Latino context is more important than objective Latino context in understanding support for immigration controls and Latino threat perceptions. Respondents who perceive a larger share of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants were more likely to support harsh immigration preferences and to perceive Latinos as more threatening, regardless of the actual size and dynamics of the Latino population in their communities. This adds to a body of mixed findings on the effects of Latino population size on immigration preferences (see Chiricos et al., 2014). This finding also suggests actual minority population size matters only to the extent that respondents are aware of these population dynamics; otherwise, it is the perception of the minority population size that matters most in influencing perceived minority threat and punitive attitudes (Alba et al., 2005; Chiricos et al., 1997; Chiricos et al., 2001; Wang, 2012).

Second, findings from this study largely support the notion advanced by Pickett (2016) and others that “immigration is an ethnicity-coded issue” (p.104; Hartman et al., 2014). Perceptions of Latino threat significantly increased support for punitive border control sentiment, net of Latino population context, the perception of Latinos as undocumented immigrants, the ethnic typification of violent crime, and political conservatism. This study is among only a handful to incorporate a direct, individual-level measure of perceived minority threat. Indeed, a majority of studies rely on aggregate-level proxies for perceived threat, with only three studies providing a full test of Blalock’s (1967) threat-control model to date (Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016; Pickett, 2016).

Third, contrary to Blalock’s (1967) threat hypothesis, there is little evidence of a mediating effect of perceived Latino threat on the relationship between Latino context and punitive border control sentiment. Instead, I find that the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitiveness is conditional on levels of perceived Latino context. Specifically, the findings from this study provide evidence of a ceiling effect that suggests perceived Latino threat may matter less for those who are more punitive when it comes to immigration control. In particular, those who already maintain high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (i.e., those who perceived a majority of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants) are less susceptible to the influence of perceived Latino threat in shaping their punitiveness; and thus perceived Latino threat matters more among respondents who do not already hold extremely punitive views regarding immigration. This finding is consistent with a handful of other studies documenting ceiling effects that suggest that

perceived minority threat matters more in influencing punitive attitudes among those who are less punitive generally (Chiricos et al., 2001, Pickett et al., 2012; Welch et al., 2011). Indeed, minority threat research has shown that the expression of threat can differ by the context (e.g., living in the south) and groups (e.g., blacks, those who are less prejudiced, etc.) being studied. In particular, Chiricos et al. (2004) find that the effect of the racial typification of crime (i.e., a proxy for racial threat) on punitiveness is only significant for whites who are less prejudiced, live outside of the south, and who are less concerned about crime. They argue that for respondents who are already “high” on these antecedents of punitiveness (i.e., southerners, more prejudiced, and those who exhibit greater crime concern), there is less of an opportunity for the perceptions of racial threat to further influence their levels of punitive sentiment. Welch et al.’s (2011) findings mimic those of Chiricos et al. (2004) in that the Hispanic typification of crime matters more in influencing punitive attitudes among respondents who are characteristically less punitive (i.e., those who are less racially prejudiced, less fearful of victimization, less likely to criminally stereotype blacks, etc.). Together with these findings, the results of the present study suggest that perceived threat matters more in influencing punitive outcomes among respondents who are more susceptible to threats because they are typically less punitive in general. In particular, when respondents perceive Latinos as being synonymous with an undocumented immigrant status, they are already highly punitive when it comes to immigration control; and thus, their support for punitive border control is less susceptible to the influence of ethnicity-based threats.

Accordingly, the finding from this study have the potential to shed light on the threat mechanisms underlying the relationship between Latino context and punitiveness. Research has been inconclusive with regard to whether general immigrant-based threats or ethnic-based threats matter more in influencing anti-immigrant preferences (Rocha and Espino, 2009; Rocha et al., 2011). Due to the heterogeneous nature of the Latino population given its close association to immigration, it is difficult to discern whether anti-immigrant sentiment is largely a reaction to Latinos, as a group, or immigrants in general, regardless of race or ethnicity. The findings of this study support both contentions, but to varying degrees. Certainly, while my findings advance the notion that immigration control is an “ethnicity-coded issue” (Pickett, 2016, p. 104), they might also reveal variation in these effects depending on levels of perceived immigrant threat. Specifically, if we consider the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population as a proxy for perceived immigrant threat, the results can be interpreted somewhat differently to shed light on the threat-control process. In particular, when the perception of immigrant threat is already high (i.e., when respondents perceive Latinos to be largely undocumented immigrants), it is less likely that further cognitive demands (i.e., thinking about the threats posed by Latino as a group in general) can worsen the effects of that threat on punitiveness. Stated differently, individuals who are already highly punitive likely do not factor general ethnicity-based concerns into their support for harsh immigration control because their punitiveness is likely driven by a general immigrant threat schema and bias against immigrants, without reference to race or ethnicity. As such, when the perception of Latinos as undocumented immigrants is high,

a more generalized immigrant threat may take over in influencing punitiveness, regardless of threats posed by Latinos. Accordingly, this finding suggests that perhaps individuals who harbor anti-immigrant bias may not effectively differentiate their bias toward specific racial and ethnic groups, and consequently, Latino threat perceptions play little role in shaping their punitive immigration policy preferences. Alternatively, when respondents perceive fewer Latinos to be undocumented immigrants, there is more room for the expression of ethnic threat in influencing punitive border control sentiment. This could be because these respondents likely do not harbor a general anti-immigrant bias, and as such there is more room for anti-Latino bias, in particular, to influence their punitive immigration preferences. Therefore, perceptions of Latino threat may inform punitive border control preferences, but only under the condition that respondents do not view Latinos as synonymous with an undocumented immigrant status. It is under this condition that immigration is more of an ethnicity-based concern, and support for punitive border control is likely a response to the desire to control Latinos in general, regardless of immigration status.

In conclusion, I found that perceptions of Latino threat influenced immigration control attitudes, and these perceptions were not influenced by the size of or changes in the actual Latino population. Instead, these perceptions were conditional on the lens through which Latinos are predominantly viewed (as undocumented immigrants or not). Overall, these findings only partially support Blalock's (1967) threat hypothesis as it applies to Latinos. Future research should work to continue to explicate the unique effects of immigrant and Latino threats on support for anti-immigrant policies to discern whether

immigrant-based or ethnicity-based threats predominantly influence these attitudes among a general sample. This study relied on data from a college sample, and thus, the generalizability of these findings to the broader population is unknown. Despite this, the sample represents a unique examination into the attitudes of respondents residing predominantly in the southwest and western regions of the U.S. wherein immigration, particularly Latino immigration, is an especially salient issue. Nevertheless, this study is among only a handful to provide a full test of Blalock's (1967) threat-control model and elucidate the perceived minority threat processes underlying the relationship between ethnic context and punitive immigration attitudes. The findings from this study largely advance the idea that "immigration is an ethnicity-coded issue" (Hartman et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016, p. 104), where topics of immigration and ethnic diversification seem to be highly conflated. Consequently, support for immigration control may be a reflection of the desire to neutralize perceived Latino threats by limiting Latino population growth in the U.S. via strict border controls.

CHAPTER 4
ON THE STRUCTURAL INVARIANCE AND DISTINCTNESS OF TWO
PERCEIVED MINORITY THREAT SCALES

Introduction

Herbert Blumer (1958) first advanced the idea that racial prejudice is largely a reaction to how groups evaluate their position in the racial hierarchy relative to one another. This reaction is guided by several group-based feelings, including fear and suspicion concerning perceived threats to dominant group status. Indeed, in his minority threat perspective, Blalock (1967) argues that an increasing minority population size may elicit perceived economic and political threats that endanger the racial hegemony of whites. Specifically, in areas with an increasing minority presence, whites are more likely to perceive an increase in competition over jobs and other coveted economic resources from minorities as well as threats to the representation of white interests in politics. In light of the conflation of race and deviance, some scholars have posited that a large minority population size is also associated with concerns about crime and the physical safety of whites, known as criminal threat (e.g., Chiricos et al., 2001). Altogether, economic, political, and criminal threat perceptions are hypothesized to be the theoretical crux of the minority threat thesis, which argues that increases in minority population size may elicit perceived minority threats, and in turn, give rise to discriminatory responses to maintain white privilege and advantage (Blalock, 1967).

While originally developed to explain racial discrimination, Blalock's tenets have increasingly been applied to explain the use of the criminal justice system as a tool for

minority group control (Liska, 1992). Certainly, there is a large body of research that has tested the link between racial and ethnic context to expanded criminal justice controls, including increases in police expenditures, arrests, sentence length, and incarceration decisions (e.g., Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Parker & Stults, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b), as well as increases in public support for punitiveness (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003). This research, however, suffers from a key weakness—that is, the lack of empirical attention to the psychometric properties of perceived threat. Specifically, prior studies testing minority threat effects have largely relied on racial and ethnic composition as a proxy for perceived minority threat (e.g., see Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b). As a result, a large share of existing research merely documents macro-level associations between indicators of minority population size and social control outcomes, *assuming* that the micro-level perceived threat mechanisms facilitate this link (e.g. see Eitle, D’Allesio, & Stolzenberg, 2002; Quillian, 1995; Stolzenberg, D’Allesio, & Eitle, 2004). However, without adequate attention to the intervening mechanism of perceived threat, Stults and Baumer (2007) argue, “the theoretical meaning of the effect of racial context on crime control is ambiguous and, perhaps more important, some of the empirical support attributed to the minority threat hypothesis may be unwarranted” (p. 508-509).

Notably, only one study to date has provided a comprehensive test of the psychometric properties of perceived threat, finding support for the validity of perceived threat as a multidimensional construct encompassing multiple bases of threat (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat; Infante et al., 2019). Although

insightful, this study focuses solely on the validation of a Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS), thus the generalizability of this scale to other minority groups (e.g., blacks) remains unknown. Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to address this gap in literature by: (1) testing the structural invariance of perceived minority threat across different eliciting minority groups (i.e., blacks and Latinos); (2) assessing the construct validity of the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS); and (3) examining whether the PLTS and PBTS are distinct constructs that have unique implications for their respective minority groups.

Measuring Perceived Threat: Current Limitations

Research testing micro-level indicators of perceived minority threat is still in its nascent stages. No standard measure of perceived threat exists in minority threat research, and as such, scholars have operationalized threat differently across studies. For example, some studies employ a single-item measure of black and Latino economic threat (e.g., “African Americans/Latinos take away resources that should go to others, like jobs and welfare”; see King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016), while others have developed a multi-item measure of economic threat, but narrowly focused on threats posed by undocumented immigrants, irrespective of race or ethnicity (e.g., “Illegal immigrants bring needed skills to this country”; see Chiricos et al., 2014). Moreover, studies have predominantly focused on one to two dimensions of threat at a time (Chiricos et al., 2014; King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016; Wang, 2012), impeding a comprehensive evaluation of the multiple bases of threat emphasized in minority threat literature (i.e., economic, political, and criminal threat). Overall, these inconsistencies in

the measurement and testing of perceived threat mechanisms have led to concerns regarding the reliability and validity of existing threat measures and have consequently raised questions surrounding the empirical validity of minority threat premises (Stults & Baumer, 2007).

In an effort to address some of these limitations, Infante, Wang, and Pardini (2019) developed and analyzed a 20-item Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) across two studies. Their findings showed that a bifactor model wherein the PLTS was comprised of four dimensions (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat) provided the best fit for the data. Their construct validation of the PLTS further supported the multidimensionality of perceived threat in that higher levels of perceived Latino threat in general were associated with a number of key criteria, such as being politically conservative, voting for Donald Trump, and stereotyping crime as being largely committed by Latinos; however, the individual dimensions of threat also maintained unique associations with external criteria. In sum, the authors concluded that the PLTS was a valid, multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat encompassing four distinct dimensions of threat.

Certainly, Infante et al.'s (2019) study improved our understanding of the psychometric properties of perceived minority threat. Although it has significantly advanced scholarship, a number of important issues in measurement development still remain. In particular, it remains unknown whether measures of perceived threat are psychometrically sound across different eliciting minority groups (i.e., blacks and Latinos). This is an important oversight given that a large share of minority threat

research has focused on the social control outcomes associated with threats posed by blacks and Latinos, yet this research has merely assumed that the threat processes are the same across different minority groups. Extant research has yet to assess whether the factor structure of perceived threat is actually consistent across perceived Latino and perceived black threat constructs. If perceived threat measures function differently across racial and ethnic groups (i.e., have different factor structures), and these group differences are not accounted for in the measurement of threat constructs, then any comparison of threat effects across eliciting minority groups may not be valid.

Furthermore, existing research has often approached the measurement and empirical assessment of threats posed by different groups as separate constructs (i.e., Latino threat, immigrant threat, black threat) without evaluating whether respondents can effectively differentiate threats posed by different groups (Chiricos et al., 2014; King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016). If respondents perceive all minority groups as threatening, then perceived black and Latino threats may not be distinct, but rather represent the same general minority threat construct. Thus, an assessment of perceived black and Latino threat scales as separate constructs is warranted to determine that they are distinct and demonstrate unique associations with different outcomes.

Invariance of Perceived Threat

Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective was originally developed to explain black-white relations, which has led scholars to question whether this perspective can explain the control outcomes of groups other than blacks. Indeed, some studies have reported mixed findings with regard to the effects of ethnic threat on social control

outcomes, suggesting that Latino threat may not function in the same way as black threat due to differences in how these groups are perceived (e.g., see Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010a). Given their unique cultural and physical distinctiveness from whites (Dixon, 2006), blacks have an unrivaled history of racial oppression and discrimination in this country that no other racial or ethnic group can match. Some have argued that Latinos may actually be insulated from this racial animus because they have ascended the racial hierarchy and are viewed as “honorary whites” (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Dixon, 2006). As Dixon (2006) notes, “Shades of whiteness bring privileges to a minority group, including limited ascendancy in the racial hierarchy” and with it “comes less [perceived] threat from the dominant group” (Dixon, 2006, p. 2185). Because Latinos are perceived as less physically distinct and more culturally assimilated, they may be viewed as less threatening to whites than are blacks (Dixon, 2006).

Consequently, differences in how minority groups are perceived might account for differences in black and ethnic threat effects. However, research documenting differences in threat effects across different minority groups does not employ direct measures of perceived black and Latino threats (Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010a). This lack of attention to the measurement of perceived threat impedes the possibility of distinguishing whether differences in the effects of ethnic and racial threat are due to real group differences in how threats operate across these groups, or whether these differences reflect inadequacies in the measurement of threat constructs across groups. Accordingly, in order to provide a

more precise comparison of levels of perceived threat elicited by different minority groups and effectively evaluate whether different minority threats have differential effects on social control outcomes, it is imperative to establish that the items measuring perceived threat operate similarly across “threatening” groups (i.e., the factor structure is invariant across groups). If threat items behave similarly between black and Latino threat constructs and differences in their effects on social control outcomes persist, then we can more definitively state that these differences are attributable to true group differences in threat effects.

In addition to establishing that the factor structures of perceived threat measures are invariant across minority groups (i.e., demonstrating structural invariance), it is equally important to determine whether respondents can effectively distinguish threats posed by different minority groups in the first place. Indeed, scholars can establish that perceived black and Latino threat constructs share similar factor structures and maintain associations with similar criteria. However, the question remains as to whether these constructs represent distinct constructs with unique implications for their respective race- and ethnicity-specific outcomes. Notably, researchers frequently assess indicators of perceived black, Latino, and immigrant threat as separate constructs (Chiricos et al., 2014, King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016; Wang, 2012) while assuming that these represent distinct types of threat that respondents can differentiate. Instead, respondents may actually group all minorities into a single “threatening” category, and threats posed by blacks and Latinos may represent the same underlying general minority threat construct. If respondents cannot effectively differentiate unique

threats posed by different groups, then there is little utility in developing separate measures of perceived threat for different minorities. Thus, not only is it imperative to test the structural invariance of perceived threat measures, but it is also important to assess if black and Latino threats are, in fact, distinct constructs with unique implications for their respective minority groups. A test of the structural invariance and distinctness of perceived black and Latino threat constructs will inform researchers on how to approach the measurement and empirical assessment of perceived threat mechanisms moving forward.

Present Research

In light of the aforementioned research gaps in minority threat literature, the present study seeks to test the structural invariance and distinctness of two perceived minority threat scales—that is, the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS) and the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). Guided by prior literature, the analysis will be organized according to the following five research hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: A four-bifactor model of the PBTS will provide the best fit for the data, thereby indicating that the factor structure of perceived minority threat is invariant across different minority groups (i.e., blacks and Latinos).

Hypothesis 2: The PBTS will demonstrate good internal consistency and unique associations with relevant external criteria in theoretically expected directions, thus supporting the reliability and construct validity of the scale.

Hypothesis 3: A correlated two-factor model for each threat dimension (i.e., economic, political, criminal, opportunity) will fit the data better than a single factor model, suggesting that the PLTS and PBTS are distinct constructs.

Hypothesis 4: The PBTS will demonstrate unique associations with race-based criteria (e.g., racial prejudice and the racial typification of crime) but will not be associated with ethnicity-based criteria (i.e., ethnic prejudice, ethnic typification of crime, and the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population) after controlling for the PLTS; thereby supporting the discriminant validity of the PBTS.

Hypothesis 5: The PLTS will demonstrate unique associations with ethnicity-based criteria (e.g., ethnic prejudice, the ethnic typification of crime, and the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population) but will not be associated with race-based criteria (i.e., racial prejudice and the racial typification of crime) after controlling for the PBTS; thereby supporting the discriminant validity of the PLTS.

Method

Participants

To assess the psychometric properties of the perceived minority threat scales, graduate and undergraduate students who were currently enrolled in criminal justice courses at a Southwestern university were administered an online Qualtrics survey in November 2016. Data collection initially yielded 463 valid surveys after screening for

duplicate responses²⁶. Given that the focus of this study is on majority group perceptions of minority threat, the final sample is restricted to 260 non-Hispanic whites²⁷. The sample is about 28 years old on average, predominantly female (65%), employed (80%), and unmarried (73%), with an average annual household income between \$30,000 and \$34,999 (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics).

Measures

Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS). This 20-item scale was derived from the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) validated by Infante et al. (2019). Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed on the same 20 statements listed in the PLTS, except with African Americans as the target group (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”). Based on the findings of Infante and colleagues’ (2019) factor analysis of the PLTS, the PBTS is expected to theoretically tap four dimensions of threat: economic threat (5 items; e.g., “African Americans use more than their fair share of government services”), political threat (5 items; e.g., “There are too many African Americans running for public office”), criminal threat (7 items; e.g., “The African American crime rate is a serious problem”), and opportunity threat (3 items; e.g., “African Americans are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their race”).

Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). This is a validated 20-item scale drawn from prior literature (Infante et al., 2019). The measure consists of four dimensions—

²⁶ Sample sizes were determined based on the recommended ratio of observations to items needed to assess the reliability and validity of a new scale (DeVellis, 2016; Gorsuch, 1983). I aimed for 10 observations per item in the proposed scale ($N \geq 200$) (Nunnally, 1978, p. 276). G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that a sample size of $N = 84$ was needed to detect a moderate correlation ($r = .30$; $p < .05$; 80% power).

²⁷ Listwise deletion was used for missing data ($N = 1$).

Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics (N = 260)

	%/M	N/SD	Range	α
<u>Demographics</u>				
Age	27.70	9.64	18 - 62	
Male	35.38%	92		
Married	26.92%	70		
Graduate Student	32.31%	84		
Household Income	12.38	5.41	1 - 18	
Employed	80.00%	208		
<u>Perceived Black Threat Scale</u>				
Total Score	42.09	11.72	20 - 76	0.95
Economic Threat	10.64	3.80	5 - 20	0.94
Political Threat	8.62	2.67	5 - 19	0.85
Criminal Threat	15.54	4.70	7 - 28	0.90
Opportunity Threat	7.28	2.36	3 - 12	0.88
<u>Perceived Latino Threat Scale</u>				
Total Score	40.54	10.73	20 - 78	0.95
Economic Threat	10.54	3.58	5 - 20	0.94
Political Threat	8.75	2.53	5 - 18	0.85
Criminal Threat	14.14	4.04	7 - 28	0.90
Opportunity Threat	7.11	2.22	3 - 12	0.86
<u>Political Affiliation</u>				
Republican	45.00%	117		
Democrat	21.54%	56		
Independent	28.08%	73		
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	58.85%	153		
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>				
Trump	44.76%	94		
Clinton	28.57%	60		
Undecided	13.81%	29		
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>				
Agentic Extraversion	43.93	6.59	19 - 60	0.77
Antagonism	21.61	7.93	12 - 58	0.88
Cognitive Empathy	46.35	6.76	21 - 60	0.90
Affective Resonance	49.72	6.50	33 - 60	0.88
Social Dominance Orientation	21.34	9.05	8 - 51	0.84
Hostility	15.96	5.78	8 - 36	0.82
<u>Perceptions of Racial and Ethnic Minorities</u>				
Increase in Blacks Living Near Home	31.20%	81		
% All Crime Committed by Blacks	44.03%	18.13	4 - 95	
% Violent Crime Committed by Blacks	45.28%	17.67	5 - 98	
Increase in Hispanics Living Near Home	45.77%	119		
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	32.20%	15.68	5 - 89	

% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos ^b	30.70%	15.54	3 - 85	
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	32.06%	18.35	2 - 92	
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>				
Negative Attitudes Toward Blacks	12.00	3.35	7 - 22	0.86
Negative Attitudes Toward Latinos	12.77	3.49	7 - 27	0.87
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	18.61	5.29	8 - 32	0.86
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	16.69	4.31	6 - 24	0.89
Denial of Racial Privilege	26.13	6.65	7 - 42	0.80
Denial of Institutional Discrimination	25.73	7.11	7 - 42	0.82
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem	15.20	4.91	6 - 29	0.76
Belief in Social Responsibility	30.92	7.14	11 - 49	0.75

Note. *M* = Mean; *SD* = Standard deviation.

^aDescriptives for indicators of voter behavior were presented only for those reporting that they plan to vote in the 2016 election (*N* = 210).

^bOne case was deleted for missing data on this variable (*N* = 259).

economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat—wherein respondents were asked to report their agreement on the same 20 statements as the PBTS, but about Hispanics (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”), including “Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others”, “Hispanics are trying to dominate American politics”, “Too many Hispanics are committing crime”, and “Hispanics are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity”.

Validating Criteria

Similar to Infante et al. (2019), I include external criteria that should theoretically be associated with the PBTS to assess the construct validity of the scale (see Table 4.1).

Demographics. A number of demographic indicators were included, namely *age* (in years), a set of dummy variables indicating whether the respondent identified him or herself as being *male* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), *married* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), a *graduate student* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), or *employed* (1 = “Yes”, 0 = “No”), as well as his or her annual *household income* (1 = “Under \$3,000” to 18 = “Over \$90,000”).

Political affiliation. Indicators of political conservatism include whether the respondent identified him or herself as a *Republican*, *Democrat*, or *Independent* (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”), and as *politically conservative vs. liberal* (0 = “Liberal”, 1 = “Conservative”).

Voting intentions. Respondents were asked to report who they would vote for if the 2016 election were held that day, Donald Trump, Hilary Clinton, or undecided. Three dichotomous measures were created from this measure, including *Trump*, *Clinton*, and *Undecided* (0 = “No”, 1 = “Yes”).

Personality/disposition. Blalock (1967) originally emphasized the importance of certain personality traits as key moderators in the relationship between perceived threat and racial prejudice. Indeed, in their validation of the PLTS, Infante et al. (2019) report significant associations between several indicators of personality and perceived Latino threat. As such, here I anticipate similar associations between perceived black threat and personality measures, and incorporated five indicators of personality, including two measures of narcissism, two measures of empathy, a social dominance orientation measure, and a measure of hostility. First, I included *agentic extraversion* and *antagonism* which are derived from the Five-Factor Narcissism Inventory (FFNI) short form (Glover et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2016; Sherman et al., 2015). Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed on several statements intended to capture a narcissistic disposition (1 = “Disagree strongly” to 5 = “Agree strongly”). The agentic extraversion subscale is a 12-item summative scale ($\alpha = .77$) comprised of statements tapping the acclaim seeking, authoritativeness, and grandiose fantasies dimensions. The

antagonism subscale is a 12-item summative scale ($\alpha = .88$) comprised of items from the arrogance, entitlement, and exploitativeness dimensions. Second, I included two measures of empathy derived from the Affective and Cognitive Measure of Empathy (ACME) (Vachon & Lynam, 2016). *Cognitive empathy* is a 12-item subscale ($\alpha = .90$) asking respondents how much they agreed on several statements reflecting their skill at knowing what other people are feeling (e.g., “I can usually tell how people are feeling”; 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”). *Affective resonance* is a 12-item subscale ($\alpha = .88$) reflecting respondents’ agreement with several statements tapping their empathic concern and compassion for others (e.g., “I often try to help people feel better when they are upset”; 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree”). In addition to narcissism and empathy, I also incorporated an 8-item *social dominance orientation* scale ($\alpha = .84$) asking respondents how much they favored a number of ideas that denote a preference for a group-based hierarchy (e.g., “An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom”; 1 = “Strongly oppose” to 7 = “Strongly favor”) (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto et al., 1994). Lastly, a measure of *hostility* was included which is an 8-item subscale ($\alpha = .82$) from the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) asking respondents the extent to which they believed several statements described how they typically interacted with others (e.g., “Other people always seem to get the breaks” and “I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things”; 1 = “Not at all like me” to 5 = “Completely like me”).

Perceptions of Racial and Ethnic Minorities. Several measures were used to assess perceptions of both blacks and Latinos. Based on prior research emphasizing the

importance of perceptual-based measures of racial and ethnic context (Pickett et al., 2012; Wang, 2012), I included a perceptual measure of both racial and ethnic composition, *increase in blacks living near home* and *increase in Latinos living near home*. Respondents were asked to report how the African American and Hispanic population changed during the past five years in the neighborhood they lived for the longest time prior to moving out on their own. These measures were then dichotomized to indicate a perceived increase in blacks and Latinos living near home (0 = “Decreased/stayed the same”, 1 = “Increased”). I also included several measures of the racial and ethnic typification of crime and violent crime drawn from prior literature (Chiricos et al., 2004; Welch et al., 2011). *Percent crime committed by blacks* and *percent violent crime committed by blacks* asked respondents to report what percentage of people who commit crime and violent crime they perceived to be African Americans, while *percent crime committed by Latinos* and *percent violent crime committed by Latinos* asked respondents to report what percentage of people who commit crime and violent crime they perceived to be Hispanic. Lastly, *percent Latinos in U.S. illegally* asked respondents to report what percentage of Hispanics living in America they perceived to be residing here illegally.

Attitudes/beliefs. I included eight measures capturing different attitudes and beliefs. First, *negative attitudes toward blacks* ($\alpha = .86$) is a measure that was slightly modified from an existing scale of racial prejudice (Wagner et al., 2006). Respondents were asked how much they agreed on seven statements about African Americans (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”), including items such as “African

Americans enrich American culture” and “There are too many African Americans living in America”. I also incorporated a 7-item ethnicity-based scale of prejudice, *negative attitudes toward Latinos* ($\alpha = .87$), adapted from the same prejudice scale (Infante et al., 2019; Wagner et al., 2006). Second, two measures of punitive control attitudes derived from prior research were also included in the study (Chiricos et al., 2004; Stupi et al., 2016). Specifically, *attitudes favoring harsh criminal sanctions* ($\alpha = .86$) asked respondents to report how much they agreed on six recommended ways of dealing with crime in the United States (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”), including “Making sentences more severe for all crimes” and “Using more mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, like ‘Three Strikes’ for repeat offenders”. *Attitudes favoring heightened border protection* ($\alpha = .89$) was also included, which asked respondents to report the extent that they agreed on six suggested ways of dealing with undocumented immigration in the U.S. (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 4 = “Strongly agree”), including support for “Increased manpower for border patrol” and “Erecting a wall along the border”.

Third, I also included three dimensions of the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS; Neville et al., 2000). *Denial of racial privilege* is a 7-item subscale ($\alpha = .80$) asking respondents to report how much they agreed on several statements describing their level of awareness regarding white privilege in the U.S. (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 6 = “Strongly agree”). *Denial of institutional discrimination* is another 7-item subscale ($\alpha = .82$) asking respondents to report the extent to which they agreed on several statements regarding an unawareness of the ill-effects of institutional discrimination (1 = “Strongly

disagree” to 6 = “Strongly agree”). *Denial of racism as a social problem* is a 6-item subscale ($\alpha = .76$) asking respondents their level of agreement on statements capturing their awareness of the existence of racial issues in the U.S. (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 6 = “Strongly agree”). Lastly, I included a *belief in social responsibility* scale ($\alpha = .75$) tapping respondents’ agreement on the perceived social obligation to help those in need (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree”).

Data Analysis

The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, to test the structural invariance of the perceived minority threat scale (hypothesis 1) across different minority groups (i.e., blacks and Latinos), I estimated a series of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models using mean and variance adjusted weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimation in Mplus 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Specifically, the CFA was conducted to test and compare the goodness of fit for a single-factor, correlated four-factor, and a four-bifactor model of the PLTS and PBTS (as reported by Infante et al. [2019]; see Figure 4.1 in Appendix C). To identify the model with the best fit for the PLTS and PBTS, I relied on several fit indices, including comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). For CFI and TLI, good fit was determined using cut off values of .95 or greater, and .90 or greater to indicate acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RMSEA values less than .05 indicate good fit, while values between .05 and .10 indicate an acceptable fit (McDonald & Ho, 2002).

The second stage of the analysis examines the internal consistency and construct validity of the PBTS (hypothesis 2). I evaluated the internal consistency of the PBTS and

its subscale scores using Cronbach's alphas ($\alpha > .70$). To assess the construct validity of the PBTS, I estimated bivariate and partial correlations between the PBTS total and subscale scores and external criteria to assess whether the PBTS is associated with validating criteria in theoretically expected directions (see Infante et al., 2019).

The final stage of the analysis evaluates whether the PBTS and PLTS are distinct constructs. I began by estimating a series of CFA models for each threat dimension (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat) using WLSMV estimation. Specifically, I compared a single factor model to a correlated two-factor model using a corrected chi-square difference test (DIFFTEST procedure in Mplus 7.4; see Figure 4.2 in Appendix C). In particular, I evaluated whether a unidimensional model in which a general minority threat construct (i.e., not race- or ethnicity-specific) better explains item-level variance for each threat dimension, or whether the variance is best explained by a correlated two-factor model that allows item-level variance to be uniquely explained by the perceived black and perceived Latino threat constructs. I then examined the intercorrelations between the PBTS and PLTS total and subscale scores to assess the shared variance in the two constructs. Lastly, I estimated a series of partial correlations between the PBTS and external criteria, controlling for the PLTS total and respective subscale scores. I estimated the same set of partial correlations for the PLTS and external criteria, controlling for the PBTS total and subscale scores. Doing so allows me to determine whether the PBTS and PLTS maintain unique associations with criteria in theoretically anticipated directions.

Results

Structural Invariance

The fit statistics for a series of CFA models testing the factor structures for both the PBTS and PLTS are presented in Table 4.2. Results demonstrated that the single-factor model (Model 1) provided a relatively poor fit to the data for both scales. The fit improved in the correlated-four factor model (Model 2), supporting the multidimensionality of perceived minority threat. However, the four-bifactor model (Model 3) provided the best fit for the data for both the PBTS and PLTS, with the CFI and TLI indicating good fit and the RMSEA indicating acceptable fit. Therefore, the factor structure of perceived minority threat is invariant across eliciting minority group, consistent with hypothesis 1.

Table 4.3 presents the factor loadings for the bifactor models for the PBTS and PLTS for a side-by-side comparison of these models. Similar to the PLTS (shown in Table 4.3 and as reported by Infante et al. [2019]), the four-bifactor model for the PBTS demonstrated that the general black threat factor accounted for a greater proportion of item-level variance than the individual threat dimensions (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat). Indeed, all of the items demonstrated strong standardized factor loadings on the general threat factor (range = .58 - .89). However, some of the residual item-level variance was also accounted for by each domain-specific threat factor, suggesting that the individual threat dimensions of the PBTS are meaningful. These findings mirror that of the PLTS factor structure shown here and as found by Infante et al. (2019), further supporting the structural validity of the PBTS as

Table 4.2

Fit Indices Comparing Confirmatory Factor Models for the PBTS and PLTS (N = 260)

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	<i>p</i> -value
<u>PBTS</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	1830.950	170	0.907	0.896	0.194	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated four-factor	836.534	164	0.962	0.956	0.126	363.413	6	0.000
Model 3: Four-bifactor	538.512	150	0.978	0.972	0.100	-	-	-
<u>PLTS</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	1975.637	170	0.890	0.877	0.202	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated four-factor	853.506	164	0.958	0.951	0.127	468.514	6	0.000
Model 3: Four-bifactor	395.185	150	0.985	0.981	0.079	-	-	-

Note. CFI = Comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

Table 4.3
Bifactor Models for the PBTS and PLTS (N = 260)

Items	General		Economic		Political		Criminal		Opportunity	
	LT	BT	LT	BT	LT	BT	LT	BT	LT	BT
Hispanics/African Americans get too much help from government services.	0.88	0.89	0.38	0.36						
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for Hispanics/African Americans.	0.87	0.85	0.46	0.45						
Hispanics/African Americans use more than their fair share of government services.	0.82	0.88	0.44	0.39						
Hispanics/African Americans take away economic resources that should go to others.	0.84	0.81	0.28	0.24						
Welfare programs assisting Hispanics/African Americans hurt the economy.	0.79	0.82	0.34	0.35						
Hispanic/African American president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.	0.64	0.61			0.35	0.58				
There are too many Hispanics/African Americans running for public office (mayors, senators, governors).	0.71	0.68			0.62	0.64				
Hispanics/African Americans are taking more public offices than they need to.	0.66	0.72			0.74	0.58				
Hispanic/African American politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.	0.81	0.72			0.06	0.21				
Hispanics/African Americans are trying to dominate American politics.	0.68	0.68			0.50	0.48				
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of Hispanics/African Americans.	0.77	0.79					0.20	0.09		
Hispanics/African Americans pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.	0.87	0.88					-0.04	-0.04		
Hispanics/African Americans are more willing to break the law than whites.	0.87	0.85					-0.05	0.06		
Too many Hispanics/African Americans are committing crimes.	0.76	0.76					0.52	0.57		
Hispanics/African Americans don't care as much about public order compared to whites.	0.88	0.88					-0.20	-0.14		
When I see Hispanics/African Americans in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.	0.78	0.81					0.09	-0.09		
The Hispanic/African Americans crime rate is a serious problem.	0.62	0.63					0.46	0.55		
Hispanics/African Americans are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.	0.59	0.62							0.78	0.78
Hispanics/African Americans are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.	0.72	0.70							0.34	0.41
Hispanics/African Americans are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.	0.57	0.58							0.74	0.73

Note. LT = Latino Threat; BT = Black Threat. Entries are standardized factor loadings for two separate bifactor models for the PLTS and PBTS.

well as the structural invariance of perceived minority threat across racial and ethnic groups.

Internal Consistency and Construct Validity

The internal consistency of the PBTS scales is reported in Table 4.1. The Cronbach's alpha for the PBTS total score was .95. The internal consistency for each of the four subscales was .94, .85, .90, and .88 for economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threats, respectively. These reliability statistics are comparable to those of the PLTS (also shown in Table 4.1).

To establish the construct validity of the PBTS and its dimensions, I estimated bivariate and partial correlations between the total and subscale scores and external criteria²⁸ (see Table 4.1 for descriptive statistics for all criteria). As shown in Table 4.4, the PBTS total and subscale scores were significantly related to several criteria in theoretically expected directions. Namely, identifying as a male, a republican, politically conservative, and reporting the intention to vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 election were all significantly associated with higher levels of perceived black threat. Conversely, identifying as a democrat and reporting the intention to vote for Hillary Clinton were correlated with lower perceptions of black threat. Furthermore, increases in perceived

²⁸ All of the validating criteria used in this study were the same as those reported in the validation of the PLTS (Infante et al., 2019); the only exception is the use of indicators of racially-based measures of prejudice and the racial typification of crime (not ethnicity-based). Infante et al. (2019) also employed a measure assessing the perception of Latinos as undocumented immigrants, due to the conflation of ethnicity with an undocumented status (Chavez, 2013). Given that this is not a stereotype of the black population, a measure capturing the perceptions of blacks as undocumented immigrants was not included.

Table 4.4
Correlations between the PBTS Total and Subscale Scores and External Criteria ($N = 260$)

	Total Score	Economic	Political	Criminal	Opportunity
	r	r (pr)	r (pr)	r (pr)	r (pr)
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	0.09	0.09 (0.05)	0.13* (0.11)	0.04 (-0.09)	0.08 (0.04)
Male	0.20**	0.21** (0.14*)	0.15* (0.03)	0.13* (-0.11)	0.21** (0.12)
Married	0.14*	0.09 (-0.04)	0.14* (0.10)	0.09 (-0.04)	0.19** (0.17**)
Graduate Student	0.03	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (-0.01)	-0.02 (-0.10)	0.14* (0.17**)
Household Income	0.08	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.03)	0.00 (0.16*)	0.17** (0.17**)
Employed	0.01	0.06 (0.14*)	-0.01 (-0.03)	-0.02 (-0.09)	-0.01 (-0.04)
<u>Political Affiliation</u>					
Republican	0.30***	0.30*** (0.12)	0.27*** (0.09)	0.27*** (0.02)	0.18** (-0.01)
Democrat	-0.31***	-0.31*** (-0.14*)	-0.31*** (-0.17**)	-0.23*** (0.10)	-0.24*** (-0.08)
Independent	-0.03	-0.04 (0.00)	0.05 (0.12*)	-0.07 (-0.10)	-0.04 (-0.01)
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	0.28***	0.28*** (0.13*)	0.28*** (0.14*)	0.22*** (-0.07)	0.20** (0.05)
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>					
Trump	0.32***	0.32*** (0.14*)	0.30*** (0.13)	0.28*** (-0.01)	0.19** (-0.02)
Clinton	-0.34***	-0.30*** (-0.06)	-0.36*** (-0.21**)	-0.29*** (-0.02)	-0.20** (-0.01)
Undecided	-0.01	-0.05 (-0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (-0.00)
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>					
Agentic Extraversion	0.10	0.12* (0.09)	0.07 (-0.02)	0.09 (-0.01)	0.05 (-0.03)
Antagonism	0.33***	0.30*** (0.05)	0.33*** (0.16*)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.21** (0.02)
Cognitive Empathy	-0.18**	-0.16* (-0.03)	-0.23*** (-0.18**)	-0.14* (0.04)	-0.10 (0.00)
Affective Resonance	-0.31***	-0.31*** (-0.15*)	-0.33*** (-0.20**)	-0.23*** (0.11)	-0.21** (-0.05)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.57***	0.55*** (0.20**)	0.49*** (0.18**)	0.50*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.13*)
Hostility	0.11	0.05 (-0.10)	0.10 (0.05)	0.12* (0.11)	0.09 (0.04)
<u>Perceptions of African Americans</u>					
Increase in Blacks Living Near Home	0.05	0.04 (-0.01)	0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (-0.05)	0.04 (0.03)
% All Crime Committed by Blacks	0.34***	0.29*** (-0.01)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.38*** (0.23**)	0.18** (-0.05)
% Violent Crime Committed by Blacks	0.39***	0.35*** (0.03)	0.28*** (-0.01)	0.44*** (0.29**)	0.17** (-0.12*)
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>					
Negative Attitudes Toward Blacks	0.66***	0.63*** (0.25***)	0.62*** (0.32***)	0.59*** (0.09)	0.38*** (-0.04)
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	0.50***	0.51*** (0.27**)	0.44*** (0.18**)	0.41*** (-0.08)	0.34*** (0.06)
Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	0.55***	0.52*** (0.15*)	0.45*** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.10)	0.40*** (0.10)
Denial of Racial Privilege	0.34***	0.35*** (0.19**)	0.33*** (0.17**)	0.26*** (-0.11)	0.24*** (0.06)
Denial of Institutional Discrimination	0.60***	0.58*** (0.26**)	0.38*** (-0.03)	0.51*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.32**)
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem	0.54***	0.54*** (0.28**)	0.40*** (0.09)	0.44*** (-0.08)	0.47*** (0.23**)
Belief in Social Responsibility	-0.44***	-0.47*** (-0.27**)	-0.34*** (-0.06)	-0.36*** (0.08)	-0.35*** (-0.12)

Note. pr = partial correlation between the indicated threat subscale and the target variable after controlling for the other three subscales.

^aIndicators of voter behavior were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election ($N = 210$). *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

black threat were also associated with greater levels of narcissism (antagonism) and social dominance orientation, and lower levels of empathy (cognitive and affective). With regard to other race-based perceptual and attitudinal correlates, higher levels of perceived black threat were associated with increases in the racial typification of crime (violent and otherwise), negative attitudes toward blacks, and more favorable attitudes toward heightened crime and border control sanctions. A greater denial of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and racism as a social problem as well as a lower belief in social responsibility were also associated with increased perceptions of black threat.

Next, I examined the unique associations between each domain-specific threat factor and external criteria to validate the PBTS (see Infante et al., 2019). Specifically, I estimated a series of partial correlations to investigate the independent effects of each domain-specific threat factor on external criteria, net of the variance explained by the remaining three threat dimensions of the PBTS (see Table 4.4). The results show that each threat dimension maintains unique associations with validating criteria in expected directions. Economic threat, in particular, demonstrated the strongest, most consistent associations with external criteria. Higher perceptions of economic threat were associated with identifying as more politically conservative, greater voter support for Donald Trump, greater social dominance orientation, more negative attitudes about blacks, and more punitive attitudes about crime and border control sanctions. Greater color-blind racial attitudes (i.e., denial of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, and racism as a social problem) and a lower belief in social responsibility were also associated with increased perceptions of economic threat; while identifying as a democrat was negatively

associated with economic threat. In addition, I found that increased perceptions of political threat were associated with being more politically conservative, narcissistic, and social dominance oriented, and less empathetic. Higher levels of political threat were also associated with more negative attitudes toward blacks, more punitive attitudes about crime, and a greater denial of racial privilege. Being a democrat and reporting an intention to vote for Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, were associated with lower perceptions of political threat. Increased perceptions of criminal threat were associated with the racial typification of crime (violent or otherwise), and higher levels of opportunity threat were associated with indicators of socioeconomic status, including being a graduate student, having a higher household income, and being employed. Greater social dominance orientation and a greater denial of institutional discrimination and racism as a social problem were also significantly associated with increased opportunity threat perceptions. Overall, the findings support hypothesis 2 in that the PBTS total and subscale scores demonstrated good internal consistency and meaningful associations with external criteria in theoretically expected directions, thereby supporting the PBTS as a valid, multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat.

Distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS

To test whether the PBTS and PLTS are separate constructs (hypotheses 3), I estimated a series of CFA models for each dimension of threat (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat). Table 4.5 reports the fit indices for a single-factor model versus a correlated two-factor model. Review of Table 4.5 indicates that a

Table 4.5

Fit Indices for Each Dimension of Threat (N = 260)

	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	<i>p</i> -value
<u>Economic Threat</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	500.126	35	0.974	0.967	0.226	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated two-factor	103.367	34	0.996	0.995	0.089	91.196	1	0.000
<u>Political Threat</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	389.740	35	0.940	0.922	0.197	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated two-factor	330.385	34	0.950	0.933	0.183	43.128	1	0.000
<u>Criminal Threat</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	839.539	77	0.899	0.881	0.195	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated two-factor	571.606	76	0.934	0.921	0.158	71.752	1	0.000
<u>Opportunity Threat</u>								
Model 1: Single factor	167.020	9	0.982	0.971	0.260	-	-	-
Model 2: Correlated two-factor	102.228	8	0.989	0.980	0.213	43.777	1	0.000

Note: CFI = Comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.

correlated two-factor model provides the better fit for the data across all four dimensions of threat. This suggests that perceived black and perceived Latino threat constructs better account for item-level variance in each threat dimension than a unidimensional model in which the item-level variance can only be attributable to a general minority threat construct, irrespective of race- or ethnicity-specific threats. Thus, the findings of the CFA support hypothesis 3 that the PBTS and PLTS are distinct constructs.

The factor loadings for the correlated two-factor models for each threat subscale are reported in Table 4.6. For economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat dimensions, the PBTS and PLTS subscale scores were highly correlated (range: $r = .80 - .89$); however, the threat items demonstrated strong factor loadings on the perceived black and Latino threat subscales, further supporting the PBTS and PLTS as distinct constructs. Moreover, Table 4.7 presented the intercorrelations between the PBTS and PLTS total and subscale scores for each construct, and inspection of this table showed that these measures were highly correlated ($r \leq .79$). This suggests that a large portion of variance is likely shared across the perceived black and Latino threat measures, indicating that these constructs are interrelated. Nevertheless, while the PBTS and PLTS are highly interrelated, they could still represent distinct constructs with unique implications. Thus, to further assess the distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS, I tested the discriminant validity of each construct, which I turn to next.

Table 4.6

Correlated Two-Factor Model for Each Dimension of Threat (N = 260)

Economic Threat ($r = 0.80$)	Latino Threat	Black Threat
Hispanics get too much help from government services.	0.96	
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for Hispanics.	0.97	
Hispanics use more than their fair share of government services.	0.93	
Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others.	0.87	
Welfare programs assisting Hispanics hurt the economy.	0.87	
African Americans get too much help from government services.		0.95
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for African Americans.		0.96
African Americans use more than their fair share of government services.		0.96
African Americans take away economic resources that should go to others.		0.85
Welfare programs assisting African Americans hurt the economy.		0.90
Political Threat ($r = 0.89$)	Latino Threat	Black Threat
Electing a Hispanic president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.	0.77	
There are too many Hispanics running for public office (mayors, senators, governors).	0.91	
Hispanics are taking more public offices than they need to.	0.93	
Hispanic politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.	0.76	
Hispanics are trying to dominate American politics.	0.85	
Electing an African American president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.		0.85
There are too many African Americans running for public office (mayors, senators, governors).		0.90
African Americans are taking more public offices than they need to.		0.89
African American politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.		0.73
African Americans are trying to dominate American politics.		0.87
Criminal Threat ($r = 0.78$)	Latino Threat	Black Threat
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of Hispanics.	0.82	
Hispanics pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.	0.87	

Hispanics are more willing to break the law than whites.	0.91	
Too many Hispanics are committing crimes.	0.78	
Hispanics don't care as much about public order compared to whites.	0.86	
When I see Hispanics in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.	0.79	
The Hispanic crime rate is a serious problem.	0.72	
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of African Americans.		0.82
African Americans pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.		0.92
African Americans are more willing to break the law than whites.		0.89
Too many African Americans are committing crimes.		0.79
African Americans don't care as much about public order compared to whites.		0.83
When I see African Americans in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.		0.79
The African Americans crime rate is a serious problem.		0.71
<hr/>		
Opportunity Threat ($r = 0.88$)	Latino Threat	Black Threat
<hr/>		
Hispanics are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.	0.97	
Hispanics are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.	0.75	
Hispanics are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.	0.93	
African Americans are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.		0.98
African Americans are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.		0.78
African Americans are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.		0.93
<hr/>		
<i>Note.</i> r = factor correlation between each threat dimension for the PLTS and PBTS.		

Table 4.7

Intercorrelations between the PBTS and PLTS Total and Subscale Scores (N = 260)

	Total Score ^a	Economic ^a	Political ^a	Criminal ^a	Opportunity ^a
<u>PBTS</u>					
Black threat (Total Score)	0.79	0.75	0.62	0.71	0.61
Economic Threat	0.71	0.73	0.54	0.62	0.52
Political Threat	0.70	0.63	0.77	0.60	0.41
Criminal Threat	0.70	0.66	0.51	0.68	0.49
Opportunity Threat	0.60	0.52	0.34	0.48	0.77

Note. All associations are significant at the $p < 0.001$ level.

^aDenotes PLTS total scale and subscale scores

Discriminant Validity

To further investigate the distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS, I estimated partial correlations between the PBTS total and subscale scores and external criteria, when controlling for the variance explained by the PLTS total and subscale scores and vice versa (see Table 4.8). Specifically, the first column of Table 4.8 illustrates the partial correlations for the PBTS and PLTS total scores (i.e., the effect of perceived black threat on external criteria, net of the effect of perceived Latino threat and vice versa); the remaining four columns represent the partial correlations for each of the subscale scores of the PBTS and PLTS (e.g., the effect of black economic threat on external criteria, net of the effect of Latino economic threat) to demonstrate the discriminant validity of perceived black and Latino threat scales.

The results demonstrated that the PBTS total score explained unique variance in a number of criteria, net of the perceptions of Latino threat. Namely, being a republican was associated with an increase in black threat perceptions, while being a democrat and intending to vote for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election were associated with lower perceptions of black threat. Furthermore, increased perceptions of black threat were also associated with less affective resonance and a greater social dominance orientation as well as more punitive crime and border control sentiments²⁹. Respondents reporting greater perceptions of black threat were also more likely to view a large share of crime to be committed by blacks as well as report more negative attitudes toward blacks.

²⁹ Contrary to what I would expect, however, perceptions of black threat were more strongly associated with punitive border control sentiment than perceptions of Latino threat, which may suggest that support for harsh border control preferences could be a guise for the expression of general anti-minority prejudice.

Table 4.8

Partial Correlations between the PBTS and External Criteria Controlling for the PLTS and Partial Correlations between the PLTS and External Criteria Controlling for the PBTS (N = 260)

	1	2	3	4	5
	Total Score ^c	Economic Threat ^d	Political Threat ^d	Criminal Threat ^d	Opportunity Threat ^d
	BT(LT)	BT(LT)	BT(LT)	BT(LT)	BT(LT)
<u>Demographics</u>					
Age	0.16* (-0.13*)	0.12 (-0.07)	0.16** (-0.10)	0.09 (-0.09)	0.16* (-0.14*)
Male	0.16* (-0.05)	0.18** (-0.05)	0.08 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)	0.22*** (-0.11)
Married	0.10 (-0.02)	0.07 (-0.01)	0.18** (-0.12)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11 (0.02)
Graduate Student	0.12 (-0.12*)	0.09 (-0.10)	0.07 (-0.09)	0.04 (-0.08)	0.20** (-0.14*)
Household Income	0.08 (-0.04)	0.10 (-0.06)	0.06 (-0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.17** (-0.08)
Employed	0.10 (-0.11)	0.12* (-0.11)	0.08 (-0.11)	0.03 (-0.07)	0.05 (-0.07)
<u>Political Affiliation</u>					
Republican	0.15* (0.05)	0.15* (0.08)	0.13* (0.06)	0.18** (0.03)	0.03 (0.11)
Democrat	-0.13* (-0.09)	-0.15* (-0.09)	-0.09 (-0.15*)	-0.13* (-0.06)	-0.09 (-0.09)
Independent	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (-0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.01 (-0.05)
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	0.05 (0.17**)	0.09 (0.15*)	0.10 (0.10)	0.04 (0.18**)	0.02 (0.14*)
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>					
Trump	0.12 (0.11)	0.12 (0.18*)	0.12 (0.10)	0.17* (0.06)	0.01 (0.15*)
Clinton	-0.16* (-0.08)	-0.12 (-0.15*)	-0.15* (-0.11)	-0.21** (-0.00)	-0.03 (-0.14*)
Undecided	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (-0.03)
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>					
Agentic Extraversion	-0.01 (0.08)	0.10 (-0.03)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.13*)	-0.08 (0.14*)
Antagonism	0.06 (0.20**)	0.08 (0.19**)	0.09 (0.16**)	0.09 (0.20**)	0.04 (0.12)
Cognitive Empathy	-0.11 (0.01)	-0.05 (-0.08)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.10 (0.00)	-0.10 (0.05)
Affective Resonance	-0.17** (-0.04)	-0.16** (-0.08)	-0.14* (-0.10)	-0.13* (-0.07)	-0.19** (0.07)
Social Dominance Orientation	0.26*** (0.21**)	0.30*** (0.19**)	0.21** (0.18**)	0.25*** (0.26***)	0.18** (0.16*)
Hostility	0.00 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.13*)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.03)
<u>Perceptions of Racial and Ethnic Minorities</u>					
Increase in Blacks Living Near Home	0.04 (-0.01)	0.06 (-0.05)	0.08 (-0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)
% All Crime Committed by Blacks	0.17** (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	0.08 (0.12)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.03 (0.11)
% Violent Crime Committed by Blacks	0.28*** (-0.04)	0.25*** (-0.00)	0.16** (0.03)	0.35*** (-0.03)	0.03 (0.10)
Increase in Latinos Living Near Home	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.03)
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	-0.20** (0.33***)	-0.12 (0.26***)	-0.08 (0.22***)	-0.15* (0.33***)	-0.17** (0.21**)
% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos ^b	-0.16** (0.28***)	-0.07 (0.19**)	-0.07 (0.21**)	-0.10 (0.28***)	-0.20** (0.22***)
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	0.04 (0.28***)	0.09 (0.26***)	0.04 (0.24***)	0.11 (0.26***)	-0.01 (0.19**)
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>					
Negative Attitudes Toward Blacks	0.43*** (0.08)	0.39*** (0.18**)	0.38*** (0.12)	0.42*** (0.12)	0.22*** (0.04)
Negative Attitudes Toward Latinos	0.08 (0.48***)	0.11 (0.50***)	0.20** (0.37***)	0.13* (0.44***)	0.07 (0.22***)
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	0.25*** (0.12)	0.25*** (0.20**)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.15*)	0.18** (0.07)

Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	0.29*** (0.14*)	0.25*** (0.22***)	0.21** (0.13*)	0.34*** (0.10)	0.14* (0.18**)
Denial of Racial Privilege	0.20** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.20** (0.03)	0.16** (0.05)	0.12 (0.06)
Denial of Institutional Discrimination	0.37*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.17**)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.36*** (0.09)	0.33*** (0.11)
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem	0.26*** (0.16**)	0.31*** (0.16*)	0.17** (0.14*)	0.23*** (0.19**)	0.22*** (0.16*)
Belief in Social Responsibility	-0.18** (-0.15*)	-0.22*** (-0.19**)	-0.07 (-0.20**)	-0.19** (-0.14*)	-0.18** (-0.07)

Note. *BT* = partial correlation between the PBTS and the target variable after controlling for the respective total or subscale score of the PLTS.

LT = partial correlation between the PLTS and the target variable after controlling for the respective total or subscale score of the PBTS.

^aIndicators of voter intentions were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election ($N = 210$).

^bOne case was deleted for missing data on this variable ($N = 259$)

^cPartial correlations reported between the PBTS total score and the target variables after controlling for the PLTS and vice versa.

^dPartial correlations reported between each subscale score for the PBTS and PLTS and the target variables (e.g., partial correlation between the PBTS economic threat subscale score and external criteria after controlling for the PLTS economic threat subscale score).

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

Importantly, perceptions of black threat were negatively associated with the perception of crime as being largely committed by Latinos, and were not significantly associated with negative attitudes toward Latinos in general, partially supporting the discriminant validity of the PBTS (hypothesis 4).

Some of the same patterns emerged when I examined the partial correlations for the PLTS total score in column 1 of Table 4.8. After controlling for the variance explained by the PBTS, increased perceptions of Latino threat were associated with identifying as politically conservative, reporting higher levels of narcissism and social dominance orientation, as well as increases in the perception that a large share of crime (all crime and violent crime) was committed by Latinos. Higher perceptions of Latino threat were also associated with more negative attitudes toward Latinos in general, greater support for heightened border control sanctions, a greater denial of racism as a social problem, and a lower belief in social responsibility. The PLTS was not significantly associated with the perception that a large share of crime (violent or otherwise) was committed by blacks, or with general negative attitudes toward blacks, thus supporting hypothesis 5 which posits that the PLTS would only be significantly associated with ethnicity-based criteria.

In addition, several notable findings emerged when I reviewed the partial correlations for each of the threat subscale scores in columns 2 through 4 (see Table 4.8). Particularly, black criminal threat surfaced as the most salient correlate of identifying as a republican and reporting the intention to vote for Trump, the racial typification of crime and violent crime, racial prejudice, punitive border control attitudes, and the denial of

institutional discrimination, net of the variance explained by Latino criminal threat.

Latino economic threat, on the other hand, demonstrated the strongest associations with voter support for Trump, ethnic prejudice, punitive attitudes toward crime and border control, the perception that a large share of Latinos are undocumented immigrants, and the denial of institutional discrimination, net of the effect of black economic threat.

Latino criminal threat demonstrated the strongest associations with the ethnic typification of crime and violent crime as well as the perceived undocumented immigrant status of the Latino population, net of perceived black criminal threat. Thus, the types of threat that are most salient in influencing key outcomes appear to depend on the minority group that is eliciting the threat, which further supports the PBTS and PLTS as distinct constructs.

Discussion and Conclusion

Perceived threat is often referred to as the “theoretical lynchpin” linking aggregate-level population dynamics to social control outcomes in minority threat literature. Unfortunately, this association remains “empirically elusive” because limited attention has been paid to the measurement of perceived threat mechanisms (King & Wheelock, 2007, p. 1272). Only one study to date has examined the psychometric properties of a Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS), finding support for the multidimensionality of threat as hypothesized by Blalock (1967) (see Infante et al., 2019). The present study builds on this research in three important ways: (1) it examined the structural invariance of perceived threat across eliciting racial and ethnic groups; (2) it tested validity of the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS); and (3) it assessed the distinctness of the PBTS and the PLTS as separate constructs.

This study represents the first to provide empirical evidence for the structural invariance of perceived minority threat across different minority groups. In particular, the CFA indicated that the four-bifactor model empirically supported by Infante et al. (2019) also provided the best fit for the data for the PBTS. Indeed, the PBTS was comprised of the same four threat dimensions as the PLTS (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat), and the PBTS total and subscale score associations with external criteria mirrored patterns demonstrated in the construct validation of the PLTS (see Infante et al., 2019). Namely, increases in perceived black threat were associated with identifying as a republican and politically conservative, reporting intention to voter for Trump, and greater racial typification of crime and racial prejudice, which were also reported as key correlates of the PLTS³⁰ (Infante et al., 2019). Meanwhile, much like the partial correlation analyses for PLTS (Infante et al., 2019), the economic threat dimension surfaced as the most consistent correlate of external criteria for the PBTS. Therefore, the findings support the PBTS as a valid, multidimensional scale of perceived black threat, wherein the threat items developed by Infante et al. (2019) operate similarly across perceived black and Latino threat constructs.

In addition to the structural invariance of threat, this study also tested whether the PBTS and PLTS are, in fact, distinct constructs. The CFA of each threat dimension (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat) demonstrated that a correlated two-factor model in which perceived black and Latino threat constructs explained unique variance in the threat items fit the data better than a unidimensional model, in which all

³⁰ The only difference is that the PLTS was associated with ethnicity-based constructs (ethnic typification of crime and ethnic prejudice).

items loaded onto a general threat factor irrespective of race- or ethnicity-specific threats. Therefore, each dimension of threat was comprised of two distinct race- and ethnicity-specific subscales in which perceived black and Latino threat constructs explained unique item-level variance, suggesting that the PBTS and PLTS are separate constructs.

The distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS was further supported in the partial correlation analyses where the PBTS was significantly associated with race-based constructs, net of the PLTS, while the PLTS was uniquely associated with ethnicity-based constructs, net of the PBTS. Importantly, increased perceptions of black threat were associated with the racial typification of crime, racial prejudice, punitive attitudes toward crime, and greater color-blind racial attitudes, net of perceived Latino threat; increased perceptions of Latino threat were associated with the ethnic typification of crime, ethnic prejudice, and punitive border control measures, net of perceived black threat.

Nevertheless, perceptions of black threat were significantly and negatively related to the ethnic typification of crime, suggesting that as perceptions of black threat increase, the perception of crime as being predominantly committed by Latinos decreases. While this association was not expected, this finding supports the notion that increases in black threat do not automatically translate into more negative attitudes and perceptions about all minorities. Indeed, the PBTS was not significantly related to negative attitudes toward Latinos, and the PLTS was not significantly related to the racial typification of crime or negative attitudes toward blacks. Furthermore, black criminal threat surfaced as a salient correlate of key criteria, net of the PLTS, while Latino economic and criminal threats were salient correlates of key criteria, net of the PBTS. Altogether, the findings indicate

that perceived black and Latino threats are not merely representative of a general minority threat schema, but instead are distinct constructs with unique correlates and implications for different minority groups.

Overall, the findings of this study and those advanced by Infante et al. (2019) represent the first foray into research testing the psychometric properties of perceived threat. The findings of this research support the PBTS and the PLTS as valid and distinct multidimensional scales of perceived minority threat that are psychometrically sound across different minority groups. Altogether, this research has important implications for how we approach the measurement and empirical assessment of perceived minority threat mechanisms moving forward. Notably, the results show that respondents can effectively distinguish threats posed by blacks and Latinos, and as such, these different types of threat might have unique implications for outcomes relevant to different minority groups. Indeed, in light of the mixed findings surrounding macro-level ethnic threat effects on social control outcomes (e.g., Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Wang & Mears, 2010a), future research should continue to evaluate whether differences in racial and ethnic threat effects persist at the micro-level when using measures of perceived threat that are psychometrically invariant across these groups. By using validated scales of perceived black and Latino threats, we can increase the probability that any observed differences in threat effects are not a product of differences in the measurement of threat constructs, and as a result, we can more precisely identify true group differences in threat effects across social control outcomes.

In conclusion, research testing the psychometrics of perceived threat is still in its infancy; nevertheless, this study represents one step toward advancing our understanding of the dimensionality and unique correlates of two perceived threat constructs that have remained “empirically elusive” in minority threat literature (King & Wheelock, 2007, p. 1272). More research is needed to further examine whether perceived threats elicited by other minority groups (e.g., Native Americans and Asians) demonstrate an equivalent factor structure and also maintain unique associations with different outcomes. Nonetheless, the findings of this research support the empirical validity of Blalock’s (1967) premises regarding the multidimensionality of perceived threat mechanisms; and consequently, lays the psychometric groundwork for scholars who wish to continue to advance this literature by elucidating whether perceived threat is actually the “theoretical lynchpin” linking minority population size to social control outcomes (King & Wheelock, p. 1272).

CHAPTER 5

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective was originally developed over a half-century ago to explain the intergroup relations that give rise to systems of racial oppression. Per this perspective, minority population size is a key antecedent for the mobilization of discrimination as a tool for minority group control. Scholars have since applied the tenets of the minority threat perspective to explain the link between racial and ethnic composition and increased criminal justice controls (Liska, 1992). A large body of research has documented an association between a large or increasing minority population size and heightened social control outcomes, including increased arrest rates, convictions, imprisonment, and sentence lengths (e.g., Crawford, Chiricos, & Kleck, 1998; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b).

Although prior research has significantly advanced scholarship, it has often paid limited attention to the mechanisms linking racial and ethnic composition to increased crime controls. Importantly, Blalock (1967) posits that the relative size of the minority population may produce a greater desire for minority group control because a large or increasing minority population size may elicit perceived threats to the racial hegemony of whites. Specifically, minority threat literature has emphasized the mechanisms of perceived economic, political, and criminal threats as the "theoretical lynchpin" of the minority threat perspective linking aggregate-level indicators of racial composition to social control outcomes (Blalock, 1967; Chiricos et al., 1997; King & Wheelock, 2007, p. 1272). However, studies have predominantly relied on racial composition as a proxy for

perceived threat (e.g., see Caravelis, Chiricos, & Bales, 2011; Wang & Mears, 2010a, 2010b), and these mechanisms of perceived minority threat have rarely been tested (Infante et al., 2019; Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018). As a result, scholars have argued that “some of the empirical support attributed to the minority threat hypothesis may be unwarranted” (Stults & Baumer, 2007, p. 508-509).

Notably, only a handful of studies have measured perceived threats directly (Chiricos et al., 2014; King & Wheelock, 2007; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016). Although these studies are insightful, important limitations remain. Specifically, although Blalock (1967) and others have outlined a multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat encompassing the multiple dimensions of threat, such a scale has yet to be developed. As a result, perceived threat mechanisms have remained somewhat “empirically elusive” in minority threat literature (King & Wheelock, 2007; 1272), and the core premises of Blalock’s (1967) theory remain to be fully tested. Ultimately, this raises key questions surrounding the degree to which perceived minority threat is actually the driving mechanism linking minority context to social control (Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018). Overall, extant research has provided little insight into whether an increasing minority population size elicits perceptions of minority threat, and whether these perceived threats, in turn, manifest in greater minority group control.

Furthermore, Blalock’s (1967) minority threat perspective was originally developed to explain the intergroup relations that give rise to racial discrimination. Indeed, the majority of this research has focused on racial threat and the social control of blacks (for a review, see Feldmeyer & Cochran, 2018). Notably, a small number of

studies have tested ethnic threat effects and provided mixed support for Blalock's (1967) premises (e.g., see Feldmeyer, et al., 2015; Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Kent & Jacobs, 2005; Stults & Baumer, 2007; Wang & Mears, 2010a). While insightful, these studies have yet to employ a direct measure of perceived Latino threat to provide a comprehensive assessment of how Blalock's (1967) threat-control model applies to Latinos. Thus, it remains unknown to what extent the minority threat perspective can be generalized to explain the threat processes and outcomes of Latinos.

Against this backdrop, the overarching goals of this dissertation were three-fold. First, this dissertation aimed to shed light on the psychometric properties of perceived minority threat by developing new multidimensional scales of perceived threat. Second, it sought to elucidate the perceived threat processes facilitating the link between aggregate-level minority population size and minority group control. Third, it sought to assess the extent to which Blalock's (1967) arguments can be applied to explain the threat-control process of Latinos. To accomplish these goals, I conducted three separate but interrelated empirical studies. The first study in this dissertation focused on the development and validation of the multidimensional Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). The second study investigated how the PLTS can inform the relationship between Latino context and punitive border control sentiment. The third and final study of this dissertation assessed the psychometrics of another multidimensional scale of perceived threat—the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS), and examined the structural invariance and distinctness of the PBTS and PLTS. The remainder of this chapter summarizes the key findings from

each study, and discusses these findings' implications for Blalock's (1967) theory, as well as the limitations and directions for future research.

Summary of Key Findings

The objective of the first study in this dissertation (Chapter 2) was to develop and test a multidimensional scale of perceived Latino threat—that is, the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS). No study to date has undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the psychometric properties of perceived threat as encompassing multiple dimensions of threat (i.e., economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threats). Consequently, we know relatively little about whether these perceived threat dimensions are meaningful and whether they have unique implications for different outcomes. To address this gap, I tested the hypothesized factor structure of perceived Latino threat using a series of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models. The findings of the CFA supported the multidimensionality of perceived Latino threat, indicating the existence of four unique dimensions of Latino threat—economic, political, criminal, and opportunity threat. The results of the bivariate and partial correlation analyses further suggested that while the PLTS total score was significantly related to a number of key criteria in theoretically expected directions, the individual dimensions of threat, especially economic threat, still maintained unique associations with external criteria. Hence, consistent with Blalock's (1967) premises, perceived Latino threat is comprised of several meaningful dimensions of threat that may influence social control outcomes differently. Overall, the findings of the first study supported the PLTS as a valid and reliable multidimensional scale of perceived minority threat.

The second study in this dissertation (Chapter 3) sought to build on the findings of the first by testing the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS) as a key mechanism facilitating punitive border control sentiment. Indeed, Blalock (1967) argues that minority population size may influence discriminatory responses through its effects on perceived minority threat. Per this argument, this study incorporated objective and perceptual indicators of Latino context and tested the PLTS as a mediating mechanism in the relationship between Latino context and punitive sentiment. In addition, this study also assessed an alternative hypothesis in which the effect of the PLTS on punitive sentiment is conditional on Latino context. Specifically, I estimated a series of OLS regression models to analyze the relationship between Latino context and punitive sentiment. Overall, the findings from this study provided minimal support for perceived Latino threat as an intervening mechanism. In addition, the results suggested a ceiling effect such that the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitive border control sentiment mattered more among respondents who were generally less punitive with regard to immigration control. Indeed, the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitiveness was weaker among respondents who perceived a larger share of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants. This finding suggests that respondents who perceive Latinos to be synonymous with undocumented immigrants might already be highly punitive when it comes to immigration control, thereby leaving little room for the influence of ethnicity-specific threats to further impact their punitiveness. Conversely, respondents who are characteristically less punitive (i.e., do not view all Latinos as undocumented immigrants) are more susceptible to ethnicity-based threats influencing their immigration attitudes.

The third study in this dissertation (Chapter 4) revisited the psychometric properties of perceived minority threat to address two gaps in the literature. First, scholars have often tested the independent effects of perceived black and Latino threats on social control outcomes without assessing whether the threat processes operate the same across minority groups. This is problematic because studies have shown differences in racial and ethnic threat effects on control outcomes (e.g., see Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Wang & Mears, 2010a), but have yet to effectively disentangle whether these differences reflect true group differences in how threats operate or merely reflect variation in how these constructs are measured. Second, scholars have often assumed that respondents can effectively differentiate threats posed by different minority groups. This assumption, however, has rarely been tested. To address these research gaps, this study tested the structural invariance and distinctness of two perceived minority threat scales—that is, the Perceived Black Threat Scale (PBTS) and the Perceived Latino Threat Scale (PLTS that was developed in Chapter 2).

The findings from the third study established that perceived threat was psychometrically sound across minority groups, thus structurally invariant, and the PBTS and PLTS represented distinct constructs that demonstrated unique associations with race- and ethnicity-specific factors. Stated differently, these findings indicated that perceived threats seem to operate similarly across racial and ethnic groups, but still maintain distinctive associations with relevant factors. Such findings suggest that when testing perceived threat effects using validated measures, any observed differences in racial and ethnic threat effects on social control outcomes are likely reflective of true

group differences in threat effects. Thus, valid measures of perceived threat can aid researchers in disentangling true differences in racial and ethnic threat effects from effects that are merely a product of differences in how perceived threats are measured.

Theoretical Implications

Taken together, the findings across all three studies provide partial support for Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective. Specifically, the PBTS and PLTS represent valid and distinct constructs comprised of multiple dimensions of threat that have been emphasized by Blalock (1967) and others in minority threat literature (e.g., Chiricos et al., 1997). Furthermore, perceived minority threat surfaced as the most robust antecedent of minority group control, which is also consistent with Blalock's (1967) argument. Nevertheless, the findings failed to provide support for several core tenets of Blalock's (1967) theory, subsequently casting doubt on the generalizability of his perspective when applied to Latinos.

First, the link between aggregate-level indicators of Latino population size and social control was not supported. Neither percent Latino nor changes in the Latino population size significantly influenced punitive border control sentiment. This finding is consistent with prior studies reporting null or mixed effects of ethnic composition on social control outcomes (e.g., see Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Hood & Morris, 1997, 2000; Stolzenberg et al., 2004), and thus further calls into question the salience of aggregate-level indicators of Latino context in the threat-control process. Second, and relatedly, there was also no direct association between objective measures of Latino context and Latino threat perceptions. This has significant implications for Blalock's (1967) theory

given that minority context is purported to be the main antecedent of minority threat perceptions. If minority context plays little to no role in how threat perceptions arise, then this adds to the existing ambiguity surrounding the mechanisms facilitating the link between racial and ethnic composition and social control outcomes. It also raises another important question—that is, if not through objective minority context, how and through what apparatuses are minority threat perceptions elicited? Third, the findings demonstrate no evidence for perceived Latino threat as a mediator in the relationship between objective Latino context and immigration control, which is arguably the fundamental thesis of Blalock’s (1967) minority threat perspective. Indeed, this is not surprising given the lack of support for the direct effects of objective Latino context on perceived threat and punitive sentiment. Nevertheless, these findings further complicate our understanding of the processes underlying the threat-control model as proposed by Blalock (1967). If the effect of perceived Latino threat on punitiveness operates independently of objective Latino context, then what factors give rise to perceived threats, and what role does context play, if any, in producing control outcomes for Latinos?

It is important to note that while the findings did not support the effects of objective Latino context on key outcomes, they did provide support for the links between *perceived* Latino context, perceived Latino threat, and punitive border control sentiment. Indeed, prior research has documented the salience of perceptual measures of minority composition as being more precise predictors of individual perceptions and attitudes than objective measures (e.g., Chiricos et al., 1997; Semyonov et al., 2004; Wang, 2012). Notably, I found that perceptions of Latino threat were higher among respondents who

perceived a larger percentage of Latinos to be undocumented immigrants, regardless of the actual size of the Latino population. Furthermore, the effect of perceived Latino threat on immigration control attitudes was actually *conditional* on perceived Latino context (i.e., the perceptions of more Latinos as undocumented immigrants), such that the effect of perceived threat was stronger among respondents who generally did not perceive Latinos as synonymous with undocumented immigrants. Overall, these findings suggest that the perceived size of the Latino population may have greater implications for influencing perceived Latino threat and minority group control, net of actual Latino context.

Altogether, while the findings provided limited support for some of Blalock's (1967) core tenets, it is worth noting that the full test of his perspective (Chapter 3) was limited to Latino context, perceived Latino threat, and punitive border control sentiment. As such, the findings should not be interpreted to mean a lack of support for the overall empirical validity of the minority threat perspective, but rather a test of the generalizability of his perspective to groups other than blacks. Indeed, the findings largely suggest that Blalock's (1967) threat-control model may actually operate differently for the threat-control process of Latinos. In particular, perceived Latino context, not objective Latino context, holds the most promise for influencing perceived Latino threat to facilitate punitive immigration controls. This finding is not surprising, because immigration attitudes "have become increasingly divorced from social reality", and individual perceptions of immigrants might be shaped more by political rhetoric and media messages than real demographic context (Sides & Citrin, 2007, p. 501). Given

President Trump's dissemination of anti-Latino sentiments during his 2016 campaign, and his consistent propagation of anti-immigrant media messages ever since, it is not surprising that respondent's perceptions of Latinos might be "divorced" from the actual representation of Latinos in their communities. This could be an indication of how minority group exposure might operate differently today than it did decades ago. When Blalock (1967) originally developed his theory in the 1960s, greater exposure to and physical contact with minorities was largely the means through which individuals developed minority threat perceptions. In the digital age, the development of perceived minority threats could be as easy as reading a tweet or watching the news in which minorities are derogatorily depicted. Thus, more research is needed to further shed light on the mechanisms involved in the contemporary threat-control process that might be unique to Latinos.

Overall, the findings from this dissertation largely provide support for the salience of perceived Latino threat as a key multidimensional antecedent of punitive border control sentiment, which is one of Blalock's (1967) main premises. Where the findings depart from traditional theory is with regard to the mechanisms that give rise to perceived Latino threat, and how Latino context and threat perceptions might actually coalesce to produce increased control responses targeting Latinos. Consequently, the findings of this dissertation provide only partial support for Blalock's (1967) theory and the generalizability of his perspective to groups other than blacks.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Although this dissertation represents a first step in advancing our understanding of the empirical validity and generalizability of Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective, several limitations warrant some discussion. First, the data across the three studies were drawn from two samples of undergraduate and graduate students from a Southwestern university. As a result, the generalizability of the findings to a nationally representative sample is unknown. That said, the samples were not limited to traditional college students residing solely within the vicinity of the university, but came from over 100 counties across as many as 40 states. Importantly, a large share of respondents (~70%) reported currently residing in the Southwestern and Western regions of the United States in which contact with Latino immigrants, especially from Mexico, is likely more frequent (Pew Research Center, 2014). Therefore, despite the weaknesses surrounding the use of student samples, my data may be an ideal sample to study Latino threat perceptions and punitive immigration attitudes. Nevertheless, future research would benefit from testing the psychometric properties of perceived threat, as well as its association with minority population context and social control outcomes, using a sample more representative of the general population.

Second, and related to the previous limitation, the lack of significant effects of objective Latino population context on perceived Latino threat and immigration control found in the second study (Chapter 2) could be a product of the nature of the sample. Typically, researchers rely on self-reported county or zip codes in which respondents currently reside to gather population data (e.g., see Chiricos et al., 2014; Stupi et al., 2016; Wang, 2012). For college students, this approach is somewhat complicated by the

fact that many students move residences to attend school. Therefore, to better capture indicators of population context among college students, I collected county-level data using respondents' self-reported current zip codes for students who reported that they did not move to attend the university and for those who did report that they moved to attend the university, I used the zip code they reportedly moved from. This method, while imperfect, represented an attempt at capturing the community most salient to shaping minority threat perceptions. Nevertheless, future research should test the effects of Latino context on immigration control using a general sample to determine whether the null effects of objective Latino context were a product of the sample and how indicators of population context were measured.

Third, the present research was limited to testing the three main dimensions of perceived minority threat (i.e., economic, political, and criminal threat) that are posed by two of the largest minority groups in the U.S. (i.e., blacks and Latinos). Importantly, recent research has emphasized other dimensions of threat as correlates of control outcomes, including cultural threats (Chiricos et al., 2014). Consequently, future research should continue to explore other possible dimensions of threat, as well as test the validity and structural invariance of perceived threats posed by other minorities (e.g., Native Americans, Asians, etc.) to determine the generalizability of these findings to groups other than blacks and Latinos.

Lastly, the findings of this dissertation reinforce the notion that immigration might be an "ethnicity-coded issue" (Pickett, 2016, p. 104); however, a measure of perceived immigrant threat was not included in the analysis. Therefore, a true test of

competing Latino and immigrant threats could not be conducted. Nevertheless, the findings of this dissertation provide preliminary evidence that suggests that both perceived Latino and immigrant threats might matter in influencing punitive immigration attitudes. Ethnicity-specific threats, in particular, appear to matter only among respondents who do not already harbor harsh anti-immigrant sentiments. This could be because respondents who are already highly punitive may be less influenced by ethnicity-specific threats, and more influenced by a general immigrant threat schema (irrespective of race or ethnicity). These positions, however, remain to be fully tested. Indeed, scholars often assess measures of perceived Latino threat and immigrant threats as separate constructs without evaluating the extent to which these constructs overlap (Chiricos et al., 2014; Pickett, 2016; Stupi et al., 2016). As such, disentangling the unique effects of perceived Latino and immigrant threats on immigration control remains an important avenue for future research.

Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation was to advance research on Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective by developing and validating perceived minority threat scales, providing a comprehensive test of Blalock's (1967) theory, and evaluating its generalizability to explaining the threat-control process of Latinos. Overall, the results emphasize the salience of perceived Latino threat as a key antecedent of punitive border control sentiment, but question the applicability of Blalock's (1967) premises to groups other than blacks. In particular, minority context and perceived threat mechanisms appear to function differently from what Blalock (1967) theorized when elucidating the threat-

control processes of Latinos. Thus, future research should work to expand on these findings to continue to empirically assess the generalizability and validity of Blalock's (1967) minority threat perspective, especially as it relates to Latinos.

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APPENDIX A

PERMISSION TO USE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED WORK

The co-authors, Xia Wang and Dustin Pardini, have granted permission for the use of the following published work to be included as a chapter in this dissertation:

Infante, A. A., Wang, X., & Pardini, D. (2019). The development and validation of a multidimensional scale of perceived Latino threat. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1-23. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2019.1616539

APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES FOR CHAPTER 2

An exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation (i.e., geomin) also confirmed the existence of a fourth factor. We ran EFA analyses that allow all of the items to load freely onto all of the factors. Judged from the number of eigenvalues greater than 1.0, theoretical interpretability, factor loadings greater than .30, as well as which model (e.g., 3 vs. 4 factor) fit the data best in terms of absolute and relative fit indices, the EFA demonstrated that a four-factor model provided the best fit for the data (see Table 2.6 below). We also estimated a correlated three- and four-factor model, finding that the four-bifactor model still provided the best fit for the data (correlated three-factor model: $\chi^2 = 998.994$; RMSEA = .0122; CFI = .944; TLI = .951; correlated four-factor model: $\chi^2 = 590.007$; RMSEA = .088; CFI = .975; TLI = .971).

Table 2.6
Exploratory Factor Analysis of the Perceived Latino Threat Scale for Study 1 (N = 332)

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Hispanics get too much help from government services.	0.50	0.15	0.22	0.13
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for Hispanics.	0.97	0.00	-0.05	-0.03
Hispanics use more than their fair share of government services.	0.86	-0.01	0.11	0.02
Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others.	0.64	0.14	0.19	0.01
Welfare programs assisting Hispanics hurt the economy.	0.92	0.02	-0.03	0.05
Hispanic president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.	0.21	0.52	0.14	-0.04
There are too many Hispanics running for public office (mayors, senators, governors).	0.08	0.91	-0.02	0.01
Hispanics are taking more public offices than they need to.	0.12	0.64	0.11	0.00
Hispanic politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.	0.11	0.33	<i>0.31</i>	0.11
Hispanics are trying to dominate American politics.	-0.01	0.70	0.12	0.03
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of Hispanics.	0.04	0.06	0.71	0.07
Hispanics pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.	-0.07	<i>0.32</i>	0.69	-0.02
Hispanics are more willing to break the law than whites.	-0.05	0.09	0.84	0.04
Too many Hispanics are committing crimes.	0.03	-0.01	0.93	-0.01
Hispanics don't care as much about public order compared to whites.	0.28	0.29	0.36	0.08
When I see Hispanics in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.	0.09	0.24	0.48	0.07
The Hispanic crime rate is a serious problem.	0.13	-0.13	0.81	-0.05
Hispanics are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.	-0.19	0.03	-0.05	1.08
Hispanics are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.	0.03	0.21	0.04	0.59
Hispanics are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.	0.10	-0.28	0.14	0.81

Note. Entries are standardized factor loadings. Significant loadings are in bold. Significant cross-loading items are in italics.

Please see Table 2.7 (below) for the decomposition of the proportion of item variance accounted for by the general Latino threat factor, the domain specific factors, and the total proportion of item variance being accounted for in each item by both the general Latino threat factor and individual threat dimensions.

Table 2.7
Proportion of Item Variance Explained in Bi-Factor Models for Study 1 (N = 332) & Study 2 (N = 259)

Items	General ^a		Economic ^b		Political ^b		Criminal ^b		Opportunity ^b		TOTAL ^c	
	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2
Hispanics get too much help from government services.	0.73	0.77	0.06	0.15							0.79	0.92
Too much taxpayer money is spent on public assistance for Hispanics.	0.55	0.75	0.30	0.21							0.86	0.96
Hispanics use more than their fair share of government services.	0.67	0.67	0.21	0.19							0.87	0.86
Hispanics take away economic resources that should go to others.	0.71	0.71	0.09	0.08							0.81	0.79
Welfare programs assisting Hispanics hurt the economy.	0.61	0.62	0.25	0.11							0.86	0.74
Hispanic president wouldn't be in the best interest of the country.	0.52	0.41			0.05	0.12					0.57	0.53
There are too many Hispanics running for public office (mayors, senators, governors).	0.62	0.50			0.38	0.39					0.99	0.89
Hispanics are taking more public offices than they need to.	0.53	0.43			0.11	0.55					0.64	0.98
Hispanic politicians don't care as much about the needs of whites.	0.57	0.65			0.01	0.00					0.58	0.65
Hispanics are trying to dominate American politics.	0.48	0.47			0.14	0.25					0.61	0.71
I worry about crime in places where there are a lot of Hispanics.	0.62	0.59					0.06	0.04			0.68	0.63
Hispanics pose a greater threat to public safety than whites.	0.68	0.76					0.05	0.00			0.73	0.77
Hispanics are more willing to break the law than whites.	0.69	0.76					0.09	0.00			0.78	0.76
Too many Hispanics are committing crimes.	0.73	0.58					0.18	0.28			0.91	0.86
Hispanics don't care as much about public order compared to whites.	0.85	0.78					0.00	0.04			0.85	0.82
When I see Hispanics in my neighborhood, I feel less safe.	0.61	0.61					0.02	0.01			0.63	0.62
The Hispanic crime rate is a serious problem.	0.50	0.39					0.14	0.20			0.63	0.59
Hispanics are more likely to get accepted into colleges because of their ethnicity.	0.28	0.34							0.71	0.60	0.99	0.95
Hispanics are more likely to get jobs because of their ethnicity.	0.42	0.52							0.15	0.11	0.57	0.63
Hispanics are more likely to get scholarships because of their ethnicity.	0.29	0.33							0.32	0.54	0.61	0.87

Note: S1 = Study 1; S2 = Study 2.

^aThe proportion of item variance explained by the general Latino threat factor in Study 1 and Study 2.

^bThe proportion of item variance explained by the domain specific factor once the general Latino threat factor has been accounted for in Study 1 and Study 2.

^cThe total proportion of item variance explained by the general Latino threat factor and each domain specific factor in Study 1 and Study 2.

We recognize that the PLTS and Negative Attitudes toward Latinos measure are similar in many respects, but we argue that the PLTS is a distinct measure, with unique associations with key outcomes. In order to demonstrate this, we estimated a series of partial correlations in which we examined the relationship between Latino Threat and a number of key outcomes, net of Negative Attitudes toward Latinos, as well as the relationship between Negative Attitudes toward Latinos and these same outcomes, net of Latino Threat. In Table 2.8, across both studies, we see that Latino Threat demonstrates stronger, more consistent associations with external criteria, above and beyond the variance explained by the Negative Attitudes toward Latinos measure. This suggests that the PLTS is better suited to explain the variance in key outcomes of interest, and thus is a measure distinct from a general indicator of Hispanic prejudice.

Table 2.8
Partial Correlations between the Perceived Latino Threat Scale, Negative Attitudes toward Latinos, and External Criteria

	Study 1 (N = 332)		Study 2 (N = 259)	
	Latino Threat <i>pr</i>	Negative Attitudes toward Latinos <i>pr</i>	Latino Threat <i>pr</i>	Negative Attitudes toward Latinos <i>pr</i>
<u>Demographics</u>				
Age	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.05
Male	0.11	-0.11*	0.03	0.08
Married	-0.00	-0.00	0.12*	-0.07
Graduate Student	-0.07	-0.00	0.02	-0.08
Household Income	0.01	-0.02	0.06	-0.04
Employed	0.04	-0.08	-0.10	0.08
<u>Political Affiliation</u>				
Republican	0.16**	0.01	0.12*	0.10
Democrat	-0.10	-0.12*	-0.15*	-0.10
Independent	-0.06	0.06	0.00	-0.02
Politically Conservative vs. Liberal	0.17***	0.08	0.18**	0.08
<u>Voting Intentions^a</u>				
Trump	0.18**	0.14*	0.17*	0.10
Cruz	0.20***	-0.01	-	-
Clinton	-0.18**	-0.03	-0.18**	-0.07
Sanders	-0.22***	-0.07	-	-
Undecided	-	-	-0.05	0.07
<u>Personality/Disposition</u>				
Agentic Extraversion	-	-	0.07	0.04
Antagonism	-	-	0.26***	0.03
Cognitive Empathy	-	-	-0.01	-0.13*
Affective Resonance	-	-	-0.02	-0.25***
Social Dominance Orientation	-	-	0.31***	0.24***
Hostility	0.17**	-0.04	0.07	0.04
<u>Perceptions of Latinos</u>				
Increase in Latinos Living Near Home	0.05	-0.00	0.09	0.01
% All Crime Committed by Latinos	0.19***	0.06	0.20***	0.01
% Violent Crime Committed by Latinos	0.19***	0.01	0.18**	0.01
% Latinos in U.S. Illegally	0.16**	0.18***	0.25***	0.16**
<u>Attitudes/Beliefs</u>				
Attitudes Favoring Harsh Criminal Sanctions	0.30***	0.01	0.21***	0.22***

Attitudes Favoring Heightened Border Protection	0.36***	0.04	0.33***	0.11
Denial of Racial Privilege	-	-	0.13*	0.11
Denial of Institutional Discrimination	-	-	0.34***	0.09
Denial of Racism as a Social Problem	-	-	0.32***	0.12*
Belief in Social Responsibility	-	-	-0.22***	-0.17**

Note. *pr* = partial correlation between each measure and the criterion.

*Indicators of voter intentions were correlated with each dimension of threat but only among those reporting that they planned to vote in the 2016 election (N = 262). *** $p \leq 0.001$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

APPENDIX C

SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 4




Fig. 4.1 Four-bifactor measurement model for the Perceived Black Threat Scale.




Fig. 4.2 Illustrates a single factor model (on the left) and a correlated two-factor model (on the right) for the dimension of perceived economic threat.