

Anti-Semitism and Israel Affiliation in the American Jewish Community:

An Analysis of American Jewish Identity

by:

Emma C. Hobbs

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Masters of Science

Approved April 2018 by the  
Graduate Supervisory Committee:

Madelaine Adelman, Chair  
Adam Cohen  
Timothy Langille  
Gregg Rashad Shabazz Sanders

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

May 2018

## ABSTRACT

Relevant literature was analyzed alongside interview data from participants concerning issues of anti-Semitism, Israel affiliation, and Jewish identity. Qualitative coding and theme identification were used to determine possible relationships among the variables, with special attention to the role anti-Semitism plays in influencing Israel affiliation. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 9 young American Jews (18-24) currently enrolled as undergraduate students in universities. The results revealed that continuity of the Jewish people is a core value for many American Jews. Anti-Semitism is often under reported by young American Jews, but for some anti-Israel sentiments are conflated with anti-Semitism. It was also observed that knowledge of anti-Semitism plays an integral role in shaping Jewish identity. Finally, it was found that Israel affiliation polarizes the Jewish community, often resulting in the exclusion of left-leaning Jews from the mainstream Jewish community. These results were analyzed within racial, social, and political frameworks.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
INTRODUCTION.....	iv
1. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	1
Historical Overview of Jewish Ontology.....	1
19th and 20th Centuries.....	1
Early immigration to the U.S.....	4
The Holocaust and Post-War.....	8
21 <sup>st</sup> Century.....	10
American Jewish Identity and Israel.....	12
American Jewish Identity and Values.....	15
Israel Affiliation.....	16
Anti-Semitism.....	20
Summary.....	24
2. RESEARCH DESIGN.....	26
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.....	30
4. CONCLUSION.....	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	52
APPENDIX.....	54

A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS..... 54

B CODEBOOK.....57

## Introduction

This study will explore the complex and multifaceted identity of young American Jews, attempting to understand the relationships among Israel affiliation, Jewish identity, and anti-Semitism. American Jewish identity has been in a constant state of negotiation since the earliest arrivals of Jews in the U.S. During high waves of Jewish immigration to the U.S., American Jewish identity has quickly evolved, integrating thousands of years of tradition into an increasingly integrated and assimilated society.

These patterns have been complicated by large Jewish communal experience and resulting shifts, many of which have drastically altered the trajectory of American Jews. In the wake of the Holocaust, Jews across the globe felt the urgency of the need for a secure homeland for the Jewish people, leading to efforts to establish the State of Israel. In 1948, when Israel was formally established, Jews became both the oppressor and the oppressed, living in the wake of one of the most horrific acts of genocide (the Holocaust) and while simultaneously exiling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes and cities. This duality of oppressor and oppressed has persisted in the Jewish community since Israel's formal declaration of independence, presenting challenges to the ways in which American Jews interpret their relationship to the State.

The core concepts of Jewish identity, Israel affiliation, and anti-Semitism are core grounding concepts for the American Jewish community and serve as the key variables for this research. The purpose of this study is to answer the question: How do young adult (18-24) American Jews' perceptions of anti-Semitism affect how they think about Israel? This study addresses the value of continuity for the Jewish people, attempting to understand the role community and stability play in informing one's Jewish identity.

## Literature Review

Anti-Semitism is one among many forms of oppression and discrimination that has permeated US culture since its founding. Over time, the actual or perceived level of anti-Semitism has waxes and wanes (Moore). Typically, overt expressions of anti-Semitism rise during times of economic hardship or political crisis, following the “scapegoat” theory of anti-Semitic attitudes and behavior (Arendt).

American Jewish identity is in a constant state of development, as the complex ethnic, cultural, and racial identities of Jews adapt. American Jews build communities to sustain affiliation with Judaism. Since its establishment in 1948, this process is complicated by the existence of the self-defined Jewish state of Israel, a simultaneously bonding and isolating force for American Jews.

In order to answer the research question, one must first understand current literature on (1) the history of Jewish identity and ontology; (2) American Jewish identity and Israel; (3) American Jewish identity and values; (4) Israel affiliation; and (5) anti-Semitism.

### **Historical Overview of Jewish Ontology**

#### **19th and 20th Centuries**

American Jewish identity has been in flux since the arrival of European Jews in the U.S., but became exacerbated in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century with new waves of immigration (Goldstein). As Jews fled increased social and economic hostility in

Europe, the United States, its Eastern cities in particular, became heavily populated with newly arrived Eastern European Jews fleeing persecution. During this period, Ashkenazi (Eastern European) Jews were considered to be outside the definition of whiteness. They were identified as distinctly Other (Arendt). Meanwhile, in Europe, anti-Semitism continued to rise, both socially and politically. Hannah Arendt, in her book *Origins of Totalitarianism*, explores how Jews in Europe had historically functioned with both an illusion of superiority and a reality of exclusion from the general European Christian population for several reasons. The Christian bible forbids loaning money to other Christians, and so Jews quickly became the method by which money was exchanged, borrowed, and lent. This placed Jews in a pigeonhole, where finance and Jews became interchangeable and inextricably linked. Arendt argues that, while many Jews in Europe had lower-economic standings, the prominence of a few wealthy Jew's and their association with financial systems created the myth of Jewish financial power and, in this mythology, tied the Jewish people to the elite of the nation-state. The power of the nation-state, a fundamental European ideal, arose out of the chaos of the 1789 French Revolution after which European states began to form cohesive national identities, generally around the ideas of shared culture, ethnicity, and religion.

Despite their transactional relationships with government figures, Jews were never allowed to become incorporated into the ideals of a nation-state, both from personal and legal exclusion, as their cultural and religious practices warranted separate environments and communities. The perceived influence some Jews possessed still lacked any underlying political capital. This functioned both as self-segregation and as an

imposed segregation. In reaction to Jewish practices and customs, Jews found themselves ostracized from the general public and subsequently fell in juxtaposition to the aims of a nation-state. Their lack of assimilation was felt as a direct assault on the aims of the newly-developing European nation-states, which imagined state-based citizenship as based in shared ethnic and religious backgrounds. The perceived status of Jews as financiers, a perception developed from the experiences of very few Jews, further complicated this relationship, resulting in, as Arendt explains, a simultaneous acceptance and discrimination. Jews were able to find places within powerful social and political circles while simultaneously feeling immense personal discrimination. Arendt argues that key to 19<sup>th</sup> century anti-Semitism was the distinction between “a Jew” and “the Jew in general.” The individual Jew could be accepted despite their Jewishness, never because of their Jewishness. To be Jewish was considered to be a “vice” rather than a salient identity (Arendt).

Assimilation in this sense existed predominantly, if not exclusively, for well-educated, intellectual, and not particularly religious Jews. This perception of Jewry resulted in a dual reality for the European Jewish population: some intellectual Jews became wealthy but remained isolated from the realm of power, while many poor, isolated Jews attempted to simply survive within their own communities. The 1800's, Arendt argues, was the lowest point for Jewish power in Europe (Arendt). Jewish identity was fundamentally not considered to be a salient one; to be a Jew was a choice, a particularistic add-on. This pervasive idea, that Jews not only selected an identity but that they subsequently used that identity to self-segregate from the general population was a



terrifying one for the German public, as it appeared that Jews were alien within any European state. Other nation states felt similar fears around the Jewish people, although anti-Semitism was concentrated in Eastern European nation-states where Jewish populations were largest. Jews did not have a home in the European nation-state, as they were always, by “choice,” on the periphery. The ontological implications of this complicated history of European Jews is profound. Jewish identity was not considered to be a true identity, or at least a sufficient one, meaning for the Jews, they felt themselves to simultaneously have a rich Jewish community while being isolated from the general national community. Thus, the subject of the Jew did not exist. The Jew existed to and for other Jews, and to and for the hate and fear of the Christian populations of European nation-states.

### **Early immigration to the U.S.**

Jewish identity, and its relationship to and with the non-Jewish population, continued to develop as immigration shifted. This pattern of isolation in Europe was replicated in the United States for Jewish immigrants (Goldstein). As they immigrated in massive numbers, fleeing increasing persecution in Europe, they constructed salient Jewish communities. In 1880, there were around 80,000 Jews in New York City, and by 1920, only 40 years later, that number had grown to more than 1,600,000 Jews (Linfield 372). The Lower-East Side of Manhattan became an American shtetl, with Jewish neighbors able to get most if not all of their everyday needs met by other Jews. In this way, similar to other immigrant communities, as Jews were building new networks and communities within the United States, they still remained outside of the mainstream

American community due to disparate religious and cultural practices. Anti-Semitism thrived in the United States during this period (Goldstein), as earlier non-Jewish arrivals in United States considered this influx of Jews to be a threat to their perception of who Americans are and ought to be. Within this framework, Jews were also deeply racialized. They were considered to fall outside of whiteness, an ontological prerequisite to subjecthood and belonging in the United States (Goldstein).

If one accepts race, not as a biological or physical truth of the world, but rather as a concept whose categories are socially constructed, it is easy to understand Jews as a racial group. Their religiosity combined with a generally shared ethnic background shaped Jews as a racial group. Eric Goldstein argues that American Jews have "competing impulses of inclusion and distinctiveness," impulses which have persisted throughout the history of American Jewry (239). Goldstein argues that during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Jews, under simultaneous pressure towards assimilation and nation-based peoplehood, adopted racial distinction as a middle road of difference. Goldstein affirms that Jews sought to find a form of difference from mainstream culture, while trying to maintain an acceptable or non-threatening amount of difference. Goldstein posits that much of Jewish racialization and peoplehood has been self-defined in the U.S., changing definitions to adapt to the social climate. He states that Jews maintained this notion of distinctive difference as they climbed up the economic ladder, holding close the feelings and identity of persecution.

Jews faced a cruel reality in which, as a diaspora population, they had no home and often were considered to be foreign and invasive. Frantz Fanon, in his book *Black*

*Skin, White Masks*, repeatedly drew ontological and social similarities between the situation of the Jews and of Black folks. Fanon argues that “[t]he feeling of inferiority of the colonized is the correlative to the European’s feeling of superiority. Let us have the courage to say it outright: It is the racist who creates his inferior. This conclusion brings us back to Sartre: ‘The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth from which we must start . . . It is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew’” (Fanon 69). The Jew, according to Fanon, is constructed by their isolation from and hatred by the general population. The Jew, Arendt argued, functions as a scapegoat, meaning Jews are both a population on which to blame societal ills and are a method by which other members of the nation-state can gain a sense of superiority. Through blaming Jews and engaging in anti-Semitism, non-Jews built their superiority by avoiding blame for problems and finding a common identity against which they can construct their own “superior” identity. This white supremacist logic results in the Jew existing in a constant state of comparison and blame. Similar to other immigrant groups, Jews were a group upon which one could easily place blame for societal ills. The progression of Jews and other immigrant groups, such as the Irish or other Eastern European Jews, were distinctly not-white and fell outside of acceptable “American-ness” (Goldstein).

Sartre, in *Anti-Semite and Jew*, continues Fanon’s analysis of Jewish identity and its comparative nature, instituted by anti-Semitism. He argues, “They [the Jews] have allowed themselves to be poisoned by the stereotype that others have of them, and they live in fear that their acts will correspond to this stereotype . . . We may say that their conduct is perpetually over determined from the inside” (Sartre 95). The enactment of

being Jewish functions around the notion of what a Jew ought be. This presents itself in two disparate forms, ones that mirror the trajectory of American Jewry. In one path, Jews increasingly attempt to become the model Jew, one of the “good Jews” whose Judaism does not fall in juxtaposition to national social aims. Their Judaism is an accommodation, a compromised identity in which Jewish identity and Jewish practices must be concealed and/or limited. Traditional Jewish practices are abandoned in favor of adaptive religious practices, moving towards the secular. Alternatively, the other path is one of assimilation, one in which Jews completely abandon religious and cultural practices and become secular or convert to more “acceptable” religions. This was a large influence in creating the disparate sects of Judaism we see today, where Reform Judaism reflects a pull towards assimilation and Orthodox Judaism represents the opposite end of the spectrum. Jews have a unique situation of identity in which they are often only Other when they identify themselves as such. Fanon states:

“the Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness. He is not wholly what he is. One hopes, one waits. His actions, his behavior are the final determinant. He is a white man, and, apart from some rather debatable characteristics, he can sometimes go unnoticed . . . They are hunted down, exterminated, cremated . . . The Jew is disliked from the moment he is tracked down.” (Fanon 87)

A Jew can disguise their noses as Italian, their skin as Western European, their hair as Mediterranean. Functionally Jews can disguise themselves, abandon Judaism, and live our lives without the effects of anti-Semitism. These dual choices leave no room for the unabashed Jew. One must either adapt their Judaism and Jewish identity or abandon it all together. The limited population of Jews who maintained old practices face continuous prejudice, as they literally and figuratively wear their Judaism on their sleeve.

## **The Holocaust and Post-War**

Leading up to and during World War II, American Jews maintained this social positioning, adapting and abandoning their identity as needed to survive. During World War II many heard of the abuses and discrimination against Jews in Europe, but the general public had little idea of the horrifying reality that lay within Europe. *The Bund Report*, released in 1942 by the Jewish Socialist Bund of Poland, was the first time it was reported that the killings of Jews, previously reported as isolated incidents, were in fact a part of the systematic extermination of European Jews (Lipstadt). This report gained little traction and coverage; it was largely ignored by the general public and many governments. It was not until after the end of World War II that the world truly learned about the unbelievable, unimaginable, incomprehensible execution of well over 6 million Jews (Lipstadt). This changed everything for Jews. Anti-Semitism was no longer some navigable inconvenience, it was no longer about random attacks, it was no longer about individual actions; anti-Semitism was, yet again, murder, anti-Semitism was death, anti-Semitism was unbearable suffering and unimaginable pain. To consider for a moment what it must have felt like, as a Jew, to learn that your people were gone, wiped from the Earth, is nothing short of heartbreaking. Jewish identity is a deeply communal one. In the face of millennia of anti-Semitism, Jews survived by building Jewish communities, cultures, and traditions. In the wake of the Holocaust, Jews felt not only the pain accompanying the loss of life, but a hole torn wide open through the vast quilt which had

stitched together the life of each and every Jew. This immense loss of Jewish life was not a distant pain, rather it was as though you had ripped part of each Jew's heart out (Smith).

Fanon observed this phenomenon of communal identity existing within individual identity. He argued, "[t]he Jew is attacked in his religious identity, in his history, in his race, in his relations with his ancestors and with his posterity; when one sterilizes a Jew, one cuts off the source; every time that a Jew is persecuted, it is the whole race that is persecuted in his person" (Fanon 125). To feel the weight of anti-Semitism is to feel the individual and communal pain at the same place. Instances of anti-Semitism thus are not isolated; they exist within a vast communal ontological framework which knits together the identity of the individual with all other members of the community. The Holocaust does not feel like an isolated incident nor something which is relegated to the past because it is neither. For Jews, this trauma is lived as it is always rooted in the network of Jewish identity. Trauma is communicated through intentional education by parents, families, and Jewish institutions (Smith). The narrative of "never forget, never again" results in a heavy emphasis on remembering the trauma of the Jewish people.

The Holocaust meant that each and every Jew had to, and still has to, confront the mortality and disposability that accompanies being a Jew. This is the foundational difficulty in understanding Jewish identity. At the root of Jewish identity is a fear of extermination which has existed throughout the entire existence of the Jews but reached a peak in the wake of the Holocaust (Moore). American Jews, post-World War II, were given increased sympathy and understanding (Moore) by the U.S. general population and government. Anti-Semitism became openly denounced, with many Americans attempting

to separate themselves from the logic that had been used for genocide. Jews felt increasingly free in American society, but the specter of the Holocaust continued to haunt them (Moore). Jews, in realizing the dangers of being in a land where they will never be home and in their recent gain of political sympathy, spearheaded the creation of the State of Israel. Efforts towards the creation of Israel were forwarded by many members of the global Jewish community, including American Jewry. Zionism gave to many Jews the feeling that if they had a homeland, a place by Jews for Jews, they could be safe and secure from the horrors of rampant anti-Semitism (Moore). While Zionism had existed as an political ideology since the late 1800's, the formal push for a Jewish State became an immediate and pressing issue in the wake of the Holocaust.

## **21<sup>st</sup> Century**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many Jews are increasingly removed from either direct or indirect memories of the emotional affect of rampant anti-Semitism that plagued the world during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in particular. Although this anti-Semitism is a degree removed, it is still deeply integrated into Jewish identity formation, reinforced through Jewish communal institutions. In Pew's 2013 research, they found that 39% of Jewish households have at least one person who belongs to a synagogue, one of the many venues in which this education of anti-Semitism takes place. In this century, what has shifted is that young Jews in particular have been exposed to a "new" form of anti-Semitism, tied to Israel and the geopolitical conflicts which have ensued from its creation. The "new" anti-Semitism refers to the conflation of some critiques of Israel with

anti-Semitism (Klug). The placement of the line between anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism is where the debate is located.

Since 1967, Israel has been formally illegally occupying Palestinian land, committing gross violations of human rights. This has become a powerful issue for leftists to rally around, but has in turn given rise to this subversive form of “new” anti-Semitism. Cohen, Harber, Jussim, and Bhasin studied this phenomenon, arguing

“Opposition to Israel . . . might be a more socially acceptable avenue for expressing anti-Semitism . . . This is not to equate all anti-Israel views with anti-Semitism but instead to suggest that in some cases and for some people hostility toward Israel may provide a socially acceptable cover for hostility toward Jews in general” (292).

According to those concerned about the emergence of new anti-Semitism, criticisms of Israel, discretely, perhaps unconsciously, and sometime overtly, cross the line into anti-Semitism (Klug). Complaints related to Israel state policy or attacks on Israel in general are transformed into attacks against Jews, with all-too-familiar anti-Semitic tropes repeated in a new disguise: ideas of Jews retaining too much power, or the perceived greed of the Jewish people, in relation to claimed wrongdoings of Israel (Klug). This reinforces the notion of collective blame seen all too frequently during the years leading up to and during the Holocaust, where Jews as a collective group were blamed for the wrongs of individuals. This “new” anti-Semitism, I would argue, while at times ambiguous and difficult for some to discern, is increasingly covert and difficult to detect, leaving many Jews in a state of uncertainty and discomfort, where they recognize something is wrong but are unable to pinpoint exactly what it is. However, “new” anti-Semitism does draw on the continuous feeling of victimhood and fear embodied within



the Jewish people from our long histories of anti-Semitism and the horrors which can follow.

Jewish identity has followed an intricate and ever-developing path. Anti-Semitism, and its corresponding fear, has pushed American Jews into the realm of whiteness while simultaneously retaining a distinctive difference. Israel has complicated these dynamic, infusing political difference among the Jewish community and between Jews and non-Jews. Below, Navon expands upon the historical overview presented in the first section of this literature review, diverging by focusing on the communication of and narratives attached to this history

### **American Jewish Identity and Israel**

Daniel Navon argues in his historical analysis of the “narrative-identity” of American Jews from Jewish source texts, particularly in relationship to Zionism, and anti-Semitism that during the early 1960’s, the Jewish community pursued two “divergent national goals.” The Jewish community worked actively towards their integration into the general American society, while simultaneously pursuing national goals of maintaining and building the Jewish state of Israel (246). Navon found that, prior to 1967, the Holocaust was not widely used to constitute American-Jewish identity or to build support for the still young Israel (Navon 346). The Six-Day War (1967 War), where Egypt, Jordan, and Syria attempted to invade Israel because of a dispute over use of the Straits of Tiran for shipping, marked a change in the commonly applied narratives in the Jewish community, particularly because the rhetoric from encroaching countries, in

addition to other anti-Israel sentiments mirrored anti-Jewish rhetoric from the Holocaust, with the Prime Minister of Egypt infamously stating that he wished to “drive the Jews into the sea.” The decisive Israeli victory in the 1967 War also released a new form of pride in Israel and strengthened the idea of Israel as a safety zone for American Jews. It is an apposition of threat and strength.

This rhetoric and the reality of the war marked a return for the Jewish community, in Israel, the U.S., and elsewhere, to the fear and victimhood felt as a result of the Holocaust (Navon 350). Navon’s narrative analysis research displayed that in the years preceding the Six-Day War, American Jews were rather detached from the realities of the Holocaust, both because the magnitude of the event was still being determined, largely through the Eichmann Trials, and because American Jews felt an urgency around assimilation. Navon states:

“the form of the Six Day War . . .” Indeed the 1968 AJC Yearbook postulates a similar progression, noting “The conflict aroused in American Jewry unpredictably [sic] intense feelings regarding Israel, Jewish survival and of their own sense of Jewish identity.” It continues: the “trauma, perhaps best diagnosed as a reliving of the Holocaust,” was, quoting Arthur Hertzberg [who was a founding Zionist thinker], “far more intense and widespread than anyone could have foreseen.” While no detailed study was undertaken, the Yearbook avers, “*it is generally agreed that the Holocaust was the underlying catalyst*” (my emphasis).” (Navon 350)

Navon demonstrated how the pain of the Holocaust was reclaimed by Jews across the world to confront and interpret the political realities facing Israel. This indicates the

power of reactions to anti-Semitism, largely stemming from opponents in the war, in shaping new definitions of American Jewish identity<sup>1</sup>.

Deborah Dash Moore (2009) both reaffirms some of Navon's analysis, while continuing to expand on the concepts of Jewish Identity development. She agrees that post-Holocaust, many American Jews attempted to assimilate into American majority-culture, increasingly abandoning their Jewish identity in favor of a white identity. However, Moore points out that there was also a large number of American Jews who became increasingly religious and tied to their Jewish culture after the Holocaust. Many of these American Jews were inspired by other identity politics movements taking place in the 60's and 70's, such as the Black Power movement. As the black community began to reclaim their identity and the power it contained, American Jews began to think that it was possible for them as well to claim power within their identity (Moore). Moore details this dual reaction to the horrors of the Holocaust, in which American Jews responded in a fight or flight sense, many fighting to reclaim their Jewish identity while others flew away from Judaism and Jewish culture. There is a lingering question from both Moore and Navon's work: What role does anti-Semitism play in the evolution of American Jewish identity? While Moore and Navon detailed reactions to the Holocaust and subsequent events negatively affecting the Jewish community, neither of them was able to draw direct conclusions that could isolate anti-Semitism as a variable in this behavior.

---

<sup>1</sup> However, Navon's research fails to fully encompass the complexities of memory in an ever-more politically charged society, which I further explore in the section below on anti-Semitism.

## **American Jewish Identity and Values**

Jews in the United States are neither a monolithic nor easily understood group. There are deep internal divides within the American Jewish community along issues of religious observance, political ideology, and community norms, to name a few. Many of these disputes are tied to how back to issues of how the American Jewish community defines their values and how they decide to act upon them. American Jewish identity and community is often grounded in core community values, informing the ways in which American Jews understand themselves, others, and the world around them. Daniel Cox and Robert P. Jones for example, found in 2012 that “nearly half (46%) of American Jews cite a commitment to social equality, twice as many as cite support for Israel (20%) or religious observance (17%) as most important to a participant’s Jewish identity. Fewer than 1-in-10 say that a sense of cultural heritage and tradition (6%) or a general set of values (3%) are most important to their Jewish identity” (Cox & Jones 1). Pew’s 2013 survey of American Jews mirrored these patterns, finding that 56% of American Jews believe the meaning of their Jewish identity it to work for justice and equality. Fascinatingly, the most selected answer (73%) for the meaning of one’s Jewish identity was remembering the Holocaust (Pew 2013). Pew’s study also found that religious observance was not a high priority for American Jews, with only 19% selecting “observing Jewish law” as the meaning of their Jewish identity. American Jews are moving away from religious beliefs as the foundation of the community, turning towards social equality and justice as the binding agent among Jews (Moore).

Cox and Jones also found that American Jews do not, as a whole, place their Jewish identity at the forefront of their interpretations of themselves. “More than 4-in-10

(42%) American Jews say that being Jewish is either very important or the most important thing in their lives. Approximately 3-in-10 say being Jewish is somewhat important (29%), and approximately 3-in-10 (29%) say being Jewish is either not too important or not at all important in their lives” (Cox & Jones 1). Political scientist Dov Waxman (2017) similarly argues that young American Jews feel far less vulnerable or insecure in their Jewish identity than older American Jews. Younger Jews “have grown up during a time in which American Jews are more assimilated, more affluent, and more influential (culturally and politically) than ever before. As such, many younger American Jews are more likely to identify with the notion of “white privilege” than with the notion of Jewish victimhood” (Waxman 188). This development in Jewish identity presents an increasingly assimilated Jewish population, in which Judaism is no longer the predominate distinguishing identity for wide swatches of young American Jews. This change, however, is not explained nor fully detailed by Waxman or any other preceding authors. The explanation for this development is left unanswered, and my research seeks to address a possible explanation for this generational change in Jewish identity.

### **Israel Affiliation**

The ways in which American Jews feel an attachment to or connection with Israel has continued to be a variable analyzed with little explanation of its cause. Jewish Americans’ orientation to or affiliation with the State of Israel varies by generation, uncovering both similarities and dissimilarities in patterns of age-based Israel affiliation. A 2013 Pew Research Center survey of American Jewry found a significant difference in Israel affiliation across generations, with 79% and 75% American Jews 65 and older and

age 50-64, respectively, reporting that they felt somewhat or very attached to Israel. Comparatively, 60% of American Jews between the ages of 18-29 reported a similar attachment (Pew 2013). Many scholars have posited that this constitutes a “distancing hypothesis” in which the younger generation of Jewish adults feel distanced from Israel (Sasson, Kadushin, & Saxe). Dov Waxman (2017), negates this hypothesis by arguing that over the past 25 years, surveys have shown similarly disparate responses between age groups (179).

Waxman concludes that Israel attachment grows with age, denying the statistical claims of the “distancing hypothesis” (179). This “distancing hypothesis” has been used by many in the American Jewish community to disregard legitimate claims of discontent with Israel from young American Jews<sup>2</sup>.

Waxman does concede that there are a variety of differences with the millennial generation of American Jews, as compared to their older counterparts. He states that the “gradual erosion of the ethnic dimension of Jewish identity; a greater emphasis on Judaism and Jewish identity as a personal choice; and the disengagement of young Jews from Jewish establishment organizations . . . have played a key role in [discouraging] . . . Jewish support for Israel” (Waxman 180). However, today’s young American Jews also are the first generation to experience mass youth travel to Israel, largely through the organization Taglit-Birthright, a free 7-10 day trip to Israel. Waxman cites that travel to Israel is largely responsible for increased Israel affiliation (180), providing a

---

<sup>2</sup> However, even in discussions of reasons beyond the model of “distancing,” academic and Jewish communities have largely failed to answer what role anti-Semitism has played in the lives of young American Jews, which are removed from immediate experiences with anti-Semitism. This gap in an understanding of anti-Semitism will be detailed in the following section.

multidimensional set of circumstances all affecting the ways in which young American Jews perceive Israel.

As compared to their baby-boomer counterparts, young American Jews demonstrate a different perception of their Judaism and Jewish values, producing different foundations upon which they develop their affiliation to Israel. In his article, Waxman argues that there are four major reasons why young American Jews' are willing to be critical of Israel and withhold their unconditional support of the state. Waxman posits that young Jews "(1) are more liberal than their older counterparts; (2) . . . are more oriented toward universalism and more concerned with social justice as central to their Jewish identities and Judaism (partly because they are more likely to be the offspring of intermarriage); (3) [have a lessened perceived impact of] the Holocaust and anti-Semitism [on their lived] . . . ; and (4) . . . have significantly different 'generational memories' of Israel than older generations" (Waxman 178).

Waxman follows up on his observation that young American Jews are more likely to be critical of Israel than younger Jews, arguing that "[c]ritical engagement with Israel is a manifestation of attachment, not alienation. It is generally because they care about Israel, or at least feel somehow connected to it, that many young American Jews question and challenge those aspects of Israel that they find problematic or objectionable" (Waxman 181). Critical engagement, for Waxman, signifies affiliation with Israel built around discontent for Israeli policies.

Cohen (2010) found in a national survey that American Jews under the age of 35 were significantly more likely to report feeling ashamed (30%) about Israel than were older American Jews. They also found that younger Jews were also less likely to self-

identity as Zionists or pro-Israel. Some of these reported lower-levels of Israel affiliation among young Jews may be due in part to anti-Israel advocacy and anti-Semitism growing on college campuses. In a recent survey of 3,199 randomly sampled undergraduate students of 2015 summer Birthright-Taglit applicants, “slightly less than half of applicants to Taglit-Birthright were told that ‘Israelis behave like Nazis toward the Palestinians’ by anti-Israel campus advocates, and about one quarter were blamed for the actions of the Israeli government because they were Jewish.” (Saxe, Sasson, Wright, & Hecht 2015, 1). In the same study, around 34% of young American Jews agreed at least “somewhat” that they have felt a hostile environment towards Israel on their campus (Saxe, Sasson, Wright, & Hecht 1).

Generation or age cohort is not the only factor that shapes Jews’ perspectives on anti-Semitism. The 2013 Pew study on American Jews also added to the evidence of religious denomination’s affect on perceptions of anti-Semitism. Orthodox and Conservative Jews, the more observant denominations, reported higher levels of attachment to Israel, at 91% and 88% respectively. Reform and non-denominational Jews reported lower levels of attachment to Israel, at 71% and 48% respectively (Pew 2013).

Thus, we understand that anti-Semitism no longer falls into the simplistic equation of the past, in which a hatred of Jews was simply a hatred of Jews. Now, the “new” anti-Semitism exists alongside the long-persisting classic anti-Semitism, presenting a challenge to American Jews in understanding what exactly constitutes anti-Semitism, and where that boundary becomes blurred with anti-Israel sentiments. This exists alongside and intertwined with the dynamic nature of American Jewish identity



## **Anti-Semitism**

The concept and enactment of anti-Semitism, or discrimination against Jews based on their religious or national identification, has served as a long-standing fear for the Jewish community, although often understood in varying degrees. Simultaneously, Anti-Semitism can be a form of racial, religious, ethnic, and cultural discrimination. The predominance of anti-Semitic ideology and actions has become both less prominent and transformed since the Holocaust. Perceptions of anti-Semitism, including what counts as anti-Semitism, is hotly contested both inside and outside the Jewish community. In Jonathan Rabinowitz, Bernard Lazerwitz, and Israel Kim's research, they found that Jews who identify as Orthodox or Conservative have stronger perceptions of anti-Semitism than do Reform/non-denominational Jews. Perceptions of the severity of anti-Semitism are positively associated with strong Jewish identity, reaffirming Rabinowitz, Lazerwitz, and Kim's findings (Cohen 2010). Uzi Rebhun, in his 2014 publication, found that "[m]ore than twice as many Jews who experienced a negative act or expression associated with their Jewishness, as against those who did not experience of anti-Semitism, believe that there is much anti-Semitism in the United States (53.4% and 26.4%, respectively)." He also found that younger Jews are more than 3 times as likely to have experienced anti-Semitism than their older counterparts (Rebhun).

Thus, previous research has established that the level of religious observance corresponds with both perceptions of anti-Semitism and Israel affiliation. However, there has yet to be substantial research to explicate the relationship between these two previously studied variables of anti-Semitism and Israel affiliation. This research project

seeks to clarify that relationship, explaining the ways in which perceptions of anti-Semitism may directly influence Israel affiliation.

Few, if any, instances of anti-Semitism have shaped the trajectory of perceptions of anti-Semitism as much as the Holocaust. In Philip Smith's article "Holocaust Trauma and Jewish Identity across Generations in Alison Pick's *Far to Go*," he employs historical and literary analysis to discuss the ways second and third generation post-Holocaust American Jews consider their relationship to the Holocaust. Smith argues that some members of the third generation (millennial American Jews) have an idealized version of the Holocaust and a Holocaust victim, reinforcing the notion of the survivor as a "hero/saint" (Smith 1). Smith posits that, "[t]his, in turn, may compound their sense that they lack the authority to comment upon the Shoah and, as a consequence, may feel uncomfortable claiming ownership of their family history" (Smith 1). In the Pew Research Forum's research on American Jewish Identity, they found that 73% of American Jews said that "remembering the Holocaust . . . [is] essential to their sense of Jewishness" (Pew 1). However, Smith's research seems to indicate that there is a gap between remembering the Holocaust and feeling an authority to discuss or fully understand the weight of the traumatic event. Smith argues that the presentation of the Holocaust, as well as the pure "logical immensity" of the subject means "many members of the second and third generations do not feel that they are able to take ownership of, or see themselves as a part of, their family history" (Smith 1). While the majority of American Jews may find remembering the Holocaust essential, they cannot fully feel themselves within the dense framework of emotional communal pain which lingers from the Holocaust. For many Jews, this means that their perceptions of experiences of anti-

Semitism may be dampened by their distance from widespread, explicit, and institutionalized anti-Semitism, such as the Holocaust.

In Richard Alperin's article "Jewish Self-Hatred: The Internalization of Prejudice," he approaches the topic of trauma and memory through a historical and psychological lens, analyzing the overarching and individual representations of historical trauma among American Jews. Alperin begins by positing that "[d]iscomfort with being Jewish is not uncommon among Diaspora Jews and can be symptomatic of a syndrome known as Jewish self-hatred" (Alperin 221). This notion of Jewish self-hatred, Alperin argues, is a reaction to the long history of anti-Semitism endured by the Jewish people, subsequently passed on to future generations of Jews through formal and informal channels. Often, American Jews find themselves exposed to anti-Semitism via indirect experiences, communicated by other community and family members. Alperin argues that "[e]ven those who have no direct experience with anti-Semitism are affected, as its legacy is transgenerational. Parents and grandparents who grew up when anti-Semitism was widespread may not openly display a sense of victimhood or speak about being discomfited by their Jewish identities, but cannot help but convey these feelings to their children" (Alperin 224). Older members of the Jewish community, who were perhaps more likely to experience direct forms of anti-Semitism, are unaware of the ways in which they transmit a fear of anti-Semitism and its consequences. These consequences are both a fear of being a potential victim of anti-Semitism and the internalization of anti-Semitic narratives.

Alperin argues that, in reaction to both direct and indirect experience with anti-Semitism, many American Jews can view their Jewish identities as problematic, hoping

to distance themselves from their Jewish identity in hopes of avoiding the pain of direct anti-Semitism (Alperin 224). We often subsequently see the formation of a Jewish identity aimed at dispelling or discrediting anti-Semitism. Alperin argues that for some, “the feeling persists that they have to prove that they or their community is different from anti-Semitic stereotypes or that they have to remake their community” (Alperin 224). This is the formation, once again, of the “good Jew,” or a Jew who seeks to differentiate their identity from the anti-Semitic stereotypes that have haunted the Jewish people for millennia. This attempt to be perceived as the “good Jew” often plays out in relation to Israel. Prefacing that criticism of Israel does not alone indicate a Jewish self-hatred, Alperin argues that:

“While some of these critics can empathize with U.S. minorities who have suffered discrimination (correctly interpreting their behavior as a reaction to an unjust system) and with Palestinians (ignoring their violence against Israelis), they appear unable to empathize with the Israeli people. They fail to consider the effects of chronic traumatization in a country established on the heels of the Holocaust, largely comprised of victims of persecution and their descendants, who live under the constant threat of annihilation” (Alperin 225).

Thus, one begins to understand the complexity underlying the relationship of Jewish trauma to the affiliation American Jews do or do not feel towards Israel. American Jews may criticize Israel for legitimate harms and violations of values the individual may hold, but, either simultaneously or independently, this may be rooted in the internalization of anti-Semitism. Alperin’s research pinpoints a starting point for understanding the relationship of trauma and Israel affiliation, but leaves open questions regarding other American Jewish dynamics which may affect the formation of these views. In order to make increased sense of Alperin’s research, one should seek to understand how denomination, political ideology, and other general differences in upbringing affect the

development of Jewish self-hatred. Particularly, are young American Jews able to identify this feeling of guilt or desire to be perceived as the “good Jew” among their counterparts?

## **Summary**

Current research has established a firm ground upon which one may seek to further understand the intermingling of Jewish identity, historical and modern anti-Semitism, and Israel affiliation. Jewish identity has been in a constant state of development within the U.S., progressing from the peripheries of whiteness to well within it’s bounds. Israel has complicated the relationship of American Jewish identity, placing Jews in the simultaneous positions of oppressor and oppressed. The memory of trauma past continues to linger as a present and pressing force on the conscious of Jews, often without reinforcement from current experiences of anti-Semitism.

There are lingering questions which my research seeks to address:

1. Do American college-age Jews find their affiliation with Israel, either positive or negative, to be directly connected with their Jewish Identity?
  - a. Particularly, do some college-age American Jews feel particularly closer to Judaism through their praise or criticism of Israel?
2. How do college-age American Jews differ in their understanding of and comfort in dealing with (a) the legacy of historical memory of anti-Semitism and (b) direct or indirect modern experiences with anti-Semitism?
3. How do college-age American Jews feel discussing their own experiences of anti-Semitism?

- a. Do they feel legitimate in their experiences of anti-Semitism? Do they delegitimize their own experiences?
- b. Does anti-Semitism feel different for college-age American Jews?

My research will seek to fill in these gaps, in addition to other formal research questions.

## Research Design

### **Sampling Size and Sample**

For this study, a smaller sample size (n=9) was used, preferring depth of inquiry over breadth. The majority of participants are, to some degree, involved with college Israel advocacy groups or organizations, lending consistency to their levels of involvement and knowledge about Israel and American Jewish communities. Participants all fell within the age range of 18-24 years old, with all participants currently enrolled in a University.

### **Participants**

This is primarily a phenomenological study, attempting to understand the complexity of individual experiences within the framework of Jewish identity, anti-Semitism, and Israel affiliation. The participants were invited based on convenience sampling, recruited by Emma Hobbs through personal and professional acquaintances. Participants reflected a wide range of Jewish religious observance, self-identifying as Orthodox/Modern Orthodox (n=2), Conservative (n=2), Reform (n=3), and Secular/Humanistic (n=2). Participants also reflected a range of Israel political affiliations, self-identifying as conservative (n=3), progressive (n=4), and moderate (n=2).

Only adults between the ages of 18-24 who are currently enrolled in a university were included in order to understand the specific ways in which anti-Semitism, Jewish identity, and Israel affiliation are constructed on campus. All participants were white in order to isolate the variable of anti-Semitism from other forms of race/ethnicity-based

ostracization. All participants had been born into and raised within Judaism. All participants identified themselves as middle class or upper middle class.

Chart #1: Participant Descriptions

Definitions:

**Very active:** Has been or is currently affiliated with the political group and attends/participates in affiliated groups or advocacy actively

**Moderately active:** Has been or is currently affiliated with the political group and attends/participates in affiliated groups or advocacy occasionally

**Not active:** Has been or is currently affiliated with the political group and attends but does not actively participate in affiliated groups or advocacy

**Strong involvement:** Has been or is currently involved in the organization or religious group and attends events or participates in programming actively

**Moderate involvement:** Has been or is currently involved in the organization or religious group and attends events or participates in programming occasionally

**Distant involvement:** Has been or is currently involved in the organization or religious group but does not actively attend events or participate in programming

Name	Pol. Leaning	Rel. Leaning	Affiliation
Isaac	Most Conservative	Modern Orthodox	Students Supporting Israel
	<i>Very Active</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>
Leah	Most Conservative	Conservative	Stand With Us
	<i>Moderately Active</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>
Abraham	Conservative	Modern Orthodox	AIPAC
	<i>Not active</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>	<i>Moderate Involvement</i>
Sarah	Conservative	Reform	Students Supporting Israel
	<i>Active</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>	<i>Strong Involvement</i>
Rebecca	Conservative	Reform	Stand With Us
	<i>Moderately Active</i>	<i>Moderate Involvement</i>	<i>Moderate Involvement</i>
Hannah	Progressive	Reform	J Street
	<i>Moderately Active</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>
Aaron	Progressive	Humanist	J Street
	<i>Very Active</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>



Deborah	Most Progressive	Reform	J Street
	<i>Very Active</i>	<i>Moderate Involvement</i>	<i>Strong involvement</i>
Miriam	Most Progressive	Conservative	J Street
	<i>Very Active</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>	<i>Distant Involvement</i>

Israel Advocacy Group Political Alignment:



**Interview Protocol**

Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured approach, utilizing a list of prepared questions (see Appendix A) developed from relevant literature and the researcher’s personal experiences with the topic. Additional follow-up questions were added throughout interviews to increase clarity of responses. Questions addressed the core topics of Israel affiliation, anti-Semitism, and Jewish identity with a strong emphasis on example-based answers.

**Procedure**

Participants were asked to and agreed to participate in the interviews. Participants provided verbal consent at the beginning of interviews after being informed of the confidentiality of their data and purposes of the research. Participants were also warned that certain content may be challenging to discuss and were informed that they may skip any question(s) at any time. Interviews were conducted both in-person and over the

phone, lasting between 25 minutes and 60 minutes. All interviews were digitally recorded and manually transcribed for accuracy.

Coding was completed by Emma Hobbs, with special attention to reliability and comparison across interviews. Codes were created in an inductive manner (Miles, Huberman, Saldana), developed throughout the entirety of the coding process to reflect the nuances of participant's personal experiences. Codes were developed when certain experiences or statements by participants either (a) were of general interest or note (b) were repeated across interviews or (c) noted a relationship between the variables being studied (Miles, Huberman, Saldana). In the process of coding, codes were identified as the transcripts were reviewed. When new codes were identified in later transcripts, previously coded transcripts were reviewed to see if the new code(s) applied. Duplicate codes were condensed into a single code in order to maintain consistency. Once coding had been completed, a codebook was created by sorting the codes into corresponding sections.

## Data Analysis and Discussion

The continuity of the Jewish people is a primary value for American Jews (Cox & Jones). Israel is a stronghold for narratives of Jewish peoplehood, representing a seemingly necessary part of Judaism in contemporary times (Navon). Many left-leaning Jews believe that Israel is a danger to itself, posing a threat to the Jewish people through critique-provoking policies. Many right-leaning Jews alternatively believe that Israel is the stronghold of the Jewish people and that one ought always support Israel. This support often leads to a desire to protect Israel by blocking out critiques of Israel, in turn leading to the exclusion of left-leaning Jews. These left-leaning Jews then must navigate their relationship with Israel in terms of what will allow them to be integrated into non-Jewish communities.

This analysis will explore the common themes which form this hypothesis. We will explore Judaism as a fundamental component of identity, the communal nature of Judaism, the role anti-Semitism plays in early education, and a variety of political beliefs around Israel. These themes, derived from interviews with participants and relevant literature, will present a wide view of topics discussed in interviews.

### *Judaism always a part of identity:*

All participants noted that Judaism has always been a part of their identity. While the manifestations of Jewish identity changed and shifted for participants, in addition to varying across lines of observance, all participants reported that they had always felt Jewish. This identity also did not differ depending on Israel affiliation, current affiliation with the Jewish community, or degree of religious observation. Participants identified

that Jewish educational/communal settings (such as synagogues, Jewish youth groups, and Jewish student centers) and observing Jewish religious practices (such as Shabbat, holidays, keeping kosher/kosher style) made them always feel as though Judaism was a core, integrated part of their upbringing. Participants remarked:

Leah (Most Conservative, Conservative, Stand with Us): “Well I went to a Jewish preschool so the second I went to school [I knew I was Jewish] we were doing those Ema [Mom] Aba [Dad] little Kaballat Shabbat things.”

Rebecca (Conservative, Reform, Stand with Us): “I've always known I was Jewish and it was really important to me”

Miriam (Most Progressive, Conservative, J Street): “It's always been a really big part of my life honestly like I've gone to services and stuff for as long as I remember”

For these participants and other similar respondents, Judaism has always been a part of their identity. Many remarked that they had been taught to incorporate Judaism into their lives by their families and Jewish educators. Most participants said they had always felt Jewish, but learned to fully claim it as their own once they became adults in college. Even if Judaism is not the primary identity for some American Jews (Cox & Jones), it is still often a salient part of one's identity. The importance of continuity of Jewish identity and the Jewish people likely stems from this early association with Judaism as a fundamental identifier. Judaism, woven into the very fabric of individuals, functionally becomes inseparable from the individual. Thus, to sustain Judaism and the Jewish people becomes equivalent to sustaining a part of your own core.

#### *Racial Formation:*

There is an ever-complex ethnic and racial history of American Jews. It is important to note that all participants in this study self-identified as white Jews. This

reinforces Cox & Jones' claim that young American Jews are more likely to identify with "white privilege" than victims of anti-Semitism (188). Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Jews were considered to be a race, a distinct subgroup (Moore). While this was true for a variety of European immigrants who arrived in the U.S. during the same time period, Jews racialization was unique in its intermingling with Jewish communal narratives. While many other groups, such as the Irish or German who faced similar racialization in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, have been able to move forward, becoming fully integrated into the ideal of whiteness, Jews have remained on the periphery of whiteness because of both externally imposed and self imposed difference.

Jews' patterns of communicating suffering across generations (Navon) have left the most recent generation of Jews with a clear knowledge of racialization past. Many Jews, particularly white Jews, have seized upon this history of racialization to identify themselves as outside the normalcy of whiteness. Participants clearly identified this phenomenon, referring to being Jewish as something uniquely special, a form of difference on which to cling. Aaron (Progressive, Humanist, J Street), when asked whether Judaism would be their primary signifier, stated: "It would probably be on the top because it's unique not in the sense that it's unique is that I'm the one person that's Jewish but that the other identities I have are pretty common, you know about half the people are males and a lot are White but only .2% are Jewish so it goes on the top." Aaron positioned Judaism as their core identifier because, as they argued, it's a unique quality which differentiates them from others. Many participants also responded that anti-Semitism now follows the model minority myth, where, according to one participant, people hate "Jewish exceptionalism." This identification of difference by Jews

themselves repeats a pattern Hannah Arendt identified, in which the Jew exists above and beyond society. They are above in their “exceptionalism,” one which Jews often identify themselves, and beyond in their ostracization via blatantly negative anti-Semitic beliefs and acts from others. Jews often reinforce themselves as a racial group as a form of finding meaning and strength within community. The history of imposed racialization has turned to a self-selecting racialization, in which some Jews chose to racialize themselves, finding it to be a positive and encouraging act.

*Judaism signifies community:*

All participants noted that a large part of their Judaism and Jewish identity is rooted in community. Participants stated that they felt a connection with the Jewish people as a whole and with Jews as individuals. Participants also identified that the communal bonds of Judaism were important to their understanding of their Jewish identity. Miriam (Most Progressive, Conservative, J Street) stated “I felt like I was bigger of something bigger than myself or a part of a family bigger than my own.” Isaac (Most conservative, Modern Orthodox, Students Supporting Israel) argued “[Judaism is] about being a better person it's about being a nation.” Jewish identity, for many, represents a vast network of communal bonds. The importance of communal bonds, which appearing in every interview conducted, is generally facilitated through both the tangible and intangible. Tangibly, Jews find community by participating in Jewish communal organizations, such as synagogues, youth groups, and student centers. Intangibly, Jewish communal bonds represent a knowledge of the existence and continuity across an international group. This intangible connection is a constant knowledge that the traditions

Jews participate in stretch both across time and space, linking Jews to their ancestry and to other Jews across the world. This connection does not need to be a physical or tangible one, but can be supplemented by the physical spaces of community. Community is thus an essential component of Judaism, not only in the enacting of Judaism, but also in the very meaning attached to Jewish identity. One's Jewish community is integral to one's Jewishness.

*Awareness of anti-Semitism from young age*

Integrated into the knowledge of self and community within Judaism is anti-Semitism (Navon). All participants stated that they had been aware of anti-Semitism from a young age. Participants learned about anti-Semitism both from their families and from Jewish education programs. Miriam (Most Progressive, Conservative, J Street) encompasses the narrative repeated by participants:

“I didn't learn about anti-Semitism because I experienced it but rather I learned about it from my family and from like my Jewish Education. Like I don't think there was a moment where I changed and then realize that, like my entire life has been learning about the Holocaust and been learning about thousands of years of Jewish persecution and like having my parents tell me about anti-Semitism in the US and I don't think it wasn't like, oh I wasn't allowed to play in the tennis game I know realize anti-Semitism.”

For participants, knowledge of anti-Semitism ran parallel with their knowledge of Judaism and Jewish identity. No participants were able to cite a moment or instance in which anti-Semitism first appeared in their lives, rather the concept was always there. While able to illustrate examples of anti-Semitism, participants were unable to pinpoint an experience that first brought them the knowledge that anti-Semitism existed in the world.

This knowledge of anti-Semitism is largely facilitated by Jewish education programs, which adhere to the maxim “never forget.” In their attempt to maintain the history of Jewish persecution, Jews often end up with an overrepresentation of historical trauma and a following distance or numbness to the pain of those experiences (Smith). In response to a question asking whether the participants thought they feel the full weight of the Holocaust, participants remarked:

Rebecca (Conservative, Reform, Stand With Us): “I feel like it's hammered a lot into my education and curriculum particularly as a child”

Abraham (Conservative, Modern Orthodox, AIPAC): “It's interesting I think I heard almost every year in my Jewish school like they had a Holocaust speaker and I'm almost desensitized to the idea of it happening”

Leah (Most Conservative, Conservative, Stand with Us): “Sometimes it feels distant. I wish I felt more like the feeling I feel like my feelings have flattened as I've gotten older I feel like they've become more constant rather than up and down just because the whole stress and anxiety of what's going on I've just become very mellow”

The constant knowledge of anti-Semitism results in a certain desensitization to the actual experiences of the Holocaust and other forms of historical anti-Semitism. This awareness of anti-Semitism also differs along lines of observance (Rabinowitz, Lazerwitz, & Kim). Participants who identified as More observant Jews (Orthodox, Modern Orthodox, Conservative) were more likely to report higher levels of anti-Semitism. They also, in association, were more likely to be fearful of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic acts, although, on whole, there was limited fear from participants. Participants who reported that they were not fearful of anti-Semitic acts generally cited the lack of frequency of these events, particularly in their region. Participants who were fearful of anti-Semitic acts reported that they had known people or organizations who had been victims of anti-Semitism. It is clear that anti-Semitism has a complicated role in Jewish identity, as it



simultaneously composes what it means to be Jewish while also distancing Jews from the realities of anti-Semitism.

*Taught to love Israel*

All participants contended that they were taught to love and care about Israel from their families and from Jewish education programs. All participants maintained that, to varying degrees, they were taught to connect their Jewish identity with Israel.

Participants, when discussing their relationship to Israel, remarked:

Deborah (Most Progressive, Reform, J Street): “It was just constantly around me, so I had this like deep love and passion for Israel without really understanding the issues, as I’m sure a lot of young Jews do”

Rebecca (Conservative, Reform, Stand With Us): “I would say pretty strong pretty good, I do a lot of stuff in relation to Israel and I always learned about Israel for a long time my mom like worked and lived there for a while so it was really important to her that we knew about it growing up”

Miriam (Most Progressive, Conservative, J Street): “When I was in high school I was like I thought it was like my obligation as a Jew to support Israel”

Isaac (Most conservative, Modern Orthodox, Students Supporting Israel): “Big fan I don't really have any family there or any close friends but it feels like home it's very different but I always loved it”

Israel, similarly to anti-Semitism, becomes integrated into Jewish identity. Many Jews brought up in the mainstream Jewish community are taught single narratives of Israel, with a single choice of loving Israel. Often these lessons do not show the full picture of Israel, leading to instances in which Jews must recon with criticisms of Israel. These participants have had varying direct experiences with Israel. All but one participant has been to or visited Israel. Out of those who did visit Israel, all have attended some form of educational Israel trip and a few (n=3) have traveled to Israel to visit family members.

It is important to set the relationship of American Jews and Israel in a historical context. Jews, for 5708 out of their 5778 years, have been without a state. In 1948, after the massive trauma of the Holocaust, Jews finally had a state in which they could find and develop the sense of security they had so long sought after. This narrative of statelessness did not end with the creation of the State of Israel, rather the ideology of insecurity continues to persist. Within this context, it is clear why Jewish institutions and individuals may push for support of Israel. This is particularly true for communal leaders and donors who recall the feelings of insecurity which were even more poignant prior to and in the decades following Israel's creation. Much of the communal narrative also reflects these ideas, as the fear of Israel being "wiped off the map" is sustained through deep-seated insecurity. However, in the establishment and continued existence of a Jewish State, Jews now find themselves as both oppressor and the oppressed. The memory of insecurity persists, accompanied by the continued existence of anti-Semitism, while the power of statehood has led many Jews to ignore how Palestinian's experiences may mirror their own history of statelessness. These complementary positions of oppressor/oppressed present a confounding and difficult position to American Jews, many of whom are only exposed to a single pro-Israel narrative.

*Global Misinformation is a Threat to Israel:*

Some participants were more likely to cite misinformation about Israel, mainly from Europe, as one of the biggest threats to its security. Participants who responded that misinformation is a threat to Israel's security were almost exclusively right-leaning on

Israel and Israeli politics (n=6, n=5 (conservative), n=1 (progressive)). Rebecca

(Conservative, Reform, Stand With Us) stated:

“I think the biggest threat to Israel is honestly policies interest or discontent like I'm worried about enough people being so fed up with Israel on things that they may be misinformed on and Israel being like divorced internationally by important allies and entities in the world because I think that that is ultimately what would be the weakening of Israel which would lead to its destruction.”

This narrative was repeated by four other right-leaning participants in similar ways, stating that what they may perceive to be “misinformation” would reduce global support for Israel leading to its demise. With only one participant did this narrative take on a racialized tone, arguing that “they just buy into a whole bunch of lies from Arab leaders around the world deluded about peace” (Isaac (Most conservative, Modern Orthodox, Students Supporting Israel)).

Left-leaning participants were markedly different. They were less likely to report high levels of anti-Semitism globally (n=2/4 (progressive) n=5/5 (conservative)), and never (n=0) cited misinformation as a threat to Israel (a stark difference between their politically right-leaning counterparts). Their aversion to citing misinformation about Israel reflects two phenomena: they simultaneously are more reflective of the global environment and less willing to accept that biases against may Israel exist. The global environment, particularly international organizations such as the U.N., often addresses Israel's occupation of Palestine. Right-leaning participants never addressed that these global critiques of Israel may be legitimate, while left-leaning participants were far more likely to legitimize these claims. Left-leaning participants rarely, if ever, acknowledged that the degree of this criticism may be disproportionate. There was only one participant who cited that there were similar occupations occurring across the globe which did not

garner as much attention as Israel's occupation of Palestine (Aaron (Progressive, Humanist, J Street).

Outside of this exception, left-leaning participants were relatively unwilling to identify that there may be international bias. I would argue that this is due to the overreliance of right-leaning U.S. Jewish communal Israel politics on the argument of "bias." This community uses "international bias against Israel" as a response to most criticisms of Israel without regard for the legitimacy of the criticism. This results in a desire among left-leaning Jews to distance themselves from this argument, as they have seen it used and abused to dodge communal responsibility for Israel's actions. This is often an uncompromised thinking in which there is no middle ground: one either supports Israel or one criticizes Israel. This dichotomous thinking is not necessarily unique to Jews and Israel, as we see similar dichotomies in general U.S. politics: one is either supportive or engages in criticisms. This thought process is pervasive throughout the Jewish community and poses serious threats to Jewish legitimacy and the continuation of Israel. When Jews are unwilling to criticize Israel, they are often perceived as tone-deaf to the general non-Jewish public. Additionally, when Jews are unwilling to criticize Israel they lend their support to policies which ultimately are a threat to Israel's safety and continued existence.

Alternatively, right-leaning participants were much more likely to rely on the argument that there is large international bias against Israel (n=4/5). Some right-leaning participants explicitly or implicitly argued that criticism of Israel by Jews feels like a separation between themselves and the Jewish community. Criticisms of Israel from Jews, for right-leaning participants, feels like a threat to both their Jewish community and

to Israel. Many (n=3/5) right-leaning participants argued that there is “already enough criticism of Israel” from non-Jews, and thus find criticisms of Israel from Jews deeply troubling. I argue that Israel serves as a stronghold of the Jewish people for right-leaning participants. For them, Israel is a representation of the strength of the Jewish community, and threats to Israel feel like threats to the continuity of the Jewish people as a whole, wherever they live. Many (n=4/5) of these right-leaning participants cited the importance of Jews “sticking together” in the face of anti-Semitism, positing that it is essential for Jews to be united. When Jews criticize Israel, it feels like a threat to the continuity of the Jewish people. Much of American Jewish communal politics has become focused on this idea of continuity, in which the success of the Jewish people is the continued existence of the Jewish people. This position was reinforced by right-leaning participant’s tendency to cite “passing Judaism onto their children” as one of the primary meanings of their Jewish identity.

*Jewish criticism of Israel:*

In discussing criticisms of Israel, participants were divided as to whether it was easier for them when a non-Jew or a Jew voiced criticisms of Israel. For example, Sarah (Conservative, Reform, Students Supporting Israel) argued that it is easier to hear a Jewish person criticizing Israel, stating:

“Yes, absolutely very different because I do assume that people who are Jewish like it's kind of like they have this sense of connection to Israel that is likely greater than the average person and that's just an assumption that my mind makes so like speaking with a Jew who criticizes Israel I'm assuming oh they've done their research they have reasons to think this way you know”

Sarah’s statements argue that when they see a Jew criticizing Israel, they assume it is coming from a place of informed critique, one based in care and concern. Alternatively,

Rebecca (Conservative, Reform, Stand With Us) contended that she prefers when a non-Jew criticizes Israel, stating

“I think sometimes because I think it's easier for me when non-Jews say they hate Israel I think there's nothing I can do about it but when Jews say they hate Israel makes me feel really bad because I think that there's a disconnect there's at some point something went wrong”

Rebecca sees criticism of Israel from a Jew as both a threat and a departure from communal norms. Rebecca seems to believe that to be Jewish means that one must have a strong connection with Israel, a belief likely derived from their relatively right-leaning view of Israel.

*Israel criticism as anti-Semitism:*

Among right-leaning participants, there was also a tendency to report that anti-Semitism plays a prominent role in criticisms of Israel. Many of these right-leaning participants (n=4/5) did not distinguish or had trouble drawing any line between anti-Semitic criticisms of Israel and “regular” criticisms (Alperin). In response to a question about what anti-Semitism means to her, Leah (Conservative, Conservative, Stand With Us), answered: “[Being] derogatory towards Jews and a lot of times people are anti-Israel because they're anti-Semitic and people don't understand where that turns into anti-Semitism.” Without prompting, Leah automatically identified Israel critique with anti-Semitism. For her, and other similar participants, anti-Semitism and anti-Israel are different branches of the same tree.

This also likely has its roots in larger communal politics, as large pro-Israel advocacy organizations, such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), Stand With Us, and the ZOA (Zionist Organization of America) control much of the

mainstream dialogue around Israel. A large majority of participants responded that continued community-oriented Jewish education and learning was important in forming their independent Jewish identity. These participants exclusively cited this learning as taking place when in college, a time in which a large majority of Jewish education is controlled by these Pro-Israel organizations. This education often takes the form of subsidized education courses, where students receive a stipend for attending a number of courses at a Jewish student center. Some of this education also is through misleading information, where displayed maps of Israel will be missing the “Green Line” distinguishing what some refer to as Israeli occupied Palestine, or when cities in Israeli occupied Palestine will be referred to as any other Israeli city. According to Ungar-Sargon’s research expose on Hillel funding in *Foreign Policy* (2011) they issued their “Standards of Partnership” which forbids partnering with organizations deemed anti-Israel or organization which support the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement. Hillel has become an increasing center for large Pro-Israel donors, garnering support from Pro-Israel and conservative mega-donors like Sheldon Adelson (Ungar-Sargon). Hillel has also received grants from right-wing Israeli organizations, one such donation totaling \$22 million (Altshuler). This has had a chilling effect on Israel dialogue in Hillel, and by extension, Jewish communities on college campuses. When right-wing money is able to influence Jewish educational programming, something participants cited as integral to their understanding of their own Jewish identity, it results in an increasingly conservative Pro-Israel view being integrated into student’s understandings of Jewish identity.

These organizations often claim that criticisms of Israel and leftist organizations critical of Israel, such as SJP (Students for Justice in Palestine) are inherently anti-Semitic. Leah (Conservative, Conservative, Stand With Us) also noted that UC Berkeley is a hub of anti-Semitism because of their SJP chapter and its actions. They argued that UC Berkeley student's criticisms of Israel are inherently anti-Semitic because they paint certain Jews as representations of Israel's occupation of Palestine. This form of criticism presented by the participant is a mirror-image of the published positions of conservative Israel advocacy organizations. These positions play the same role as labeling all criticisms of Israel as a result of international bias, as it allows these organizations to dodge addressing the substance of the claims.

*Feels excluded from Jewish community*

All left-leaning participants (n=4) feel a degree of exclusion from the mainstream Jewish community. These participants' experiences are best illustrated by Miriam (Most Progressive, Conservative, J Street)'s statement:

“It makes me feel like I can't really even talk with friends about how I feel because they think my views are like disgusting, and I think that like it is really hard for me to like honestly go to Hillel or like even Chabad and like knowing that if the topic of Israel comes up I'll feel very uncomfortable. And yeah I guess it does sort of feel like a loss, like I wish, it feels like there's like no way for me to be an authentic Jew in the U.S. while having my views on Israel, which is really frustrating”

Miriam highlights the dynamic that many progressive young Jews experience. Their political beliefs, in the words of Miriam, prevents them from being an “authentic Jew in the U.S.” Much of this is due to the shift of the mainstream Jewish community to the



right on Israel politics, a result of conservative donors' control over Jewish institutions as previously noted.

The belief that criticism of Israel by Jews leads to distancing from Jewish communities may, for observers of the Jewish community, seem over reactive. However, within the Jewish community this is an observable phenomenon. Many left-leaning participants had starkly lower levels of involvement with their Jewish community, citing their political beliefs about Israel as a separating force. For many left-leaning participants, retreat from mainstream Jewish communities has become essential as the mainstream Jewish community maintains a firm, unquestioning, Pro-Israel period stance. They subsequently must form their own progressive Israel communities, where their political beliefs are not seen as incompatible with their Judaism. This becomes a new form of Jewish identity, where they can develop the meaning of their Jewish identity through progressive Israel advocacy. Much of this is due to funding sources, as the majority of large-scale Jewish donors are more conservative, and thus wish to create Jewish spaces that are politically in-line with their beliefs. Many left-leaning participants cited instances in which their campus Hillel (Jewish Student Center) had either directly or indirectly ousted their progressive Pro-Israel groups or students from leadership. The fear among right-leaning participants of Israel criticism leading to a distancing from the Jewish community is not unwarranted, but instead needs this alternative structural explanation.

*Feels guilt about being Jewish:*

Some left-leaning participants stated that they felt guilt about being Jewish, particularly in reference to Israel. These participants argued that they felt guilty being associated with the actions of Israel, and that their Jewish identity connected them to Israel's actions (Cohen & Kelman). Deborah (Most Progressive, Reform, J Street) illustrated this feeling of guilt around Israel:

“I went on the Olive Tree Initiative this past summer and so I was in Jordan and different parts of the West Bank and Israel proper, and I felt a lot of guilt by association, especially within the refugee camps. I don't know I mean you can read about the conflict as much as you want but it doesn't really become really real until you're talking with people that experience it everyday or seeing it for yourself. And yeah, lots of guilt by association and also like arriving into Israel and being told welcome home was like very cringe-worthy for me.”

Deborah identified with this feeling of guilt around Israel, a guilt-by-association, because she was Jewish. However, this also functions as a coping mechanism (Moore) as an attempt to be the “good Jew” (Alperin). In the face being guilty by association for Israel's wrongdoings, many Jews become increasingly critical of Israel and further polarized from the complicity of the mainstream Jewish community. For left-leaning participants, they often are no longer allowed to fit into the Jewish community and thus must strive to be accepted by non-Jews. Simultaneously, left-leaning participants become increasingly challenged by being seen as Jews, as their guilt around Israel's actions translates to guilt in their Jewish identity. This requires a negotiation in which they must choose how they can best be accommodated by the non-Jewish community.

## Conclusion

This research has interrogated the complex negotiations among Jewish identity, Israel affiliation, and anti-Semitism. American Jews' long and ever-evolving history of

anti-Semitism has moved throughout the realms of racial, ethnic, and cultural anti-Semitism, leaving young American Jews in a complicated position (Goldstein). Israel, as a stronghold for American Jews, presents another challenge (Alperin). While many participants believe that respect, love, and admiration for Israel is an essential part of American Jewish identity, others have a much more complicated relationship with the state (Pew 2013, Waxman). Left-leaning American Jews, through their progressive views on Israel, are often excluded from mainstream Jewish communal spaces, resulting in a new form of accommodation. These left-leaning participants often become increasingly ostracized from the mainstream Jewish community, resulting in their increased anti-Israel sentiment (Waxman). Many, but not all, of these left-leaning participants believe Israel should continue to exist. With only one exception, all of the left-leaning participants believe in a Two-State Solution and feel frustrated by the mainstream Jewish community's lack of work on this issue. In contrast, right-leaning American Jews maintain their positive, often unwavering, commitment to Israel. Still, what is common across political orientations is a desire for continuity of the Jewish people (Pew 2013).

There are a variety of explanatory frameworks that may allow for an increased understanding of the data and analysis presented in this research. Navon's analysis of narrative identity may allow one to better understand the complexities of American Jewish identity. American Jews, on the whole, have not directly experienced anti-Semitism, and yet they still feel the weight of this historical oppression. The lingering pain participants communicated in reference to anti-Semitism may be explained by Navon's narrative identity, meaning the communication of suffering, alongside other historical experiences of the Jewish people, feels lived. Narrative identity comes to shape

the identity of Jewish individuals, as they feel themselves within the dense network of Jewish communal identity.

Goldstein's racial analysis may also offer an additional explanatory framework. Goldstein argued that American Jews experience the privileges of whiteness while also maintaining a self-imposed racial/ethnic difference. Many participants in this research referred to their Jewish identity as a form of uniqueness, often making the active choice to present their Judaism to others. Goldstein posited that this self-imposed difference allows American Jews to be white while also, simultaneously, attempting to position themselves as empathetic to the experiences of marginalized groups, as their Judaism is made to mark the experiences of discrimination as well. Participants felt that anti-Semitism went hand-in-hand with their Jewish identity, reaffirming Goldstein's hypothesis that American Jewish identity can be used to communicate empathy for the suffering of others.

In this era of increasing nationalist tendencies, it is essential that we better understand the logic that underlies these ideologies. Many Jews who express nationalistic, unwavering support for Israel do not do so with the malicious intent of endorsing the sometimes detrimental actions (i.e. the Occupation of Palestinian land) of the Israeli government. For many, especially those in conservative areas with a limited Jewish population, their imaginary boundary of understanding has never been expanded to incorporate the idea that one can be Jewish and simultaneously be critical of Israel. Within the black and white of the current political environment, many Jews also observe that critique for Israel is juxtaposed with supporting Israel, demonstrating that the two cannot politically coexist. Trump's election has also given rise to the phenomenon of

anti-Semitic Israel supporters and general anti-Semitic tendencies, further complicating Jews' relationship with Israel. This, compounded with Trump's hard-liner stances on Israel and a potential Two-State Solution, has distanced the U.S. from meaningful critique of the actions of the Israeli government.

This relationship between American Jews and their perceptions of anti-Semitism and Israel affiliation also has profound global implications. The U.S. is one of, if not the nation most supportive of Israel, both through hard and soft power. Key to this relationship is the American Jewish community's support of Israel and associated influence upon the U.S. political system. Jewish-lead Israel advocacy organizations, such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), exert strong influence within the U.S. political system, pushing for a strong, unwavering support of Israel. However, as evidenced in this research, often the harder these organizations push the Jewish community, and particularly the young Jewish community, the more progressive Jews find themselves moving away from this mainstream Israel support.

While AIPAC and other hardline pro-Israel organizations will likely continue to exert influence due to the strength of their conservative donor base, alternative left-leaning Israel organizations are beginning to seize upon conservative pro-Israel organizations errors. In providing both social and political advocacy for progressive Jews who feel excluded from the mainstream Israel advocacy community, organizations such as J Street have introduced room for negotiation within the meaning of "pro-Israel" in the U.S. and its' political arena. As conservative organizations continue to exert pressure upon and form fissures within the Jewish community, progressive organizations are quickly growing their base and exerting more influence than ever. This has the

opportunity to lead to substantial shifts in the U.S./Israel relationship, although that day would likely have to come under a different political administration. A shift in this relationship would have significant global repercussions, influencing the trajectory of Israel and their other global relationships.

It is also important to note the role that region likely played in this research project. While every participant currently resides in the Southwest (Arizona or Southern California), a few (n=3) participants are originally from the areas with high Jewish populations in East Coast and Midwest. For Jews in the southwest, particular in places such as Arizona, there is likely a dynamic of Jewish identity that is affected by the relatively small Jewish population. While not explicitly studied in this research, one may hypothesize that many participants from areas with small Jewish populations often felt unique in their Jewish identity, serving as a non-self-elected representative of Judaism. For some this may have been a positive experience, granting them a feeling of positive uniqueness in their identity. For others, this may have been an unrequested burden. It is also important to note that in regions with small Jewish populations, there is a relatively small imaginary boundary of what it can mean to be Jewish, meaning many may not have been shown the full array of what being Jewish can look like. Further, in relatively conservative regions such as the Southwest, there is likely an overlap between general conservative ideology and Jewish-oriented political ideology (Israel).

Anti-Semitism and perceptions of anti-Semitism are also likely affected by region. In areas associated with both modern bigotry and significant histories of bigotry, one may expect to see anti-Semitism as a part of that bigotry. This may play a role in comparative anti-Semitism, in which people compare the severity of their experience of

anti-Semitism against wider known or perhaps more “severe” instances of anti-Semitism experienced by others. In regions with higher levels of bigotry and associated anti-Semitism, “smaller” acts of anti-Semitism may go unrecognized or unnamed as such by Jews, as they feel less “severe” than other instances. Alternatively, in areas notorious for acceptance and inclusion, there may be an increased perception of anti-Semitism as each instance feels significant in and of itself.

This work has shed light on the dynamics of young American Jewish identity, particularly around the topic of Israel. It is important that there be shifts in the mainstream Jewish community in order to adapt to the evolving nature of Jewish identity in relation to Israel. Many young American Jews feel ostracized from their Jewish communities because of their political beliefs, a dynamic which must change in order to maintain the expansiveness and longevity of American Jewish communities. Fundamentally, funding sources must be examined for Jewish centers, groups, and organizations in order to pave the way for true reform. Progressive Zionist organization, such as J Street and If Not Now, have already begun working to create Jewish spaces for progressive young Jews, but it is essential that this work is encouraged and continues to flourish. The formation of both inclusive and distinct Jewish communal spaces would be able to nourish the complex political, social, and communal needs of the young American Jewish community. Religious spaces, such as synagogues, ought to be de-politicized by naming and challenging unitary political messages and opening opportunities for expansive political beliefs within pseudo-religious spaces and groups. Additionally, distinct political spaces ought to be supported, allowing for the construction of community across political lines while respecting the disparate forms of Israel advocacy.

This work also has identified spaces for future research into young American Jewish identity. While able to present an outline of these dynamics, this research was limited in its scope and size, a necessity for this research project but also an opportunity for future research. It would be interesting for future research to better understand the dynamic nature of Jewish identity in an increasingly polarized political environment. Further research could also explore these new progressive Zionist Jewish groups and environments in order to fully understand the experiences of those group members. On the flip side, research into the formation and continuity of right-leaning Israel advocacy would shed light on the complexities underlying these political beliefs. It is also important that more work is done to understand the complexities of current funding of Jewish centers, groups, and organizations to pinpoint the areas requiring change.



## Bibliography

- “A Portrait of Jewish Americans,” Pew Research Center. (2013)
- Alperin, Richard. “Jewish Self-Hatred: The Internalization of Prejudice,” *Clinical Social Work Journal*, vol. 44, no. 3, pp. 221-230, (2016)
- Altshuler, George. “Student Group Protests Hillel’s Funding From Israel Government-Led Project,” *Washington Jewish Week*, (2017)
- Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. Print.
- Cohen, Jeffery E., “Perceptions of Anti-Semitism among American Jews, 2000-05, A Survey Analysis,” *Political Psychology*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 85-107, (2010)
- Cox, Daniel and Jones, Robert P., “Chosen for What? Jewish Values in 2012,” *Public Religion Research Institute* (2012)
- Fanon, Frantz, and Charles L. Markmann. *Black Skin, White Masks*. (1967) Print.
- Goldstein, Eric L. *The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity*. Princeton University Press (2006). Print.
- Kelman, Ari; Belzer, Tobin; Horwitz, Ilana; Hassenfelt, Ziva; Williams, Matt. “Conceptualization of Jewishness in the lives of American Jewish Post-Boomers,” *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 134-167 (2017).
- Kim, Israel; Rabinowitz, Jonathan; Lazerwitz, Bernard; Kim, Israel. “Changes in the Influence of Jewish Community Size on Primary Group, Religious, and Jewish Communal Involvement - 1971 and 1990,” *Sociology of Religion*, vol. 56, no. 4, pp.417, (1995)
- Klug, Brian. “Interrogating ‘New Anti-Semitism’,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 468-482, (2012)
- Linfield, H.S.. *Statistics of Jews*. Bureau of Jewish Social Research, pp. 365 - 411 (Date unknown)
- Lipstadt, Deborah E.. *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust 1933-1945*. New York: The Free Press, 1986.
- Miles, Matthew B.; Huberman, A. Michael; Saldana, Johnny. “Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook. Third Edition,” Sage Publishing (2014)

- Moore, Deborah Dash, "American Jewish Identity Politics," University of Michigan Press (2009)
- Navon, Daniel. "'We are a people, one people': How 1967 Transformed Holocaust Memory and Jewish Identity in Israel and the US," *Journal of Historical Sociology*, vol. 28, no. 3, (2015)
- Rebhun, Uzi. "Correlates of experiences and perceptions of anti-Semitism among Jews in the United States," *Social Science Research*, vol.47, pp. 44-60, (2014)
- Saxe, Leonard; Sasson, Theodore; Wright, Graham; & Hecht, Shahar. "Anti-Semitism on the College Campus: Perceptions and Realities," Cohen Center, (2015)
- Smith, Philip. "Holocaust Trauma and Jewish Identity across Generations in Alison Pick's *Far to Go*," *Literature Compass*, vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 530-537, (2016)
- Ungar-Sargon, Batya. "How the Israel Lobby Captured Hillel," *Foreign Policy*, (2015)
- Waxman, Dov., "Young American Jews and Israel: Beyond Birthright and BDS," *Israel Studies*, vol. 22, no. 3, pp 177-199 (2017)

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

### Jewish Identity:

1. Can you tell me about your earliest memory of learning or knowing you were Jewish?
  - a. What did that mean to you?
  - b. What does it feel like to be Jewish?
2. Have you ever questioned the meaning of your Jewish identity?
  - a. If so, what was that experience like? What came from it?
3. People have more than one identity, and sometimes one or more feel more important over others. When or where do you feel the most Jewish?
  - a. The least Jewish?

### Anti-Semitism

4. What does anti-Semitism mean to you? Definition and personal meaning?
5. Can you tell me about a time you experienced anti-Semitism personally or observed someone else experiencing it?
6. What was the most recent or most memorable incident of anti-Semitism that you remember?
7. How severe do you think anti-Semitism is in the United States?
  - a. Internationally?
  - b. Has it gotten better or worse?
  - c. When has been the worst period of anti-Semitism?
    - i. Example?
    - ii. When did it wane?
  - d. How do you know when it rises and falls?

8. Tell me about an instance of anti-Semitism?
  - a. Can you describe how the Jewish community responded?
    - i. Were there different kinds of responses from the Jewish community?
    - ii. Which felt most helpful/worthy/valuable/suitable?
9. How did you first come to learn about anti-Semitism?
  - a. How was it discussed?
  - b. How did it feel to learn some of this information?
10. How do you think the Jewish community deals with anti-Semitism?
11. How does it feel to discuss or think about the Holocaust?

Israel Affiliation:

12. How would you describe your relationship to Israel?
13. Do you fear for Israel's security?
  - a. What do you think about Israel's security?
14. How comfortable to you feel criticizing Israel or Israeli policies?
15. How does it feel when someone you know criticizes Israel?
  - a. Can you give an example?
  - b. Does it change depending on whether the person is Jewish?
16. Can you tell me about a time when you have criticized Israel among friends or family?
  - a. Is it easier to do so when the person you are speaking with is Jewish?
17. What's the difference between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism?
18. Do you ever feel guilty about being Jewish in relation to Israel

APPENDIX B

CODEBOOK

<b>Anti-Semitism</b>	
AS_Extent_Minor	Reported that anti-Semitism feels like a minor or not very severe issue.
AS_Extent_Major	Reported that anti-Semitism feels like a major or pressing issue.
AS_Reason_Unprovoked	Participant believes that anti-Semitism is generally unprovoked. Participant did not find any form of justification for anti-Semitic beliefs or acts.
AS_Reason_Provoked	Participant believes that anti-Semitism may be provoked by Jews, the Jewish community, or Judaism. Participant, in some form, justified anti-Semitic beliefs or acts.
AS_Reaction_Fear	Reported fear or concern about anti-Semitism. Includes arguments that anti-Semitism could happen to them or that anti-Semitism is frequent or severe enough to make participant fearful.
AS_Reaction_ConcealIdentity	Reported that they try to avoid experiencing anti-Semitism by hiding or concealing Jewish Identity. Includes any form of not-divulging Jewish identity in attempts to go unnoticed and avoid anti-Semitism.
AS_Perception_GettingWorse	Reported that anti-Semitism is getting worse. Based on participants' personal understanding of what anti-Semitism and personal view of when it has been better or worse. No objective category of "worse" used to determine whether it is worse.
AS_Perception_GettingBetter	Reported that anti-Semitism is getting better. Based on participants' personal understanding of what anti-Semitism and personal view of when it has been better or worse. No objective category of "better" used to determine whether it is better.
AS_Perception_Changed	Reported that the form of anti-Semitism has changed or evolved. May include remarks that anti-Semitic acts are different in content or motivation.
AS_Impact_JewishIdentity	Reported that knowledge of anti-Semitism is related to one's Judaism, Jewish identity, or Jewish education. Includes remarks that anti-Semitism was a part of their education or ran parallel to their knowledge of Judaism and Jewish identity.
AS_Impact_DisregardedJews	Argued that anti-Semitism is disregarded by Jews or not taken seriously. Includes arguments

	that the Jewish community or individual Jews do not take anti-Semitism seriously or do not react in a responsive way.
<b>Holocaust</b>	
Ho_Emotion_Distant	Reported that the feelings, emotions, and/or realities of the Holocaust feels distant. Includes remarks that one does not feel the full weight of the Holocaust.
Ho_Emotion_Present	Reported that the feelings, emotions, and/or realities of the Holocaust feels present or close. Includes reported feelings of closeness to the realities of the Holocaust
Ho_Emotion_Relation	Reported that the Holocaust feels challenging because participant feels as though they or their family could have been victims.
<b>Israel</b>	
Is_Security_Fear	Reported feeling fear for Israel's security. Includes any affirmative answers to question asking whether they fear for Israel's security.
Is_Security_NoFear	Reported not feeling fear for Israel's security. Includes any negative answers to question asking whether they fear for Israel's security.
Is_Security_DefendSelf	Participant believes that Israel can defend itself from potential threats. Includes arguments that Israel would survive if attacked or threatened by any actor.
Is_Threat_Inaccurateinfo	Participant feels that global information is inaccurate and a threat to Israel. Includes any arguments of biased, inaccurate, or hateful information about Israel.
Is_Criticism_PrefJews	Reported that it is easier to experience criticisms against Israel from a Jewish person.
Is_Criticism_PrefNonJews	Reported that it is easier to experience criticisms against Israel from a non-Jewish person.
Is_Criticism_Comfortable	Reported feeling comfortable criticizing Israel to any degree.
Is_Criticism_NoComfortable	Reported feeling uncomfortable criticizing Israel to any degree.
Is_Criticism_QRightToExist_AS	Participant believes that questioning Israel's right to exist is always anti-Semitic.
Is_Connection_Family	Participant has a family connection to Israel. Includes having any relatives who currently live in or have previously lived in Israel for any sustained time.
Is_Connection_Zionist	Participant identifies as a Zionist. Includes any hyphenated form of identifying as a Zionist.



Is_Connection_NotZionist	Participant does not identify as a Zionist in any way.
Is_Connection_Guilt	Participant reported feeling guilt about being Jewish because of Israel's actions and the connection of the Jewish people to Israel
Is_Connection_NoGuilt	Participant did not report feeling guilt about being Jewish because of Israel's actions and the connection of the Jewish people to Israel
<b>Jewish Identity</b>	
JID_Emotion_Always	Participant reported always feeling Jewish. Includes reports of feeling Jewish since they could remember.
JID_Development_JewishEducation	Reported that learning about Judaism makes participant feel a stronger sense of Jewish Identity. Includes any form of education the participant classifies as Jewish education
JID_Meaning_NextGen	Participant believes that the meaning of their Jewish Identity is to pass Judaism onto the next generation
JID_Meaning_Traditions	Participant believes that the meaning of their Jewish Identity is to keep Jewish traditions. Includes any and all degrees of keeping or practicing traditions
JID_Meaning_GoodPerson	Participant believes that the meaning of their Jewish Identity is to be a good person. Includes any and all personal definitions of what it means to be a good person
JID_Importance_First	Reported that their Jewish Identity is their most salient identity
JID_Importance_NotFirst	Reported that their Jewish Identity is not their most salient identity