Towards an Understanding of Combatants' Motivations:

The Implications of the Links Between Gender Bias and Political Violence

by

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ABSTRACT

A growing body of literature has sought to explain the nature and effects of conflict-related sexualized violence. However, a critical problem that persists concerns why wartime rape varies both within and across conflicts. Political science literature mainly addresses these questions of variation in sexualized violence through group-level or structural explanations. Yet, clear patterns of combatant non-participation in conflict-related sexualized violence is apparent, even in cases where sexual violence is severe and pervasive. What allows one combatant to refrain, while another combatant, even within the same combat unit, perpetrates sexualized violence? In this dissertation, I argue that critical differences concerning attitudes, beliefs, and motivations exist between individual combatants. In light of these differences, I reintroduce the individual combatant onto the theoretical map as a critical unit of analysis and I explore the implications of gender inequality as an important and relevant factor related to sexualized violence in political conflict. Drawing on findings from social psychology, political psychology, sociology, and political science, the theory developed argues that combatants differentially internalize important norms related to gender that become particularly activated based on primarily externalized contextual influences. To test the theory, I conduct a mixed-method, sub-national comparative analysis of combatants and attitudes and beliefs associated with gender inequality during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). I rely on qualitative data generated from semi-structured, comprehensive interviews with psychologists, victim's advocates, and legal experts managing sexual violence war crimes cases, and combat veterans directly associated with the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) to assess differences at the individual-level of analysis. To additionally determine the

broader effects of gender inequality, I employ an ordered probit regression analysis to ascertain the relationship between gender inequality related to institutional health and education factors and the severity of wartime rape. The combined results of these analyses demonstrate that individual differences between combatants better predicts the likelihood of a combatant to commit sexualized violence compared to structural or institutional accounts alone.

DEDICATION

יקצור בבכי שזורע מי
שמחה בשירי
-Psalms (125:6)

For my grandparents and all the generations who have come before me. I dedicate this to you in honor of your tremendous resilience in the face of great suffering and sorrow.

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The intellectual journey outlined in the pages that follow represents years of academic engagement, intensive study, and commitment to a singular subject matter. An enterprise such as this is often quite solitary, borne out of the necessity to retreat from external distractions in order to direct one's focus entirely and devotionally to the endeavor of knowledge generation. While it is in many ways a lone odyssey, I have had the privilege to be remarkably supported by a loving and diverse community that has compassionately and generously held space and provided endless support. It is with a tremendously grateful heart that I extend my appreciation to each of you.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> "In the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of identity." – Erik Erikson

On an unusually sunny mid-June day in 2014, I occupy a table at an outdoor café facing *Katedrala Srca Isusova*, the Sacred Heart Cathedral, located just a short distance from the Eternal Flame memorial honoring the loss of life of both military personnel and civilians in the region of Bosnia Herzegovina[1] during World War II. A short walk from the Eternal Flame on the highly trafficked Ferhadija pedestrian road brought me to this seat in the center of Sarajevo. Here, I transcribe notes and impressions from the latest interview I conducted with a civilian and medical professional. As I write about her recollections of the fall of Jajce[2] to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in 1992, and her efforts to save lives in a makeshift hospital she labored in for 18 hours a day, along with her memories of her family's harrowing journey to escape as war descended, the bright day darkens as the clouds roll in. And, in typical Sarajevan fashion, the weather radically shifts, and rain begins to lightly fall and shortly thereafter pours out in earnest.

Passersbys raise their umbrellas and I crowd under an awning to wait out this latest round of afternoon storms. As I stand there, with the cathedral and the entrance to Galerija 11/07/95[3] within my sight, I notice the bullet holes on the outside of cathedral and pause. Like many conflict scholars, I am curious about the processes and motivations that can alter a seemingly peaceably coexisting multi-ethnic and religious society, like the

[1] Heretofore Bosnia
[2] A city located in central Bosnia.
[3] Galerija 11/07/95 is a memorial gallery with a permanent exhibition of the events in Srebrenica, which were a motivating factor facilitating more substantive international intervention ultimately leading to conflict termination and the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA).

one in Bosnia, into a warzone where neighbors and friends transform into mortal enemies. Where bullet holes remain embedded in sacred religious sites even two decades later. Even more so, I am interested in better understanding what motivates, constrains, and manages individuals when political violence erupts.

Just around the corner sits Markale open-air market, a site where two bombings directly targeting civilians occurred during the course of the Siege of Sarajevo. During the first Markale massacre, 66 civilians died in February of 1994 and an additional 43 perished in a second attack in August of 1995, along with hundreds of injured (ICTY 2014; Kifner 1994). Indeed, in this spot, and hundreds of others across the city, a 'Sarajevo Rose' demarcates a moment of atrocity where mortar fell and civilians died. The scarred concrete, filled in with red resin, serves as a reminder to all who pass of a moment in time where civilians lost their lives during warfare (Korchnak 2014). .

Undeniably, one of the more concerning consequences of modern warfare is that most casualties are civilians – primarily women and children – and in some cases are targeted for sexual violence by combatants. The sheer numbers of those affected is staggering. Importantly, the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), the central case examined in this dissertation, is a conflict in which the severity of sexualized was considerably severe. In the UN's estimates of high severity cases of sexualized violence, the former Yugoslavia is recognized as such in the following:

"In Rwanda, between 100,000 and 250,000 women were raped during the three months of genocide in 1994. UN agencies estimate that more than 60,000 women were raped during the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), more than 40,000 in Liberia (1989-2003), up to 60,000 in the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), and at least 200,000 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1998 (2014)[4]."

[4] The estimates for the DRC may be slightly different for two main reasons – 1) time since this report and 2) incentive structures in the DRC for reporting sexualized violence (Crawford, Hoover Green, and

In many ways, modern warfare situates women as the leading victims of sexual violence in war[5]. Women disproportionately carry the costs of political conflict in ways that are frequently unobservable. Without a doubt, the price of wartime rape is high and the harm is not limited to the individual. It tears at the social fabric of communities, traumatizes the victim, breaks up families, and leads to significant health related issues (i.e. HIV, unwanted pregnancy, and STI's) (United Nations 2013). Furthermore, the legacy of psychological effects and potential legal costs if redress is sought, lead to heavy burdens in post-conflict environments that these communities can little afford to manage in the fragile aftermath of war (United Nations 2013).

The scale of those affected and the weight of the costs of conflict-related sexual violence has led to a body of literature devoted to increasing our understanding of this type of political violence. However, the presence of sexualized violence in warfare is by no means a new phenomenon. What has shifted is the burgeoning interest in these occurrences over the past few decades, which has not only transformed the ways in which we view political violence and conflict processes, but also the methods we engage to study these processes and their effects. This dissertation represents an effort to examine important patterns in sexualized violence in conflict from a distinct and relatively underexplored perspective – individual combatants' motivations.

While conducting field research during the summer of 2018 in Bosnia, I made a similar inquiry of each person I interviewed regarding acts of sexualized violence during

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Parkinson 2014). Regardless, the scale of this type of violence in these cases and amongst several others remains significant.

[5] Men are also frequently victims of sexual violence in warfare. However, in spite of the likelihood of a greater degree of underreporting by men *vis a vis* women victims, women are still excessively affected in this way in comparison to their male counterparts.

the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). I was intrigued by the questions related to variation in sexualized violence raised in the political violence literature, which was the primary impetus behind my inquiry. The question I raised challenges readers (and this researcher) to shift perspective regarding acts of sexualized violence in conflict settings.

Importantly, all respondents unequivocally and unreservedly responded, "yes" to my question. My query may surprise readers given the affirmative responses participants provided and the ways in which we currently frame questions related to sexualized violence in the academic literature. I asked, "Were you aware of combatants who did not commit sexualized violence during the conflict?" Not only did participants readily confirm that they were aware of such individuals, they were also able to quickly provide anecdotes of enemy combatants sometimes intervening on behalf of civilians and potential victims, along with accounts of non-interventionists who made efforts to avoid committing acts of violence. Some participants further offered observations about the passive, non-interventionist who did not commit violence, but who also did nothing to intervene. The stories were many.

However, if one were to rely on media and academic accounts about sexualized violence alone, the non-offending combatant is mostly absent from this narrative. In conflicts that have been characterized by a high degree of sexual violence – the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - to name a few, it is rare, if at all, to hear stories of the combatant who refrained. Yet, the combatant who resists committing sexualized violence exists and, I contend, likely has important insights to offer about what allows them to withstand committing violence in spite of the

opportunity structure to do so. Indeed, the difference that exists between the passive resistor and the perpetrator is a theme that underpins this research.

Yet, while it was a desired aim at the outset of this research to empirically evaluate the resistor and other categories of combatants who did not commit sexualized violence in conflict, that endeavor turned out to be much more challenging than it initially seemed. Undoubtedly, the fact that the passive resistor exists and represents a significantly large cohort (as will be demonstrated further along in this dissertation) is an important descriptive observation in and of itself, especially since this category of actor is mostly absent from the current literature. More importantly still, in spite of significant efforts on my part to gather interview data from respondents on the non-perpetrator, in this case my efforts were in vain. This seems interesting and important to consider.

There are a host of likely suspects for this outcome, which I enumerate here as a means of anchoring and guiding the reader for the analysis in the pages ahead. First, as has been argued by scholars of sexual violence, the portrayal of wartime sexual violence often focuses on the most sensational narratives in a well-meaning effort to mobilize support that often leads to a host of unintended and detrimental consequences (Crawford, Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). This focus on the sensational not only leads to unhelpful outcomes for victims, but it also generates inaccurate representations of sexual violence data and patterns, which informs policy and research agendas (Crawford, Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). In the case of this dissertation, I argue that one of the negative externalities of the selective focus on the perpetration of sexualized violence is the challenge this presents in illuminating the categorical other who does not commit sexualized violence.

By way of example, while respondents I interviewed were able to reflexively and openly identify single shot stories of restraint, when I probed further about the potential motivating factors for this restraint, they remained relatively silent. This may be a reflection of the expertise the respondents I interviewed have in terms of their knowledge related to the perpetration of sexual violence in conflict. They are well acquainted with perpetrators because their roles require laser-focus on the perpetrator. And yet, as a result, the unobserved but substantive category of non-perpetrator remains inscrutable and little understood. While this dissertation does not engage this unobserved category causally or empirically, I invite the reader to keep the potential motivations of the non-perpetrator in mind as a subtext of this analysis juxtaposed against the individual motivations of the perpetrator that are empirically explored in this dissertation.

Critically, this dissertation engages in two orders of analysis and inquiry. First and implicitly, I consider the origin and emergence of gender-biased attitudes and beliefs and how they pertain to conflict-related sexual violence. Secondly and directly, I explore individual differences between combatants broadly as a factor motivating sexual violence in conflict. It is the synthesis of these two processes by which a theoretical account of gender-bias is both developed and tested in this dissertation. While I empirically focus on the individual differences associated with the perpetration of sexualized violence in conflict, the individual difference theoretical framework I develop may have applicability to other individual drives and motivations associated with restraint for future research. However, in the case of this research, I focus on a singular application of the theoretical framework.

In this way, this project explores the politics and psychology of identity as part of the answer to the two orders of questions raised above. By drawing on several literatures – social psychology, developmental psychology, sociology, and political science – I examine the notion of identity in relationship with contextual influences. I consider how combatants' self-construal operates within the broader context of political conflict. I further assess whether and in what ways certain social identities manifest into the formation of distinctive attitudes, beliefs, and preferences amongst combatants, which are then observable in behavioral outcomes within the politically conflicted context.

Critically, this dissertation argues that aggregate explanations of violence leaves out important individual distinctions occurring both within and across conflicts. Structural and even institutional explanations cannot, in isolation, effectively account for the large number of combatants who refrain from violence even in cases experiencing highly severe rates of sexualized violence.

Thus, I outline a theoretical explanation addressing the process by which individual differences make sexualized violence more likely to occur. In this theory - which I have labeled the individual difference theory of gender bias – I suggest that certain social identity labels that are more deeply embedded for the individual combatant results in the formation of biased attitudes, beliefs and preferences. These biased attitudes and beliefs then translate into different behavioral outcomes than what may be typically observed during peacetime due to the unique constraints placed on an individual's judgments and motivations within the context of political conflict.

Moreover, this interactive process between social identity, attitudes and beliefs, and judgment and motivations operates within a milieu of exogenous contextual factors

related to warfare that the individual combatant navigates. These extrinsic factors – military organizational factors, group cohesiveness factors, and various types/qualities of violence[6] - all shape the ecology of the environment in which the individual soldier operates. These conditions can either serve to amplify or diminish the likelihood for soldiers' biased beliefs to be enacted.

As an initial effort in evaluating a potential array of individual differences between combatants that make sexual violence more likely, I hone in on a limited set of social identity labels and ensuing attitudes and beliefs that are theoretically more salient to enacting sexual violence in conflict. Respectively, I argue that certain social identity labels over others act as orienting principles in navigating the social world - in this case – political conflict. Further, the resulting biased attitudes and beliefs linked to a sense of self-construal generated from these more fixed labels are also more entrenched and thus more readily utilized as reference points for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty.

Given this, a central precept of this dissertation is that gender analysis is critical – and a source of differentiation in combatants' attitudes and beliefs. Undoubtedly, a primary and deeply embedded social identity category is gender. Notions of gender – and masculinity and femininity – are essential reference points that individuals rely on in daily living in order to make sense of the social world. To leave gender out of the equation of conflict-related sexual violence analyses is to perhaps miss a vital component that potentially shapes combatant behavior in conjunction with other important contextual influences. However, the ways in which we conceptualize and include gender into our

[6] Not an exhaustive list.

examinations has critical implications for the research we engage and the outcomes we observe. This dissertation thusly is cognizant of how, when, and it ways the notion of gender is considered.

In what follows, I conduct a case study of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) as a means of empirically testing the individual difference theory of gender bias. I select a sub-national case study as the primary method of analysis in order to capture and closely evaluate within conflict differences that are central to the two orders of inquiry raised in this dissertation. However, in keeping with a dual theme in terms of questions explored, I also employ two distinct methods of analysis by evaluating the sources of differences through a cross-conflict, ordered probit regression analysis. In such a way, a multi-method approach allows for a comprehensive investigation of the two orders of questions raised - a) the sources of individual differences and b) the effects these individual differences have in motivating sexualized violence within conflict.

As I apply two different analytical approaches, I similarly assume two different tones throughout this dissertation. Initially, I take up a more traditionally positivist tone reflective of the theory development and broader cross-conflict analysis explored in these sections. As I engage in the qualitatively driven analysis, I invoke a more ethnographic voice, similar to the tenor that began this chapter. I do so with purpose to signal the distinctions in these approaches. And, much like the method of this chapter, I strive to find a synthesis and balance between the two.

Accordingly, in **Chapter 2** I outline the main research question driving this project, namely why some combatants commit sexualized violence in conflict when others clearly refrain. By way of response, I outline the main tenets and component parts

of the individual difference theory of gender bias, which suggests that combatants differentially internalize a set of attitudes, beliefs and preferences – particularly as it pertains to gender. Essentially, I argue that combatants who have certain gender biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences are more likely to engage in sexualized violence in combat. I additionally explore contextual influences that interact with the aforementioned individual factors including conditions of uncertainty and social norm constructions that surround the individual. From there, I generate deductively developed hypotheses outlining the ways that individual differences predict the likelihood that a combatant will commit sexualized violence.

In order to effectively evaluate the individual difference theory of gender bias regarding combatant behavior in conflict, in **Chapter 3,** I provide an overview of Bosnian history with attention given to the development of the multi-ethnic society leading up to the conflict (1992 – 1995). In this historical overview, I describe several of the contextual influences outlined in the theory chapter that helps to shape identity formation and future combatants' beliefs and attitudes in the buildup to Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). In this way, Chapter 3, in part, addresses the first order of questions regarding institutional and societal sources of identity formation in the former Yugoslavia. The shaping of ethnic, religious, and gender identity is traced in this chapter as a means of portraying the environmental factors under which combatants' form identities.

Following this, I provide an analysis of the nature of the sexualized violence committed during the course of the conflict in Bosnia (1992 – 1995). In **Chapter 4**, I pay close attention to the form, purpose, timing, and targeting elements of the sexual violence

engaged in the Bosnian case. In a similar vein as Chapter 3, I focus on important contextual influences – including the type of sexualized violence – targeted and opportunistic, amongst several other patterns illuminated in this analysis. Additionally in this chapter, I evaluate human rights reports and the *Annex IX Rape and Sexual Assault Report* commissioned by the UN Security Council through Resolution 780 (1992) to begin to demonstrate a pattern of individual differences within a conflict characterized by highly severe sexual violence. In this way, Chapter 4 begins to descriptively illuminate a pattern associated with the second order of analysis in this dissertation – that individual differences do motivate sexual violence in conflict.

Returning to the first order of inquiry in this dissertation, in **Chapter 5**, I directly consider sources of individual differences and evaluate the effects of societal level gender inequalities and their relationship with the severity of wartime rape. A key element in the individual difference theory of gender bias is that combatants vary in terms of their beliefs and attitudes about gender. In this chapter, I explore whether or not the effects of gender inequality are observable in the aggregate or if the individuating process of combatant internalization is where the effects might be more readily observed. To analyze this, I provide a sub-theoretical account – the gender role socialization theory – describing a societal level source of gender bias in combatants. In this chapter, I evaluate whether or not societal gender inequalities are an observable source for the differences in attitudes, beliefs, and preferences about gender formed by combatants during childhood. In order to empirically evaluate this proposition and the sources of individual differences, in this chapter, I conduct a cross-conflict, ordered probit regression analysis testing the relationship between gender inequalities in the aggregate and severity of conflict-level

wartime rape. The result leads back to the individual as the integral unit of analysis. While the sources of gender inequality are many, what remains pivotal and relevant is the ways in which the individual combatant internalizes, interprets, and then enacts them.

Finally, in **Chapter 6** I directly evaluate the individual difference theory of gender bias through qualitative discourse/content analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted over the course of two field research trips to Bosnia in 2014 and 2018 respectively. In this analysis, I explore both orders of questions driving this dissertation and I evaluate the individuating processes outlined in the individual difference theory of gender bias. In this investigation, I find evidence supporting the relationship between combatants' attitudes and beliefs associated with gender inequality and the likelihood to commit sexualized violence in the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995). In addition, I also find that two important judgment constraining and motivating factors were also present as posited by the individual difference theory of gender bias – conditions of uncertainty and alcohol use. Moreover, as is often the case with inductively driven research, important variables were revealed that offer critical insight for future research regarding the principal individual differences between combatants, which I also reveal as part of the interview content analysis conducted in this chapter.

In **Chapter 7**, I offer a summary of the results of this research and make suggestions for an ongoing research agenda. I highlight the importance of continuing to explore ways to evaluate and better understand the non-perpetrator and suggest ways to move this complex research agenda forward to help prevent and mediate the detrimental effects of conflict-related sexualized violence in the future. Notably, because this is a relatively novel question and approach to studying sexualized violence in conflict, there

are several limitations associated with this research, which I describe in the concluding chapter and also highlight here. First because this is a case study of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), which occurred over twenty years ago, there are constraints associated with the time that has elapsed since the war, which undoubtedly has an effect in terms of respondent recollection and perception. However, the Bosnian case is unique in that it is well documented, so I triangulate evidence with reports made at the time or close to the conflict to try to manage this limitation to some degree. In addition, evaluating an individual-level process associated with political conflict is a complex and ambitious endeavor. Methodologically, the most ideal approach is to collect data that directly captures individual distinctions. While more direct methods would have been preferred, constraints in terms of capacity and ethics prevented these methodological approaches. As such, field research and interviews extrapolating the impressions of experts and those with direct experience with perpetrators who committed conflict-related sexual violence was the approach deployed. This provided significant within case data, but it is limited to the Bosnian case only.

Accordingly, while the findings of this research are limited, it does show promise as a burgeoning research agenda. Consequently, this dissertation generates prevalent questions to consider as part of ongoing research and supplies answers for only one dimension of the puzzle due to the complexity of this phenomenon. By discovering more about the potential causes associated with individual combatant differences in behavior, and most importantly, more about the non-perpetrator, we can undoubtedly better enrich existing and future research agendas and ultimately better inform future policy prescriptions that research generates.

CHAPTER 2

UNDERSTANDING AGENCY: THEORIZING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Introduction

Questions persist concerning why civilians are seemingly targeted in some conflicts and yet enjoy relative immunity from violence in others. Given the puzzling variations observed in these patterns of violence, attempts have been made in order to better understand the mechanisms that lead to or constrain political violence in conflict settings by academics and policy practitioners alike. Adding to this, in conflicts where civilians are targeted, additional questions surface related to the types and variation of the violence engaged over the course of conflicts both on and off the formal battlefield. One notable form of political violence that is characterized by these noticeable variations is conflict-related sexual violence.

A burgeoning body of literature specifically addresses some of the more puzzling variations observed in sexualized violence both within and across conflicts. These valuable contributions offer excellent analyses that outline distinct causal mechanisms presumably at work within conflict settings. However, in most cases, these explanations have examined the phenomena mainly from meso and macro level perches with a noticeable dearth in the examination of the micro-level processes that undoubtedly impacts how, why, and when combatants engage in sexualized violence. For example, recent scholarship has identified clear cross-conflict variation in the perpetration of conflict-related sexual violence. These broad, macro-level studies have successfully identified a general pattern of variation that undoubtedly calls for deeper examination.

Yet, when we sharpen the conceptual lens, we know that within these broader contexts, soldiers commit different forms of sexualized violence. For example, some conflicts are characterized by more frequent gang rapes and others appear to engage more opportunistic forms of sexualized violence that do not involve the performative elements of gang / group violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Indeed, there are even greater variations in these patterns when factors such as timing and location are considered (Cohen and Nordås 2014).

To date, scholars have looked to structural accounts, like systemic gender inequality (Enloe 2004), and organizational and group socialization reasoning for explanatory power (D. K. Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; E. J. Wood 2009b). These arguments provide important insight about the broader context in which combatants are situated, but they tell us little about the ways in which combatants internalize the structural and group influences that surround them. In short, these studies attribute differences in combatants' behavior mainly to organizational and/or structural factors leaving the individual attributes of these combatants underexplored.

I contend that while group cohesion and organizational variables matter as it pertains to the context in which combatants engage in conflict, there remains an element missing from our current conceptual map. Micro-level factors, such as combatant personal characteristics and beliefs, map onto these broader processes and indelibly shapes the resulting patterns of conflict-based sexual violence. Accordingly, the analysis of variation at the individual combatant level allows for a more nuanced exploration of the linkages between 1) identity, 2) motivations, and 3) actions (Kalyvas 2003). Arguably, the individual combatant remains an important unit of analysis since political

violence is an interactive and process-oriented phenomenon that spans different levels of analysis (Tarrow 2007). As such, this research maintains that understanding micro-level processes serves to add to the explanatory power of existing structural and organizational accounts.

Investigating Variation in Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

Presently, several leading explanations for variations in conflict-related sexual violence are explored in the existing literature. In terms of mapping the phenomenon, scholars effectively demonstrate that sexual violence is more prevalent in some conflicts and less so in others (Cohen 2013; Wood 2009b). In conflicts where evidence of sexual violence is apparent, there is also additional variance in terms of the timing, location, and quality of the sexualized violence deployed (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Additionally, conflicting accounts argue whether or not extreme war rape and/or rape as a weapon of war is ubiquitous or rare (Meger 2016, Crawford 2013; Farr 2009; Leiby 2009). These studies examine the prevalence and severity of particular forms of sexualized violence and debate what qualifies as sexualized violence in conflict. Additionally, agreement about the conceptualization and operationalization of this form of political violence continues to receive attention. In spite of ongoing debates concerning the degree and quality of variation in sexualized violence in conflict, scholars agree that variation does indeed exist, and they also agree that these patterns merit deeper exploration.

Existing analyses of the observed variations have led to important arguments that explain some of the aforementioned patterns. A significant contribution argues that, "armed group leadership, the norms of combatants, dynamics within small units, and the effectiveness of military discipline (Wood 2006 p. 308)," all contribute to the differing

levels of sexualized violence in a given conflict context. This line of reasoning maintains that fluctuations in wartime rape also depend on critical organizational factors (Wood 2009). Primarily the argument explores in what ways military group leadership and hierarchies have established norms concerning sexualized violence and can effectively enforce these norms through information flows and chains of command[7].

Building on the organizational effectiveness explanation, Hoover Green (2011, 2018) notes that the quality of the institutions and ideologies of armed groups are directly related to the capacity of the militarized organizations to establish and maintain control over violence. Hoover Green (2011, 2018) explains that commanders face a dilemma - they must simultaneously valorize violence to encourage combatants to utilize it when required and limit it when not needed. In order to control violence, militarized bodies must - 1) demonstrate military organizational effectiveness in terms of discipline and sanction power, and 2) develop effective institutions to control combatant preferences for violence. In order for commanders to effectively control combatant preferences, combatants are socialized into the military culture through institutional arrangements that seek to alter combatant preferences for violence.

Notably, Hoover Green (2011) defines combatants' preferences and predispositions as "beliefs, instincts, and attitudes regarding violence (p.22)," that are

[7] Wood (2009a) advances a two-pronged explanation for the absence of conflict-related sexual violence across conflicts. There are several mechanisms described under these two overarching factors, which are the basis upon which much of the literature on variation in this area has been built. The first point suggests that military leaders may decide sexual violence is counterproductive or normatively abhorrent and are charged with the task of enforcing this position. The second logic argues that observed patterns of violence may diverge from the command structure norms because of the norms held by combatants concerning violence against civilians. For more on the additional mechanisms under these categories, see (Hoover Green 2012).

observable in different "layers."[8] The 'layer' Hoover Green (2011) primarily focuses on pertains to the pro-violence preference changes combatants experience under the influence of the military socialization processes of indoctrination and discipline (p. 22). Markedly, both Wood (2006; 2009a) and Hoover Green (2012, 2018) concede that combatants undoubtedly enter the militarized environment with heterogeneous norms concerning violence[9]. Although Wood (2009a) indicates that it is possible that the recruitment strategy of armed groups may lead to combatants joining armed groups with homogenized norms concerning violence, this notion of entering with a uniform set of norms is only believed to be operative in a minority of cases[10]. Regardless of this starting point, Wood (2009a) is consistent with Hoover Green (2011, 2018) when she states that combatants, "norms and beliefs may be *profoundly altered* as recruits are inducted into the group through formal and informal practices...(p. 138, emphasis mine)[11]."

Similar to the position of Wood (2006, 2009a) and Hoover Green (2011), Cohen

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[8] In my review of this literature, only Wood (2006; 2009) and Hoover Green (2012) (political science), and Henry, et al (2004) (criminology) address heterogeneous preferences of individual combatants in this context. Additionally, it should be noted that these scholars utilize a variety of terms for combatants' beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and motivations. Wood (2006; 2009) uses combatant norms and internalized norms interchangeably. Henry, et al (2004) use terms such as distal, individual traits, and personality dispositions.

[9] Wood (2006, 2009a) and Hoover Green's (2012) concession concerning the heterogeneous norms of combatants is limited to violence in particular. The individual difference theory advanced in this research suggests that the consideration of combatant preferences ought not be limited to violence alone as alternative preferences beyond norms concerning violence serves to shape the propensity for violent behavior in conflict. This research posits that attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of combatants associated with notions of masculinity and femininity are key in this analysis.

[10] For example, a fighting group that has the resource capacity for remuneration may lead to the recruitment of criminals or mercenaries who share a similar perspective about the use of violence. Conversely, a fighting group that lacks material resources must recruit based on ideological imperatives, which could result in a strongly shared vision concerning violence by recruits and combatants alike. For more on the resource hypothesis, see Weinstein (2007) and Wood (2009a). Also, Hoover Green (2012) engages this hypothesis in her research. Ultimately, while cases where shared beliefs may exist, it is more likely that individuals differ in beliefs and preferences.

[11] I place emphasis on the language of 'profoundly altered' as this research explores this particular theoretical assumption in Wood (2009a) and Hoover Green's (2012, 2018) arguments. Which norms, beliefs, and attitudes held by combatants and have salience in conflict-settings and whether or not they can be 'profoundly altered' are central concerns addressed in this research.

(2013) explains variation in wartime rape as a function of forced recruitment and unit cohesion. Cohen's (2013) theory argues that forced recruitment leads to battle units with low group solidarity and social cohesion. Drawing on Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), Cohen (2013) makes the case that these low solidarity groups commit gang rapes as a form of "performative violence," in order to build group solidarity. In this way, Cohen (2013) addresses and adds to both prongs of Wood's (2009a) two-part theory, which pertains to combatant norms on violence and the efforts at small-group organizational cohesion. For Cohen (2013), group socialization processes associated with forced recruitment and the building of group solidarity can help explain cross-conflict variation in wartime rape. Yet, this account does not fully capture significant within conflict variations in wartime rape, nor does it readily apply to the broader category of sexualized violence[12].

As such, even within units exhibiting the characteristics existing analyses have identified, considerable variation in the perpetration of sexual violence persists and remains unaccounted for within the parameters of these existing explanations. It is not the case that every soldier in every unit with weak command and/or organizational control and low group solidarity engages in sexual assault. Indeed, many refrain from enacting this form of political violence. Indeed, these conditions create a permissive environment that makes sexual vioelnce likely, but this does not explain individual differences in behavior when exposed to similar conditions. These individual differences is at the heart of the puzzle this dissertation engages.

[12] The phenomenon of conflict-related sexual violence is more extensive than the specific category of wartime rape. The performative nature of this violence as a group solidarity function does not readily fit with opportunistic patterns of sexualized violence that appear to be the more common form of sexual violence in conflict settings (Cohen and Nordås 2014; Crawford, Green, and Parkinson 2014).

Moreover, these divergences do not necessarily arise from lack of opportunity to commit violence and cannot be explained away as simply being in the right place at the right time. By way of example, the UNJHRO (2013) reported extensive human rights violations committed by the Congolese armed group, the *Mouvement du 23 Mars* (M23) and the Congolese national army (the *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC), between November 15 and December 2, 2012, when soldiers from the FARDC were forced to retreat from their front line positions in the city of Goma to the towns of Sake and Minova. During this time, roughly 2,000 FARDC soldiers from various regiments were present in Minova[13]. UNJHRO reported 135 incidents of sexualized violence committed by FARDC forces during the course of the fighting. While the number is grave indeed, it is evident that many of the soldiers refrained from committing sexualized violence in spite of belonging to the same fighting units with exposure to the same organizational and socialization factors thought to explain variation in conflict-related sexual violence[14]. Thus, even when accounting for the organizational and structural factors utilized to explain variation, it is clear that there are some soldiers who do engage in sexual violence and some who refrain.

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[13] This number is an estimate from documentary sources. Accurate counts of soldiers in the Congolese national army are not presently available, especially given the regular fluctuation in the military census. This fluctuation is in part due to the integration of groups in and out of the national army at various stages during the conflict. Human Rights Watch (2015) reported that, "(d)ifferent army battalions and thousands of soldiers were in Minova at the time of the crimes, making it difficult to identify individual perpetrators (p. 3)." This highlights the challenges associated with accessing accurate census data on the fighting forces in the Congolese conflict. It should also be noted that 2,000 soldiers is a conservative estimate. UNJHRO (2013) reports that following the fall of Sake to *M23* on November 22, 2012, that somewhere between 6,000 and 8,000 FARDC soldiers, along with their dependents, retreated towards Minova and the surrounding areas. While not all of the retreating soldiers installed in Minova, there were a number of FARDC soldiers in and around Minova, quite possibly more than the conservative estimate outlined in this example.

[14] Underreporting related to sexualized violence and wartime rape is common. While it may be argued that not all cases of rape during the episodes of violence in Minova were reported, even allowing for inflation, there is clear anecdotal evidence that many soldiers refrained from committing acts of sexualized violence.

The Value of Micro-Level Analysis

Viewing these differences in combatant behavior from a micro-level perch opens inquiries as to what incentivizes a combatant to engage in sexualized violence and conversely what allows them to refrain. From this analytical position, we observe clear distinctions in individual combatant experiences that remain hidden under the purview of alternative theoretical accounts for variation. Thus, it is necessary to explore these emergent questions concerning variation at the level of analysis that allows these questions to be detectable. Consequently, it is a valuable endeavor to understand the micro-level mechanisms and factors that shape these differences.

A particularly critical question that is generated from this viewpoint evaluates which belief systems and/or attitudinal positions are activated and relevant for perpetrators in enacting this type of violence? Arguably, an assumption that underpins many of the existing explanations for variation in sexualized violence in conflict is that each belief, instinct, and attitude combatants hold about violence are equal in salience and thus will be uniformly susceptible to pro-violence military training and socialization strategies.

For example, while Hoover Green (2011, 2018) acknowledges that combatants enter the conflict environment with pre-military beliefs, instincts, and attitudes about violence, she explicitly states that her argument assumes that these prior preferences matter little under the powerful constraint of organizational control and military socialization processes. In addition, for Wood (2006; 2009a), Hoover Green (2011, 2018), and Cohen (2013), individual agency in conflict settings appears to be mostly overridden by prevailing group and institutional processes. Yet, given that there is evidence that many

combatants refrain from violence, the notion that individual agency is mostly constrained by factors exogeneous to the individual is not always the case.

Importantly, in the context of civil war, research suggests that it is vital to explore the interaction between the broader political motivations associated with a fighting group's master cleavage and the private motivations of the individual in the conflict setting (Kalyvas 2003). In order to effectively examine the transactional relationship between the wider political climate and the private drives of the combatant, a deeper investigation of individual attributes and motivations is imperative and presently lacking in the literature. Attention to individual preferences and motivations has largely been limited or assumed irrelevant in the face of the presumably more powerful influence of structural, organizational, and small-group factors.

Given the evidence that these explanations cannot fully explain within combat unit variation in conflict-related sexual violence, it is necessary to probe further. I argue that certain, although not all, pre-military beliefs, instincts, and attitudes held by combatants matter more than previous accounts suggest. Building on existing theories, this research explores the underdeveloped treatment of individual combatant attitudes, beliefs, and preferences in order to add to our current understanding of the patterns of sexualized violence in conflict.

While these pre-existing beliefs are potentially moderated by the degree of organizational control leveraged by military units and command structures, an empirical question persists as to the extent these organizational factors suppress and/or facilitate the individual beliefs and attitudes of combatants. Because individual beliefs and attitudes remain mostly under analyzed empirically, this research adds to existing knowledge by

re-engaging the individual in group-level models, so we can better understand within group variation as it pertains to incidents of sexualized violence under the context of differential organizational control factors.

A micro-foundational understanding of individual differences enhances the conceptual landscape by identifying combatants who commit sexualized violence and observing those who resist the influence of organizational and structural factors intended to shape combatant preferences regarding the use of violence (Hoover Green 2011, 2018). Similarly, this perch calls for a deeper understanding of those combatants who refrain from committing sexualized violence. Current meso and macro level conceptual analyses overlook non-perpetrators and their critical presence as conflict actors. While this dissertation provides a thoeretical account for those who do commit sexualized violence, the presence of the non-perpetrator is considered in the subtext of this research.

A final added value is the potential to expand upon our comprehension regarding the interaction between individual attitudes and beliefs and organizational and institutional-level influences. The interactional processes between these distinct factors shapes combatant behavior within the context of political conflict. Thus, as the examples in this section illustrate, meso and macro-level factors remain unable to fully account for observed within unit variations in acts of sexualized violence, which suggests that there are additional factors to explore in order to better understand this complex phenomenon.

Individual Differences as a Theoretical Framework in Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

A) *The question of unit of analysis – why the individual and gendered attitudes and beliefs matters.*

> *"The locus of agency is as likely to be at the bottom as at the top, so civilians cannot be treated as passive, manipulated, or invisible actors…" - Stathis Kalyvas (2003, 481)*[15]

When developing a theory related to the individual differences between combatants and their propensity to commit sexualized violence within conflict, it is essential to consider what relevant factors are associated with variation between them. Within the context of this research, I consider social identity factors[16], along with attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, to be foundational elements within the framework of the individual difference theory of gender bias I introduce in this dissertation. These, along with other features expanded on in the following section, provides a conceptual map for understanding the logic of combatant behavior as it pertains to acts of sexualized violence in conflict settings.

I begin by evaluating why social identities matter when considering questions related to individual combatant differences. It is fitting to consider what ends social

[15] While this quote refers to civilians, I employ a similar logic to soldiers. Soldiers, who may be more directly considered political actors *vis a vis* civilians as it pertains to political conflict, are also agents. Indeed, soldiers, especially in the case of intrastate conflict, are often civilians first and foremost. This means that they do not receive the same training, socialization, or even pay that professional soldiers receive. Thus, these 'soliders' are often civilians occupying a position of power. Because this dissertation considers the social context as a mediating factor shaping beliefs into behavior, these distinctions between 'soldiers' may result in different violent behaviors. This has implications for behavioral outcomes in conflict.

[16] Social identity labels are discussed at length in the sections ahead. In brief, identity can be thought of as a sense of self-construal within the larger social world an indiviudal interacts with. Building from the singular notion of identity, social identity labels then are considered categorical groupings an indivudal *and* others perceive an individual belonging to including gender, ethnicity, relgious labels amongst a host of others. Social identity is an inherently social psychological concept in that it is both socially constructed and indivudally perceived. Thus, it is a highly interactive and recreated concept.

identities serve to the individual who occupies them. Hale (2004) provides the following response for consideration:

> "(T)he notion of identity (is) the set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad constellations of social relationships they encounter, to discern their place in these constellations, and to understand the opportunities for action in this context (p. 463)."

This definition suggests that social identities are critical orienting principles upon which, in this case, combatants rely on to effectively navigate the environment that surrounds them. In a sense, it is the primer from which attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately motivations for actions are built. While combatants hold more than one social identity, some are more salient within the context of political conflict than others.

The theory advanced here directly challenges the notion that combatants are lone actors with no variability in terms of motivation and identity within the civil war context. I posit that combatants are not passive actors that simply comply with the directives of the master cleavage of their fighting group or even their commander. While these factors contextually influence combatants, they remain agents with their own set of attitudes, preferences, beliefs that translate into an interpretation of contextual influences that informs their behavior during warfare. In this way, the individual difference theory of gender bias departs from other contributions by accounting for these distinctions between combatants, which are observable in the differential behaviors of these actors.

Kalyvas (2003) argues that patterns of violence that emerge during conflict are simultaneously ambiguous and complex, much like the social identity labels that are relevant for combatants in the case of political conflict. Kalyvas (2003) cautions scholars to be wary of considering only a singular social identity label for actors in civil war as

this can lead to underrepresentation of the variability in interests, beliefs, and motivations at work for individuals within the civil war context. Indeed, this is particularly true when a singular identity label is appropriated and conceptualized from the top down to the local level. Kalyvas (2003) contends that this is an overly homogenizing conceptual approach that misses significant variability given that individuals occupy multiple social identity categorizations. It is not the case that a combatant identifies exclusively and only as a soldier and it remains critical to consider the complexities of self-construal within the framework of political conflict.

For example, Kalyvas (2003) describes conceptual issues that arise when viewing civil war dynamics (and political violence in particular) from a singularly top-down perspective. According to Kalyvas (2003), identity, motivations, and actions in the context of civil war are as diverse as the array of actors that are relevant within this context (civilians, armies, combatants, local, and government actors to name a few). Kalyvas (2003) further suggests that generalizing a unitary, master cleavage from the center leads to imperfect theories of causation.

Case in point, these sorts of generalizations lead to the assumption that (all) Serbs (as distinct actors) are then driven by a lone motivation (ethnic domination), which then results in the same actions and behavior for all (p. 481). And yet, this is not empirically borne out. Not all Serbs sought ethnic domination and indeed, the Serb identity is further reducible to even more nuanced categories – Serbian and Bosnian Serb – for which motivations during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) were quite distinct. This example highlights the importance of considering how interests and motivations are built from various social identities, which is shaped by contextual factors associated with the social

context of warfare. Indeed, these conditions interact to shape combatants' violent behavior.

For instance, while individuals evaluated in this research occupy the social identity category of combatant, solider, rebel and the like, these are not the only identity categories that are relevant to their behavior in conflict. While the combatant category is certainly highly salient, it is this identity label coupled with other relevant social identity labels and additional factors that can assist in predicting who will and will not commit conflict-related sexual violence.

Arguably, social identities are constructs and debate persists concerning the malleability or fixedness of them. In political science, sociology, and comparative politics, much of our discourse surrounding social identities pertains to the relationship individuals have with different social groups and how these attachments are mobilized by political elites, institutional influences, and by processes inherent to social groups (i.e. in group/out group processes). In the case of conflict studies, and civil war in particular, scholars mainly explore social identities as it pertains to notions of ethnicity.

In this body of work, analysis of social identities is primarily differentiated based on two distinct positions - primordial explanations (Bayar 2009; Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; Van Evera 2001) and constructivist accounts (Brubaker 2002; Chandra 2012; Nagel 1994; Okamura 1981). These points are further differentiated by questions about the durability and flexibility of these identities. Instrumentalists claim that these identities are easily altered whereas "perdurabilists," as coined by (Hale 2004), argue that once formed and embedded, these identities remain highly durable[17].

[17] See Hale (2004) for a robust discussion regarding the politics of social identity construction.

In the case of the individual difference theory of gender bias outlined in this chapter, I follow a middle path position that suggests that identities are indeed social constructs and thus are alterable. However, I qualify this by suggesting that certain identities, by the nature of their very construction and embeddedness, are much "stickier" than others. In this way, I posit that not all social identity categories and social group membership are readily comparable, which suggests that more enduring social identity categories are internalized differently, will be mobilized differently, and will ultimately lead to different behaviors.

Consider the identity of a soldier, for an example. 'Solider' is a social identity label our exemplary individual currently carries. In addition, our soldier's gender, ethnic, and religious identity all may be relevant to this soldier's self-construal and is simultaneously pertinent to those who interact with them. The list of identities this soldier carries may be extensive and may include political affiliations, relationships, and avocations, amongst others.

These identifiers provide the world surrounding this soldier with information about them, while also providing the soldier with a 'social compass' to effectively navigate the world that surrounds them. In this way, the internal drives of the soldier and the shaping influence of the social world are connected. Indeed, this notion of identities being dependent on the social world – that the psychological and social are indelibly linked (Erikson 1968) – is central to the individual difference argument advanced in this dissertation.

Our soldier's connection with varied identities is intriguing. Perhaps our soldier identifies as an artist, as well as an athlete, and also as a parent. Does this mean that the

parent and athlete identity are equivalent? Does the soldier equally value association with these groups? Is one more valuable to the solider, thus making it more fixed as an identifier? Furthermore, does the context surrounding the social identity matter? When our soldier is competing athletically, and their child is at school, does the athlete identity perhaps take primacy in that moment, even though the soldier does not stop identifying as a parent?

The example here is, of course, a simplification of complex issues around social identity. Certainly, some social identity categories are more readily shed throughout a lifetime. A soldier retires, interests change, and children grow. Yet, some identities appear to be more crystallized compared to others. Perhaps this is because of the persistent relevance such an identity has in the daily rituals of social life. If a particular identity is ever present and carries with it deep social meaning, it is likely such an identity will be even more entrenched as a point of self-construal.

In the case of this research, gender is just such an identity that carries with it important social meaning and rituals, while also being highly relevant to sexually violent behavior in conflict. Before turning to a discussion regarding the individualization of gender, I first describe the ways in which gender and political conflict are linked. Comprehending this context provides clarity regarding why biased attitudes and beliefs combatants hold about gender are more readily activated in this space.

Given that conflict-related sexual violence is a gendered form of violence, consideration of gender as a salient social identity factor cannot be overstated. There are several reasons why gender remains a critical analytical concept to include in this analysis. First, political conflict is a highly gendered space. By way of example,

Goldstein (2001) importantly highlights that in nearly all of the national armies across the world's nation-states, women soldiers, and particularly women combat soldiers, comprise an incredibly small portion of these fighting forces[18]. This means that women and their lived experiences within political conflict are often underrepresented or imperceptible. Analysis thusly tends towards a partial account of their experiences and perceptions of conflict. The imbalance and dearth of women's representation in these spaces provides compelling anecdotal evidence that gendered factors and processes innately shapes political conflict.

The case may be made that women do in fact participate equally in conflict, but their participation is unobservable due to the types of questions explored in conflict scholarship and the manner in which they are evaluated. However, even Tickner (2001) notes that while the role of women in war has been rendered relatively invisible, in part due to epistemological challenges in the study of international relations and political conflict, she agrees that a gendering of war persists[19]. She outlines clear linkages between masculinity and war. Notably, she argues that misogynistic training is employed in states' militaries to teach soldiers how to fight. For Tickner (2001), "military masculinity" requires the disparagement of the feminine within this space. Further reinforcing typified norms associated with masculinity and femininity, the militarized environment valorizes

[18] Arguably, these data are dated from 2001 and Goldstein (2001) is speaking only of national forces, not rebel groups and irregular actors who often recruit or count more women fighters in their ranks *vis a vis* national forces. Yet, these descriptive statistics provides convincing evidence that the warring context is a highly gendered space, even giving room for large error margins in the data (Goldstein 2011, 10 -11).
[19] Tickner (2001) suggests that women have been a part of armies over the course history in support roles. Indeed, she notes that women have worked on the front lines in military nursing roles, but these stories are rarely told, likely due to not fitting into the dominant cultural narratives that are inclined to make links between masculinity and warfare.

the "just" and "hero" soldier for protecting vulnerable people who cannot protect themselves – namely women and children.

The gendering of political conflict is discernable in multiple sites. In addition to the observable gendering in the militarized environment, Caprioli (2005) uncovered a correlation between gender inequality and the onset of political conflict. According to Caprioli (2005), states that are characterized by high degrees of gender discrimination are more primed for internal conflict because the context is ripe with violence supporting norms.

In addition, the gendering of war is particularly salient as it pertains to sexualized violence within the conflict context itself. Skjelsbæk (2001) claims that the victim of sexual violence in the war zone is victimized through the feminization of both their sex, ethnic, political, and/or religious identity. Conversely, the perpetrator's sex, ethnic, political, and/or religious identity are empowered by becoming masculinized. Consequently, in times of conflict, the association with gender and patriarchy more frequently and substantively maps onto other social identity categories – ethnic, political, and religious[20].

This suggests that the concept of gender is relevant to explore not only within the broader conflict context, but most especially as it pertains to conflict related sexual violence. However, the concept of gender is complex. Gender is not a simple discrete variable that can readily be plugged in as an input with a correlating output. Indeed, some scholars claim that gender is not a variable at all, but rather it is an accomplishment of sorts (Deutsch 2007; West and Zimmeman 1987). From this constructivist perspective,

[20] I argue that the uncertainty of the conflict setting more frequently facilitates ascribing significance to these categories than in peacetime. This process is described in greater detail in the next section.

gender is dynamically produced through interaction and thus readily changeable, which in some ways counters leading sociological and psychological arguments concerning the ways in which gender difference occurs.

Like some "perdurabilist" accounts, many psychological and sociological arguments suggest that individuals understand gender through an internalized set of norms that embed during key developmental periods (Bussey and Bandura 1999; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Much like the scholarship on ethnicity - psychological, sociological, and biological theories debate the degrees of flexibility surrounding notions of gender and differentially explore what facilitates variation in our understanding of this important concept. However, nearly all of these theoretical approaches agree that critical processes occur during developmental life phases. In keeping with this agreement across theories, the individual difference theory of gender bias advanced in this research assumes that soldiers' development during formative years has important implications for how these soldiers view the world beyond these developmental phases[21].

The theory advanced here takes manifest accounts of gender and gender difference under consideration. While it is clear that gender is a construction and as a construction its conceptualization can transform, it is equally clear that gender is an organizing principle that provides a primer from which social relations are built (Bussey

[21] Henry, et al. (2004) also consider development in their complex model of wartime rape. The individual difference theory of gender bias I outline differs from this account in several ways. In their model, Henry, et al. (2004) focus on links between sex and aggression during adolescent and pubescent developmental periods explicitly. While this is interesting, the theory I outline posits that aggression and sex linked by an individual in peacetime may not be primary in predicting the likelihood of a combatant to commit sexualized violence. Rather, beliefs and attitudes surrounding notions of masculinity and femininity, which are built upon key social identity categories (gender), have significant influence on combatant decision-making upon entering the context of civil war. These attitudes and beliefs may not be what is typically associated with and conceptualized as "aggressive," which is why victims are often surprised when perpetrators known to them enact sexualized violence upon them.

and Bandura 1999; Deutsch 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmeman 1987). While the cultural meanings associated with gender may shift over time, the embeddedness of internalized gender norms during childhood cannot be overlooked[22].

Thus, both the *intrapersonal* conceptualization of gender norms and the *interpersonal* construction of gender in social interaction are relevant to the violent behavior of combatants. These are each sources of gender bias. For example, individuals learn early in life the difference between masculine and feminine. They further develop associations with the attributes that comprise these categories during early childhood development and receive regular and persistent societal reinforcement related to these categories (Bussey and Bandura 1999). Undoubtedly, these associations are learned constructions, but they are learned and constructed during key biological and psychological developmental periods, which leads to the entrenchment of these associations. Further, these embedded associations are then performatively reinforced as individuals move into adulthood through "doing gender" in social interaction and relations (Deutsch 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmerman 1987).

And, the "doing of gender" is a daily ritual. Bussey and Bandura (1999) importantly state that, "Human differentiation on the basis of gender is a fundamental phenomenon that affects virtually every aspect of people's daily lives (p. 676)." This contention suggests that both the conscious and nonconscious performance of gender deeply reinforces and informs upon a person's self-construal. This critical factor associated with a sense of self is then carried into various contextual interactions and sites

[22] See the cross-conflict analysis in Chapter 5 for more developed discussion on gender role socialization processes.

throughout a life span. And, the different sociological sites of these interactions and differential exposure for individuals lead to the development of varying degrees of bias.

One such distinctive site, political conflict, provides a unique context where combatants' self-construal interacts with a traditionally masculinized environment. Scholars advancing socialization and organizational arguments agree that the concept of "military masculinity" is heightened during times of conflict (Cohen 2013; Enloe 1983; Goldstein 2003; Wood 2006). Notably, power is intimately associated with the military masculinity norm. Consequently, when "doing gender" combines with other significant social identity categories in the wartime milieu, certain behavioral outcomes become more likely as a result of the interaction between identity categories, beliefs and attitudes developed from these identity categories, and continued interaction with the social context. As such, understanding whether and in what ways biased attitudes about gender, gender-power relations, and masculinity impacts combatants' actions matters.

While it is important to analyze particular social identity categories, it is also critical to be clear about which attitudes are relevant to explore. Indeed, individuals hold thousands of attitudes and beliefs, yet which of these attitudes and beliefs are salient to this context matters. Given that conflict-related sexual violence is an act of gendered violence, the individual difference theory of gender bias considers the broader relationship between developed gender-biased attitudes and acts of sexual violence. Importantly, previous literature in social psychology has extensively explored the links between individual trait differences and attitudes towards rape and sexual violence.

In a meta-analysis of 72 studies exploring the relationship between individual traits and rape attitudes, Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) found that, "traditional

gender role beliefs, adversarial sexual beliefs, needs for power and dominance, aggressiveness and anger, and conservative political beliefs predicted rape acceptance (p. 295)." Because the individual difference theory of gender bias is interested in the conditions under which biased attitudes translate into behavior, I focus primarily on overarching attitudes and personality inclinations that appear to link to a more accepting attitude towards rape and sexualized violence.

Notably, Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) found that individuals who believe in the continuation of more traditional gender roles were associated with higher attitudes of rape acceptance. Additionally, individuals who measured higher in anger and expressed a high need for power and dominance were also linked with a higher incidence of rape acceptance. Further, individuals who hold a negative view of sex-relations and have a higher hostility position towards the opposite sex were also more associated with higher rates of rape acceptance (Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura 1997). While the studies analyzed by Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) were conducted in the context of the United States outside of conflict-zones, the attitude proclivities uncovered provide important insight into which overarching attitude clusters link to rape acceptance, which may ultimately translate into sexualized violence in conflict. These attitudinal positions also mirror the attitudes and beliefs associated with the military masculinity norm explored in the political science literature.

Thus, this research seeks not only to explore the relevant social identity categories of interest, but it also analyzes particular attitudinal states that are more likely to result in conflict-related sexual violence. In this way, it is critical to evaluate the connections between combatants' identity and their role as soldiers, their biased attitudes associated

with femininity and masculinity[23], and the resultant patterns of conflict-related sexual violence.

B) The conflict context and attitudes, beliefs, and behavior – how does it all connect?

"The human mind must think with the aid of categories… Once formed, categories are the bases of normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it (Allport 1954)."

As a result of the conflict context increasing levels of insecurity, polarization occurs frequently such that individuals are inclined to rely on heuristic strategies in decision-making and problem-solving about the environment within which they are operating (Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Common heuristical strategies employed by individuals include stereotyping and/or profiling (Shapiro and Neuberg 2007). Individuals rely on heuristics when the cognitive resources needed to deduce an optimal outcome is unavailable. Often, decision-making is cognitively costly, which makes heuristic strategies practical and attractive. Undoubtedly, such cognitive strategies are regularly deployed in the conflict setting since civil war threatens an individual's physical integrity and life chances in significant ways, thusly requiring rapid impression formation and decision-making. This means that individuals rely on deeply embedded beliefs and attitudes to form impressions and ultimately make decisions. Given that gender is an organizing principle in human life, combatants, like anyone, hold deeply embedded attitudes and beliefs about gender and gender relations

[23] I add a note here on bias. Because humans are not machines, I assume that all individuals hold some degree of bias. Further, I do not assume a value related to bias (i.e. good/bad), but rather I hold a normative free position in that I assume that a basic part of being human is to have biased atttiudes and beliefs based on the varied influences involved in attitude and belief formation. Essentially, humans are constrained, which leads to bias. The extent of that bias is variable. Interestingly, indivudals are able to recognize bias in others, but are notoriously ill-equipped to recognize their own biases (Propin 2007). Individuals are convinced that their own perspective reflects reality, in spite of the fact that cognitive, perceptual, and motivational biases are innaetly part of the human condition (Pronin 2007). In the next section, I discuss conditions that moderate or facilitate bias in greater detail.

and it is these deeply rooted beliefs that informs their decision-making process regarding violence in the conflict setting.

The condition of uncertainty and its relationship to combatants' self-construal cannot be understated. Social psychologists have long understood that uncertainty reduction is an essential human motivation (Brown and Pehrson 2019; Gaertner et al. 2002; Hogg and Mullin 1999). Active political conflict, with its persistent and immediate existential threat, remains a critical filter through which individual combatant beliefs and attitudes translate into actions. Summarizing Hogg and Mullin (1999, pgs. 253 - 255), Hale (2004) puts it best:

> "People have a fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their place within it – subjective certainty renders existence meaningful and thus gives one confidence about how to behave, and what to expect from the physical and social environment within which one finds oneself (p. 464)."

This desire for certainty and a need for categorization helps explain how social identity groupings serve as reference points when navigating the social sphere. These identity categories are associated with a set of attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that eases the complexity associated with navigating the social world that surrounds the self. As such, combatants draw on these developed and biased attitudes and beliefs, which in turn serves as a reference point for establishing their preferences regarding violence[24].

The individual difference theory of gender bias centrally engages the concept of gender and gender bias. As outlined in the previous section, differences between gender categories are one of the first distinctions humans are socialized to identify and it is from

[24] While I do not address this directly in this research, it is important to note that many of the attitudes and beliefs that influence combatant preferences for violence occur nonconsciously. Implicit bias is an important concept to consider for future research related to attitudes and beliefs that may be connected to pro-violence behaviors. See Brown and Pehrson (2019) and Greenwald and Banaji (1995) for more on nonconscious bias and implicit social cognition processes.

this category that individuals begin to know themselves and others (Bussey and Bandura 1999; Henry, Ward, and Hirshberg 2004). This is important because in an effort to cope with the vast amounts of incoming data individuals are confronted with in their environment, they are forced to make simplifying judgments to manage. Gender differentiation and the sense of one's own gender identity position within the social world is one of the earliest simplifying distinctions individuals are primed to access (Bussey and Bandura 1999; Henry, Ward, and Hirshberg 2004). Indeed, early in life individuals are able to identify their own gender and that of others and further feel some pressure to follow the expected behavior ascribed to the gender category the individual has been assigned to (Blakemore, Berenbaum, and Liben 2008; Bussey and Bandura 1999). In many ways, the capacity to categorize in this important way reduces feelings of uncertainty experienced by the individual.

Thus, a central theoretical assumption in this argument is that gender is an important organizing principle, which means that biased attitudes and beliefs associated with gender are generally more deeply embedded than other attitudes in certain contexts. While it is also true that gender is also produced through the performance of social interaction (West and Zimmerman 1987), these interactions rely on prior scripts about gender in order to perform them at all. Above all, what is imperative is not only that combatants see a difference between gender categories, but also the value that combatants ascribe to these categories. This is the breeding ground for gender bias and it is in assessing this difference between combatants that is at the heart of this theoretical account[25].

[25] Sources of gender socialization and gender bias are many and mostly outside of the scope of this research design. Arguably, there are a host of institutional, political, societal, and cultural processes that shape and inform the development of this bias. These potential sources of gender bias could undoubtedly be a separate

Additional contextual factors also matter. Violence does not occur in a deterministic manner. Rather, there are several different ways in which political actors deploy violence – targeted, indiscriminate, and opportunistic to name a few. Thus, the ways in which gender bias sways combatants' actions depends on the contextual influence exerted by the quality of violence deployed. In consideration of the manner of violence employed, I also suspect that other high valence social identity categorizations interact with gendered attitudes and beliefs to result in distinctive patterns of violence[26].

Another critical contextual factor that has received attention in the literature is the effects of military norms on violence, strong/weak enforcement mechanisms of these norms, and effective command responsibility and control (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; Wood 2006). These factors undoubtedly shape combatants' behaviors as it pertains to sexualized violence in conflict. Much like the moderating effects of effective, stable peacetime institutions, strong military enforcement mechanisms can curb pro-violence preferences to some degree whereas weak enforcement provides a more permissive environment (Hoover Green 2011, 2018).

Keeping these contextual factors in mind, I situate the aforementioned social psychological arguments about gender explicitly within the current literature on conflict-related sexual violence. In this way, I contend that those combatants that have attitudes that hold more bias about gender generally, gender roles specifically, and adversarial

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dissertation project. Suffice it to say, the individual difference theory assumes that combatants have been exposed to a host of forces that have shaped this process. However, while the concept of gender socialization is invariant in the sense that all people have experienced socialization, the *internalization of norms* concerning this social identity category and the *degree of bias* an individual develops is variable.

[26] Since the conflicted space constrains more developed decision-making strategies, it holds that beliefs and attitudes about other social identity categories will also be relevant. However, it should be noted that while religion and ethnicity are also high valence social identity categories, socialization into gender occurs before these other categories and is recognized early in life by most individuals. Thus, this dissertation primarily focuses on the gender distinction in the empirical analysis that follows.

beliefs about the opposite sex prior to military socialization are more likely to engage in sexual gender-based violence in conflict. Indeed, this is likely, especially if the military socialization procedure simply reinforces the attitude already held. On the other hand, those combatants who hold less bias are more able to resist the effects of militarized valorization of violence and as such, are less likely to commit sexual gender-based violence. Further, those same combatants who more deeply hold gender biased attitudes and beliefs will be less likely to commit sexualized violence in cases where strong enforcement mechanisms are in place. However, when they step away from these more direct enforcement mechanisms (i.e. off the formal battlefield), they remain vulnerable to committing sexualized violence within the uncertainty of political conflict.

Thus, I contend that the explanatory effects of the socialization, organizational, and indoctrination procedures outlined by Cohen (2013a;), Hoover Green (2011, 2018), and Wood (2009b) are critical and relevant. The individual difference theory of gender bias advanced here simply adds to the literature by contending that accounting for differences in individual attitudes and beliefs that have developed and embedded not only over time, but also during key developmental periods in an individual's life (Henry, et al 2004; Bussey and Bandura 1999), contextualizes the effects of socialization and organizational arguments (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; Wood 2006, 2009a).

In this way, I explore the biased beliefs and attitudes of the individual that are more or less susceptible to these military socialization and organizational factors, namely attitudes associated with gender bias. Kimmel (2000) notes that gendered biases develop and become relatively fixed early in life. These biases represent implicit attitudinal states that are then adjusted or moderated explicitly through information processing. However,

the capacity – the luxury – of reflection and processing is either constrained or facilitated by the environment that allows the information processing to occur. The conflict context seriously constrains this capacity.

Thus, the individual difference theory of gender bias argues that certain beliefs and attitudes of the individual are more or less susceptible to military socialization and organizational factors. This means that certain beliefs and attitudes might be more readily supplanted with the military socialization position on violence, but those beliefs and attitudes that are more deeply embedded are less flexible to this military indoctrination and education. Further, given that there is some anecdotal evidence of a difference in behavior between combatants exposed to the same organizational and socialization factors, this difference merits further investigation.

Conceptualization and Operationalization

Thus, the individual difference theory of gender bias addresses the conditions under which combatants' gender-biased beliefs and attitudes impacts patterns of political violence in conflict. The sources of biased beliefs and attitudes are many. As discussed in the previous sections, the sources include socialization during combatants' formative years, interaction with gender inequaliaties built into societal institutions, and a host of individual level interactions recreating gendered social identities. In addition, the conditions that allow these biased attitudes and beliefs to be enacted include constraints on judgments and motivations unique to the context of political conflict. These constraints are realized either externally through strong/weak military norm enforcement mechanisms, or internally through influences on combatant cognitive functioning such as threat perception or feelings of uncertainty.

Accordingly, my main argument expands on existing scholarship on conflict-based sexual violence by exploring the individual level factors that shapes this form of violence in conflict settings. I argue that while group cohesion and organizational variables matter, individuating factors concerning combatants' gendered attitudes maps onto these broader processes and shapes the resulting patterns of conflict-based sexual violence. The formula below in Figure 1 describes the theoretical interactions between individual attributes, contextual influences, and the resulting behavioral outcomes.

Figure 1: Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias Theoretical Formula

***Individual**: (social identity categories + attitudes + beliefs) (judgment + motivation) +*
***Context**: (conflict type, quality of violence [opportunistic or strategic], military/organizational structures, societal norms/institutions) =*
Behavioral Outcome (*sexualized violence in conflict*)

Table 1 outlines the basic composition of the variables of interest in this theoretical model. The table is parsed into two broad categorizations – individual processes and contextual influences. The previous section has described the importance of each within the theoretical framework and how each of these factors link back to the likelihood combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict.

Table 1: Table of Theoretical Factors

Individual	Context
Social Identity Factors (gender + ethnic identity + religious identity)	*Violence Type* (targeted, indiscriminate, opportunistic)
Attitudes and Beliefs (gendered beliefs, attitudes, preferences)	*Military Organization/ Group Cohesion* (Strong command structure/ enforcement mechanisms, weak command structure/ enforcement mechanisms, group cohesion/solidarity)
Judgments and Motivations (impaired, implicit, conscious)	*Societal norms / institutions* (structural inequalities in military codes of conduct norms; religious/political/state institutions; norms regarding gender)

Conceptually speaking, a variety of terms describe forms of gendered violence in conflict in the literature and by media. It is critical to identify what is meant by conflict-based sexual violence. It is also essential to define the contextual qualities this form of violence takes on in order to test these relationships. An important contribution argues against singular attention on "rape as a weapon" and suggests that this conceals other forms of sexualized violence that occurs both during and outside of active conflict (Crawford 2013). Thus, expanding the conceptual definition of sexualized violence beyond rape as a strategic weapon of war is imperative[27].

[27] The Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is the case study explored in this research. This well-known case is often characterized by wartime rape as a strategic weapon war. While the International Criminal Tribunal

Consequently, for the dependent variable, I employ the definition of sexual violence as conceptualized by Cohen and Nordås (2014) in the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset. Drawing on the definition from the International Criminal Court (ICC) and from Wood (2009), Cohen and Nordås (2014) include seven acts in their classification of sexual violence. This includes "(1) rape, (2) sexual slavery, (3) forced prostitution, (4) forced pregnancy, (5) forced sterilization/abortion…(6) sexual mutilation, and (7) sexual torture (p. 419)." The import of this conceptualization is that it moves beyond the singular framing of wartime rape and accounts for other forms of sexualized violence that are critical to include in analyses. A further appeal is that it is gender neutral, allowing for the analysis of female perpetrators and male victims (Cohen and Nordås 2014)[28].

My primary independent variable(s) are the gender biased attitudes, beliefs and preferences held by combatants. Thus, I conceptualize gender biased attributes typically associated with cultural notions of masculinity. For example, combatant attitudes about power and strength, both of which are desirable attributes in combat, are considered to comprise a gender-biased viewpoint. Further, attitudes that are supportive of traditional gender roles are also considered under my conceptualization of gender bias. Finally, negative viewpoints about sex-relations are also considered to be gender-biased attitudes.

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for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found evidence that there was a clear strategic objective involving the use of sexualized violence in this case, interviews and research conducted in 2018 revealed a continuum of sexually violent behavior both during and outside of active combat within the case. Thus, even in cases associated with wartime rape as a military strategy, opportunistic violence and distinct patterns of sexual violence persists in these cases.

[28] While the preponderance of references of sexual violence examined in this research involved male perpetrators and female victims, it is critical to note that male victims and female perpetrators were also referenced in this research. Importantly, gender bias is held by all to some degree, regardless of the gender identity category a person occupies. What is critical here is the value combatants ascribe to masculinity and femininity. Do they value qualities typified with masculinity over qualities associated with femininity, particularly within the context of political conflict?

Additionally, contextual patterns surrounding broad categorizations of conflict-related sexual violence also has implications for the effects gender bias has on combatant actions in conflict settings. It is critical to note that the combatant clings to a hyper-masculinized identity in the conflicted environment, much more so than during peacetime. In this way, gender biases held by combatants become more likely to be enacted in this space.

Drawing deductively from these concepts, I hypothesize that, *ceteris paribus*, combatants who hold higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit acts of conflict- related sexual violence compared to combatants who hold lower levels of gender bias (H1). While (H1) captures the basic expected relationship between gender bias and the likelihood that a combatant will commit conflict-related sexual violence, accounting for what is exactly meant by gender bias remains critical. In this research, I conceive of gender bias as beliefs associated with masculinity and femininity that are ordered in a hierarchical or unequal manner. The operational composition of inequality in these attitudes and beliefs is outlined in what follows.

In the case of this research, attitudes associated with a high need for power and domination, attitudes supportive of traditional gender roles, and a negative viewpoint about sex-relations are all proxy indicators for gender-biased beliefs (Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura 1997). As such, I further offer several sub-categorical hypotheses that comprise a way to effectively test for (H1). In this way, I assert that combatants who have a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence (*Sub-H1.a)*. Further, combatants who have a higher need to adhere to traditional sex relations are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexualized violence (*Sub-H1.b)* Finally, combatants who hold more negative views of

the opposite sex are more likely to commit conflict-related sexualized violence *(Sub-H1.c)*.

This research additionally explores the interactive relationship between combatants' gender biases with other situational factors specific to conflict. Some situational factors that mediate the relationship between gender bias and behavior include the difference between active armed combat and the overarching conflict space generally, organizational control, master cleavage of the conflict, and military socialization factors. These previously established factors interact with the differential gender-biased beliefs and attitudes of combatants', which in turn drives inclinations towards political violence. As such, considering these different contextual factors is essential. I argue that the ways in which gender bias impacts combatants' actions depends on the contextual influence exerted by the organizational and military socialization environment in which the combatant operates.

Consequently, I posit that when sexualized violence is opportunistic, combatants with higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit conflict-related sexual violence. While previous scholarship has engaged the question of strategic wartime rape and/or gang rape in conflict (Cohen 2013; Farr 2009), scholars have come to agree that much of the sexualized violence observed across internal conflicts is often opportunistic in nature (Cohen and Nordås 2014; Crawford, Green, and Parkinson 2014; Meger 2016). When violence is opportunistic, it is likely that organizational and group socialization factors will have a lesser effect than when sexualized violence is strategically ordered. When violence is opportunistic, the individual differences between combatants in gender bias will be more pronounced and observable. Conversely, I argue that when command

control is weak, combatants with higher levels of gender bias will be more likely to engage in conflict-related sexual violence than their counterparts with lower levels of bias[29].

As argued, contextual factors that occur in conflict matters, so these relationships are either facilitated or constrained by the influence of these important situational factors. The key is that the difference in the gender-biased beliefs between individual combatants interacts with these different contextual factors, which either increases or decreases the likelihood of the individual combatant to commit sexualized violence.

Figure 2: Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias Visualization[30]



Conclusion

It is evident that to better understand the complex landscape of conflict-related sexual violence, deeper analysis is needed into individual-level characteristics and decision-making processes that predicts who will and will not engage in conflict-related sexual violence. Given the vast amount of resources and attention that is devoted to overcoming sexual violence in conflict, and into demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating former

[29] Arguably, under the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation, when sexual violence is part of the military strategy for warring groups, it is likely that those combatants with lower levels of gender bias will be more likely to resist or avoid committing acts of sexualized violence. Nonetheless, I do not empirically evaluate the non-perpetrator in this project. However, these categorizations appear to be potentially important for future research and are natural extensions of the discussion here.

[30] For ease, I refer to the Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias as the Individual Difference Theory moving forward in the manuscript.

combatants back into society, understanding the complex motivations that induce the propensity to commit violence in conflict and elsewhere is crucial for advancing our knowledge of how to overcome it and better understand where, when, and why it is likely to occur.

In order to empirically evaluate this theory, I now turn to the case of the Bosnian War (1992 - 1995). The Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is an ideal case for evaluation given the well-documented, high-levels of sexualized violence associated with the conflict. Additionally, variations in several of the key factors outlined in Table 1 are identifiable in this case. In the chapter that follows, I provide a history of Bosnia with attention to the identity construction of some of the key social identities of interest in this research. In this way, I explore a source of biased beliefs – the historical and hierarchical construction of societal gender norms that is recreated over time and space into the present day.

CHAPTER 3

BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND GENDER NORM FORMATION

"On that day we'll say to Hell: 'Have you had enough?'
And Hell will answer: 'Is there more?"
Toga dana mi ćemo reći paklu: 'Jesi li se napunio?'
A pakao će odgovoriti: 'Ima li još?'
Meša Selimović, *Derviš iSmrt*[31]

Introduction

The history of mass violence in the Balkans is long and storied. While this dissertation deals specifically with the parameters of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), it is useful to understand the historical processes that inform patterns of violence in the former Yugoslavia (FYR). Close examination of the background that led to the outbreak of violence in the early 1990's, and Bosnia's central role in this violence, provides a foundation for process-tracing this particular case. This allows for increased understanding of the potential mechanisms at work that can also be generalizable to cases similar to this single case study (Beach 2017).

In addition, because this dissertation is focused on the social construction of identity, it is critical to analyze the historical framework by which we arrive to modern-day Bosnia. As I identified in the previous chapter, entrenched inequalities built into social institutions is one source for the internalization of gender-biased beliefs and attitudes. Indeed, this is the milieu where other more immediate or close social interactions occur. Understanding the processes that shape various Bosnian identities and

[31] Quote from Little and Silber (1997), Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. See this title for more detail on the events leading up to and during the war period explored in this dissertation.

culturally grounded notions about what it means to be a man and a woman within this context is vital.

The Balkans, comprised of various states occupying the southeastern area of Europe, is a geopolitically and culturally diverse region of the world. Drawing its name from the Balkan Mountain Range that stretches from the Serbian-Bulgarian border, which then rises and reaches east to the Black Sea, it is a place with a rich and abundant natural environment. This highly mountainous region has seen its environs utilized in completely contradictory ways. This setting has served as the stage for the politically unifying 1984 Olympic Games and has also been the platform for destructive and catastrophic mass political violence during more than one historical epoch.

Inside this region resides Bosnia, a unique nation-state with a complex and diverse history and geography. The landscape is as varied as the people who call Bosnia home. It boasts dense mountain ranges characteristic of the region, along with a host of rivers that crosscut the landscape. Conversely, the Herzegovina canton located southwest of Sarajevo is arid and dry. The countryside shifts from the lush greenery of the mountains to the brown and taupe-tones characteristic of the desert. The seat of this land is styled with a culture of east meets west due, in large part, to a host of great powers converging on this pocket of the world during various historical eras. The Roman, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian Empires have all influenced and shaped both this region and the political and religious structures that have emerged as a result of their presence. It is a place where a rich tapestry of religious practices including Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism have combined and overlapped resulting in a distinctive and singular society (Malcolm 2002).

Historians have grappled with documenting Bosnia's complicated history in order to better understand the ultimate dissolution of the Yugoslav project in the early 1990's. Explanations for the causes of the disintegration often depend on which perch the dissolution account is explored from. As such, it is critical to look back at some of the processes and events, as perceived from different contexts, that led to the making and ultimate unmaking of modern-day Yugoslavia.

Lampe (2000) notes that there is undoubtedly a 'point of view' effect in his introduction to understanding modern-day Yugoslav history. He suggests that through cunning media manipulation in the 1980's, along with the strategic machinations of nationalist party leaders, both Croats and Serbs[32] were led to believe that other ethnic groups presented an existential threat to their own survival that thusly resulted in the revival of "imagined adversaries (xvii)." This ultimately provided the fuel for adherence to and support for ethno-nationalist ideologies that suddenly came into the political consciousness in full force in the 1980's.

Maksić (2017) agrees with Lampe when he argues that individuals defaulted to support nationalist parties like the *Srpska Demokratska Stranka* (SDS), *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* (HDZ), and the *Stranka Demokratske Akcije* (SDA)[33] through affective mobilization. These parties effectively argued that the only way to defeat the

[32] The two largest ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia at the time of the war period (1992 – 1995) explored in this dissertation.

[33] These political parties (and others) will be discussed intermittently throughout this dissertation. Several nationalist parties arose just before and as Yugoslavia began to fracture. Each of the parties mentioned here were officially founded in 1990 as nationalist parties aligning with the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. The SDS, Serbian Democratic Party, was first founded in Knin, Croatia where there was a majority Serb population, and then also formed in Bosnia. The official leader of the party was the psychiatrist Radovan Karadžić who was under the direction of Slobodan Milošević. The HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, led by Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, also had an ofshoot in Bosnia that was managed by several different leaders. Lastly, the SDA, Party of Democratic Action was led by Alija Izetbegović, was the Bosnian nationalist response as Yugoslavia disintegrated from the previous 45-years of one-party rule.

nationalist party of the opposition was to fight fire with fire. Thus, reluctant support was offered out of fear that was facilitated through the rhetoric espoused by many party leaders that opposition parties posed an existential threat to Yugoslavia broadly and individuals specifically. It is here where the memory of 'otherness' that was presumably long forgotten came to the fore once again and became the justification for massive bloodletting and violence.

Given the importance of understanding the conditions leading up to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and the importance of identity, beliefs, and motivations in this dissertation, I cover a condensed history of Bosnia and the surrounding region. This is explored to demonstrate the process by which ethno-nationalist identities were formed and how they informed the political conflict examined in this dissertation. In conjunction with this process tracing, I also review gender dynamics in the South Slav region mainly over the course of the twentieth century as gender, gender-roles, and gender-relations are relevant to several hypotheses advanced and examined in this thesis.

Where Did the 'Otherness' Begin? A Brief Bosnian History

In June of 1989, Slobodan Milošević, with his characteristic charisma, spoke to a crowd of several hundred Serbs on a battlefield in Priština, the capital of Kosovo to commemorate a battle from 600-years before. Milošević addressed the crowd with these words, "After six centuries, we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, but this cannot be excluded yet[34]."

The revival of seemingly long abandoned ethnic hatreds was suddenly finding mobilization in the nationalist rhetoric of the various leaders of the newly forming

[34] Malcolm (2002, p. 213) cites this quote as harbinger of the death of Yugoslavia.

nationalist parties. But, from where did these source and why would a reference to a 600-year-old battle receive uproarious applause from the several hundred attendees listening to Milošević espouse this rhetoric? A glance backwards at the historic processes that led to modern-day Bosnia is required in order to better understand the complex political and economic relations that immediately preceded the war period (1992 – 1995) examined in this dissertation. This look back will also help explain how long-ago battles became salient political fodder once again and how once dormant identities became high valence political issues as Yugoslavia inevitably fragmented.

Ancient Bosnian History

The Slavs arrived in the Balkans, and Bosnia, over a thousand years ago and encountered the Illyrians. These ancient peoples were organized into various tribes that inhabited most of the Balkans region. Their ancient language closely matches modern-day Albanian and their ancient practices have been culturally recognized and expressed in song and poetry to this day (Malcolm 2002). While several of these tribes attempted to rebel against the invading Romans, by 9AD Roman rule reigned supreme in the region. Roman road building and infrastructure had an early effect on the racial and religious diversification of Bosnia. Christianity came quickly to the region as evidenced by the excavated Roman basilicas peppered throughout the territory.

Following this era, several invasions were attempted by various actors between the third and sixth centuries but left relatively little imprint on the region. It is possible that these visiting groups were more interested in raiding rather than settling, but what remains clear is that in the 6th century a large migration of Slav settlers came onto the peninsula bringing with them two distinctive Slavic tribes – Croats and Serbs (Malcolm

2002). Historically, these two tribes shared a close connection and it is believed that they may have descended from the Iranian caste and/or tribe system. The two groups settled into different areas of the Balkan territory with Croats organizing in what is roughly modern-day Croatia and Serbs settling into what is a portion of modern-day Serbia and Montenegro and a small part of Herzegovina (Malcolm 2002).While these groups were distinct and separate, it is evident that they were closely related.

As the 10th and 11th centuries approached, it was clear that Bosnia was recognized as a separate autonomous territory. However, as is the case with this historical era in other regions, a host of skirmishes and efforts at power grabs meant that the area was alternately controlled by the various ruling groups of the moment, but seemingly none of these groups had lasting impact on the social, political, and cultural structures (Malcolm 2002). By the close of the 11th century, Serbs establish a territory in the eastern Balkans and the Croatians were ruled by Hungarian royalty, which established a long-standing relationship between the Croats and Hungary that continued until the end of World War I (WWI) (Malcolm 2002).

Malcolm (2002) notes that both Slavic Croat and Serb tribes influenced and settled in certain areas in Bosnia throughout the course of this early history. He demonstrates that Serb tribes clearly settled in parts of what is today Herzegovina and that Serbs ruled Bosnia for short periods – notably at times in the 10th and 11th centuries. And yet, culturally speaking, Bosnia's religious and political structures appear more influenced by Croat-Hungarian design. However, in either case, Malcolm (2002) argues that it is a mistake to apply the tribal labels and settling patterns of the past to modern-

day structures. He states, “All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were Slavs who lived in Bosnia (p. 12).”

As history moved forward, Bosnia made territorial gains in Herzegovina and a part of the Dalmatian coast during the medieval era. This area was certainly coveted by neighboring Serbian Kings and by Hungary, but Bosnia was a difficult conquest. The terrain made it challenging to enter the territory and the semi-feudal political structure resulted in an empowered land-owning class that was troublesome to manage (Malcolm 2002). These and other factors served to protect Bosnia from any real aggression during the medieval period. This status altered quickly in the mid-1400's when Bosnia was invaded by the Ottomans, which had a lasting impact on Bosnia's social, cultural, and political structure (Malcolm 2002).

Ottoman Rule and Influence

In 1463, the Turkish military machine of the Ottoman Empire conquered Bosnia with relative ease. Over the next century and a half there were some efforts to hold off the Turks, mainly by the Habsburgs, but they were mostly in vain. Ultimately, the Ottomans consolidated power in the region and the vestiges of its influential reign remain evident to this day (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

The Ottomans were known for their military prowess and effectiveness. Their political and administrative systems were designed exclusively to support the military structure and the conquest interests of the empire. In this way, under the administration of the Ottomans, Bosnia was organized as a military-feudal state in order to fuel soldiers and materials to wage war and expand the territorial interests of the empire (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

While identifying as a Muslim certainly had its advantages under the Ottomans, military matters superseded religious concerns. Malcolm (2002) illustrates these preferences: "It was not state policy to convert people to Islam or make them behave like Muslims; the only state policy was to keep the country under control and extract from it money, men and feudal incomes to supply the needs of the Empire further afield (p. 49)." This meant that there was a degree of religious freedom for non-Muslims, albeit with some restrictions, due to a sort of pseudo-secularization approach by the Ottomans.

Yet, in spite of this, Islamization clearly spread throughout Bosnia as the Ottoman Empire consolidated in the region. Evidence from the Ottoman tax registers demonstrate the pace and rhythm of the transformation (Malcolm 2002). In the early years post the 1463 conquest, the migration of the non-Islamicized out of the region is apparent. About a century later, an increasing number of individuals identifying as Muslim seems to have been the result of converting Christian and Catholic individuals to Islam (Malcolm 2002). In roughly 150 years, Muslims became the religious majority[35]. Notably, the large towns that developed during the Ottoman era were Muslim and were defined by Muslim institutions and buildings. The influence of this process is undeniably present in the composition and demographics of modern-day Bosnian cities and towns (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

[35] There are a host of theories about the Islamization of Bosnia that are relevant to the historical land claims leveraged by differing ethnic groups in the region. The claim for certain territorial rights has been identified as a potential cause of the war. Most of these theories are outside of the scope of this dissertation. For more on these theories and whether or not the Islamization in the region was forcibly imposed or imported, please see Malcolm (2002) Chapter 5.

The Orthodox

Interestingly, Serbian Orthodox presence in Bosnia was timed symmetrically with the arrival of the Turks. While there are few mentions of this demographic prior to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they quickly become a marked presence in the region with several notable monasteries being built during the sixteenth century (Malcolm 2002). The apparent speed of this shift is attributable to the Ottomans supporting migration from Orthodox regions to areas that experienced extreme depopulation from plague and war (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

Vlachs, a large demographic that migrated to fill the depopulation gap, were ideally aligned with the Ottoman military agenda. They were known for their military aptitude and were given special permission to carry arms legally and were allowed to keep any spoils from their military expeditions[36]. While the Ottomans did not formally pay them, they were expected to fulfill a military role in exchange for the aforementioned special permissions. When they initially arrived in the Bosnian territory they were more nomadic in nature, but over time and under Ottoman rule, this distinctive group ultimately settled in various parts of the region and carry down demographically to this day (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

Ottoman Decline, Serbian Autonomy, and Austro-Hungarian Rule

As is the case with many empires, the Ottoman's slow decline in Bosnia can be attributed to many costly and lengthy wars that had significant and catastrophic economic impacts. Another shaping effect of the wars between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires was the refugee effect. As the Austrian armies marched toward and into Balkan territory,

[36] These individuals were known as *janissaries.*

Muslims residing in the contested territorial areas affected during these sieges were driven into Bosnia for refuge (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

As a highly militarized empire, the Ottomans warred with several different actors at the same time. A few key conflicts had significant determining effects on the territorial and demographic identity of Bosnia. These included a series revolts mobilized from the east in modern-day Serbia in the early 1800's (Malcolm 2002). By 1815, the militarily efficient *janissaries* and other anti-Ottoman factions, managed to create enough battle fatigue to force the Ottomans into negotiation for a relatively autonomous region as a precursor to Serbian independence (Malcolm 2002).

Simultaneous to Ottoman military decline, the military-feudal structure of old transitioned into an administrative system of landowning aristocracy that created taxable revenues for the governing Ottomans (Malcolm 2002). Under this evolving system, the majority of the major landowners were Muslim and the peasant class was primarily Christian. This system led to early social polarization based on religious and social dimensions (Malcolm 2002). This tension between peasants and landowners persisted to the end of Ottoman rule.

Bosnia experienced heavy economic hits during this decline and the economic uncertainty resulted in massive reform efforts. Some of these efforts included equitable representation of the various ethno-religious groups participating in judiciary and other administrative functions (Malcolm 2002). Additionally, there was a significant increase in places of worship for the Orthodox and Catholic communities. However, these reform efforts could not hedge the economic instability, the weight of which was primarily borne on the back of the peasant class (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). These factors and others

led to the ultimate decline of the Ottoman Empire and ushered in Austro-Hungarian rule and influence.

The dual monarchies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were actually reluctant to pursue Bosnia as a territory. The manifest benefits of the rich, largely untapped, natural resources were not alluring enough to balance the political complications such a move would engender (Malcolm 2002). Policymakers worried that taking on Bosnia would result in a strong South Slav alliance between Bosnia and Croatia that would result in a host of political concessions the Empire was loathe to provide (Malcolm 2002). Yet, the Austro-Hungarian Empire most feared a greater Serbia absorbing Bosnia, which would ultimately generate influence in Croatia as a South Slav alliance. Thus, the decision to pursue Bosnia was made as a defensive measure when Serbia pursued war against the Ottomans in 1876 (Lampe 2000; Malcom 2002).

The Austro-Hungarians took over the administration of Bosnia, but mainly kept the functional operation of the Ottoman institutions in place (Malcolm 2002). The change in administrative processes was generally gradual with little substantive change. One change that would largely impact the demographics and migration patterns in the region was the Austro-Hungarian conscription policy. Conscription, along with emigration, by those avoiding reprisal and/or avoiding being ruled by a Christian monarch, led to large swaths of individuals migrating mainly to Turkey (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2000).

While the Austrians remained relatively neutral on social reforms, their rule was characterized by robust economic and infrastructural development (Malcolm 2002). Roads that were previously considered practicably impassable were improved and

railways were built to crosscut the region. The agriculture and industrial sectors also saw much improvement under these reformation efforts (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

However, it is during the Austro-Hungarian era that nationhood and religion became entangled resulting in the salience of religious identities for the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats (Malcolm 2002). As South Slav identity began to be parsed into more refined categories on the basis of shared histories, language, and religion - Croatia and Serbia also began to be more territorially defined along these same dimensions (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

In Bosnia, however, identification for Serbs and Croats were different since ethnic and religious labels could not functionally align with territorial boundaries. As such, the Serb and Croat national identities lined up exclusively with their correlating religious qualifiers. Both within and outside of Bosnia, nationalism amongst these groups rose during this period and was effectively facilitated through the social networks of educators and priests committed to these groups (Malcolm 2002). Additionally, these identities became more entrenched as a result of some heedless Austro-Hungarian policies – most notable of which was the full annexation of Bosnia (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

Ultimately, the annexation of Bosnia led to strong anti-Austrian sentiment across the South Slav region. While anti-Austrian Serbs and Croats initially mobilized separately, inter-ethnic and inter-religious organizations emerged desiring social revolution and liberation (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). The agenda for a unified South Slav state independent of Austria became the order of the day. And, on the infamous June 28th day of 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Serb nationalist famously assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg through a series of gunshots

on the streets of Sarajevo next to the Latin Bridge. During his trial, Princip stated, "I am a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslav, and I do not care what form of state, but it must be free from Austria. (Jelavich 1983, p. 235; Malcolm 2002, p. 153)."

World Wars, The First Yugoslavia, and the Interwar Years

The assassination of the Archduke is known as the precipitating event that set the Great Powers in warring motion in what is known today as WWI. The fact that Princip was considered a Serb nationalist led to a backlash against the Serb community in Bosnia. At the outset, there was massive resettlement - Serbs were pushed outside Bosnia's eastern border towards Montenegro and Serbian and Bosnian Serb nationalists were held in internment camps (Malcolm 2002; Lampe 2000). In spite of this backlash, the community of South Slavs ultimately pursued and won a negotiation with Austria to become a defined and autonomous sovereign state. The first Kingdom of Yugoslavia was understood to be the unification of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. As is often the case with power transitions - skirmishes, looting, and attacks against the landowning class, who were mostly Muslim - characterized the early period of the first Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002).

As the region settled into a new political order, various ethnic and religious groups maneuvered and organized in order to maximize their power (Malcolm 2002). Bosnian policymakers were pushing to be a separate territory within the newly forming Yugoslav state. However, several Serb parties and activists supported either an entirely centralized Yugoslav state or the addition of Bosnia to Serb territory in order to expand Serbian boundaries (Malcolm 2002). Conversely, Croatia supported a confederate system

and wished to avoid a highly centralized approach. The tensions concerning regionalism *vis a vis* centralization between Croatia and Serbia persisted through the interwar period (Malcolm 2002).

In the late 1920's, Serbia's centralization dream was realized, although not in the way or to the degree it was wished for or intended. Constant and escalating debate and violence amongst representatives in the parliament provided the impetus for King Alexander[37] to arrange for royal rule with the suspension of the burgeoning constitution of the First Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). A royal system was not the type of centralized government Serbia was aiming for and resentment festered against the Crown for most of the interested parties. Ultimately, the Crown made moves to deepen centralization in most government institutions, and soon after King Alexander was assassinated and the pendulum swung back to form a more constitutionalized government (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

As World War II (WWII) was fast approaching, the inevitable breakup of the First Yugoslavia began in earnest. There was to be no federal arrangement at that time that would be satisfactory for Croatia. Through a series of tense negotiations, parts of Bosnia were assigned to Croatian territory (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). In spite of the best efforts of Bosnian statesman who still pursued the possibility of an autonomous Bosnia, this suggestion was deemed untenable due to the high concentration of Serbs that remained in existing Croatian territory (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). And yet, the

[37] First King of Yugoslavia. He was initially the Crown Prince of Serbia. He led forces during the First and Second Balkans Wars. At the end of WWI, as part of the reorganization of the territorial map, he accepted the role as Prince Regent of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. See Lampe (2000) and Malcolm (2002) for more.

ongoing debate and efforts to negotiate a solution were ultimately for naught as WWII reached over and breached the borders of the First Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia experienced WWII as a series of international and internal conflicts. First, there was the invasion by Germany and Italy into Slovene territory. Yugoslavia was of strategic interest because it provided raw materials and human capital for the Axis powers to wage war against the Allies. While the international conflict was incredibly damaging to the region; importantly, there were two civil wars that largely accounted for the estimated one million people who died in Yugoslavia during those four years of war (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

After making military gains in the region, the Germans and Italians established an independent Croatian state, known as NDH, which included the whole territory of Bosnia and Croatia (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). This territory was then divided into German and Italian militarized zones and a Croatian leader was established – Ante Pavelić, who was the leader of the Ustaše movement (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). Shortly following the creation of the NDH, anti-Jewish laws and policies were issued and executed (Malcolm 2002). However, another ethnic group was the target of the extreme Ustaše ideologues – the sizable Serb minority within the newly established borders of the NDH. Between June and July of 1941, widespread acts of violence were committed against the Serb population. These acts included mass arrests, indiscriminate killing, and destruction of entire villages (Jancar-Webster 1990; Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).

These atrocities mobilized the Serb population into defensive action and individuals began to align with the two primary resistance movements operating within

the NDH. The two resistance movements were the Ćetniks[38] and the Communist Partisans (Malcolm 2002). Serbs filled the ranks of both movements but the ideologies of the two groups were distinct, leading to a secondary internal conflict premised on the competition between the two (Malcolm 2002).

The vision and agenda of the two movements were quite distinct. The Ćetniks' post-war vision for the territory was for a greater and homogenized Serbia (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). Ćetniks wanted to absorb Bosnia and other parts of the territory, but they also wanted Croats to go to Croatia and Muslims to go to either Turkey or Albania (Jancar-Webster 1990; Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). This meant that they saw a future where ethnicity and nationality were exclusively defined and aligned within territorial boundaries.

On the other hand, under the direction of Josep Broz Tito, a Stalin loyalist with a Communist vision for the future Yugoslavia, the Partisans sought to drive the Germans out and facilitate social revolution (Malcolm 2002). The communist ideology driving the Partisans was based on the position that organizing on the basis of ethno-religious identity was bourgeois and untenable, which was entirely counter to the position of the Ćetniks. The Partisans sought centralization and a one-party vision where the Ćetniks were more interested in the status quo and a Greater Serbia (Malcolm 2002).

Thus, Tito strategically sought to defeat Ćetnik competition for the territory. Eventually, with some tactical maneuvering and shifting alliances amongst the key four

[38] Ćetnik is generally considered a pejorative term. It originates from a guerilla force that mobilized during World War II to defend against the Axis Powers, but that ultimately fought against the Partisans. This group is associated with the image of a white skull and cross bones superimposed on a black background (Malcolm 2002). Any further reference throughout this dissertation is not associated with any pejorative references. Further, I use Ćetniks and Chetnik interchangeably.

warring parties in the territory (Germans, Italians, Ćetniks, and Partisans), the Partisans did achieve the mission with Allied support (Malcolm 2002). As the Germans eventually withdrew from the region, Communist rule became the order of the day with King Peter[39] and the Allies encouraging the population to back Tito (Malcolm 2002).

At the time, three primary groups comprised Bosnian territory – Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims. The position of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs during WWII was fairly obvious given the context. While a minority supported the extreme Ustaša position, most Bosnian Croats were initially pleased with the formation of the NDH without fully embracing an extreme Ustaša ideology (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). However, after four terrible years of war, most Bosnian Croats abandoned support for the NDH and joined the now majority Partisans. Given that they were extreme targets during the war, Bosnian Serbs naturally aligned in opposition to the Ustaša and joined the Partisans in resistance at regular intervals throughout the war (Jancar-Webster 1990; Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).

The Bosnian Muslim position during WWII was more complex than the other two groups. Given the historical nationalism from the Serbs, most Bosnian Muslims supported being led by Croatian leaders rather than leaders from Belgrade (Malcolm 2002). Thus, at the start of the war, most aligned with the newly established NDH under the promise of religious freedom. However, the NDH was unable to credibly deliver on these commitments and the Bosnian Muslims became disenchanted with this alliance (Malcolm 2002). Yet, the alternative of joining the Ćetniks in resistance to the Ustaša

[39] The last King of Yugoslavia. He was a monarch ruling in exile.

was equally vexing because of the ongoing violent conflicts between the Serbs and the Muslims.

Under these circumstances, between 1941 and 1942, Bosnian Muslims began to slowly organize and fill the Partisan ranks (Malcolm 2002). Support for the Partisans was cautious given the rumored mistreatment of Muslims in other European Communist territories. Atheism also did not appeal to Muslim sensibilities, but the alternatives were even less of a draw. In certain regions of Bosnia, there were Ćetnik-Muslim alliances[40], but these were less common than smaller Muslim defense units that organized to protect their interests and communities from all four of the primary fighting groups (Malcolm 2002).

Ultimately, as the war persisted, Bosnian Muslims sought German support to once again become an independent, autonomous territory separate from the Ustaša and the NDH. However, Germany would never acquiesce this request given the uproar it would cause from the Croatian perch (Malcolm 2002). But, human capital to wage war remained a critical and declining resource for the Germans and negotiations led to the formation of a Muslim SS unit called Hadžar, which was sent away from Bosnia for training (Malcolm 2002).

This was highly distressing for the Muslims remaining in Bosnia and for those who volunteered for the Hadžar unit (Malcolm 2002). Volunteers believed they were joining to protect their communities and being sent away to train was not what they expected. Furthermore, while they were sent away, the Ustaša continued to commit atrocities against Muslims and Serbs throughout Bosnia (Malcolm 2002). Ultimately, and

[40] Malcolm (2002) highlights the activities of one such unit in the area of Zenica (p. 188).

after several requests, the Hadžar unit was sent back to Bosnia and upon their return, they committed indiscriminate violence against Bosnian Serbs in the north and eastern parts of Bosnia. It is estimated that anywhere between several hundred and several thousand Serbs were victims during this period of violence (Malcolm 2002).

As the war persisted, German-Ćetnik agreements became more public and obvious, which left Bosnian Muslims suspicious of German intentions (Malcolm 2002). As 1944 drew to a close, the Partisan movement appeared to be the most ideal alliance for Bosnian Muslims and for the advancement of Muslim interests. Many of the Bosnian Muslims comprising the Hadžar unit defected to join the Partisans at this time (Malcolm 2002). In the end, for all the groups, most roads ultimately led to Partisan support and on April 6, 1945, Tito and the Partisans liberated Sarajevo and by the close of the month the territory of Bosnia was fully under Partisan control (Malcolm 2002).

As was the case in all of the occupied territories, the close of WWII left devastating loss in its wake. In Bosnia, the human cost was significant. Of the one million Yugoslav's that died during the course of WWII, it is estimated that 8.1% of the total Bosnian Muslim population was killed (Malcolm 2002). Following closely behind were Serbs with a 7.3% loss of their total population (Malcolm 2002). Only Jews and Gypsies experienced greater loss of life. All groups faced death in many of the more infamous German concentration camps, but most of the death was perpetuated as Yugoslav upon Yugoslav acts of violence (Malcolm 2002). It was under these grim conditions that the Titoist Yugoslav era was ushered in.

Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and the Age of Tito (1945 – 1989)

Josep Broz Tito (Marshall Tito) is often attributed for bringing peace and reconciliation and effective one-party rule to Yugoslavia after WWII. "Tito was not only a national hero," Trošt (2014) noted, "he represented the unifying facet of Yugoslav identity (p. 147)." However, this unification came at a cost. Immediately following the war, Tito instituted strong-arm tactics in order to eliminate enemies and competition. Executions, forced death marches, and placement in concentration camps continued in the early Tito years in order to eliminate any competition or critics to Communist centralization (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).

At the end of World War II, from roughly 1945 – 1946, Tito and the Partisans brutally established one party rule by eliminating any threats to the Partisan's singular vision of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The establishment of the Yugoslav Communist Party resulted in 40 years of social training and indoctrination into a unified, socialist vision of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The vehicles for this indoctrination included schools, museums, and array of cultural sites that regularly and persistently reinforced the message of "brotherhood and unity (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002)[41]."

In 1946, Yugoslavia's federal constitution was rolled out and the indoctrination into the message of brotherhood and unity – one unified Yugoslavia – began in earnest. Notably, there was often a gap between the aspirational propaganda touted by the regime and actual practice. In order to achieve Tito's vision of brotherhood and unity, it required the tempering of distinctions based on ethnicity, nationality, and/or religious identity

[41] Interview conducted on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo with a museum curator.

(Malcolm 2000). Yugoslav was to be the primary salient identity. In praxis, this was often a brutal process.

In the early years of Tito's reign, targeted campaigns were waged against major religious institutions. During this time, many monasteries and other places of worship were shut down. Courts of Islamic law were also eliminated and laws forbidding wearing hijab were also instituted (Jelavich 1983). While the constitution guaranteed religious freedom, in practice the Communist party set out to regulate and control institutions that might challenge a one-party state (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).

Over time, however, the most severe practices against religion were relaxed and promises of religious freedom were renewed. Ever the consummate politician, Tito recognized the strategic importance of religion as a remedy to some of Yugoslavia's more troubling economic and political challenges (Malcolm 2002). By allowing religious institutions to fill the gaps in the state resource capacity, Yugoslavia could more effectively focus on international matters. This allowed Tito to pit East against West while each courted Yugoslavia’s for favor.

Up to this point in time, Muslim identity was restricted to religion and nationality and was essentially defined separately. The manner in which Muslims aligned with a separate and distinct national identity is demonstrated in the changing demographic categories listed on the census reports from 1948 and beyond (Malcolm 2002). In 1948, options for Muslim identification were limited to Muslim-Serb, Muslim-Croat, or Muslim-nationality undeclared (Malcolm 2002). Overwhelmingly, Muslims identified with the undeclared category (Malcolm 2002). This manner of identification with a

separate nationality for the Muslim population persisted and by the 1960's, Muslim became an equally recognized identity as Serb and Croat (Malcolm 2002).

Notably, religious interests mobilized only a small portion of the Muslim community. It was, in fact, more of a politically motivated movement on the part of secular Muslims concerned about Muslim status under Communism (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002). Through the 1950's and 1960's, Bosnia struggled under the Communist administration of Yugoslavia and lagged well behind Croatia and Serbia on nearly all economic indicators (Malcolm 2002). Some analysts argued that this was because Bosnia did not contain a homogenized sense of nationality, but rather a mix of their neighboring nations and one undefined nationality (Malcolm 2002). This state of affairs certainly provided motivation for Muslims to organize as a nationality in order to achieve effective political representation within the Communist administration (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).

In concert with the solidification of Muslim nationality, after roughly two decades of strong centralization, in the 1970's reformation began in earnest in Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The constitution was rewritten and each republic was given an increased degree of administrative autonomy (Malcolm 2002). Some negative externalities emerged from this shift. Partial decentralization led to increasing economic inefficiencies as industry was duplicated across the region and competition for government funding was mobilized based on ethno-national dimensions (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002). The seeds for nationalist discontent were planted and both Serbia and Croatia leveraged complaints (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).

Serbian nationalism was particularly strong. A leaked memo, the *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* (SAUN memo) was highly controversial (Morus 2007). It was commissioned and authored by sixteen Serb intellectuals and shared a list of grievances against Yugoslav centralization. The SAUN memo notably claims that Serbs have historically and persistently been victims of a host of political ails including, but not limited to, religious persecution, forced assimilation, and cultural genocide (Morus 2007).

In addition, territorial claims persistently remained a highly salient concern for Serbs. At the end of WWII, Tito established defined internal boundaries in the Yugoslav territory; two areas were declared autonomous territories of Serbia – Vojvodina and Kosovo. Both areas had a high, yet minority, concentration of Serbs within its borders, but many Serbs argued for Serbian historical claims on these land (Malcolm 2002). While these areas weren't really at issue during Tito's early years, post-decentralization was another matter entirely (Malcolm 2002). These territories enjoyed increased autonomy as an effect of constitutional reform, which threatened the minority Serb status in these areas. Conflicts broke out and by the early 1980's and Kosovo became a permanently militarized zone (Malcolm 2002)[42].

At this time, Tito-era Communism was in major decline mostly due to the crippling economic struggles the region faced (Malcolm 2002). These economic challenges created fissures to allow for ethno-national rhetoric and religious mobilization

[42] The details of the dynamics between Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina are outside of the scope of this dissertation. However, it is important to note that Kosovo was (and is) comprised mainly of ethnic Albanians who religiously and secularly identify as Muslim. This increased Orthodox Serb resistance to Muslim political representation out of concern for Serb minorities in these territories (Malcolm 2002). This may have been another factor feeding into increasing Serb nationalism.

amongst the distinctive groups scattered across the territory. Malcolm (2002) describes the economic situation in the 1980's as follows:

> "The whole Titoist economic system – which has been aptly described as 'Self-Mismanagement' – was in a state of terminal decline, with a steep and steady fall in real wages and a rise in absenteeism and strikes...Meanwhile, inflation rose to 120 per cent (sic) in 1987 and 250 per cent (sic) in 1988. By the end of that year, Yugoslavia's total foreign debt came to $33 billion, of which $20 billion was repayable in hard currencies to the West. In this way, the long-term legacy of Tito's economic policies had been to create an increasingly discontented and impoverished population – the perfect place for demagogues to get to work, stirring up the policies of resentment (p. 210)."

It is here that the dissolution of a nation began in earnest. The combination of economic factors, cunning maneuvers of nationalist leaders, and policies borne of resentment ultimately led Yugoslavia on an inexorable march towards fragmentation.

Bosnia and the Fall of Yugoslavia 1989 – 1992

The causes for and build up to the war in Yugoslavia are many. Several different scholars highlight different explanations for the outbreak of violence. Both Cohen (2013) and Maksić (2017) argue that affective mobilization was facilitated by Serb party leaders to play on existential fears premised on the victimhood and persecution of the Serb nation by non-Serbs. However, this affective mobilization required a charismatic leader to facilitate and direct those energies. Meier (2005) argues that Slobodan Milošević perfectly fulfilled this role.

The battlefield speech referenced at the start of this chapter given by Milošević is a prime example of elite mobilization of violence. Milošević played on fear and argued that the Serbs could not rule out armed battle for the survival of the Serb nation. This speech is simply one example of many of rhetoric stirring discontent during the years building up to the outbreak of violence. The speech exemplifies the combined effect of

charismatic leadership and affective mobilization in arguing for a Greater Serbia that led up to the outbreak of violence.

Economic explanations also serve as a primary cause for the violence. Certainly Lampe (2000) and Malcolm (2002) both highlight a host of economic concerns that festered in the wounds of an impoverished population. Pugh, Cooper, and Goodhand (2004) make the case for the pressure of the immediate economic situation leading to the jockeying of power on the part of the various parties in the political system. Little and Silber (1997) and Ramet (2005) argue that it was not only the immediately preceding economic conditions, but rather the troubles with the mismanagement of the Yugoslav state as a whole combined with Serb nationalist ambitions that resulted in the outbreak in violence.

More than likely, part or all of these explanations holds some truth. As the historical review thus far reveals, the flames for a greater Serbia had been stoked in the political and economic structures of the failing Yugoslav state (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002; Woodward 2003). However, existential fears were not simply premised on economic factors alone, but also on quantitative demographic superiority. Albanian families significantly outpaced the rhythm of Serb family rate growth. As such, party leaders called on Serb women to do their patriotic duty and reproduce the nation to stymie this threat (Cockburn 1998; Berry 2018).

In any case, during this time both inflation and Serb nationalism continued to rise as Communism fell. Communist after communist became politically unseated allowing a multi-party system to emerge in Yugoslavia where several independent parties jockeyed for power (Malcolm 2002; Maksić 2017). It was evident that the Communist Party was in

decline and during the first multiparty elections in1990 several nationalist political parties won seats across all of the territory (Maksić 2017; Berry 2018). Emboldened by Communist decline and political rhetoric, the revival of the Serb Ćetnik movement came in force with a host of cultural nationalist symbols sweeping the landscape[43].

Under these conditions, tension continued to build in the region and debate persists to this day about which particular event is said to have been the ultimate catalyst for the pending outbreak of violence. There was a rebellion in Knin, situated close to the border of Bosnia in Croatia. As Croatia contemplated seceding and making a move for independence, the roughly 80% majority Serb population in Knin rebelled against Croatia and declared itself independent (Little and Silber 1997). The police chief at the time, Milan Martić[44], was integral in facilitating this rebellion in what is now known as the Log Revolution, essentially blocking the south border of Knin with logs (Little and Silber 1997).

In addition to this, as both Slovenia and Croatia prepared for the multiparty elections in 1990, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) began confiscating the weapon stores of both Republics in order to avoid the building of internal armies that might lead to secession (Little and Silber 1997). The JNA commandeered roughly 70% of the weapon stores before Slovene President, Milan Kučan, ordered a stop to the process. (Little and Silber 1997) The JNA's campaign of arms reduction, particularly in Slovenia and Croatia led to secret and illegal arms procurement processes by Croatia that

[43] Songs, uniforms, and flags from WWII were displayed. For more, see Berry (2018, p. 115).
[44] Martić was convicted on 16 counts and sentenced to 35 years in prison in 2007. As a leader of the Croat-Serb paramilitary unit in Knin his crimes included murder, torture, deportation, attacks on civilians, crimes against humanity and violations of laws and customs of war (LOAC) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2007).

ultimately became public (Little and Silber 1997). Throughout 1990, tensions continued to rise as secret independence and partition talks occurred between key leaders of the Republics (Little and Silber 1997).

Zimmermann (1995) argues that Slovenia's referendum for independence at the end of 1990 was the key deathblow for Yugoslavia. This maneuver at the height of the crisis ultimately facilitated a domino effect of fractionalization. As soon as Slovenia declared independence, Croatia indicated that there could be no Yugoslavia without Slovenia and made their intent for independence clear (Little and Silber 1997; Berry 2018). Croatia's claim for independence was untenable for Belgrade and full-scale war erupted shortly following the Croatian referendum.

These events left Bosnia in a precarious position. Options were limited to remaining in a now Serb dominated Yugoslavia or to also pursue independence. Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims began to organize into paramilitary groups in preparation for conflict. In the end, Bosnia's referendum for independence was approved by a significant margin[45] and in April 1992 the international community recognized Bosnia as an independent sovereign state (Little and Silber 1997; Berry 2018). On April 6, 1992, an organized anti-war rally comprised of 100,000 protestors of various nationalities poured onto the streets of Sarajevo (Little and Silber 1997). This peaceful protest turned deadly when Serb snipers indiscriminately shot at the crowd

[45] Berry (2018) notes that 99% of the turnout voted for independence. However, Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum entirely, which means only 63% of eligible voters supported the referendum. In either case, the margin was still large for independence. These numbers, however, reflect the diversity in Bosnia and exemplifies why Bosnia is colloquially considered a mini-Yugoslavia.

killing several people[46]. War had officially come to Bosnia. None could predict how long it would stay and the terrible costs it would engender in its wake.

A Brief History of Gender Roles in Bosnia

In addition to understanding the standard historical processes that led to the outbreak of war in Bosnia (1992 – 1995), it is also critical to examine some of the historic gender norms and relations that developed and were shaped in this region over time. These gender roles and interactions, in conjunction with the other processes already described in this chapter, are the primer and the context under which sexualized violence was perpetrated during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Ramet (2010) argues that culture is central to politics, "and that a political history must, of necessity, take up cultural questions (p. 5)." In the historical review outlined in this chapter, gender equivocates to culture and women's history leading up to the outbreak of the war is an essential part of the narrative.

While some ancient Balkan practices demonstrate early gender distinctions, the gender examination here begins in modern history rather than ancient. However, an anecdote related to ancient Illyrian tattooing practices that carried through to the modern age seems particularly noteworthy and a reasonable place to begin. Durham (1979) studied the Illyrian tattooing practice in the 1920's and observed that women were much more elaborately tattooed than men. The women she interviewed noted that they engaged the practice because it was their custom and that tattooing would make their hands

[46] It remains debated who the first victims of the Bosnian war were. Serbs claim that the killing of a groom's father during a wedding procession on the day of the referendum in May is the first victim. Bosniaks claim that two women protestors killed during the anti-war demonstration at Vrbanja Bridge are the first victims. Other accounts may vary. See Little and Silber (1997) for more on the causes for the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

prettier (p. 102). This was distinct compared to the tattoos of men. Here, we see that women and men behaved differently and were expected to engage customs differently from early on in Balkan history.

It is fairly apparent that distinctions between men and women are evident throughout Balkan history. That these differences were shaped by the six distinct political systems that women and men lived in over the course of the twentieth century is equally clear. Of the six political arrangements, only the Titoist era of one-party rule expressed an explicit policy goal of gender equality (Jancar-Webster 2010). And yet while strides were made, this goal was largely unmet. The reason this was the case rests largely on understanding the gender dynamics amongst the South Slav communities.

What better place to begin than with the family and the dynamics therein? Importantly, Simić (2010) highlights that Yugoslav culture is highly male-oriented and places emphasis on, "patrilineality, patrilocality, and male dominance (p. 13)",[47] as both common and cross-national features of South Slav society. Publicly, machismo is natural and expected. However, in the Yugoslav family, women derive their power and influence not from their role as wives, but rather from their role as mothers[48]. Here, mothers are able to exert influence on their sons, but this is done exclusively in private spaces. Thus, a public-private divide in gender power relations is operative in the social construction of the family and society at large. However, adherence to traditional sex-relations was (and

[47] Andrei Simić's (2010) book chapter, *Machismo and cryptomatriarchy: Power, affect, and authority in the traditional Yugoslav family,* has some limitations. It is mostly an evaluation of the South Slav family from the Serbian and rural perspective. In the case of this dissertation, this is applicable to the second order of question raised related to the sources of differences between combatants – especially as it pertains to the rural/urban context as a dichotomy of interest.

[48] Nationalists mobilize the sanctity and power of motherhood later as a form of patriotism. Women are told that it is their patriotic duty to become mothers in order to advance the interests of the (Serb) nation Malcolm (2002).

is) of high importance for South Slav families throughout the twentieth century and building up to the war (Jancar-Webster 2010; Malcolm 2002).

In the economic and public spheres of society, women experienced some moments of opportunity, but remained largely disadvantaged compared to their male counterparts. In the early twentieth century, women began working in earnest in the more advanced areas of the South Slav region and joined different unions to mobilize for their advancement. Importantly, war provided an opportunity structure previously unavailable to these women. As such, women's economic advancement saw more significant gains during WWI as vacancies left by men who joined the defense ranks had to be filled (Berry 2018; Ramet 2010) .

As the interwar period arrived, the hope that some of the opportunities provided by war would become more permanent was diminished. WWI had been incredibly costly and like the rest of the international community, Yugoslavia was the victim of an economic depression that left women particularly disadvantaged (Berry 2018). Suffrage had yet to be achieved and women's wages were quite low. Importantly, women's education was not a priority and illiteracy rates amongst women was quite high (Jancar-Webster 1990; Berry 2018).

The patrilineal organization of the family was evidenced in the rural areas in the social structure of the family *zadruga.* The *zadruga* was a multi-generation family unit controlled by a patriarch who defined the agricultural work, organized women's labor, and owned the property (Cockburn 1998, p. 156; Jancar-Webster 1990, p. 27; Berry 2018, p.107). Consistent with Simić's (2010) assessment concerning the power of

motherhood, women were considered servant status until they bore male children (Jancar-Webster 1990; Berry 2018).

Women did leave the *zadrugas* to find other employment but remained disadvantaged in these spaces. Women joined collective action movements at this time and engaged in labor strikes and ultimately began joining communist parties[49] in order to further their interests. Women remained involved in a host of social movement organizations and unions up to WWII.

Much like the earlier effects of WWI, the Second World War once again provided an opportunity structure for women's advancement. Women's participation in the Partisan-led Yugoslav National Liberation Movement (NOP) allowed women political participation as fighters and administrators in the political movement. Evidence that women performed equally as well as men is apparent in the research (Jancar-Webster 2010). WWII served as a liberating and democratizing process for South Slav women during this era. The Partisans progressively allowed women the right to vote, recruited them for armed fighting positions, and allowed them to serve in public administrative and political roles (Jancar-Webster 2010). Yet, while these were progressive steps, patriarchy still defined the parameters and structure of women's advancement in spite of their equal participation and performance in WWII.

As the Titoist era of Communism was ushered in, the promise of equality for women was, as previously mentioned, a formal policy of the party. However, as is consistent with other Communist aspirational promises, the gap between policy and practice in this area was quite significant. While women made gains in literacy, basic

[49] Women joined the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) and Union of Communist Youth (SKOJ).

education, and entrance into the labor market - they were underrepresented in leadership roles and fields like the hard sciences (Ramet 2010). Essentially, women engaged politically, socially, and economically, but the structure was based on patriarchy and stymied women's full advancement (Jancar-Webster 2010; Ramet 2010).

In the end, women were generally in a second-seat position compared to their male counterparts in most dimensions. Politically and economically, women were behind men in public life. In family life, women's value was elevated only based on their mother identity. Power and power dynamics were the purview of the South Slav men. Critically, this chapter demonstrates clear distinctions in varied social identity groupings associated with Bosnian society. These social constructions are one element of the exogenous factors surrounding individual civilians and soldiers as war descended on Bosnia (1992 – 1995). Thus, it is from this frame and context that the sexualized violence that characterized the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is evaluated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

OBSERVING PATTERNS IN WARTIME SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF THE BOSNIAN WAR (1992 - 1995)

Introduction

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is well-known for extreme rates of sexualized violence perpetrated during the course of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and the other secessionist wars that occurred during the fractionalization of Yugoslavia (Bouchard 2015; D. K. Cohen 2013; Lai and Ralph 1995). While estimates vary radically regarding how many rapes and acts of sexualized violence actually occurred during the war, it remains an accepted fact that this form of political violence particularly characterized this conflict. The fact that sexualized violence was seemingly committed with impunity led to intense scrutiny and attention from the international community, which transformed how sexualized violence within conflict is perceived and now analyzed.

Much like other entrenched gendered processes, prior to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, sexualized violence during and within conflict was deemed a private crime, not an act within the purview and adjudication of the public and political. Until the 1990's, the perception of sexualized violence within the framework of the public-private divide led to underdeveloped explorations of conflict-related sexual violence as a weapon in warfare and as a crime counter to the laws of armed conflict. Essentially, this form of violence was considered a "commonplace" and expected negative cost of war, but not a political act to which military leaders, political elites, and even individuals who

committed these offenses could be held responsible (Bouchard 2015; Hoover Green 2011; Lai and Ralph 1995; E. J. Wood 2009a).

The war in the former Yugoslavia was a catalyst to facilitating change in this outlook and international organizations, along with other human rights monitoring groups, began in earnest to challenge the status quo in this area. In 1994, in a preliminary report from the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, the committee noted that, "(R)ape remains the least condemned war crime; throughout history, the rape of hundreds of thousands women and children in all regions of the world remains a bitter reality (Lai and Ralph 1995, p.64)[50].

Yet, in the time that has passed since the war, in Sikkink-esque fashion, post-hoc tribunals and other legal entities have mobilized based on several imperatives. One such impetus for change is defined in UN Resolution 1820, which more directly addresses sexual violence during wars (United Nations 2008). This has led to indelible and rapid transformation in the norms surrounding this form of violence. These changes have allowed for more refined approaches in scholarship, has resulted in additional data for analysis, and allows for a deeper understanding of the processes that inform this type of violence in warfare.

In the case of the former Yugoslavia alone, under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 78 individuals of the 161 accused by the international court have been indicted for crimes of sexual violence

[50] It should be noted that sexual violence during conflict is not limited to women and children only. As norms continue to shift in the reporting, investigating, and adjudicating of sexualized violence, more men have come forward to also report being victims of this violence (Interview conducted with a war crimes reporter and editor on 7/9/2018 for 1.5 hours). See also the ICTY (2016) for more on the delineations related to crimes of sexualized violence in conflict.

(ICTY 2016). This translates to roughly 48% of those accused receiving indictments for acts associated with conflict related sexualized violence. Additionally, more than one third have been found guilty for sexually violent crimes (ICTY 2016). These facts alone illustrate the pervasiveness of sexual violence in the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995).

Due to the seemingly increasing prevalence of sexual violence in this and other wars[51], the international community mobilized to respond to redress these crimes in a novel manner not pursued in the past. Notably, in spite of prior international treaties and conventions initially establishing norms surrounding sexualized violence in warfare[52], both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were among the first courts of its kind to prosecute cases of wartime sexual violence. Further, the ICTY was the first court to prosecute and secure convictions defining rape as torture and for sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity (ICTY 2016). These indictments and convictions provide clear evidence of the shifting norms, and the enforcement of these norms, in a relatively short timeframe (Amnesty International 2017; Sikkink 2011; United Nations 2015, 2008).

[51] I state "seemingly increasing prevalence" with purpose here. While it may seem that sexual violence was increasing in conflicts, world attention and access to data and information was also transforming during this time. Sikkink (2011) describes the process of norm cascades, which suggests that these changes in norms and enforcement isn't so much that the behaviors and crimes are increasing, but rather that the attention through international organizations are a catalyst for transforming this space. The number of human rights reports and reports from the tribunals and international mechanisms reviewed throughout this research suggest that these claims are accurate.

[52] See the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for more on treaties and information on Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The ICTY notes that one of the earlier efforts to outlaw sexualized violence in warfare is found in the Hague Convention of 1907. Yet, in spite of this, wars that occurred in the ensuing years failed to restrain and enforce the spirit of this Convention. This is notable in the failure of both the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to indict and adjudicate cases of sexualized violence that clearly occurred during WWII. The Geneva Convention of 1949 more explicitly defined legal parameters concerning rape, prostitution, and other sexualized assaults. While it mainly addresses this in terms of women only, it is the framework and legal precedent from which the ICTY and ICTR were built.

Yet, in spite of these gains lauded by the tribunals and other actors in the international community, it is critical to note that there are varied acts of sexualized violence committed during the course of a conflict, which the indictments and convictions of the ICTY and other legal mechanisms cannot fully capture. Political violence, including sexualized violence, is a process-oriented act that involves multiple factors. When analyzing the causes and conditions associated with sexualized violence in conflict, it is important to expand upon and define the distinctions concerning the variances in the form and function of this violence. In this way, a better understanding of the processes that lead to increases and decreases in this violence can be revealed. It is the aim of this dissertation to better understand the conditions surrounding not only what perpetuates this violence, but also to consider what may allow for restraint and restriction on the part of combatants.

In the *Handbook on the Study of Multiple Perpetrator Rape*, Wood (2015) describes some of the key variances in the patterns of sexualized violence in conflict. She notes that, "(w)hen sexual violence does occur during war, the pattern varies in targeting, form, and purpose, as well as frequency (p. 132)." In the case of Bosnia, variances in each of these dimensional areas existed and as such, it is important to break down these categories in order to provide a clear framework for the analysis of the Bosnian case employed in this study.

Accordingly, in this chapter, I describe each of the variances referred to above and how they specifically apply to the Bosnian case in more detail. I then close the chapter with examples from witness testimony, human rights reports, and direct interview responses highlighting soldiers' efforts to either intervene or resist participation in these

violent acts. I perform this analysis to highlight that individual differences clearly exist, which suggests that these actors – the perpetrator, the non-perpetrator, and even the interventionist – are divergently motivated for violence. Thus, it is from this perch that the analysis of the hypotheses associated with the gender bias motive advanced in this dissertation can more effectively be analyzed in future chapters.

Targeting

In this section outlining targeting, it is important to elaborate on several key elements that coalesced to lead to different types of targets in the Bosnian case – individuals, groups, and geographical areas. Extensive background is provided out of necessity to better understand these categories and their relevance to this research.

The actors engaged in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were many. The ethnic politics of the region were, and remain, quite complex. As explored previously, the convergence of ethno-nationalist and political changes over the course of time in this region were relatively frequent and certainly have impacted all of the Balkan states, but most especially, Bosnia. The political rearrangements that ensued in the era following the Great Wars deeply impacted political and demographic processes. Notably, the Partisan efforts during World War II, and the ensuing narrative of heroism in the defeat and deterrence of the Axis powers, brought about the appearance of a seemingly unified Yugoslavia. The cult of personality of Marshall Tito, maintained through a brilliant and effective public relations machine, allowed for the construction of a novel and often idealized national identity that superseded previously embedded ethnic identities (Pavasović Trošt 2014; Weber 1968).

While the full story of Marshall Tito is outside of the scope of this work, as alluded to in the previous chapter, he was essential to the development and realization of the second Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to the primacy of the Yugoslavian identity over other ethno-religious identifiers for the majority of the citizens in the region. At the conclusion of World War II, the Balkan region was experiencing massive war fatigue and was primed to mobilize around the heroic image of the Partisan leader defeating the Goliath-like Axis Powers (Pavasović Trošt 2014). Ethno-national identities, which were once preeminent before the World Wars, were now relegated to a backseat position to the Yugoslav identity. During the course of my interviews, it was apparent that there was a clear delineation between the older generation who were socialized during the era of Tito and the younger generation who were children during the war. Many who were raised during the era emphasized their previous Yugoslavian identity and still appeared to attach to that identity over other labels.

Several respondents highlighted the one-party message that infiltrated social institutions throughout Yugoslavia after the Partisans ousted the Ustaše and the Axis powers at the end of World War II. One interviewee noted that museums, cultural sites, and schools were all utilized to generate and embed a collective narrative about socialism and the greater project of a singular Yugoslavia[53]. This agenda was an incredibly successful undertaking, and, on the surface, there existed an appearance of a unified, one-party state that held strong throughout Tito's reign.

However, a closer inspection reveals that there were fissures that were simply awaiting exploitation to expand into full-scale resentment and ultimately war.

[53] Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo.

Respondents indicate that inside churches and mosques, religious leaders proselytized the importance of religious identities over all else[54], which was a narrative that ran counter to the dominant Socialist agenda. Further, those who supported the Ustaše and/or the Axis Powers during the war continued to pay social costs in the years that followed.

By way of example, during field research, an interviewee described an annual ceremony held in Tito's honor called *Štafeta Mladosti* to illustrate processes employed by the state to encourage adherence to the one-party message. During this annual ritual, the youth of Yugoslavia participated in passing a baton across the region in homage to Tito each year. The participant selection process usually involved teachers identifying a student who was the embodiment of revered national qualities. It was considered a high honor to be chosen. One year, a Croatian student was selected from the Boban family line. This choice was considered entirely taboo and the selected child was restricted from participating. Furthermore, both the student and the teacher who selected him were sanctioned. In this way, and in many others, individuals and families associated with certain ethno-national identities and/or political positions experienced less than favorable conditions and opportunities in Tito's Yugoslavia[55]. In this way, deep-seated resentments swirled under the surface for those relegated to the periphery and simply awaited the opportunity to be voiced and exploited.

After Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavia was hit by a series of political and economic crises that began to test the strength of Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity, which only served to deepen festering and unresolved resentment. In the years that followed, the politicization of previously latent ethno-nationalist identities began in earnest. For nearly

[54] Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo.
[55] Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo.

a decade, ethnic division in the autonomous province of Kosovo between the Albanians and the Kosovo Serbs intensified and became a harbinger for what was to come beyond those borders for the other republics across the region (Little and Silber 1997).

As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, through a series of political machinations and skillful propaganda campaigns designed to exploit existing resentments, Slobodan Milosević began to consolidate power throughout Serbia, Montenegro, and the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, by aggressively pursuing centralization policies. These actions raised grave concern for many of the key political elites and republics comprising Yugoslavia. Tensions increased as rhetoric calling for a Greater Serbia began in earnest and the critical elements for revolution were in place to challenge the utopian one-party state ideal that had managed to mostly thrive during the golden era of Tito (Cohen 2018; Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). In the face of these factors, conflict seemed imminent.

By 1989, Yugoslavia was primed for fracture. In the elections that followed the Milosević propaganda campaigns during the mid-1980's, stalwart socialist parties suffered heavy defeats throughout the country in favor of ethnic separatist parties who played on the existential fears of the voters (Maksić 2017). This resulted in increases in nationalist rhetoric that made the status quo untenable. At the end of 1990, Slovenian voters resoundingly voted in favor of an independence referendum and prepared to break from the broader federation. Croatia followed suit shortly thereafter, although Croatian Serbs boycotted the vote and were highly opposed to the move (Malcolm 2002; Little and Silber 1997).

The nationalist calls for a Greater Serbia was unsettling for all of the republics across Yugoslavia, but most especially for Bosnia, given the high concentration of Bosnian Serbs residing in Bosnia who supported the vision proposed by Milosević and his allies, amongst a host of other factors. While Yugoslavia broadly speaking was considered a multi-ethnic region, for the most part, the various ethnic identities resided within territorial boundaries that nearly perfectly aligned with their ethno-national identity. As illustrated in Figure 3 below - Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro - were almost exclusively comprised of individuals with the same ethnic identity as aligned with the associated territorial boundaries.

However, Bosnia was distinct from her sister republics. Bosnians of varying ethnic identities interviewed during the course of this research have frequently referred to Bosnia as the 'little Yugoslavia' due to the demographics of the region. Even the most cursory glance at Figure 3 demonstrates the veracity of this claim. Demographically speaking, Bosnia was clearly the most ethnically diverse republic in the region, comprised of the three largest ethnic identities residing in Yugoslavia, along with several others. The demographic breakdown in Bosnia included a mixture of Bosnian Muslims (heretofore Bosniaks) who comprised just over 43% of the population, while Bosnian Serbs made up an additional 31%, and Croats made up just under 18% of the total regional population (Amnesty International 1992; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1992)[56].

It should be noted that during the parliamentary election held in November in 1990, each of the three primary nationalities won the majority of the seats in parliament

[56] See Figure 3 for the spread of these nationalities across the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

in proportion to their demographic representation. These three national parties would become key players in the war years ahead (Amnesty International 1992; Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). The three main parties were the *Party of Democratic Action* (SDA), which is associated with the Muslim community, the *Serbian Democratic Party* (SDS), which is supported by the Bosnian Serb community, and the C*roatian Democratic Union* (HDZ), which is an extenuation of the party of the same name in Croatia. Seats were won during this election proportional to their demographic representation throughout Bosnia, which ultimately left Alija Izetbegović as the President of the seven-member Presidency of the broader federation (Amnesty International 1992; Malcolm 2002).

Yet, according to the 1991 census, while Muslims were the largest nationality represented in Bosnia, Serbs were far and away the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. Serbs comprised roughly 36% of the national population with those identifying as Muslim running a distant third demographically at well under 10% (U.S.Central Intelligence Agency 1992)[57]. Essentially, the Muslim population primarily resided within the borders of Bosnia and did not disperse across other regions in the federation, with a few key exceptions[58]. Comparative to Bosnia, most of the other republics were more homogenized in terms of ethnic identity, which ultimately made independence a less challenging option in those instances than was the case for Bosnia.

[57] This census data must be considered with caution. See Hammel, Mason, and Stevanović (2010) for more on issues related to census collection during the Yugoslavian era and during the last census collection before the war in March of 1991. However, for the purposes of this research, the demographic spread is significantly different enough to effectively demonstrate the general trend, which is the aim here.
[58] Refer to Figure 3 once again to see the dispersion of Muslims across the region.

Figure 3: Majority Ethnic Distributions in Yugoslavia at the Municipality Level (1991)[59]

Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg (CIA 1992)

In any event, once Slovenia and Croatia declared independence formally in June of 1991, it was apparent that Yugoslavia was in full dissolution. Questions persisted concerning how the other republics would proceed. Presidential summits were held with

[59] Map sourced from Hammel, Mason, and Stevanović (2010). The map data is also maintained at the url addresses listed below the map image. See CIA (1992) for this image.

the leaders of the republics in an attempt to negotiate the secessions without a call to war. However, Franjo Tuđman, Croatia's president, famously described these meetings as, "conversations of the deaf (Little and Silber 1997, 147)," illustrating the discouraging outlook these negotiations engendered. While the initial fragmentation of the region was met with limited resistance and small skirmishes - for Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia - the break was bitter and negotiations tense as the parties marched inexorably closer to war (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).

Referring once again to Figure 3, the map highlights the concentration of Serbs located in both Croatia and Bosnia. Serbs living outside of the territorial boundaries of Serbia remained a pressing concern for Milosević as rising Serb nationalism called for a unified and centralized Serb state. As this was the case, Milosević and his allies did not contest the right for Slovenia and Croatia to pursue independence, but they maintained that Serbs residing within the boundaries of Croatia had a similar right to declare independence, which would require redrawing the boundaries established in 1945 at the end of World War II (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).

Relinquishing territory was a less than preferred option for the leaders of the other republics and conflict intensified in spite of multiple negotiation efforts leveraged by the European Community (EC) and Germany to facilitate a peaceful transition. In the end, both Slovenia and Croatia received early recognition as independent states throwing a wrench into the negotiations and ultimately leaving Bosnia facing the dilemma of either likewise pursuing independence, which would undoubtedly lead to civil war within its borders, or being dominated by a Serbia with nationalist intent (Little and Silber 1997). These choices appeared bleak.

Bosnian Serb political leadership strongly opposed a move for an independent Bosnia and warned leaders that there would be terrible consequences should Bosnia receive recognition as its own nation-state. The Bosnian parliament was aligned along ethnic lines - with the SDA, led by President Izetbegović, singularly representing Bosniak interests and the HDZ representing Croatian interests. The SDS, led by Radovan Karadžić, represented the Serbian opposition party and he warned that a move to separate would undoubtedly lead to war and existential threat to the Muslim community (Little and Silber 1997; Maksić 2017; Malcolm 2002). When it became apparent that an independence referendum would occur, Karadžić along with members of the Bosnian Serb assembly, declared Serb-dominated regions autonomous areas, no longer under the purview of the Bosnian government. These regions would later be known as Republika Srpska.

In a counter move, Bosnia's government held a highly contested referendum for independence, which received nearly 100% support from the roughly 60% of the voters that turned out (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). Bosnian Serbs, having already formed the autonomous regions, boycotted the vote and refused to recognize the call for independence. Only a few short days after the vote, Bosnia declared independence and a month later was recognized as an independent state by the international community (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the exact act that formally resulted in the full-scale outbreak of hostilities remains contested to this day. What is agreed upon is that several events served to hasten, rather than deter, hostilities. In the early days of March in 1992, Sarajevo became partitioned by barricades and roadblocks established by the

opposing parties. Bosnian Serbs reportedly began erecting barricades following a shooting at a wedding where the father of the groom was killed and an Orthodox priest injured, now known as the Bloody Wedding (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). Bosnian Serbs claim that this was a politically motivated act and hence, an act of war. The events at the Bloody Wedding incident also aligned with the timing of the independence referendum providing more fuel for the mounting tensions.

Just one month later, as international recognition of Bosnian independence loomed on the horizon, the northeastern region became ground zero for hostilities. Bijeljina[60] was the first municipality to fall fully under Serbian control in a campaign leveraged between April 1 – 2, 1992. The paramilitary unit, *Arkan's Tigers*, under the command of Željko Ražnatović, began efforts to forcibly remove the non-Serb population from the city. By the close of April 2nd, approximately 48 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat men, women, and children were killed (ICTY 2019a). When images of the dead reached Izetbegović, it is reported that he began to realize that the crisis had intensified to proportions he had not fully anticipated (Little and Silber 1997).

[60] See Figure 4 for mapping and location. Bijelijna is located in close to the northeastern border of Bosnia and Serbia. Further along in this section, I describe the territorial aims that are closely related to the targeting associated with the sexual violence committed during this conflict.

Figure 4: Map of Bosnia Herzegovina – 1994

Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bosniaherzegovina.jpg (CIA 1994)

" It was unbelievable almost. The civilians being killed, pictures showed the dead bodies of women in the streets. I thought it was a photo-montage. I couldn't believe my eyes. I couldn't believe it was possible." – Alija Izetbegović (Little and Silber 1997, 224)

In realizing the scale of the emergency, Izetbegović reached out to a Serbianized JNA when he learned of the deaths and the flight of Muslims in the northeastern villages

and cities. Since the JNA had served as the army for all of Yugoslavia, Izetbegović turned to JNA generals for assistance to try to manage and resolve the hostilities in the northeast. As Little and Silber (1997) note, Izetbegović later acknowledged that, "(it was) like putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop (p. 224)." JNA forces did not appear to act as a neutral party and civilians were left with limited options, ultimately fleeing from Serb dominated areas in the northeast. As the situation worsened, on April 4, Izetbegović, along with support from Croatian representatives for President Tuđman[61], issued a general mobilization call to the Bosnian territorial defense, the reserve military force (Amnesty International 1992; Little and Silber 1997).

Leaders of the Serb opposition decried the move and both Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, co-founder of the SDS, appealed to Izetbegović to reverse the decision. They noted that only Croats and Bosniaks would respond to the call and claimed that the maneuver was tantamount to an overt declaration of war. Izetbegović rejoined with the fact that he was left with little alternative. The escalating crisis was gaining momentum moment by moment.

Finally, on April 5th, the shooting death of Suada Dilberović at a highly attended (in the thousands), multi-national anti-war march may have also been the final catalyst to spark the flames of war (Little and Silber 1997). Sarajevo's citizens, proud of their multi-ethnic heritage and long history of peaceful coexistence took to the streets to denounce all of the leaders of the Bosnian parties. Individuals of all nationalities and identities

[61] Croatia had already been engaged in active hostilities with the JNA and Serbian paramilitary units for a year. In the case of this dissertation, the focus is on the interactions primarily between Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Serbs. As such, much of Croatian involvement in the conflict is left to the periphery in this examination. However, Croatian influence and participation in the conflict is referred to and noted occasionally throughout as they were key actors and a main party to the conflict.

comingled and marched peacefully together. As snipers shot into the crowd and hand grenades were thrown, the demonstrators began to realize that the war they once thought unimaginable was perhaps a reality (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).

The day after the antiwar march, the international community recognized Bosnia as an independent and autonomous state. Little and Silber (1997) describe Karadžić's predictions concerning Bosnia's future if independence was recognized:

> "Karadžić had warned that if Bosnia-Herzegovina won international recognition as an independent state, it would not last a single day. It would, as he put it, be still-born. On the afternoon of April 6, the European Community recognized Bosnia. (The United States followed suit the next day.) Karadžić kept his word. He proclaimed the independent 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,' later to be renamed Republika Srpska, and announced that it would come into existence that night at midnight, with Sarajevo as its capital (and currently under enemy occupation) and himself as head of state. Bosnia, he said, had disintegrated the day it was recognized (p. 228 – 229)."

No matter these initial causes, when Bosnia was recognized by the international community as an independent state on April 6, 1992, Karadžić delivered on his promise and rejoined by declaring the later named Republika Srpska regions fully independent and laid siege to Sarajevo (Little and Silber 1997). Figure 5 shows the fate of Sarajevo after the siege began and throughout the stalemate of the 44-month long offensive. As the siege began, Serbs were able to control mountain positions allowing for sniper fire into the city below. In order to achieve this position, in the early days of the conflict, Serbs strategically took Sarajevo's police academy, which also allowed for a high vantage point and access to arms.

Figure 5: Siege of Sarajevo – Estimated front line locations and territorial control



Source: Map secondarily sourced from BBC online news. Map is originally sourced from UN maps generated during the siege and it is possible that certain elements are incorrect. The news source reports that the UN maps are not readily available, so this is a recreation utilizing OpenStreetMap and Creative Commons-CC-BY-SA. (BBC 2012).

An outbreak in conflict was simultaneously occurring in the villages and cities of eastern Bosnia that included a mixed population. Figure 4 illustrates the mapping of Bosnia building up to and during the war period. It lists the names of key villages and cities that were impacted during the war. Just days after the siege began in Sarajevo, on April 8th, Bosnian Serb paramilitary units and JNA[62] forces began an offensive on the town of Zvornik, another municipality located on the northeastern border of Bosnia close to Serbia. (ICTY 2019a; Little and Silber 1997). As the map indicates, Zvornik is located just south of Bijelijna and northeast of Sarajevo, where violence had transpired the week

[62] JNA is the acronym for the Yugoslav People's Army. As Yugoslavia dissolved, the army was under the de facto control of Milosevic and aligned with paramilitary forces for the offensive in the both the Croatian and Bosnian wars for independence at various times. The Yugoslav People's Army transitioned to the military formation of the newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , which was the combined territories of Serbia and Montenegro, at the end of May in 1992. This army had control of and maintained the weaponry and systems previously established by the JNA (Little and Silber 1997).

before. Arkan and his Tigers[63], along with Serb police, descended on Zvornik and the town fell in just two days (Little and Silber 1997; Prosecutor of the Tribunal 1997; The Hague 2016). Zvornik, like Bijeljina, was of key military importance for the Serbs given a few critical factors – the location of the city on the northeastern border of Bosnia linking it directly to Serbia and the high concentration of Serbs living there (Little and Silber 1997). It also served as the midpoint to connect territory in western Bosnia towards Croatia back to Serbia in the east.

Figure 6 illustrates the territorial dispensation at the conclusion of the conflict and the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) peacekeeping assignments. The red areas highlighted on the Bosnian portion of the map are areas that ultimately became Republika Srpska territory. During the early Serb-led offensives, the paramilitary units and police forces drove non-Serbs from Zvornik in the thousands (Little and Silber 1997; The Hague 2016). Once again, in terms of Serbian military strategy, the eastern border of Bosnia was critical to secure to create a sort of Serb bridge from Croatia across Bosnia to Serbia proper. Figure 6 highlights the bridge effect from Serbia into the eastern regions of Bosnia and ultimately extending northwest towards the Croatian border. Serbs gained territorial control of a significant portion of this region in the early to middle stages of the war (1992 – 1995).

[63] A particularly vicious paramilitary group led by Željko Ražnatović (aka Arkan) who was indicted for several atrocities including rape. Arkan died in Belgrade and was never brought to trial (ICTY 2019a)

Figure 6: Map of SFOR Areas of Responsibility

Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/bosnia_sfor_97.jpg (CIA 1997)

Once hostilities were formally declared and engaged in early April 1992, targeting began in earnest. While all parties to the conflict committed war crimes and sexually violent atrocities, the balance of military might was asymmetrical in the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Bosnian Serb paramilitary units were backed by the military complex of the former JNA and thus, had greater capacity to engage in violence compared to the fledgling and developing Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH). ARBiH suffered heavy deficiencies and lacked basic and essential resources to wage war.

Initially, the JNA was seen as asymmetrically supporting the Bosnian Serbs, rather than acting as a neutral agent to mediate the outbreak in hostilities between the

nationalities. On May 4, 1992, Belgrade announced the intention to formally withdraw JNA forces from Bosnia, but simultaneously announced that soldiers declaring Bosnian origin would be able to stay in Bosnia (Amnesty International 1992). As a result, only a small contingent of soldiers withdrew and most of the equipment remained to support the newly formed VRS forces (Amnesty International 1992).

The fighting units comprising the Bosnian Serb opposition included paramilitary units originating in Serbia and included Serbs from Bosnia and the newly reformed VRS. This fighting force also added the territorial defense reservists from Serbia and soldiers previously serving in the JNA. Because of these factors, their military capacity was far superior to ARBiH (Amnesty International 1992). This left Muslim, non-Serb, and even Serb civilians who were conscientious objectors, vulnerable to attacks and abuse.

In the case of this conflict, Bosniaks were the primary targets of the aggressing Bosnian Serbs and Serbs[64]. As has been described above, the rise of Serb nationalism during the preceding decade was the *raison d'etre* mobilized by Milosević for a Greater Serbia. As the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) began in earnest, Bosnian Serbs and Serbs continued the call for a Greater Serbia and took actions to create a homogenous Serbian territory. This involved removing, forcing out, and eliminating non-Serbs from territorial areas of interest.

In the case of the sexual violence engaged during this war, "enemy" women were the primary targets of this violence. However, there are several instances of men also experiencing sexual abuse. Case in point, in Zvornik, the ICTY (2019) notes that, "(b)etween 9 and 27 June 1992, over 30 non-Serb male prisoners were killed at the

[64] Arguably, all non-Serbs were targets. Because Croats comprised much less of Bosnia's population, the primary target were Bosniaks largely due to the demographic composition of the region.

Čelopek Culture House, others were beaten and on one occasion fathers and sons were forced to sexually abuse each other in the presence of other inmates (Zvornik information page)[65]."

Children and the elderly were also victims of sexualized violence during the conflict, but this was not the norm even though it did occur. Age ranges of the victims varied, although women of childbearing age made up the preponderance of the cases. In the early stages of reporting the human rights abuses during the conflict, Amnesty International (1992) conducted a field survey and attempted follow up interviews with victims. While this report indicates that the investigators received many reports of rape, due to the stigma associated with the act and the potential social costs and harm to families, victims were reluctant to formally report. However, this report generally covered April – August, 1992 and indicated that, "(t)here were numerous allegations that young women, mainly in their teens, were taken and raped at night by Serbian guards at the camp (p. 51)." This suggests that the primary targets were young women and women of childbearing age. In a UN report on the status of the sexual violence judgments, Oosthuizen (2009) reported that, "(t)he findings of relevant judgments show that women, children, and men were victims of sexual violence in the armed conflicts relevant to the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. They also underscore that the majority of victims of sexual violence identified in these cases at these courts are women (p. 24)[66]."

[65] The number of men victims is uncertain and difficult to gauge. As is the case for women victims, there is significant underreporting by men victims. Indeed, underreporting is expected to be greater for men victims. Further, men were killed more frequently throughout the conflict and whether or not men who were killed were also victims of conflict-related sexual violence remains undetermined (Withers 2017).
[66] The fact that women comprise the majority of reported cases and incidents provides some anecdotal support for hypotheses leveraged in this research concerning perpetrator negative views towards sex relations and desire for adherence to traditional interactions amongst the sexes.

As this section demonstrates, victims of sexualized violence during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) were civilian, non-Serb, primarily Bosniak, women of child-bearing age. However, 'enemy' men, elderly women, and children were also targets of this violence. Since there were multiple parties to the conflict, Serb and Croat women were also victims of such violence, but due to the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, Bosniak women were particularly vulnerable.

Form

The form that sexual violence took in the Bosnian case was manifold. For analysis purposes, this research draws on the definition defined by the *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset* defined by Cohen and Nordås (2014). The conceptualization outlined by the dataset is a particularly ideal match for this research since it builds on the legal definition prescribed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) because these definitions were similarly mobilized by the ICTY. The following acts are considered to be sexual violence crimes according to the ICC: "1) rape, 2) sexual slavery, 3) forced prostitution, 4) forced pregnancy, 5) forced sterilization/abortion (Cohen and Nordås 2014)." The *SVAC Dataset* also includes acts of sexual mutilation and sexual torture in keeping with Wood (2009).

In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), most of the acts described above have been perpetrated against the civilian population, although some more so than others. The most commonly reported of these acts in the beginning of the war were multiple perpetrator and mass rapes against women. However, widespread sexual violence took a host of forms throughout the conflict as many academic, human rights and legal reports indicate (Amnesty International 1992; Bouchard 2015; ICTY 2016; Lai and Ralph 1995;

United Nations 2008). In the *Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women* developed by Lai and Ralph (1995) at the conclusion of the war, they indicate the following about the nature of the sexual violence perpetrated during their investigation of the conflict:

> "Combatants for each of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina have raped women and girls in their homes, in front of family members and in the village square. Women have been arrested and raped during interrogation. In some villages and towns, women and girls have been gathered together and taken to holding centers - often schools or community sports halls - where they are raped, gang-raped and abused repeatedly, sometimes for days or even weeks at a time. Other women have been taken seemingly at random from their communities or out of a group of refugees with whom they are traveling and raped by soldiers…Women interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they were gang-raped, taunted with ethnic slurs and cursed by rapists who stated their intention to forcibly impregnate women as a haunting reminder of the rape and intensification of the trauma it inflicts (p. 10)."

In addition to these qualifying acts of sexual violence perpetrated against civilians, the judgment produced by the ICTY concerning Radomir Kovac, confirms that incidents of sexual slavery and forced prostitution also occurred regularly during the early years of the conflict (Holthuis 2001). In a judgment leveraged by the ICTY, Kovac, along with his co-defendants, were convicted of forcibly detaining 4 young Bosniak girls, two of which were held for nearly a year and regularly sexually assaulted throughout, while also being shared with other soldiers and Serb civilians during this time. The time spent in Kovac's apartment also included extreme acts of sexual degradation and humiliation (Holthuis 2001, 241–48).

Other patterns to consider include the form of sexualized violence in conjunction with other forms of political violence and the timing of the incidents during the conflict. The *Annex IX* Report from the UN Security Council revealed several key patterns that emerged after evaluating 1,100 incidents of alleged sexualized assault by all the main

parties to the conflict (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). First, sexual violence occurred during looting and intimidation campaigns prior to the outbreak of fighting in the area. Once fighting breaks out, women are often raped publicly in the direct conflict zones. Detainees were also sexually assaulted by individuals or small groups, and detention camps were developed for the sole purpose of sexual assault and perpetrator gratification (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).

Detention camps were critical areas where sexual violence was deployed. Mass rapes regularly occurred at some of the more infamous camps. The Republika Srpska controlled territory near the town of Prijedor, which is located in the northwestern region of Bosnia close to the Croatian border, is in the corridor where Serbs aimed to bridge the territory to link back to Serbia proper[67]. This was the center for several camps where mass sexualized violence occurred (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Keraterm, Omarska, and Trnopolje Camps were all located near Prijedor[68].

In the Keraterm camp, some of the more severe abuses against men reportedly occurred while women were abused briefly there, but then quickly transferred to Omarska. Men faced different abuses than women, often forced to perform sexual acts on family members and were abused with objects (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). One early strategy of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units was to roundup prominent members of the community early in the conflict. Omarska was a camp that housed these community leaders and was the site where some of the more extreme acts of sexual mutilation and humiliation were perpetrated against both men and women there along with the camp at Trnopolje (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).

[67] Refer to Figure 6.
[68] These are some of the more infamous and well-known camps identified with the conflict.

Finally, there is evidence of a strategic approach to the camp compositions and locations. The Hotel Vilina Vlas in Višegrad, located east of Sarajevo towards the Serbian border, was the site where especially young women were detained. Estimates indicate that there may have been around 200 women kept at the hotel. Reports indicate that young women were brought to Vilina Vlas and older women were routed elsewhere (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Further, the forces that were known to manage Višegrad were presumed to be Serb forces direct form Belgrade, distinct form the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. At Hotel Vilina Vlas, there were efforts to impregnate women so that they would have 'Chetnik' babies (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).

This section demonstrates that several different forms of sexualized violence were engaged during the war. Only four camps were reviewed here, but it should be noted there were roughly 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where sexual violence was perpetrated by all parties to the conflict (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Of the 162, it is estimated that 88 of those were run by Serbs (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Accordingly, seven of the eight categories conceptualized meet the definition of sexually violent crimes in armed conflict and appear to have occurred during the course of this war. For the remaining category, there does not appear to be evidence of efforts to forcibly sterilize or forcibly abort a pregnancy. Indeed, efforts were taken with pregnant women to ensure the pregnancy came to term before these women were able to be released from detention sites (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Lai and Ralph 1995).

In this highly publicized case, researchers have been able to document the manifest forms of sexualized violence that occurred during the course of this war. Yet,

even with the amount of data available, it is likely that the abuses were even more severe than this picture can reveal. Undoubtedly, the abuses against men are underreported to an even greater extent than is the case for women. However, this data reviewed in this section has provided a general picture of the form these acts have taken throughout the course of the hostilities.

Purpose

As has been alluded to in the section on targeting, the incommensurable differences between the ethno-nationalist parties led to the SDS, SDA, and HDZ becoming entrenched and immovable in their positions. The SDS wanted to be fully autonomous and integrated with Serbia. Their initial offer to Izetbegović and the SDA to cantonize Bosnia was simply inconceivable prior to the war. As Yugoslavia fell, the SDS and the political leadership in Belgrade wanted to ensure that all Serbs fell within the territorial authority of a Greater Serbia. Figure 6 illustrates the territorial overlap and the areas that sought to be absorbed into Serbian territory. Since Bosniaks and Croats, for the most part refused this proposition, Serbian forces broadly sought to displace non-Serbs from these areas through several strategies. Not surprisingly, most sexually violent crimes occurred in the regions under Republika Srpska control along the Serbian border and along the "bridge" towards Croatia.

One effective way to discern the purpose of sexually violent crimes is by evaluating their timing in conjunction with other war crimes. The crimes of sexual violence perpetrated during the war often occurred in conjunction with detainment, looting, torture, and more (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). This suggests that these acts were allowed, ordered, ignored or encouraged by commanders.

Another means for ascertaining the intent of the perpetrators is by considering how the law evaluates this concept. In the case of the ICTY, judges were given the imperative to discern the intent the perpetrators had when enacting their crimes. For example, convictions associated with rape as torture require the trial panel to determine whether the intent to humiliate, cause pain or suffering, intimidate, or coerce victims through sexually violent acts can be determined (Oosthuizen 2009, p. 26). However, even if intent is determined, questions persist. For example, what is the broader purpose underlying the intent to humiliate, intimidate, and coerce victims? To what end does this serve?

Ultimately, most of the reports concerning sexualized violence during the war in Bosnia agree that these acts were designed to move non-Serb individuals out of the territories Serbia wished to absorb. In the *Annex IX* report, the conclusion notes that, "(r)ape and other forms of sexual assault harm not only the body of the victim. The more significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate and personal decisions and bodily functions. This loss of control infringes on the victim's human dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective means of 'ethnic cleansing.' (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994)." While certainly not all cases reported were efforts to ethnically cleanse or forcibly displace victims from the area and there is undoubtedly more nuance to the intent behind these acts, there is strong evidence to suggest that some of the violence was consistent with an intentional pattern to move or eliminate the non-Serb population from areas of strategic interest (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).

While the clearing of Serb territory of the non-Serb population may have been the broader goal of the master cleavage for a Greater Serbia, it is also apparent that individual soldiers and units enacted or did not enact sexual violence at various times. Indeed, during interviews, key informants noted clear distinctions between multiple perpetrator and multiple victim violence *vis a vis* single perpetrator and single victim violence. Key informants also noted delineation based on prior knowledge and associations between victims and perpetrators. Key informants further describe a highly emotional presentation of perpetrators during testimony in the single perpetrator and single victim war crimes cases that is noticeably distinct from the multiple perpetrator cases[69].

These observations highlight the complexity and nuance associated with the phenomenon of conflict-related sexual violence. Even in cases characterized by high severity sexual violence, when we examine the within case patterns more closely, critical distinctions signal that distinguishing motivations underlie the purpose of sexual violence. While military elites may have had one purpose, evidence of variations in the quality of sexual violence employed suggests that individual combatants and even civilians also have their own purpose and motivations that are separate from the overarching premise driving the conflict. This suggests a variation in the purpose for sexualized violence during and within conflict.

Frequency

Sexual violence outside of conflict spaces is notoriously underreported. The same pattern of underreporting exits within the politically conflicted space and is also the case of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Respondents indicate that the deterrents to

[69] Interviews conducted on 7/9/2018 and 7/19/2018 with representatives associated with a war crimes reporting and monitoring organization.

reporting victimization are many, although reports continue to trickle in even in the two decades that have passed since ceasefire[70].

Estimates vary in terms of quantifying the number of victims of sexualized violence during the war (1992 – 1995). Reports range from anywhere between 12,000 – 50,000 victims (Amnesty International 2017; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Lai and Ralph 1995). For men, the number is conservatively estimated at 3,000, but it is likely that there were many more victims (Withers 2017). Psychologically, socially, and culturally speaking, there are several barriers for victims when considering reporting crimes of sexual violence, which leads to an obvious impact in terms of quantifiably verifying these acts of violence.

At the ICTY, 60 victims of sexually violent crimes testified during the tribunal (ICTY 2019a). This appears to be a shockingly low number considering the fact that over 4,500 witnesses testified at the tribunal. Not to mention that it is believed that there was a minimum estimation of 12,000 victims (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). However, the erosion of the family system, a central societal underpinning in the region which was already in distress from the effects of war, is undoubtedly one of the primary social costs that did and continues to deter victims from reporting and testifying (ICTY 2019b). Also, reporting during the war was challenging at best[71]. It seems possible that the longer it takes to report the crime, the less motivated a victim feels to do so.

[70] Interviews conducted from 6/22/2018 – 8/7/2018 in and around the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
[71] During an interview with a Bosniak commandier, I inquired about the procedures for reporting sexual violence during the conflict. More than one ARBiH soldier I interviewed noted that once an individual was in government-controlled territory, they were able to connect alleged victims with the police department. However, given that the government was engaged in a massive defense, it was unlikely that these crimes could be fully investigated at the time. The Head of the Office for the Residual Mechanism, who worked directly with refugees in Tuzla during active conflict, also noted that only two individuals ever reported this

However, the number of victims is not the only frequency factor to consider. Frequency also includes the number of incidents for a single victim and the time period over which the victimization occurred. In geographical analysis alone, there are over 57 villages, towns, and cities in Bosnia where acts of rape and sexual violence occurred (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Within each of these towns and regions, there were often multiple sites where sexual violence was employed by perpetrators.

Returning to the previous example of Prijedor, not only were different forms of rape engaged in, but also there were multiple locations utilized for this violence. To illustrate, there were 33 reported incidents of public and private sexually violent acts that occurred in conjunction with fighting. These incidents occurred in 14 villages in the vicinity of Prijedor. But, there were also at least six camps in the Prijedor vicinity where mass and multiple perpetrator rapes occurred (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). In the *Annex IX* Report, only 178 incidents were documented in Prijedor, but it is easy to imagine that the number of incidents is much higher than this artificial number accounts for (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Add to that, Prijedor is only one of the 56 regions that were targeted with this form of violence. This is evidence that the frequency was quite high in the affected areas.

Another, and the final, frequency factor considered in this section is the timeframe within which this violence was deployed. Following the formal start of hostilities in April of 1992, the development of the detention/rape camps followed shortly thereafter. There is agreement across various reporting sources that rapes occurred with high frequency from the Spring – Fall of 1992 (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick

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type of violence to her. While it was known to be occurring, it was unspoken or expressed in generalities. (Interview conducted on 6/22/18 in Sarajevo for 1.5 hours).

1994; Lai and Ralph 1995). The Head of the Sarajevo Field Office for the UN Residual Mechanism for the International Tribunal also confirmed this observation and noted that sexual violence was primarily perpetrated between 1992 – 1993[72].

Indeed, as was the case with Višegrad, once non-Serbs effectively fled the Republika Srpska regions, reports of sexual violence decreased significantly (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Lai and Ralph 1995). Arguably, this is another piece of evidence linking back to the purpose of these crimes. Since the reporting of rape was linked with multi-ethnic cities at the start of the war, this suggests that ethnic cleansing was one of the primary purposes of the sexualized violence and may explain why this is a high severity case when compared cross-nationally to other political conflicts.

Regardless of underreporting, there is evidence in this case of frequent acts of sexualized violence. While the intensity and frequency is seemingly limited to the early years of the war, this was a conflict where all parties to the conflict deployed sexual violence, albeit at varying rates as a mechanism to wage war. In spite of this, there were many who intervened, resisted, and restrained themselves and others from this violence.

Evidence of Soldiers' Efforts to Intervene, Resist, or Refrain

The Bosnian case appears to meet all the required elements of a case characterized by highly severe rates of sexualized violence. The merging of the JNA, Serb special forces, conscripted and reluctant Bosnian Serb civilians and Bosnian Serb forces into a cohesive and connected fighting unit likely required some group socialization and fraternalization practices (D. K. Cohen 2013; E. J. Wood 2009a).

[72] Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 6/22/2018 for 1.5 hours.

Additionally, while there remains limited direct evidence of overt commands given by military leaders to engage in sexualized violence in order to ethnically cleanse the region of non-Serbs, the command structure definitely did not enforce norms to refrain from this violence and may have passively or overtly supported this violence (Hoover Green 2011). Indeed, of the 32 individuals convicted by the tribunal, four were found to have superior responsibility under Article 7(3) (ICTY 2016).

And yet, in spite of this, there is regular and obvious evidence in witness testimony, reports from international organizations, and from field interviews conducted during this research that soldiers often did not participate or attempted to intervene. I outline a few examples here:

> 1) "Mohamed Kaltak came out of his house in the Dobrinja suburb of Sarajevo early in the morning of 12 May 1992 when a group of about 25 Serbian soldiers (whom he referred to as Cetniks) came to the area ostensibly searching for weapons. The soldiers took him with others to a Serb-owned house about 1.5km away in the suburb of Lukavica. A shot was fired from a nearby building as the group were taken into the house (sic), killing one of the Serbian soldiers. They returned fire after taking the prisoners into the house. Here the journalist noted Mohamed Kaltak's words (Mohamed Kaltak implies in the reported statement below that he was not himself a combatant): 'We were a group of 20 - four Croats, five Serbs and 11 Muslims. They were 25 Cetniks. They took us to one room and separated Serbs on one side and Muslims and Croats on the other. At the beginning they threatened only Serbs. They said they would kill [us]. They told these Serbs that we were good Croats and Muslims because we didn't join the army of Alija [referring to the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic], but they were bad Serbs because they didn't fight for the Serbian cause. They were heavily beaten by these Cetniks." The group were held for about two hours before the detained Serbs were taken away (sic) (Mohamed Kaltak speculated that they were taken to be enlisted in the Serbian forces) and the Muslims and Croats were taken to a detention centre at Kula, apparently a public building. Upon their arrival, they were beaten outside the building; one of the men allegedly lost all his teeth. A Serbian officer shouted to the soldiers to stop the beatings, but they threatened the officer and ignored the order (Amnesty International 1992, 32 - 33)."

A few factors relevant to this research are demonstrated in this witness report to a reporter from the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1992. Note that Serbs who had not already joined the fight were likely forcibly conscripted. Many Bosnian Serb civilians, especially those from Sarajevo, identified as Sarajevan or even Yugoslavian before identifying as Serb. These individuals objected to the conflict and provide an example of civilian resistance. More importantly, in this testimony, a Serbian officer not only objected to the behavior of the soldiers, he attempted to intervene. While his intervention was in vain, the effort was there.

> 2) "The article reports an interview with three Serbian women in Novigrad. The first, 37-year-old Ljubica Leši, stated that one night (the date was not specified, but was apparently in July or August) she and three other women were abducted and taken to a nearby house by Croatian neighbours who had previously accused them of hiding Cetniks. Fifteen uniformed men were waiting, they reportedly told the women that they were to be raped because Cetniks had raped 150 women (presumably Croats). Seven men (all neighbours according to Ljubica Leši) raped the women in the course of five hours. The following night another woman, a 37-year-old named Smilja (her surname was not reported), who was apparently sheltering with Ljubica Leši, was taken away in a van by militiamen, one of who she knew well, together with a 45-year-old woman from another house. Croatian military policemen reportedly tried to intervene upon hearing the women's screams but failed when the van drove off (Amnesty International 1992, 51–52)."

In this example, there is an attempt on the part of Croatian military police to intervene upon hearing the distress of the women. Of importance, the military police did not participate in the sexual violence and further took efforts to intervene.

> 3) "There also are many cases where female victims are protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attackers. Men take women out of camps to protect them from rape or sexual assault, tell other guards or soldiers that the women are "taken," or help them escape. Women hide other women or bring them contraceptives (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994, Under Section C. - Summary Analysis).[73]"

[73] Interestingly, the *Annex IX* findings indicate that there is insufficient reporting of sexual violence perpetrated against men to determine whether a similar pattern of intervention exists. However, this

The *Annex IX Report* from the UN Security Council on Rape and Sexual Assault in BiH, Croatia, and Serbia is a rich source of data. Their methodology involved a multi-methodological approach including documentary evidence from the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), extensive field interviews, and additional government collected data that was not included the in IHRLI database. Interestingly, with the 1,100 reported cases of rape and sexual assault, the contributors found that, "many victims are protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attacker…" The language here suggests that intervention is not uncommon. Review of the examples provided here provides anecdotal evidence of a pattern that is at the heart of this research.

> 4) "One report states that girls and women were raped only once at Trnopolje camp. That report states that drunk Chetniks burst into a hall, holding women and children. Some guards tried to protect the younger girls, wresting them from the arms of the Chetniks and saying the girls were theirs. The girls who returned stated that they had been raped. The commander apologized for the actions of the Chetniks and posted an armed guard around the women for a few days. He stated that he personally guaranteed their safety (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994, Trnopilje Section)."

This is a direct example of the intervention described in Example 3. Here, a commander intervened to the extent that he ordered armed guards to ensure ongoing safety, in spite of being unable to fully deliver on safety previously. However, what is important is that in spite of systematic rape and sexual violence occurring throughout Republika Srpska controlled territories, many soldiers existed who did not appear to participate. In this case, the commander and the armed guard resisted the influence of the social norms forming and being implemented across their comrades within the same milieu.

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distinction indicates that there may be some gendered processes at work in the areas of non-participation and intervention during incidents of sexual violence involving men.

> 5) "All the attackers participate even though not all sexually assault. The first pattern occurs before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in a region. This type of rape and sexual assault is accompanied by looting, intimidation, and beatings. Tensions in an area grow, and members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours by intimidation, looting and beatings. Two or more men reportedly break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them, and often rape and sexually assault female residents. Some of the reported rapes and sexual assaults are singular and some are multiple. In either case, there is often a gang atmosphere where all the abuses are part of the same event, and all the attackers participate in the event, even if they do not sexually assault the victims (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994, Summary Analysis Section)."

Actual intervention on behalf of the victims is one of the subtext considerations in this research as is the bystander or the non-participant. The *Annex IX Report* once again highlights a pattern of violence discovered through their analysis. Interestingly, in this example, the contributors indicate that all the attackers participate in the event, but not all participate in the sexual assault. In this case, the soldier may loot, physically abuse the victim, or even serve as a lookout, but they refrain from participating in sexual violence[74].

[74] In this example, it is difficult to determine whether or not the soldier who refrains in a given situation, also refrained throughout the conflict. While it is undoubtedly the case that not every soldier who committed sexual violence did so every day and at every opportunity, it is also the case that a significant number of soldiers refrained from sexual violence through the course of the conflict. This research does not account for the soldier who commits violence one day and refrains from doing so on another. That is outside the scope conditions of this argument. Further, some many argue that gender bias or gender inequality may be linked to political violence broadly (see Caprioli (2005a) for the links between societal gender inequality predicting conflict onset). While this may be true in the aggregate, the individual difference theory I advance in this dissertation argues that the differential individual internalizations of gender bias predicts combatants' sexually violent behavior during civil war given that it is a gendered form of violence. Indeed, there are cases where combatants, as described in these examples, choose to intervene or refrain from sexualized violence, but they are engaged in other forms of political violence by the very nature of their presence during these violent episodes. During an interview with a Victim's Advocate for the War Crimes Chamber for the Sud Bosne conducted on 8/6/2018, this key respondent described several victim accounts of soldiers not engaging in violence even though the opportunity was available. In one account, the key respondent noted that a victim in a camp had a soldier come into the room where she was being assaulted and coach the victim to scream and pretend that she he was assaulting her. In this case, the soldier was participating in violence at the camp but was purposefully avoiding sexual violence. While the motivations for restraint are not empirically explored in this dissertation, this evidence of restraint suggests that there are different individual motivations for committing sexual violence, which is what the individual difference theory addresses.

> 6) “I.T., a married woman with two children, describes how she was raped:
> On the third of May 1993, a group of Serbs came to our house; they all wore uniforms of the Serbian Army. I was on the second floor when they surrounded the house, broke the main entrance and came upstairs. I was in the bedroom with my children and our neighbors - a husband, his wife and their daughter. The Serbs wore black ski masks which covered their faces (sic), but in spite of that, I recognized Mišo Trivić our neighbor who was in the Serbian Army; he used to come into the shop where I worked for many years. They [the soldiers] told us to lie down on the floor, after which they covered us with blankets. Mišo asked me to give him our money. I told him we had 1,400 German marks [approximately US $875] and brought it to him. He cursed me all the time. Then Trivić and three other soldiers took me into the living room and raped me there. The name of the second man was Siniša Milovčić; the third man I didn't know. The fourth man left the room; he didn't rape me. My neighbor was raped too. – Interview conducted in Croatia on February 27 – 28, 1994 (Lai and Ralph 1995, 14–15).”

This final illustration is similar to what the *Annex IX Report* describes in Example 5. While four men came into the room, only three remained to participate in the violence. The victim clearly states that the 4th man left the room and did not rape her. While there is no “heroic” action on the part of this soldier to prevent or intervene, he did not remain in the room and participate in this violence.

In this final section, examples are outlined of overt intervention and passive inaction on the part of soldiers concerning sexual violence. All are examples of non-participation in violence and of actors that have not been fully accounted for in previous analyses of sexualized violence in conflict. Importantly, these witness accounts and reports are not striving to highlight this behavior. The reports of these actions are generally unprompted since the aim in these interviews is to understand the act of sexualized violence rather than restraint of the same. Undoubtedly, this is a meaningful pattern that deserves closer attention and analysis.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the framework for conflict-related sexual violence during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is laid out. The complexity of the multi-ethnic dynamics is elaborated on and attention given to the process of targeting victims, examining the forms of sexualized violence, understanding the intent and purpose of the perpetrators, and considering the effects and multiple dimensions of frequency of sexualized violence during the course of this conflict. The chapter concludes with anecdotal evidence of the non-perpetration of sexualized violence by combatants in witness accounts and victim testimony. It is evident that clear examples of individual combatant differences on violent behavior as a pattern exists. To evaluate what motivates a combatant to commit sexualized violence, in the next chapter I turn to a cross-conflict empirical analysis of the potential sources of gender bias. Here, I evaluate whether or not the effects of gender inequalities in societal institutions link to sexual violence and are observable in the aggregate.

CHAPTER 5

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIETAL INEQUALITIES: GENDER ROLE SOCIALIZATION AND WARTIME RAPE

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I reviewed some of the significant patterns of sexualized violence that took place throughout the course of the conflict within the region of the former Yugoslavia. I provided an overview of the targets, form, purpose, and frequency by which acts of sexual violence occurred during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Importantly, the review of sexual violence committed in the Bosnian case provides anecdotal evidence that there are clear differences in individual combatant behavior. However, the main purpose of the sexual violence overview is to emphasize some of the exogenous contextual factors discussed in the individual difference theoretical framework[75].

The individual difference theory developed in this dissertation argues that gender (in)equality[76] and sexual violence in conflict are linked. In this chapter, I explore societal sources of gender (in)equality and examine their effects at the aggregate level of analysis. While a case specific study remains the ideal analytical approach for the questions explored in this project, in an effort to ensure conceptual clarity while also avoiding path dependence, an examination of the broader cross-conflict patterns is equally important (Bennett and Elman 2006; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Lieberman 2005). Indeed, in

[75] These include, but are not limited to – the strategic agendas of the warring parties, military resources and territorial aims, interest from the international community, and the influence of the master cleavages engaged in the conflict. These factors are extrinsic to the individual. A key assumption of this dissertation is that the individual combatant internalizes these, along with other factors evaluated in this chapter and dissertation, differentially.

[76] In this chapter, following Karim and Hill (2018) I stylistically refer to gender (in)equality to connote both dimensions – equality and inequality.

order to better understand the social effects on the psychology of the combatant that is described by the individual difference theory, an analysis of socially constructed (in)equalities and their effects is an ideal endeavor.

Thus, keeping in mind the two primary inquiries underpinning this research, in this chapter, I analyze the effects of gender (in)equality found in societal structures as an exogenous factor shaping gender bias. The individual difference theory agrees that particular societal-level contextual factors, amongst others, shape the formation of a person's self-construal and ultimately attitudes and beliefs generated from these social identities. Nevertheless, the argument maintains that the primary impact is not necessarily observable only in societal structures, but are perhaps more discernible in how individuals internalize these structural influences and then enacts them.

While the individual difference theory agrees that the social structures under which an individual develops informs the ways in which an individual, in this case a combatant, views the world, this is not considered a singularly influential argument. Accordingly, in this chapter, I explore societal gender (in)equalities and consider if/how these (in)equalities inform upon the environment under which combatants are socialized and ultimately operate.

I begin by discussing the leading arguments explaining cross-conflict variations in sexualized violence. I then provide a sub-theoretical account, the gender role socialization theory, for the ways in which gender (in)equality reflects patterns of discrimination related to gender roles in society. This theory is absorbed under the broader individual difference theory in that the gender role socialization theory suggests a potential source for (in)equalities by further accounting for external contextual factors

under which combatants develop identities, beliefs and attitudes, and judgments and motivations[77].

These (in)equalities reveal shared ideas and expectations concerning masculinity and femininity at the societal level. In this sub-theoretical framework, I outline the means by which notions of gender hierarchies integrate in societal structures during the early childhood socialization period of combatants. I then discuss the potential implications this has for enacting sexualized violence during war. In the final section, I conduct a cross-conflict analysis exploring linkages between gender (in)equality, combatant socialization processes, and variations in wartime rape in order to evaluate whether or not structural socializing factors alone can account for variations in violence.

Variations in Cross-Conflict Sexualized Violence

Because the unit of analysis shifts away from the individual in this chapter, I first provide a brief outline of the variations in sexualized violence across conflicts, not just in the Bosnian case. Drawing on the universe of intrastate conflicts from Fearon and Laitin (2003, 2011) established from 1980 – 2009, Cohen (2013) determined rape severity for a total of 86 conflicts covering 984 conflict-years[78]. Cohen's (2013) analysis reveals that roughly 22% of conflicts evaluated meet highly severe standards, with 40% reaching moderately severe standards. Conversely, just fewer than 20% of conflicts are characterized as less severe and 17% were not associated with wartime rape at all.

As an aside, this identified pattern challenges any residual claim that conflict-related sexual violence in war is simply an expected part of the conflict process across all cases. A clear pattern of variation is observable across conflicts, much like the anecdotal

[77] See Figure 2 for more.
[78] Discussed further in the methods section of this chapter.

and descriptive analysis of the within conflict variation associated with the Bosnian case identified in this dissertation. Further, these observed patterns demands deeper evaluation into the causes and mechanisms at work.

To date, several key contributions have improved our understanding about the factors that are likely to lead to high levels of sexualized violence across conflict settings. Amongst these are structural accounts linking the weakening of the state, changes in resources, along with opportunistic actions on the part of combatants to higher levels of sexualized violence in conflict (Goldstein 2003; Mueller 2000; Weinstein 2005, 2006). Other explanations claim that organizational processes related to combat group cohesion and military codes and norm enforcement impacts variations in sexualized violence (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; Wood 2006, 2009a)[79]. Finally, broader gender (in)equality arguments suggest that entrenched gender (in)equalities in societal and political structures impacts patterns of wartime rape and sexualized violence (Enloe 2004; Green 2006; Hansen 2001; Seifert 1996). The latter structural explanation, combined with individual and group socialization processes, is explored in more depth in this chapter.

Group and Military Socialization Processes

An essential line of argumentation in the current literature related to this dissertation holds that group cohesion and socialization processes can explain the variance in wartime rape across conflicts (Cohen 2013; Wood 2006, 2008, 2008)[80]. Cohen (2013) theorizes that low group solidarity/cohesion amongst fighting units is

[79] Covered in more depth in Chapter 2.
[80] A review of this literature is important to the gender role socialization sub-theory developed in this chapter. This is an alternative explanation of the patterns of difference this dissertation tackles.

correlated to higher rates of wartime rape amongst these groups, which she further links to the military recruitment strategy of combatants. In this argument, combat groups that have been constructed as a result of abduction or conscription are believed to enact rape more often than voluntary armies. This, Cohen (2013) suggests, can explain variance in wartime rape patterns across civil wars. However, an explanation as to why enacting rape should serve to shore up group cohesion amongst low solidarity combat groups has yet to be fully developed and tested, which this dissertation indirectly seeks to remedy.

Another organizational factor that is believed to shape combatant behavior in conflict is the effectiveness of military norm enforcement and command structure (Hoover Green 2011, 2018). Here, commanders face a crucial dilemma – sanctioning the use of violence and moderating it simultaneously (Hoover Green 2011, 2018). Thus, limited or ineffective norm enforcement ultimately permits the use of violence even if not sanctioned. In this way, a permissive environment is created via weak institutional arrangements, which allows combatants the opportunity to commit to violence.

In another, but similar line of theorizing, Wood (2008) discusses distinct social processes that are disrupted by civil war, which indelibly impacts and reshapes social networks. Two social processes unpacked by Wood are military socialization and transformation of gender roles, which have important implications for the hypotheses later leveraged in this chapter[81]. Wood's (2008) evaluation of military socialization is at

[81] My treatment of Wood's (2008) social processes argument is partial. Wood (2008) fully unpacks six processes that she claims are interactive using four nation-states as case studies (Peru, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone). Other processes evaluated by Wood (2008), and not referred to above, include political mobilization, polarizaiton of social identities, militarization of the local authorities, and fragmentation of the political economy. I take liberty here to address the particular processes that are directly related to my main hypotheses.

the heart of Cohen's (2013) argument and is of particular relevance concerning why rape might be used to create cohesion amongst a fighting group/unit.

In terms of building cohesion, Wood (2008) describes the rituals of military training as formal and informal processes of hazing and initiation, along with drills and the 'tearing down and building up' of the individual soldier. This socialization, in part designed to prepare combatants for the unique context of conflict, builds cohesion amongst the group in order to wage war effectively as a unit. In essence, these groups create a combat readiness culture that increases certainty and trust within combat groups that have engaged in these rituals, which is critically valuable during the crisis of battle.

However, while this explanation is compelling, why sexualized violence should serve as the socializing factor for combat units in spite of the opportunity for an array of alternative options to perform the same cohering function remains undetermined. The argument leveraged in this chapter, and throughout the dissertation, suggests that sexualized violence may serve to build group solidarity because of the norms of masculinity that are communicated through these acts. I previously posited that combatants who hold higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit sexualized violence in conflict. In conjunction with this hypothesis, it follows that combatants who have higher levels of gender bias are likely to nonconsciously engage sexualized violence as a means of signaling commitment to the group by demonstrating/performing 'masculinity.' In this way, individual processes link to group processes in relationship to outcomes associated with sexualized violence in conflict.

Gender (In)equality

The presence of gender asymmetries cross-nationally and the potential effects of these (in)equalities is an important link to evaluate when explaining wartime rape and processes associated with sexualized violence in conflict. However, the scholarship in the area of gender and conflict is fairly vast and operates from several distinct perches in relationship to the role gender (in)equality plays in explaining sexualized violence during war. Perhaps the most prevalent are arguments claiming that the presence of patriarchal structures alone is sufficient to explain rape (Cohn and Enloe 2003; Koo 2002). While it is important to consider patriarchy broadly, it is not sufficient *ipso facto* to explain the variance that exists across conflicts. In many ways, this position is difficult to falsify as generalized, sweeping statements about patriarchal structures and their effects on violent behavior in conflict can be challenging to disprove.

In addition, some social systems are in fact patriarchal, and yet do not engage in collective and/or wartime rape. Consider, for example, that while Bosniak women were victims of systematic rape, Bosniak fighters did not *on the whole* in turn employ rape as a weapon of war[82]. Further, as the historical processes addressed in Chapter 3 illustrates, while there is significant diversity across the Balkans, many of the social and political structures at the time of the conflict were unified[83]. In any case, because the notion of

[82] Bosniak soldiers did commit wartime rape and other atrocities throughout the course of this conflict. This is not to say that *some* soldiers did not engage. It was, however, asymmetrical in terms of scale committed compared to other parties to the conflict. Another example of the relative absence of sexualized violence is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both group identities engaged in the conflict have fairly prescribed roles for men and women in society, yet this conflict is not characterized by the extreme levels of wartime rape observed in many other conflicts. In this way, patriarchal processes and structures alone cannot explain the absence of sexualized violence in this case.

[83] It may also be relevant to consider whether or not combatants are in the aggressor or defender role as these roles might also be couched in gendered terms as power dynamics often split along gendered lines. However, a more robust exploration of this is outside the parameters of this project.

patriarchy is an umbrella term, precisely testing its effects requires a high degree of conceptual clarity about patriarchy itself.

There are other arguments that explore gender within the conflict space that are indirectly relevant to the argument leveraged in this chapter. While the body of research I refer to here does not draw direct connections between gender and wartime rape, it does explore gender and gender roles within the ecology of conflict. For example, Wood (2008) examines whether or not gender roles are static in times of civil war. She notes that women have often become part of insurgencies, sometimes as fighters, but more often take on head of household roles that had previously been reserved for men. This is in large part out of necessity, but Wood (2008) contends that the features of civil war create radical displacement of gender roles. Still other scholars have effectively demonstrated opportunity structures that emerge out of the byproduct of restructuring in the conflict space (Berry 2018).

These transformations and opportunity structures are indeed noteworthy. However, while it is true that the pace of some social transformations is expedited during conflict, these changes are still constrained. For example, while historically there have been some all-female insurgent groups (i.e. LTTE)[84], and some mixed-gender insurgency groups, this is hardly the rule (E. J. Wood 2008). Goldstein (2003) finds that on the whole there are extremely few women fighters, which is indicative of persistent and embedded gender asymmetries pertaining to war. Additionally, Goldstein (2003) notes that women

[84] LTTE refers to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The common reference to the rebel group is the Tamil Tigers. LTTE was a rebel separatist group active in Sri Lanka from around 1976 to approximately 2009 See the Department Of State Human Rights Report on Sri Lanka from 2009 for more.

often support war by reinforcing soldiers' masculinity, thusly limiting some changes in gender norms and roles despite appearances.

Another important variant of the gender (in)equality argument coalesces with the socialization arguments described in the previous section and in Chapter 2. Processes of military socialization and group cohesion have undoubtedly advanced our knowledge significantly regarding cross-conflict patterns in sexualized violence. Yet, questions remain as it pertains to the effect norms surrounding masculinity and femininity have within and around these socialization processes broadly.

Indeed, Cohen (2013) tested a gender (in)equality hypothesis and found that the coefficient representing gender (in)equality was consistently positively correlated, although not found to be significant in her model. This finding, or rather non-finding, along with anecdotal evidence of gendered effects, leads to questions about the exact *nature* of the presence of gender (in)equality in relationship to wartime rape. In this chapter, I examine if there is sufficient variation in gender (in)equality in the aggregate in order to capture the broader socialization environment individual combatants formulated certain social identities in.

A Theory of Gender Role Socialization

Early Childhood Identification of Gender Differentiation

A critical difficulty that is apparent in the approach previous scholars have taken to test gender (in)equality cross-nationally pertains to the ways in which they have conceived of the relevance of its presence. It is important to consider that other scholars have already made the link between the presence of gender (in)equality and conflict onset (Caprioli 2005a; Fearon 2011), but equally significant and substantive links between

gender (in)equality and wartime rape remain elusive. I contend that the challenge associated with measuring the presence of gender (in)equality at the time of war is that it misses key socializing dimensions related to gender, essentially rendering prior processes entirely exogenous to the phenomenon of wartime rape.

Further, the individual difference theory outlined in Chapter 2 argues that it is combatants' self-construal that facilitates biased beliefs that closely relate to the likelihood that combatants' will commit sexualized violence within a conflict. One potential source for the development of biased beliefs about masculinity and femininity is the nature of the gendered environment during combatants' formative years. In this cross-national analysis, I argue that observed societal-level gender hierarchies during combatants' childhood matters. The question remains at what level of analysis the effects of this process can be perceived.

Importantly, as early as three years of age, children are able to identify their own gender and that of others and further feel some pressure to follow the expected behavior ascribed to the gender role the individual has been assigned to (Blakemore, Berenbaum, and Liben 2008; Bussey and Bandura 1999). Interestingly, much of this gender role identification occurs prior to the period of earliest available memory recall, thusly resulting in individuals' tacit acceptance of gender norms with few exceptions.

Although it by no means can be argued that gender role socialization is a fixed and complete process at three years old, certain orienting principles become difficult to unravel since the individual presumably has little cause to question what is considered to be a 'social fact.' For example, Parsons (1968) discusses the composition of social structures through which the individual is simultaneously shaped and shapes. He further

asserts that the theorizing of both Durkheim and Piaget suggest that moral attitudes and logical thought are largely developed during socialization as a child (Parsons 1968, 401), which affirms that periods of early childhood are essential forming grounds in terms of the development of an individual's assessment of gender differentiation and the development of values associated with these differences. As discussed in Chapter 2, no human is value free and it is the internalization and assignment of value to a social category where bias is generated.

Despite the fact that Bussey and Bandura (1999) assert that socio-cognitive development occurs across a lifetime, they also suggest that modeling of gender-linked roles leads to early gender differentiation identification, although ages can range somewhere between three and seven across various gender role development theories. Regardless, within these formative years a conceptual map is constructed by which future behavior is mobilized.

Gender Hierarchies

Hudson and Brinton (2007), paraphrasing French Philosopher Sylviane Agacinski, observe that gender is the first social difference identified as a child and is the frame by which other social and structural distinctions are understood. Exemplary of the claims made by Hale (2004) outlined in Chapter 2, social identities are developed as points of personal reference in order to ease navigation of the social world. Gender then, as the first social grouping, is fundamental socially.

Returning to the earlier, albeit brief discussion of social facts, this argument can thus be oriented to the inherent problem of the social facts surrounding gender asymmetries. They exist exogenous to the individual and are not per se created by the

individual, but rather are reenacted and as such recreated into a version of social reality. The assumption that gender distinctions are "natural" as advanced in some capacity by Gottschall (2004) is to effectively fail to investigate the sources and historical process of these distinctions[85]. Enloe (2004) argues that "(a)ny power arrangement that is imagined to be legitimate, timeless, and inevitable is pretty well fortified (pg. 3)," which is undoubtedly the case with asymmetrical gender distinctions. Yet, these distinctions are not necessarily facts and it is likely that combatants internalize these social imperatives differently, which is a chief claim of this dissertation.

Before examining how these hierarchies might explain patterns of wartime rape in intrastate conflict, I consider Lasswell's (1950) exposition on the study of politics and the influential. He states that "politics (is) who gets what, when, (and) how," and that power dynamics largely shapes this process. Situating gender hierarchies within the frame of this series of questions serves to demonstrate how perceived gender asymmetries might have implications for wartime rape. Answering these questions within the framework of recognizing the latent effects that are initiated concerning gender distinctions illustrates how gender (in)equality and wartime rape are linked.

Simone de Beauvoir (1978) and Agacinski (2001) identify critical societal and structural features at the heart of gender hierarchies being accepted as social facts. First, de Beauvoir (1978) addresses what she describes as the duality of Self and Other, which has implications for how both men and women process gender roles. She states, in part,

[85] Gottschall (2004) offers an evolutionary explanation for wartime rape. See his article for a more robust discussion on the evolutionary determinants of wartime rape. Notably, even if some of his assertions hold true, it still does not explain the substantial number of combatants who refrain from committing violence as they are exposed to the same evolutionary imperatives as their counterparts. Further, Chapters 3 of this dissertation highlights the historical development of identities and their construction in to 'social facts.'

that women are "nothing other than what man decides; she is thus called 'the sex,' meaning that the male sees her essentially as a sexed being; for him she is sex, so she is it in the absolute. She is determined and differentiated in relation to man, while he is not in relation to her; she is the inessential in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the Other (1978, 6) [86]." Agacinski (2001) moves the argument a step further when she asserts that within hierarchical structures, "woman is neither *the other* nor *different,* but only an incomplete being, inferior or mutilated (x)."

Keeping in mind the relegation of women to an inferior space, Goldstein's (2003) confirmed hypothesis concerning the feminization of enemies further supports the claim raised in this argument that the value individual soldiers assign to gender categories has implications for variance in wartime rape across conflicts[87]. Furthermore, the gendered value assignment is linked to the measure of structural gender (in)equalities present during early childhood socialization. These structures are so profoundly a part of daily life that they are in fact, the mortar with which individual beliefs about their social world are built. They are deeply foundational and nearly impossible to shift once grounded into the psyche as social fact.

For example, Goldstein (2003) draws on the Melian Dialogue to historically illustrate the various means utilized in the feminzation of the enemy (357), but this example also serves as evidence of systemic gender hierarchies over time[88]. In the Dialogue, Thucydides describes the role of women as private property and spoils of war,

[86] In her treatment of the self and other in this discussion, de Beauvoir (1978) asserts that both men and women internalize this message equally. Women see themselves as object in relation to the male subject and men see the same.
[87] Because this chapter is a cross-conflict analysis, I focus on that level in this discussion. However, a key assumption in this structural modeling is that most soldiers associated with a given conflict internalize societal norms concerning gender relatively equally. This may not be borne out.
[88] See Thucydides (2013) for the Melian Dialogue, heretofore The Dialogue.

which is still relevant today in the normalization of wartime rape as a routine, and often expected part of conflict. However, other means of the feminization of the enemy, which includes castration, acts of homosexual rape, simulating positions of domination, and insults and intimidation leveled in gendered terms, further substantiates the problem of gender hierarchies in wartime violence (Goldstein 2003). These forms of "symbolic domination" demonstrate the implicit and normative assumption of the feminine as inferior and the masculine as superior. Enloe (2004) asserts that gendering the political further apprehends this asymmetry. Nationalism is equated with the masculine in-group and the feminine with the rebel out-group[89].

Applying the structural imperatives concerning gender outlined here to Lasswell's (1950) political question series, the following answers might be framed. Men get power during war by leveling wartime rape against women (and men) *as a symbolic attack on the "manhood" of* the enemy. Additionally, groups with low social cohesion gain group solidarity by enacting wartime rape as an act of *power and domination*[90], thereby affirming superiority from the perch of masculinity and its associated values. Also, women get victimized and subjugated during wartime rape by the reenactment of asymmetrical scripts concerning gender roles. Finally, men get (or pursue) power through

[89] Consider the following excerpt from Enloe (2004) concerning a Serbian militia fighter, Borislav Herak who was indicted for being a part of perpetuating the systematic rape during the conflict in former Yugoslavia in 1991. Enloe interviewed Herak and found some of these themes to be present in his responses: "He was a man. More to the point, he was a man raised in the 1960's, '70's, and '80's to think of himself as masculine. Or perhaps it is more useful to say that Borislav was a man raised to think of himself as *needing* to be masculine. If we leave this process out of the story, if we treat it as unproblematic, then we leave out the exploration of the gendered politics of nationalism. With such a gaping omission, we will have a hard time arriving at a satisfactory explanation of why a factory worker became a militarized rapist (p. 101)." This example is illustrative of the value assignment to gendered categories and some of the critical intersections with these values.

[90] Power and domination are gender-biased values evaluated in one of the main hypotheses generated from the individual difference theory.

wartime rape and sexualized violence as a result of being socialized into particular notions of gender hierarchies during childhood.

Of course exceptions always apply – women are often complicit in violence and oppression, not only in terms of themselves, but also others (C. Enloe 2004)[91]. However, these incidents are typically the exception and not entirely the rule. In any case, examples of women oppressing other women and men can be attributed to a sort of false consciousness that the gendered processes described in this theory are likely to foster[92].

Thus, the potential implications of a theory of gender role socialization, combined with gender value hierarchies, and soldiers' conduct concerning wartime rape calls for an empirical test of the claims posited here. I further contend that gender (in)equality, as theorized in this chapter, is connected to the group and military socialization processes explored by other scholars. As such, I hypothesize that the presence of gender (in)equality, in conjunction with combat unit cohesion, is linked to the severity of wartime rape.

Hypothesis (1): Greater measures of gender (in)equality present with combat unit cohesion is positively associated with rape during civil war. *Hypothesis (2):* Greater measures of gender (in)equality during combatants' formative years present with combat unit cohesion is positively associated with rape during civil war.

Table 2 outlines the logic of the expected effect gender (in)equality has in relationship with wartime rape. While it is clear that combat units require cohesion to

[91] See Abu Gharib and Guantánamo, along with women of Rwanda inciting rape (United Nations 2013).
[92] Consider Franz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* (2004) for more on the notion of the identification of the oppressed with the oppressor. Fanon articulates the problem of colonization in the psychology of the colonized as believing in the identity prescribed by the oppressor. *Ceteris paribus*, women and men are equally socialized into asymmetrical values related to masculinity and femininity.

effectively wage war, and that the ways in which combatants arrive to a unit impacts the level of unit solidarity, it is still unclear as to why wartime rape serves as the solidarity building function for combat units. Table 2 visualizes and describes gender (in)equality as a factor in this process.

Table 2: Predicted Relationship - Gender (In)equality and Sexualized Violence

Conditioned for violence: Gender role socialization and violent outcomes	
Degree of gender (in)equality	*Outcome*
Low levels of gender (in)equality *during combatants' formative years*	Infrequent acts of wartime rape to build group solidarity
Higher levels of gender (in)equality *during combatants' formative years*	Frequent acts of wartime rape to build group solidarity

Data and Methods

This design draws heavily upon an existing dataset developed by Cohen (2013) that measures the severity of wartime rape by conflict year. I rely on this dataset and a portion of the modeling and hypothesis testing employed by Cohen (2013) in order to test the effect of gender (in)equality as conceptualized in this theory in conjunction with military socialization and combat unit solidarity. The most effective way to test these relationships is to replicate Cohen's (2013) existing model with the addition of the gender (in)equality variables related to the theory developed in this chapter. In addition to Cohen's (2013) dataset and modeling, several different datasets and sources have been utilized to develop proxies for the independent variables and to empirically test the gender role socialization theory, which is described in more detail below.

Cohen's (2013) wartime rape severity dataset was the first of its kind to systematically collect and code data regarding wartime rape to this scale[93]. Cohen's (2013) collection effort includes the coding of rape severity for 86 major civil wars occurring between 1980 – 2009. Cohen (2013) built this data from the existing framework of Fearon and Laitin (2003), from a more developed dataset from Fearon and Laitin (2011) to identity active civil wars from 1980 - 2009[94]. Cohen (2013) then coded the dependent variable, rape severity, by following a similar coding schema established by Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell (2007) premised on the widely used Political Terror Scale (PTS) from (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2011)[95].

To capture rape severity, Cohen (2013) coded U.S. Department of State[96] reports for mentions of rape severity across active conflicts occurring between 1980 – 2009. Cohen's (2013) unit of analysis is actor type-conflict-year. I utilize the same unit of analysis in keeping with her procedure, but I model only one of the five dependent variables Cohen (2013) evaluates. I evaluate at the conflict level instead of refining by actor in the modeling effort explored in this chapter. I do this because I assume that each of the actors - insurgent group or state military combatants - will have generally been

[93] Cohen (2013) acknowledges several early efforts to both create datasets on wartime sexual violence (Farr 2009; Green 2006) and in-depth case studies of the same (Leiby 2009; Sharlach 2000; E. J. Wood 2009a). This is list is not exhaustive. See Cohen (2013) for more.
[94] A more recent and robust dataset is the Cohen and Nordås (2014) that covers more conflicts (both minor and major interstate and intrastate conflicts) and a more nuanced conceptualization of sexual violence. However, because I am interested in seeing if/how gender inequality interacts with group solidarity/cohesion processes, Cohen's (2013) dataset appears to be a more appropriate match to evaluate this relationship.
[95] For more information on the coding procedures utilized in the original and the development of the dependent variable, please see *Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980 – 2009).*
[96] Henceforth State Department.

socialized under similar structural conditions due to the fact that these are intrastate conflicts[97]. Thus, I evaluate only at the conflict level in this chapter.

Dependent Variable: Severity of Rape during Conflict

The severity of rape during conflict is the dependent variable in this chapter. Drawing on Butler et al. (2007), Cohen (2013) establishes a four-point rape severity scale, with three being "massive" or "systematic" rape and zero being no mention of rape, for each actor (insurgent group or state military) during a conflict year. To score this, Cohen (2013) codes State Department Human Rights Country reports to assess for rape severity[98]. The severity of rape determined for a conflict in a given conflict year is the high score by any actor (insurgent group or state military) in a conflict year.

Combatants' Childhood Socialization

Several options were considered to account for the childhood socialization periods for combatants[99]. This argument raises a key conceptual distinction from other gender (in)equality arguments leveraged at the conflict-level concerning wartime rape – namely, that time matters. Given that gender role socialization largely occurs between ages three - seven, I employ a lag period to account for the time range when gender (in)equality ought to have an effect. This lag effectively captures the developmental era for most soldiers

[97] This is a significant assumption and one of many reasons why micro-foundational analysis is required to effectively explore the processes advanced in this dissertation. Arguably, soldiers may have been exposed to similar conditions that are built into public institutions. However, the variation in gender processes at the regional and individual level is missing in this analysis. These variations are likely not insignificant. Factors such as religion, urban/rural divides, SES, amongst others, undoubtedly impact gender role socialization processes.

[98] While the *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC*) dataset is coded using more human rights organization sources, including Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) (D. K. Cohen and Nordås 2014b); in supplementary materials, Cohen (2013) identifies close agreement between the two coding processes such that she is able to determine that the State Department source is sufficiently comprehensive and closely matches both AI and HRW.

[99] One option included an effort to code military data from the *CIA World Factbook* covering the same year range (1980 – 2009) as Cohen's (2013) dataset. However, this effort did not yield significant enough data to establish proportional measures reflective of the state military machinery engaged in conflict.

who engage in active conflict processes. While shifts in the indicators could vary significantly over two decades, annual shifts tend to be less substantive, which allows for this lag period to account for the general societal climate during the socialization period of interest[100]. For two of the proxy variables used to test for gender (in)equality - fertility rates and the difference between male and female life expectancy - I run the model both at the time of conflict and at a 15-year lag prior to the conflict year[101]. For a third and final (in)equality variable, ratio of female to male secondary education enrollment, I lag across three points in time – 15 years, 10 years, and at the time of conflict[102].

Indicators

Debates are rampant concerning how to effectively measure the presence of gender (in)equality. While many efforts have been advanced to create various indices reflective of the lived experience of women and men, data availability for the time period of interest does not allow for the utilization of those more developed indices. The lag period needed to account for childhood socialization ranges rules out several robust data indicators as a means of measurement[103].

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[100] Some of the conflicts coded are characterized by the use of child soldiers, which this lag period does not account for. However, even if child soldiers are utilized, these conflicts are still comprised of soldiers of the typical war waging age.

[101] I choose to lag 15 years only because data for both variables is available to test back to a time that may more fully capture the socialization environment considering the age range across combat soldiers. The number of observations is not greatly reduced due to unavailable or missing data.

[102] I choose to test at three points in time due to loss of observations related to missing data as the lag lengthens. As Table 3 results reveal, the difference in lost observations between the lag time of this indicator alone is fairly marginal.

[103] For example, *CIRI*'s Human Rights Data Project has a section of data available that captures women's economic, social, and political rights. However, this data lags back to 1981, which is not sufficient to capture the socialization context evaluated in this section. In addition, the *Womanstats* data collection project offers valuable data capturing women's economic, social, and political rights, but it is not systematized in a manner fit for this modeling.

In the literature, both Fearon (2011) and Carprioli (2007) describe the use of fertility rates as a good proxy to capture elements of women's inclusion and rights at a national level. Both scholars have further employed this indicator to reveal substantive links between the presence of gender (in)equality and conflict onset (Caprioli 2005b; Fearon 2011). Caprioli (2005) notes that, "(a)lthough gender roles change over time and are culturally dependent, gender is used as a benchmark to determine access and power, and is the rubric under which inequality is justified and maintained (165) ." As such, essential to the argument being raised here is the assumption that gender role socialization does indeed change over time and that the proxy variables employed to represent gender (in)equities ought to effectively serve as indicators representative of the relationship between gender hierarchies and access and power.

Caprioli (2005) further claims that fertility rates serve as a direct indicator of gender (in)equality and a robust indicator for lower levels of education, employment, and decision-making power (169)[104]. As such, in this chapter and consistent with Cohen's (2013) effort to test for the effects of gender (in)equality in predicting the severity of sexual violence in conflict, I utilize fertility rate data collected by the World Bank over the lag period explored in this design[105].

While Caprioli (2005) indicates that fertility rates can effectively proxy for many dimensions of gender (in)equality, it is an imperfect proxy at best given that it captures only some of the elements of women's lived experiences. Fertility rates address complex issues related to maternal health, but other indicators are potentially superior as a measure

[104] For more, see Caprioli (2005) *Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality.*
[105] See *World Development Indicators* for more.

of gender (in)equality[106]. Thus, for robustness and in an effort to capture as many dimensions of gender (in)equality as possible, I mobilize two other predictors to proxy for gender (in)equality.

To capture equity in women's health and perceived societal value, I develop a measure based on Amartya Sen's (1990) missing women hypothesis. Sen (1990) established a calculation arguing that, *ipso facto*, women should outnumber men and should live longer. Building on Sen's (1990) hypothesis, I develop a life expectancy difference variable by accounting for the life expectancy difference between men and women by nation. Because Sen's (1990) hypothesis focuses on the physical well-being of women (maternal death rates, infanticide, planned gendered abortions, etc.), this variable provides a general sense of the physical integrity of women. Again, I rely on the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* (WDI) to collect this data for analysis.

The final indicator I use to evaluate the effects of gender (in)equality during combatants' formative years leading to sexualized violence in conflict is a ratio of female to male secondary education enrollment. This predictor is more robust than the others as it more directly assesses the degree of women's inclusion and participation in society where the others more indirectly capture gender (in)equality. Several scholars have employed education related variables to evaluate the effects of gender (in)equality along several key political dimensions[107]. Additionally, because the overarching theory guiding

[106] While Caprioli (2005) and Fearon (2011) both raise sound arguments for the use of fertility rates, problems remain with this predictor. Examples include China's one child policy and the high fertility rates in Ireland due to religious imperatives. Other predictors, particularly education rates are far superior.
[107] See Shair-Rosenfield and Wood (2017) who use a secondary education measure to evaluate the relationship between female representation in parliament and prolonged peace in post-conflict environs. Also, Karim and Beardsley (2016) use a primary education measure, along with others, to assess the effects of gender inequality on sexual exploitation and abuse on UN peacekeeping missions. Both Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz (2006) and Simmons (2009) use education/literacy related variables in their models related

this project argues that combatants who exhibit a higher need for power, hold a negative view of the opposite sex, and adhere to strong belief's regarding traditional gender roles, women's (non)participation in higher levels of education more closely relates to these dimensions of (in)equality explored both in this chapter and in this project broadly. Thus, it is an ideal proxy for determining the effects of gender (in)equality.

Consequently, the independent variables under analysis create a multi-dimensional picture of the presence of gender inequality during combatants' formative years. By employing lagged *fertility rates*, *difference between male and female life expectancy*, and a *secondary education ratio* accounting for the gender socialization period of combatants' engaged in conflict, a comprehensive multivariate statistical model representing the earlier theorizing outlined serves as an empirical test of the argument described.

Data Limitations

Accurate data on wartime rape and sexual violence, both case specific and in the aggregate, is difficult to obtain. Cohen (2013) notes that the reliability of the true values of rape reports is not wholly available. Problems of potential overrepresentation of rape in a given conflict due to media attention associated with conflict events, along with problems of victim underreporting, plagues a research agenda engaging questions surrounding wartime rape. With that being said, the consensus amongst scholars is that it is acceptable to rely on data that demonstrates significant enough patterns indicative of validity. As such, the limitations of the data should not wholly undermine the analysis employed in this design.

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to gender equality. Suffice to say, scholars agree that education variables are an excellent proxy variable for women's inclusion and participation in society.

In coding severity of wartime rape, Cohen (2013) exclusively utilizes State Department reports, and although robustness checks were performed within the sample by verifying through other sources, the limitations surrounding data collection cannot be understated. Factors such as time, resources, and access, amongst a host of other issues constrains the full accuracy of this data.

Regardless, Cohen (2013) and Wood (2009) both maintain that it is unlikely that the, "variation in reporting and the reality of the occurrence of rape confound the extraction of meaningful information (Cohen 2013, p. 467)." This is to say that the four-point scale used to measure severity and magnitude is effective in that it is probable that those regions experiencing high rates of rape likely did in spite of the lack of a precise quantifier. Similarly, a region identified as experiencing no rape is unlikely to have the presence of systematic rape. While this does not account for what is unobservable, it does create a rough picture of the general patterns.

Further, data availability to account for the lag time to effectively capture the climate of combatants' socialization period is lacking. Reliable data that lags back far enough remains inconsistent with missing years interspersed through the 29-year range analyzed using Cohen's (2013) dataset.

Control Variables

In this analysis, I am interested in adding a link to the conceptual map already established by Cohen (2013) and Wood (2005, 2008). Cohen (2013) argues that wartime rape serves as a cohering function for combat groups with low social cohesion, largely due to the ways by which they were recruited for combat. While this explanation makes an important contribution, I add to this by exploring *how* and *why* wartime rape should

improve group solidarity. Because of this, the control variables used in the series of regressions modeled below include the controls utilized in Cohen's (2013) conflict-level model[108].

I use the same controls for Cohen's (2013) conflict level model *population (log)* from the Penn World Tables 7, *ethnic war*[109] to assess whether or not the conflict was based on ethnic claims, and *conflict aim* controls for whether or not the war was secessionist, regime change, or mixed[110]. Finally, because the observations are not statistically independent from each other, I cluster the analysis by conflict[111].

TABLE 3. Gender Socialization and Rape During Civil War: Ordered Probit Results[112]

	Dependent variable: Severity of Rape – Conflict Level						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ethnic War	-0.062	-0.062	-0.064	-0.181	-0.144	-0.155	-0.106
	(0.114)	(0.118)	(0.157)	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.127)	(0.118)
Magnitude of State Failure	0.061	0.061	-0.351	0.151	0.283	0.046	0.051
	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.303)	(0.138)	(0.161)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Conflict Aim	-0.212	-0.211	-0.170	-0.169	-0.255	-0.126**	-0.143
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.148)	(0.114)	(0.116)
Difference between male/female life expectancy	-0.001						
	(0.025)						
Difference between		-3.68					

[108] See Cohen's (2013) Model 1 for more on the control variables used. I describe them in text above. I choose to utilize the conflict level model because the effects of gender inequality should be generally static across the region. This model should sufficiently operationalize the process hypothesized in this chapter.
[109] From Fearon's original coding schema
[110] From Fearon's original coding schema
[111] I also clustered by country with similar results.
[112] See raw STATA tables in Appendix E.

male/female life expectancy (Lag 15 years)		(0.033)					
Secondary Education			0.00002 (0.003)				
Secondary Education (Lag 10 years)				-0.005 (0.004)			
Secondary Education (Lag 15 years)					-0.004 (0.004)		
Fertility Rate						0.114 (0.076)	
Fertility Rate (Lag 15 years)							0.115 (0.074)
Extrajudicial Killings	0.287* (0.121)	0.287* (0.117)	0.319* (0.128)	0.297** (0.111)	0.216 (0.136)	0.269* (0.117)	0.278* (0.119)
Polity2	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.018)
Duration	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)	0.0003 (0.009)	-0.0005 (0.007)	0.0003 (0.007)
Year	0.085*** (0.009)	0.085*** (0.010)	0.087*** (0.010)	0.088*** (0.012)	0.073*** (0.013)	0.091*** (0.009)	0.090*** (0.010)
Population (log)	0.157* (0.072)	0.157* (0.073)	0.102 (0.082)	0.164* (0.081)	0.169 (0.091)	0.195** (0.071)	0.178** (0.066)
Observations	854	854	549	496	440	854	854
Pseudo R-squared	0.16	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.13	0.17	0.17

Note: $^{*}p$ $^{**}p$ $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 2: Summary NOTE: Values represent ordered probit parameter estimates with robust standard errors, clustered by conflict, in parentheses. *p < 0: 05, **p < 0: 01, ***p < 0: 001

Interpretation

Table 3 describes the results from the ordered probit analysis conducted using the three different proxy indicators for gender (in)equality. While the coefficients for nearly of all of the gender (in)equality variables mostly directionally correlate as predicted with conflict level rape severity, none of the predictors are statistically significant. However, even though the movement is marginal, it appears that lag time may matter for each of the gender (in)equality predictors as hypothesized. In this way, the model performs similar to the version run by Cohen (2013) to test for the effects of gender (in)equality.

This null result is intriguing and suggests that variation is not readily observable in societal level structures. While there are clear gender (in)equalities in societal institutions and structures, the effects of those (in)equalities likely interact at the group and individual levels. The key difference is not in the existence of gender (in)equalities in societal level structures, but rather in the differential manner by which combatants internalize and then act on these differences. In many ways, the results here are also limited related to challenges with data availability to effectively and directly capture the relationships between structural gender (in)equalities and combatants internalization of these (in)equalities. In order to overcome problems associated with data availability and with conceptual precision in variables representing gender (in)equality, individual-level qualitative analysis related to combatant attitudes associated with gender (in)equality and gender bias is a valuable endeavor. I perform just such an analysis in the following chapter.

Conclusion

How and in what way gender (in)equalities link to sexualized violence remains undetermined in this analysis. The relationship is not readily observable in the aggregate. Further, the null result supports the premise made by the overarching theory guiding this project – that important differences in gender biased beliefs and attitudes exist at the individual level of analysis. Given this, it is critical to test how and in what ways the key differences theorized about throughout this dissertation link to the likelihood that a combatant would commit sexualized violence in conflict.

In this chapter, I investigated a potential relationship between societal gender (in)equalities and wartime rape. The null result suggests that the effect of socialization and gender bias is more observable at the group and individual levels of analysis. Case study analysis that explores these intersections is critical in enhancing our knowledge surrounding this phenomenon. The fact that some combatants within the same conflict and within the same combat unit do refrain from committing sexualized violence is undeniable. The individual difference theory suggests that the important differences and variations between combatants are motivated at the individual level. Thus, the effects of structural gender (in)equalities are discerned between individuals. The results of this analysis are consistent with that postulation. In the next chapter, I more directly evaluate the links between gender bias and combatants' sexually violent behavior in conflict.

CHAPTER 6

COMPARING COMBATANTS: ANALYZING ATTITUDES, MOTIVATIONS, AND JUDGMENTS

Introduction

In keeping with the dualism theme woven throughout this dissertation, I now make a purposeful shift in both tone and analysis. As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, there are two orders of inquiry evaluated throughout this project – 1) what are the sources of individual differences between combatants, and 2) in what ways do they motivate sexualized violence in political conflict? To address these overarching questions, I similarly employ two distinct analytical methods to evaluate them. In this way, this project is ordered from a multi-method, binary approach.

Moving from the regression analysis conducted in the previous chapter, I now outline the results from field research trips conducted in Bosnia in the summers of 2014 and 2018. During these journeys, I became familiarized with the Bosnian case through inductively driven research that involved trips around the region to rural and urban areas where impacts from the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) were deeply felt. These trips not only included interviewing experts, civilians, soldiers, and victims from the war period, but they also involved becoming familiar with the cultural constellations unique to Bosnia, particularly as it pertains to the theory of gender bias that is central to this research.

However, before we begin the qualitative shift, I first review what has been covered in this dissertation thus far. In Chapter 2, I outlined the framework for the individual difference theory as an argument addressing the aforementioned pair of

questions guiding this project. Indeed, I assume that individual differences related to gender bias exist and matter related to committing conflict-related sexual violence. In the individual difference theory, I suggest that a combination of social identity factors, attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations are mediated by exogenous socializing factors, which then relates to the likelihood that a combatant will commit sexualized violence in conflict. I particularly highlight that not *all* social identity factors, attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations are relevant to combatants' propensity to commit sexualized violence, but rather that factors related to gender are the primary distinctions between combatants related to a sexually violent behavioral outcome.

Drawing on the case study of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), I began an analysis of the individual difference theory in the chapters that followed. In these chapters, I assume a more positivist tone and provide clear evidence of differences in individual combatant behavior is observed in human rights reports and direct investigations of sexual violence and rape in the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). In addition, I process trace the historical formation of ethno-national and gender distinctions woven into Bosnian society across time and space as part of the sources feeding into the individual gender differentiation that shapes sexual violence in conflict. In the last chapter, I evaluated the relationship between societal-level gender (in)equalities and the severity of wartime rape. The result of that analysis offers support for the main premise of the individual difference theory and points to the value of evaluating gender differentiation at the individual-level of analysis, which is the aim of this chapter.

Accordingly, in this chapter, I explore distinctions in gendered beliefs and attitudes between combatants and I also evaluate how those beliefs and attitudes are set into motion. In the previous chapters, the writing style employed was distant and clinical as typical of a more positivist tone and reflective of the nature that approach to empirical analysis. In this chapter, I shift to a more evocative tone that reflects the intimate quality of the ethnographic analytical approach engaged in this chapter. In this way, I begin this chapter by painting a picture of Bosnia twenty years post-conflict. Following that, I illustrate the main gender biased themes analyzed in this section through a soldier's narrative. This is followed with a brief review of the theoretical structure predicating this project and a review of the main hypotheses explored in this chapter. Following that, I describe the methodology employed to evaluate the theory and the primary hypotheses tested and the importance of the qualitative method as a means of capturing the individual-level factors related to this project. I then outline the key findings from the qualitative research.

Setting the Stage

I begin the day[113] in the Novo Sarajevo municipality, located just a short distance from the famed Holiday Inn[114], once home and place of comfort for visiting foreign war correspondents, diplomats, and policymakers during the interminably long Siege of Sarajevo[115]. On this July morning, I look down on the bustling streets from my temporary home in a 4th story flat in the center of Sarajevo, which provides a birds-eye view of the activity below. The tram stop located just steps beyond the building entrance, along with

[113] Friday, July 6, 2018
[114] Now renamed Hotel Holiday.
[115] The siege lasted 1425-days – nearly four years.

a beloved local bakery offering a variety of Bosanski burek – a filo pastry pie filled with any combination of meat, cheeses, and spinach – facilitates the constant activity outside the flat.

On this day, I meet my research assistant and translator close to the tram stop to drive to a highly anticipated interview with a former Bosniak[116] police officer, soldier and commander. We begin to drive the route to a local soldier's organization, which was once the first Bosniak paramilitary unit formed in Bosnia to defend against JNA forces as the former Yugoslavia began its inevitable disintegration[117]. I take in the view of Mount Trebević to my left and of the many high-rise Tito-era buildings surrounding the roadway as we pass by.

Evidence of the atrocities of the past pepper buildings of various ages as we move along what was once known as 'Sniper Alley' towards our interview destination. Stark reminders of the siege demand my attention as buildings scarred by mortar shells and bullets from nearly two decades ago await repair[118]. I am reminded of what was once a retirement home for the elderly, Retirement Home Nedžarići, now a shell of itself, and yet somehow transformed into a piece of structural art. My research assistant educates me

[116] Bosniak refers to a person identifying as Bosnian Muslim.
[117] Today, this soldier's organization celebrates various anniversaries from the Bosnian War and provides financial support to the veteran population from the war period (1992 – 1995). Political and economic challenges make reparations a fraught landscape in Bosnia. Hronešová (2016) highlights the differential power between various veterans and victims' groups and the potential for material reparations to more deeply entrench social and ethnic cleavages. However, the purpose of connecting with this soldier's organization is unrelated to their social and reparation work in the community. It is, rather, to collect data from a combat soldier's perspective.
[118] (Martín-Díaz 2014) reports that 74% - 96% of buildings across three out the four municipalities in Sarajevo incurred damage throughout the course of the three-and-a-half-year long siege. The urban reconstruction of the city has been significant. Yet, even 20+ years later, the damage of the war remains observable throughout the city and Bosnia as a whole.

on that section of the city and particularly notes that this building will not be repaired, but instead will serve as a stark reminder of what transpired two decades ago.

Indeed, this very building seems to capture the soul of this city in its current post-war state. The building is a skeleton of its former self, stripped down completely to just the concrete structure, and yet the concrete serves as a canvas for the sprayed-on art that refuses to be ignored. More powerfully still, green and verdant life grows up throughout the building, rising through the concrete all the way to what would be the sixth and highest floor. Each of these individual elements seems to capture a facet of Sarajevo's post-war journey. She is the same and yet different – wildly artistic, filled with the drive to survive in spite of assorted barriers and obstacles, and yet deeply wounded to this day.

I am filled with this sense of place as we approach our destination. Stories from the war are close to the surface of this community. Indeed, art exhibitions, war memorials, and testimonials are plentiful. From my perspective, there is a strong sense that the war period is now a living, breathing part of the DNA of Sarajevo[119]. In some ways, it is as if the conflict occurred just yesterday.

Perhaps it feels this way because the ICTY only completed its mandate in 2017 and the residual mechanism continues to manage appeals and other legal filings related to the adjudicated cases (ICTY 2019b; United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2019). Or perhaps, it is the continued work of the Court of Bosnia[120] and other domestic courts charged to process unresolved war crimes complaints (OSCE 2017). Or conceivably, it is the effects of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)

[119] While I conducted interviews in some of the rural areas of Bosnia and in smaller municipalities, I did not spend significant enough time in these areas to make this assertion for all of Bosnia.
[120] Locally, SUD Bosne i Hercegovine

that resulted in a complex, Lijphart-esque consociational agreement that parsed Bosnia into two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska – along with the arbitrated district of Brčko. It may also be the continued presence of various international organizations that serve to mediate the uneasy alliance between these entities. No matter which of these causes, the effect is certainly felt.

We arrive to the interview early and are greeted by the Director's assistant who, in typical Bosnian tradition, kindly escorts us into a conference room and offers coffee[121]. As we await our respondent, I reflect on some of the key questions underpinning this research. What drives a soldier to commit sexualized violence in conflict? Are there perhaps unseen patterns in the beliefs, attitudes, and motivations of those combatants that do commit sexualized violence compared to those who do not? How can we better understand the individual differences between combatants who do and do not commit conflict-related sexualized violence? And, who better to ask about these questions than a soldier[122].

As a means of evaluating and analyzing these questions, the individual difference theoretical framework outlined earlier in this dissertation provides a sketch of combatant qualities and attributes I propose makes certain politically violent behaviors more likely to occur. In this way, building on literatures in political and social psychology, political

[121] The Ottoman influence on the region is no better observed than in the coffee culture. Bosnian Coffee, never to be labeled otherwise, is a staple. Coffee is served in a variety of ways in the sidewalk cafes that line the road to Baščaršija and throughout the city. Bosnian coffee is unique in the manner by which it is prepared and served. It is a cultural symbol of hospitality and community. Typically, it is served on a tray in a long-stemmed pot with small ceramic cups similar in size to a demitasse. Sugar cubes and Turkish delights are also often served on the coffee tray. In the case of this setting, just the coffee was served without some of the other elaborations.

[122] I did not exclusively interview soldiers. Respondent demographics are discussed in more detail further along in the chapter. While the soldier population was a great resource, other key respondents are also uniquely positioned to offer important insight.

behavior, and sociology I explore notions of power and dominance, beliefs about masculinity and femininity, and the interplay between these biased attitudinal states[123]. I then evaluate how these biased beliefs and attitudes become operative, primarily through constraints on individual judgments and motivations, to then be mobilized into sexually violent behavioral outcomes.

With these questions in mind, I meet with the Director of the soldier's organization[124]. A career soldier, the Director was conscripted into the JNA forces in 1978. Like all Yugoslavian men of his generation, he was committed to eight years of service to the military. In the Director's case, he went to military school and became a commander of a thirty-man troop and ultimately exceeded his conscription commitment by serving ten years before transitioning. He left the military in 1988 and entered police service just as nationalistic tendencies began to foment and entrench across the countryside.

As these tensions began to mobilize into outright skirmishes, the Director reported that managing civilian defense became a complex issue as the police force along with grassroots community organizations collaborated to defend against the pending onslaught. The Director was an active combatant during the siege and while he denied having witnessed sexual violence firsthand during the conflict, he helped many victims make reports who were fleeing some of the eastern territories into Sarajevo[125].

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[123] The literature for building this analysis is extensive and diverse. I include a condensed list of key citations consulted for conceptualizing the individual attitudes and beliefs of interest here. (Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura 1997; Bargh et al. 1995; Bargh and Williams 2006; Bussey and Bandura 1999; Cossins 2000; Deutsch 2007; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Malamuth 1986, 1989, 1996).

[124] Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/6/2018 for 2.5 hours.

[125] The Director was stationed on Mount Igman on the outskirts of Sarajevo. He described many women fleeing Foča, a village that fell quickly under Bosnian Serb control through a premeditated military

During our interview, the Director spoke about his impressions of those soldiers who committed sexualized violence during the war. He highlighted that he felt that those who did engage in this form of violence, also exhibited "bad behavior" before the outbreak of hostilities. He noted a sense of inferiority amongst some of the opposition. Here the Director observed that power was undoubtedly an operative factor in committing sexualized violence. He attributed power as a conduit, "to show a man's face," and that power is a factor that reveals the, "nature of a man's character."

To illustrate his assertions, the Director described a neighbor he knew and socialized with for an extended time during the prewar period. They were close enough to regularly play futbol together and he felt that he knew his neighbor fairly well. The Director described his neighbor as having a low education resulting in work as a laborer in the logging industry. According to the Director, he believed his neighbor felt insecure and inferior concerning these life conditions. He went on to observe that his neighbor was highly religious and, "displayed no respect for his wife."

Once the war began, the Director conveyed an image of his neighbor behaving in an, "unnecessarily vicious," manner. He described his neighbor beating the elderly unprovoked and he noted that, "power was a weapon he got," and he wielded it

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takeover beginning on April 7, 1992 (Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project 1998). A combination of Serbian forces from Serbia proper and Montenegro and localized paramilitary forces identified as Bosnian Serb soldiers managed the takeover and expulsion of non-Serbs from Foča (Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project 1998). During the takeover, men and women were separated and primarily non-Serb women were sent to various detention sites around Foča and were allegedly systematically raped. The ICRC was prevented from entering Foča from the time of the military takeover in April of 1992 until October of the same year. As forcible deportations occurred, civilians were forced northwest towards Sarajevo (See Figures 4 and 6 for mapping). It is here where the Director assisted civilian women with making reports. Seven combatants indicted by the ICTY for sexual violence crimes in the Foča area have since been convicted and sentenced to no less than 12 years and upwards to 34 years in prison for crimes associated with rape and torture (Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project 1998; ICTY 2019a). Foča is, in fact, known for housing some of the more infamous rape camps during the course of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995).

indiscriminately once he occupied a superior position. The Director noted that his neighbor was aggressive and when the inquiry was made as to how he thought his neighbor viewed men and women respectively, he indicated that, from his neighbor's perspective, "women were objects of lesser value." While the Director's observations are anecdotal when examined alone, his responses covey an image of some of the key attitudes and beliefs of interest in this dissertation, which is where I posit that the key differences between individuals exist.

The Director's account broadly describes the gender-biased attitudes and beliefs hypothesized to increase the likelihood that a combatant will commit sexualized violence in this dissertation. The neighbor in the Director's account demonstrated a desire for power as he struggled with a sense of inferiority. Indeed, the conditions of conflict facilitated his expression of power and dominance in a manner distinct from peacetime. The Director's neighbor further demonstrated an adherence towards traditional gender roles in his marriage and appeared to hold a more negative attitude towards women by seeing them as, "objects of lesser value."

These gender-biased beliefs and attitudes exhibited by the neighbor are the areas of interest evaluated explicitly in this chapter. In what follows, I evaluate through interview analysis whether or not there is an observable pattern of these gender-biased attitudes amongst those who perpetrated sexual violence in the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). But first, in the next section, I describe the methodology employed to accomplish this end.

Methods

Individual Difference Theory Revisited

In the previous chapters, I provide evidence for the importance of micro-level analysis in adding to our current knowledge of the processes believed to be associated with sexualized violence in conflict. As previously noted, group-level and structural accounts have made meaningful contributions to the political violence literature. However, as demonstrated frequently throughout this dissertation, these accounts cannot effectively account for the consequential number of combatants refrain from committing sexualized violence in spite of the opportunity structure to do so. The evidence of their existence suggests that combatants are differently motivated for violent and non-violent behavior. In this chapter, I evaluate what individuating factors makes sexual violence more likely.

In Chapter 4, several examples illustrate a pattern of non-participation in sexualized violence in spite of exposure to similar conditions expected to result in sexualized violence. Notably, the illustrations reviewed are not exhaustive and only scratch the surface of the phenomenon of restraint and non-participation. In addition to this evidence, all respondents interviewed during the course of this research endorsed that non-participation and, at times, intervention absolutely occurred during violent episodes and events throughout the conflict. Again, these conditions indicate that there are important individual-level differences that deserve deeper evaluation and analysis.

In the previous chapter, in order to effectually apprehend these differences between soldiers, I explored how gender inequalities impact the social milieu under which combatants are reared through cross-conflict analysis. The null result of that

examination, similar to that of Cohen (2013), produces compelling evidence that the effects of gender inequalities are difficult to capture in the aggregate. Consequently, the current chapter seeks to provide a closer examination in order to evaluate how and in what ways gender bias and inequalities at the individual level relate to the likelihood a combatant will engage in sexualized violence in conflict.

The individual difference theory posits that there are certain attitudes and beliefs held by the individual combatant that are necessary, but not independently sufficient, to commit sexualized violence during conflict. These key biased attitudes and beliefs interact with other factors – such as, structural, organizational, and social influences – to then result in combatants' either committing or refraining from committing sexualized violence. Please refer to Figure 1 found in Chapter 2 to recall the theoretical formula behind this analysis.

The determining factors then probed in this research are further divisible into two categories - individual and contextual factors. Subsumed under each of these broader categories are component parts that comprise elements of both the individual and the context. Table 1 found in Chapter 2 features these categories and the subdivided component parts.

Thus far, in the previous chapters and in findings already established in the existing literature, the contextual influences have been explored[126]. In this chapter, I primarily hone in on the individual and the component parts highlighted under this category.

[126] See (Balcells 2010; Downes 2006; Kalyvas 2006) for more on types of violence. See Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011; Wood 2006, 2009 for more on military organizational and group cohesion factors. See (Baaz and Stern 2013; Carpenter 2006; Davies and True 2015; C. Enloe 2000) for more on structural contextual accounts.

Individual Level Analysis and the Qualitative Method

When exploring individual-level distinctions, it is essential to select a method of analysis that most effectively aligns with the nature of the research question and the hypotheses generated. Several potential methodological approaches for evaluating the questions examined in this project were considered. Ultimately, while a mixed-method approach is utilized throughout the broader project, the main tool of analysis is qualitatively driven – both in terms of theory development and in theory testing (Mahoney 2010; Tarrow 2004).

In the case of assessing combatants' motivations for sexualized violence in conflict, qualitative field interviews were conducted in order to effectually capture and understand combatant beliefs and attitudes and the processes associated with those beliefs and attitudes (Dilley 2003; Rubin and Rubin 2011). In keeping with the qualitative tradition, exploratory field research conducted in the summer of 2014 in Bosnia facilitated initial theory development regarding the potential influence of gendered beliefs and attitudes in the perpetration of sexualized violence in warfare[127].

During the field research trip in 2014, I conducted extensive interviews with leaders of the demographically dominant ethno-religious groups in Bosnia at the time of war (1992 – 1995). This included Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Orthodox Bosnian Serbs, and Croatian Catholics. In addition to meeting with these religious leaders, I also conducted interviews with adults who were children during the war, civilians, soldiers, and representatives of an array of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and cultural institutions. Through semi-structured interviews, I explored gender norms and identity

[127] See Appendix A for IRB approved interview schedule for field research conducted in 2014. Note: Only an English version of the interview questions was developed for the 2014 exploratory research.

formation in Bosnian society - both contemporaneously and historically and to the lead up to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Interviews lasted no shorter than two hours with some extending over five hours in length. Interviews occurred in homes, cafes, at NGO's, and in churches and mosques.

During this initial exploration in 2014, interviewees identified clearly defined gender roles and norms across ethno-national and religious boundaries. And yet, during interviews, differences between combatants were revealed frequently enough to sufficiently require a deeper investigation into these differences. Consequently, following the 2014 research trip, I delved deeper into secondary and archival sources regarding incidents of wartime sexualized violence in order to see if there was more evidence of individual variations observable in reports of human rights violations and sexual assault cases (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; ICTY 2016) . Undeniably, the "deviant case" of the non-perpetrator became more and more observable in various witness accounts of violence (Mahoney 2007)[128].

Although the non-perpetrator was not explicitly represented in these narratives, inferences to such actors were woven into the disclosures concerning this form of violence. The initial research conducted in 2014 provided the impetus to begin to consider individual distinctions more closely. The ensuing research revealed compelling enough anecdotal evidence that there are a significant number of combatants that do not conform to existing theoretical expectations regarding expected patterns of sexualized violence in conflict. In this way, the principles of a "deviant case study" underlies the

[128] Secondary sources include the array of human rights reports and recorded victim accounts regarding sexualized violence. See (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Human Rights Watch 1995; Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project 1998) for more on direct accounts of sexualized violence.

theory development in this project and specifically this chapter (Emigh 1997; George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1971; Mahoney 2007). The presence of non-perpetrators is important in that their very existence provides evidence that differences exist between them and perpetrators. They are categorically distinct from each other suggesting that individual-level differences matter within the context of political conflict. While I was constrained from empirically evaluating the motivations of the non-perpetrator in this dissertation, their existence allowed for the development of theoretical distinctions between those who do and do not perpetrate sexual violence[129]. In this dissertation, I focus on a theoretical account for those who do commit sexualized violence.

Following the initial exploratory research, I reentered into the field in the summer of 2018 armed with several deductively pre-established hypotheses gleaned from the theory developed post the 2014 research trip. As outlined in the theory section of this dissertation, the hypotheses generated were determined based on the theorized biased beliefs and attitudes held by combatants that I posit are necessary to commit sexualized violence during conflict. They are as follows:

[129] As discussed in the introduction, while I attempted to gather data on the motivations of the non-perpetrator, the experts I interviewed were unable to provide meaningful information about the non-perpetrator – other than accounts of their existence and their restraint in conflict. The experts I interviewed were able to speak intelligently and at length about the motivations and behavior of perpetrators, but were relatively silent about the motivations of the non-perpetrator in spite of efforts made through probing questions. This limitation is intriguing. First, it suggests that our collective focus has been on the causes and conditions associated with the perpetration of sexualized violence. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of empirically engaging the unknown motivations associated combatant restraint in future research. I address this area in the conclusion.

Table 4: Deductive Gendered Attitudes and Beliefs Hypotheses

(H1) Ceteris Paribus, combatants who have higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence.
(Sub-H1.a) Combatants who have a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence.
(*Sub-H1.b)* Combatants who have a higher need to adhere to traditional sex relations are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexualized violence.
(Sub-H1.c) Combatants who hold a more negative view of the opposite sex are more likely to commit conflict-related sexualized violence.

In order to analyze the validity of the individual difference theory, I developed a semi-structured interview tool to conceptually capture and operationalize each of the requisite variables included in the hypotheses outlined in Table 4[130]. Then, equipped with developed analytical tools to empirically test the individual difference theory, I returned to Bosnia for a second research trip in summer of 2018.

Conducting research related to war crimes is complex and filled with ethical considerations. In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), Bosnian Serb soldiers are notably silent regarding the discussion of war crimes and violence perpetrated during the course of the war. Further, ethical questions persist related to interviewing individual soldiers directly about their own behavior during the war.[131] How, then, should a researcher approach assessing individual-level motivations for committing sexualized violence?

In this case, I selected to interview experts on the subject matter – conflict-related sexual violence – and on the unit of analysis of interest – soldiers. The Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is an ideal case to explore these questions given the high severity of sexualized violence reported during the war and the number of experts working in the

[130] See Appendix B for the IRB Interview Schedule in both English and translated to BCS.
[131] Questions of validity are relevant. For example, social desirability bias is undoubtedly an issue in exacting valid responses from soldiers regarding their violent behavior during war. For more on social desirability bias see Nederhof (1985).

region with impressions of individual combatant motivations. In this way, I sought interviews with psychologists with expertise in working with victims and perpetrators of sexualized violence during the war. I also sought interviews with NGO's with direct experience with war crimes cases associated with sexualized violence. I further sought interviews with combat soldiers and with human rights and media watch groups with specific expertise in conflict-related sexual violence. In this way, these key informants and interviewees are uniquely positioned to formulate clear impressions regarding the attitudinal proclivities and beliefs of perpetrators of sexualized violence they have interacted with and observed.

Given this approach, I developed an interview schedule specifically matched to the categorical expertise of each respondent and their knowledge or association with a perpetrator[132]. The question set was constructed from the deductively developed hypotheses outlined in Table 4. While this was not survey research, I honored a similar methodological rigor to developing and then implementing the questions during interviews. For example, the question set is not leading and broadly engages the concepts of gender bias and other differences of interest outlined in the individual difference theory. In this way, I avoid demand characteristics and confirmation and social desirability biases by designing the interview structure to allow for open expression of impressions and expertise on the part of respondents.

From the hypotheses and interview questions, I developed a code sheet for the themes of each of the gender inequality hypotheses. To evaluate each of these hypotheses, I developed a code sheet of terms and language associated with and

[132] See Appendix B for the interview schedule. Questions were categorized based on expertise. Judges/psychologists/attorneys; combatants; family members of combatants.

contradictory to each of the concepts in the hypotheses prior to analyzing the interviews. In this way, I evaluated for confirmation or falsification of the individual difference hypotheses outlined in Table 4[133]. In addition to the gender-biased terms related to the hypotheses in Table 4, I also coded for terms associated with judgment and motivation as described in the individual difference theory in Chapter 2.

The primary data generated for this analysis was through two research trips in Bosnia in 2014 and 2018. During these two trips, I conducted a total of 41 in country, semi-structured interviews with key informants and respondents. Sixteen of the 41 interviews occurred in 2014[134]. The 2014 interviews, while key in identifying the research question and the individual difference theory developed to guide this project, are not substantively included in the analysis below.

Accordingly, data analysis in this chapter is limited to the 25 in country and one additional interview conducted between 2018 and 2019[135]. Throughout this research period, I spent a total of 43.25 hours in direct interviews. I interviewed a cross-section of key informants and respondents with varying expertise and direct knowledge related to combatants' beliefs and attitudes as described above. Respectively, the interview

[133] See Appendix D for code sheet with terms endorsing and falsifying the hypotheses.
[134] Because the research conducted in 2014 did not engage respondents in questions directly related to most of the hypotheses explored in this chapter, I did not code these interviews in the same manner. That being said, I do refer to the 2014 research when addressing social identity and gender roles as that research provided important insight concerning societal distinctions related to ethno-religious and gender roles. However, direct insights garnered from that research is primarily limited to that section and is not calculated in the coding results found in Appendix C and D.
[135] Three interviews included two respondents, which increases the number of participants to 29 through the course of the research. The number of hours engaged in interviews is determined according to the 26 total interviews conducted in 2018. One of the 26 interviews was conducted in the United States.

schedule found in Appendix B demonstrates the recruitment of participants with specific expertise and knowledge based on their current role and/or role during the war[136].

Thus, participants in this research are many and varied. 38% of respondents and informants work for international organizations or NGO's that serve as monitors related to war crimes and human rights abuses. Three key informants are associated with the domestic high court of Bosnia charged with adjudicating war crimes cases now that the ICTY has completed its mandate. Each of these informants has direct expertise related to war crimes cases and crimes associated with sexual violence in conflict[137]. 20% of respondents are psychotherapists or psychiatrists that have treated both victims and perpetrators during the aftermath of the war[138]. Finally, 20% are combat veterans of the Bosnian War[139].

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[136] Notably, while I have assigned a primary role designation that seems most appropriately aligned to the participant in terms of their presentation during the interview, several participants occupy multiple roles related to their knowledge of the war. For example, one interview conducted with a senior official associated with the ICTY and the Residual Mechanism revealed that this official also had first-hand experience of the war through on the ground humanitarian intervention. This key informant first worked with Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) and then took an assignment with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Tuzla and Brčko during the war period analyzed in this research. Thus, this informant, while an expert as a senior official, also offered critical knowledge as a field worker interacting with both victims and perpetrators alike during the conflict and into the post-conflict reconstruction period (Interview conducted on 6/22/2019 in Sarajevo). Similarly, several other informants and respondents occupy multiple perches related to their experiences and knowledge of the war.

[137] Two informants related to SUD Bosnia are victim's advocates. One respondent is a judge specifically working for the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) who has ruled on cases involving sexualized violence. This key informant reports that the WCC has, at the time of the interview, heard 192 war crimes cased involving 302 defendants. He conservatively estimates that 30% - 40% of these cases involve sexual violence (Interview conducted at SUD Bosnia in Sarajevo on 7/25/2019 for 1.5 hours).

[138] One key informant, a psychologist once stationed at a military hospital but without direct military experience, has conservatively treated over 1000 combat veterans in Serbia (Interview conducted via Skype on 7/20/18. Sarajevo to respondent location in Belgrade). Others have solely treated victims and others still have treated both when seeking emergency services related to PTSD.

[139] Two respondents were commanders. All soldiers interviewed were associated with ARBiH. While their observations offer important insights and are critical to this research, representation of Bosnian Serb soldiers is lacking in this project. This is not surprising. The Bosnian Serb soldier population is notably silent and reluctant to interview due to ongoing political complexity related to the DPA and the ensuing political system. Several recruitment efforts were made to attempt to interview three different candidates, but these interviews did not materialize. One interview was scheduled, but was cancelled due to a

A potential concern associated with small-*N* studies is related to problems associated with selecting on the dependent variable (Mahoney 2007) – in this case the likelihood a combatant will commit sexualized violence . While it is unfortunate that respondents had difficulty directly speaking to the attitudes and beliefs associated with non-perpetrators and interventionists in spite of efforts made to probe in these areas, the analysis that follows reveals that there are clear patterns that emerged across respondent reports to support evidence of identified variation on the dependent variable[140].

In terms of the analysis of the interviews, I follow the tenets of grounded theory in the sense that the theory generation and testing process followed in this section is an iterative process that has been updated based on novel empirical observations (Bennett and Elman 2006; Charmaz and Belgrave 2015; Rubin and Rubin 2011). In this sense, I engage in an interactive process between both deductive and inductive reasoning to capture the best representation and test of the theoretical model posited[141].

George and Bennett (2005), highlight that one benefit of the qualitative approach is its capacity to recognize new variables of interest that serve to sharpen theoretical

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scheduling conflict identified by the soldier. Ideally, future research will include this important and absent narrative.

[140] In fact, this very issue in and of itself provides support as to why ongoing research in this area is a fruitful endeavor. Conflict scholars and experts in sexualized violence in conflict have begun to articulate the need for more refined analysis and attention to the nuances related to this form of violence (Crawford 2015; Crawford, Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). It appeared challenging for respondents to adjust to speaking about the non-perpetrator. This required effort, likely due to the means by which the current narrative regarding sexualized violence is mobilized. Continuing to evaluate the non-perpetrator is an important future research agenda. However, I remain diligent about the scope conditions related to this study. Analysis here is not generalizable to all combatants across time and space. Further, I am limited to evaluating which individual differences increase the likelihood of sexualized violence. Thus, the empirical analysis here remains focused on the perpetrator.

[141] While deductively developed hypotheses anchored this research prior to engaging the field research, while in the field and during the course of the interviews, several new variables of interest emerged as concepts deserving representation in the analysis. However, these variables were not fully deductively drawn per se, but rather inductively generated as empirical, in field observations. I outline these "left out" variables towards the conclusion of the chapter.

precision when they state, "Unless statistical researchers do their own archival work, interviews, or face-to-face surveys with open-ended questions in order to measure the values of the variables in their model, they have no unproblematic inductive means of identifying left out variables (p. 21)." In this way, I discovered "left out" variables that are examined more fully in the final section.

Finally, I elaborate once more on an additional element in the coding procedure[142]. In the coding schema, I focus on both frequency of mentions and substantive relationship to the concepts examined. In this way, I coded interview data for the essential themes and concepts associated with the main hypotheses and the broader theoretical model (Rubin and Rubin 2011). The analysis of these variables, the hypotheses, and theory testing follows below.

Theory Testing and Analysis

In this section, I organize the data according to the divisions established under the individual category of the theoretical model. An analysis of the following sub-categories – social identity factors, attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations – is conducted to demonstrate support or lack thereof related to the strength of the individual difference theory. In addition, I address some, but not all, of the additional concepts and patterns that are revealed through interview analysis[143].

However, before delving into evaluation and interpretation, I offer a note on validity and reliability. Each respondent and key informant interviewed is uniquely situated to effectually draw conclusions regarding combatants' motivations through direct

[142] See Appendix D for code sheet.
[143] See Appendix D for code sheet and section titled: "Additional Patterns, Themes, Concepts, Variables Identified During Coding."

experience with both perpetrators and victims alike. In this way, these participants provide one degree of separation from firsthand testimony from both perpetrators and victims. Through the process of comparison, it is striking how many statements related to key concepts of interest are nearly identical yet unprompted based on interview questions. The repeatable nature of these statements offers a degree of reliability. This will be highlighted and discussed in more detail in the subsections that follow.

Social Identity Categories

"Why do people have 'identities?'" queries (Hale 2004) in his 2004 article, *Explaining Ethnicity (*p. 462). (Hale 2004) By way of one response, he states, "It is, in a certain way, a kind of social radar, a perceptual device through which people come to see where they stand in relation to the human environment (p. 463)."

Indeed, it is this notion of identity that is foundational to understanding the presence and effects of individual differences on combatant behavior in conflict settings. As posited by the individual difference theory, it is from these identities - which serve as organizing principles for social interactions - that biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences are formed and ultimately mobilized into actions. However, not all identities are especially salient within the conflict context. In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), the central case of this project, three identity categories are notable in shaping behavior – gender, ethno-national, and religious identities. As a reminder, the individual difference theory argues that the internalization of what it means to be a man or a woman and the attitudes and beliefs that formulate from this grouping, is a critical part of developing differentiation.

During interviews conducted in 2014, the questions explored during that research period primarily dealt with role expectations surrounding gender and notions of womanhood and manhood in Bosnian society. Nearly all respondents endorsed the existence of differentiated gender role expectations in Bosnian society. However, while respondents observed that differentiation between the sexes existed, they similarly noted that there were gradations in these differences based on several factors. These preliminary observations invited deeper analysis into notions of masculinity and femininity in Bosnia and how these vary individually.

The gender role socialization theory identified in Chapter 4 suggests that the social environment within which the self-construal of the individual combatant is shaped likely has important implications related to the formation of gender identity[144]. Accordingly, it is incumbent to explore the gendered role expectations in Bosnia during the socialization period of combatants engaged in the conflict (1992 – 1995).

The formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the aftermath of World War II ushered in an era of constitutional and legal equality for all – regardless of gender or ethnicity. Yet, in spite of this women remained on the periphery of power and full inclusion. In an analysis of Balkan women from suffrage in 1946 through the war years (1992 – 1995), Spahić-Šiljak (2010) demonstrates that women

[144] The cross-national analysis evaluates at a structural level only. A key assumption of the individual difference theory is that heterogeneity in gender (in)equality exists outside of structural influences. Structural accounts presume that all members of a given society are generally exposed homogeneously to (in)equality. From this perch, (in)equality is built equally into the system, thus variation within the system is difficult to evaluate at this level of analysis only. Yet, variations do indeed exist. As outlined in the Chapter 2, I assume that gender (in)equality is a multi-level system and that important variation exists at other levels- namely the interactional and individual. I discuss structural gender factors here under the assumption that the *internalization* of these (in)equalities varies for the individual combatant. This is the key and critical site of variation. For more on the system of gender (in)equality, see (Deutsch 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004).

were expected to be mothers and wives in spite of the supposed egalitarianism of Tito's socialist era. The role of mother and wife was afforded primacy in comparison to any other role women aspired to.

While women were afforded the identity of "worker" or "Communist," ultimately efforts to organize as coalitions in these areas were thwarted, which various movement leaders attributed to a deeply entrenched system of patriarchy (Spahić-Šiljak 2010)[145]. During SFYR's economic downturn following the oil crisis in the 1980's, women were the first to be removed from public positions[146]. Evidence of the lack of women's full inclusion is revealed, not only in terms of the labor market, but also in political representation. Women achieved a high of 24% of elected political positions, but they remained on the fringe of high-level decision-making and political power (Spahić-Šiljak 2010). Accordingly, while women were formally afforded rights of inclusion, a system of difference persisted presumably privileging men over women.

In a similar trend, the SFYR proffered a message of "brotherhood and unity" effectively stymieing the ethno-nationalist tensions that the region grappled with for centuries[147]. In leading the way for a Partisan victory against fascist forces during World War II, Tito shaped a government that demanded allegiance to Yugoslavia above all[148]. The curator for a museum in Sarajevo emphasized the essential role of cultural sites,

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[145] The leading women's movement immediately following WWII was the Antifascist Front of Women (AFW). While the movement sought to keep women's lived issues at the center of their work, it dissolved just ten years following WWII in spite of messages of equality espoused by the Communist Party (CP) (Spahić-Šiljak 2010).

[146] Following Tito's death, the economic downturn in the 1980's was significant. These economic conditions led to job loss and women were the first to be released and the last to be offered opportunities for rehire (Spahić-Šiljak 2010).

[147] See Chapter 3 for more on historical socialization processes in Bosnia.

[148] Ustaše and Ćetnik sympathizers were dealt with harshly in the aftermath of World War II. Mass executions and imprisonment were the method of the day and resistors were sent to reeducation camps that drove in the Tito imperative (Borneman and Borneman 2004; Malcolm 2002).

museums, and social institutions in communicating the, "greatness of socialism and the greater project of a unified Yugoslavia[149]." He further described a message of socialism not only facilitating indoctrination through the cultural spaces in Yugoslavian society, but also in education, the sciences, basically in all institutions. For this respondent, he indicated that he did not believe the message was wrong, but he also described a process by which community narratives interactively created a message of collectiveness that indelibly shaped the socialization process of all Yugoslavians.

During interviews, respondents that grew up during Tito's reign were quick to identify as Yugoslavian before claiming other ethnic or religious identities. One respondent stated that he doesn't place value on his ethnic identity, although he endorsed identifying as ethnically Serb. But, he qualified this by stating, "This is number 11 or not even on my list of identities. I am Bosnian or Yugoslavian[150]."

However, this same respondent identified the reemergence and the mobilization of ethno-nationalist identities as being a chief cause of the outbreak of hostilities (1992 – 1995). While he articulated little attachment to his ethnic identity, he endorsed the salience of these identities for others. How these once latent identities became relevant once again is the subject of extensive exploration in the literature (Cohen 2018; Guss and Siroky 2012; Little and Silber 1997; Maksić 2017; Oberschall 2000), but it is accepted that ethnic politics played a central role in the conflict.

Thus, what it means to be a Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak), Bosnian Serb, or Croat played a role in the ultimate formation of individual attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of

[149] Interview conducted on 7/6/2019 in Sarajevo for 2 hours.
[150] Interview conducted on 7/13/2019 with the Director of a soldier's organization in Sarajevo for 2 hours.

conflict actors[151]. Some respondents argued that rhetoric voiced by religious leaders in churches, mosques, and other religious institutions provided the kindling for political elites to light [152]. In this way, religious institutions served as an interactional site for mobilization of these social identity categories.

Researches have also asserted that gender and ethno-nationalist identities coalesced in the buildup to the war (1992 – 1995) (Sofos 1996; Spahić-Šiljak 2010). In this line of argumentation, women in Bosnia, regardless of ethnic identity, remained subjects of a system of patriarchy in that their value as mothers and reproducers of the nation became more explicit in religious discourses and public rhetoric respectively (Sofos 1996; Spahić-Šiljak 2010). Indeed, interviews conducted in 2014 with religious leaders endorses that religious imperatives based on gender are inherent in the messages for religious adherents of each of the major religions[153].

Women's bodies served as fodder in nationalist propaganda and women's value was ultimately reduced to fulfilling their reproductive capacity (Sofos 1996; Spahić-Šiljak 2010). Pro-life campaigns were mobilized institutionally and politically[154]. As tensions between the parties intensified, discourse deepened surrounding women's bodies as a symbol of national value. During an interview with the head of a war crimes monitoring NGO, she stated, "The body of women was recognized as a symbol of how

[151] See both the Bosnian History and Sexual Violence Chapters for more on the rise of the SDS, HVO, and SDA nationalist parties and the mobilization of ethnic identities in the buildup to conflict onset (1992 – 1995).
[152] Interview conducted on 7/6/2018 in Sarajevo with the curator of an historical museum in Sarajevo for 2 hours.
[153] Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic.
[154] See Spahić-Šiljak (2010, p. 218) for more on the various campaigns from the Croatian Catholic, Serbian Orthodox, and Bosnian Muslim religious leaders. Notably, these campaigns encouraged families to reproduce at certain rates as a form of patriotism to their nation.

you can hurt one society, one family, one nation.[155]" In this way, ethno-national, religious, and gender identities fused to form a symbiotic relationship. Accordingly, this was the social and political climate the individual combatant was internalizing as conflict onset approached.

However, returning to the prevailing assumption rooting this research, the ways in which these cultural and political constructions are internalized and enacted by the individual is not singular. In spite of the framework rendered in creating ideals of Yugoslavian womanhood and manhood, I assert that individuals vary in how these ideas manifest into mobilizing biased beliefs, attitudes, and preferences.

Attitudes and Beliefs

Why do attitudes and beliefs matter? What purpose do they serve? Importantly, how do beliefs and attitudes shape political behavior? By way of response, Jervis (2006) advises, "People adopt opinions not only to understand the world, but also to meet the psychological and social needs to live with themselves and others (p. 641)."

In the case of sexualized violence in conflict, certain attitudes and beliefs held by individuals are more relevant within this context than others. For soldiers engaged in combat, certain biased beliefs and attitudes are more likely to emerge in order to effectually manage pervasive existential threats raised within the active conflict context[156]. These attitudes, beliefs, and preference serve as a prime from which decisions

[155] Interview held on July 26, 2018 in Sarajevo for 1.25 hours.

[156] Some questions may arise concerning the fixed nature of attitudes, preferences and beliefs. While attitudes and beliefs may be adjusted and updated, this requires some conscious effort. Further, I contend that not all beliefs and attitudes function the same and certain beliefs are more deeply entrenched than others. Because gender binaries is one of the first dichotomies a human identifies during development, it follows that the values, beliefs, and attitudes that are constructed out of this orienting principle becomes deeply anchored in order to assist with navigating the social world. Further, when a belief system provides a benefit (i.e. power), it is more likely to be fixed. This contention is supported by Kray et al. (2017) who

are ultimately made (Sanbonmatsu 2003). Particularly within the context of political conflict, decision-making processes can often appear instantaneous, but there are processes involved in the making of the decision. In fact, attitudes and beliefs precede judgment and motivation and ultimately decisions to act. Given this, it is critical to evaluate, the biased attitudes and beliefs theorized to be relevant to combatant behavior.

Beginning with needs for power and dominance, I evaluated each of the twenty-six interviews for references to terms associated with power and dominance[157]. I coded the interview as supportive of *sub*-H1.a if a respondent directly referenced power and dominance as a factor related to sexualized violence[158]. In addition, if there was a more robust discussion and frequent mentions of power and dominance, I added one value (1) to the frequency of mentions of the concept[159]

Of all the hypotheses evaluated, combatants demonstrating a need for power and dominance received the most support. 73.08% of respondents used language endorsing the need for power or dominance as a factor for combatants who committed sexualized violence. Language respondents used with striking similarity included, "inferiority complex," "aggressive," and "desire to humiliate.[160]" One key informant stated that it is

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find that men hold more fixed beliefs about gender roles, likely motivated to maintain the status quo given their membership in a higher status group compared to women. The Bosnian case matches this criterion in that it supports a history of clearly differentiated gender role expectations with men occupying the higher status social group.

[157] See the code sheet and the section titled H1.a in Appendix D for the list of terms identified as matches for references to power and dominance.

[158] Note: I followed the same coding schema for *sub*H1.b and *sub*H1.c in what follows.

[159] I did not record interviews, so the frequency measure is an approximation. Procedurally, I took hand written notes during each interview and scheduled interviews to allow for time to immediately transcribe and document the totality of the interview. I measure frequency as a way to test for the strength of the measure. A single mention of the concept in interviews offers some evidence of support for the hypotheses, but when a respondent expounds and unpacks the concept further, this improves the strength of support for the concepts and hypotheses.

[160] Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, Zenica, and Vareš.

an, "act of humiliation, power, and revenge[161]." Several respondents endorsed a personal revenge motive, a vendetta of sorts, related to a desire to avenge perceived slights and grievances.

There appears to be a consensus that combatants who committed sexualized violence may have felt powerless or inferior before the start of the war. Once they were in a position of power, they weaponized their inferiority in order to humiliate where they may have once felt humiliation[162]. As an example, an Assistant Professor referred to a discourse of Serb victimization and identified that some Serb-aggressors may have felt "second-rate" or subjugated[163].

Aggression was also a term used with great frequency. Respondents not only referred broadly to the conflict as a war of aggression, but also to sexualized violence as extreme acts of aggression. One respondent indicated that high levels of aggression were a key factor in order for combatants to commit rape[164]. A Victim's Advocate with the Court of Bosnia stated, "There are people who are more innately aggressive that select into sexual violence. There is something dormant that waits for the moment to be released[165]."

In addition, I coded a minimum number of 41 mentions related to *sub*H1.a. This combined with the rate of endorsements across interviews along with the nature of the

[161] Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist specializing in Serbian combat veterans via Skype from Sarajevo to Belgrade.
[162] While I speak indirectly here related to combatant attitudes of power and dominance in relationship to acts of sexualized violence, responses across interviews spoke consistently of this humiliation relating to a need for power and dominance, which ultimately translated into acts of sexualized violence.
[163] He referred to Ćela Kula (translates to Skull Tower) in Niš, Serbia. In this tower, the skulls of 956 vanquished Serbian warriors were used to construct and mount the walls (The Skull Tower of Nis – Niš, Serbia - Atlas Obscura) (Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/16/2018). Perhaps the tower serves as a reminder of past "humiliations" leading to a need for power and dominance.
[164] Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist via Skype from Sarajevo to Belgrade.
[165] Interview conducted in Sarajevo at the Court of Bosnia on 8/6/2018.

qualitative responses provided by respondents and key informants provides support for *sub*H1.a. A leader of a local NGO dealing directly with legal issues associated with sexual violence as a war crime illustrates these concepts when she states, "Power for a man comes from the top. Man is recognized such that he can do whatever he wants[166]." The combination of evidence suggests that a need for power and dominance as a reinforcement of masculinity is observable and finds support in the responses.

One respondent who served as a war crimes court observer for a media outlet noted that she has directly observed well over 20 perpetrators by following all court appearances[167]. I asked her the following question: What were your impressions of the combatants you worked with who did commit sexualized violence? She replied that she believes that individuals who commit this form of violence have some, "sort of complex." She further stated that she believes it is a sort of, "inferiority complex." She noted that there might be something that occurs for the individual in childhood that creates this feeling of inferiority. Because of this inferiority and because, "we are a very traditional society," she believes rape was used by those experiencing this sense of inferiority as a means of humiliation. She further articulated that culturally speaking, the opposition understood the annihilation to both the individual and family identity associated with the act of rape, which is another way that rape and sexualized violence serves as an act of humiliation.

This example leads to an evaluation of traditional sex relations within the Bosnian context. Turning now to the need to adhere to traditional sex relations, 42.31% of

[166] Interview conducted in Sarajevo with a war crimes monitoring NGO on 7/26/2018.
[167] When pressed for a number, she noted that she could not count. When I asked if it was more than 20, she noted that it is likely much higher.

respondents and key informants endorsed this concept in responses. While there is a drop in quantifiable support for this hypothesis, the depth of some of the qualitative responses around this key concept, in combination with some of the additional variables and themes that emerged throughout this research, provides some support for this hypothesis. I begin with an illustration from an interview:

> "We are a very traditional society…Men are stronger, the pillar of the family…Women, in the villages, were housewives, they cooked and took care of the children…Men provide money, respect, authority, like afraid of your father when he comes in the room (sic).[168]"

This response highlights the importance of tradition in parts of Bosnian society. Importantly, many participants identified that this traditional nature crosses ethno-national and religious identifiers. However, one factor to consider in terms of variation in these traditional views is related to a rural/urban divide. Returning to the code sheet once again,[169] exactly 50% of respondents associated the concept of adherence to more traditional relations between the sexes to being from rural communities. It is here - the rural region *vis a vis* more urbanized communities – where variation appears to exist.

A victim's advocate noted, "You have to know we live in a community where we have very specific roles with (sic) women and men. Especially in our culture. Patriarchy exists, especially in rural villages[170]." And, in a similar vein, a psychotherapist in Zenica noted, "There is deep stigmatization. Patriarchal roots are important and the rural areas are more exposed and more vulnerable to this stigmatization[171]." Here, respondents

[168] Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/9/2018.
[169] See Appendix D
[170] Interview conducted in Sarajevo at SUD Bosnia on 8/6/18.
[171] Interview conducted in Sarajevo via Skype to Zenica on 7/30/18.

identify a relationship between an adherence to traditional sex relations and a rural-urban divide.

Some terms or short statements employed by respondents that attests to the independent variable in this hypothesis are: "primitive domination of the man above his wife," "rural men raised in a situation of violence," "violence becomes normalized when he (soldier) observes his father treating his mother poorly," "patriarchy oriented in a lot of rural regions with a lot folklore habits," and "norms of traditional masculinity." Notably, many of these statements include mentions of violence. This is not to say that the current hypothesis presupposes that violence is inherently associated with an adherence to more traditional roles between the sexes. Yet, during interviews, these concepts appeared to intersect frequently[172].

Importantly, there were frequent mentions of family identity as an important factor. One respondent who worked with a family focused NGO after the war stated that he believes that family is the microcosm for broader society. He noted that soldiers who viewed violence and aggression in their family – "for example, the father hitting the mother," – that violence would be more acceptable or accessible for that individual. While traditional sex relations may not be fully associated with acts of familial violence, several psychotherapists frequently mentioned domestic violence in the family of origin of perpetrators as a factor. Marital violence historically remained a private concern, which may suggest a more "traditional" means of marital interaction. One key informant and psychotherapist stated that a, "rural man is grown in a situation of violence." He

[172] I do not mean to infer here that rural men are inherently more violent. This would be a misrepresentation of the data here. There are other factors related to being from a rural community that may impact adherence to traditional sex relations and also ultimately beliefs and behaviors around violence.

continued the discussion of the rural man by stating that often in the conditions during formative years, gender violence becomes normalized. He describes a child witnessing a father directing violence towards his mother as a influential factor in the development of gender biased beliefs and attitudes.

Additionally, another variant of the adherence to traditional sex relations question pertains to the perception by the opposition of the victims. For example, psychotherapists working with Vive Žene and Medica Zenica noted stigmatization of rural women in being victims of rape. According to these respondents, women often do not report sexualized violence from the war period for fear of being expelled by their husbands and families for being perceived as unclean. Thus, it is not only the perpetrators' own adherence to traditional sex relations, but also their perception and assumption that the opposition will reject their family members that may also motivate their behavior.

Given the pattern of these responses, there is evidence that supports *Sub*-H1.b. I also scored for frequency of mentions related to adherence to traditional sex relations correlating with committing sexualized violence. While there were multiple mentions in a total of four interviews, I also consider the role of the respondent who endorsed this concept. The WCC judge and several psychotherapists and the victim's advocate all clearly identified this as a factor. This suggests support for this hypothesis given their direct experience with perpetrators.

Lastly, I evaluate negative views towards the opposite sex. There is diminished quantitative support for this attitudinal position in comparison to the other two hypotheses. Only 27% of respondents, or 7 participants, directly affirmed negative attitudes about the opposite sex relating to acts of sexualized violence. While one key

informant stated, "negative views of women – this is necessary[173]," when speaking about attitudinal positions of the combatant who commits sexualized violence, there is limited direct support for *Sub*-H1.c throughout the totality of the interviews.

One key informant who observes war crimes trials shared the story, and his own observations, of a convicted perpetrator that anecdotally captures these hypotheses within the narrative[174]. Radovan Stankovic, was born in 1969 in the village of Trebića in Foča, a town on the eastern border of Bosnia near Serbia with a mixed population. Stankovic, a soldier in the Miljevina Battalion, was indicted for criminal responsibility related to crimes enumerated in Article 7.1 of the ICTY Statute (TRIAL Internaional 2014). These crimes included four counts of violating the laws and customs of war related to Article 3 – rape and outrages upon personal dignity, and four counts of crimes against humanity related to Article 5 - enslavement and rape (TRIAL Internaional 2014). Ultimately, the Stankovic indictment was the first to be referred by the ICTY to the national jurisdiction of the WCC of the Court of Bosnia (The Hague 2005; TRIAL Internaional 2014).

When Stankovic appeared before Court of Bosnia to make his initial plea, TRIAL International reports that, "(H)e asserted that the indictment was a sham and had been fabricated by the Bosnian Muslim secret service. The judges concluded that his protest was tantamount to a not guilty plea (2014, Fact Sheet)." As the respondent shared the story of Stankovic, he noted that he was known to yell at the judge, to use profanity in the courtroom, and to make overtly nationalist comments during court proceedings. "He was aggressive," the respondent claimed. Ultimately, he was expelled from the court proceedings due to his behavior.

[173] Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist in Sarajevo and Belgrade via Skype.
[174] Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/19/2018.

At the conclusion of his trial, Stankovic was convicted and sentenced to 16 years in prison, which was increased to 20 years following an effort to appeal (TRIAL Internaional 2014). Stankovic famously escaped from prison in May of 2007 and it took nearly five years to apprehend him (Taušan 2012). The respondent referred to a strong adherence to traditional sex relations in how Stankovic perceived the obligations of his wife, which is reportedly related to his ultimate recapture[175].

This story captures some of the key elements related to the attitudes and beliefs that I posit impacts the likelihood for a combatant to commit sexualized violence. Stankovic clearly demonstrated a need for power and dominance – even engaging in power struggles with the judges that ultimately led to his expulsion from the courtroom. Cleverly, he managed to escape and was able to maintain freedom for nearly five years, but presumably sacrificed his freedom by returning to Foča out of expectations related to adherence to the traditional gender roles within his marriage.

Judgments and Motivations

Now, I turn briefly to judgment and motivation. As a reminder, the context of political conflict is a unique environment that undoubtedly impacts and shapes human behavior. It is not solely enough that perpetrators hold gender biased beliefs and attitudes. If this were so, then we would likely see similar acts of violence committed around the same rates during peacetime. Given that this is not the case, I contend that the conditions of conflict facilitate the enactment of biased attitudes and beliefs. I argue that diminished judgment and constraints on motivation are essential.

[175] Interview conducted with the Editor in Chief of a war crimes monitoring media outlet in Sarajevo on 7/19/2018.

The individual difference theory posits that decisions and behavioral outcomes, such as committing or not committing sexualized violence in conflict, are associated with automated internal processes that are triggered by external factors and the environment within which these decisions about behaviors are made (Bargh and Williams 2006).

While individuals can be aware of their attitudes and beliefs, on the whole, attitudes and beliefs simplify information and create shortcuts to effectively navigate the social world while managing the effort required for that navigation. Essentially, they also operate nonconsciously and automatically. Bargh and Williams (2011) identify an important benefit to automaticity:

> "As do all nonconscious forms of self-regulation, these automatic, evaluative processes keep the person adaptively tied to his or her current environment while conscious attention and thought might be elsewhere (e.g. focused on the person's current goal pursuits) (p. 430)."

During interview analysis, two key factors related to the automaticity of motivation and judgment were endorsed - uncertainty and substance use[176]. During the course of interviews, several respondents referred to the contextual factor of uncertainty and noted that existential threat informed how individuals responded. These conditions of uncertainty, generated by the context of political conflict, arguably impacts which attitudinal scripts an individual draws on to act.

The notion that conditions of uncertainty constrains the way an individual approaches choices is consistent with research that demonstrates that social behavior is informed by choices made available within the ecological environment (Cesario et al. 2010). In environments rife with uncertainty, individuals draw on heuristics in order to

[176] Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, Zenica, and Vareš.

reduce complexity that could be incredibly costly (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The politically conflicted environment frequently requires individuals to make quick judgments in order to survive. A psychotherapist described the politically conflicted context as, “terrifying.”

Impressions matter in this pressured environment. Social psychologists have identified multiple pathways by which an individual makes impressions about the environment that surrounds them. While there are varied means by which individuals form impressions (Fiske and Neuberg 1990), the context of violent conflict requires individuals to draw on categorization techniques rather than the more individuating option of attribute-oriented impression formation. Attribute-oriented impression formation is an individuating impression formation procedure that requires the perceiver to evaluate beyond an initial categorization process (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). In the case of political conflict, this requires time, which is potentially costly. As such, the initial categorization process, which is based on stereotypes of a particular social group and is incredibly rapid (Fiske and Neuberg 1990), is usually relied on.

In the case of this research, the established beliefs and attitudinal proclivities of the individual combatant assessed in the previous section are associated impressions about gender groups. The conditions of uncertainty referred to by respondents during interviews suggests that it is even more likely that individual combatants will draw on the attitudinal positions defined above when determining their behavioral choice because the attitudes are categorically driven. Thus, the conditions of uncertainty only serve to strengthen support for the hypotheses evaluated. However, it is likely that all combatants within a unit are equally exposed to the same or similar conditions of uncertainty and

approach decision-making under those same conditions. Thus, conditions of uncertainty provide even more evidence supporting the claim that variance is observed in the gender biased attitudes and beliefs held by combatants.

Much like uncertainty, substance use deeply impacts judgment and decision-making. Nearly all of the soldiers interviewed during this research identified alcohol use as an important factor related to whether or not a combatant commits sexualized violence in conflict. Research has demonstrated that alcohol and other substance use has been a factor, not only in the Bosnian case, but also in other wartime efforts (Olusanya 2013; Plavljanić and Mijić 1997).

Indeed, it is a well-established finding that alcohol affects judgment (Friedman, Robinson, and Yelland 2011; Jellinek and McFarland 1940; Maylor, Rabbitt, and Connolly 1989). While many of these studies focus on perceptual reasoning and response time, there is evidence that other dimensions related to judgment are affected with alcohol use. Another, more cautionary finding, is the relationship between alcohol use and violence (Bard and Zacker 1974; Lipsey et al. 1997; Maldonado-Molina, Reingle, and Jennings 2011). While it cannot be said that a causal relationship exists between alcohol and violence, there is evidence that violence occurs more frequently when alcohol uses is involved (Maldonado-Molina, Reingle, and Jennings 2011).

Further, risk perception and impulse control are both affected by alcohol use (Gidycz et al. 2007; Leigh 1999). In this way, alcohol interferes with key decision-making functions in an environment that is already fraught with constraining factors. Given that respondents strongly endorsed the alcohol factor, thusly adding another factor

facilitating reliance on nonconscious processes, additional support is offered for the hypotheses advanced in the attitudes and beliefs section of this chapter.

Additional Concepts

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, qualitative research lends itself to an inductively driven knowledge generation process. During interview analysis, several additional concepts and themes were revealed in responses that bear mentioning. While some of these do not directly address the theory and hypotheses advanced throughout this dissertation, they may be avenues for additional research or future theory refinement[177]. Referring to the code sheet a final time[178], I discuss four themes described by respondents related to the individual combatant and sexual violence in conflict. These are – psychiatric disorders and pathology, denial/implied consent, stranger *vis a vis* known perpetrator, and perpetrator trauma and time in conflict. I begin this discussion with psychiatric disorders and pathology. Seven respondents, mostly psychotherapists, endorsed an abnormal psychological presentation in association with many of the combatants who committed some of the more atrocious acts of sexualized violence.

In this way, respondents referred to the conflict space as providing an opportunity structure for sociopathic combatants to exploit. Various accounts of opportunistic violence have been explored in the research (Balcells 2010; Hoover Green 2011; Kalyvas 2003, 2006; Tarrow 2007; Tilly 2003; R. M. Wood 2010). While most of these accounts evaluate at the group level and thus, do not consider the individual combatant per se, the

[177] Nearly all of these concepts have some indirect connection to the hypotheses. Hence, they require some unpacking here.
[178] See Appendix D.

logic that a combatant with psychopathy would embrace the opportunity structure afforded by conflict follows the argumentation advanced by similar group-level accounts.

Another important factor discovered during the course of this research is the tacit denial by perpetrators regarding acts of sexualized violence. Legal experts noted that combatants admit to killing and even acts of atrocity associated with killing. However, in the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), perpetrators have remained collectively consistent in their outright denial related to acts of sexualized violence. Frequently, convicted sexual violence perpetrators claimed consent as their legal defense. Further complexity arises when the victim knows the perpetrator, which is frequent. Legal experts identify that testimony in these cases are highly emotional and contentious[179].

Finally, I offer a short discussion on traumatized soldiers. I include trauma and time in combat even though only two key informants referred to this as a factor related to the perpetrator. One of the two key informants who endorsed this concept has worked with over one thousand combat veterans and discussed this issue as a potential causal factor at length[180]. During the course of interviews, trauma was frequently mentioned, but it was almost exclusively discussed as singularly experienced by victims of political and sexualized violence.

Grossman (2001, 2014) claims that most soldiers have an aversion to killing and that the act of killing is innately abhorrent to them. While Grossman's (2001, 2014) dependent variable is enemy kills rather than acts of sexualized violence, the effect of

[179] Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, Zenica, and Vareš.
[180] Interview conducted in Sarajevo and Belgrade via Skype on 7/30/2019 for 1.25 hours. Qualitative consideration is extended given this key informant's expertise and work with Serbian and Bosnian Serbian soldiers.

combatant trauma and its relationship with sexualized violence may be an important future research area[181].

By way of example, during an interview with an ARBiH commander, he described the first time he killed a man in combat in graphic and vivid detail and reported vomiting immediately after and being haunted to this day[182]. He shared that after he fired his weapon he instantly thought, "What is this animality in me?" He further describes drinking a liter of alcohol a night in order to stop the nightmares to try to sleep. His story is undoubtedly not unique. Research demonstrates that symptoms of PTSD are increased in soldiers who actively participated in combat *vis a vis* soldiers who passively witnessed violence in combat (Van Winkle and Safer 2011).

In addition, the time spent in active combat matters. Indeed, current research has found evidence of an increase in opportunistic violence based on the length of combatant deployment in units with weak command structure (Manekin 2013). This finding suggests that time in combat fatigues soldier defense mechanisms to resist impulsive and potentially criminal behaviors.

As such, I suggest that time in combat functions much like the moderating effects of uncertainty and alcohol use on combatant cognitive defenses for moderating biased attitudes and beliefs. Some may posit that time in combat may alter or transform existing attitudes and beliefs, but as outlined throughout this dissertation, certain beliefs are more deeply entrenched and thusly much less malleable. It is not necessarily the attitude itself

[181] I do not intend to make a false equivocation here. I understand that there are several conceptual distinctions that are important to consider. 1) Combatants and perpetrators of war crimes are categorically distinct. 2) An act of sexual violence is different than killing enemy combatant. In spite of this, I argue that the logic concerning trauma is similar.
[182] Interview conducted in Goražde on 7/17/2019 for 1 hour.

that is altered, but rather the defenses to moderate the bias that becomes weakened due to the conditions associated with the conflict context.

To illustrate, through experimental research conducted in laboratory settings, researchers found that under conditions of cognitive "busyness" and resource depletion, individuals rely on stereotypes to process information and ultimately make decisions (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Pendry and Macrae 1994). An essential assumption to the argument leveraged is that the context of political conflict is inherently resource depleting - cognitively and materially. Individuals who spend extensive time in political conflict are operating in an environment that regularly and persistently depletes their available cognitive resources requiring reliance on stereotypes in order to navigate this complex setting. This means that attitudes are not necessarily changed in the case of conflict, but rather it is the defenses required to moderate these attitudes that are diminished[183].

In the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), the conflict context was long. The siege in Sarajevo marched on for three and a half years and the countryside was ravaged. Respondents noted that at conflict onset, most believed the conflict would end in days not years[184]. The psychotherapist, who identified time in conflict as a factor, also emphasized exposure to atrocities as a concern that increases combatants' vulnerability to commit political violence.

[183] See Kenrick et al. (2010) for an updated discussion on Maslow's hierarchy of needs and how it pertains to this discussion. One of the notable features of the hierarchy is that certain needs take precedence over others. Importantly, the need for physiological safety and self-protection preempts needs associated with affiliation, esteem, and status. For example, an individual who faces immediate existential threat is highly engaged in efforts for physiological safety and well-being, which places demand on their available cognitive resources.

[184] Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, Zenica, and Vareš.

The relationship between the victim and perpetrator is complex. These simple categorizations organize our perceptions and values associated with these labels. They inherently hold within them a wealth of meaning and interpretation. Yet, the perpetrator remains a complicated figure, which is also a traumatized individual. Giesen (2004) states:

> "Perpetrators are human subjects who, by their own decision, dehumanized other subjects, and in doing so, did not only pervert the sovereign subjectivity of the victims but challenged also their own sacredness. Every subject needs the recognition of others for its own self-consciousness, and it is exactly this recognition that is denied to perpetrators (p. 114)."

By its very nature, violence is traumatizing for victims and perpetrators alike with few exceptions[185]. The effects of trauma diminish the perpetrators capacity to resist exclusive reliance on categorical attitudinal positions, which in turn makes it more likely to rely on these attitudes to persist in committing acts of sexualized violence. In the case of this research, combatants rely on attitudes and beliefs associated with gender stereotypes in order to navigate the politically conflicted milieu and thus continue to commit acts of sexualized violence based on these biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences.

Conclusion

In the previous section, I find support for attitudes associated with a higher need for power and dominance (*sub*-H1.a) and a desire to adhere to traditional sex relations (*sub*-H1.b) increasing the likelihood that combatants committed sexualized violence during the Bosnian war (1992 – 1995). I was unable to find substantive support for more

[185] Sociopaths and others with unique personality presentations are not equally affected. See Anestis et al. (2017) for more on psychopathy as a protective factor in relationship with symptoms of PTSD. I also do not make a claim of equivocation in the internalization of trauma between victims and perpetrators. I only highlight that both, perhaps differentially, experience trauma.

negative beliefs about the opposite sex being associated with an increased likelihood that combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict (*sub*-H1.c). On the whole, these two dimensions of gender biased attitudes and beliefs – higher needs for power and dominance and adherence to traditional sex relations – in combination, provide some support for the supposition that combatants who demonstrate attitudes and beliefs associated with gender inequality are more likely to commit sexualized violence in conflict.

In addition, the research conducted demonstrates that at the individual level, both socializing processes and constraints on judgments and motivations shape these attitudinal and belief predilections. These factors either facilitate or limit reliance on biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences in relationship with the likelihood that combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict. Two critical shaping factors that were revealed are conditions of uncertainty and alcohol use by perpetrators. In the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), both of these concepts appear to facilitate an environment whereby combatants rely on more implicitly biased and categorically based impressions while navigating the politically conflicted context.

There are limitations related to these findings. This research applies to the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995) only and does not account for the myriad of alternative factors that other cases experiencing high levels of sexualized violence in intrastate conflict. Also, due to the silence on the part of perpetrators, I rely on the impressions of those who have worked directly with or are uniquely positioned to extrapolate opinions about the motivations of known perpetrators. While perspectives can be faulty, in the

cases of *sub*-H1.a and *sub*-H1.b, there is significant enough confirmation in the quality and frequency of responses across respondents that suggests a pattern exists.

However, these results must be considered cautiously. The only way to fully know the attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of perpetrators compared to non-perpetrators is to either survey them directly or to conduct laboratory experiments in order to more closely capture nonconscious processes that are unknown, even to the perpetrator. The findings outlined in this chapter suggest that such a research agenda may be fruitful and worthwhile.

CHAPTER 7

LOOKING AHEAD: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This dissertation represents an initial attempt to explore the question of variation in sexualized violence at the individual level of analysis as a departure from existing evaluations that explore variations at the group and aggregate levels. In developing the individual difference theory, I focus largely on notions of social identity, namely gender, and how interactions with political contexts (i.e. civil war), either facilitates or constrains individual inclinations and motivations to commit sexualized violence. The theoretical model I developed takes into consideration important distinctions in combatants' biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, while also accounting for conditions of uncertainty and other critical shaping factors, and how these relate to combatants' violent behavior in conflict. Much like any attempt to address novel research questions, there are strengths and challenges associated with this dissertation project. In what follows, I enumerate these strengths and limitations, while also summarizing the main results generated from this research. Additionally, I discuss why continuing research at the individual level of analysis is a crucial future research agenda in conflict studies and political science broadly. Finally, I also highlight the important theoretical contributions made and suggest a way forward within a complex research agenda.

Summary of Results

This dissertation begins with the development of a novel theory that seeks to explain the curious and observable within conflict and within combat unit variations in combatant violent behavior. The individual difference theory, which draws on political

science and social psychology, and sociology literatures, describes the ways in which combatants' self-construal constructs particular biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, which are, in turn, differentially motivated into distinct behavioral outcomes. The theory leveraged in this dissertation is focused on which attitudes, beliefs, and preferences shape combatant proclivities surrounding violence. In addition, the theory highlights several contextual factors that shapes and mediates the relationship between these individual points of variation and the likelihood for a combatant to commit sexualized violence in conflict.

From there, and because this dissertation is particularly focused on notions of identity formation and mobilization, I provide an historical analysis of the case study explored in this project – Bosnia Herzegovina. In this section, I focus the investigation on the history of political violence and warfare in the region of the former Yugoslavia and the simultaneous formation of complex ethno-national identities fashioned throughout the region during various historical epochs of violence.

I conclude this chapter with a discussion of gender role expectations and construction within the region since I consider the social identity formations related to gender a critical factor in combatants' propensity to commit sexualized violence in particular. I highlight that gender distinctions date back to the Illryrian era, which extends to the 6th century BC and through to modern day. In this fashion, I demonstrate evidence of gender divisions persisting throughout Balkan history. This is further corroborated through interview analysis as a significant number of respondents referred to male chauvinism enduring throughout history to present-day Bosnian society. This discussion

exemplifies the process of societal norm construction and institution building across time, which is a key theorized contextual element in the individual difference theory.

I follow this historical discussion with an examination of the immediate lead up to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and I outline the nature of the reported sexualized violence during the conflict. I focus on the form, purpose, targeting, and frequency of the sexual violence perpetrated during the course of the conflict. In this way, I discuss several of the contextual factors described by the individual difference theory including violence type, command control within military organizations, and targeting norms associated with the political violence. Additionally, I draw on secondary source analysis to assess patterns of combatant (non)participation in sexualized violence and find strong evidence of non-participation in spite of opportunity structures to do so. The descriptive evidence of non-participation provides support for the contention that combatants' are differently motivated and behave differently in spite of exposure to the same conflict conditions previously explored in the literature. This evidence allows for empirical analysis of the motivations for soldiers who do commit sexualized violence in conflict.

I then move on to the empirical analysis of this research. I begin the evaluation by examining if/how gender (in)equality at the societal level impacts the severity of conflict-level wartime rape. To do this, I perform a cross-conflict ordered probit analysis of 86 civil wars covering a potential range of twenty-nine conflict years resulting in 984 observations for analysis. I use several gender (in)equality proxy indicators – fertility rates, life expectancy, and a secondary education ratio – to assess for an effect in the aggregate. Each indicator represents a dimension of institutionalized gender inequality - primarily vital health and education factors. Importantly, the null findings in this section

offer support for the argument leveraged in this dissertation. Gender inequality that exists in the structures and institutions of a given society is undoubtedly a crucial factor, however, it is in the differential way that combatants internalize these distinctions where the important variation lies.

These results, along with earlier evidence of key distinctions in violent behavior between combatants who are similarly situated, called for deeper qualitative review of the patterns observed. In the final empirical chapter of this dissertation, I conducted a field work-based investigation assessing combatants' biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that I hypothesize make combatants more or less likely to commit sexualized violence within the context of political conflict. Through qualitative interview analysis, I found that attitudes and beliefs linked with a high need for power and dominance being associated with combatants who commit sexualized violence was strongly endorsed by respondents. Additionally, combatants' desire to adhere to traditional sex relations being associated with those combatants who committed sexualized violence during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) was also supported by respondents and key informants. In this way, there is evidence supporting the claim that variation in individual combatant beliefs and attitudes associated with gender inequality is related to a propensity to commit sexualized violence in conflict.

Additional factors regarding motivational and judgment states, particularly as it relates to conditions of uncertainty associated to the unique state of political conflict, were also endorsed during interviews. While much like variation of gender inequality is difficult to determine at the aggregate level, so is the case of uncertainty in conflict. Uncertainty is equitably distributed in the areas of a conflict that are directly involved in

combat and warfare. While it may be differently distributed based on distance from active combat, combat soldiers are relatively equally exposed to the conditions of uncertainty present in active conflict since they are placed close to the action. What differs is how conditions of uncertainty allows implicit or nonsconcious variations in beliefs and attitudes between combatants to be mobilized. Through interview responses, there was support for uncertainty and existential threat being an important factor for biased belief systems to be enacted. And, another important judgment affecting factor highly endorsed during interviews was the use of alcohol. These two factors substantiate elements raised in the individual difference theory related to facilitators and constraints on motivation and judgment linked to combatant attitudes, beliefs, and preferences.

These findings, combined with the null finding at the aggregate level through the ordered probit analysis, corroborate key elements of the individual difference theory. Thus, there is evidence that implies that the individual difference theory can serve as an explanation for the important variations in individual combatants' behavior regarding a propensity to commit sexualized violence while being exposed to equitable external conditions during political conflict.

Limitations – External Validity and Endogeneity

In spite of these important initial results, there are several questions that are raised concerning the assumptions built into this argument, along with critical inquires regarding external validity. In short, there are several limitations to this research that ought to be considered before discussing potential contributions.

First, given the method of analysis, it is difficult to determine a degree of certainty in confirming the hypotheses advanced in this research. While analysis at the aggregate

level points towards individual level differences in gender bias being important factors related to the sexually violent behavior of combatants in conflict, the qualitative interview analysis method is not without limitations. To begin, the number of respondents alone restricts the generalizability of this explanation. However, it should be noted that the replicable rate of responses suggests some reliability in the concepts endorsed. In qualitative research, quantity does not necessarily equate with the quality of the research and ultimately the findings. In this case, experts provided consistently similar responses affirming the primary concepts developed in this theory.

Further, the scope of these findings is limited to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and is not necessarily applicable outside of this case study. Yet, while this dissertation provides evidence supporting the individual difference theory, additional research is required to either further validate or contradict the preliminary findings established here. I discuss important avenues for ongoing research further along in this discussion.

In addition to certain limitations associated with the analytical methods employed in this dissertation, I raise the question of endogeneity that inevitably arises in relationship to the key hypotheses explored throughout this project. It is reasonable to question the potential alternative relationship between the variables of interest, which is whether or not the act of committing sexual violence in conflict alters combatants' attitudes and beliefs regarding gender inequality. It is further reasonable to inquire whether or not committing an act of sexualized violence in conflict increases combatants' need for power and dominance and a desire to adhere to traditional sex relations.

I have addressed these questions indirectly throughout the dissertation and more directly in the section on judgment and motivations in Chapter 6. I argue that there is

strong evidence to support the contention that the attitudes of interest in this research are less malleable compared to other attitudes individuals may have about the social world. What is more fluid are combatants' motivational and judgment states that rely on attitudes, beliefs, and preferences as quick data reference points in order to navigate the social world – in this case, political conflict.

Essentially, I argue that the conditions of conflict require the individual combatant to draw on *pre-established* attitudes in order to make rapid decisions about the environment. Interview responses from psychotherapists and other experts provide supportive evidence that conditions of uncertainty and substance use impacts the ways perpetrators behaved in the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995). While this offers some confirmation, these results must be considered carefully.

The most ideal way to address this particular endogeneity problem is to consider the aforementioned field experiment that surveys combatant attitudinal states prior to entering active conflict and, once again, following their engagement in conflict. However, the ethics of such an experiment is fraught with issues. An alternative would be conducting a laboratory experiment that simulates the conditions of conflict while following a similar measurement procedure. While not ideal, since the affective conditions of conflict are difficult to practically simulate, such a research design is an option to evaluate the endogeneity question concerning these attitudes more directly.

Indeed, evaluating individual motivations for violence is a complex and process-oriented research agenda. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, in many ways this project generates more questions than it effectively answers. I evaluate only one dimension of individual motivations in this research, but it is a beginning. Individual

motivations cannot be effectively understood through singular dimensions. As the null result from the cross-conflict analysis in Chapter 5 indicates, while the effects of gender inequality on the severity of wartime sexualized cannot effectively be explained in the aggregate only, the individual difference theory advanced in this dissertation includes structural inequalities amongst other structural and group level socializing factors as part of the process of the construction of individual distinctions. In isolation, group-level and structural accounts simply cannot explain why combatants who are exposed similar conditions behave differently from each other. As such, what is under development in this dissertation addresses a complex and important process for conflict scholars to consider. Thus far, in spite of the limitations, the account developed here both logically and empirically provides an improved explanation for the pattern of differences observed between combatants. This was a central aim of this dissertation.

Contributions to the Literature

This project makes two key contributions to the political science, political violence, and conflict literatures. First, to my knowledge, it is one of the first efforts to substantively evaluate individual motivations for sexualized violence within the context of civil war. While others have brilliantly explored the logic of violence in civil wars (Kalyvas 2006) and have also explored variations in patterns of sexualized violence in civil wars (Cohen 2013; Wood 2006, 2009a, 2009b), neither explanation can effectively answer the within conflict and within unit variations in sexual violence that are observable across civil wars. This dissertation points to important distinctions occurring in the conflict setting and provides an individual-level account for why this observed pattern of variations exists.

Further, it does so by bringing individual agency back into the equation. Much of the existing scholarship on political violence in civil wars focuses on top-down explanations for violent behavior in conflict. In these explanations, the individual is effectually constrained by external forces with little choice in their response to these influences. In this account, I bring the individual and their distinctive attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that are associated with violence in conflict and place them on the existing theoretical map. In this way, I add to the existing literature by refining and extending key factors that are related to the outcome of conflict-related sexualized violence.

However, and perhaps more importantly, this dissertation invites conflict scholars to shift perspective in how we view, and approach questions related to sexualized violence in conflict. Inquiries connected to sexualized violence, both in academic and policy communities alike often explore patterns of violence by focusing on the perpetrator and the victim. Recorded narratives concentrate on the more severe accounts of violence, which deeply informs the ways in which research questions are framed and ultimately analyzed. Indeed, these accounts almost exclusively look for where violence occurs rather than the sites and spaces where violence is rare. In keeping with Hoover Green (2011, 2018) and Wood (2009a), I approach this research by seeking to better understand how it is that a non-perpetrator behaves differently than the perpetrator who is exposed to nearly identical conditions believed to facilitate sexualized violence within conflict. In this account, I offer an explanation for the motivations associated with the perpetrator, but in moving this research forward it is critical for scholars to take notice of where and how violence is not occurring and to consider what implications this has for

our understanding of the broader phenomenon and ultimately the interventions implemented to address it. I discuss this further in the next section.

Future Research

A substantial amount of research remains in order to better understand the potential causal relationships between the individual differences amongst combatants and their propensity to commit sexualized violence in conflict. Indeed, this dissertation represents only an initial effort at grappling with the critical variables of interest related to the patterns of variation identified in this project. As such, this is only a beginning, but there is potential for a rich and productive research agenda to deepen our knowledge in this area of conflict studies.

For example, while qualitative interviews was the method of choice used to empirically test the individual difference theory, several others were considered for this research. As is the case with many dissertations, constraints in terms of resources and feasibility in the implementation serve as a limitation. During the research design development phase of this project, one leading approach I considered involved the possibility of a field experiment to test combatant implicit biases more directly. Indeed, field experiments along with lab-controlled experiments may prove to be valuable in future research in order to better capture the internalization processes outlined in this project. Additionally, direct survey research with active and/or enlisting combatants related to their attitudes and beliefs could also be a generative option. However, the ethics of survey research requires deep consideration prior to implementation. Nevertheless, more direct empirical analysis can increase the degree of confidence with which it can be

stated these relationships exist and may assist in resolving any uncertainty regarding the question of endogeneity.

Additionally, regional analysis can further verify the concepts explored in the individual difference theory. In the case of this research, and likely in most civil wars, violence is not equitably distributed across a region. Certain areas are more directly impacted, and many fighters tend to be from these same areas. In the Bosnian case, respondents indicated that a rural/urban division had an effect on patterns of sexualized violence. Research that explores the gender norms in each of these spaces can sharpen the conceptual analysis endeavored here. In addition to gender-related factors, the individual difference theory posits that combatant judgment and motivational states are crucial to consider. In the Bosnian case, the front lines were located in certain villages and cities of strategic importance over others, which makes these cities and villages important sites to evaluate related to the concepts raised in the theory outlined in this dissertation.

While I mainly focus on one dimension of social identity – gender – other social identities likely influence violent behavior. I descriptively discuss the historical formation of ethno-national identities in the Balkans and the mobilization of these identities in conjunction with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia was well-known for its multi-ethnic heritage with several distinctive religious sites and places of worship closely located to each other in Bascarsija in Sarajevo[186]. Indeed, Sarajevo is sometimes referred to as the 'Jerusalem of the Balkans,' due to the religious diversity extending throughout the city. Extensive research has been conducted regarding the mobilization of ethno-national and religious identities that had seemingly been absent or

[186] The main religions include adherents to Islam, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Judaism.

dormant during the socialist era of Tito, which I briefly discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

I refer to these factors here because future research may wish to more substantively engage these identities as it pertains to their relationship to gender. One important site for gender norming is found in religious institutions. Interviewees described clearly prescribed gender roles according to religious doctrines during interviews conducted in 2014 with imams and Orthodox and Catholic priests. This is one site, amongst other established institutions, where values about gender are recreated through religious ritual and teachings. This is undoubtedly an important dimension of identity to consider in future analysis.

More critically still is the opportunity to begin to understand the non-perpetrator. During the course of this research, I was able to identify clear evidence of a non-perpetrator group that is significant. Yet, their experience remains relatively concealed compared to the representation of the perpetrator in the literature. Research that seeks to better understand not only the non-perpetrator, but also the interventionist, is undoubtedly an essential and valuable research agenda. In spite of efforts on my part to encourage discussion and analysis about the non-perpetrator, respondents found it difficult articulate much about their behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. Interestingly, all respondents confirmed that they were aware of non-perpetrators and expressed understanding that their restraint was significant and, in some cases, valued. Reflective of the literature on sexualized violence, restraint and non-perpetrators are only mentioned in accounts of sexualized violence in passing or incidentally. Yet, there is clear agreement that these actors exist in great numbers. In view of this, future investigations should shift these

actors to the primary subjects of research and analysis rather than viewing them as ancillary to the roles of perpetrators and victims. This will undoubtedly improve our interpretation of the distinctive patterns of sexualized violence in conflict.

Looking Ahead

There are numerous policy agendas surrounding conflict-related sexualized violence. Over the past 10 years, since the establishment of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, a host of UN Security Council Resolutions has been implemented as a means to manage and deter political actors from committing sexualized violence in conflict (UN Secretary-General 2019). UN Security Council Resolutions 2106 (2013), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1960 (2010) all recommend strategic actions and represent a sign of the shifting norms surrounding the acceptance of sexualized violence in conflict settings. As Sikkink (2011) highlights, there has been a norm, and in the case of sexualized violence in conflict, a policy cascade that has produced a tremendous amount of research and recommendations related to these forms of violence.

Yet, Crawford, et al. (2014) remind scholars and policymakers to exercise caution when making recommendations and decisions regarding policy related to sexualized violence in conflict. They importantly state the following regarding current media representations and unintended consequences of these presentations:

> "To scholars of sexual violence, these media narratives look typical in three related ways: They are selective and sensationalist; they obscure deeper understandings about patterns of wartime sexual violence; and they are laden with false assumptions about the causes of conflict rape. The narrative in play here carries concrete implications for politics and policy, including the inadvertent *aiding* of perpetrators and worse outcomes for survivors. Policies that prevent and mitigate the effects of sexual violence

require attention to the whole problem – not just one media-friendly subset – and to solid research on wartime rape (P.2).[187]"

In keeping with the warnings leveraged by scholars of sexual violence, I do not provide any specific policy prescriptions related to this research given the nascent and burgeoning nature of this agenda and the complexities associated with it. However, I wish to highlight the importance for future research to include evaluation of non-perpetrators as part of strategic plans associated with data collection. A common recommendation made by sexual violence and conflict scholars is the importance of grounded research and quality data generation and analysis in order to make intelligent and mindful recommendations to mitigate the harmful effects of sexual violence in conflict (Cohen, et al. 2013; Crawford 2015; Crawford, et al. 2014). The dearth of data related to this significant conflict actor constrains our understanding of this important phenomenon that has lasting and profound effects beyond the scope of conflict.

As highlighted throughout this dissertation and in this conclusion, much remains to be revealed about the combatant who resists committing sexualized violence and the only way to know more is if research is mobilized in order to better understand this important subgroup of political actors. The research conducted in this project suggests that there is much to be gained and learned from these individuals, but present policy approaches and research agendas restrict this knowledge generation. By including the non-perpetrator in analyses and in data collection, we increase the likelihood that "reliable and accurate data" are produced to more effectively moderate the effects of sexualized violence in conflict and to make conscientious and effective recommendations

[187] Emphasis in the original.

in order to mitigate the effects of sexualized violence within conflict settings (Crawford 2015). This underexplored actor is certainly crucial to consider in any comprehensive picture of sexualized violence in conflict.

Inevitably, conflict comes to an end – even if it is identified as intractable. The long-term effects of the violence enacted during the course of warfare have implications for the ways in which the post-conflict environment is able to rebuild institutions and community in the aftermath. Prevention of severe sexualized violence in conflict can also have lasting beneficial effects for rebuilding after war. Research that explores individual differences can identify ways that effectively deters perpetrators while valorizing and learning from non-perpetrators, which promises to remediate the more severe deleterious effects of sexualized violence.

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APPENDIX A

IRB INTERVIEW TOOL FOR 2014 FIELD RESEARCH

PROJECT PROPOSAL

Prepared for: Arizona State University IRB Approval
Prepared by: Holly Williamson
Date: April 27, 2014
Proposal Title: Gender role socialization, religion, and wartime rape in the former Yugoslavia

Semi-structured interview schedule and guide

- Interview types: Informant interviews and respondent interviews
- Interview stance: Responsive interviewing (Rubin and Rubin 2005)
- Overarching research question and theme driving the project: In what ways does gender inequality during combatants early childhood impact the severity of wartime rape in conflict?

Some guiding questions

1. What were some of the expectations for men and women in society? Were there very specific tasks for women and men?
2. How important would you say it was for a military fighter to be considered strong and masculine? Why/Why not?
3. What were some of the typical activities for boys and girls during childhood? What things did they like to do while growing up?
4. Concerning (religious activities), what are/were some of the responsibilities of women? What about the responsibilities of men?
5. Do you recall how men responded to hearing about the rape of women? How did they respond?
6. How did women respond to hearing about the rape of other women? Did they speak about it?
7. What did fighters think about Yugoslavia? What about regions other than the one where they lived in Yugoslavia?

Some general themes to address in interviews

- Gender roles during childhood
- Religion and gender
- Nationalism and gender
- Roles of men and women in society
- Various identities and primacy of particular identities (i.e. gender identity, national identity, religious identity)
- Motherhood and women's childbirth and child rearing obligations according to various identities
- Treatment of boy and girl children by parents, teachers, religious leaders, other children, etc.

APPENDIX B

IRB INTERVIEW TOOL FOR 2018 FIELD RESEARCH

Note to participants: When responding to the questions, please use a pseudonym (a fake name) when referring to others.

Gender questions for psychologists, attorneys, and judges

1. Can you tell me a little about your professional experience and your area of specialization?
2. How long have you worked in this field? Why did you select to work in this area? What drew you to this work?
3. Given your professional experience, can you tell me about your knowledge of sexual violence committed in the war?
4. Can you tell me in general terms about your knowledge of any sexual violence perpetrated by individuals you worked with?
5. How would you describe the personalities of the combatants you treated or worked with?
6. What were some of the personality traits of those who committed sexualized violence? How about those who did not?
7. How did the individuals you worked with deal with/manage stress? Did those who commit sexualized violence deal with stress differently than those who did not? In what ways?
8. Did the individuals you treated/represented experience 'normal' developmental milestones?
9. Did those who did not commit sexualized violence achieve milestones differently than those who did? If yes, in what ways?
10. What was the reason most of the combatants you treated or saw give for coming to see you?
11. What were some of the main struggles the combatants you worked with report having at the time of treatment? In the past? Before the war?
12. What were your impressions of the combatants you worked with who did commit sexualized violence?
13. Were there similarities you noticed about the individuals you worked with who did commit sexualized violence?
14. Were there differences you noticed between the combatants you worked with who did engage in sexualized violence and those who did not? What were some of the key differences you observed?
15. Were there similarities you noticed between the combatants you worked with who did engage in sexualized violence and those who did not? What were some of the key similarities you observed?
16. How did the combatants you worked with navigate relationships with men and women?

Military Context Questions for Psychologists, Judges, Lawyers

1. How did individuals you worked with describe their military experience?
2. How did they feel about fighting?

3. Did the soldiers you treated talk about the violence they experienced during the war?
4. Did any of them talk about sexual violence?
5. How did the soldiers you treated talk about the rules during the conflict?
6. Did you treat/represent commanders? Foot soldiers? Special forces?
7. [If treated/represented more than one category] What patterns did you notice about these soldiers?
8. What attitudes and beliefs do you think changed in those you treated from before the war to after the war?
9. If you treated soldiers who committed sexualized violence, did they appear to change more, less, or the same than those who did not?
10. Did the individuals you treated/represented describe what military training was like for them?
11. What did the individuals you treated/represented appear to know about military codes of conduct? Were these considered by the individuals you treated/represented?
12. What are your opinions about how the individuals you treated felt about the outcome of the war?
13. In your opinion, what are some of the commonalities and differences in the beliefs systems of those you treated/represented?
14. Did any of those individuals you treated refrain from committing sexual violence that you know of? Did you explore how/why they refrained?

<u>General cultural/identity questions for combatants and other participants</u>

1. Where did you grow up?
2. What was your community like when you were growing up?
3. Was your family religious? What religious practices did you observe?
4. Who were you closest to growing up? Can you use three words to describe your mother? Your father?
5. Can you tell me where you were when the war started?
6. What are three qualities you would use to describe a strong man?
7. How about three qualities to describe a strong woman?
8. What were some of your favorite games to play when you growing up?
9. What did you want to be when you grew up? What do you do for work now? Before the war?
10. Are you currently or have you ever been married? What makes for a good marriage or a good relationship?
11. If you are married, who handles the money in your house? How about when you were growing up?
12. When you were growing up, was your mother or father more of a decision-maker? Equal?
13. Are there any jobs you would never do? Why or why not?
14. Who does the housework in your home?

<u>Military Context Questions for Combatants</u>

1. What led to you serving as a combatant?

2. How long did you serve during the war?
3. What was your training like?
4. What were the relationships like with others in your unit?
5. What do you think makes a good soldier?
6. How did you / do you feel about your comrades?
7. How did you / do you feel about the opposition?
8. Were there women soldiers and/or helpers you or your unit worked with?
9. What were the roles for men and women during the war? What did women do and what did men do?
10. Were there any rituals your unit had? Special ceremonies and/or procedures?
11. Were there any rites of passage you had to complete for your unit?
12. Do you think anything about you is different since your military service? If so, what has changed?
13. What about for others in your unit? Do you think some of them are more different than others? What are some of the reasons you think some have changed more than others?
14. Did you know anyone who committed sexualized violence during the war? If yes, what do you think are some of the things that led to them doing so?
15. For those who did not, what are some of the reasons why you think they didn't?

Gender Questions for Family Members

1. What was _____ like when he was growing up?
2. What are three words you would use to describe _____'s personality when he was growing up? How about as an adult before the war? How about during and after the war?
3. How does_____ behave in relationships with women?
4. And relationships with other men?
5. Were there rules for the boys growing? How about rules for the girls?
6. Is there any work that you think _____ would never do?
7. What are some of the differences you notice in _____ from before the war to after the war?

BSC Interview Schedule

Napomena za učesnike: Kada odgovarate na pitanja, koristite pseudonim (lažno ime) kada govorite o drugima.

Rodna pitanja za psihologe, advokate i sudije.

1. Možete li mi reći nešto o vašem profesionalnom iskustvu i vašem području specijalizacije?
2. Koliko dugo radite u ovom polju? Zašto ste odabrali raditi u ovom području? Šta Vas je privuklo u ovom poslu?
3. S obzirom na Vaše profesionalno iskustvo, možete li mi reći Vaša saznanja o seksualnom nasilju počinjenom u ratu?

4. Možete li mi uopćeno reći Vaša saznanja o bilo kojem seksualnom nasilju koje su počinili pojedinci sa kojima ste radili?
5. Kako biste opisali ličnosti boraca koje ste liječili ili sa kojima ste radili?
6. Koje su bile osobine ličnosti onih koji su počinili seksualno nasilje? Šta kažete za one koji nisu?
7. Kako su se osobe sa kojima ste radili nosili / upravljali sa stresom? Da li su se oni koji su vršili seksualno nasilje drugačije nosili sa stresom u odnosu na one koji nisu? Na koji način?
8. Da li su osobe koje ste tretirali/yastupali doživjele "normalne" razvojne prekretnice?
9. Da li su oni koji nisu počinili seksualno nasilje postigli drugačije prekretnice za razliku od onih koji jesu? Ako jesu, na koji način?
10. Koji je bio razlog zbog kojeg je većina boraca koje ste tretirali ili vidjeli došla da Vas posjeti?
11. Koje su bile neke od glavnih borbi boraca koje su Vam isti iznijeli za vrijeme tretmana? U prošlosti? Prije rata?
12. Kakvi su bili Vaši utisci vezano za borace sa kojima ste radili, a koji su počinili seksualno nasilje?
13. Da li je bilo sličnosti koje ste primijetili kod osoba sa kojima ste radili, a koje su počinile seksualno nasilje?
14. Da li je bilo razlika koje ste primijetili između boraca sa kojima ste radili, a koji su bili uključeni u seksualnom nasilju i onih koji nisu? Koje su bile neke od ključnih razlika koje ste primijetili?
15. Da li je bilo sličnosti koje ste primijetili između boraca sa kojima ste radili, a koji su bili uključeni u seksualnom nasilju i onih koji nisu? Koje su bile neke od ključnih razlika koje ste primijetili?
16. Kakve su odnose imali borci sa kojima ste radili prema drugim muškarcima i ženama?

<u>Vojna kontekstualna pitanja za psihologe, sudije, advocate</u>

1. Kako su osobe sa kojima ste radili opisivali svoje vojno iskustvo?
2. Kako se osjećaju kad je borba u ptanju?
3. Da li su vojnici sa kojima ste radili govorili o nasilju koje su iskusili za vrijeme rata?
4. Da li je neki od njih govorili o seksualnom nasilju?
5. Kako su vojnici sa kojima ste radili govorili o pravilima za vrijeme konflikta?
6. Da li ste liječili/zastupali komadire? Pješadijeske vojnike? Specijalne jedinice?
7. [Ukoliko su tretirane/zastupane više od jedne kategorije] Koje paterne ste primijetili kod ovih vojnika?
8. Za koje stavove i uvjerenja mislite da su se promijenili kod tretiranih vojnika u periodu prije i poslije rata?
9. Ukoliko ste radili sa vojnicima koji su počinili seksualno nasilje, da li su se oni promijenili više, manje ili isto u poređenju sa onima koji nisu?
10. Da li su osobe koje ste tretirali / zastupali opisali kakva je bila njihova vojna obuka?

11. Šta su osobe koje ste tretirali / predstavljali znale o vojnom kodeksu ponašanja? Da li su to pojedinci koje ste tretirali / zastupali razmatrali?
12. Kakva su Vaše mišljenja o tome kako su osobe koje ste tretirali osjetile ishod rata?
13. Po Vašem mišljenju, koje su neke od zajedničkih osobina i razlika u sistemima vjerovanja onih koje ste tretirali / zastupali?
14. Da li znate da se neko od tih pojedinaca sa kojima ste radili suzdržao od vršenja seksualnog nasilja? Da li ste istražili kako / zašto su se suzdržali?

Opšta pitanja kulture / identiteta za borce i druge učesnike

1. Gdje ste odrasli?
2. Kakvo je bilo Vaše društvo gdje ste odrastali?
3. Da li je Vaša porodica bila religiozna? Koje religiozne prakse ste zapazili?
4. S kim ste bili najbliži za vrijeme odrastanja?Možete li opisati majku u tri riječi? Oca?
5. Možete li mi reći gdje ste bili kada je počeo rat?
6. Koje su tri kvalitete kojima biste opsali jakog muškarca?
7. Tri kvalitete kojima biste opsali jaku ženu?
8. Koje su bile Vaše omiljene igre za vrijeme odrastanja?
9. Šta ste želejli biti kad porastete? Šta sada radite? Šta ste radili prije rata?
10. Da li ste trenutno oženjeni ili ste nekad bili? Šta čini dobar brak ili vezu?
11. Ako ste oženjeni/udati, ko raspoređuje novac u Vašoj kući? Šta za vrijeme odrastanja?
12. Za vrijeme odrastanja, da li su donosioci odluka bili Vaša majka ili otac? Jednako?
13. Da li postoje poslovi koje nikada ne biste obavljali? Zašto ili zašto ne?
14. Ko obavlja kućanske poslove u Vašoj kući?

Vojna kontekstualna pitanja za borce

1. Šta Vas je navelo da budete borac?
2. Koliko dugo ste služili za vrijeme rata?
3. Kako je izgledao Vaš trening?
4. Kakvi su bili odnosi sa drugima u jedinici?
5. Šta mislite da čini dobrog vojnika?
6. Kako se osjećete ili ste se osjećali kada su u pitanju Vaši drugovi?
7. Kako se osjećete ili ste se osjećali kada je u pitanju Vaša pozicija?
8. Da li je bilo žena vojnika ili / i pomoćnika sa kojima ste Vi ili Vaša jedinica radila?
9. Koje su bile uloge žena ili muškaraca za vrijeme rata? Šta su radile žene, a šta muškarci?
10. Da li je bilo rituala u Vašoj jedinici? Specijalne ceremonije i/ili procedure?
11. Da li je bilo nekih obreda koje ste morali obaviti da bi bili dio Vaše jedinice?
12. Da li mislite da se nešto kod Vas promijenilo nakon služenja vojci? Ako jeste, šta se promijenilo?
13. Šta je s drugima iz Vaše jedinice? Da li mislite da su neki više drugačiji od ostalih? Koji su razlozi vzbog kojih mislite da su se jedni promijenili više od drugih?

14. Da li ste poznavali nekoga ko je počinio seksualno nasilje za vrijeme rata? Ako jeste, šta milite da su razlozi koji su ih naveli da počine nasilje?
15. Za one koji nisu, šta mislite da su razlozi pa nisu počinili nasilje?

Rodna pitanja za članove porodica

1. Kakav/kakva je bio _____ za vrijeme odrastanja?
2. Koje su tri riječi kojima biste opisali _____ osobnost za vrijeme odrastanja? A riječi kojima biste opisali odraslu osobu prije rata? Za vrijeme i poslije rata?
3. Kako se_____ ponaša u vezama prema ženama?
4. Odnosi sa drugim muškarcima?
5. Da li su postojala pravila za odrstanje kod dječaka? Pravila za djevojčice?
6. Da li postoje poslovi za koje mislite da _____ ne bi nikad radio/radila?
7. Koje su neke od razlika kod _____ od prije rata pa do perioda poslije?

APPENDIX C

KEY INFORMANT / RESPONDENT DATA MATRIX

Date	Interview #	Role	Interview Time	Length	Direct wartime experience	Region
6/22/18	1	Head of Office - Legal Mechanism	10am - 11:30am	1.5 hours	yes	Sarajevo-Tuzla-Brcko
6/27/18	2.a	National Legal Officer, Human Rights Section	10:30am - 11:25	1 hour	undetermined	Sarajevo - covers all of Bosnia
27-Jun	2.b	Rule of Law Mointor	10:30am - 11:25	1 hour	undetermined	Sarajevo - covers all of Bosnia
7/2/18	3	Director-Pscyhiatrist	11:20am - 1:20pm	2 hours	yes	Sarajevo-Sweden
3-Jul	4	Advokat-Lawyer	3:30pm - 5:15pm	1.75 hours	yes	Sarajevo
7/6/18	5	Director-Soldier (ARBiH)	10:05am - 12:20pm	2.5 hours	yes	Sarajevo-Mt Igman
7/6/18	6	Museum Curator	1pm - 2:55pm	2 hours	yes	Sarajevo
7/9/18	7	Analytics-War Crimes Reporter	12pm - 1:40pm	1.5 hours	undetermined	Sarajevo
7/13/18	8	Director-Soldier (ARBiH)	11:30am - 1:25pm	2 hours	yes	Sarajevo
7/16/18	9	Assistant Professor	12:15pm - 1:45pm	1.5 hours	undetermined	Sarajevo-Ilidza
7/17/18	10	Reporter	11:40am - 12:45pm	1 hour	yes	Gorazde
7/17/18	11	Commander (ARBiH)	12:50pm - 1:55pm	1 hour	yes	Gorazde
7/17/18	12	Soldier (ARBiH)	4pm - 5:05pm	1 hour	yes	Gorazde
17-Jul	13	Civillian	5:05pm - 5:30pm	30 minutes	yes	Gorazde
7/19/18	14	Senior Officer for Government Relations - INGO	11:10am - 12:45pm	1.5 hours	undetermined	Sarajevo
7/19/18	15	Editor In Chief - War Crimes Monitor Org.	3:10pm - 4pm	1 hour	yes	Sarajevo
7/20/18	16	President - Camp Survivor	11am - 2pm	3 hour	yes	Vares
7/22/18	17.A	Head of Children during War - Ministry of Refugees	5pm - 6:30pm	1.5 hours	yes	Tuzla
7/22/18	17.b	Civilian	5pm - 6:30pm	1.5 hours	yes	Tuzla
7/23/18	18	Psychotherapist	1pm - 2:45pm	1.75 hours	yes	Tuzla
7/25/18	19	Judge - War Crimes Chamber (WCC) SUD Bosne	11:10am - 12:35pm	1.5 hours	undetermined	Sarajevo
7/26/18	20	Head of BIH Program - War Crimes Monitoring Org.	13:00 - 14:15	1.25 hours	yes	Sarajevo
7/30/18	21	Psychotherapist - Combat Veterans Specialty	13:00 - 14:15	1.25 hours	undetermined	Belgrade
7/30/18	22	Psychotherapist - Sexual Violence Survivor Specialty	15:48 - 17:15	1.5 hours	undetermined	Zenica
7/31/18	23	Executive Director - Human Rights Monitoring Org.	11:15 - 12:30	1.25 hours	yes	Sarajevo
8/6/18	24.a	Administrative Consultant to the Assembly - SUD Bosne	11:10am - 13:00	2 hours	yes	Sarajevo
8/6/18	24.b	Victim's Advocate - SUD Bosne	11:10am - 13:00	2 hours	yes	Sarajevo
8/7/18	25	Psychotherapist - Sexual Violence Survivor Specialty	9:35am - 10:30am	1 hour	undetermined	Sarajevo
2/18/19	26	Professor - Srebrenica Specialty	1pm - 2pm	1 hour	no	Amsterdam

APPENDIX D

CODE SHEET

H1.a - Combatants who have a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence. Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.					
Terms/Themes representing concept	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions	Falsifying Themes Terms	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions
Dominance, superiority, strength, authority, privilege, command, dominion, supremacy, inferiority, weakness, impotent, incompetent, incapable, subordinate, aggressive, combative, attacking, chauvinism, effort to humiliate, victim of nation (feels less powerful), vengeance	19	41	Non-threatening, easy-going, relaxed, compliant, calm, mild, cool, undisturbed	1*	1*

*Contraindicated evidence – Key informant mentioned that chauvinism is a Bosnian trait broadly that crosses ethno-religious identities. Did not see this as a distinctive trait, but could not speak to variations around this and did not really apply this to perpetrators. (Interview conducted 6/22/2018, Sarajevo)

H1.b – Combatants who have a higher need to adhere to traditional sex relations are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexualized violence. Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.					
Terms/Themes representing concept	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions	Falsifying Themes Terms	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions
Describes sex-role expectations in some of the following ways: *Personality*: women=nurturing/emotional men=aggressive/strong *Household division of labor:* women=cleaning/cooking men=manual labor tasks *Occupation*: "women's work"= nursing, teaching, etc; men=doctor, lawyer, etc. *Physical appearance:* women = elegant, wears dresses, make up, etc. men= tall/muscular, strong, short hair, etc. Mentions of domestic	11	15	Does not describe sex-role expectations, egalitarian. Describes even division of labor, shared household tasks, shared money management, share in child-care, etc.	0	0

violence. [188] How a soldier viewed gender relations in the family. Term: Primitive					

H1.c – Combatants who hold a more negative view of the opposite sex are more likely to commit conflict-related sexualized violence. Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.					
Terms/Themes representing concept	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions	Falsifying Themes Terms	# of Interview Mention 0/26	# of total mentions
Uses demeaning language when speaking about the opposite sex. Speaks negatively about wife/partner in public. Resents women/opposite sex. Women/opposite sex as inferior.	7	9	Speaks neutrally about opposite sex. Does not use demeaning language. Is kind in speech regarding opposite sex in public.	0	0

Additional Patterns, Themes, Concepts, Variables Identified During Coding		
Concept/Variable	# of Interview Mentions 0/26	# of total mentions
Uncertainty (existential threat)	6	8
Ethnic Grievances	5	5
Urban/Rural Qualifier Points to the importance of regional chapter	13	14
Sociopaths/Pathological Psychiatric Disorders	7	7
Low Education	4	5
Addiction – Alcohol Use	9	10
Denial/Implied Consent (Defense by perpetrators) Will to admit to killing, struggle to admit to sexualized violence	5	5

[188] I add mentions of acts of domestic violence here because historically, domestic violence can be perceived as an acceptable behavior in traditional sex relations. Indeed, it is acknowledged to this day that in spite of post-conflict reconstruction efforts surrounding domestic violence, it is still often considered a private matter (Muftić and Cruze 2014) for a more robust discussion.

Correlation between sexual violence and executions	5	5
Post war divorce	5	5
Combatants forced to commit violence	3	3
Trauma and Time in Combat[189]	2	2
Stranger vis a vis known perpetrator	3	3

APPENDIX E

STATA REGRESSION MODELING RESULTS

Model 1: Ordered Probit with Difference between Male/female Life Expectancy Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop mle_sub
> _fle, cluster(conflictcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -968.88965
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -811.52138
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48468
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48445
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48445

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        854
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     121.70
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -810.48445               Pseudo R2         =     0.1635

                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.0615071   .1143164    -0.54   0.591    -.2855631     .162549
     magfail |   .0608523   .1106155     0.55   0.582    -.1559501    .2776548
         aim |  -.2117829   .1194009    -1.77   0.076    -.4458044    .0222386
     newkill |   .2870623   .1209978     2.37   0.018     .0499111    .5242136
     polity2 |  -.0212895   .0173052    -1.23   0.219     -.055207     .012628
      durest |  -.0013077   .0067035    -0.20   0.845    -.0144463    .0118308
        year |    .085324   .0094702     9.01   0.000     .0667628    .1038853
        lpop |   .1568626   .0723493     2.17   0.030     .0150604    .2986647
 mle_sub_fle |   -.000606   .0252115    -0.02   0.981    -.0500196    .0488076
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   171.7692   18.86711                      134.7904    208.7481
       /cut2 |   172.7021   18.87158                      135.7145    209.6897
       /cut3 |   173.9092   18.88441                      136.8964    210.9219
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 2: Ordered Probit with Difference between Male/Female Life Expectancy (Lag 15 Years) Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop mle_sub
> _fle_l15y, cluster(conflictcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -968.88965
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -811.52194
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48536
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48512
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -810.48512

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        854
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     121.66
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -810.48512               Pseudo R2         =     0.1635

                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |   -.062202   .1177034    -0.53   0.597    -.2928963    .1684924
     magfail |    .060771   .1107185     0.55   0.583    -.1562333    .2777753
         aim |  -.2110578   .1177033    -1.79   0.073    -.4417521    .0196365
     newkill |   .2872123   .1174358     2.45   0.014     .0570424    .5173823
     polity2 |  -.0212291   .0175065    -1.21   0.225    -.0555412     .013083
      durest |  -.0013115   .0067834    -0.19   0.847    -.0146066    .0119837
        year |    .085304   .0096516     8.84   0.000     .0663872    .1042208
        lpop |   .1565611   .0731727     2.14   0.032     .0131453    .2999768
mle_sub_f~15y |  -3.68e-06   .0332843    -0.00   1.000    -.0652397    .0652323
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   171.7242   19.20827                      134.0766    209.3717
       /cut2 |   172.6571   19.20925                      135.0076    210.3065
       /cut3 |   173.8641   19.22211                      136.1895    211.5388
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 3: Ordered Probit Secondary Education Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop ratio_fmse, cluster(conflic
> tcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -620.28319
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -505.28444
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -504.21716
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood =  -504.2161
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood =  -504.2161

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        549
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     153.89
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood =  -504.2161               Pseudo R2         =     0.1871

                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 64 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.0635949   .1574883    -0.40   0.686    -.3722662    .2450764
     magfail |  -.3510344   .3029503    -1.16   0.247     -.944806    .2427372
         aim |  -.1695139   .1246874    -1.36   0.174    -.4138968    .0748689
     newkill |   .3186851   .1283634     2.48   0.013     .0670974    .5702728
     polity2 |  -.0204545   .0198502    -1.03   0.303    -.0593601     .018451
      durest |   .0010308    .008049     0.13   0.898     -.014745    .0168067
        year |    .087183   .0099605     8.75   0.000     .0676607    .1067052
        lpop |   .1015842   .0820837     1.24   0.216     -.059297    .2624654
  ratio_fmse |   .0000169   .0044685     0.00   0.997    -.0087411    .0087749
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   175.0854   19.90577                      136.0708    214.0999
       /cut2 |   176.0569   19.91456                      137.0251    215.0888
       /cut3 |   177.3787   19.93194                      138.3128    216.4446
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 4: Ordered Probit Secondary Education (Lag 10 Years) Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop ratio_fmse_l10y, cluster(co
> nflictcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -551.11392
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -452.04653
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -451.20537
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood =  -451.2048
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood =  -451.2048

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        496
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     114.91
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood =  -451.2048               Pseudo R2         =     0.1813

                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 59 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.1805664   .1275825    -1.42   0.157    -.4306235    .0694906
     magfail |   .1514056   .1375049     1.10   0.271    -.1180992    .4209103
         aim |  -.1692938   .1225705    -1.38   0.167    -.4095275     .07094
     newkill |   .2972815   .1107257     2.68   0.007     .0802632    .5142998
     polity2 |   -.017088   .0210082    -0.81   0.416    -.0582632    .0240873
      durest |   .0006397   .0085276     0.08   0.940    -.0160741    .0173535
        year |   .0878984   .0105863     8.30   0.000     .0671495    .1086472
        lpop |   .1637869   .0813776     2.01   0.044     .0042898    .3232841
ratio_fmse_l10y |  -.005372   .0043833    -1.23   0.220    -.0139631    .0032192
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   176.5225   21.08874                      135.1893    217.8557
       /cut2 |   177.4562   21.09205                      136.1166    218.7959
       /cut3 |   178.8573   21.12487                      137.4533    220.2613
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 5: Ordered Probit Secondary Education (Lag 15 years) Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop ratio_fmse_l15y, cluster(co
> nflictcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -525.82839
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -458.27446
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -458.00192
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -458.00191

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        440
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =      59.26
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -458.00191               Pseudo R2         =     0.1290

                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 57 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.1438985   .1400046    -1.03   0.304    -.4183023    .1305054
     magfail |   .2829933   .1607227     1.76   0.078    -.0320174    .5980041
         aim |  -.2547597   .1476253    -1.73   0.084    -.5440999    .0345806
     newkill |   .2161201   .1361362     1.59   0.112     -.050702    .4829421
     polity2 |  -.0034106   .0193194    -0.18   0.860    -.0412758    .0344546
      durest |    .000302   .0088861     0.03   0.973    -.0171145    .0177185
        year |   .0731682   .0129893     5.63   0.000     .0477097    .0986266
        lpop |   .1686593   .0906289     1.86   0.063    -.0089702    .3462887
ratio_fmse_l15y |  -.0037671    .004411    -0.85   0.393    -.0124125    .0048783
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |    147.093   25.73936                      96.64481    197.5412
       /cut2 |   148.0529   25.75062                      97.58259    198.5232
       /cut3 |   149.2335    25.7501                      98.76426    199.7028
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 6: Ordered Probit Fertility Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim newkill polity2 durest year lpop fertility, cluster(conflict
> code)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -968.88965
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -805.85444
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -804.56737
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -804.56673
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -804.56673

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        854
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     134.87
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -804.56673               Pseudo R2         =     0.1696

                            (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.1547958    .126503    -1.22   0.221    -.4027371    .0931455
     magfail |   .0455008   .1071089     0.42   0.671    -.1644288    .2554303
         aim |  -.1264079   .1135019    -1.11   0.265    -.3488677    .0960518
     newkill |   .2690614   .1171045     2.30   0.022     .0395407    .4985821
     polity2 |  -.0138225   .0190154    -0.73   0.467    -.051092     .0234471
      durest |  -.0004563    .007025    -0.06   0.948    -.014225     .0133124
        year |   .0907337    .009441     9.61   0.000     .0722296    .1092377
        lpop |   .1946923   .0708622     2.75   0.006      .055805    .3335796
   fertility |   .1144476   .0758346     1.51   0.131    -.0341855    .2630806
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   183.5084   19.04049                      146.1897    220.8271
       /cut2 |   184.4476   19.03414                      147.1414    221.7539
       /cut3 |   185.6684   19.04689                      148.3371    222.9996
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Model 7: Ordered Probit Fertility (15 year lag) Indicator

```
. oprobit svconflict ethwar magfail aim  newkill polity2 durest year lpop fertility_l15y, cluster(co
> nflictcode)

Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -968.88965
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -806.06035
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood =  -804.8189
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -804.81834
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -804.81834

Ordered probit regression                       Number of obs     =        854
                                                Wald chi2(9)      =     123.62
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -804.81834               Pseudo R2         =     0.1693

                          (Std. Err. adjusted for 76 clusters in conflictcode)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
  svconflict |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      ethwar |  -.1059487   .1182899    -0.90   0.370    -.3377926    .1258952
     magfail |   .0511361   .1105593     0.46   0.644    -.1655561    .2678282
         aim |  -.1431202   .1156519    -1.24   0.216    -.3697938    .0835534
     newkill |   .2778937   .1193576     2.33   0.020     .0439571    .5118303
     polity2 |  -.0123616   .0182293    -0.68   0.498    -.0480905    .0233672
      durest |   .0003239   .0067518     0.05   0.962    -.0129093    .0135571
        year |   .0902458   .0100149     9.01   0.000     .0706169    .1098746
        lpop |   .1777073   .0659692     2.69   0.007     .0484101    .3070045
fertility_l15y |   .1154896   .0744186     1.55   0.121    -.0303683    .2613475
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       /cut1 |   182.5527   20.20523                      142.9512    222.1543
       /cut2 |   183.4923    20.2014                      143.8983    223.0864
       /cut3 |   184.7102   20.22206                      145.0757    224.3447
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

APPENDIX F

IRB APPROVAL LETTERS

ASU Knowledge Enterprise Development

EXEMPTION GRANTED

Miki Kittilson
Government, Politics and Global Studies, School of
-
Miki.Kittilson@asu.edu

Dear Miki Kittilson:

On 5/12/2014 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Gender role socialization, religion, and wartime rape in the former Yugoslavia
Investigator:	Miki Kittilson
IRB ID:	STUDY00001031
Funding:	Name: Arizona State University; Name: Arizona State University;
Grant Title:	
Grant ID:	
Documents Reviewed:	• Gender and Wartime Rape CONSENT DOCUMENT -SHORT FORM.pdf, Category: Consent Form; • Gender and wartime rape IRB Protocol.docx, Category: IRB Protocol; • Former Yugoslavia Interview Questions , Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions); • Gender and wartime rape recruitment verbal-script.pdf, Category: Recruitment Materials; • Travel funds for Women in War Conference .pdf, Category: Sponsor Attachment; • Williamson_Award Notification.pdf, Category: Sponsor Attachment; • FOC Grant Proposal - Williamson - Final.pdf, Category: Sponsor Attachment; • FOC Travel Award App_Williamson.pdf, Category: Sponsor Attachment;

The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 5/12/2014.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

Sincerely,

IRB Administrator

cc: Holly Williamson
Holly Williamson
Miki Kittilson

EXEMPTION GRANTED

Miki Kittilson
Politics and Global Studies, School of
-
Miki.Kittilson@asu.edu

Dear Miki Kittilson:

On 4/2/2018 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Assessing Combatants' Motivations for Violence
Investigator:	Miki Kittilson
IRB ID:	STUDY00007956
Funding:	Name: ASU: Graduate and Professional Student Association (GPSA)
Grant Title:	
Grant ID:	
Documents Reviewed:	• Recruitment Script - English , Category: Recruitment Materials; • GPSA Spring Grant Application .pdf, Category: Sponsor Attachment; • Interview Protocol , Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions); • Informed-Consent-Research-Participant-English.pdf, Category: Consent Form; • IRB Protocol - Balkans , Category: IRB Protocol;

The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 4/2/2018.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

Sincerely,

IRB Administrator

cc: Holly Williamson
Holly Williamson

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Holly Williamson is a PhD candidate at Arizona State University in School of Politics and Global Studies. Her research interests include peace and conflict processes, human rights issues, and gender and political violence. She specializes in comparative politics and qualitative and mixed-methods in the study of political violence. She has conducted two field research trips to Bosnia Herzegovina exploring combatant behavior pertaining to conflict-related sexual violence.