

The Role of American Consultants in the Development of Television

News Broadcasting in the United Kingdom in the 1990s

by

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ABSTRACT

U.S. television is about earning profits, but European broadcasting has historically been governed as public service, indirectly or directly operated by the government. Substantial changes occurred in the 1990s. Privatization and the United Kingdom's Independent Television franchise auction stimulated commercial developments throughout Europe. Even public service broadcasters lost their traditional characteristics, adopting routines making them almost indistinguishable from commercial competitors.

Television remains the number one news source overall. Research shows news adheres to similar, recurring and predictable elements; an anchor team balances the broadcast and its various elements, following a formula of friendly personalities, visuals and sound bites.

This study examined American news consultants' role in the development of television news in the UK in the 1990s. American news consultants' work abroad is important because they spread the U.S. model - the origin of today's on-air news style - and changed television news on a global scale.

Limited research has been conducted on the consultants' European work and how they operated, largely because of proprietary material. This study was based on 2359 pages of archival material from Frank N. Magid Associates' European archives. In addition, 24 interviews with Magid staff and UK journalists allowed for a comprehensive examination.

Magid truly infiltrated UK television - from the headquarters of the BBC and ITN, to the regions. A major finding is the extent of Magid's penetration with research

services, storytelling and performance training. During the franchise auction, Magid worked with ITV clients in 11 of the 16 regions.

This study examined how Magid played a role in the development of television news. It analyzed key concepts integrated into UK news and how those are similar or different from the U.S. The importance of good storytelling permeated the findings. Tell a story well – tailored to the culture, medium and viewers – and it will attract an audience. In turn, that attracts advertisers, making news profitable. Change theory guided an analysis of societal forces. Driving forces, such as privatization and technology, spurred on development of television news; restraining forces, such as fear of Americanization, slowed it down.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Tage and Sonja. From an early childhood, they instilled in me the value of a good work ethic and determination. My parents encouraged me to pursue my goals and supported me in all my endeavors. I truly appreciate everything they have done for me. Together with my sister, Jenny, my parents have always been my strongest cheerleaders through all of life's ups and downs.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“Many stations have found that the local newscast has become their most important – and profitable – operation. Station managers find that news sells. And news directors discover they no longer are considered heads of parasite departments.”

Lock, Christopher & Morris, 1970, p. 18

With a click of the remote, the television is turned on. It is 5 p.m. and the local evening news comes on. There is a newscast “open” with flashy graphics and music, teasing the content that is to come. An anchor team appears on the television screen. Their demeanor is upbeat; they look at each other, smile and chitchat. They “toss” to reporters in the field, in the studio, or in the newsroom. Conversations ensue. The newscast includes a weatherperson and most likely a sports person. Today this scene is played out in homes all over the world. It is a perfect example of what Morris Roth, a respected *Variety* correspondent (Powers, 1978) back in 1970 dubbed “happy talk” (Primo, 2008; Variety Staff, 2008). It “owes much of its identity to the bantering remarks made among anchormen, reporters, weathermen, and sportscasters during transitions from topic to topic” (Powers, 1978, p. 36).

Turn on the television to watch the news the following day. And the following day. And the following day. The main scenario will repeat itself. The story topics will be similar too, with the chief difference being the actual content of each story.

From its inception, television in the United States was primarily viewed as an entertainment medium; entertainment drew large audiences and generated revenue. That viewpoint changed in the late 1960s and early 1970, with the development of the eyewitness news and action news formats and the subsequent merger. It drew a mass audience, which in turn attracted advertisers. Suddenly news was profitable. The commercially successful American news format spread globally. Turn on the local evening newscast in the United States, Germany, Canada, South Africa or Singapore – or anywhere else in the world today - and a similar format is shown. In Europe, with the privatization movement and subsequent commercialization and marketization of media, the main growth period for the format was the 1990s. It began in the United Kingdom and spread rapidly to the rest of Europe.

Modern television news adheres to certain similar, recurring and predictable elements (McManus, 1990; Millard, 1993; Phillips, 1976; Rose, 1979; Stephenson, Reese, & Beadle, 2005). Today, the American news format or “happy talk” – although many would protest the “happy talk” terminology - is seen around the world, much because of the work of American television news consultants. As the consultancy business became saturated in the United States, television news consultants sought to expand their client base (Atkinson, 1994), and foreign media outlets were eager to embrace them and their services. The American commercial television model “has become the dominant model across the world” (Kishan Thusu, 2007, p. 2).

The American News Format

In the United States, news was originally done merely as a way to satisfy requirements from the Federal Communications Commission; television was not seen as

a serious medium for providing news (Kiska, 2009). That changed, starting in the 1960s, which was the medium's most important growth period (Watson, 1990). It was a time when the visual aspect of television was affirmed; the American public watched coverage of the John F. Kennedy assassination, feats in outer space, and civil unrest. The networks expanded their evening newscasts and CBS anchor Walter Cronkite became known as "one of the most trusted men" in America (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). It was also when television news became profitable.

In the early 1960s, television news had a "medium of record" structure that fit the upper-middle class, but not the middle majority – the bulk of the U.S. viewers (Glick & Levy, 1962). Sociologist Lloyd Warner's social class model showed that almost 70 percent of the U.S. population was basically ignored when it came to the structure of television news because of style and language. Warner felt television as a medium was capable of reaching a mass audience, but the message needed to fit the "middle majority." Using Warner's social class model, the American news consultants became a conduit for what everyday people wanted (Allen, 2001). They conducted audience research, and with it as a base, came up with concepts to better communicate news to the "middle majority."

The original news concept and marketing phrase in the wave of the "peopleization" of news - tailored to a mass audience by using a "friendlier" and more understandable type of news - was called eyewitness news. There are two entities credited with the development of the eyewitness news format – news director and later consultant Al Primo and consultancy firm McHugh & Hoffman. McHugh & Hoffman teamed up with Warner's company, Social Research, Inc., and used that company's research as a base for their recommendations.

The concept of the eyewitness news format began in 1955. Al Primo was covering a story, and because of technical issues, had to step in front of the camera. He realized this made him an eyewitness to what was occurring (Primo, 2008). Being there, and showing that to the audience, provided added credibility to the story. However, it was not until ten years later that the concept developed, at KYW-TV in Philadelphia (Casella, 2013). There Primo used a four-person anchor team – two anchors, one weatherperson and one sportsperson. He found a loophole in the union contract, which meant he could use staff on the air without paying them extra; the bulk of the newsroom staff became on-air talent overnight. They were required to step into the video to show they had been at the events they covered, as eyewitnesses. Theme music, graphics and moving cameras were added to the newscast, and upcoming stories were teased so that the viewer would continue watching (Primo, 2008).

The eyewitness news concept expanded when Primo accepted a position as news director at WABC-TV in New York in the late 1960s. Women and minorities could be seen on-air, and matching blazers and lapel pins were added. It was also at WABC that Primo's and McHugh & Hoffman's paths crossed for the first time. From then on, McHugh & Hoffman were eyewitness news evangelists, spreading a message of television storytelling that helped station owners attract mass audiences.

In 1970, a new style called action news debuted. It was a news format derived by Frank N. Magid, who felt eyewitness news was too slow for the television medium. Action news made its debut in Philadelphia, just like eyewitness news, but at rival WFIL-TV (Fox, 2010). The main characteristic of action news was its short news stories and thus rapid pace. Sound bites were no longer than ten seconds and there were as many as

three stories for every minute (Ponce De Leon, 2015). Action news also contained many live shots and friendly anchors (Sullivan, 2010).

As news started to attract a mass audience – that large middle-majority of Americans that Warner had identified – it became seriously profitable. The newscast attracted both audiences and advertisers, and station owners realized news was a force to be reckoned with. With news profitable, “news directors discover they no longer are considered heads of parasite departments” (Lock, Christopher & Morris, 1970, p. 18); suddenly news departments mattered to station owners. A large part of the commercial success came from “heavy investment in research” (Potter, 1989, p. 217) to identify what audiences wanted and liked. News consultants are important to journalism “because they have given the audience a voice in the news process” (Allen, 2000, p. 85).

Eventually the two formats - eyewitness news and action news - merged and became indistinguishable. The news business is a copycat business; whatever draws an audience is quickly copied. The format merger was clear as early as 1976 (Allen, 2001). That style of news delivery has developed into today’s personality-driven newscast that can be seen all across the United States, as well as abroad.

American Versus European Television

One of the “most influential sets of differentiations and oppositions in the history of world broadcasting has been that between the U.S. and Great Britain” (Hilmes, 2003, p. 2), with the two national systems largely in opposition because of how they were set up. The “British structure of public service broadcasting has been a model for systems developed around the world” (Henningham & Delano, 1998, p. 143). In contrast, television in the U.S. has been the opposite of the public service model; it has always

been about making money and creating profits for station owners (Brown, 1971; Cushion, 2012; Tuchman, 1974). American television was set up with profitability as its goal from the inception. It was a way to move goods (Powers, 1978) and viewers were essentially consumers of products (Hoynes, 1999). This commercial focus has historically not been the case in other countries where television has been valued as a public service medium for public benefit. Public service television is for a wide range of audiences and aims to help promote indigenous culture. In public service broadcasting, news is primarily viewed as a way to inform the public and not a way to make money.

In Europe, broadcasting has traditionally been a monopoly, governed by the public service broadcasting system (Servaes & Wang, 1997; Syvetsen, 1997) and indirectly or directly operated by the government (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). The medium was set up to provide a public service with a clear public affairs mission. Various taxes and fees have supported European television. Even today, Europe does not follow the American commercial model. Countries in Europe now have a mixed broadcasting system – a dual system - where the government-supported stations have to compete with commercial stations (Bardoel & d'Haenens, 2008; Servaes & Wang, 1997).

Expansion with the Help of Privatization

Up until the 1990s, European television was essentially a monopoly regulated by the government. Thus the U.S. news consultants would not have been successful in spreading the American television news format if there had not been various societal movements at play. The introduction of privatization, more commercialization and marketization in general, the 1991 Independent Television (ITV) franchise auction, and the efforts of the news consultants, all helped the American news format gain a foothold.

There would not have been any business opportunities for the news consultants without the opening provided by Margaret Thatcher's privatization movement. Privatization – the selling off of state-owned assets to private entities – was a way to turn Britain's recession around and for the government to bring in money. Few European countries had experience with commercial television and market-based competition; that is why the American television news consultant found their niche in Europe (Allen, 2001).

In the latter part of the twentieth century, Europe welcomed privatization with open arms, mainly because of a serious financial recession. The European countries moved from the Keynesian doctrine that had taken a stronghold after World War II – the notion that government via public ownerships could provide employment and stabilize the economy - to an open marketplace with privatization on a global scale. Countries began selling their public assets, deregulating their economies and eliminating market force barriers (Anderson & Hill, 1996; Feigenbaum, 2009; Feigenbaum, Henig, & Hamnet, 1998). Assets were transferred from public hands to private hands, via the privatization process (Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Hanke, 1987; Hemming & Mansoor, 1988; Starr, 1988). The overall aim was to reduce the role of the state, as well as bring in much needed money to the government. The private sector was deemed more efficient than the public sector, mainly because of a lack of competition in the public sector (Chang, 2006). Competition was viewed as a way to stimulate the economy, helping bring Europe out of the recession.

On a global level, both the United States and the United Kingdom were considered privatization leaders. They had strong privatization pioneers in Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (Cline Horowitz, 2005; Djelic, 2006; Pierson, 1992).

Some regarded the UK as the foremost innovator and undertaker of privatization (Estrin, 1991; Henig, 1989; Young, 1986) and the British privatization program had an influence on economic policy throughout the world (Bishop, Kay and Mayer, 1994).

UK Television Commercialization and Marketization

In Europe, television commercialization was not done in the first wave of a country's privatization movement. It was generally done after the privatization of major industries. The UK situation was slightly different from the rest of Europe as commercial television technically began in the mid-1950s, when ITV started broadcasting. However, it can be argued the privatization of British Telecom spurred on the 1991 franchise auction, and opened the UK to a more advanced commercial and marketized television system. It was the telecom privatization, in conjunction with the influx of new broadcasting technology such as cable and satellite (Blumler & Hoffman-Riem, 1992; Ferrers, 1988; O'Malley, 1994) that stimulated television development. In the 1990s, UK television opened up to market forces in a substantial way.

Although some argue there was an element of commercialism from the inception of British broadcasting, true marketization of television began in the late 1980s. The first movement was the 1986 Peacock Report that determined the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) should remain funded by license fees, but needed to move toward a more market driven system (Goodwin, 1998; O'Malley, 1994). It was what BBC itself called "a fundamental re-think of the long term funding of the BBC" (BBC, n.d., a, p. 3). The second and even larger movement towards marketization was the 1988 government White Paper on broadcasting. In it, the process for the deregulation of British broadcasting was delineated (Home Office, United Kingdom, 1988). At that time, there

were two main television outlets in the UK – the BBC and ITV. ITV had a network of regional television stations and the White Paper outlined an auction process for their broadcast licenses. The White Paper was “the biggest bomb put under British TV in half-a-century” (Wenham, 1988, headline).

The franchise license auction was viewed as the “sale of the century” (Bell, 1991b, p. 33) and it was one of the most closely watched events in world broadcasting (Allen, 2001). However, not many know that American consultancy firm Frank N. Magid Associates was involved with ITV franchises in 11 of the 16 regions at the time of the auction. In the U.S., Frank Magid was well known and his company was considered a premiere research and consulting firm. Magid was “the pre-eminent broadcast news consultant in the United States” (Powers, 1978, p. 78), referred to as the “supremo” (Karpf, 1985, para. 2), and viewed as having “perfected the business of news consultancy” (Powers, 1978, p. 122). While Magid was a well-recognized name in U.S. broadcasting circles, that was not the case internationally. This was, at the time, Magid’s largest foray into international broadcasting territory.

When the 1991 franchise auction was over, nine Magid clients were winners. Only two accounts lost their bids – incumbent TV-am for the breakfast license and incumbent TVS in the South and South East. Magid eventually worked with 12 of the 16 ITV entities (Davidson, 1992). After the auction, Magid added Sunrise - later known as Good Morning Television – the outlet that had won over TV-am. In addition, Magid also worked with the BBC – both in London and elsewhere in the UK - thus working in what was considered the premium British broadcast media institution. The American company’s reach and influence in the UK was comprehensive.

Magid was incredibly successful and their work drew a significant audience. At one point, *The Guardian*'s Rosie Millard (1993) said that when one ITV outlet ignored the consultants' recommendations, it was at "their peril" (para. 2). She also saw a significant anxiousness in British broadcasting, "to prove that most of the changes were done by insiders, not from some American set-up based in a place called Marion" (para. 12). At the time, Magid's world headquarters were in Marion, Iowa, a location not many in the UK had heard of. The Magid crew that was tinkering with ITV and BBC, were not only foreigners, but also from a place in the middle of nowhere.

Magid's road to UK success was not easy. Foreign television consultants had to "wend their way through a maze of cultural obstacles" (Atkinson, 1994, p. 7) and be "cultural chameleons – street-wise but sensitive and respectful students of native custom" (Atkinson, 1994, p. 7). British media critics frequently described American consultants as "news doctors" and their work as the "dumbing down" of television.

The fear of Americanization of the British media was a significant force working against the consultants. When Magid worked with the BBC, their hiring "was likened to the Vatican assembling atheists to pick the next Pope" (Allen, 2000, p. 94). Hiring American consultants that could possibly influence the ultimate in UK broadcasting and the gold standard for public broadcasting – the BBC – was thought of as an unthinkable act. The UK public service system "sought to avoid not only U.S. domination of media production but its 'vulgar' cultural influence as well" (Hilmes, 2003, p. 2). That is why the United Kingdom had carefully regulated and restricted their television system for so long. The ITV franchise auction created quite a stir in the UK. Roy Hattersley, the Labour Party's deputy leader, said about the auction, "if you press one button and get

Mickey Mouse, press another and get Donald Duck, press another and get Pluto – that’s no real choice” (as cited by Bell, 1989, para. 1).

Before the 1990s privatization movement, most countries in Europe only had one or two television stations, via government-supported public service broadcasting (Allen, 2001). From the UK, modernization and marketization of television quickly spread to France, Spain, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. It spread to Eastern Europe as well, once communism there had collapsed. Even the public broadcasters in Europe quickly lost their old public broadcasting characteristics and adopted routines that made them indistinguishable from their commercial competitors (McQuail, 1994; Syvetsen, 1997). Today “television is essentially the same medium in America and in Europe” (Postman, 2000, p. 47). In the UK, with the pressure of the commercial broadcast system, “American television was a source of inspiration and quickly influenced the British system” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 64).

Purpose and Significance

Television, as the former stepchild to print and radio, has come a long way since its inception. It was not until 1951 that television first topped radio in prime time audience size in the U.S. Television has grown to become “our global medium” (Hilmes, 2003, p. 1). In the latter part of the twentieth century, it gained a foothold as the premiere source for news worldwide. Today, even with the surge in popularity of the internet, television remains the number one news source overall (European Union, 2000; Kiska, 2009; Marketing Charts, 2015; Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016, Montgomery, 2007; Straubhaar, 2007; Thompson, 2006). For example, 57 percent of American adults get their news from television, while only 38 percent get it through

social media and websites (Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016). However, traditional television news and appointment viewing is not as stable as it once was. It is facing serious threats from 24-hour news channels that change how audiences consume news and a younger digital audience that is not as likely to tune in to television news as the older generation (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2016). Journalism as a profession is also under scrutiny, with allegations and discussions of “fake news.”

This research focuses on the development of television broadcasting in the United Kingdom and the role of American news consultants in that process. The procedure in the UK is historically significant because it was the starting point for true commercial television in Europe. In addition, the expansion of the American news consultants’ work abroad is important. At the beginning of 1980, over half of the U.S. television newsrooms used consultants (School of Communication, The American University, 1980). By the late 1980s, the television consultancy market had reached saturation in the U.S. and Canada. News consultants sought to expand their client base (Atkinson, 1994) and moved into Europe, Asia and Latin America. What took place in the U.S. shaped Canadian broadcasting, European broadcasting, as well as Asian and Latin American broadcasting.

The American news model has spread around the world and is the origin of today’s global on-air news style, thanks to media consulting companies such as Frank N. Magid Associates, Audience Research & Development, and McHugh & Hoffman. Yet, despite the vast success of the American consultants and the spread of the American television news model worldwide, very limited research that focuses on the role of the consultants and how exactly they operated has been conducted. There is a hole in the understanding of precisely how the consultants spread the American news format. It is

virtually unexplored territory from a scholarly standpoint. The news consultants did not import anything per se; they did not export television programs. Foreign governments can easily control how much television programming is allowed to be imported. However, in this case, the American consultants worked with indigenous media outlets to shape television news on a worldwide scale. Nothing was thus officially exported or imported.

Most of the UK television research has focused on the BBC as the “flagship” broadcast outlet. ITV has “often been marginalized or neglected in histories of broadcasting in Britain” (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p. 1). That is partly because ITV has a more complex history than the BBC and the BBC is considered “the elder statesman and ‘true’ advocate of public service broadcasting” (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p. 2). The “relative lack of access to archive material” (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p. 4) has also been an issue when it comes to analyzing ITV’s progression. This study examined both the BBC and ITV. However, the bulk of the archival material used focused on ITV stations and most of the UK people interviewed worked for ITV outlets during the 1990s.

Prominent British journalist and book author Andrew Davidson (1992) did an in-depth review of some of the key actors in the TV licensing process, but did not fully examine how the bids were put together or what followed in terms of the changes in UK television. UK researchers Steven Barnett, Emily Seymour and Ivor Gaber (2000) conducted a study where they looked at changes in news content, but they did not analyze presentation, language or treatment of news stories or examine how American consultants may have played a part. American media historian Craig Allen (2000) studied consultancy newscast traits on UK television. He compared one ITV channel with the

BBC using a content analysis. This study adds to the research literature and fills a knowledge gap caused, in part, because of a lack of access to source material.

Getting in-depth information from news consulting companies has previously been virtually impossible. While plenty of proprietary research material exists, “it is not made widely available” (Wilson, 2008, p. 74). The surveys the consultants did were detailed and to the point; one of the reasons they are “seldom made public in any form” (Shosteck, 1973, p. 63). But it is also because “news consultants maintain confidential relationships with the media who hire them. Sworn to proprietary secrecy, news consultants do not speak in public and are rarely seen in the media” (Allen, 2000, p. 85). In addition, as the study will show, when American consultants work abroad, there tends to be an added level of secrecy, mainly because of the fear that the notion of Americanization will hurt their work.

Summary and a Look Ahead

This study provides an in-depth examination of exactly how American news consultants helped change television news in the UK. The research questions that guided the study included why the American consultants were brought into the UK, how they played a role in the development of television news, and what key concepts they integrated. The study also sought to understand how those concepts are similar or different from U.S. television concepts, and what key driving and restraining forces played a role in television news development in the UK.

American consultancy companies have previously not allowed scholars to examine their television material. Their research information has been a trade secret, proprietary, and closely guarded. The material has been kept a secret by both the

consultancy company and the client television station (Godfrey, 1999). For the first time, Frank N. Magid Associates allowed an outside researcher full access to their European archives. The material provided the base for this study, and with its help, the vast extent of Magid's work in the UK can be understood. In-depth qualitative interviews further allowed for a comprehensive examination of the television news development process. Interviews were conducted with Magid staff members that had direct experience with their UK operations, as well as with active UK journalists and news management members during the 1990s.

Qualitative case methodology tied together various data sources in order to develop an explanatory narrative of the development of television news broadcasting in the UK in the 1990s. Kurt Lewin's change theory, and in particular his theory of unfreezing of a condition, a transition, and a refreezing in the new condition, helped provide context. The researcher synthesized the data in a findings chapter. The analysis examined changes of key newscast concepts such as sound bites, live shots, standups (piece to camera) and anchor (presenter) and reporter roles. It also discussed forces, such as the fear of Americanization that hindered the consultants' work, and the privatization process movement that helped their work. The final chapter summarizes and contextualizes the findings and includes future research suggestions.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

“It’s a high-impact medium. It does some things no other force can do – transmitting electronic pictures through the air... The great sadness of my life is that I never achieved the hour newscast, which would not have been twice as good as the half-hour newscast, but many times as good.”

Walter Cronkite, as cited by Kaplan (1984)

The 20th century marked the official birth of radio, television, cable and satellite, and the development of true global media. Using Marshall McLuhan’s words, a “global village” developed. Each new medium built on the old one; radio was originally transposed to television with minimum change. While radio began as a stepchild to print, television began as a stepchild to radio. Television quickly grew in popularity and ruled the mid to latter half of the 20th century as the medium most widely used for news and information. It displaced newspapers as the primary information source, and took over radio’s role as the mass medium of choice.

Scholarly literature offers strong justification for understanding television’s place in society, locally and globally. This review focuses on the development of television news in the United States, both at the network and local level, and particularly on what is known of the part played by consultants. It also covers United Kingdom television history and the privatization and commercialization process in Europe.

For television news, the 1960s in the U.S. were as important as the 1990s in the UK, when the changes addressed in this study occurred. Those periods may be 30 years

apart, but the growth and changes in both nations are similar. Television in the U.S. came into age in the 1960s, as it was the medium's most important growth period (Watson, 1990). Television news "would become more than a headline service during the 1960s" (Kiska, 2009, p. 46), both locally and nationally. At that time, more than 46 million households in the United States, about 87 percent, had a television set (Watson, 1990). This was also the period when Walter Cronkite became one of the "most trusted men" in America (Bliss, 1991; Sterling & Kittross, 2002).

Historically, television in the U.S. has always been about making money. This has, however, not been the case in Europe. Traditionally, there it was set up as a public service where "channels were programmed by state enterprises, or by independent non-commercial public agencies" (Karamanis, 1999, p. 43), thus "state broadcasting authorities in Europe were the rule" (Schiller, 1992, p. 138). There was "virtually no national competition" (Rowland & Tracey, 1990, p. 10) for the public broadcasters. That changed with the privatization and commercialization process that has resulted in today's dual European system – with both public and private television operators.

The difference between public and private television is that private television is predominantly accountable to the market, while public television is "rooted in the social system from which it draws its existence" (Blumler & Hoffman-Reim, 1992, p. 32). In addition, traditionally "public service broadcasting was regulated by norms and values firmly rooted in the distinct cultural and political paradigms that prevailed in different nation states in Europe" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a, p. 39).

Ofcom, the UK's national communications regulator, has spelled out the importance of public service broadcasting. Among the purposes are not only "reflecting UK cultural identity" (Ofcom, 2016, p. 4), but helping to strengthen it as well.

Continuing Primacy of Television News

Despite people having more ways to consume news now than ever before (Risk, 2011), and even with the surge of the internet as a news source, television remains overall the preferred source for news in the United States (Kiska, 2009; Mitchell, Gottfried, Barthel, & Shearer, 2016; Montgomery, 2007), in Europe (European Union, 2000; Montgomery, 2007; Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2016; Thompson, 2006), and around the world (Marketing Charts, 2015; Straubhaar, 2007). A large 2013 study examined news consumption in eleven nations from four continents and found that television is still dominant, despite online media. In addition, "the more citizens watch TV news, the better informed they seem to be" (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2013, p. 697).

In the UK, "television is now the supreme news medium, in a sense that it is used and respected by almost everyone" (Hargreaves & Thomas, 2002, p. 4). While the Reuters Institute – the University of Oxford's research center on global news media – in their 2016 Digital News Report found there has been a decline in television news viewing among people under 45, and in particular those between 18 and 24, it remains the top news source. The UK television audience is large but aging, and the younger generation is more apt to go online for news, a growing trend around the world (Kleis Nielsen, 2017). Younger people tend to replace traditional news outlets, especially newspapers, with internet sources but that process is still in its early stages (Papathanassopoulos et al.,

2013). Broadcasting outlets are adapting to the trend with websites, recorded newscasts, online videos, and social media outreach.

Since the late 1960s, television news, and in particular local television news, has adhered to certain similar, recurring and predictable elements (McManus, 1990; Phillips, 1976; Stephenson, Reese, & Beadle, 2005; Rose, 1979). The newscast has anchors and reporters appearing as “hosts” that frame the newscasts for viewers; typically a male and female anchor team balances the broadcast and its various elements (Allen, 2001). News and “media communication is laden with strategies, from the selection of words to the tone of voice” (Smith, 1977, p. 147).

The first minutes of the contemporary newscast are devoted to the day’s big stories. The lead story’s “purpose is to entice viewers into the show, either with the prospects of horrors, laughs or ‘relevant’ information” (Rose, 1979, p. 171). The second segment is generally slower, “a place to fit all the events which lack surefire appeal” (Rose, 1979, p. 171). The American newscast components are generally 15 minutes of news, four minutes of sports, two minutes of weather and one minute of open, close and transitions (Stephenson, Reese, & Beadle, 2005). In addition, about six minutes are used for commercials. The news stories vary in length from 30 seconds or less to more than two minutes, although two minutes is rare today. In general, “the shorter stories are usually straight, on-camera reading by the anchors, probably with an over-the-shoulder graphic included” (Stephenson, Reese & Beadle, 2005, p. 167).

Two perspectives address the split in defining the newscast’s purpose. One posits it is about showing the audience something versus merely telling them (McManus, 1990), while the other maintains the newscast is just as much about showing as it is telling

(Montgomery, 2007). In addition, “a news story with strong pictures is likely to take precedence over one without footage, all else being equal” (Montgomery, 2007, p. 9). Television news relies on video and visual elements, and technology allows for an emphasis on live coverage (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). In general, when no moving pictures are available, stories run considerably shorter than when there is video (Wulfemeyer, 1982).

The way television news is structured today largely came about because of research and work done by media consultants such as Frank N. Magid Associates, Audience Research & Development, McHugh & Hoffman, and Al Primo. They shaped local and national television news in the U.S., as well as abroad (Allen, 2001). Television news programs are similar across the world (Bourdon, 2000; Millard, 1993); “from Sweden, to Greece, Liverpool to America, we see the same bright set; the jaunty, electronic theme tune; the branding of packages within the programme and the emphasis on live, ‘happening events’” (Millard, 1993, para. 8). The commercial television model, with origins in the U.S., “has become the dominant model across the world” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 2). Because television is important for public information purposes “what is happening to television news, globally, becomes one of the key areas of concern, not only for those who study, consume or produce television news but for society as a whole” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 2).

It is clear “much of the impetus behind the recent globalization of television has been commercial – and American” (Blumler & Hoffman-Riem, 1992, p. 31) - as “the American system, meaning the commercial model of communication, has spread to the international arena” (Schiller, 1992, p. 137). Now “television is essentially the same

medium in America and in Europe” (Postman, 2000, p. 47). But that was not always the case. It used to be “two different media, used in different ways, for different purposes, based on different suppositions” (Postman, 2000, pg. 47).

Historical Background

When television was first invented, it was primarily considered an entertainment medium; news was not seen as profitable. Furthermore, television journalism was not viewed as prestigious as print journalism, or even radio journalism. It has been noted that, “outbursts against the medium are more newsworthy than is praise, making it difficult to distinguish how much of their public visibility is due to the fact that newspapers and magazines are in competition with television” (Glick & Levy, 1962, p. 74). Furthermore, “if television news were ineffectual, it would be let alone. It is not” (Fang, 1972, p. 12). From its inception, “television in America has been a fighting word, a battleground, a stormy topic filled with many conflicts” (Warner, 1962, p. 5). These battles continued even as “America from coast to coast had become a TV nation” (Warner, 1962, p. 6).

Television Development

Television has been around for almost 100 years and the word television means “seeing at a distance” (Fang, 1997, p. 154). Television is “the greatest means of communication ever developed by the mind of man” (Hutchinson, 1946, p. xi), and “a window looking out on the world. Radio brought sound to the house – television adds the visual image” (Hutchinson, 1946, p. x).

Television’s true origin has been debated as “nearly every country in the world lays claim to the true and only ‘Father of Television’” (Stashower, 2002, p. xvi); many people played significant roles in the development (Stashower, 2002). Vladimir

Zworykin and Philo Farnsworth developed television systems in the 1920s (Black & Whitney, 1988). Zworykin, while working for Westinghouse, patented an all-electronic television system in 1923. The core of it was a camera tube called the iconoscope. In 1926 he invented a receiving part he called a kinescope, and in 1928, he showed the system. At the same time Zworykin was working on his television set, Farnsworth was working on his. In 1927 Farnsworth transmitted his first picture. That same year, an experimental television program was broadcast between New York and Washington D.C. Because of arguments over patent rights and financing, it would take years for true commercial television to develop (Black & Whitney, 1988).

In 1937, even though the public did not have access to television sets, as many as 17 experimental stations were operating (Black & Whitney, 1988). DuMont Laboratories began selling all-electronic TV sets in 1938, but it was not until 1939 at the New York World's Fair that the general public saw television (Fang, 1997). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officially authorized commercial television in 1941; by 1942, there were 10 stations operating in the U.S. (Black & Whitney, 1988). In the mid-1940s, black and white TV sets were available for purchase from several manufacturers (Barnouw, 1990; Black & Whitney, 1988). Color was introduced in 1953 (Melzer, 2010), but it was not until 1965 that the public finally embraced color. That is when almost the entire NBC schedule was offered in color (Quaal & Brown, 1976).

In the 1940s and 1950s many “ignored television as just a fad” (Fang, 1997, p. 134), but history has proven the medium was much more than merely a fad. Almost 100 years after its invention, people around the world are using it on a daily basis. A television set today is relatively inexpensive and readily available most everywhere.

Network Versus Local Television

The American networks were born on May 1, 1948, “when AT&T inaugurated regular, commercial intercity transmission of television pictures” (Frank, 1991, p. 7). That day, ABC, CBS, NBC and the television receiver company DuMont, used the AT&T transmission cable to reach nine cities that had been connected. In total, there were only television stations in 18 U.S. cities at the time (Frank, 1991).

The “Big Three” television network parent companies in the U.S. are ABC, NBC and CBS. There are other successful networks today too, such as cable networks CNN and Fox. The television network parent companies provide programs to each of their affiliates, including sports, newscasts, prime time and daytime programming.

A television network is essentially a grouping of local stations, tied together to achieve a national reach. They can be either owned by or affiliated with their parent network. The stations share programming, provided by their parent network company for simulcast on a national basis. The affiliate stations are generally obligated to run the parent network’s programming during set hours, but have flexibility the rest of the time.

The parent network provides its affiliates national morning and evening newscasts. During the morning news, it is common the affiliates have five minutes for a local news cut-in every half hour. In addition, the local television stations produce their own morning and evening newscasts.

This U.S. set up is different from the traditional European set up. In Europe, television stations are generally national stations with bureaus in different locations. These bureaus provide news for a national newscast and/or do local cut-ins.

The Television Newscast

Television was “for the most part not a serious journalistic vehicle” (Kiska, 2009, p. 13), mainly because of technological problems and the entertainment focus of the medium. Television news “grew from two roots, newsreels and radio newscasts” (Fang, 1997, p. 164); early television programming was merely “televised radio” (Quaal & Brown, 1976, p. 208). It began as radio shows being “transposed to the new medium with little change” (Quaal & Brown, 1976, p. 208).

The starting point of the U.S. newscast was two 15-minute daily television programs that began at WCBW in New York in July 1941 (Conway, 2009). That was seven years prior to the emergence of network television delivery. At its inception, news was “virtually an all-male domain” (Allen, 2003, p. 154) and originally newscasts began as segmented presentations that followed “old radio news patterns” (Fang, 1972, p. 84). The news programs essentially had radio journalists merely reading the news in front of a camera, sometimes with photographs as visuals (Winston, 1993); it was news delivered orally as in radio broadcasting, but illustrated with photographs (Hutchinson, 1946). For years, newscasts continued as smaller bulletins in between entertainment programs, and often late in the evening. News was not seen as profitable.

Seven years after the start of the newscast, in 1948, Douglas Edwards was the face of the *CBS Evening News*. At NBC, John Cameron Swayze became the personality of the *Camel News Caravan* before Chet Huntley and David Brinkley took over the NBC flagship newscast in 1956. However, the newscast was still 15 minutes in length as of 1960. Many local stations carried news only to satisfy their FCC licensing requirements (Robinson & Levy, 1996) and carrying network news helped meet those requirements.

Several scholars, including Ed Bliss (1991) and Christopher Sterling and John Michael Kittross (2002), have said modern television news began in September 1963, when the first half-hour network newscasts began. It was also the year the Roper Poll first disclosed information that television was the majority's preferred news source (Quaal & Brown, 1976). The 1960s was when Cronkite became "one of the most trusted men" in America (Bliss, 1991; Sterling & Kittross, 2002) and NBC's *Huntley-Brinkley Report* fortified and rose in rating (Murray, 1995). The *Huntley-Brinkley Report* was the first big moneymaker in TV news and became a huge revenue source for NBC (Bliss, 1991).

Merely weeks after the network news expansion, the assassination of then President John F. Kennedy took place. The networks provided live coverage for four days, with no commercials by any of the three networks (Barnouw, 1990). The coverage efforts "exceeded anything ever seen before. And it included the first 'live' murder on television, the first murder ever witnessed by millions" (Barnouw, 1970, p. 228). As a result, "television critics in every city wrote in superlatives about how the medium heroically rose to the tragic occasion and how it provided public service of the highest order" (Watson, 1990, p. 226). The coverage "brought the American people together" (Sterling & Kittross, 2002, p. 407) as "American television, it was felt, had helped pull a nation together" (Barnouw, 1990, p. 337). Scholars recalled it as TV's finest hour (Bliss, 1991; Sterling & Kittross, 2002) and the Nielsen ratings were dramatic. By 11 p.m. on the day of the assassination, figures showed that 92.6 percent of the American people had seen on average almost six hours of coverage (Quaal & Brown, 1976).

Later, the extended network newscasts also allowed Americans to witness Vietnam War coverage every night, social unrest and transformation in the U.S., and

achievements in outer space (Dary, 1974; Hunter & Gross, 1980). The networks became good at “instant specials – partly news, partly documentary, and partly special events real time coverage” (Quaal & Brown, 1976, p. 225) when large events occurred.

“In the early days – the 1950s and ’60s – newscasters were typically white males with deep voices” (Green, Lodato, Schwalbe & Silcock, 2016, p. 171). At the network level, the first male and female anchor team – Harry Reasoner and Barbara Walters – did not appear until 1976. They anchored *ABC Evening News* together for only two years (Bliss, 1991). Americans became attuned to a “pantheon of individuals” (Matusow, 1983, p. 1) that anchored and presented the news and “anchors were superstars of TV news” (Westin, 1982, p. 122). It was broadcasting reared by “earnest men we have learned to respect and trust, of Cronkite, [Eric] Sevareid, Huntley, Brinkley, [Howard K.] Smith” (Fang, 1968, p. 8). The expansion of the newscast was because of the talents, trust and determination of the network television news professionals (Edgerton, 2009).

While the “friendly” news format that can be seen today has its roots in local television news, and came about largely thanks to news consultants in the 1970s, as early as 1955 the networks called for surveys and viewer opinions to find out what the audience wanted. At the closing session of the 1955 National Association of Radio and Television Broadcaster’s convention, then CBS head Dr. Frank Stanton “offered to have his concern finance an impartial and comprehensive study into what the public ‘wants’ from television” (Shuster, 1955, para. 4). Stanton furthermore stated “we owe it to our audience, as well as to ourselves, to try to establish some systematic method of inviting the public to participate in shaping what we do” (as cited by Shuster, 1955, para. 8).

At the local level in the early 1960s, TV was a class-conflicted medium (Allen, 2005). While the highly educated treated the television set, or “idiot box” as beneath them, the working class “purchased TV sets by the million” (Warner, 1962, p. 5). It was the center of life for the middle majority in the U.S. They loved entertainment programs, but news did not cater to their needs. With news, preferences were divided along class lines (Coleman, 1983). The middle majority had different values from those in the social strata above them; they wanted television that was easy to understand. Television at the time was not a mass medium. It had a “medium of record” structure that fit the upper-middle class, but not the middle majority (Glick & Levy, 1962). It catered to the “elite” which meant 70 percent of television viewers were virtually ignored (Allen, 2005).

When the FCC introduced a new policy called community ascertainment – basically calling for audience research – things changed in terms of look, content and news delivery. The FCC essentially gave the public a voice in what aired on TV (Bishop & Hakanen, 2002). Broadcasters were forced to seek public input; this research requirement effectively gave birth to the news consulting profession (Allen, 2001).


In societies with large populations, there is always some type of a social status system, with some in higher and some in lower positions; “social class permeates all parts of our existence” (Warner, Meeker & Eells, 2006, p. 84). Every aspect of life is “directly or indirectly influenced by our class order” (Warner, Meeker & Eells, 2006, p. 70). Furthermore, it is a “factor in the kinds of skills, abilities and intelligence an individual uses to solve his problems” (Warner, Meeker & Eells, 1960, p. vi).

The “peopleization” of news began with sociology scholar Lloyd Warner and his American system of social class diamond-shaped model. The model had six social classes

(Coleman, 1983; Warner & Lunt, 1941), or three basic strata with each being divided into an upper and lower level, thus making it six levels (Nash & Calonico, 1993).

The model included the upper-upper class, the lower-upper class, the upper-middle class, the lower-middle class, the upper-lower class and the lower-lower class (Nash & Calonico, 1993). The upper-upper class was people born into and raised with wealth, while the lower-upper class was “new money,” meaning people who had become rich within their own lifetime. The upper-middle class was high salaried professionals, the lower-middle class was lower paid professionals but not manual laborers, and the upper-lower class was blue-collar workers and manual laborers. The upper-lower class has also been referred to as the “working class.” The last category was what Warner called the lower-lower class. They were permanently unemployed and/or homeless. Sometimes they were referred to as the “working poor” (Warner, Meeker, & Eells, 1960).

Figure 1



Warner isolated what he called the “middle majority” - essentially 70 percent of the lower-middle and upper-lower class Americans with a high school education, similar incomes, occupations and lifestyles. The middle majority did not understand news and found it boring, especially network news. Furthermore, the upper class was virtually oblivious to the huge middle majority; the upper class “do not adequately understand the lives and struggles of working- and middle-class families” (Greenberg, 1996, para. 4).

To be successful, not only in making money, but also “as conveyors of common meanings to most people in America, the mass media must break through the private meanings of small groups” (Warner, 1962, p. 9). In addition, “many critics of television and other mass media forget that just to send symbols (such as programs) is insufficient; it is also necessary for the meaning of such media to be received, in order to complete the conveyance” (Warner, 1962, p. 9). Television as a technology was capable of reaching a mass audience, and television news had the potential to do that too, if the message fit larger groups of people. It needed to cater more to the masses to be successful.

Television news was not embraced by the middle majority because of its “medium of record” structure. These viewers could “talk at length about television without mentioning news programs” (Glick & Levy, 1962, p. 134-135). Good storytelling “focuses on what ordinary people care about” (Atkinson, 1994, p. 9); it was clear there was no focus on ordinary people. Research showed the middle majority lived for “quitting time” and the weekend (Allen, 2001). They found the TV set to be a status symbol and were dependent on it, frequently placing it in the living room (Blood, 1961).

In 1964, a research report on the Kennedy assassination – hailed as network news’ finest hour because of the four days of uninterrupted news coverage – was published.

Respondents described feeling like they shared the tragedy with the anchors (Allen, 2001). Cronkite had choked up, and a warm, caring newscaster made a difference to the viewers. Cronkite thus became the first network news “people’s newscaster” and “one of the most trusted men” in America (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). Television in a way provided an illusion of a conversation “between anchors on television and viewers at home, unmediated” (Melzer, 2010, p. 21) and “reporters who couldn’t ‘connect’ with viewers were a problem” (Ryan, 1999, p. 140). Television made viewers feel as though they were a party in a conversation (Zelitzer, 1990). As early as the 1950s, research showed American working class viewers had a tendency to form “friendships” with people on television (Horton & Wohl, 1956). It is a phenomenon many scholars have referred to as parasocial interaction (Giles, 2002; Grant, Guthrie, & Ball-Rokeach, 1991; Hartmann & Goldhoorn, 2011; Rubin & McHugh, 1987).

The news consultants became a conduit for what everyday people wanted (Allen, 2001). They are “important in journalism” (Allen, 2000, p. 85) because “they have given the audience a voice in the news process, which previously was intensely coveted as the sole domain for journalists” (Allen, 2000, p. 85). Warner’s research, in conjunction with audience data and news consultants, gave rise to the “peopleization” of journalism in the 1960s. This approach can now be seen in every mainstream information source across the globe. Television news today has a formula it follows of friendly personalities, visuals, sound bites, stories and useful news, and it focuses on viewers as the middle majority. There is a homogeneity in the newscast format (Matusow, 1983).

The “peopleization” of news began with a newscast concept called eyewitness news. Marshall McLuhan called eyewitness news the first format designed for television

because it made viewers a part of the action (Dominick, Wurzel, & Lometti, 1975). It was true to the immediacy of the medium, where the audience was a part of it. The audience “is not a camera eye looking at a phantasmagoria of bizarre scenes, but a very personal presence in the private homes of the nation” (McLuhan, 1971a, p. 35). The eyewitness news “format recognizes the sharing of such experience as a normal feature of our new electronic world by putting a warm personal dialogue at the centre of news processing” (McLuhan, 1971a, p. 35).

McLuhan (1971b) called the format a “friendly teamness” news style and said it was better than newspaper and radio style because it did not separate the content from the audience. The public is not a spectator and “the ‘friendly teamness’ news style is a recognition of the need in this new TV time to translate all the old ‘hot’ and ‘hard’ news into low key, involving the banter of interplay and recognition” (McLuhan, 1971b, p. 15). This “‘friendly teamness’ news style is a wholly new ball game in a brand new ball park” (McLuhan, 1971a, p. 35).

Soon after eyewitness news was developed, another concept called action news entered the television arena. Because ratings and profit ruled American television, stations and consultants were not afraid to use key concepts that worked, and eventually, the two styles merged into the newscast that can be seen all over the world today.

Eyewitness News

There are two main developers of the eyewitness news concept – the consultancy company McHugh & Hoffman, and news director turned consultant, Al Primo. Peter McHugh and Philip Hoffman formed McHugh & Hoffman in 1962 and that is the year news consultancy was invented (Powers, 1978). McHugh & Hoffman teamed up with one

of the largest U.S. broadcasting companies at the time, Storer Broadcasting. It was the first time a local broadcaster and an outside research-consultant had joined forces (Allen, 2001). McHugh & Hoffman worked with sociologist Lloyd Warner and his company Social Research, Inc. Social Research provided the actual research and McHugh & Hoffman was essentially a sales division. They used their work with Storer and the FCC community ascertainment rules to pitch other clients in the television news business.

An important turning point in local television news came when McHugh & Hoffman introduced audience research in the newsroom (Allen, 2005). They used focus groups and field surveys to find out what people wanted, to get people to define what they believed “good” journalism was. The first step was to cater to a mass audience. While media scholars sometimes talk about the “lowest common denominator,” sociologists talk about the “bottom” groups.

Viewer recall of television news stories is enhanced by visuals (Graber, 1990). McHugh & Hoffman found that viewers liked the visuals of a newscast; thus they recommended content for which there were no pictures should not be shown. Viewers disliked discussions about politics, but they loved weather because they saw it as news they could use. Television news is an ongoing process, “thus weather has become a major news form since TV. Weather has no final edition. It is also an ongoing process like a talk show. Weather is always top news because it is an environment that includes everybody”(McLuhan, 1971a, p. 35). The audience wanted smiling anchors that were like the people next door, and they wanted news in a conversational style they could understand (Allen, 2001). There are characteristics that influence the popularity of a news

personality, including voice and speech, professional attributes, personal appeal and appearance (Shosteck, 1973).

The concept of the eyewitness news format started in 1955 already, when Al Primo went on assignment and a cameraman forgot a crucial piece of equipment and could not record the audio portion. When b-roll was needed, Primo stepped into the shots. It gave Primo an aha-moment - showing he was on location, an eyewitness to the event (Primo, 2008).

Primo officially began his version of eyewitness news in 1965 at Philadelphia's KYW (Casella, 2013). He used a four-person anchor team - two anchors, one weather and one sportsperson. Primo found a loophole in the union contract that meant he did not have to pay staff to go on the air, something that was the norm at the time. He used everyone and gave them beats to cover. Reporters were forced to do standups to show they were eyewitnesses. In addition, Primo put a set in the newsroom and added theme music, graphics, and moving cameras. Primo also used "data banks" – static news scrolls – that teased upcoming stories. The eyewitness news concept was a team effort because all newsroom staff got involved (Primo, 2008).

ABC saw what Primo was doing in Philadelphia and brought him to WABC in New York to help increase the station's competitiveness. In 1968, WABC's Eyewitness News premiered with a sophisticated set and musical theme. The main anchor introduced reporters, who in turn introduced their stories. Then the main anchor asked follow-up questions. Theme music played at the end.

The most unusual feature of the concept was the visibility of women and minorities (Allen, 2001). Primo's hiring practices made him a champion of social change

(Rivera & Paisner, 1992). WABC also used mic flags, circle 7 logos, matching blazers and in-house sophisticated promotions (Allen, 2001).

McHugh & Hoffman's breakthrough came in 1968 (Ponce De Leon, 2015; Powers, 1978). That is when they joined Primo at WABC and thus the eyewitness news concept. According to Primo, McHugh & Hoffman were brought in by ABC and made a lot of recommendations in their first report. But, Primo felt their recommendations would have killed the eyewitness news concept so he did not adopt them. McHugh & Hoffman came back later with a second report, praising the concept (Primo, 2008).

The main notion of eyewitness news centered around the viewer preferring "to invite friendly, outgoing people into his home, people who obviously like each other, and can take some of the sting out of the usual catalogue of daily troubles which form so much of our news" (Fang, 1972, p. 85). Surveys indicated a very strong response for the eyewitness news format (Fang, 1972).

Action News

Frank N. Magid entered the television market in 1970 (Fox, 2010). He had a Ph.D. in sociology and had trained under a protégé of Lloyd Warner. Magid was "one of the most influential people in the development of local television news" (Ryan, 1999, p. 139). His first work in television was a local Cedar Rapids, Iowa, station. The FCC's ascertainment requirements are what propelled Magid into television, as there was assurance of ample work for years to come (Allen, 2001).

Initially, Magid only did the data gathering, which was different from McHugh & Hoffman who used Social Research, Inc. for their data gathering. McHugh & Hoffman touted not being the ones doing the research as a strength, highlighting it in a 1974

advertisement in *Broadcasting* by stating “our company consults *only*. We secure the finest research we can find, from the country’s leading social scientists, to gather our background facts. But research isn’t our primary business” (para. 3). Nevertheless, Magid ultimately became larger than McHugh & Hoffman, with more clients.

Magid’s action news format premiered on Philadelphia’s WFIL in 1970 (Fox, 2010). The defining characteristics of action news were its abundance of short news stories and rapid-fire pace. Stories had sound bites that were no longer than ten seconds and quick cut video clips. There were as many as three stories every 60 seconds (Ponce De Leon, 2015). Action news emphasized “co-anchors who chatted between stories, fast-paced graphics, sports tickers and live shots” (Sullivan, 2010, para. 1).

Magid hired reporters who were first generation television reporters and a young news team. The newscast had a musical theme and used promotions. Magid’s Philadelphia experience was the greatest ratings expansion, network or local, in the history of television news (Allen, 2001). WFIL was the highest rated major market newscast for almost 30 years. Magid was also closer connected to action news than McHugh & Hoffman had been to eyewitness news.

In 1976, Magid was “the pre-eminent broadcast news consultant in the United States. He was Number One because his stations moved up in the ratings...” (Powers, 1978, p. 78). Magid “perfected the business of news consultancy” (Powers, 1978, p. 122) and was called the “supremo” (Karpf, 1985, para 2).

Format Merger and Today’s Newscast

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many stations found the newscast to be their most profitable - and thus most important - operation (Loch, Christopher, & Morris,

1970). With news profitable, “news directors discover they no longer are considered heads of parasite departments” (Loch, Christopher & Morris, 1970, p. 18). In the early 1970s, “consulting firms for television news recreated the patterned, packaged formats that dominated radio in the ‘Top-40s’ heyday of the 1950s” (Quaal & Brown, 1976, p. 176).

News is a copycat business and people use what works for ratings (Primo, 2008). Eventually eyewitness news and action news merged and no one could distinguish between them (Allen, 2001). It became the fast-paced personality-driven newscast that exists today. The fusion of the concepts was clear by 1976 already (Allen, 2001). In the 1980s, this hybrid news earned local broadcasters huge profits and many stations expanded their newscasts (Ponce De Leon, 2015).

News Consultants

Essentially “news consultants are applied research firms which use information gathered in surveys, focus groups and auditorium screenings to structure television newscasts” (Allen, 1996, p. 320). News consultants generally had multi-year contracts with stations, doing a combination of advising and research. The data they gathered in the field helped them make recommendations “aimed at helping client newsrooms maximize their share of the audience and, in turn, profitability” (Allen, 2000, p. 86).

By the late 1980s, virtually all stations in the top 100 U.S. television markets used consultants. What eventually “became news consulting started as a mandate of the FCC and was shaped by FCC concerns about the proper assessment of the public’s ‘interest, convenience, and necessity’” (Allen, 1996, p. 321). Starting in the 1960s, the FCC “sought to gradually respond to technological innovation in the communications

industry” (Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006, p. 6), while at the same time affirm “its commitment to the public interest standard” (Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006, p. 6).

In 1960, the FCC released its first audience research requirements, “community ascertainment” (Allen, 1996, p. 321). It was officially named the “1960 Programming Policy Statement”¹ (Avery, 1977; DeLuca, 1976; Krasnow & Goodman, 1998; Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006) and it listed major requirements necessary to meet public interest (Krasnow & Goodman, 1998). It required broadcasters applying for a new license or renewal to discuss what measures they had taken to determine the “tastes, needs and desires” (Krasnow & Goodman, 1998, p. 616) of their service areas. It also needed to include a plan for how they aimed to meet those needs (Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006).

The 1960 Policy Statement essentially “promoted the public from casual advisor to required consultant” (DeLuca, 1976, p. 61). While the policy obligated broadcasters to meet community needs with programming, “it did not recommend specific procedures to effectively delineate community needs” (DeLuca, 1976, p. 62). The rules were so unclear that most stations merely went to a few “community leaders” and asked what programs they wanted on air (Avery, 1977). Sometimes the responses were so ambiguous or general that they were of little value and “for all practical purposes, the initial ascertainment process was regarded as a meaningless exercise by virtually everyone involved” (Avery, 1977, p. 139).

Because the “1960 Programming Policy Statement” had left many questions (DeLuca, 1976), in 1968 the FCC came out with their “Ascertainment of Community

¹ FCC, “Report and Statement of Policy re: Commission en Banc Programming Inquiry (the 1960 Programming Policy Statement)”, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960).

Needs by Broadcast Applicants”² (Avery, 1977; DeLuca, 1976; Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006). It provided more guidelines, a formalized process, and stated “a broadcaster may hire a professional survey organization or use lower-level employees under management supervision to conduct the study” (DeLuca, 1976, p. 67). It “increased the formality of the ascertainment process and it made it clear that the identification of community needs and the public’s programming preferences were two entirely different matters” (Avery, 1977, p. 140). But the 1968 regulation left broadcasters upset. They now had to keep a file readily available for the public to view (Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006). The public file scared broadcasters because anyone could now inspect their file, including those hoping to challenge the license. A “license revocation was nothing short of the TV death penalty. Without a license, a broadcaster had to go out of business” (Allen, 1996, p. 327). In addition, the FCC stated it would do on-site file inspections, without prior announcement of their visits (Allen, 1996).

Thus in 1971, the FCC published an “ascertainment primer,” officially called “Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants”³ (Avery, 1977; DeLuca, 1976; Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006). The primer’s “purpose was to increase the responsiveness of a broadcast applicant to the needs to its proposed service area” (DeLuca, 1976, p. 55). Now broadcasters were required to conduct interviews with community leaders and the general public at least six months before the application was

² FCC, “Ascertainment of community needs by broadcast applicants,” 33 Fed. Reg. 12133, F.C.C. 68-8473 (1968).

³ FCC, “Primer on ascertainment of community problems by broadcast applicants,” 36 Fed. Reg. 4092, 27 F.C.C. 2d. 650 (1971).

due. However, it did not specify how many people had to be interviewed, if they had to be face-to-face, or if telephone interviews were enough (Allen, 1996).

The “ascertainment primer” required broadcasters to know the demographic makeup of their area (Avery, 1977). They also had to create a list of major community concerns, identify the issues the station could focus on, and compile a list of programming that would address it (DeLuca, 1976; Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006). The primer stated a professional survey organization could be hired to conduct the research (DeLuca, 1976); the primer thus endorsed professional research (Allen, 2001).

Several inquiries were opened in 1973 to resolve lingering questions. The broadcasting renewal application form was updated and an annual reporting form was created. Licensees also became required to compile a list of the top ten most significant problems that existed in their community during the prior year and identify programming in response to those.⁴ Furthermore, they had to every 15 days broadcast “public notices inviting comments about station performance” (Avery, 1977, p. 141).

In 1975 a revised primer⁵ came out that dropped the 6-month requirement and specified the public file with information could be gathered on a continuous basis (Zarkin & Zarkin, 2006). Broadcasters liked this revised primer because it allowed for “more efficient procedures for community ascertainment” (Avery, 1977, p. 143). Then, in 1981, the FCC eliminated the community ascertainment requirements (Allen, 1996; Zarkin &

⁴ FCC, “Formulation of rules and policies relating to the renewal of broadcast licenses,” 43 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1973).

⁵ FCC, “Ascertainment of community problems by broadcast applicants (primer),” 41 Fed. Reg. 1371, 55 F.C.C. 2d 298 (1975).

Zarkin, 2006) for radio. In 1984 it dropped them for television⁶ as well. It meant the first steps in deregulation of U.S. television.

News consultancy peaked in the 1990s. At that time, 75 percent of stations in the U.S. had consulting contracts (Allen, 2005). Most media outlets today are owned by conglomerates with their own research departments (Allen, 2005) and audience research has spread from television to radio, newspapers and magazines. When “the American consultancy business reached near-saturation levels at home and began to generate a level of domestic odium, some of its more prominent practitioners sought new clients abroad” (Atkinson, 1994, p. 4). As the U.S. market dried up, the consultants spread the American television news model abroad, first to Canada, then Europe, Asia and Latin America.

Much of the expansion of news consultancy has been because of foreign governments allowing private media outlets. As that has occurred “news consultants have been among the chief beneficiaries, their expertise in demand throughout Europe, many parts in Latin America, and all round the Asian Pacific Rim” (Allen, 2000, p. 84). Without a “loosening of government controls on the media” (Allen, 2000, p. 89), there would have been no reason for European media outlets to seek American expertise.

Most news consulting is a two-stage event (Allen, 2007). After compiling data on newscast content and presentation, consultants work with news directors to implement plans. The consultants have denied a direct editorial influence, stating they provided recommendations and clients were not obligated to follow them. The recommendations

⁶ FCC, “The revision of programming and commercialization, policies, ascertainment requirements and program log requirements for commercial television stations (Deregulation Report and Order),” 49 Fed. Reg. 33588, 94 F.C.C. 2d 678 (1984).

“come about only after there has been assembled all the possible facts that research can uncover in a given market” (McHugh & Hoffman, 1974, para. 1).

Typically several recommendations were postponed or ignored, but studies show topics such as government and politics were de-emphasized in favor of weather, crime, human interest, and “news you can use” types of stories (Hardman, 1990; Maier, 1986; Peale & Harmon, 1991). The “news you can use” allowed “local stations to serve the ‘public interest’ while also boosting ratings” (Ponce De Leon, 2015, p. 138). The large recommendations were usually implemented because otherwise it defeated the purpose of paying money for the consulting service (Allen, 2001). Consultants in their research do review content and advocate topics that will draw viewers, thus maximizing profits for clients (Berkowitz, Allen & Beeson, 1996).

While some argued “news consultants were conduits connecting local TV stations to the majority of average television viewers” (Allen, 1996, p. 321), there were plenty of vocal critics. Then *CBS News* President Richard Salant was one, stating in a speech to affiliates (Hamilton, 2004) that “news judgment ... can’t be delegated outside the news organization” (Salant Meets Critics Head-On in Los Angeles, 1974, p. 53). Salant also said news needs to tell people what they ought to know, not what they want to know (Ponce de Leon, 2015; Powers, 1978), and television journalism should not be confused with show business (Buzenberg & Buzenberg, 1999). In addition to Salant, then *ABC News* executive Av Westin said local stations had an operative based around “what sells is good” (Westin, 1982, p. 208). He felt local news was too preoccupied with graphic, visual stories that are easy to present.

CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite was another critic. In a speech to CBS affiliates, Cronkite stated station operators had “been sold a bill of goods, that they’ve been made suckers for a fad: editing by consultancy” (Cronkite, 1976, p. 24). He said “there is no evidence that this formula news broadcasting works” (p. 24), adding it may produce a temporary advantage, but it also produces too large of a turnover of anchors and news directors to be successful. At the same time Cronkite spoke those words though, CBS at the local level had a massive commitment to news consulting.

Pulitzer Prize winning television critic Ron Powers (1978) argued “the biggest heist of the 1970s was the five o’clock news. The salesmen took it. They took it away from the journalists, slowly, patiently, gradually, and with such finesse that nobody noticed until it was too late” (p. 1). News had ceased to serve the public and had a primary allegiance to advertisers; when consultants brought market research into the newsroom, it changed the definition of American journalism. While examining a Chicago newscast in 1976 – Channel 7’s Eyewitness News - Powers (1977) found it followed a blueprint for the eyewitness news model, being “a glib, delicious, but empty newscast – a Twinkie of the airwaves” (p. 21). He referred to the format in general as “cybernetic, modular Twinkies of the airwaves” (Powers, 1977, p. 17) and argued “the hoax is made more insidious by the fact that very few TV news watchers are aware of what information is left out of a newscast to make room for the audience-building gimmicks and pleasant repartee” (Powers, 1977, p. 23).

One of the most vocal critics was Marvin Barrett, the director of the Alfred I. du Pont-Columbia University Survey and Awards in Broadcast Journalism, who argued, “the country is dotted with casualties of the consultants” (Barrett, 1973, p. 17). Furthermore,

in a book called “Moments in Truth?,” and especially in a chapter called “The Trojan Horse,” Barrett argued against the consultants, using a remark from Ralph Renick, then the news vice president at a station in Miami, Florida. Renick described the consultants as “a Trojan horse. They roll it in and suddenly the enemy troops are in your camp” (as cited in Barrett, 1975, p. 97). Barrett (1975) was the first to publish information to show a “blueprint” in regards to how the consultants operated within a newsroom.

Critics argued consultants provided a “variety of eccentric anti-journalistic developments that characterized local news operations” (Barrett & Sklar, 1980, p. 58). These included items such as “matching blazers and haircuts, fancy sets, and shorter and softer news items. Anchor people of both sexes were more conspicuous for the brightness of their smiles and the clarity of their skin than for similar qualities in their journalistic prose” (Barrett & Sklar, 1980, p. 58-59) and “quality local news, thanks in part to the influence of the consultants, remained the exception rather than the rule” (Barrett & Sklar, 1980, p. 61). It is the “perfect news show for people who can’t stand news...if no news is good news, ‘Eyewitness News’ is the best news show on the air” (Morgenstern, 1971, p. 9).

One symptom of “happy talk” was described as “the inordinate amount of yakking it up between anchors, sports reporter, and whoever is doing the weather” (Bliss, 1990, p. 459). The news format brought essentially a competition in wishing viewers well. They were now being told to have a good week, a good night, and a good day (Newman, 1983) and “the ‘happy-talk’ or ‘chitchat’ format of the New Electronic Journalism giggles its way to apocalypse” (Leonard, 1971, p. 12). Local news was called “Eye-Witless News” and “Malapropaganda,” and described as the “process by which

incompetence is converted into cuteness” (Leonard, 1971, p. 12). Producers select stories, not because those stories are designed to serve the audience, but because they are designed to attract the audience (Hart, 1988). There are pressures of audience ratings, and “even in the most independent sectors of journalism, ratings have become the journalist’s Last Judgment” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 251).

Critics argued local television was going tabloid and a “new sensationalism is sweeping the airwaves as once-sedate network affiliates highlight sex and violence in search of big ratings” (Kurtz, 1993, para. 6). The “tabloid virus” (Briller, 1993, p. 60) showed up on nightly newscasts, including network news. The show business aspect of ratings-conscious news was condemned. “Some people in the television business believe that television news is for people who don’t want to be bothered with the news. And this is what has created the demand for gimmicks and window dressing in our business” (Miller, 1977, para. 2). The eyewitness news concept was said to be trivial (Morgenstern, 1971) and the consultants go for “more of the qualities of an air steward, promising a smooth flight, than a journalist” (Karpf, 1985, para 9). There have been many critics of both eyewitness news and action news and the development of television news (Carmody, 1977; Czerniejewski & Long, 1974; Deeb, 1974; Diamond, 1975; Grossman, 1997; Henninger, 1975; O'Connor, 1974; Steinmetz, 1975; Townley, 1974).

In 1979, the same year Margaret Thatcher came to power in the United Kingdom, most of the criticism related to eyewitness news and action news had faded. At that time, a large study by graduate students in broadcast journalism at The American University surveyed 700 local newsrooms in the U.S. The research showed that over half of the newsrooms used consultants. The survey also indicated news directors felt consultants

were now an integral part of television news (School of Communication, The American University, 1980). While consultants could create anxiety for the anchors, “the skills they teach are valued by the modern television industry” (Bock, 1986, abstract).

Despite the initial criticism, the American news format as developed by the consultants thrived. Because of the high ratings and success, their formula rapidly spread from the United States to other parts of the world.

European Television History

In the U.S., television has always been about making money (Brown, 1971; Cushion, 2012; Tuchman, 1974). Commercial television sees viewers as consumers of a product (Hoynes, 1999); television is a medium “designed to primarily move goods” (Powers, 1978, p. 6). U.S. television is “tailored almost exclusively to fit the market needs of the consumer goods producers who sponsor and finance the programming. The program material is designed especially to secure and hold mass audiences in thrall to the delights of consumerdom” (Schiller, 1992, p. 156). In commercial broadcasting even the purpose of news “is to attract the most and right kind of viewers, for revenues derived from the sale of advertisements which accompany the newscast” (Roberts & Dickinson, 1984, p. 392). It comes down to “the battle for ratings, which reflect national audience allegiances and the status of affiliated stations” (Smith, 1977, p. 148). There is an obsession with figuring out how to sell products and a large movement across many industries to use social scientists and their data for selling purposes (Packard, 1957).

This race for ratings and selling products has traditionally not been the case with European television. In addition, American local television has always been extremely competitive with at least three stations in direct competition in most markets (Atkinson,

1994). The set up in the U.S. is different from the European market, but things changed in the 1990s with the privatization and commercialization movement. All of a sudden public assets, including television stations, were being sold to the highest bidder (Feigenbaum, 2009). It affected all aspects of European broadcasting.

In Europe, broadcasting has historically been a monopoly, governed by public service broadcasting (Servaes & Wang, 1997), indirectly or directly operated by the government (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). In most countries in Western Europe, it followed the UNESCO definition of Public Service Broadcasting: “broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for the public. It is neither commercial nor state-owned, free from political interference and pressure from commercial forces” (UNESCO, n.d.).

UK Television History

Surprisingly, broadcasting in the UK began as a commercial enterprise. In December 1922, the British Broadcasting Company was registered (Briggs, 1961) and it was started by six radio manufacturers in an effort to sell radio receivers (Paulu, 1956; Schlesinger, 1978; Wilson, 1961). While it was a commercial organization, it was subject to “exceptional rules and restrictions” (Briggs, 1979a, p. 49). John Reith, the first director general of the BBC, said the role of the broadcaster was to provide information both free from the government and commercial pressures (Reith, 1924). He argued it was imperative it remained in a public service role, meaning “the Company is not out to make money for the sake of making money” (Reith, 1924, p. 57). While direct advertising was banned by the government, “sponsors might finance programmes in exchange for having their names mentioned” (Wilson, 1961, p. 19).

The British Broadcasting Company began having financial difficulties and a committee was appointed to examine the situation. The committee did not recommend a public monopoly, but did state, “public control over broadcasting was essential” (Wilson, 1961, p. 20). This resulted in the British Broadcasting Company becoming the British Broadcasting Corporation and being established as a public entity in January 1927 (Wilson, 1961), starting a long tradition of public service.

The “British structure of public service broadcasting has been a model for systems developed around the world” (Henningham & Delano, 1998, p. 143). In the UK, the BBC has been funded through license fees paid by British citizens (Kishan Thussu, 2007). This ensured that “at least in theory, programme makers do not have to chase ratings and can make quality programmes which ‘inform, educate and entertain’ in that order” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 7).

The BBC established a radio news department in 1934 (Winston, 1993). Two years later, it began television transmission (Fang, 1997; Hartley, 1999; Kishan Thussu, 2007). John Reith, the BBC’s director general, then regarded television as an “unnecessary distraction from the real business of radio” (Barnett, 2011, p. 21). One of British television’s pre-war successes was the coverage of the coronation process of George VI in 1937 (Conboy, 2004). However, on September 1, 1939, the BBC closed down its television service “without any attempt to televise the news having been undertaken” (Winston, 1993, p. 185). BBC’s news broadcasting during World War II was “exceedingly limited in its time and resources” (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 14) and was an “instrument of state information policy” (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 14).

The BBC's television service did not re-start until 1946 (Garnham, 1983; O'Malley, 1994). It was then the BBC began "making a wider use of the medium for journalism" (Conboy, 2004, p. 197). Newsreels were used to provide information and that continued until 1953. That year Queen Elizabeth II's coronation forced a re-evaluation. The coronation was "the point where television first demonstrated its abilities as a national medium" (Jacobs, 2003, p. 71); it was UK television's large coming of age event (Briggs, 1979b). Cameras were inside Westminster Abbey and subsequently the audience "could feel that it was participating as well as watching" (Briggs, 1979b, p. 457). For the first time in history, a British monarch was truly crowned "in sight of all the people" (Briggs, 1979b, p. 457). Citizens bought TV sets just to be able to view the coronation, cameras were set up all over London, and it was "BBC's biggest-ever outside broadcast at the time" (BBC, 2015, para. 7). Over 20 million people watched, with each television set being viewed by an average of nine people (BBC, 2017).

The coronation marked a turning point in British television history. It resulted in "British television's first live, that is radio-style, news which came, voice only over caption, at the end of each day's transmission, starting in March 1953" (Winston, 1993, p. 206). In July 1954, this radio-style news was joined with a newsreel on a daily, early evening basis – the BBC Television News and Newsreel (Winston, 1993). That month and year also marked the passing of the Independent Television Act.

Originally, the BBC downplayed the possibilities of the visual aspects of television. That included the newscaster role (Conway, 2014a). From 1946 to 1954, TV news was focused on words and "suspicious of any personalization of news, particularly through presenters on screen" (Conboy, 2004, p. 197). The evening news was "simply the

radio news announced by an anonymous voice, the reader off-camera, with a photograph of Big Ben, the only visual element” (Conboy, 2004, p. 197). The newscaster was a “newsreader” and news was “composed of scripts spoken by a newsreader, which are written to film, videotape, still photographs, maps, diagrams and other visual symbols” (Schlesinger, 1978, p. 56). With the introduction of Independent Television, and thus competition, things changed and the newscaster became more of a personality (Barnett, 2011; Hartley, 1999). In addition, while the European tradition had been to have a rotating newscaster, they are now generally following a more traditional American model with a permanent news anchor (Allen, 1997; Bourdon, 2000).

In July 1954, a bill creating the Independent Television Authority (ITA) became law. ITA was “modeled on the BBC’s Board of Governors” (O’Malley, 1994, p. ix). This in turn meant the beginning of Independent Television and effectively ended “the monopoly of broadcasting which the British Broadcasting Corporation had sustained for twenty-seven years” (Wilson, 1961, p. 13). Some called the process a “military-styled push for commercial television” (Jenkins, 1961, p. 19). The debates about breaking up the BBC’s television monopoly were “protracted and bitter” (Briggs, 1995, p. 3). Some argued the public had not been allowed a say, “there was no public demand for the introduction of a commercial system” (Wilson, 1961, p. 16) and “commercial television produces audiences not programmes” (Curran & Seaton, 1981, p. 232). Many did not want television viewing interrupted by advertisements, but were largely ignored (Jenkins, 1961). “This innovation seemed to many a long step in the direction of ‘Americanization’ of British society, and it was taken by the Party representing those who had been most vehement in condemning American (i.e. vulgar) influence” (Wilson, 1961, p. 16).

Many of the “official histories of British broadcasting have depicted the emergence and impact of ITV in rather damning tones, as a chronology of populist programs catering to the lowest common denominator” (Wheatley, 2003, p. 76). ITV did offer something the BBC did not – a way to address viewers on a more regional basis (Wheatley, 2003). ITV was organized as a “number of separate companies broadcasting to discrete regions of the country” (O’Malley, 1994, p. ix), and “designed to compete with the London-centric and metropolitan bias of the BBC” (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p. 1). Some argued how these broadcast regions were initially set up did not make cultural sense, only financial sense (Curran & Seaton, 1981); “the regionalism of commercial television appears less firmly rooted in popular needs than in the convenience of the market” (Curran & Seaton, 1981, p. 237).

The UK launched the first commercial broadcast late in 1955 (Hartley, 1999; Jacobs, 2003; Johnson & Turnock, 2005; Wheatley, 2003; Wilson, 1961) but it was not till mid-1958 that the coverage reached some 80 percent of British citizens (Briggs, 1985). It needed “the arrival of commercial television to generate the innovations which lifted television news into its own as a journalistic medium” (Conboy, 2004, p. 198). Also in 1955, Independent Television News was set up to supply news coverage to all the ITV regions. ITN can be described like an American network providing news programming to affiliates, in this case Independent Television franchises.

Independent Television affiliates right away set out to produce “‘telegenic’ news which led to an increasing use of filmed, on-location reporting and the presence in the studio of an authoritative journalistic newscaster, offering comment on the day’s events” (Wheatley, 2003, p. 78). The BBC, with its radio heritage, had a heavy talk emphasis.

Because Independent Television did not have that background, they were at an advantage for television. As early as the beginning of ITN in 1955, an almost American-style anchor could be seen – a journalist reading his own text, coming back on air every evening (Sendall, 1982). This created a familiarity for the viewers. The editor-in-chief at the time “was determined to introduce ‘personalities’ into news presentation” (Briggs, 1985, p. 306). However, it was the BBC that three weeks before ITN’s first transmission, “had shown its news readers’ faces on screen for the first time” (Wheen, 1985, p. 72).

The BBC originally “fought against its television newsreaders appearing on screen at all” (Lindley, 2005, p. 20). When they finally did, they were not identified (Lindley, 2005; Sendall 1982) “to ensure that no element of subjectivity in presentation might impair the objectivity which was the pride of the BBC” (Sendall, 1982, p. 123). In addition, the BBC did not “allow its newscasters, however, to adopt such a personal tone as that of ITV” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 64). A permanent newscaster is the American format and many Europeans were trying to imitate their American counterparts (Bourdon, 2000).

In the 1970s, ITN’s presenter Alistair Burnet and producer David Phillips travelled to the U.S. to analyze the American anchor role. They went “to see in particular how the great CBS front-man Walter Cronkite managed to present his programme with the wonderful blend of cosiness and authority that had made him the nation’s favourite newscaster” (Lindley, 2005, p. 258). The term “Cronkytization” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 70) is associated with *CBS Evening News* anchor Walter Cronkite. News presenters in Europe were not journalists originally and “Cronkytization” signified the shift to the American model with the same presenter night after night and where the presenter was a journalist. The term also indicated someone who did not merely read the news, but was involved in

the process, many times someone who had, like Cronkite did, a managing editor title or some similar high ranking title. The American news anchor model was “the common model which was massively imported by most countries in Europe” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 71).

Unlike the BBC, ITV outlets could carry advertising and it opened “a crucial market for American advertisers and their agents” (Barnouw, 1970, p. 108). The commercialization is said to have been organized by the U.S. company J. Walter Thompson advertising agency’s London branch, together with members of the British Parliament. In order to achieve commercial television, the group attacked the BBC’s monopoly status more than they touted commercial advantages (Wilson, 1961). The new commercial television “brought to Britain the same sort of explosion that had taken place in the United States” (Barnouw, 1970, p. 108-109). Roy Thomson, a Canadian who was opening a television franchise in Scotland described it as “having a license to print your own money” (Braddon, 1966, p. 240.) The phrase quickly became synonymous with any organization destined to make a sure profit (Cryer, 2010). Thomson was right because there was no competition. ITV stations were the only ones allowed to sell advertising and there was only one station per region. Thomson also stated, “What is editorial content? The stuff you separate ads with” (Braddon, 1966, p. 127). Initially, commercials were limited to an average of six minutes for every hour (Brucker, 1962).

In late 1955, when Independent Television began broadcasting news bulletins, BBC had to follow suit. The bulletins from Independent Television looked a lot more natural than the BBC’s (Winston, 1993). The UK approach to bulletins “had been painstakingly developed in the U.S. since 1948” (Dugdale & Saynor, 1992, para. 8).

Virtually all genres of British television, including news, have borrowed ideas from the U.S. British program makers “are by now clinically dependent on regular fixes of (largely) American ideas” (Dugdale & Saynor, 1992, para. 20).

In 1967, ITN was the first television channel to provide 30 minutes of news when it launched *News at Ten* (Kishan Thussu, 2007). In 1972, it expanded and started a 1 p.m. newscast that in 1976 became known as *News at One* (Bourdon, 2000). In 1982, Channel 4 was established in the UK. It was advertisement based, but it retained a clear public-service mission (Kishan Thussu, 2007).

UK commercial television back then cannot be compared to today’s commercial television; many do not consider it truly commercial. The “description of Independent Television as ‘commercial’ has always been one of the glaring misnomers of the business world” (Buckingham, 1992, para. 1). The British system was not a dual system, but rather a single system with some variants (Wedell, 1968). While there were differences between the BBC and ITV, if the governing documents for both entities were to be put side by side, one would be “struck forcibly by the essentially *unitary* character of the broadcasting system in the United Kingdom” (Wedell, 1968, p. 51). It could be called a hybrid because it had a “public service broadcasting remit within a television distribution system that was commercial” (Harrison, 2005, p. 123). It was heavily regulated and had to meet “certain public-service obligations” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 23).

The Independent Television Authority drew on “notions of responsible control” (Briggs, 1979a, p. 11) when they set up commercial television. It was advertisement-driven, but operated within a regulated public service sphere. Both ITV and Channel 4 were “public-service by regulation” (Humphreys, 1996, p. 199) and had to meet tough

standards regarding program nature and quality. Furthermore, the ITA could “insist on seeing all programmes from ITV and Channel 4 before transmission and can force companies to show educational and documentary programmes at peak-viewing times” (A matter of quality and quantity, 1990, para. 4).

ITV companies were closely monitored on all matters involving procedure, ownership and programming by the ITA. The ITA had been set up as an entity modeled by the BBC’s Board of Governors (O’Malley, 1994). While the ITV franchises were privately owned, it was thus not truly commercial television. The 1988 White Paper was set up to remove all previous restrictions (Allen, 1997).

At the beginning of the 1980s, there were essentially only three television channels available to British viewers (Bonner & Aston, 1998). The 1980s and 1990s in the UK meant a lot of changes (Fitzwalter, 2008), including increased commercialization and competition. The introduction of Channel 4 in November 1982 (Ellis, 2003) changed the game too, as it stood for a redefinition of public service. It was a hybrid of public service and commercial (Hilmes, 2003) as it was forced to find its own income (Ellis, 2003). Furthermore, Thatcher’s Peacock Committee, established in 1985 had judged that the BBC should remain funded by license fees, but should move toward a more market driven system (Goodwin, 1998; O’Malley, 1994). It was what BBC called “a fundamental re-think of the long term funding of the BBC” (BBC, n.d., a, p. 3).

The Peacock Committee in its report concluded that “British broadcasting should move towards a sophisticated market system based on consumer sovereignty. That is a system which recognizes that viewers and listeners are the best ultimate judges of their own interests” (Home Office, United Kingdom, 1986, para. 592). The Peacock

Committee also said it would be good for consumers to have “the option of purchasing the broadcasting service they require from as many alternative sources of supply as possible” (Home Office, United Kingdom, 1986, para. 592).

Some saw strength in the report’s “recognition that change is needed” (Forsyth, 1986, para 12) and the direction “in which the choices of individual viewers ultimately determine the future shape of broadcasting” (Forsyth, 1986, para. 12). Others argued the Peacock Report was so flawed it “offers not something for everyone but nothing for anyone” (Fiddick, 1986, para. 5).

It took almost two and a half years from the time of the publishing of the Peacock Report, to the White Paper outlining the auction of the ITV licenses (Goodwin, 1998). The Broadcasting Act of 1990 brought changes to both the BBC and ITV. While the government confirmed the BBC as the cornerstone of British broadcasting, the company now had to show 25 percent of programs produced by independents and rights to 10 national sporting events were revoked (BBC, n.d., b). Many saw the Broadcasting Bill and the ITV auction “as a flat contradiction of the Government’s declared aim to ‘place the viewers at the centre of the broadcasting policy’” (Nigel, 1989, para. 1). Some argued money that could have gone into making better programming would now instead go straight to the government and the Treasury Department (Nigel, 1989). Others noted the Broadcasting Act did contain safeguards for quality programming, stating that “licensees must provide a diverse programme service appealing to a wide variety of taste and interest, high quality news and current affairs, and a reasonable proportion of other programmes of high quality” (Coles, 1989, para. 8).

The television developments and commercial influences put a strain on public service broadcasting in the UK. Because of the mix of commercial and public broadcasting, in order to attract audiences, public broadcasting had to become similar to American television and “this is exactly what has happened to the BBC in England” (Postman, 2000, p. 51). European television has gone from a public service monopoly, to commercial television, to an “Americanization of the format of television news” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 63). With “the pressure of commercial competition, American television was a source of inspiration and quickly influenced the British system” (Bourdon, 2000, p. 64). Essentially, “publicly funded broadcasting in an age of spectrum abundance has to work harder than ever to justify itself to the taxpayer. Money spent by the BBC is money coerced from people under legal sanction” (Ball, 2003, para. 8). There is a threat of jail if consumers do not pay their fees; critics argue “such coercion is clearly not ideal in a free society where consumers have great choice” (Ball, 2003, para. 8).

Before privatization in the 1990s, almost every European country had one or two television channels, via government-supported public service (Allen, 2001). Some local television could be seen at the community level in the mid-1980s (Lang, 2004). Generally, European television stations provided national newscasts, with occasional news reporting from bureaus in various parts of the country. If the national media outlet aired local broadcasts, it was a very short newscast, and more in line with a bulletin format. European history of local and regional television varies (De Moragas Spa & Garitaonadia, 1995). In the UK, television news is broadcast at national and regional levels (Henningham & Delano, 1998) and regional news was granted an important element early on (De Moragas Spa & Garitaonadia, 1995).

Today the UK has essentially two networks, seen from a U.S. perspective. They are the BBC and ITN/ITV. On a regional level, the BBC has 15 offices in England, as well as BBC Wales, BBC Scotland and BBC Northern Ireland. These regional offices offer news programs, generally twice a day, and a weekly current affairs program. The second network, ITV, has 15 regional license holders. Of those, all but three are owned by ITV Plc because of consolidation. In addition, Scottish Television (SVT) has licenses for two Scottish regions, and Ulster TV (UTV) owns the license for Northern Ireland (Kevin, 2015). ITN provides the national news to the ITV franchises.

It is hard to compare television achievements on a global scale and “the ‘success story’ that is written by commercial local television in the United States remains unique” (Lang, 2004, p. 162). European local television stations generally thus far have not been as successful, looking at it from a purely commercial standpoint.

Privatization

The twentieth century saw the decline of the public sector and a welcoming of privatization on a global scale. Starting in the 1980s, countries all over the world began selling their public assets, deregulating their economies and eliminating barriers to market forces (Anderson & Hill, 1996; Feigenbaum, 2009; Feigenbaum, Henig, & Hamnet, 1998). Privatization is the most common term for downsizing and restructuring of government and it is a way to transfer public assets to private entities (Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Faircloth, 2006; Hanke, 1987; Hemming & Mansoor, 1988; Starr, 1988).

The basic intent is to reduce the role of the government and governments of all ideologies can carry out privatization (Anderson & Hill, 1996). There are five main reasons that governments privatize – to downsize (to focus on what they do well), for

fiscal relief (to move away from subsidies and to receive more in taxes), for improved efficiency (to make the company more efficient), for depoliticization (from political objectives to bottom-line business objectives), and for wider ownership reasons (to encourage ownership within a wider share of the audience) (Anderson & Hill, 1996).

The idea behind privatization is that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector, mainly because of a lack of competition in the public sector (Chang, 2006). However, some public enterprises are as efficient as private sector companies (Prager, 1994). Many European public enterprises prior to the 1990s had access to government funds and operated under sheltered conditions. Reducing government gives individuals greater freedom of choice in how they spend their money (Chang, 2006). It centers on consumers knowing what he or she wants and what is best for them. There is “no better judge of needs or desires than the consuming individual, while she will exercise her choice through some form of payment mechanism” (Karamanis, 1999, p. 45). A company cannot succeed if consumers are not willing to pay for their services or products.

In regards to whom started privatization, the literature argues both Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher spearheaded efforts (Cline Horowitz, 2005; Djelic, 2006; Pierson, 1992). Reagan started to work on privatization programs early in his term (Henig, 1989) and used it as a central strategy in the 1980s (Chang, 2006). The sale of Conrail in 1987 was arguably his big official privatization program (Ang & Boyer, 2007; Henig, 1989; Letwin, 1988; Poole, 1988). He also started a commission on privatization in 1987 (Brinkley, 1987; Henig, 1989).

Privatization in Europe

There was a European movement to nationalize many items after World War II. It was a part of the Keynesian doctrine, named after British scholar John Maynard Keynes, who developed it as a way to examine and understand the Great Depression. Keynes argued that government intervention could stabilize the economy and many European countries followed this doctrine (Chang, 2006; Hall, 1989). For example, by 1946 the UK had begun nationalize major sectors of its economy, including the Bank of England (Cairncross, 1988).

In the 1970s and 1980s, an economic downturn occurred, a crisis providing justification to slow down socialism and nationalism as countries examined ways to stop the money loss. Privatization was one way to attempt a turn around, to replace Keynesian economics with free market liberalism (Chang, 2006). The hope was it would not only turn the tide, but also bring wider competition and thus consumer benefits.

Privatization was not new as it could be seen in the 1960s and 1970s in some European countries (Wright, 1994), but not much had been written about it prior to the 1980s (Iatridis, 1998). What made it significant in the 1980s and 1990s was how widespread it became and how rapid the pace was across Europe. In the 1980s, the commercial deluge hit Europe with full force (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b), even spreading to countries with socialist governments (Letwin, 1988). Privatization also worked well with the European integration movement that was well underway by the middle of the 1980s, and in full effect in 1993 (Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 1994).

The bulk of the European privatization movement took place in the mid-1990s (Chang, 2006). After the collapse of communism in 1989, Eastern Europe joined Western

Europe in the privatization movement. Soon after the communism collapse, privatization was “implemented throughout Central and Eastern Europe with varied results” (Caristi, 1996, p. 281) and the “key component in the Central and Eastern European privatization success stories has been partnerships” (Caristi, 1996, p. 283) with foreign companies.

Privatization required “the receptiveness and understanding of business leaders. Its success depends on their willingness to take risks and their faith in the future of their country” (Andic, 1990, p. 35). Privatization could only be successful when the private and public sectors collaborated in creating a political and economic atmosphere that was conducive to the privatization movement (Andic, 1990).

The particular aspect of privatization that was attractive to a country varied greatly. There were common pressures all European countries faced, but they also had specific market conditions that dictated the privatization process (Wright, 1994). Thus how privatization developed in each European country was different. The inherent flexibility is what made privatization so attractive (Letwin, 1988).

The techniques used in the privatization process were largely dictated by the goals of the process (Chang, 2006; Vuylsteke, 1988) and “the different techniques used to privatize assets affect what emerges from privatization” (Starr, 1988, p. 17). A country did not have to use merely one privatization method, but could use several methods combined or separately. The two largest categories of sale of state enterprise were telecommunications and power utilities (Anderson & Hill, 1996).

Privatization in the UK

The UK has been regarded by many as the leading innovator and undertaker of privatization (Estrin, 1991; Henig, 1989; Young, 1986). The British privatization

program influenced economic policy around the world (Bishop, Kay, & Mayer, 1994) and what Margaret Thatcher did was essentially a “privatization showcase for the world” (Goodman, 1985, p. x). Thatcher emphasized the moral dimension to privatization. Her political convictions, as well as Ronald Reagan’s convictions (Smith, 1990), viewed nationalization as wrong as it burdened the state and cost the taxpayers money. Thatcher viewed it as socialism, which to her was a form of enslavement. Through privatization, the state’s power was reduced and the power of the people was enhanced (Evans, 1997); when no one owns anything, no one cares about anything (Letwin, 1988).

Britain had had a very long history of public ownership, in particular as it relates to industry (Richardson, 1994). Going back to the impetus of the European privatization movement, while rolling back governmental power had been an element of the conservative party policy in the UK prior to Thatcher’s reign (Rees, 1994), it did not truly develop until she came into power. It was not even an official feature of the 1979 election manifesto for Thatcher’s Conservative Party (Burton, 1987). At the time she became prime minister in 1979, the UK was struggling with high interest rates, high inflation and high unemployment. The British government had its hands deep in the economy because of its ownership in various companies (Forelle, 2013). The election of Thatcher “marked a turning point in modern British politics” (Wolfe, 1991, p. 243) and it changed the “view of what constituted viable economic and political solutions” (Douglas, 1989, p. 401).

Thatcher was convinced big government was the root of the financial problems (Chang, 2006), and that privatization would bring not only a greater efficiency, but also large consumer benefits (Andic, 1990). The idea behind her privatization movement was that competition and market disciplines should be introduced to areas that had been

government-owned monopolies (Andic, 1990). Thatcher started UK privatization slowly, with the sale of public housing, allowing individual tenants to buy their homes (Andic, 1990; Forrest, 1991; Forrest & Murie, 1988; Letwin, 1988). The privatization program was highly successful; “the success of early parts of the programme, and political gains from it which may not have been fully anticipated at the outset, clearly led to its extension and intensification” (Rees, 1994, p. 45).

Privatization was a great platform for Thatcher as she was elected three times. She led the most extensive privatization program in the world (Henig, 1989; Veljanovski, 1990). Statements about the objectives of the UK privatization programs were not made officially until November 1983 (Mitchell, 1990). Between 1984 and 1991, the UK accounted for nearly one third of the total assets privatized in the world (Wright, 1994) and there were over 20 different methods and variations used for privatization of various aspects of the UK economy (Pirie, 1985). The privatization movement was accompanied by easy credit, fueling consumer spending. Living standards grew quickly and a “feel good” feeling emerged (Evans, 1997). Privatization had financial benefits and enabled pride in work and better job satisfaction (Letwin, 1988).

While Thatcher confessed to not liking the term “privatization” (Green, 2006), the movement became a recipe for success. It was not only successful, but it was also relatively easy to implement because it meant minimal social disruption (Chang, 2006). Three years after she had been elected the first time, by 1982, Thatcher had brought Great Britain out of its recession (Evans, 1997) and privatization was moving full steam ahead.

One significant privatization initiative was the sale of British Telecom. It was privatized in 1984, in a move called “privatization without competition” (Kolderie, 1990,

p. 28) because other companies were not allowed to enter the market freely to compete with it. It was described as privatization without liberalization because it had not been subjected to true competitive forces (Starr, 1990). It was successful as over 2.3 million people bought shares (Letwin, 1988).

Even with the success of Thatcher's privatization program, not everyone in the UK was positive. Former UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan accused Thatcher of selling what he referred to as the family silver (Richardson, 1994).

Television Privatization and Commercialization

Privatization and commercialization of television spread rapidly in Europe in the 1990s, but it was never done in the first wave of the privatization movement. It was generally done after the privatization of major industries, such as telecom.

Television Commercialization in the UK

While television in the United States was set up as private television from the beginning, this was not the case in the United Kingdom where the medium was heavily regulated by the government. It can be argued that privatization of British Telecom is what opened the door for the full commercialization of British television. However, it appears to have been in conjunction with the availability of new broadcasting technologies such as cable and satellite (Blumler & Hoffmann-Riem, 1992; Bragg, 1989; Ferrers, 1988; Garnham, 1983; Karamanis 1999; Negrine, 1988; O'Malley, 1994; Rowland & Tracey, 1990).

It is clear that Margaret Thatcher dramatically changed the European media landscape. Truly commercial and marketized television in Europe had not been fully considered prior to the privatization movement. It is what brought the American

influence to European television. Few countries at the time had experience with commercial television and market-based competition and that created a demand for American television news consultants (Allen, 2001).

In 1988, the process for the deregulation of British television broadcasting was outlined in a White Paper (Home Office, United Kingdom, 1988). It was described with headlines such as “Airwaves up for grabs; the White Paper on Broadcasting is the biggest bomb put under British TV in half-a-century” (Wenham, 1988). At the time, the UK had ITV and the BBC. ITV was structured like an American television network with a web of affiliates (Allen, 2001). It had been established in 1954 as an alternative to the BBC (Sterling & Kittross, 2002), was semi-commercially supported, and “the ITV audience was more working class” (Tunstall, 1977, p. 19) than the audience for up-market BBC.

The BBC did not allow advertising, leaving ITV and its franchises with a monopoly on advertising (Davidson, 1992; Rosselli, 1961; Sterling & Kittross, 2002). This in turn led to complaints about advertising prices on ITV. ITV had also become too large, with too many staff members on the payroll, leaving a “peculiar mix of public service broadcasting and public company profits that turned ITV into a Jekyll and Hyde outfit” (Davidson, 1992, p. 274). This provided conflicting values with a quality-before-ratings-ethics. Those were some of the factors that led Thatcher to examine ITV and eventually action off its broadcasting licenses to, in most cases, the highest bidder.

There was a programming quality threshold as a safeguard, so in cases deemed to have “exceptional circumstances” (Henry, 1989, para. 1), the license could be sold to someone not placing the highest bid. And that did indeed happen. Once the license winners had been announced, eight out of 16 franchise winners had won with lower bids

than their rivals so the quality threshold did come into play (Alan, 2007a). Some felt the quality test was not enough because there was “nothing to test financial fitness, investment plans, programme budgets and the rest of the economic apparatus involved in a well-run TV company” (Bell, 1989, para. 10). The old commercial television adage – ‘a license to print money’ – no longer applied after the auction. The 1990s would be more about “losing cash than printing it, as the industry pays an extra £100 million to create the new order in British commercial television” (Bell, 1991b, para. 5). The Treasury benefited some £200 million as a result of the auction (Bell, 1993).

There was concern “that several of the winners had pledged too much money to sustain strong programming” (Henry & Buckingham, 1989, para. 7). The term winner could be misleading as “we don’t know now, and we won’t know for several years, who the real winners are. Some companies may have overpaid for a license to lose money” (Laurance, 1991, para. 1). While the main concern had been Americanization of British broadcasting, the real pain was not Americanization. Instead it was the pain felt by the ITV shareholders (Buckingham, 1993).

Some argued the auction was seriously flawed and the clearest demonstration of that was that three of the regions only had one bidder – the incumbents (Fireman, 1991). Because of the auction and the government’s relaxation of the ITV rules, the Independent Television Commission was left with “a pivotal role in safeguarding viewers’ interests by ensuring ITV companies fulfill licence promises” (Culf, 1993, para. 1). The watchdog function needed to happen regardless of future franchise ownership changes (Culf, 1993).

The deadline to submit a bid in the ITV franchise auction was in May 1991 (Bell, 1991a; Henry, 1991a), but the actual results were not revealed until October. The

auctioning off of ITV was one of the most closely watched events in world broadcasting (Allen, 2001). Some headlines called it “sale of the century” (Bell, 1991b, para. 1). The BBC’s 11 a.m. news bulletin on the morning of the auction results reveal proclaimed, “the industry rumours are correct. There are spectacular casualties” (Alan, 2007b). One of the most stunning was that Thames had lost as it supplied a lot of programming to the ITV stations (Alan, 2007a; Fitzwalter, 2008). On ITN’s newscast at 5:40 p.m., anchor Carol Burns called the results “the biggest shakeup in ITV’s history” (Alan, 2007c). One of the more stunning visuals in ITN’s report showed a Thames TV cameraman covering Carlton TV’s celebration for the Thames newscast. Thames had been the incumbent and lost their franchise license to Carlton, showing “the difference in bidding was a mixture of luck, circumstances, and in some cases, clearly bad advice” (Bell, 1991b, para. 10). Prime Minister Thatcher was disappointed in the outcome, “admitting that she shares the blame for one of her favourite companies, TV-am, losing its license” (Henry, 1991b, para. 1). TV-am had been one of the franchises that had lost its license and Thatcher’s daughter Carol worked at the station (Henry, 1991b). Maps of the ITV franchises prior to and after the auction can be found in Appendix A.

It is clear some overspent for their license. Quickly after the auction, the Independent Television Commission had to grant a merger of Yorkshire and Tyne Tees (Bell, 1993) as Tyne Tees found itself in financial difficulty. Furthermore, ITV ownership rules were relaxed in 1995. It was then announced the two-license limit was to be removed and replaced with an ownership limit of a 15 percent share of the total television audience (Culf & Buckingham, 1995).

Some stated there were a total of 37 applications for the licenses (Bonner & Aston, 1998), while others said there were 40 (Brooks, 1991; Davidson, 1992). Not many know that an American consultancy firm played a part in UK television at the time of the auction – then Iowa-based Frank N. Magid Associates. They worked with 11 of the bidders, to varying degrees. When the auction was over, nine Magid clients were winners. Other companies who had won bids signed on with the American consulting firm (Allen, 2001). Furthermore, shortly after the franchise auction, Magid also worked with Independent Television News. ITN was “a consortium responsible for the news seen on the main national ITV network and its companion Channel Four” (Allen, 2001, p. 90).

The British experience was unique in many ways (Davis & Levy, 1992), mainly because the evolution of the mixed public and private system and the historically unique position of the BBC as a source of skilled labor and an industry cultural benchmark. The BBC is “recognized worldwide as the pre-eminent public broadcasting organization, and, until the development of CNN, the most valued international broadcaster” (Henningham & Delano, 1998, p. 144). Because of the UK structure, the BBC had been placed in a stronger position than public service systems in other countries (Davis & Levy, 1992). The BBC does not operate under the same commercial pressures that ITV does, although the BBC does have to “maintain high viewing figures in order to justify its license fee” (Wilson, 2005, p. 160).

American media historian Craig Allen (2000) examined consultancy newscasts traits in the UK and compared news on Magid’s Channel 4 with BBC One, a station he said at the time had not yet used American consultants. Allen found clear consultancy traits at Channel 4 and thus fairly substantial differences in news styles (Allen, 2000). For

example, Channel Four had much shorter stories than BBC One. While BBC One focused on London, Channel 4's coverage was spread throughout the UK where the majority viewers could be found. While both stations had video and reporter involvement, Channel 4 had the typical broadcast tease, urging viewers to "stay tuned." Thus, "short stories, souped-up formats, and localized coverage provided definite clues to the level of Magid's activities" (Allen, 2000, p. 90-91). When the six traits designated as "consultancy" traits – crime, personal economic matters, human interest, health, sports and weather – and the ones considered "non-consultancy traits" – government politics, national business, education, the economy, wars in distant places and disasters – were examined, there were staggering differences (Allen, 2000). BBC One "excelled in 'non-consultancy' topics and the consultancy network [Channel Four] excelled in 'consultancy topics'" (Allen, 2000, p. 91). Surprisingly, Channel 4 aired a significant amount of political news (Allen, 2000).

Overall, the UK tends to have high political coverage as compared to other nations, although reporting of politics is falling off too. UK researchers Steven Barnett, Emily Seymour and Ivor Gaber (2000) conducted a study jointly funded by the BBC and the Independent Television Commission. They examined changes in news content and analyzed over 700 TV news bulletins spanning 1975 to 1999. While they did find a "healthy balance of serious, light and international coverage" (Barnett, Seymour, & Gaber, 2000, p. 12), they also found an overall increase in sports and consumer stories and a "decline across the board in coverage of political affairs" (Barnett, Seymour, & Gaber, 2000, p. 12). They saw an increase in what they referred to as tabloid stories, centering on topics such as crime, tragedy, entertainment, humor interest and quirky

stories. In 2012, an update was conducted, making it the most comprehensive longitudinal study of television news content in the UK. They found that overall it is clear that UK television news is “continuing to offer a predominantly serious domestic and foreign news agenda” (Barnett, Ramsay, & Gaber, 2012, p. 33). Neither one of these studies examined presentation, language or treatment of the news stories.

There were also differences in aesthetics (Allen, 2000). Channel Four’s newscast was “steeped in aesthetic elements and an approach more eye-catching, urgent, immediate and personable” (Allen, 2000, p. 91). While BBC One featured different newscasters, adhering to Europe’s traditional “presenter” system, Channel Four had a fixed news anchor team consisting of a male and female - a definite American trait. Channel 4 also had a more intimate studio setting than BBC One (Allen, 2000).

Commercial television in the UK has many critics, arguing that a “wealth of choice does not mean abundance of quality” (Porter, 1999, para. 7). British television journalist Ray Fitzwalter (2008) argued that after the ITV franchise auction, UK broadcasting lost its quality programming and it became a race for commercial success (Fitzwalter, 2008). He stated the 1980s “had been the last decade committed to public service broadcasting. Now the hands of commerce would dictate” (Fitzwalter, 2008, p. 146). With the ITV franchise auction, even with a quality threshold, “drossvision became a guaranteed fact” (Phillips, 1997, para. 3) and television is dumb and growing dumber (Arlidge, 2000). There was a clear distinction between how public service and commercial television treated customers as “public-service television sells programmes to audiences. Commercial television sells audiences to advertisers” (Nigel, 1989, para. 4).

Several other senior UK journalists lamented the overall commercialization of the media, calling for a strengthening of the public-service aspect, especially in terms of news coverage (Humphrys, 1999; Lloyd, 2004). British journalist Andrew Marr (2004) said “the idea of news has altered. It stopped being essentially information and became something designed to produce – at all costs, always – an emotional reaction, the more extreme the better” (p. 381). Furthermore, “those within public broadcasting feel pressure about its identity and role” (Rowland & Tracey, 1990, p. 20). Public service broadcasting faces many dangers, including a “slow assassination” (Rowland & Tracey, 1990, p. 22) because of competition from cable and satellite and fiscal restraints. “To survive, public service broadcasters must peer not to the horizon to see if the enemy has arrived, but into their souls. In reckoning with the future, public broadcasters must insist that the reckoning be conducted more on their terms” (Rowland & Tracey, 1990, p. 22).

After the 1991 auction, Magid continued its consulting work in the UK, while simultaneously working in other European countries. In the UK, Magid worked not only with ITN and the ITV franchises, but also with the BBC in London and around the country. Because of BBC’s reputation as the epitome of quality journalism, Magid’s hiring “was likened to the Vatican assembling atheists to pick the next Pope” (Allen, 2000, p. 94). However, “the Magid-BBC relationship was no real surprise in the newly privatized British system that forced the BBC to compete” (Allen, 2000, p. 94). The Americanization debate contributed to Magid’s gradual business decline in the UK.

British media critics frequently described the American consultants and their work using terms such as “news doctors” and “dumbing down.” Negative headlines with subheads such as “a year after its revamp, News at Ten’s ratings are up. But has it sold its

soul?” (Millard, 1993) were common. Magid staff members were described as “specialists in ‘inoculating’ presenters with techniques ‘that help viewers feel personally involved’” (Miller, 1993, para. 2), offering “obstetrics for the new ITV companies and facelifts for the old” (Miller, 1993, para. 5).

Stewart Purvis, the chief executive of ITN at the time, wrote that “anybody who uses an expert or consultant from America would do best not to tell any broadcasting correspondents who like nothing more than the smell of the ‘Americanisation’ of UK TV news” (1999, para. 12). Purvis used Magid for a revamp of *News at Ten* and stated after reading about the changes that were done, “you’d believe the whole blueprint was planned and implemented from Magid’s headquarters in Marion, Iowa. After all the ideas from all the internal and external experts, it’s the broadcaster who makes final decisions” (Purvis, 1999, para. 12). Some argued the term “dumbing down” should not be used to describe television because it “is corrosive. The phrase is sweepingly stapled to anything popular” (Willis, 1999, para. 13).

Television Developments in Europe

The UK developments opened doors for new opportunities and changes in other Western European countries, including France, Italy and Norway. Privatization and commercialization of European media eventually included everything from the smallest broadcasting station to large, nationwide stations. The most dramatic change in European media overall was the commercialization of broadcasting (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b).

Television privatization and commercialization brought vast changes. The main shift was from a trustee model to a marketplace model, from broadcasters as public trustees that are regulated by the government for the public good, to media that is profit

maximizing (Karamanis, 1999). The marketplace model assumption is that competition promotes public interest and the viewer is a rational consumer. This marketplace model with “multi-channel television offers people what they want, not merely what others think they need” (Bazalgette, 2003, para. 6), shifting power to the viewer.

Because public broadcasters are supported by items such as license fees, they have “a much greater stake in their audience ratings performance than their American counterparts have, since it presupposes the universal appeal of their service in return for such a universally imposed exaction” (Blumler & Hoffmann-Riem, 1992, p. 21). If the public broadcaster does not do a good job keeping its audience, there is no reason for the public to pay for the service.

Today the audience has choices. When the public broadcaster was the only choice, “they could be all things to all people” (Blumler & Hoffmann-Riem, 1992, p. 25). That is no longer the case in Europe’s dual broadcasting system. The “dual system came into existence in the United Kingdom” (Kleinstauber, 2004, p. 80); the country was a clear frontrunner for the development of European commercial television. The public broadcaster must both be in a “competitive and complementary relationship to private broadcasters” (Blumler & Hoffman-Riem, 1992, p. 26). Some say commercial channels are more likely to use a significant amount of American programming, and in the “mixed television economy, it falls to public television to look to its society’s more indigenous cultural needs” (Blumler & Hoffman-Riem, 1992, p. 30).

Numerous scholars have outlined key factors driving the privatization of television broadcasting in Europe (Dyson & Humphreys, 1989; Humphreys, 1996; McQuail, Mateo & Tapper, 1992; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1990; Weymouth,

1996). One is the natural movement from the old monopoly system to a market driven system and another one is new technologies such as cable and satellite. Other factors include a crisis in the ethos of public service broadcasting, international market forces, and the European Union's own broadcasting policy as it sought to establish an unrestricted European TV market.

EU's 1986 *Television Without Frontiers* directive advocated a European market with free trade, which could be met in a commercial and free environment (Karamanis, 1999). It was also meant to combat concerns about "Americanization" of European television broadcasting (Karamanis, 1999). The directive called for "broadcasters to reserve the majority of their air time for European works" (Karamanis, 1999, p. 56). The primary reason for this directive was the "desire to protect the European audiovisual industry against the invasion of popular American programming on pan-European televisions" (Karamanis, 1999, p. 56). In 1997, the original *Television Without Frontiers* directive was replaced with a new one, creating a stronger framework for European broadcasters to work within EU borders. It also allowed for digital-related television services. In addition to the *Television Without Frontiers* directive, the EU developed the MEDIA program at the end of 1990 to create an audiovisual area and stimulate an increase in film and audiovisual program producers (Karamanis, 1999).

The public service broadcasting system that was set up in Europe was not set up the same way in every country (Blumler, 1992; McQuail, 1994). Individual countries also varied in how much government controlled television. The set-ups included everything from a strict government overview that included censorship, to more indirect ways via appointments or the distribution of financial resources.

Many countries have come to view communication as a source of money, instead of a source of culture (Garnham, 1983; Rowland & Tracy, 1990). Europe rejected the U.S. model of complete privatization of television broadcasting, in favor of a mixed model, but even the public broadcasters that remained quickly lost their old public broadcasting characteristics and adopted routines that made them indistinguishable from their commercial competitors (McQuail, 1994; Syvetsen, 1997). Some state only certain items from the commercial sphere were adopted by the public service broadcasters, such as cost awareness (Blumler, 1992).

What emerged in Europe was a mixed broadcasting system where public service had to compete with the commercial system (Bardoel & d'Haenens, 2008; Postman, 2000; Servaes & Wang, 1997). Critics argue it is now possible to “detect commercial factors exerting their influence on editorial agendas” (Cushion, 2012, p. 22) and the dual model meant a move away from the traditional public service news agenda to a “more market-led, ‘tabloid’ version of news, with its emphasis on consumer journalism, sports and entertainment” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 5). A 2005 survey by the Open Society Institute examined European television – covering 20 countries – and found the “distinction between public-service broadcasters and their commercial competition, in terms of programme content and quality, has become increasingly blurred” (p. 22). Other have echoed that sentiment, saying “the distinctions between private and public broadcasters grow ever more blurry as the latter are forced to consider not social utility but cost efficiency and audience maximization” (McCourt, 1999, p. 5). In addition, “in the battle between public-service and private, commercially-driven television, the commercial model of broadcast journalism has won” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 10).

From Western Europe, the privatization of broadcasting media spread to Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist system in 1989. All former communist countries have followed the European model of substantial public broadcasting (Jakubowicz, 2004; Pavlik, 1999; Sparks & Reading, 1994). In some East and Central European countries, media privatization was difficult because some minority media was kept in operation merely because of government support (Caristi, 1996). They thus had to reinvent themselves and adjust to the new market forces in order to stay in business.

The changes that took place in the European television landscape within a short time frame were quite astounding. The European Institute for the Media, based in Manchester in the UK, published a study in 1993 that showed vast changes. In 1983, the data showed 36 publicly funded television channels in Western Europe, spread over 17 countries. Only two stations were considered truly commercial in nature, smaller outfits found in Luxembourg and Italy. In the latter part of the 1980s, there were three pan-European stations, but only one was commercial – Sky TV – a British satellite outfit in its infancy stages. In 1993, the pan-European number had jumped to 17, many of them commercial. There were also several thematic channel operators – focusing on sports, news or music (European Institute for the Media, 1993). The market had drastically expanded and the focus had moved from mostly public service to commercial.

As television opportunities increased in Europe, more consultants found lucrative work. By the end of the 1990s, American television consultants could be found virtually everywhere in Europe. As media systems changed to include increasingly more commercial systems, there was a large need for audience research. More and more independent American consultants joined firms overseas (Allen, 2001). With all these

U.S. advisors overseas, and with so much American broadcast programming being exported, closely related to the development of commercial television in Europe is the overall American domination of mass media abroad.

Commercial television programming relies on eliminating a lot that is culturally distinctive, but consultants had to be “sensitive and respectful students of native customs” (Atkinson, 1994, p. 7) and “wend their way through a maze of cultural obstacles” (Atkinson, 1994, p. 7). Consultants furthermore had to face cultural differences related to domestic and imported views of the world, as well as different perspectives of news journalism and money management (Atkinson, 1994). Part of the balancing act was dealing with the fear of Americanization of European television. That fear did not seem to play a role in German CTL naming its newscast on RTL2 “Action News.” They were consulted by American firm AR&D and did not even bother to make its newscast name German (Allen, 1997).

The role of the American consultants in the development process of UK television is interesting from a scholarly perspective for several reasons. One of the reasons is because the consultants themselves did not officially export anything. They did not export any of the movies or entertainment programs that are often criticized for Americanization. The consultants did not sell programming per se. They operated within the foreign newsrooms, set up consumer studies, and in that way affected indigenously prepared newscasts. They were helping their foreign clients do their own news programming.

The Americanization Debate

Media systems are homogenized towards an Anglo-American model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a, 2004b; Tunstall & Machin, 1999) and much of the homogenization that can be seen on a global scale is American (Blanchard, 1986; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1975; Negrine & Papathanassopolous, 1996). Research shows an Americanization of media culture and content around the world (Hamelink, 1983; Schiller, 1992; Tunstall, 1977). Furthermore, research shows American journalism as a motivation for European journalists. News producers in Europe used the American model in establishing formats (Lee, 1976; Pöttker, 2005; Schudson, 1995) and design (Barnhurst & Nerone, 2001), and even when it came to organizing newsrooms (Hoyer & Nonseid, 2005).

The U.S. has been both hated and celebrated in Europe, especially as it pertains to media and culture (Bondebjerg et al., 2008). Many scholars have studied American influences overseas, in several different genres. Some have called it Americanization (Glancy, 2014; Malchow, 2014; Stephan, 2006), while others have used the term cultural imperialism (Lee, 1979; Schiller, 1976, 1992; Thompson, 1995). It is what is often seen as an American dominance in world media, spreading American values and weakening local cultures (Faircloth, 2006). Some have stated it is complex and not just about cultural invasion, but also about modernization (Bondebjerg et al., 2008). It is “an indicator of the process of modernisation and globalisation of post-war Europe in which television was one increasingly important aspect” (Bondebjerg et al., 2008, p. 156).

Americanization is often viewed as a simple word, but it refers to a complex process. It is the study of the transmission of values, ideas, images and myths from the U.S. to other parts of the world, but it also deals with the transformation process. From

the standpoint of the receiving country, the influence can be felt in many, often subtle, ways. These ideas and values are rarely imported wholesale as they interact with established patterns in the receiving country. The original significance of an item may change, often quite dramatically. The way an American looks at an American item may not be how it is being viewed in the country where it is being introduced (Schou, 1992).

Critics have argued U.S. consultants Americanize the “foreign news systems and social values of other audiences around the globe. This Americanizing of international programs has come from both important American programming and consultants working abroad” (Godfrey, 1999, p. 51). American television shows are popular throughout the world, and scholars argue they carry with them American values, such as materialism, violence and a concern for affluence (Hiebert & Reuss, 1998). The U.S. does a subtle invasion by sending “our television shows” (Postman, 2000, p. 47).

There is a fear national independence and authentic culture will become extinct because of media domination by certain countries (Howell, 1986). “If the European countries do not react forcefully and mobilize their rich and diverse cultural potential, it will be committing spiritual suicide in a flood of Donald Duck Americanization” (Skovmand & Schroeder, 1992, p. 3). Some argue “the strong position of Europe as a market player makes it likely that Europe would be better equipped than many other regions to withstand (if such a word may be used) Americanization” (Örnebring, 2009, p. 12). The image of the U.S. as a power driven to Americanize the world is commonplace (Sparks, 1996). That discussion has intensified with increased internet use (Kroes, 2004).

It is clear the concept of Americanization stirs up emotions. There is an American domination of mass media today. What makes the role of the American news consultants

so fascinating is that they operated within domestic newsrooms and conducted studies of domestic audiences in each country. It is intriguing how the American television news model has been able to spread throughout the world, with the help of the consultants.

Theoretical Framework


This research is a case study, and in a case study, large amounts of data are collected and analyzed (Thomas, 2016). For the data to be useful, it needs to be connected, which is where theory comes in. Theory “makes the connections between X, Y and Z and holds them together” (Thomas, 2016, p. 220).

The study was informed by change theory, developed by Kurt Lewin. Many scholars have found his concepts valuable (Ash, 1992; Dent & Goldberg, 1999; Dickens & Watkins, 1999; Schein, 1988) and he is “widely considered the founding father of change management” (Cummings, Bridgman & Brown, 2016, p. 34). Lewin used his theory to analyze societal, group and even individual behavior (Burnes, 2007) and was interested in “understanding the dynamic laws of behavior” (Patnoe, 1988, p. 5) because “behavior is caused by forces” (Patnoe, 1988, p. 6).

Lewin (1951) argued there are three steps in a transformation process – the “unfreezing” of a condition, a transition, and a “re-freezing” in a new condition. Lewin, as a part of his change theory, also used what he referred to as force-field analysis (Lewin, 1951). It provides a framework for examining forces that influence a particular situation, either providing movement towards a goal (helping) or blocking the movement (hindering). He argued that “unfreezing” means different things, depending on the scenario, but it has to be something significant. The same holds true for “re-freezing” in the new state. Some change can be short lived, when something changes merely

temporarily and returns to the previous level later. Permanency requires significant, strong forces and shows that “the new force field is made relatively secure against change” (Lewin, 1951, p. 229).

Figure 2



People face limitations that are “imposed by the structure of their world” (Elie-Dit-Cosaque, Pallud & Kalika, 2011, p. 205). For a change to happen, the equilibrium has to be upset, either by forces favorable to a change or by reducing resisting forces. Whenever driving forces are stronger than restraining forces, the equilibrium will change (Lewin, 1951). Strong forces can be described as a “high tension” system and weaker forces as a “low tension” system. The equilibrium can more easily be moved “if one could remove restraining forces” (Schein, 1996, p. 28) because driving forces are generally already in the system. Stability within a social system is dynamic and not static (Brager & Holloway, 1993). Forces continuously operate within the system to “produce what we experience as stability” (Brager & Holloway, 1993, p. 17) and change happens when forces shift. Before any change can occur, a person has to be ready for change and “the direction of the action is influenced by a person’s perceived benefits and perceived barriers to taking the action” (McMahon, 1986, p. 109).

One helping force in the case of UK television development is the privatization movement. In addition, the “unfreezing” can be viewed as the 1991 ITV franchise auction. Then there was a transition, followed by a “re-freezing” of the situation that now includes a more marketized private and public television. When it comes to television itself, there were also various forces at play related to how the consultants were able to shape UK newscasts. Lewin’s model can be used to examine cultural differentiation as potential forces (Elsass & Veiga, 1994), and in this study, it was used in terms of forces playing a role in the integration of U.S. and UK television styles. The model has furthermore been utilized to examine cultural differences and intercultural concepts such as acculturation and assimilation (Elsass & Veiga, 1994).

Some scholars criticized Lewin’s model as being too linear and simple (Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992). However, many regard Lewin’s model as the fundamental approach to the change process (Robbins & Judge, 2013; Sonenshein, 2010). Lewin’s model dominated almost all change theories for years (Michaels, 2001) and “the whole theory of change is reducible to this one idea of Kurt Lewin’s” (Hendry, 1996, p. 624). It has been called “the most powerful tool” (Levasseur, 2001, p. 71) in a researcher’s toolbox, “sophisticated, complex and responsive” (Swanson & Creed, 2014, p. 30). There is more to the model than merely a simple three-step process; “don’t let the apparent simplicity of Lewin’s model fool you. It is a truly elegant and infinitely practical guide to the host of complex and sometimes baffling issues inherent in the change process” (Levasseur, 2001, p. 71). Lewin understood the importance of context and his model is “continually informed and changed by the unfolding situation” (Rosch, 2002, p. 8).

Some researchers have found three conditions – facilitating, constraining and blocking – to be better explanations, rather than driving and restraining forces (Cronshaw & McCulloch, 2008). To them, force field analysis is really about assessing “the conditions prevailing in the environmental field at a given point in time and not field forces per se” (Cronshaw & McCulloch, 2008, p. 91).

In the 1980s, more recent theories emerged that view change as complex and interactive. Some feel the world today is changing too rapidly for Lewin’s model, that in today’s society people need to constantly adapt (Burnes, 2008). Today a change “requires it to be implemented in ways that allow for flexibility and further adaption” (Child, 2015, p. 350). There are models where a continuous freeze-rebalance-unfreeze occurs (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Because the 1991 franchise auction can be viewed as a “one-time deal,” and a specific time period was examined, the researcher believes Lewin’s original model served the study well as the underlying theory.

Lewin’s change theory has been used in many different studies, including changes in structure, technology and people (Elie-Dit-Cosaque, Pallud, & Kalika, 2011; Hellriegel, Slocum, & Woodman, 1983; Huse, 1980; Kruglanski, Belanger, Chen & Köpetz, 2012; Steers, 1981; Thomas, 1985). It has also been used to examine print-broadcast convergence (Thornton & Keith, 2009), group dynamics in simulation and gaming (Hermann, 2015), curiosity in children (Chak, 2002), change management in nursing and health care organizations (Baulcomb, 2003; Lorenzi & Riley, 2000; Wojciechowski, Pearsall, Murphy & French, 2016), art and architecture by leadership as a force to affect change (Holloway Cripps, 2013), and even factors influencing eating (Green, 1990). It is a versatile theory that can be used across a wide variety of disciplines.

After Lewin's death, interest in his theory declined quite significantly, but it picked up again in the 1990s, partly as that marked the one-hundredth anniversary of Lewin's birth (Burnes & Cooke, 2013). Some have argued "a return to Lewin's original conception of field theory" (Burnes & Cooke, 2013, p. 408) versus more modern interpretations of the theory. The power in Lewin's theory lies in his models that allow researchers to draw "attention to the right kinds of variables" (Schein, 1996, p. 28).

Research Questions

Television news is no longer considered the stepchild to print and radio. It is now a legitimate form of journalism. The American television news model has evolved from a person merely reading the news, to eyewitness news, to action news, and to today's hybrid formula. Station owners do not have to depend solely on entertainment programming to make money because news can attract audiences too. According to current assessments, successful newscasts need relatable anchors and reporters and the news needs to cater to its viewers.

While American television was set up as a commercial enterprise from the beginning, television in Europe was organized around a public broadcast service model. In the 1980s, as Europe moved away from Keynesian doctrine to privatization, vast changes occurred in a wide variety of industries. This included the media. Today most European countries have a thriving dual broadcast system where public service television competes with commercial television.

Europe, as well as the rest of the world, imports a lot of American television programming. The analysis shows European journalists and media outlets have been heavily influenced by American forces as well. This includes television newscasts. Watch

the evening news in Sweden, Germany, Italy or the UK, and the format is the American news model, with slight variations. It is a formula, prescribed by what critics call, the American news doctors. It is a formula that many are attracted to and clearly want.

From the literature review emerged the questions that guided this study. The consultants were instrumental in spreading the American news format on a global scale, yet despite their success, little is known about exactly how they operated. The UK was the European starting point. The privatization movement was very strong, but it is possible other societal forces were at play too. It is obvious UK television evolved in the 1990s, but not clear exactly how. It is also not clear what concepts the consultants worked to incorporate in the UK and how those concepts are similar or different from American concepts. Perhaps there were cultural nuances and considerations. Therefore the research questions that guided this study were:

1. Why were American consultants in the UK and how did they play a part in the development of commercial television?
2. What key concepts did the consultants integrate into UK television from their audience research studies and how are they related to U.S. concepts?
 - a) How are they similar?
 - b) How are they different?
3. What were the key forces that played a role in television news development in the UK?
 - a) What were the key driving forces?
 - b) What were the key restraining forces?

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

“The distinctive need for case study research arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.”

Yin, 2014, p. 4

The Magid archives are located downstairs in the main building at One Research Center in Marion, Iowa. They are in a large room referred to as “The Dungeon.” The gray, fireproof door leading to the archives is clearly marked, with a yellow sign using black lettering, spelling out “THE DUNGEON” – utilizing capital letters. That is the starting point for this research; it arose from the depths of “The Dungeon.”

This investigation into the development of British television news in the 1990s explains how American consultants were involved, the concepts from audience research they integrated into UK television news, and how those may relate to U.S. concepts. Furthermore, this study identifies key driving and restraining forces that played a role in that process.

This chapter discusses the methodology used for the study and the rationale behind it. It outlines the procedures, research approach and method for the collection and analysis of the data. It also discusses ethics and validity.

Qualitative Procedures

Good research design guides a project from inception to completion. The method used should depend on what is studied (Silverman, 2010). This research utilized a qualitative, humanistic and interpretive approach (Jackson, Drummond, & Camara, 2007)

because the nature of the subject matter lent itself to qualitative inquiry. Gaining knowledge from sources that are intimately familiar with a situation (McRoy, Grotevand & Zurcher, 1988) is much better than the objective distancing approach that characterizes quantitative methodology (Haworth, 1984). Qualitative research is based on an inductive analysis of the data (Iorio, 2004). It is open ended, exploratory, and allows the researcher flexibility (Babbie, 2013). For example, qualitative interview techniques allow the interviewer to ask questions that are open-ended, eliciting rich responses, going beyond yes and no. It allows for follow-up questions, based on the answers received, providing flexibility to probe responses.

Qualitative research involves collection, analysis and interpretation of data that cannot be easily reduced to numbers (Anderson, 2010; Scott & Garner, 2013). It is an interpretive examination where meaning is investigated (Pauly, 1991). The research “allows deep exploration of different issues” (Holloway & Brown, 2012, p. 15) and the data depth level is what makes qualitative research demanding. This type of research has quickly been increasing (Caelli, Ray, & Mill, 2003), having “established a firm foothold” (Eisner, 1998, p. 5) in the scholarly community. It started being widely used in the 1950s, gained importance after 1970 (Brinkmann, Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2014), and has been extensively used over the past 40 years (Creswell, 2015). The research that is defined as qualitative research is also expanding (Flick, 2002).

Qualitative methods are a research framework allowing scholars to “understand how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and what meaning they attribute to their experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 5). The context is extremely important in qualitative research (Creswell, 2015), and because it focuses on

finding meaning in context, humans are the most suitable for gathering and interpreting the data as it requires a certain level of sensitivity (Merriam, 2009). Qualitative inquiry allows for an investigation into the nature of a problem (Patton, 2002) and provides the researcher the opportunity to be closely involved with participants to better understand processes, motivations and contexts (Daymon & Holloway, 2011).

Qualitative methods use items such as speech, gestures and social actions as the raw materials of analysis (Anderson & Meyer, 1988) and “qualitative analysis is addressed to the task of delineating forms, kinds and types of social phenomena; of documenting in loving detail the things that exist” (Lofland, 1971, p. 13). Research design starts with an assumption that human behavior is made up of responses to stimuli; what something means to someone affects how they respond (Taylor, 1994). Qualitative researchers want to understand their areas of interest, and that is where the strength of qualitative research lies (Lindlof, 1995). They view meaning as both individual and shared, as contextual, and coming from an interaction with others (Taylor, 1994).

Qualitative research has many characteristics. They include a theoretical interest in human processes, a concern with the study of socially situated human action and artifacts, the use of human investigators as research instruments, and a reliance on narrative forms of interpreting data and writing texts (Lindlof, 1995). Qualitative research may need to be constructed and reconstructed, depending what is uncovered in the research (Maxwell, 2013) and it is not a linear process (Ravitch & Mittenfelner Carl, 2016). Instead, “the processes of qualitative research are continuously interacting and building off one another in a cyclical fashion” (Ravitch & Mittenfelner Carl, 2016, p. 2). This means the research material has a rich range of perspectives and substantial depth.

Qualitative research is sometimes “criticized as biased, small scale, anecdotal, and/or lacking rigor; however, when it is carried out properly it is unbiased, in depth, valid, reliable, credible and rigorous” (Anderson, 2010, p. 3). When conducting interviews for example, if a researcher goes beyond the saturation point and interviews are not adding any new information, the process has not only been demanding but the data can be deemed valid and reliable.

The research questions selected are key. They will generally lead the way to answers that explain, describe or outline information (Saldana, 2009). In addition, research questions can elicit constructed meanings and contexts surrounding a situation, and any variances that may occur within that context (Luttrell, 2010). This research study was guided by “how” and “why” questions, which in turn lend themselves to a case study approach (Yin, 2009; Yin, 2014). Examples of such questions included why the American consultants were brought to the UK, how they played a role in the development of commercial television news, and what key concepts they integrated into UK television. The study also sought to understand how those concepts relate to U.S. concepts and what key driving and restraining forces played a role.

Case Study

Research design “is similar to an architectural blueprint” (Merriam, 1988, p. 6). It is a plan for how to arrive at the end product – the findings. The primary methodology – the blueprint - for this dissertation was a qualitative case study. A case study is an in-depth examination of a group or situation and its related context during a set time period. It gained significant traction, recognition and support in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Merriam, 1988). The strength, or distinctiveness, of case study research is that it has a

generality to it (Stake, 2000). A researcher can study a person, an enterprise, an institution, a collection or a population. It is thus a method that can be applied to different scenarios. Case studies “allow us to look at the world through the researcher’s eyes and, in the process, to see things we otherwise might not have seen” (Donmoyer, 2000, p. 63). Some scholars have argued case study is not a method per se but instead “a focus and the focus is on one thing, looked at in depth and from many angles” (Thomas, 2016, p. 9).

The method does not have one definition, but rather “definitions of ‘case studies’ abound” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 301). It is a way to focus “attention on a single instance of some social phenomenon” (Babbie, 2013, p. 309). There is little consensus as to what exactly constitutes a case (Gerring, 2004; Merriam, 1988; Ragin and Becker; 1992) and “researchers have many things in mind when they talk about case study research” (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). A case study approach involves studying a particular case, or several cases, at a turning point or a particular point in time (Lofland, Snow, Anderson & Lofland, 2006; Neuman, 2006; Yin, 2009). It is an approach that is used when a researcher wants to understand a real-world case (Yin, 2014). The main concern is to understand the case itself, with “no real interest in theoretical inference or empirical generalization” (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000, p. 4). It is an “intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units” (Gerring, 2004, p. 341).

A case study can be an individual person, a group and institutions, a community or even multiple cases (Gillham, 2000). The term “case study” is used broadly (Ragin & Becker, 1992). Typically, a case study has a limit, bound by either time and/or place (Creswell, 2013). A case is a “specific, a complex, functioning thing” (Stake, 1995, p. 2). Some scholars say the actual case is the unit of analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

In case study research, often new theories are developed as findings are extended from one case to another and more data is collected and analyzed (Dooley, 2002). There is no real right way in a case study (Thomas, 2016). Two researchers can have the same starting point, but different paths and approaches to their research. Instead of being a methodological choice, it is “a choice of what is to be studied” (Stake, 2005, p. 443). Thus, the ultimate choice is to study the case and that is where the focus lies.

Qualitative research is not generalizable, nor does it seek to be. It has characteristics that are unique, such as an in-depth understanding and connections within a context. It provides rich content for a deep level of understanding. In case study research, “there can be no generalization” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 39) as “its findings are not generalizable” (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 2000, p. 98). Because qualitative research involves such a deep examination, a researcher should adopt the simplest design allowing them to address their research questions (Silverman, 2010).

Case study research can employ a wide variety of data sources, such as interviews, observations, and documents and artifacts (Anderson, 2010; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The data in a case study is usually “detailed, varied and extensive” (Neuman, 2006, p. 40) and “the bottom line for assessing the quality of a case study...is still the richness of the data presented” (Donmoyer, 2000, p. 64). This study derived rich data from various primary sources, particularly archival materials and in-depth interviews.

Primary Artifacts

Primary artifacts were one of the cornerstones of this study. Many scholars agree that, without primary artifacts, what took place in the past cannot be adequately recounted. Primary items are a direct link to the past and include original, unfiltered

evidence. They can be anything created during the time period examined (Fullerton, 2011), including written records, printed materials, oral sources, photographic records, radio and television broadcasts, and physical remains (Benjamin, 2011). They are original documents that underscore the legitimacy of the research being undertaken.

Relying too much on secondary sources is a clear weakness in research. However, even primary artifacts may be inaccurate and need to be thoroughly examined and corroborated with other source work (Startt & Sloan, 1989). Secondary sources are generally based on primary material and comprise a wide variety, such as pamphlets, periodical literature, studies and biographies.

Archives are a great resource for primary artifacts. They can provide a treasure trove for researchers, as they contain mainly primary source work (Lusk, 1997). They generally have materials specific to one institution, one organization, or one particular activity. The “archival record contains those rarest and most valuable data” (Connors, 1992, p. 20), but getting access to archives can be hard, depending on if the archives are private or public.

The experience the researcher has in the archive “creates certain conditions of possibility for what will emerge from the archival research: how she will make selections about what to see, note, transcribe or ask to be photocopied” (Tamboukou, 2014, p. 620). It is important to not only search for material to support a thesis or hypothesis. Researchers should browse with a directed intent, but also need to be open to pursuing sidetracks that may look promising (Connors, 1992).

Archival research can be looked at as being fragmented in a way because “there is always something missing” (Tamboukou, 2014, p. 631). Unfortunately, not everything

makes its way into the archives for safekeeping. Some archives will also have more information than others, at times containing information on the same subjects, to varying degrees of completion.

Archives and “organizational and institutional documents have been a staple in qualitative research for many years” (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). An analysis of these documents means that data is interpreted in order to gain understanding and elicit meaning (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Rapley, 2007). “Documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (Merriam, 1998, p. 118). Information in the documents is often used in combination with other qualitative methods, as a way to provide triangulation.

Triangulation utilizes a “combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1970, p. 291) as researchers draw on multiple sources of evidence when analyzing evidence (Bowen, 2009). Archival “documents provide background information as well as historical insight” (Bowen, 2009, p. 29) and the “documents may be the most effective means of gathering data when events can no longer be observed” (Bowen, 2009, p. 31). It is important that the researcher is able to separate relevant information from not so relevant information (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).

For this study the researcher has, as the first outside scholar, been allowed access to the Frank N. Magid Associates European archives located in Marion, Iowa. The researcher was given complete, unrestricted and unprecedented admittance to everything in the archives during a full week in March 2016. All available archival material on Magid’s television accounts in the United Kingdom was scanned by the researcher to provide easily accessible electronic files.

The Magid archives are located downstairs in the main building, in a room called “The Dungeon.” Once the door is opened, a gold mine of history is unveiled. There are shelves upon shelves, full of Magid client binders. It is all clearly labeled with dividers separating clients and categories. Most of the material from Magid’s European television clients reside on a shelf labeled “International TV.” However, several accounts, including BBC Television, are located on a shelf labeled “Non-local TV.”

The archival material related to this study included 2359 pages. Unfortunately, information from Magid’s first official ITV account – Yorkshire Television – was missing and could not be located. In addition, materials involving Tyne Tees Television, TV-am, TVS, Westcountry, and BBC Northern Ireland were also missing. This reiterates the notion that archives are never complete; there is always something missing or left out. The researcher bridged the gap with qualitative interviews, as there were people involved with most of those accounts available to the researcher.

From the literature review, the qualitative interviews conducted during this study, and informal conversations with staff from other consulting companies, it is clear the other two large American consulting firms – McHugh & Hoffman and AR&D – did not have a key role in the development of traditional television news in UK in the 1990s. Although both companies were active in Europe at the same time Magid was, they focused more on other European countries and/or not traditional television news. This research study therefore focused only on Magid’s involvement.

Qualitative Interviews

In addition to archival material, this study utilized long qualitative interviews. It also drew from structural descriptions of oral history and elite interviews. The long

interview is “one of the most powerful methods in the qualitative armory” (McCracken, 1988, p. 9), mainly because it takes the researcher “into the mental world of the individual” (p. 9). Interviews provide texts that are full of insights (Conway, 2014b) and add context and provide rich narratives (Murray, 2011). Qualitative interviews are a way to gather insight into the world of the interviewee, with an intention of interpreting the meaning of what is described (Kvale, 1983; Weiss, 1994). Interviews add a human aspect and a personal connection to research and are great “when the goal is to understand the ‘insider’s’ perspective” (Hornig Priest, 1996, p. 106).

Interviews are indispensable in case study research (Gillham, 2000). They are unique in terms of data sources because they are records that do not exist in a defined form until they have essentially been created via the interview itself (Fogerty, 2006). The researcher is essentially creating a new resource to use when conducting interviews (McMahan, 2006). The interview aim is to gather material that is not available in other forms and the interview subject is selected “because he or she has first hand-knowledge of events” (Beasley & Harlow, 1980, p. 38). Interviews can be used to complement existing written records to help fill in gaps in the knowledge (Grele, 2006).

Qualitative interviews try to add meaning to central themes (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) and it is a particularly useful tool for getting a story behind someone’s experiences (McNamara, 1999). It is a way to uncover meaning and a great way of “exploring relationships between different aspects of a situation” (Arksey & Knight, 1999, p. 32). By using detailed interviewing, qualitative researchers can get closer to a participant’s perspective (McColl-Kennedy, Vargo, Dagger, Sweeney & van Kasteren, 2012) and “interviewing gives us a window on the past” (Weiss, 1994, p. 1).

One strength of the in-depth interview technique is that it “permits the respondent to move back and forth in time...” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 273). The technique is positive for both respondent and researcher. “The flexibility of the technique allows the investigator to probe, to clarify, and to create new questions based on what has already been heard” (Powell, 2004, p. 151).

Qualitative in-depth interviews are “appropriate for situations in which you want to ask open-ended questions that elicit depth of information from relatively few people” (Guion, Diehl, & McDonald, 2001, p. 1). A small sample is studied, but the researcher goes deep to develop detailed responses from interview subjects (Creswell, 2015). While a researcher using interviews utilizes a smaller, non-random sample, the interviews provide a wealth of detail, and that in turn increases the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon under study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Scholars warn that “research based on in-depth interviews is labor intense” (Seidman, 2006, p. 112), making a case for a smaller sample size. If a large sample is examined, a researcher loses the richness that comes from learning from a smaller group and will “lose the depth of understanding specific individuals” (Creswell, 2015, p. 7). An interviewer should not be as concerned with the number of interview subjects, as they should be about the quality of the interviews (Shopes, 2006). Good interviewers “are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like a good talk among old friends” (Berry, 2002, p. 679).

Qualitative research studies are not designed to be generalizable and representative of the population at large (Daymon & Holloway, 2011; McCracken, 1998). The number of interviewees is small (Marshall, 1996) because the researcher is gathering in-depth information and analyzing a certain segment or case. The purpose is not to count

people or opinions, but to elicit a range of opinions or representations of an issue (Gaskell, 2000). Sampling in qualitative research is focused on depth (Kuzel, 1992), meaning people with direct knowledge of a topic are selected because they can provide in-depth information. The number of participants required depends on topic and available resources (Gaskell, 2000). It is not so much a requirement, which implies a limit set ahead of time and arbitrary, but a standard one must meet. It is usually identified as having been met when the researcher attains data “saturation.” That is an important distinction. Because qualitative “research is much more intensive than extensive in its objectives” (McCracken, 1988, p. 17), the focus with participant selection should be that “less is more” (McCracken, 1988, p. 17). In addition, “it is more important to work longer, and with greater care, with a few people than more superficially with many of them” (McCracken, 1998, p. 17). For many projects as few as “eight respondents will be perfectly sufficient” (McCracken, 1998, p. 17).

An appropriate interview group “is composed of participants who best represent or have knowledge of the research topic” (Bowen, 2008, p. 140). The adequacy of sampling is related to a demonstration that saturation has been reached, as it relates to depth and breadth of information (Bowen, 2008). An sufficient sample size is “one that adequately answers the research question” (Marshall, 1996, p. 523). All scholars have to make a decision for themselves when they have enough material, as there is no simple answer (Sloan & Stamm, 2010). For this study, guidelines established by scholars Herbert and Irene Rubin (2005) were followed, meaning saturation was reached when new interviewees, or new material, added little new information to the research.

Because of the complexity and length of qualitative interviews, some scholars suggest recording the interviews (Evers & de Boer, 2012; Gillham, 2000). A qualitative research goal is to understand items from the viewpoint of the people being studied, and not from the viewpoint of the researcher. For this reason, qualitative researchers often rely on open-ended questions when conducting interviews (Taylor, 1994). Interviews as a part of a case study method are “usually conversational in nature and guided by the researcher’s mental agenda, as the interview questions do not follow the exact same verbalization with every participant interviewed” (Yin, 2014, p. 239). The questions asked in a qualitative interview are based on the research questions guiding the study (Evers & de Boer, 2012). A “conversation guide” is often recommended rather than a list of questions, allowing for a “semi-structured interview with open questions” (Evers & de Boers, 2012, p. 69). The guide should not be longer than two pages and contain six to eight main questions (Evers & de Boer, 2012). In this study, an interview guide was used (see Appendix B). However, interview questions were also tailored to fit each interview subject’s background and knowledge.

The interviews for this study were done via telephone, Skype, FaceTime and Zoom. One of the obvious advantages to “remote” interviewing via phone and other technology is that it can “facilitate the inclusion of participants who are geographically distant from the interviewer, without the need for time-consuming and expensive travel or recruitment of local interviewers” (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 80). This type of remote interviewing means “international research becomes viable for even modestly-resourced projects” (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 80).

The researcher recorded each interview – audio only. She was able to observe some body language when Skype, Zoom and FaceTime were used and the researcher took notes during all the interviews. The audio recording was done for the purpose of transcription, and as a tool to help increase interpretive validity, meaning making sure the researcher had captured the participants’ responses accurately (Pyrzczak, 2016). The use of an audio recorder made it possible to collect large amounts of data (Brinkmann, Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2014) and the subsequent transcript allowed the researcher to read and re-read the data (Gibbs, Friese & Mangabeira, 2002). Only audio was recorded because it “minimizes distractions” (Riley, 1996, p. 30). People can get nervous with a video recording and it can impede the interview itself (Morrissey, 2006).

This research study was based on primary artifacts from Magid’s European archive and 24 in-depth interviews with 23 respondents. The interviewees consisted of 10 Magid staff members and 13 British journalists (see Appendix G). The Magid respondents included four people with over 20 years of service to the company, and many close to that, or with over 10 years of service. The participants were involved in sales, research and coaching. They included the first staff member to do audience research in the UK, their European operations manager and founder of their London office, and the main European sales person. One of the staff members interviewed is a current Magid employee, one is in higher education, several have retired or changed careers, but some are still involved in the media industry. Eight of the Magid interview subjects were male and two were female. The two females were both in coaching roles.

All of the journalists interviewed were active in the 1990s. Most of them had well over 20 years of industry experience; all of them had over 10 years experience. Six of the

respondents had over 20 years at various ITV outlets, while three had over 20 years with the BBC. Several of the respondents were high-ranking managers in the broadcasting industry during the 1990s. The interview subjects included former chief executives of ITV and ITN and a former director of global news for the BBC. One respondent has served as a content regular with Ofcom, the UK communications regulator. Two of the respondents, both females, left terrestrial television to work in cable and then satellite. Two of the UK interview subjects now live in the U.S.; one is in higher education, while the other is a senior correspondent for Al Jazeera English. From this interview group, two are currently in higher education, others are still involved in the industry, and several have retired. Of the 13 interview subjects, all were in broadcasting except one who was a print reporter. In total, ten were males and three were females.

Most interview subjects were approached using a recruitment template (see Appendix C) that explained who the researcher was, what the project was about, and why they were being approached. Each interview subject was asked to fill out an interview consent form (see Appendix D) to show they understood the interview procedure and their rights as interviewees. In addition, prior to each interview, the researcher reiterated to each interview subject that the interview was going to be recorded. The researcher also took notes during the interview, mainly to ensure important points were noted.

The interviews were transcribed as quickly as possible afterwards, generally within a week. All but one interview was transcribed using a professional transcription service and the researcher verified all transcriptions. Coming from an oral history interview tradition, scholars Jeanine Evers and Fijgje de Boer (2012) suggested the researcher conducts a respondent validation by providing the transcript with questions

included to the respondent. In this study, the interview subjects were shown the transcript and allowed follow-up interviews and clarifications, if they chose to. The transcript was provided for two reasons – to ensure respondents understood what they signed a copyright agreement (see Appendix E) for and to check facts such as names, locations and specific British television terminology. In a couple of transcripts, names and locations were subsequently corrected. In addition, some respondents provided a more comprehensive explanation of certain television concepts and UK terminology as background information for the researcher.

Interviews should not be used as isolated sources and need to be collaborated through other evidence (Godfrey, 2011). If there is other evidence to back up the interview, then the interview adds substance and personal color to the research. Independent sources are needed to crosscheck information in interviews (Vansina, 1985). Interviewing, especially semi-structured or unstructured, “fares well when compared to other data collection techniques in terms of validity of the information obtained” (Merriam, 1988, p. 86). There are three basic important principles that are fundamental to all historical type of research. They are to assess each interview for internal consistency, crosscheck the information found in the interviews with as many published or archival sources as possible, and read the interviews with as a wide historical and theoretical lens as possible in order to line it up with relevant sources (Thompson, 1988).

The researcher utilized the four interview stages outlined by journalism historians Maurine Beasley and Richard Harlow (1980). They are preliminary contact, pre-interview preparation, interview, and post interview activities. Traditionally these stages

are used in oral history projects. However, they can be utilized for long qualitative interviews as well as the methods are virtually identical in structure.

The first stage means reaching out to subjects. It is important to ensure sources are eyewitnesses or have intimate knowledge of the item under examination and that their memory is good (Larson, 2006). The interview list should be prioritized to ensure interviews are done with the most suited interviewees (Yow, 2006) and age and health of subjects should be considered (Conway, 2014b). A researcher does not want to risk losing an interviewee because they did not prioritize their interviews.

If a person was a part of an event or witnessed an event first hand, his or her testimony has more value than someone who did not directly experience or witness the item at study (Vansina, 1965). That is why the researcher in this study specifically sought out people directly involved and intimately familiar with the television news process in the UK. While the researcher had an initial list of interview subjects, a snowball sampling technique was utilized, meaning the interview process led to names of other possible interview subjects. The snowball technique has been recommended and used by several scholars (Berry, 2002; Conway, 2014b; Larson, 2006; Patton, 2002).

In the initial stage, it is important the researcher provides the interview subject with enough information so they can decide if they want to participate (Shopes, 2006). They also need to be told the intended use of the interview. In addition, the interviewee should be told they will be recorded, will be able to review the transcript, and can refuse to answer a question and terminate the interview at any time (Shopes, 2006). Additional details can be found by examining this study's recruitment template (Appendix C) and the interview consent template (Appendix D).

The second stage as identified by Beasley and Harlow (1980) is pre-interview preparation. That includes writing a legal release form for copyright (Appendix E). As soon as something is fixed in “a tangible means of expression,” that copyright belongs to someone. That is essentially as soon as the interview has been completed (Neuenschwander, 2015). The person that owns the copyright can reproduce, publish, distribute and sell the interview (Shopes, 2006). They can also prevent others from using it without explicit permission. In an interview setting, the U.S. Copyright Office recognizes both the interviewer and the interviewee as authors (Shopes, 2006). For this study, the researcher asked the interview subjects to sign an interview copyright form (Appendix E) so she could use the interviews in as an unrestricted way as possible.

The researcher should always be well prepared and conduct extensive background research prior to the interview because it will help the researcher during the interview (Conway, 2014b). The more the researcher knows, the easier it is to build trust with the interview subject. It also shows respect for the interviewee. In addition, doing background research helps to efficiently structure the interview (Larson, 2006) and helps the researcher formulate good questions (Conway, 2014b). Background research can also aid in deciding whom to interview first, whom to prioritize (Morrissey, 2006).

Surveying existing literature will help the researcher understand the topic context (Godfrey, 2011). Understanding general information, and not just a narrow focus area, will help the researcher comprehend the time period and context (Bodnar, 1989). It will also help the researcher spot inconsistencies during the interview process. It is important to “do your homework” (Berry, 2002, p. 681), meaning making sure the researcher understands the topic and the background literature. For this study, a literature review

was started months prior to interviews (see chapter 2). In addition, the researcher started a list of Magid's UK accounts using the Magid archival material, and later firming it up with information from the interviews (Appendix F).

The third step as outlined by Beasley and Harlow (1980) is the actual interview. A researcher should be prepared for anything in an interview; "as interviewers, we might anticipate a certain kind of narrative or description from our respondents, but we can never be sure what will happen" (Roulston, deMarrais & Lewis, 2003, p. 644). The interview is an exchange between two people – the interviewer and the interviewee – and it is clearly a joint product (Ritchie, 2015). It is important to establish a good rapport early on, so the end product is as good as possible (Morrissey, 2006). The interview should be done in the spirit of critical inquiry (Shopes, 2006). The interviewer is an "information elicitor" and not an "information assessor" (McMahan, 2006, p. 339), meaning the interviewer is trying to receive information from the interview subject and not assess the information per se.

There is a concern about reliability in interviewing. That is the consistency with which an individual tells the same story repeatedly (Conway, 2014b; Hoffman and Hoffman, 2006; Sharpless, 2006). Most studies focus on the reliability of the memory, rather than the validity, because people's memories tend to be reliable (Conway, 2014b).

A qualitative interview is about more than merely looking for information or data. It is an activity based in seeking an understanding of what took occurred at a certain time (Morrissey, 2006). While some scholars suggest using an interview guide with either a list of topics or an ordered list of questions (Larson, 2006; Magnusson & Marecek, 2015), others recommend a skeletal framework with questions (Terkel, 2016). A framework

should never be kept in a rigid way, but be adjusted as the interview flows. American Pulitzer Prize winning author, broadcaster and historian Studs Terkel's (2016) notion of framework is virtually the same as Evers' and de Boer's (2012) interview guide. This study utilized an interview template in line with Terkel's (2016) and Evers' and de Boer's (2012) suggestions (Appendix B), although it was tailored to each interview subject.

Interviews should not be rushed and the researcher should plan for a long interview (Conway, 2014b). Most people get tired after an hour or two. If the researcher needs to go over two hours, for example if he or she has traveled a distance to get to the interview subject, a break is important. In one case, the interviewer conducted two interviews with the same participant. The first session took 1.5 hours and the second session took 43 minutes.

Open-ended questions need be asked one at a time (Morrissey, 2006). A researcher should ask "why" and "how" questions as they show motivation, inspiration and objectives. Interviewers need to listen carefully and not tune out; this will help with follow-up questions (Morrissey, 2006). Researchers should not ask leading questions or imply an answer is obvious. However, providing a cue to help trigger the memory can be helpful (Conway, 2014b). When it comes to inaccuracies, the researcher can point out other accounts of an incident to see if the interview subject perhaps misspoke.

If an interview subject asks the researcher to turn off the recorder, the researcher should do their best to avoid it. Once the recorder is turned off, it can be hard to turn it back on again to continue the recorded interview (Morrissey, 2006). For this study, the researcher encouraged participants to share "off the record" information after the interview, once the official recording had been completed.

The interview should end with two questions: Are there any questions I failed to ask that you feel are important and are there any topics you want to say more about (Conway, 2014b; Morrissey, 2006)? The researcher should also ask about names and places they are unsure about. This is also a good time to ask for names of people the interviewee feels may be good for the researcher to reach out to for interviews, for snowball sampling. The researcher in this study followed these guidelines.

The last interview step as outlined by Beasley and Harlow (1980) is the post interview activities stage. The researcher should complete the transcript as soon as possible after the interview, while it is fresh in their mind (Maze, 2006). The best transcript “is an accurate verbatim reflection of the interview's content, preserves as much of the quality of the interview and the individualities of the speakers as possible, and is easy to read and understand” (Davis, Back & MacLean, 1975, p. 57).

The transcribing process is one of the most time-consuming parts of the interview process (Conway, 2014b) and an audit check should be conducted once the transcript has been done (Maze, 2006). The check involves a person making sure the transcript matches the recording. For this study, a professional transcription service was utilized for all but one of the transcriptions and the researcher then conducted an audit check of the audio and transcript to ensure they matched. In addition, the interview subjects were asked to review their transcripts to ensure the documents were as factually correct as possible in terms of names, locations and television terminology.

Some scholars suggest providing the legal release form with a copy of the transcript because then the interview subject can see exactly what they are signing off on (Morrissey, 2006). For this study, the researcher encouraged the interview subjects to

wait to sign the copyright form (Appendix E) until they had viewed the transcript. It is suggested that if an interviewee is unhappy or reluctant to approve a transcript because they did not express themselves adequately, it is best to provide them an opportunity for a second interview so they can clarify portions of the initial interview (Murray, 2011). The interview subjects in this study had only minor changes, mostly related to errors in the transcription process or incorrect spelling of names and locations.

Data Collection

All of the data collected were analyzed to create an explanation, understanding, and interpretation of the involvement of the American news consultants in the development of television in the UK. An inductive approach allowed for a narrative framework that surfaced relationships and context. In March 2016, the researcher started collecting primary artifacts in Magid's European archives in Marion, Iowa. Other materials were collected sporadically in 2016 and with a firmer purpose starting in summer 2017 through the end of the study. Plans to conduct the in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews were made after approval from Arizona State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) was received. On June 1, 2017, the study and its research protocol, interview guide (Appendix B), recruitment template (Appendix C), interview consent (Appendix D), and copyright form (Appendix E) were approved. The interview guide was based on questions aligned with the literature and the study's research questions. The IRB approval was granted through the end of May 2018.

The outreach to interview participants began in the late summer 2017 and interviews were conducted September through December 2017. Each interview subject received a copy of the interview consent form (Appendix D) and the interview copyright

form (Appendix E). The participants were selected because of their specialized knowledge, because of who they were, or because of positions they held or currently occupy (Hochschild, 2009).

The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions. This allowed for flexibility in the interview and discussion. In addition, the interviewee was encouraged to structure the account of the situation and was allowed to introduce what he or she regarded as relevant (Dexter, 1970). However, the researcher had main questions that had been developed before the interview, based on the interview subject's particular knowledge of the topic under study. The questions encompassed depth and detail (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) and were designed to both cover a wide range of experiences and be narrow enough to provide specific details (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). The interviews were conducted until a redundancy in the information was achieved, as per the recommendation of scholars Yvonna Lincoln & Egon Guba (1985). Each interview took, on average, well over one hour. The shortest interview was 37 minutes long, while the longest was 1 hour and 58 minutes.

In total, 23 people were interviewed for this study. In one case the researcher conducted two interviews with the same person - a key Magid staff member – as there was too much to cover in one interview. The researcher started with interviews of known Magid European staff, then used a snowball technique to find other interview subjects. In addition, the researcher gathered 116 names of British presenters and reporters from the Magid archival material. She then used the internet and reached out to the ones she was able to locate via personal websites, LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook accounts. The researcher tried to get an as good sample as possible, utilizing not only people from the

American consultancy company, but also people involved with British media such as journalists, staff and management. The interview subjects were participants who represented the topic under study. A complete list of interview participants and their professional background can be found in Appendix G.

Data Analysis

All of the data was collected and analyzed in several steps at different times during the study. The 2359 pages of Magid archival material were reviewed in-depth in August and early September 2017, prior to the start of the qualitative interviews. The qualitative interviews were conducted at the convenience of each interviewee, from September through December 2017.

When each interview was finished, as a first step, the recording was transcribed. The researcher did this as quickly as possible following each interview so that a timely analysis could be done. In all but one case, a professional transcription company was utilized. The researcher made sure to double-check each transcript for accuracy, before sending it to the interview subjects for a fact check. In most cases, the transcriptions were turned around to the interviewees within a week. Once the transcript had been produced and checked, the next steps were interpretation and analysis of the data.

It is important to note that the transcripts utilized U.S. English, even though the majority of the interview subjects spoke UK English. The basis for this was that the researcher was hearing the interview subjects, rather than reading an account. The researcher made a conscious decision to produce the transcripts in U.S. English, keeping in mind this was research being conducted at Arizona State University, and thus primarily for a U.S.-based audience.

The researcher analyzed a total of 457 transcribed pages from the interviews. She followed qualitative researcher Irving Seidman's (2006) recommendation of reading the transcript and marking down areas of interest. Some of the areas the researcher paid extra attention to were if the information from the interview was consistent with the literature and if any new connections were understood. The point of the analysis was to find out what was learned (Seidman, 2006) from the interview.

Using the literature review as a framework, and through the analysis of the archival artifacts and the qualitative interviews, answers to the research questions emerged naturally. Themes could clearly be seen, starting with the archival material and the interviews backed up those themes.

Ethics and Validity

Analyzing “data for reliability and validity assesses both the objectivity and credibility of research. Validity relates to the honesty and genuineness of the research data, while reliability relates to the reproducibility and stability of the data” (Anderson, 2010, p. 3). In a broad sense, validity is about measuring what the researcher set out to measure (Kvale, 1994).

Trustworthiness and authenticity is important in qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). They can be shown by the researcher's careful documentation and the decisions that are made during the research process (Daymon & Holloway, 2011). Authenticity means examining points of views of a presenter, time and place of an observation, truthfulness and any influencers of the process (Benjamin, 2011). Complementary sources build a stronger case. However, concepts such as reliability and validity are hard in qualitative research because there are so many variables and different

perspectives to take into account (Babbie, 2013). Reliability is not of large concern in qualitative research (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011). In addition, when utilizing in-depth interviews, questions vary depending on the interviewee's particular area of expertise. Nevertheless, the researcher was vigilant to any possible issues related to authenticity, validity and ethics in this study. She used the same process to analyze each of the interview transcript and the same process for reviewing the primary artifacts from the archives. In addition, the interviewer checked and re-checked the interview transcripts. This allowed for repeated observations to ensure the likelihood that the data was indeed correctly analyzed (Olson & Given, 2003).

Information received during the qualitative interviews was crosschecked with other interviews, with archival material, and/or via secondary sources. In addition, key questions were asked of the interview subject more than once to confirm consistent answers. Because so much of an interview relies on someone's memory, the researcher took extra precautions not to provide too much information to the interview subjects with regards to items or events they may not have remembered on their own. The researcher was cautious to strike a balance between how much she revealed to jog someone's memory and how much was too much. If the researcher noticed that an interview subject did not remember an event, she pulled back from that particular topic.

Furthermore, to verify the authenticity of the data collected, the researcher used triangulation. Triangulation is essentially "a set of processes that researchers use to enhance the validity of a study" (Ravitch & Mittenfelner Carl, 2016, p. 194). It means "having different sources or methods challenge and/or confirm a point or set of interpretations" (Ravitch & Mittenfelner Carl, 2016, p. 194-195). Triangulation is thus

when researchers use multiple, different sources of information (Creswell & Miller, 2000). It is important to check interview material with other data (Bodnar, 1989) and scholars should use multiple source (Berry, 2002). Researchers are concerned with validity, meaning the agreement between what is said in an interview and other types of historical sources (Conway; 2014b; Hoffman & Hoffman, 2006; Sharpless, 2006). All the source work needs to match and inconsistencies need to be resolved. The researcher in this study achieved triangulation by verifying facts from the interviews with facts stated in other interviews and written sources as much as possible to ensure validity.

A possible threat to validity was that the researcher was working alone. When working alone, a researcher cannot assume everything is interpreted and analyzed correctly. For this study, the researcher therefore used peer-debriefing and member checks – also commonly referred to as respondent validation (Barbour, 2001) - to ensure details were being portrayed in an as factually correct manner as possible. Archival material and secondary sources also provided a good frame of reference.

Although all research requires mastery of new areas of knowledge, another validity threat is that, despite the researcher having a fairly solid understanding already of privatization and commercialization of media in Europe, her prior research concentrated on Eastern Europe. Because this research focused on the United Kingdom, there was a lot of new material for the researcher to learn and understand.

While Magid has a fairly extensive archive, even that was shown to be incomplete. Qualitative interviews rely on people's memories. Some people have better memories than others, hence the importance to verify the information with other sources. While in-person interviews are always preferred, because of the researcher's limited

travel funds and timeline, interviews were conducted via telephone, Skype, FaceTime and Zoom. That means the researcher's exposure to body language was limited, and the special type of personal connection one can often ascertain with an in-person interview, was not fully established.

Summary

The chapter discussed the methodology used for the study. The research was set up as a qualitative case study. It was important to gather rich, qualitative data, and because of the research questions involved, a case study methodology was most appropriate. Within the case study methodology, primary artifacts and 24 qualitative interviews provided primary evidence to deliver a rich narrative. The interview subjects were Magid staff members and UK media people in the 1990s. As a theoretical framework, Lewin's change theory, and in particular force field analysis, was utilized.

This study began in March 2016, when the researcher was allowed full access to the Magid archives in Marion, Iowa. The bulk of the study, including the qualitative interviews, began, as required, after ASU Institutional Review Board approval in summer 2017. Data was collected and analyzed throughout the study.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

“The timing was perfect, the hunger was there, the need was there and everybody kind of understood it. The old days were coming to an end.”

Ned Warwick, 2017

There were extensive changes in news broadcasting in the UK in the 1990s. Several basic elements of the newscast changed, driven by a combination of elements including technology, American consultants, the franchise auction and increased competition. Many essential newscasts concepts evolved, such as storytelling, sound bites, visuals and graphics, live shots, and tags and transitions. In addition, the roles of presenters and reporters progressed. The 1990s was an era when many changes occurred at the same time in British society, spurring on television news development.

Background information is important in order to understand the context of that era. To answer the research questions – why the American consultants were in the UK, the role they played, the concepts they tried to integrate, and driving and restraining societal forces – a narrative structure guided by themes and topics is used. These themes and topics emerged after the analysis of the archival material and the interviews.

Magid’s Entry into the UK

Two years before the 1988 White Paper on UK broadcasting, Frank N. Magid Associates provided a report for then London-based Worldwide Television News (WTN) (Worldwide Television News, 1986). WTN was a supplier of international news coverage and worked with ABC in the U.S. Because Magid also worked with ABC, the two

companies connected. WTN was interested in offering tailored international services to local American television stations. Despite Magid finding that opportunities existed for WTN in the U.S. market, this project did not move forward.

Magid's work did not go unnoticed, as one of the WTN executives was Paul Fox. Fox had started his career at the BBC and was at the time the managing director for ITV-affiliate Yorkshire Television. Fox was influential and well connected. In 1985, he had been honored with a Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (CBE) award (Bonner & Aston, 1988), and in February 1991, he was given the honor of Knighthood (The London Gazette, 1991) by Queen Elizabeth II. Fox was a powerful connection for Magid. He had heard rumblings that Margaret Thatcher was thinking about doing something dramatic when it came to the ITV television stations. Fox brought Magid onboard to help at Yorkshire Television, thus providing Magid an important entry point into the UK television market.

Magid's Clients

Magid worked with 11 of the accounts involved in the 1991 ITV license auction. They included TV-am, Scottish Television, Anglia Television, Central Television, Ulster Television, Tyne Tees Television, Granada Television, TVS, Westcountry Television, HTV and Yorkshire Television. All in all, nine Magid clients were victorious during their franchise bidding process. TV-am, who had been an incumbent for the breakfast license area, lost their bid to Sunrise. Both had passed the quality threshold, but Sunrise had bid more than double what TV-am had (Davidson, 1992). In addition, TVS had what was determined a failed business plan. Magid did pick up at least one additional client after

the auction, working with the new breakfast franchise, Sunrise. That company changed its name to Good Morning Television (GMTV) prior to their January 1, 1993 launch.

The work leading up to the franchise auction was involved in heavy secrecy. Joe George, Magid's executive vice president and director of marketing at the time, was responsible for sales in Europe. He explained that Magid kept things quiet because "if the word got out, that before the franchise, that some American was going to come in, the PR would have been deadly" for the bidder. Everything was kept top secret. George described a meeting in a butcher shop after Magid had been hired because the client was afraid to be seen with representatives of the American company. In addition, bidding groups used code names to protect their identity. For example, Magid conducted research to provide an assessment of the ITV franchise in Wales and the West of England for Project Actor, "a consortium interested in challenging the HTV franchise" (Project Actor, 1991, pg. 1). They delivered reports in December 1990, March 1991, and April 1991. However, no Magid staff included in this study remembered what company used the Project Actor code name. This may be partly because so many Magid staff members were involved in various aspects and with various accounts in the UK.

Richard Myers, who was helping to run London News for LWT while at the same time secretly working on a franchise bid for Westcountry, said the process was so covert that people involved in the franchise bidding did not know who else was involved. The small group that worked on the Westcountry bid usually meet at a hotel in London by the Paddington Railway Station. Their code name was "Let's Go Gardening." Myers said they "moved strategically from room to room so we didn't meet other people." Charles Munro, the manager of Magid's European operations and the founder of their London

office, said they “had meetings that were so secret that they would sweep the room for microphones and things. Because it had to be so confidential because it was very, very competitive.” They did not want others to know they were bidding until the last minute.

Laurie Upshon, who was Central Television’s controller of news and later controller of news and operations, described similar secrecy, stating, “We had all our meeting rooms swept. Phones were checked. We held meetings offsite.” Companies were registering their corporations calling themselves things like “Midlands Mercia Television or something like that. People thought, ‘Oh, hang on, these are bidders coming in,’ and they registered the company. I reckon two or three of those we’d set up ourselves.” Everything possible was done to throw other potential bidders off.

Myers said when they wrote the actual bid, they moved to “another secret office in Central London, which was actually near the Smithfield Meat Market.” Magid helped put together some of Westcountry’s team members and the consulting firm was “good for bouncing ideas, and they were good for management structure, because the higher echelons of our company had very limited television experience, so they needed Magid’s support in creating the structure of the company.”

Upshon remembered there were “a lot of smoke and mirrors trying to decide how you can get away with a low bid” and if there was anyone bidding against you. Central Television ended up running unopposed and Upshon largely credits that to the size and structure of the coverage area. Anyone bidding against them would have had to promise three news service bureaus and “that I think made it a bit more difficult or frightened off some people from working out the sums.”

Exactly how Magid worked with each client varied, depending on the client's needs and wants. During the time leading up to the franchise auction, Magid helped several clients "put together their business plan" (Munro), as well as help with information for the quality threshold portion of the bid. For clients like Westcountry for example, the business plan also meant, "staffing plans and facilities plans" (Munro), because they wanted to expand their newscast. After the franchise auction, Magid helped primarily with programming and newscast needs (Munro). For some, they only conducted research, for others they tied the research into recommendation for future direction. They also provided varying degrees of staff training.

Magid worked with several television clients at the same time, all over the UK; there were not many areas where the American company did not provide services. In addition to working with ITV franchises and ITN, Magid worked extensively with the BBC as well, both the radio and television divisions in the 1990s. In terms of television, they worked with BBC News in London and several BBC regional outlets.

Magid's Research

The type of research Magid did, "where it looked at the consumer, looked at their appetite for certain types of programming, tested the efficacy of new ideas, it did not exist," said George. Instead, programming tended to be whatever a group of executives decided the audience should watch. Roger Bolton, who worked for the BBC in various roles for over 20 years before moving to Thames Television as their controller of factual programs, said that when they started measuring what the audience was interested in, then it became more about the audience versus "that which the broadcasters thought was important."

Mike Hais was a research analysis for Magid in the 1990s and the first Magid researcher assigned to an account in the UK. He worked with both Worldwide Television News and Yorkshire Television. Hais said “Magid always believed that the consultation we provided was based on research” and how Magid conducted research for their clients varied depending on the client needs. While Hais was the first Magid researcher to enter the UK, others quickly followed. Each Magid researcher was assigned a project and they operated independently of each other; it would have been physically impossible for one researcher to conduct all of the UK research. It was also considered a perk to go abroad.

The first thing Magid did after they had signed up an account was to have what was called a “problem definition” meeting, but it should have been called a “solution definition” meeting instead according to George. It was a meeting to understand the client’s concerns and interests and their perceptions of strengths and weaknesses. Magid staff also gathered basic information such as on-air talent names and special newscast features. “It was just basically a fact-finding mission,” said Hais, as it was important to understand what exactly the client wanted to get out of the research. It was imperative to have the client’s involvement, because if it was purely Magid’s research, George explained, “then they won’t believe it.” After the research had been conducted, Magid sat down with the client to help build a plan and execute it.

One difference between the U.S. and the UK was that while Magid in the U.S. did a lot of telephone research at the time, this was initially not a good way to do research in the UK because of phone penetration and phone use (George; Hais). It was thus not uncommon, especially in the early days, for Magid to do over 1,000 in-home interviews for a television client in the UK. The research process was cumbersome and time

consuming. For example, Magid delivered reports to Scottish Television in February and March 1991, showing they had conducted 1003 in-home interviews in January (Scottish Television, 1991a; Scottish Television, 1991b). Also in January 1991, Magid had done 809 in-home interviews for Ulster TV (Ulster Television, 1991b), and in March 1991, they did 1,000 in-home interviews for Granada (Granada Television, 1991c; Granada Television, 1991d). In October and November 1991, Magid had conducted 1,012 in-home interviews for BBC Wales (BBC Wales, 1991) and in July and August 1993 they did 800 in-home interviews (BBC Wales, 1993a).

Magid was very concerned about methodology, especially for their first UK ITV account – Yorkshire Television. They had to figure out which questions were suitable and which were not, and what terminology was appropriate. They had an extensive pre-testing stage of their questionnaires before they conducted their actual research and their clients always approved the questionnaires. In addition, they retained local, UK-based professional interviewers to do the actual in-home interviewing. This was done to ensure respondents felt comfortable and to better understand cultural nuances (Hais); a local interviewer would better understand the subtext of what was going on. Having an American ask the questions may have influenced how people responded (George). Hais recalled a chatty and pleasant process as he went on the first in-home pre-test interviews, being given cookies and tea by the homeowners and staying for a long time. George explained that was because people were excited to talk about television.

Magid utilized in-home interviews for studies on a national level too. In June 1992, the company did in-home interviews with over 1,000 viewers from across the UK.

Their client, Independent Television News, wanted to see how their evening newscast related to the BBC's *The Nine O'Clock News* (Independent Television News, 1992c).

There were times when Magid did use telephone interviews. In April 1992 they conducted 725 phone interviews, with a follow-up phase in May 1992 of 400 phone interviews (Independent Television News, 1992a). This study was done for ITN as they had done substantial changes, including their 5:40 newscast changing its name to *The Early Evening News* (Independent Television News, 1992b).

Most of Magid's research was quantitative, but the research could contain open-ended questions as well (Hais). Many times, especially when it came to presenter and reporter analysis, Magid used a mixed methods approach, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. For example, when they were identifying female presenters for Good Morning Television in May 1992 (Good Morning Television, 1992a). Magid used respondents in Glasgow, Leeds and London to get a good cross-section of the British morning audience. Later they did a similar set-up in Manchester to test female and male presenters (Good Morning Television, 1992b), and another one in Essex (Good Morning Television, 1992c). Two years later, they conducted nine focus groups in three locations – Chester, Glasgow and Enfield, to examine female presenters, a male fill-in presenter and two weather presenters (Good Morning Television, 1994). In many cases, follow-up research was done with the original respondents. Munro said you cannot draw scientific conclusions from focus groups. The best use is “for very specific things and then perhaps to generate questions you can then take out to a wider survey,” he explained.

Generally, especially in the early days, Magid researchers tried to describe key concepts to respondents. Sometimes Magid used videotapes to show programming

(Hais). For example, at Westcountry Television, Magid played videotapes to an audience and analyzed their reaction (Myers).

Stuart Prebble, whose roles have included ITV's controller of factual programs, chief executive of Granada Sky Broadcasting, chief executive of ITV Digital and chief executive of ITV, was with Granada Television in the 1990s. He explained when the research was presented at Granada, "we took it seriously." Alan Fisher, who is currently a senior correspondent with Al Jazeera English, was a reporter and presenter at Scottish Television. Fisher remembered the staff received "some of the bare audience feedback, not the full details that the bosses would have gotten." In terms of the feedback about him personally, it was that "people liked me reading the news, but they preferred it much more when I was out reporting," adding, it "dictated how my time was split." That was ok with him since it was exactly how he wanted it.

The research Magid did for Ulster Television was very specific in terms of the data sample because of the turmoil at the time between the UK and Northern Ireland. The station was walking an incredible tightrope and "even a hint of being biased would have been a deathblow to those people," explained George. "It was probably the most sensitive piece of research we ever did over there." The research results were, according to Hais, usually "clear cut enough that the recommendations weren't that difficult to make. And our biggest concern from time to time was making sure that we weren't stepping on too many cultural toes." When Magid did their research they found differences, sometimes significant differences, between what the audience wanted in the various ITV regions (Munro). While there were some items content wise that were applicable across the board, Munro said Magid "always took each case as an individual case."

Tom Sattizahn, then Magid's manager, international client services, said, "research was the foundation of anything I said. If I couldn't prove it by research, I wouldn't go there." However, there are television techniques related to storytelling that can be taught without conducting research. Reagan Ramsey, who was a television news director before becoming a senior international consultant for Magid, said the company never insisted that their clients do research, but that he is a firm believer in research. Research "doesn't give you all the answers" he said. "It gives you pathways." It shows where needs are that are not being met and "where there are gaps. It will tell you what's important and what isn't important." If the client did not want Magid to conduct research, they asked for any research that client may have already done. Generally, the client's own research was not specific enough for Magid's needs (Ramsey).

Magid's Training

Magid had several staff members that conducted various types of television training for their UK clients. Mackie Morris was a vice president, THE MAGID INSTITUTE™, and one of the first to provide training in the UK. He usually went to each client at the beginning of a relationship. There Morris conducted three and four hour seminars, usually two seminars at a time, all around skills, meaning "writing, storytelling, production, performance, video do's and don'ts." The sessions were intense. The first part involved lecturing and illustrating and "the point was for those audiences to learn and implement." The second half of the training was more of a conversation where they "engaged in storytelling" and where Morris reviewed their work. He worked with ITV franchises, as well as BBC Wales and the seminars took place wherever there was room;

in the spare studio at the station, a restaurant down the road, and even a church. The sessions included not only the news division, but other departments as well.

Before going to conduct a training session, Morris would want to “know people’s names, and I wanted to know geography of a place, names as best I could.” He also tailored his presentations for his British audience in terms of grammar, and while he felt being an American was not an issue, he always kept the audience in focus. “I always remember being aware of the need to make sure the receiver of the message, that those in the audiences, were interested and willing and able to participate.” Morris had mostly great U.S. examples to share at first, but eventually he could fold UK ones into his presentations too. As trainer, his “task was always to show ‘here’s how we do it and here’s why we do it this way. So let’s see how you can achieve the same results within your style and your approach, your culture.’”

Magid staff members Carla Hargis, Tom Sattizahn, Reagan Ramsey, Ned Warwick, Terry Page and Jeff Puffer also did training seminars. They reviewed newscasts and storytelling techniques and sat down with presenters and reporters to discuss their work. Terry Page, whose first television job was with Worldwide Television News in South Africa and who currently works for the Foreign Press Association in London, was one of Magid’s BBC trainers. The two-day master classes she was involved in “touched on everything – writing, producing, teases, headlines. I mean every single aspect of putting together a 30-minute news broadcast.” When Ramsey worked with the BBC’s political unit, that work was slightly different, more conceptual than his other work, as they tried “to introduce a lot of advanced storytelling.” He was careful with showing American stories because “they were almost 100 percent dismissive of

American television.” Ned Warwick, who had overseen coverage of Europe, the Middle East and Africa for ABC News in London prior to joining Magid to work with the BBC, explained they would use as few American examples as possible. Page described it was important “that the examples we showed were never too American” as “there was always a feeling that American television was kind of dumbed down, compared with British television.” They would frequently show good British examples first, to sort of soften up the audience, then use “a fantastic example of an American correspondent doing the same thing” because “people had a limited tolerance” for American examples, she explained.

Sattizahn said because he was American, it was “a huge mountain to overcome. And so I think my tenet was I didn’t show them U.S. examples of everything.” He would go into a training session, showing them different ways to tell a story, trying to show examples from the BBC, ITV and Australian television. “People were surprised that they could start analyzing storytelling, and realize that it really comes across as completely different, and the story is different based upon angles that they are taking.”

Warwick, because of his work at ABC London, knew several of the British reporters and “understood the buzz in the world of British media and the culture around it ... I think I had a little more sensitivity to where the land mines were” and that was a large advantage, especially when working inside the BBC. His first BBC entry was with lower-level managers on the marketing end, merely discussing the BBC’s strengths and weaknesses and how they could improve. From there it snowballed to news managers and even a presentation to the head of the BBC News. The training sessions would go on for years, with Warwick and Page trying to improve and upgrade their presentations each time. In all of it, Warwick described how he was led by the respect he had for the BBC

brand “and that good journalism had to be the key priority.” It was a sensitive undertaking for the BBC, “opening itself to an American consultant ... was extraordinary, and we had to be respectful” of whom they were. The work was needed in “how to produce stories better, how to produce the broadcast itself, how to write, how to do standups.” It was “taking and overhauling all those notions and trying to bring them forward into contemporary times.” Warwick and Page worked with the BBC in London, as well as with BBC’s local broadcasts around the country. The BBC understood changes were coming; it was going to become more competitive (Warwick).

Ramsey had thankfully done his homework the first time he met with the BBC’s political unit. One of the main reporters – Andrew Marr - raised his hand and asked Ramsey to provide an evaluation of Marr’s work prior to the start of the actual training. Marr wanted to know where Ramsey thought improvements may be needed. Ramsey had anticipated it, and “I actually had a pretty strong opinion about it.” He talked for about 20 minutes about Marr’s work and the work of the political unit, “a lot of it complimentary, but some critical stuff too.” After Ramsey stopped, he said Marr stated the information was fair and he was interested in working with Ramsey. Warwick had a similar experience. About 15 minutes into a training session, a BBC science correspondent interrupted and stated loudly how he thought the information was a bunch of garbage. Warwick thought, “Oh, God, this is what I was expecting. This is what I feared. How are we, as Americans going to ever get on this beach if there is just that kind of resistance, and it’s just so explicit?” Then three or four voices spoke up and told the science reporter to be quiet. Those voices won the day and it got easier after that. Warwick namedropped as a way to show he had been paying attention to what the BBC staff was doing.

Munro described how his probably most memorable work was at BBC in Westminster. He could see Big Ben outside the window and was “talking about writing with BBC journalists, talking about the use of their language. Here’s an American guy talking and having them take notes.”

Ramsey said, “getting people to change how they do things is hard.” The goal was always to teach someone “really good journalism.” Writing, video, natural sound, sound bites, graphics etc., is all interwoven. To get someone to a high level, “you have to work with them on all those pieces.” UK television had always been good with content and substance, but not so good at presentation. Sattizahn recalled doing seminars for reporters and photographers at BBC Wales on how to do live shots. That was fairly new because the technology had not been sophisticated enough before. Warwick felt reporters in particular were hungry for feedback and advice on how to do their job better.

The Magid crew talked to Granada’s entire news team on several occasions. “They were brilliant,” said Prebble, although the staff was skeptical at first. The Magid people had done their homework. When they entered the room, “they knew a number of faces around, because they were onscreen people. They were really good at saying, ‘when Bob over there does his piece on...’ and they’d refer to a piece that had been done the week before.” They knew half a dozen names, their presentations were slick, and it was persuasive. “I think people who came to it feeling skeptical went away thinking, ‘Yeah, there are things we can learn.’”

Scottish Television’s senior program producer, Angus Simpson, worked as a reporter and presenter for the station during the 1990s. He not only worked on their lunchtime newscast, but also on their flagship evening news, *Scotland Today*. Simpson

described how Magid staff sat in the studio during the news broadcasts and then took each person aside to give them recommendations. “It was an important thing. It was a very significant thing for us ... because we had never been style coached in terms of how we looked, and how we behaved, and how we presented the news.” Fisher, who then was also on-air talent at Scottish Television, remembers a writing training session with Magid. He is not a big fan of consultants and “there was a lot of skepticism about Magid. I understand why the company did it. And there were a few things that you could take away. I don’t think it was a wholly pointless exercise.”

Lindsay Charlton worked for several ITV outlets in various roles, including being the managing director for LWT, Meridian and ITV Local. He also worked for Granada, Thames and the London News Network. In the 1990s, Charlton was a reporter and presenter at *London Tonight*. He felt Magid was good at television and explained how “television is a visual medium and it’s not radio” meaning “television is always received first by the retina, not by the ear.” Magid made the crew at *London Tonight* understand how visual television is. “They had lots of good examples and interesting ways of using pictures.”

Richard Sambrook is currently a journalism professor at Cardiff University and a senior research associate at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in the UK. In the early 1990s, he was a news editor with BBC News, before getting promoted to head of newsgathering overseeing both radio and television correspondents. He also worked as their director of UK news and director of global news before leaving. Sambrook explained that while the BBC had its own training for journalists, it was a “very basic form of journalism training” and “less about the kind of performance aspect of television

news, and less about the more sophisticated elements of storytelling” than Magid’s training. At the BBC in London, Magid did an initial review, before doing workshops.

ITV Versus BBC

Several patterns emerged showing basic differences between ITV and BBC stations. Generally the ITV stations were viewed as having an advantage, being seen as the local stations for their particular areas. ITV was perceived by journalists to be more innovative, while the BBC was more structured but the BBC had more resources. There were also fairly clear social class differences in the ITV-BBC audience structure.

Hometown Advantage

In the regions, generally the ITV franchise was viewed as the hometown television station. Alan Douglas, a BBC Scotland television and radio presenter whose duties included anchoring their flagship evening TV news, *Reporting Scotland*, explained it had to do with how the regions were split; they did not always line up between BBC and ITV. Douglas essentially covered three ITV areas – Scottish Television in the central area, Border Television in the border between Scotland and England, and Grampian Television in the north. The ITV stations could devote more attention to a specific area, “whereas we had to look at the whole of Scotland ... I think they did a better job catering for the local community than we did.” Bolton added one of the strengths of the ITV affiliates was that they were close “to the community they served, and they knew what was happening.”

Sambrook argued because the BBC had local radio, their regional television stations were seen as hometown stations too. He said, “The BBC had a long history of being the voice of community issues.” Barbara Gibbon, one of the few women in

leadership positions in UK television news at the time, worked for TV-am as a program editor and head of the features department. She agreed with Sambrook and did not believe the ITV franchises had an attitudinal advantage in the region. Gibbon began her television career with the BBC in the north and they had a well-known presenter in Mike Neville. She strongly felt the BBC affiliate had the pulse on that region better than ITV, saying, “I don’t think ITV had anything like the edge of the BBC in the northeast throughout the 90s.” Prebble acknowledged the northeast being a strong BBC outlet at one point, but said ITV has generally always been strongest in regional news. He explained, “ITV always beat the BBC in regional news because ITV was a much more regionally-based service.” But Sattizahn said that BBC Wales was very much a hometown station; it had both English and Welsh television and radio. “They were as local as you could get, and were highly respected.”

Many times viewers did not agree if the BBC regional outlet had its own identity or if it was merely an extension of the BBC. Simpson said the local BBC stations were all “styled the same, they looked the same, the editorial policies were the same, the sets were identical. You felt like you were looking at a local version of a national product.” Sattizahn explained the BBC was uniform throughout the country graphically so it was easy to see which news was on a BBC station. Simpson felt the BBC reporters “came out as clones of each other” because they had gone to the same BBC training school. In Wales, Magid recommended that “the more clearly BBC Wales defines its own image separate from the BBC will only enhance BBC Wales’ image among its viewers” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 22).

Across the board, the Magid research material showed a general lack of audience attachment. There was not much of a preference when it came to ITV versus the BBC and no firm commitment to the ITV affiliates. In the case of Granada, Magid was surprised the research showed viewers age 65 and older barely had a local favorite news channel. That was highly unusual as normally older viewers tended to be the most attached audience (Granada Television, 1989). With Anglia Television, Magid found that the “majority of viewers have difficulty differentiating *Anglia News* from its BBC counterpart, *Look East* (Anglia Television, 1991a, p. 2).

Stewart Purvis worked for ITN, the equivalent of the U.S. network level, for over 30 years. His last role was as chief executive where he oversaw news for ITN, Channel 4 and Channel 5. He has also been a content regulator with Ofcom, the UK’s communications regulator, and is currently a non-executive member of Channel 4’s board. During the 1990s, Purvis was ITN’s editor-in-chief. He explained while they would never call it an affiliate system in the UK, “that’s the way it sort of worked.” However, while the network affiliation is showcased at the local television level in the U.S., “the phrase ITV was rarely ever used on the screen.” In addition, “every region was known by its regional name, so, in Ulster, they were always watching Ulster Television. They didn’t call it ITV.” Furthermore, “that meant that there was this sort of sense of identity about these stations.” Another example was Granada, a name inspired by a place in Spain. “Everyone said they lived in Granada Land. Well, they didn’t, actually. People said they lived in Granada Land, although they lived in Manchester or Liverpool.” Charlton added to that, saying, “people would say I live in the Anglia region. They didn’t say I live in the BBC East region.” He thought part of that was because they were

individual brands and looked different from one another. Penny Chrimes described how “people just felt your franchise belonged to your area” and it had a “stronger sense of identity.” She worked at TV-am as an assistant editor and program editor in the 1990s, before building a long career at Sky News.

Often it came down to whatever time the audience sat down to watch the news. Because the ITV affiliates and BBC rarely went head-to-head with their newscasts, it was also not unusual for someone to watch the news on one station and then switch over to the other station. In Ulster Television’s case, because the audience rarely watched the entire newscast, Magid recommended they “work to keep *Six Tonight* compelling and interesting throughout the programme” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 8).

The interviewees agreed that if a big story broke, viewers tended to turn to the BBC, especially if it was a big national or international story. That aligned with Magid’s findings; there were tremendous opportunities for ITV affiliates at the local level. The ITV stations also generally had a significant attitudinal advantage, but needed to play it up better. For local news, “viewers tend to prefer their regional ITV channel over the BBC” (Anglia Television, 1991a, p. 7). Magid found that Ulster TV had a “tremendous attitudinal advantage over the BBC, as viewers are heavily predisposed towards favouring Ulster Television, especially in the area of local news” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 1) Ulster TV needed to “reinforce its product and take better advantage of its attitudinal lead over the BBC” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 1). The station also needed strengthen its community involvement. Munro explained how in Ulster’s case, everything had to be done with extreme caution “because you were televising news to a divided community” in Northern Ireland. He described how later on, when they were no longer

working with Ulster, Magid worked with BBC Northern Ireland and focused on what “BBC Northern Ireland has to be, has to be seen to be.”

Magid suggested Granada Television work hard to become viewed as a “solid, trustworthy, and reliable source of important local news” (Granada Television, 1991b, p. 1) and the station viewers turned to “in times of crisis and emergency” (Granada Television, 1991b, p. 12). In Scotland, although Scottish Television was the station people turned to for big, local news, Magid proposed they “more effectively promote the channel’s strength and convert viewer’s attitudinal preferences for Scottish Television into actual viewing behavior” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 1).

Magid found that the first item that came to viewers’ minds with ITV programming was *Coronation Street*. Local news was consistently the second top mention (Granada Television, 1991c; Granada Television, 1991d; Ulster Television, 1992).

In terms of the BBC and Independent Television at the “network” level, Magid worked both with BBC in London and ITN. ITN supplied the national news to all the ITV affiliates. Magid found similar pattern at the national level that they had at the regional level. BBC One was the channel viewers were most likely to prefer for national and world news, over ITN. However, they also found a significant cross-viewership (BBC News, 1992; Independent Television News, 1992c).

Freedom Versus Structure

Respondents felt the ITV stations overall had more freedom and could be more creative, while the BBC was more rigid in its structure and news reporting. Usually, if

someone had worked for an ITV station, they felt strongly that it was the better environment and vice versa.

ITV companies were “prepared to do things that were a slightly different way,” said Chrimes. “And experiment.” Myers described himself as “strongly an ITV man. I didn’t really approve of the way the BBC was run, the lack of innovation and the lack of freedom. And I think if you were a creative person, ITV was the place to be.” Charlton labeled ITV a “vibrant place to work, a creative place to work.” Simpson said it had “a very different presentation style. It’s more friendly, informal, more integrated style of presentation” and that is what drew him to his local ITV station. Purvis started out with the BBC and then worked for ITN for 31 years. He felt the BBC “was like being in the army ... you belong to a company, or a regiment, or a battalion, but you don’t really have much connection to anybody else.” At ITV, “we were bolder, braver” and the “BBC would always be more ... conservative, more restrained” especially when it came to coverage of political matters. Prebble thought similarly and found it difficult to move across units with the BBC early in his career. However, he also said there was creative freedom within the BBC, depending on which unit you belonged to. ITV was braver than the BBC for news and current affairs. Prebble joined Granada because he wanted to work with their *World in Action* program and felt the station “was well-known to be quite a radical company. It was much less conservative than the other ITV companies.”

The BBC was “trying to compete with the commercial stations, but with one hand tied behind the back because they were still a public organization,” said Douglas. They had to comply with the terms of the BBC charter and had “a responsibility to educate, inform and entertain.” Douglas said commercial stations “could take a risk. They could

be a little more maverick than the BBC could ... I felt we were quite restricted, whereas they had freedom.” Bolton explained that ITV could be “lighter on their feet,” adding they could “take risks that the BBC doesn’t.” He said, “BBC has got to be right. So, BBC will tend to wait. That means slightly cautious but also getting a second source or third source for something.” He attributed that to “partly because it’s a bit more bureaucratic, mainly because of its reputation. The BBC’s job is to get it right.” Page described the BBC as being afraid to lose the license fee. It was cautious and never wanted to be “too much of anything. It’s the middle porridge. It’s the Goldilocks’s porridge kind of scenario,” said Page. The BBC newscast was, in Warwick’s words, “noble in its intentions and serious in its agenda, but stiff and inaccessible. Predictable, a little dull,”

Resources

When it came to news resources, who was stronger depended on where you were. BBC Wales’ “reporting resources blanketed the region, providing comprehensive coverage more capable than on HTV Wales” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 9). In addition, with the BBC, worldwide resources were readily available. Douglas felt “the resources were immense and you always knew that was available to you.” The BBC had far more resources than ITV and bureaus around the world (Bolton) and the BBC coverage had greater depth because they had, according to Gibbon, “so many more people on the ground” than ITV. They could muster a lot of forces when the story needed it. Douglas said he could do more in-depth stories than his ITV counterparts because he was allowed more time. If it was a major news item, “I could have three, four, five minutes to cover it, and we could have various aspects to it.”

The 1990s was also a period when the BBC invested a lot of money into their news operation. Sambrook described it as a “period of real growth and development” and a great time to be at BBC news headquarters. “ITV was a formidable competitor, but did not have the scale or resources that the BBC offered.” The BBC “had a lot more correspondents,” both in the UK and in bureaus abroad. ITV also did not have as many foreign bureaus as the BBC did.

While the BBC had more resources, ITV was a little more enterprising. Purvis said sometimes that “was driven out of the fact that we had so much less resources than the BBC, we had to be enterprising to remain competitive.” Sambrook agreed that the BBC was perhaps more rigid, but that it was because the BBC was “a big battleship whereas ITV was a, kind of, smaller and nimbler operation that could turn things around.” At the BBC it was “more complicated because it’s bigger to coordinate and takes longer therefore to, kind of, move and it’s logistically more complex.”

Prebble found “ITV would be better resourced” than the BBC in the regions. At Westcountry, they had a lot more photographers in the 1990s than the BBC. Myers said “we had probably between 15 and 20 video units out every day ... the BBC in those days had probably four or five. We were three to one in shooting power.”

The BBC name was a resource when it came to lining up interviews. Douglas said, “When you phone someone up wanting an interview and said you were from the BBC, that really carried some authority. People would put down what they were doing. They would stop what they were doing to talk to the BBC.” Ramsey stated the BBC had “credible credentialed people no matter where they went.”

Social Class

Magid's research showed there was a difference in the viewership between ITV and the BBC in terms of social class. The ITV stations tended to have a lower social class audience than the BBC (BBC Wales, 1991; Granada Television, 1990; Scottish Television, 1990; Ulster Television 1991a; Ulster Television, 1991b). For Granada Television, Magid clearly saw "Granada is strongest among downmarket viewers (manual workers and those not working)" (Granada Television, 1990, p. 1). However, they did find the station was competitive among lucrative upmarket viewers too. For Scottish Television, Magid's research indicated the station was strongest with women and those in lower social classes (Scottish Television, 1991b).

With BBC Wales, Magid's message was clear – strengthen the appeal of your news to women or you are "alienating a critical demographic group" (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 29). They suggested targeting issues of interest to women, younger people and lower social classes by "thoughtful editorial selection, careful pacing, and clear writing" (BBC Wales, 1993b, p. 22).

Just as Magid had found in the regions, there was a difference at the national level too. ITN's audience tended to be in the lower social grades with BBC's audience being the higher social grades (Independent Television News, 1992b).

Douglas used the Scottish expression "cuthie" when he described the ITV stations. The expression means "'come on, we're all pals, or we're all in this together,' whereas the BBC was a bit more, 'We're above all that. We're a bit more sophisticated.'" The ITV affiliates "were more friendly, and more down to earth, and more talking at the same level as their audience," said Douglas. They catered more to soaps and comedy

shows, while the BBC was more serious news and documentaries. Charlton said ITV was more in tuned to the way younger people were living; the “BBC was probably aimed at an older audience.” His station had a “much broader agenda” and a “more tabloid-y, showbiz approach to the city of London” than the BBC did.

Television News in the 1990s and the Franchise Auction

Watching television news in the UK in the 1990s was so-called “appointment viewing.” Fisher described how people came home after work, had dinner, then sat down in front of the television. “The first thing they’d do,” he said, “is watch local news.” Sattizahn concurred, adding it was a conscious decision, and if they wanted to watch news, they turned on the newscast, and then turned it off afterwards. He said the UK viewers “were very, very caught up in routines.”

The UK news broadcasts were very different from U.S. broadcasts; European television news overall was years behind the U.S. (Warwick). UK news was conservative and boring. George felt “television news was literally a cure for insomnia” and “television compared to American television was in the dark ages.” Television news was “almost like Moses with the tablets” he said. “Here we are. Read them. Here it is.” It was providing the facts, but “you wouldn’t have understood what it meant to you.” Munro described it as “by production standards these days, it was very primitive” and Hais explained “it was much more formal than in the United States at the time. I would say more standardized than we saw here.” UK television, according to Morris, was “stylistically much more conservative than we were, more mundane in terms of production values.” Gibbon called TV news in the 1990s for ponderous, quite slow and not very slick, while Page described it as “dull, safe.” Magid talent coach, Jeff Puffer,

worked with reporters and presenters on their on-air delivery. He called UK news “sterile,” saying, “there was a great deal of reserve in their style.”

However, the interviewees described a transformation of UK television in the 1990s. Many of the changes were because of advances in technology, and that in turn resulted in a more competitive climate. The 1991 ITV franchise auction was in many ways a springboard for the marketization of UK television; the viewers gained importance. The 1990s was a period of tremendous growth for the industry, a period of expansion. Upshon described how they were questioning things more and it was “an exciting time both in terms of program content and technology.”

The early 1990s was “the last boom years of commercial television as it had been originally envisaged in the UK,” according to Fisher. He said television felt uncertain because “there was a feeling that changes were coming ... it was a real time of, on one hand optimism, but also uncertainty of what lay ahead.” Bolton said what happened was that “news got large audiences” and competition increased in terms of channels. If someone did not want to watch the news, they could easily switch the channel to something more entertaining.

Because Magid was involved in research with several clients very early, and with some of the actual 1991 franchise bids, their archival material referenced the auction. In 1990, Magid provided Central Television a report that among other items assessed the station’s positioning in the marketplace (Central Television, 1990). For Granada Television, research covered items directly related to the auction. Magid had asked if viewers could identify which ITV franchise covered the northwest and “virtually all (96%) of the respondents correctly identify Granada Television in this regard” (Granada

Television, 1991d, p. 4). They also found that “most viewers (71%) would miss Granada Television at least a little if it stopped broadcasting tomorrow and were replaced by a new ITV company” (Granada Television, 1991d, p. 21).

In March 1991, Magid explained to Anglia Television that “only 55 per cent of the viewers were aware that Anglia Television would be competing with others for the contract to serve the East of England” (Anglia Television, 1991a, p. 20). While the majority of respondents preferred Anglia got the contract rather than a new ITV company, over a fourth said they did not really care.

The awareness and impact of the auction can be debated. Emily Bell, the director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia’s Graduate School of Journalism in New York, worked as a media business editor for *The Observer* in the UK in the 1990s. She described the “public mood as largely oblivious” and it “hit home when the franchises were changed.” As can be expected, ITV personnel felt it and were aware. People like Myers who had helped with Westcountry’s bid had a lot riding on the auction. He took out a personal loan to buy shares in the company and “for a lot of people at the top of ITV, in the early 1990s, it was precarious.”

Many stations, such as Scottish Television, went through heavy changes to get ready for the auction. The time leading up to it was nerve-wracking. Simpson described “the Day of the Long Knives,” when the staff was “called together as a news team, and we were told that there were going to be some stringent cuts.” Scottish TV was becoming leaner for the auction and it was a brutal day. The staff was told to go back to their desks and “you can imagine the atmosphere sitting in the newsroom that day waiting for your phone to ring. Then you’re seeing your best friend’s telephone ringing, and ok, and they

left the room and didn't come back." But, Scottish Television was ready for the auction. They "had trimmed back. We had gone to the gym. We were lean and mean, and we were ready to fight at that point."

Scottish Television had been "reinvigorated and recreated," said Fisher, and it was "very much of the time. It was youthful, aspirational, different." He described Scottish Television's bid of some £2,000 "like betting the house at Vegas and winning. It was great, and there was a real joy and celebration at that point." Similarly, Central Television had gone through downsizing and restructuring prior to the auction; they too bid only £2,000. Central was "actually a lot leaner than we were before," said Upshon. "We were quite a strong, if you like, incumbent to dislodge." When they found out they had won, "there were pictures of the fax, the champagne opened." Staff members were given a bonus. In contrast, one of Upshon's friends at a different station received bad news. There "were some winners and losers and tears and smiles on that day."

Because ITN was a news provider, Purvis explained they did not have any issues with the auction but were aware it was going to happen. Gibbon said because she had been offered a couple of jobs, the auction personally did not bother her. However, when TV-am lost the license, "there was a sense of sadness that we'd all been through so much." She felt it must have been particularly difficult for older people who may not get a similar job. Chrimes, who worked with Gibbon, described the grief as "there was a sense of a family that was breaking up" and "the shock of having to find a job." They assumed they would win the auction because the managing director had a good relationship with Thatcher. Losing the franchise came as a shock to staff.

The auction was “quite an odd way to settle the future of your commercial broadcasting sector, and it was very clearly done to favor certain parties over others,” said Bell. The way the auction was structured – selling to the highest bidder with sealed bids – Bolton explained as “insane.” The incumbents had fixed costs and studios to deal with. If they needed to do a staff reduction, they had to pay redundancy payments. “A company coming from the outside without any of this could of course bid much higher,” said Bolton, adding, “Thames didn’t bid high enough and it lost to somebody with no experience of making programs.” Bolton was summoned to the studio and watched people cry. “I’d only been there a short term. For lots of people, it was just devastating.” The next 15 months before they went off the air, Thames became an “increasingly, daily, more isolated, silent office.”

At BBC Scotland, Douglas “wasn’t aware of the auction taking place. It just was something that really didn’t affect me ... So I didn’t appreciate what turned out to be the implications of what went on then.” BBC was protected from the auction. Sambrook explained that they “watched from the sidelines and reported on but it didn’t affect us directly in any way.” BBC’s main competitor, ITN, was not going to be affected either.

While there is an argument the UK did not have fully developed commercial television prior to the auction because it was too heavily regulated, it was still commercial television, just not as commercially driven as today. “Commercial means making your money by advertising, and they were making a lot of money” explained Prebble. “They weren’t notably less regulated after that franchise round. They’ve certainly become a lot less regulated now.” Myers described that “commerciality just changed.” It became a situation where “ITV became far more accountable, not just to the

government, but in a commercial sense. So you had to know what you were doing to make money.”

There had been many franchise renewal terms prior to 1991, and Sambrook argued this franchise auction did not change much. “It was certainly commercial television before those franchises and after. It became more competitive, but it was the same model,” he said. However, Myers explained this auction was different “because it was a double whammy. It was a bid process where you had to bid cash, and it was a bid process with standards of broadcast.” It was the first time broadcast quality standards and revenue to the government were combined. This auction, according to Upshon, “was unique in that the government had decided that it wasn’t just going to be a beauty parade of applicants submitting their plans on paper.” This time, the government decided they were going to auction the franchises to receive extra money.

Before the 1991 auction, “you’d always get your franchise back,” explained Purvis, “just on the basis of the quality of the service that you had provided, and were promising to provide.” Thatcher changed that when she suggested it was going to be decided simply on the highest financial bid. The quality threshold was then added when many, including Prebble, spoke up about the need for it. In Granada’s case, “the introduction of this element in the criteria for awarding the franchise saved Granada,” because the competitor had bid more money. In the preparation process, Prebble said Granada had done “a load of reorganization of the service in order to make that happen, including hiring Magid.”

A lot of the companies running for a license wanted to be able to show they had done research to meet audience needs (Sattizahn). Munro described the quality threshold

as “undefined. Not clear. Just quality” and George stated it was “in the eyes of the beholder. And it was a bit vague as to exactly what that would mean.” George remembered working with clients to help them “structure the programming quality threshold strategy.” The vagueness of the quality threshold was good, according to Prebble. If it had been spelled out that a station had to show a certain amount of programs, “people could have just ticked those boxes and presumably demonstrated that they could make it.”

Respondents testified that leading up to the auction, political news was covered the same way it always had. There was no change, even if a franchise was in danger. “If you told reporters to just be careful because the franchise was coming up, and Granada management had discovered it, they would be furious,” said Prebble. Simply “the notion that you’d hedge your coverage in any way because of that would have sent people into orbit.” Simpson described how “we were encouraged to be entirely objective, and straight down the line,” he said. “We simply did our jobs ... and let the viewers make up their minds.” Bolton did not tread lightly with political stories and his team would not have let him, even if he would have wanted to. The controversial *Death on a Rock* about IRA members killed in Gibraltar and the outfall from that would be an example of how Thames did not back down with story coverage. At the BBC, Sambrook said, “it was a business and media story that we reported on like other business and media stories.”

Television Ratings in the UK

The respondents were divided about whether ratings mattered in the UK prior to the auction. The Broadcaster’s Audience Research Board (BARB) delivered official viewing figures for the television audience in the UK in the 1990s (Broadcasters’

Audience Research Board, n.d.). During that time, “most of Western Europe was using peplemeters to measure television viewing” (Webster, Phalen & Lichty, 2014, p. 33). These peplemeters was an audience measurement tool that could monitor television viewing activity and even allowed the viewers to indicate who was watching.

For some, ratings truly did matter; for others, they were not a vital part. There was a saying you could “have put a test pattern on and 2 million would have watched it,” George said. It was not about getting the “audience voice into the programming strategies.” Because advertising revenue had to be balanced with spending, Myers always cared about ratings. However, “the 1990s budgets were analyzed more in detail ... You had to be economic in the way you did things.”

Ratings were imperative at TV-am. Because they had almost gone bankrupt in the 1980s, “ratings mattered massively,” Gibbon explained. Chrimes said it was “the most commercially aware organization I’ve ever worked for. We knew down to the minute who was watching.” Gibbon, as a program editor, described sitting next to the person selling the airtime, asking what was coming up. “What came in the breaks straight away was hugely important.” At TV-am “you would get figures almost straight away, as soon as you came off air.” This was in stark contrast to her experience later in satellite and subscription television where “ratings seemed to be almost irrelevant.” They were also incentivized to do well at TV-am because if they “had a good year, we would all be better rewarded.”

At ITN, Purvis did not face the daily issues Gibbon and Chrimes did. While there were commercial pressures prior to the franchise auction, there were not really commercial burdens on a day-to-day basis. But there was cost pressure from the

customers, the ITV affiliates. Purvis had to reduce the budget and make things more commercially sustainable. He called it becoming marketized, which meant trimming staff, making the budget more viable and making the station more competitive so that outside competitors could not take over news for the ITV affiliates. There “was a constant pressure to beat the BBC in terms of the onscreen product, whilst reducing the cost.” For 30 years, the only commercial channel had been ITV, “and advertisers couldn’t go anywhere else.” ITV franchises were viewed as a license to print money. Then “thanks to Margaret Thatcher, the situation came to a sudden halt, and there were competitors everywhere. And so it’s totally understandable that ITV had to completely change its game,” he said. The launch of Sky News created further competition.

At Scottish Television, they were aware of ratings, but it was more to see if they were on the right track with their viewers than in terms of competition (Simpson). In addition, ITV station and the BBC regional outlet were not on the air at the same time so they were never in direct competition (Simpson; Warwick). Sometimes Scottish Television even shared resources with the BBC. “We would quite happily share facilities and share resources and take turns with each other,” said Simpson. “It was all very gentlemanly and very polite at the time.”

Ratings did not matter as much because there was less competition. In addition, ratings depended on the audience that was inherited from the program prior to the newscast (Bolton). Ratings, especially in the early days of ITV, were “a very long way down your list of things to worry about,” explained Prebble. If a station is the only place to advertise, low ratings actually provides more money. If ratings are low, and an advertiser needs to reach a certain amount of viewers, then they buy more ad time.

Prebble contended “certainly most in the BBC had never heard the word ratings” but Sambrook explained the BBC “has always been a mass audience public provider so we were very competitive with the ratings.” The BBC in order to justify its public funding and presence “has always had the view it needed to deliver strong ratings.”

At BBC Scotland, Douglas said he had a good working relationship with his colleagues from the commercial station, “but we were in competition ... we were always trying to get one over on the other.” They were “working under a lot of commercial pressures,” although it was not as stressful as now with the internet and social media. Commercial television was “quite low key,” although at BBC Scotland they were always made “aware of audience figures, but whether you would actually call them ‘ratings,’ because they weren’t broken down, they weren’t detailed. It was just the block figure.”

Ample Business Opportunities for Magid

Magid was initially brought to the UK by Paul Fox to help him gather information about Yorkshire Television’s audience, i.e. to conduct audience research. However, it is clear what kept the consultants in the UK were the ample business opportunities. “It was a good business move,” explained Munro. “It made the company money. It was, at one time, the most profitable part of the company.” Just how profitable Magid’s UK business was is not public information. Warwick said, “the timing was perfect, the hunger was there, the need was there and everybody kind of understood it.” Carla Hargis, a Magid talent coach who specialized in international news before becoming a full-time staff member for the BBC, discussed how Magid had the infrastructure, making it easy for them to work in the UK.

The 1991 ITV franchise auction meant there were many eager clients looking for an edge in the bidding process; Magid was ready to help fill that need. “We didn’t face any competition there from other companies,” explained George. The auction was designed to provide the government with a lot of money, but it was also about bringing “television closer to the masses” and “research, the kind of research we were doing did not exist in that country.” Sattizahn said Magid was “a premiere research organization.” Because of the quality threshold, Hais clarified, the “winning bidder had to be able to demonstrate an ability to meet public interest, public needs.” Paul Fox with Worldwide Television News and Yorkshire Television was familiar with Magid and “he believed there was not another entity in the UK like Magid at that point,” said Hais. “There was no other company like Magid that could provide those services” because “there was really no reason for anybody to conduct our kind of research” prior to the auction. Morris said “I believe we were a pioneer ... I don’t remember anybody else being ahead of us in the UK.” Magid’s services were unique. “There were no Brits doing it,” stated Fisher. “There was no one at that point who was offering any sort of bespoke consulting service.” Purvis explained, “there was no one doing anything like that, not just in Britain, but in Europe. They obviously saw this as an enormous market if they could build a reputation.”

Magid worked with their UK accounts on how commercial television works because “Americans had been in the commercial television a lot longer” Ramsey said, “so we knew some of the things to avoid and all that sort of thing.” Warwick explained “what America had to offer was the experience of having to compete in a white-hot competitive situation where ratings and who’s winning and who’s losing were of paramount importance.” As Munro pointed out, the U.S. has a very “well-developed

commercial news culture. Understood the whole nature of selling news and how to make money from news. That just wasn't the case there." The BBC did not need to make money and the ITV affiliates did not believe news could draw much of an audience. Magid was exposing their clients to "what was going to be coming down the pipe in terms of competition," said Sattizahn. "And trying to get them ahead of that curve." Prebble explained they were aware of "entering a much more competitive environment, and America already was a much more competitive news environment." When Magid came to Granada, people were "immediately skeptical because we at the time believed our television service was fabulous, and Americans, what could they teach us?" But Prebble said, "it turned into a fantastic fountain of interesting new ideas. Was it needed? Probably not. Was it helpful? Certainly."

At the BBC, "we were in a very competitive situation and the view was that some of our production values needed to be improved," explained Sambrook. BBC News had reorganized its operations to combine radio and television. They thus had radio correspondents that "were not polished television performers." Sambrook added that, "television programs had fallen behind the competitors and needed to be improved." It was to help with that polishing that Magid was brought in. Hargis was a part of that effort as she worked with the BBC's talent. Magid was not trying to make the BBC American, but rather to "bring out more of the reporter's personality," said Hargis, and "more of the anchor's personality, trying to make them less stiff, less formal, and more human, more relatable and just more interesting to watch."

The Magid staff was sensitive to cultural differences. Sattizahn explained he would tell job candidates for Magid positions in the UK, that if he ever heard them say,

“this is how we do it in the United States,” he would fire them. The work was about helping the stations figure out how to communicate with their viewers using their culture; it was about establishing trust and understanding the UK culture. Clients would not have used any advice that went against their cultural norm.

“Magid always believed that each market was and is, in fact, unique,” said Hais, so the approach would have been to first understand the culture. Hais acknowledged Magid had to earn their stripes. UK news people also “felt a little bit differently about things like the pace of work and the role of television, but for the most part we still are close allies and shared a somewhat common culture and common language.” During the research process, Hais was surprised that viewers wanted “to see a more Americanized style newscast, at least in terms of the way the presenters operated, than something they were used to seeing.” George explained the great fear was that Magid was going to Americanize British television “and that would have been a terrible mistake.” The fact that Magid was not only a consulting company, but did research as well, helped them get accepted. “We were first and foremost an attitudinal research company,” said George, and “what we were coming in with was the ability to ask the right people the right questions.” Magid knew how to test ideas. For example, “if you have never tasted steak, hamburger is terrific and you can’t describe how a steak tastes to make someone say, oh gee, I would like to have that rather than hamburger.” Magid had a “reservoir of program ideas, approaches to TV that had never been seen there.”

Charlton said, “everybody had this absolute fascination with America.” It was time to modernize the newscast and they were “heavily influenced by the American model.” There was resistance when Magid turned up “telling you how to do telly,” said

Charlton. But they wanted “a more exciting, fresher type of program, which was more appropriate to 1993 than like something that was made in 1963.”

While the Magid staff did encounter some resistance, “for the most part I think people were quite willing to listen to what we had to say,” stated Hais. At the BBC, Sambrook explained there may have been some resistance at first, but “even if it had been a British company coming in to do it, that resistance is more being told that ‘You don’t look smart enough. You need to sort yourself out.’” He added, “Anybody might be a little defensive about that kind of feedback and criticism.”

Key Television News Concepts

Magid worked in different ways with each client, depending on their needs. The firm played a very active role with both the ITV stations and the BBC, at the network and regional levels. The first thing Magid had to do was to make clients understand how to use data in their business. “You can’t assume you know your audience,” said Munro. “You have to have help. You have to do audience research.” That was the first step.

From the archival material, patterns emerged in terms of key concepts Magid personnel pushed to change in UK television news. With the ITV newscasts around the region, Magid observed some similar patterns, resulting in similar recommendations. They generally felt the presenters should be produced as teams rather than individuals; stories needed to focus on how they impacted viewers; stories lacked a clear beginning, middle and end; reporters did not have a consistent presence in their stories; the weathercast was a major opportunity area; and, sports was limited to traditional sports. Magid also felt newscasts needed to focus more on their region to leverage the attitudinal advantage they had as the hometown stations. In addition, from the interviews, patterns

also emerged in terms of areas of the newscast and news in general that had changed. These patterns are described next, as they relate to the key television news areas.

Newscast

In the UK, Magid found newscasts that had “a news of record” structure. It was official and un compelling, with a lack of pacing and conversational techniques, and not meeting audience needs. The newscast was merely a rundown of events. Stories were grouped together in an order that did not make sense to Magid; the newscast was lacking cohesiveness to pull the viewer through from story to story. In the 1990s, things changed. The newscast became more viewer oriented and stories became shorter.

American television news is “driven to holding the viewer’s attention,” explained Page, and that effort was seldom seen in the UK. Magid felt a good newscast should use “clear and creative storytelling, strong pacing and more personable tone” (Central Television, 1990) and that would draw an audience. Within a newscast, “attention must be given to clear and explanatory writing” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 3) and a conversational writing technique needs to be utilized.

Scottish Television’s newscast, *Scotland Today*, had fundamental issues to overcome, including “the staff’s official approach to news, the insufficient development and structure of stories and the programme’s overall lack of identity” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 4). The newscast was “simply a compilation of stories with nothing truly unique to capture the viewers’ attention” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 10). Ramsey explained it as “stacking a newscast” where the producer puts together stories that “don’t have anything to do with each other, and the newscast has no sense of purpose.” Page described stacking similarly, and how British television did not see a value in building,

“producing and clustering segments.” The flow was not natural. “If you’re talking with friends and you’re talking about one event in Westminster, the friend would say, ‘Gosh, and can you believe they did this too?’ ... That’s how we naturally communicate,” said Page. A variety of treatments should be used in a newscast so that there is not, as Warwick described it, “a sense of plodding, marching along, filling blank B, blank C.” In a newscast one should “cluster stories to build thematic, common themes.” Gibbon experienced some program editors using a template, essentially having three stories here and three stories there. She approached producing in terms of what the news agenda demanded; a template stifled the newscast. Not having a template “would sort of stop the robot presenter, and it gets some modulation, gets a pace,” she explained.

The BBC’s *Reporting Scotland* had similar issues, mainly because their coverage of “hard news was wholly official and un compelling” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 4). Magid found that “personalized and meaningful reporting are two elements that are truly deficient in the marketplace” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 4). More than eight in 10 respondents in Magid’s research felt that it was very important for a station to have good news coverage (Scottish Television, 1991b). The majority had also expressed a desire for the newscast to “be interested in ordinary people, be friendly and be lively” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 10).

Anglia Television in the eastern part of the UK had similar issues as Scottish Television and BBC Scotland. The majority of Anglia’s viewers were looking for a balance between entertaining elements and hard news. Research showed 62 percent of viewers wanted a newscast that was “good-humoured and friendly” rather than “straightforward and business like” (Anglia Television, 1991b, p. 12). Anglia needed to

be more involved with people instead of issues and fix its newscast structure. At times the “news was a hodgepodge of stories rather than a cohesive, easy-to-follow production” (Anglia Television, 1991a, p. 3).

At BBC Wales, “the process of gathering, reporting and presenting event-based stories drives all the programmes” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 3). This resulted in “BBC effectively becomes Wales’ ‘news of record’” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 2). The daily newscast was “dominated by interviews with officials, missing in many cases the real people who the news affects” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 2). There were instances on *Wales Today* where stories were tailored to viewers, but overall it had nothing unique to capture a viewer’s interest. The station had “made a conscious effort to develop a news programme that is direct and to the point; yet in the process it has created a homogenous product that has few distinguishing features” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 13). The station was urged to highlight unique elements the viewer could not get anywhere else. “Successful programmes can have a sense of humanity, relevance, and variety while successfully being seen to cover the most important events of the day” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 4). A year later, the BBC Wales newscast still had issues, but viewers clearly wanted a more human approach. They were “interested in a more relaxed type of local news programme that stresses care and involvement rather than one that is objective and reserved” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 15).

In Ulster Television’s area, research showed viewers wanted a friendly-people oriented news program. News needed to go beyond relating the day’s events to draw the viewer in and keep them tuned in (Ulster Television, 1991b). Magid also found that the BBC’s 9 o’clock news used a traditional style with “remarkably little attempt to explain,

investigate or uncover” (Independent Television News, 1993, p. 1). For *Granada Reports* and *Granada Tonight*, Prebble explained they were successful shows, “so we weren’t trying to fix something that was broken. We were always just trying to improve and have interesting ideas.”

Myers was used to short, tight packaging from his time in London and at the network level. His Westcountry newscast had far more stories than was traditional. The packages would be a just over a minute, when in the older days they may have run three minute packages on ITV stations. The audience had to adjust to the sort of “machine gun effect,” he said, “but then they got used to the pace and grew to like it, because they realized that they could see more video on the telly every night than they used to.” At Central Television, the packages became more concise and shorter in the 1990s (Upshon). One of the criticisms of Magid was that they wanted to “fast edit, chop, chop, chop ... the stories can’t be longer than 1:20, and all that other stuff,” Sattizahn said, ‘and that wasn’t what we were trying to do. It was about “trying to teach people how to tell stories in a way that was easier to understand and gave some personality to it.” Fisher explained, “everything tried to become a big tighter so you could get more stories in.” Virtually all items in the newscast – graphics, visuals and the way stories were presented - became better as an extension of technology becoming better (Fisher).

The BBC worked on all aspects of the newscasts in the 1990s. They worked on production values, and “part of that was on the grammar and pace of the program,” said Sambrook. They also focused on the anchor being better at guiding the viewer through the newscast. Sambrook explained that traditionally, “American TV invested its money in talent, and British TV invested its money in newsgathering.” Ramsey said the BBC was

formal and structured so what only needed two minutes, took them sometimes four minutes. In his opinion, it was not about necessarily shortening the packages, but presenting the story “so it is clear and understandable.”

Package pacing became quicker, but “nowhere near the way it’s happened in America, but certainly, to a certain extent,” said Purvis. ITN’s *News at Ten* copied “slightly from NBC and slightly from CBS News. The half an hour format had never been done on a major network in the UK before.” One item Purvis said “Magid may have influenced me on, but I think I’d seen it anyway” was “Eye on America.” He described it as a feature, about two-thirds into the show that took an issue of the day, went to a location, and told a story through the eyes of ordinary people. Purvis called his “Focus on Britain” but found an “extraordinary resistance to that in Britain. People again said it was an Americanization. I think it was just an issue of presentation and packaging.” Had he not called it anything in particular, “no one would have thought anything about it, but because we put up a banner saying, ‘Focus on Britain. There’s a big problem with drug addiction, we go to so and so,’ they all thought that was very American.”

Tags and Transitions

Magid felt there was an overall lack of tags and transitions in UK newscasts. That hurt the flow and left the viewers without closure (Central Television, 1990). However, interview responses showed how in the UK body language had been used more than the American tradition of verbal cues. Tags and transitions was an area the British had not analyzed much and there was an increased effort to use them in the 1990s.

It is important that transitions make sense and gets the viewer comfortably from one story to the next, especially when going from hard news to soft news (Ramsey).

Scotland Today at the time “lacked a natural flow because of the absences of transitional devices” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 12). Fisher said he thought the increase in tags and transitions was because of Magid. However, Simpson disagreed with Magid’s findings and said they used tags and transitions at Scottish Television. What he did as a presenter was to “alter the shot. I would deliberately look down. I’d mark my script and look down, and look back up just to give the shot a bit of variety.” Simpson thus used body language instead of verbal cues to make the transition. Central’s Upshon agreed, saying “you can make that transition with a look sometimes,” but a story needs to have a clear ending to it. The presenter should use it in the “deconstruction process. They’re not just reading intro into the package, intro into the package, intro into the package.”

At BBC Wales, without tags and transitions, there was a lack of “sense of pacing and cohesiveness” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 10). It resulted in the newscast being “more of a hodgepodge of stories than a focused programme” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 10). Without clear transitions, the viewers were kept off balance, making it hard to recognize when one story ended and the other one started.

News programs need to have a seamless flow that draws the audience through the newscast naturally. Transitions are used to connect similar stories or to shift to a different topic. Douglas, who worked as a presenter and reporter, said they did not really think about tags and transitions much. In terms of transitions, they said things such as “now moving on” or “to elsewhere in the country.” As an editor, Gibbon urged her presenters to write their own lead-ins. She felt the benefit was that if they transitioned between two completely different stories, “the modulation of the voice is going to change, because

they feel some ownership, because they've already had to think about it ... they'll have made the gear change so you'll get modulation.”

Tags and transitions was an area of the newscast becoming “slightly more American,” said Myers. The transitions “were supposed to become smoother. They weren't always, but they were supposed to be smoother.” Purvis said, “we've never created artificial transitions.” ITN has never really done “‘funny talk,’ when the anchors chat to each other, that sort of thing. We've never bantered, we've never done that.”

Tags are ways to help close a piece, and in the UK, they are referred to as back references (Munro). They punctuate a story, provide a summary, offer updated information, or are used as space for additional information such as phone numbers. Tags also provide an opportunity for the presenter to be more involved in a program (BBC Wales, 1991; Puffer; Scottish Television, 1990).

The expression of a relationship between people on the news team came in the 1990s. Prebble described how it was viewed as quite radical, yet innovative, in the beginning to “have your main news presenter to do a back reference. The notion that the person who just filed the filmed report would be in studio and be interviewed about whatever the latest news.” In the 1990s, “the general trend was towards the team being more identifiable as a group.”

Newscast Opens and Teases

Newscast opens and teases were clearly undeveloped. The opens generally lacked strong station identifications and teases were boring. These areas of news require a different kind of writing – a selling style – to show viewers what is to come and to keep

them tuned in. During the 1990s, opens and teases became stronger and more sophisticated.

Charlton remembers Magid working with their producers on the open to make “it clear at the top of the show what you’re going to get in the rest of the show.” The Magid crew stressed the importance of all the ITV outlets showcasing their regionality; the newscast open was one area where regional commitment could clearly be shown. It was also important the open tied together with the station’s overall image (Sattizahn). *Scotland Today’s* open conveyed energy with its rapid editing of scenes, but the images did not support the station’s identity. Magid suggested they “develop an open which conveys its commitment to the community” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 15). In 1992, Magid did a study that analyzed newscasts opens for the BBC, including possible new opens for BBC One’s *6 O’Clock News* and *The Nine O’Clock News*. Viewers liked the current opens and did not particularly like the proposed new opens, although they liked them better than the opens for ITN and Sky News (BBC News, 1992).

Overall, UK stations were not good at news teases; theirs tended to give the story away, were simply boring, or too obscure (Warwick). Tease writing is tough because “it’s ‘selling writing,’ not ‘telling writing,’” explained Morris. They are difficult, said Munro, because “they are not written as news.” Teases should be a balance between not giving the story away, but providing “enough information to make the viewers want to watch” (Central Television, 1990, p. 10). Magid was impressed with the strong video and writing the BBC Wales offered in their teases. However, their issue was that the program itself needed work and did not live up to the great promises in the teases (BBC Wales, 1991).

There was not much promotion done at Scottish Television. Magid recommended they “promote the main news programme through teases of ongoing coverage” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 18). Fisher later saw “better teasing of stories.” He said the intention was simply better writing to “make sure that people hung around for other stories as well, and signposting stories so that people would.”

At Westcountry, teases became like menu items, essentially telling viewers what was coming up and when. Those items depended on what fit the station. There could be one menu item - one, two or several teases. Sattizahn said they also used “teasing short” and “teasing long.” Teasing short meant something coming right up and teasing long meant something further down in the newscast. When they began “teasing long,” ratings went up and the “retention of viewers increased dramatically,” he said.

Tone

In Britain the tone was overall more formal than in the U.S. It was “more stand back” said Munro, and “not as intense, just a different kind of tone.” Magid felt a conversational and helpful tone and style should be used (Scottish Television, 1990). The tone should be relaxed and friendly as a way to approach the viewers in a more natural way. While ITV stations generally had a more conversational tone than the BBC outlets, the tone was further developed in the 1990s. Even the BBC’s tone became softer.

Ulster Television’s tone needed “to reflect a slightly more relaxed and engaging tone” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 32). However, that did not mean the station should abandon hard news, but that it instead shift its emphasis to the human element and people-oriented issues. Because of the violence in the region, this type of approach in

news tone would also “offer a better context for stories about violence in the province, making them seem less numerous and negative” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 32).

In Granada Television’s case, Magid felt their tone helped the station have an edge over the BBC. Granada had a “relatively comfortable and friendly style and tone” (Granada Television, 1990, p. 2) as contrasted with the BBC’s local news that was “stiff, overly formal, boring and stale” (Granada Television, 1990, p. 2). The tone helped viewers relate to Granada as a station that was friendly and “showing concern for the viewers” (Granada Television, 1990, p. 2).

Morris explained the “greatest reporters display various tones on various stories, as is appropriate and accurate.” Hargis worked with reporters “on the hooks, which were the first sentence, and I would talk to them about using tone at the very top.” That first sentence or two can set the tone for the rest of a piece. Ramsey said the BBC’s overall tone changed a bit too and became “a little less like your headmaster telling you what happened today.” He added that he wants to trust presenters and reporters and believe what they are saying, but that “they’re not my friend.” This is an aspect that has gone overboard in the U.S., according to Ramsey. The BBC did a great job with tone and “got a little warmer, a little more relaxed, but being professional and being the authority always was important to them and not compromising their credibility,” he explained.

Some stations had a long ways to go to achieve the right tone. For example, Anglia’s tone was too official and institutional. It failed to deliver meaning and a human perspective (Anglia Television, 1991a).

Pacing

There were some differences in what the audiences wanted in the regions, even though overall an increase in the newscast pace was desired. Most of the desire to speed up was because of news packages. Package lengths were many times “determined by the amount of time to fill and not the demands of the subjects” (Central Television, 1990, p. 5). In addition, the tendency to primarily show packages slowed down the newscast pace. Increasing the number of stories would generally improve the pacing.

At Ulster Television, Magid found a split audience – half wanted a calm and slower-paced newscast, while the other half wanted a lively, fast-paced newscast. They recommended “Ulster Television should attempt to strike a proper balance between these two extremes” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 15). Meanwhile, Anglia’s newscast had a good flow with a multitude of stories. Their use of voiceovers enhanced the energy of the newscast. However, there was a lack of flow and cohesiveness to unite the stories that were presented (Anglia Television, 1991a).

At the national level, viewers enjoyed a quick pace in the early evening. Viewers “tend to be more interested in getting a brief overview of many different news stories than in getting detailed, in-depth analysis of fewer stories when they watch an early-evening news programme” (Independent Television News, 1992b, p. 17). However, for the late evening news, in ITN’s case the 10 p.m. newscast, viewers wanted a calmer and slower-paced newscast. At the same time, viewers tended to watch only the top stories and then tune out (Independent Television News, 1992c).

It may be surprising, but Magid’s research showed that even in the case of breakfast television, viewers felt the pace could increase. Respondents in Magid’s focus

group study complained “the programme is too ‘static’” (Good Morning Television, 1994, p. 25) so Magid recommended Good Morning Television add more action and movement within the studio to help improve the pacing.

Graphics

The majority of the respondents said graphics improved dramatically in the 1990s because of better technology. It was important graphics added to the story and related information in a good way, while being consistent with the other station visuals.

Charlton remembered that graphics used to be letters set up on a black board in front of a camera and Bolton explained how graphics initially used to be made out of cardboard. Chrimes described a graphic at TV-am, that “became sort of the laughing stock. It was basically a screen that was entirely green and there was a dot in the middle that said ‘Leeds.’” In the early 1990s, that changed, with an increase in electronic graphics and computer animation. Upshon went to The National Association of Broadcasters’ (NAB) conference in the U.S. and found a Chyron character generator. He said they “ditched the British Aston character generator and went to the Chyron” because it was more precise and could provide information in a new way.

Scottish Television went over the top with the use of graphics, using them too much “simply because we could,” said Simpson, “simply because the toys were there.” He described how almost every package had a graphic in it merely because they had the technology. It was important the graphics fit with the story, stated Page, and graphics should help relate information and clarify issues. For the regional ITV outlets, the use of graphics could showcase locations to help heighten awareness of the station’s local news coverage efforts (Central Television, 1990). Graphics could also showcase special

reporting efforts to help the ITV stations differentiate themselves from the BBC's regional stations (Scottish Television, 1990). Magid recommended the use of over-the-shoulder graphics with story slug supers and name supers for full-screen personality shots (Scottish Television, 1990).

News stations should be consistent in their visual language. Someone tuning into a program should immediately be able to identify it. That requires a "common thread of colour and/or graphic treatment throughout the entire programme" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 14). At TV-am, they were influenced by American use of graphics and colors according to Gibbon. At Granada, in the early days the "closing credits were a camera pointed at a black roll of paper that went up with letters on it, who people were," described Prebble. "It was unbelievably primitive, really." Thus, Granada sought to modernize its graphics and it was an evolving process.

Television consultants often get criticized for pushing flashy graphics and Magid's recommendation to Central Television in 1990 may be surprising. In one program, Magid found that "production values seemed to smother the message. The bold images and special effects weren't supported by compelling content" (Central Television, 1990, p. 9). Magid recommended that Central tone down some of the production values and focus more on the basic message. Ramsey felt that the BBC had good graphics, but that they were predictable and needed to become "a little more contemporary."

Visuals

Generally, visuals shown in UK newscasts in the early 1990s were not very appealing. They were boring, static shots and there was a lack of cohesiveness between words and pictures. Visuals in *Scotland Today's* newscast were "often centered on static

meeting rooms, and thus didn't help tell the stories. Nondescript footage of the House of Commons was the most common offence, occurring several times in a single programme" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 13). ITV affiliates were not the only offenders. BBC outlets had similar issues and "landscape shots of buildings were common (one report consisted of eight different angles of the same building), diminishing the impact of the news, failing to tell a story, and distracting viewers" (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 11). There was also use of still photographs in television news stories, sometimes as long as 30 seconds (BBC Wales, 1991).

The visuals improved and "it's not the story if you haven't got the pictures," explained Douglas. "The importance of stories would change depending on how good the pictures were ... we went for good pictures, dramatic pictures, and grabbing the audience's attention." Page clarified it was the reporter's job to "tell a good story" even if the visuals were not great.

There was a lack of cohesiveness between words and pictures and "reporters need to establish a bond between words and the pictures to tell the story effectively" (Central Television, 1990, p. 5). Sometimes there was a conflict between the words and the pictures. When that happens, "the pictures usually win the battle over the viewers attention" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 13) and viewers only get half of the story. "Direct video referencing is a vital marriage between copy and video which brings clear and sometimes compelling storytelling" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 14). Presenters should make the effort, to at times, reference the b-roll (BBC Wales, 1991). Munro referred to it as "touch and go," meaning the reporter should refer to the "video

frequently enough that it doesn't part ways with your copy." "Touch and go" is imperative to good television storytelling (Page; Warwick).

It was not only visuals in stories that could be improved overall, but also newscast visuals. In BBC Wales' Welsh newscast, *Newyddion*, there was "little variety, even in camera shots in the studio" (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 6).

Storytelling

UK journalists have always had a reputation for being great storytellers. However, when it came to television storytelling in the 1990s, things were lacking. From an American perspective, sometimes even basic items were missing. During this decade, all aspects of storytelling became stronger. It became visually more pleasing, with a tighter relationship between words and visuals, better organized, and focused more on the audience.

Page described British journalists as "great storytellers, but they were dull storytellers ... our job was to improve their storytelling." Munro said it comes down to "clear and understandable storytelling." It meant "getting away from jargon, getting away from official language that people don't speak, getting to more conversational language, and controlling a story." It was not about shortening stories necessarily, but rather "about doing more and telling more." If that is done, stories naturally become more concise.

Virtually all aspects of storytelling became better – how a story was told, production values, visibility of reporters, involvement of news presenters, graphics, throws to commercials, etc. In addition, things such as "putting up name supers of your presenters, so people actually knew who they were. Or using their names in the news open. Just basic block and tackle stuff ... became standardized," explained Sattizahn. The

British “storytelling techniques were not as well developed as the United States” said Bolton, “and we had a lot to learn from that.” Storytelling became more picture-led (Charlton). Page explained the importance of visuals and words matching because if the “eye is seeing something different from what the ear is hearing, the ear will shut down, and you will find that you are just watching the picture on television, and actually thinking about something else.”

Besides incorporating a marriage between visuals and words, Magid found basic issues in storytelling. A package and a newscast need a beginning, middle and an end as “in any show, of any subject, it’s important to orient the viewers by explaining to them what’s ahead” (Central Television, 1990, p. 20). It should follow the “tell viewers what you’re going to tell them; tell them; and tell them what you’ve told them” (Central Television, 1990, p. 23). A news story should be well organized and not conclude mid-though. It needs to have a proper ending (Anglia, 1991a). Munro called it “buttoning up a story,” meaning properly ending a story so the viewer could feel the story was finished.

Morris and Warwick discussed the importance of good storytelling in their training seminars and how the structure has a beginning, middle, and end. In addition, good storytelling involves writing in active voice (Morris; Ramsey; Sattizahn,) and in a conversational style (Warwick). It makes things tighter, more interesting, and more conversational. Morris called it “better reporting” and Ramsey explained active voice makes stories “more crisp and more to the point.”

Gibbon said American journalists were always so good at basic storytelling. “The actual craft of laying down the story, the beginning, the middle and the end, and having it all ... when we were tested and pushed, it wasn’t always there.” At the BBC, they were

“trying to train radio correspondents to be good at television,” said Sambrook, “and some were and some never quite got it.” There was “quite a lot of production emphasis put on how you tell stories, human interest, the kind of general approach to it.” The “whole operating philosophy of the BBC’s journalism at the time, was to explain things.”

It is about understanding the basics of the story and what is most important. Fisher learned from his first television boss to ask himself, “‘what's the story here?’ You run into a room and you say, ‘Hey, mom, guess what?’ And the top line is the top line.” Great storytelling is all about reaching the “emotional core of the viewer,” said Ramsey. It needs to cause a reaction, whether that is making them smile, laugh or sad, it needs to reach the viewer at an emotional level; it needs to have an effect on the viewer (Upshon). As Ramsey explained, if the viewer is merely “sitting there drooling on their sweater, you’re not a good newscaster.” Charlton said, “news needs to not just inform. News needs to entertain.” Page urged reporters to “make me smarter. Tell me something.”

Modern day journalists know they need to tailor their messages to their audiences. However, UK television news in the early 1990s often lacked an audience focus. In Magid’s work, they always found “the single common denominator of a successful news programme has been a human focus. Simply put, for news to appeal to people, it must be about people” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 5). At times, the audience was “left hanging, because the reporters rarely explained how the stories affected the people” (Anglia Television, 1990a, p. 4). In the UK, the general focus was “parliamentary discourse and board meetings rather than life as most people know it” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 5). Stations were urged to concentrate on “the things that were driving daily life in the community,” said Hais.

Scottish Television's newscast "lacks a noticeable viewer orientation; the stories aren't directed to the viewers. Reports are steeped in facts and official rhetoric with little relevance to the audience" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 3). The newscast was "overloaded with information and short on meaning" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 4). A personalized approach "does not mean that officials never appear; nor, more importantly, does it mean *Scotland Today* should do 'lighter' news. It means reporting important 'hard' news stories in a way which impacts viewers" (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 6-7). One example was a story about dangerously toxic levels in shellfish that could cause paralysis. That statement could produce concerns among viewers, yet the station had not given people enough information to take precautionary measures, nor did it say how widespread the issue was, or if this tainted fish had made it to stores. The consequences of events need to be stressed and should be sufficiently explained (BBC Wales, 1992).

"There was more intention to get people involved in the stories, to have more voices from the street, rather than just politicians" said Fisher, and "people's stories became much more important" in the 1990s. Munro described how reporters could certainly include politicians and officials, but he wanted them to "go looking for real people" as well. Officials are "paid talkers" and thus "in many cases, predictable, not interesting."

Douglas felt the storytelling procedures and techniques changed for the better, "making it more interesting, and not necessarily more dramatic, but just better storytelling than just doing it a boring formula. You actually thought about how it would be more impactful." He added, "we were aware that we had to hold onto the audience more than we had done in previous years when there was less competition."

Sound Bites

As would have been expected, Magid advocated for shorter sound bites and all the television respondents stated sound bites did become shorter in the UK in the 1990s. But it was not merely about making the sound bites shorter. Magid staff and UK reporters agreed that sound bites need to have an impact. Sound bites should “assume a supplementary role in stories, providing perspective not facts, on the issues” (Central Television, 1990, p. 5) and “add emotion, perspective, punctuation” (Central Television, 1990, p. 9). Sound bites “are punctuation,” explained Morris, and “they are not information. Any time you have information in a sound bite, that is to say something the reporter or anchor can say, it’s not an effective sound bite.” He described it as a “ripples in the water,” meaning it is not where the rock hits the water that is important, but rather “the great stories are the ripples away from that.” Morris advocated talking to people who were directly impacted by an issue. Sattizahn said sound bites need to be succinct, but that in the UK sound bites tended to be longer and that was not necessarily always a bad thing. Even today, sound bites in the UK tend to be longer than in the U.S.

Overall sound bites in UK newscasts were long and cumbersome; they did not add to the storytelling aspect. Ramsey stated if you have a minute long sound bite, and can justify it being there, that is ok. However, if it is merely “a bunch of random information that is building up to the point, don’t use it,” he said. “Just use the part that’s the point.” A sound bite is a way to make people “understand the impact” of a story. Hargis explained one technique she taught reporters was to let a person answer a question, then ask them to re-state the answer to make sure the reporter understood it. She

said what happens then is that “they’ll re-say their answer and they’ll say it much shorter and much tighter.”

At times, UK reporters simply turned over their microphones to “politicians for lengthy, unedited discourse” and “long statements are not only hard to follow for the average viewer, but they stifle the pacing and interest of the story” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 7-8). This notion of long sound bites from politicians did not merely occur at the regional level, but at the national level as well, especially at the BBC. Magid found that the BBC’s *9 O’Clock News* had “too many overlong sound bites – especially from MP’s and other officials” (Independent Television News, 1993, p. 1). Essentially, the reporters “allowed the sound bites to tell stories,” explained Munro. Page said she was “shocked at how cavalier reporters would be about sound bites ... reporters would just be happy to abrogate their own responsibility. And instead of bothering to tell a story, they could just lob in the sound bite.” Upshon clarified a sound bite should not describe a process or provide the narrative, “because the reporters are paid to do that.” Munro said the British would “rarely write in and out of sound bites. They would say something and the sound bite would just go.” It needs to be seamless and a part of a narrative. Page also re-iterated the notion of writing into and out of the sound bite and how “every aspect of it needed to hold hands.”

Sound bites with politicians were easy to get and you did not have to worry about them being nervous when it came to speaking in front of the camera. It was what Douglas referred to as “a safe approach.” Upshon thought “Americans were far more adept at talking to camera than the more reticent British public. You put a microphone in front of someone in the UK in the ‘80s and ‘90s, they’d run a mile” he said. Douglas recalled

using more sound bites in the 1990s and he was “aiming for the 15 second clip;” he was looking for it as he went out on a story.

Purvis resisted the recommendation of shorter sound bites, as he did not feel it was right for the UK market. “Sound bites have always been long in the UK,” he said, “and always will be.” But, he explained what happened with political news was that they stopped interviewing politicians in the newscast. They would instead use a sound bite or what became known as an “‘arranged doorstep,’ where a politician knows that a camera is going to be at a certain place at a certain time, and they should say 25 seconds and that’ll get used.” Up until then, it was common to use two to three minute interviews with politicians. Purvis said the change was “partly because of research, for which Magid and others, which certainly showed in Britain, probably the same in the States, that viewers didn’t like interviews with politicians.”

Sound bites became more succinct but also more interesting, because as Charlton said, they “wanted to get away from just a bland opinion. We wanted interesting opinions.” Advances in video technology contributed to that because it made it easier to both record and edit (Gibbon). With the change, “you can actually just use your contributors to tell the story,” Gibbon said, “and get the balance between it.” In turn, reporter packages became “richer, and deeper. There are more voices in them,” she said. Simpson explained sound bites became “more considered, more planned, more part of the structure of the piece.” He added how vox pop sound bites are their most popular “because it’s the man on the street. It’s fast and dirty. They’re clipped and thrown together. But it’s a real voice, a real opinion, a real laugh, and people identify more with

that.” Fisher has always judged sound bites for their worth. The tendency was to cut things down, but “you’ve got to let people have their say,” while trying to keep it tight.

Interview Subjects

UK journalists said news stories and interview subjects were dictated by the news of the day, but there was an increased effort in getting interviews with ordinary people instead of with politicians. It was in line with Magid’s recommendations of more interviews with ordinary people who were affected by the issues being presented in the newscast (Anglia Television, 1991a; Good Morning Television, 1994). In general, “staff wasn’t approaching the people affected by the issues” (Anglia Television 1991a, p. 4) and they were too reliant on officials. For example, *Scotland Today* was “compromised predominantly of official sources – MPs, committee chairpersons, business executives – with practically no ‘real people’ to whom the viewer could relate” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 5). While politicians and officials are important, the information can often be abbreviated and paraphrased more effectively and clearer by the reporter.

News topics and interview subjects were determined by the news of the day, but “you spoke more to people,” said Fisher. Gibbon saw a change with interview subjects being “more real people” and an increase where “packages would include case history of a real person.” At Central, they always tried to “humanize every story” and explain what it meant to the average viewer. Upshon described how if there was a story about unemployment, Central’s reporter would not only talk to the person being unemployed, but also to his or her family members because unemployment affects an entire family.

Live Reports

As technology improved, live shots became standard and more natural and useful in news coverage. Live shots needed to be used so that people knew how to do them when news broke (Puffer; Sattizahn; Warwick). Magid worked with clients on how to approach live shots, when to use it and when to incorporate it. “I would just expose them to lots, and lots, and lots of storytelling using live,” said Sattizahn, because that helped them become comfortable with the live element. Hargis explained how she worked with talent on keyword outlines to memorize a flow because that provides “an animated, genuine performance, but at the same time you’re going to be tight and you’re going to get the points across that you want to get across.” Live shots show viewers that a news station is committed to bringing them news (Munro), and as stated by Ramsey, it was “a big defining component that we all agreed need to be used, but used effectively.”

In the 1990s, Fisher explained reporters were “able to be live from places that you couldn’t before,” but live shots needed to add something to the newscast. One source of frustration with live shots for Page was the lack of interaction between the reporter and presenter as there was rarely a second question asked. “You don’t sit at a dinner table and say, ‘So tell me what happened.’ And then your friend tells you what happened, and you don’t have a follow-up question.” The lack of interaction may be because some reporters were not used to going live and using live shots effectively.

In the beginning, live shots were mostly done in London as they had the technology and resources. Myers, who was working for LWT’s *The Six O’Clock Show* prior to the ITV auction, described doing two or three live inserts in their evening news each night. Gibbon felt the expense of the live shot is what held it back. When reporters

did go live, because it was so expensive, it meant they did not waste it. “You were well prepared if you went live,” Gibbon said, and “everything felt more immediate.” It also meant “a news show could actually start to really get quite interesting used in the right way.” However, “if the live link went down, it was a bloody disaster,” she said. Granada Television had used live shots in 1983 already and Charlton described the best live shots as breaking news because then “you’d get the drama of news, which is entertaining in itself.”

Live shots were rarely done in the regions in the beginning of the 1990s. Prebble felt it was largely a question of resources, and as Douglas stated, “because the technology wasn’t so good.” The few live shots Douglas did, he remembers as cumbersome. The BBC system required a well in advance booking “to get the truck, and of course the reason you would be doing it live is because it was a developing story, so you didn’t get advance notice, so you couldn’t do it.” There was not much interaction between the presenters in the studio and the reporters in the field because of the lack of practice. Most of the material was pre-recorded, although there were rare occasions when Douglas would go live in the studio as a reporter.

According to Myers, the BBC simply did not have the firepower Westcountry did. Westcountry had a lot of live capabilities and could have as many as five or six lives in a newscast, from different locations. In addition, they “used the American technique to top and tail it,” he said. Topping and tailing is the British term for when a reporter is live, there is a video insert, and then the reporter is live again. Myers also recalled using signposting (special graphics) to showcase the live shots.

Scottish Television was doing “more live inserts into the show” Simpson said, and “were able to take ourselves out of the studio more.” Going live “broke down any barriers that were ever perceived between us and the viewer,” Simpson explained, and “it made us part of the story. It made the viewers part of the story.” Upshon described how Central’s “reporters had to learn how to adapt to a live” and the worst thing that could happen was a reporter just standing there “and telling you exactly what was said in a package.” Magid said, “live coverage must become a more regular component in every news programme” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 25) as it enhances coverage, helps with the explanation and shows community involvement. It also should be promoted as a way to showcase a station’s commitment to bringing the viewer breaking news, as it happens.

When ITN revamped its evening newscast, they included more live shots and viewers noticed. Magid found that “nearly all respondents (92%) say they are at least quite interested in seeing such live reports” (Independent Television News, 1992b, p. 18) and that “nearly eight in ten respondents (78%) say live reports from the scene of news events help them understand news stories a lot” (Independent Television News, 1992b, p. 18). While Magid generally did not advocate for being live simply for being live’s sake, their research for ITN found that viewers liked live reports “even when nothing is actually happening at the scene of the event” (Independent Television News, 1992c, p. 27). Purvis explained it was quite controversial when they went live because ITN’s prime time show was at 10 p.m. “It was normally dark, so people were saying, ‘Why are you having live crosses to these people standing in the dark?’ And there wasn’t always a convincing answer for that question.” He mentioned a live two-way conversation

between the anchor in the studio and the reporter in the field as something he had picked up from Magid.

Live shots with BBC correspondents became the norm in the 1990s, and not just live shots from within the UK, but from around the world. Sambrook said you could “by the end of the 1990s have a live shot from anywhere on earth. I think we did a live from the North Pole just to prove we could do it once.”

News Presenters

The British term for an anchor is a news presenter and news presenters in the UK had traditionally been news readers. Personality was not encouraged, as the news should speak for itself. In the 1980s and into the 1990s, the news presenters transitioned from being trained news readers, and many times actors, to being journalists. Personality was also encouraged, although not to the same extent as in the U.S. In addition, during the 1990s, there was more of an effort to showcase news presenters as a part of a team, instead of individuals.

Presenters in the UK in the 1990s cannot be compared to the traditional American news anchors. While “British presenters are well known public figures,” said Sambrook, “they are nothing like as powerful as the U.S. anchors are.” Generally, “the norm of British television focus less attention on specific personalities than in other English-speaking countries” (Granada Television, 1990, p. 61). Munro explained that in the UK, traditionally news was the star, not the individual, and Puffer said the UK research showed there was an interest in presenters speaking more as “a confidant, rather than as a detached and removed official.” Hargis explained how the camera should be viewed as a person that the presenter is communicating with. If the camera is a friend, then the

presenter speaks in a voice that is more their true self, as a trusted friend. A presenter is then “reaching through the camera, and the viewer sees you as a trusted friend telling them that story, not performing.” In the 1990s, there was “an attempt to build a connection with the audience so they could relate,” Fisher said. “If people felt you could relate to the newsreader, then they were more likely to watch you, therefore advertising rates would go up.”

The UK presenters in the 1990s could be compared to the U.S. presenters doing a rip-and-read. It was “just some nice looking radio announcer usually reading news,” said George. Sattizahn explained presenters on the BBC “were hired because they could read the news well, not because they could do interviews, and other journalistic things. They were news readers.” Originally presenters were actors, and as Bolton said, “they weren’t required to do much more than read the news.” As competition increased, they hired presenters who were journalists. In the 1990s presenting became “a much more demanding job,” said Chrimes. “It became much less a case of reading out to audio cue.”

While the UK used more of a rotating system for their news presenters, when Hais conducted research for Yorkshire Television, viewers “preferred the American model, even though that was not the model they were used to seeing, because I think they wanted to get to know a little more about the people who are presenting the news.” In particular, female viewers were interested in the personalities of the newscasters. Warwick lamented how he felt the rotating presenter system was not good because having one main presenter “can make a huge difference.”

ITN’s *News at Ten* initially had two anchors said Purvis, but “up to five or six people who actually performed that anchoring role” as they rotated. However, in the

1990s, they went to a single anchor for *News at Ten*, the first black prime time anchor – Trevor McDonald. At the BBC, Sambrook said they worked on developing “a presenter or anchor’s role to lead viewers through the program, and through the stories and issues.” He added that “there was an attempt to associate particular presenters with particular programs, and to have some consistency about it” and they tried to “build them up as figures and trusted guides for the audience to take them through the news.” Presenters could no longer just be someone reading a teleprompter. Charlton said they needed a personality who could handle many different scenarios. In addition, being both a presenter and reporter is a performance. “If you’re live on television,” Charlton said, “it is a performance. You’re not on the stage, but it is still a performance.” It was important to be able to engage the audience as a presenter. Prebble wanted the presenters “to express their personality. They were hired as much for that as anything else.”

There was a shift in the 1990s towards the presenters becoming more recognized. Douglas said “the personality, the profile of the person changed. Well, certainly in my experience” and “you became more of a well-known face.”

Magid’s research showed “the importance of presenters displaying a human rather than systematic tone” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 12). A “narrative, matter-of-fact – indeed stiff – manner of presenters lent no context to the news of the day” (BBC Wales, 1991, p. 4). In addition, a presenter’s “detached delivery emphasises his distance from the news items he is presenting and, by implication, from his viewers, too” (Independent Television News, 1993, p. 1).

In the UK, it was quite normal that there was not a specific personality that dominated in a market. Hais explained how in the U.S. a superior newscaster would get a

20 to 25 percent outstanding score in research. However, in the UK, if “somebody got a 10 percent outstanding, they were really outstanding compared to others in the market,” he said. Americans “tend to be more, ‘everything is super. Everything’s colossal. Everything is great,’ and the people in the UK are a little more reserved.”

In cases where there were two presenters of a news program, they were most of the time produced as individuals, rather than as a newscast team (Anglia Television, 1991a; BBC Wales, 1991; Scottish Television, 1990). Magid found that the “familiarity level of local presenters appear to be fairly high in the Scottish Television market” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 2). They therefore recommended Scottish Television position *Scotland Today* “as a personality-driven news programme” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 36), and that they frame their presenters as a team. The presenters only appeared together at the beginning and end of the newscast. The single shot technique “denied any interaction between the two presenters which stifled any opportunity to establish energy and personality in the program” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 11). In addition, the “constant ‘ping-pong’ production from one presenter to the other disrupted the pacing” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 11). Magid found the same “ping-pong” movement at Anglia Television (Anglia Television, 1991a).

Magid outlined best practices as one presenter reading two or three stories, before tossing to the other presenter. In that toss, “the two should generally appear on camera to transition the viewer through the move” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 11). This would also allow for a shift in content and tone, while providing a moment of interaction between the presenters. A “good presenter will explain, using phrases such as ‘we’ll show you’ or ‘to sort things out’ or ‘what all this means to you’ or ‘to help explain,’ etc.”

(BBC Wales, 1992, p. 23). Puffer added that a good presenter speaks “about a subject with true heightened interest.”

The presenters became “more informal,” said Gibbon, “friendlier, perhaps a bit more intimate.” Simpson stated if there is any Americanism that has crept into British broadcasting, “it’s the role of the presenter, or the anchor.” For Fisher, he has always worked with people he has liked so there has been a natural chemistry. However, “there wasn’t this intention that there would be ‘happy talk’, as they call it in the States,” he said. It was more about getting the stories told and getting through the newscast. ITV was, according to Prebble, “inclined to hire presenters with a distinctive personality.” Douglas said when the two-presenter system was introduced, it was hard because you had to work well with the other presenter. He found dual presenting “full of hazards.”

Being a good presenter is not necessarily about someone’s appearance and presence. In fact, if an anchor is too attractive, they can “present something of a threat to women who are made to feel somewhat uncomfortable or even inadequate” (Good Morning Television, 1994, p. 8). The overall criticism of female presenters were that they appeared to be “clones” or from the same “school of enthusiasm” (Good Morning Television, 1992b, p. 3). Viewers “complained that many of the female presenters were ‘too much;’ their hair was not natural, it was something like on ‘Dallas’ or ‘Dynasty’” (Good Morning Television, 1992b, p. 3).

Magid found that UK audiences related best to presenters who were “ordinary” and the ability to project “ordinariness” is a talent. If a presenter does it successfully, they are seen as “being on the same level” (Good Morning Television, 1994, p. 2) as their viewers. The respondents found “ordinary” presenters “undemanding and unthreatening,

and they feel as if they know them” (Good Morning Television, 1994, p. 4). Prebble said, “sometimes people reporting on the news here look frightful. You know, not aesthetically pleasing and not well-turned out, I think. Did nobody tell you were going to be on the camera?” He felt that was a big difference between UK and U.S. presenters.

When it came to the selection of the presenters, Myers explained “a local audience likes to see their local people on the telly” and Magid stressed local presenters whenever possible. This was especially important in areas such as Northern Ireland. Magid said it was imperative that presenters and reporters “actually come from Northern Ireland and have a local accent (Ulster Television, 1991b). However, at the national level, accents such as Welsh and Scottish can turn viewers off (Good Morning Television, 1994). Viewers also wanted presenters that represented Britain’s multicultural, multiracial society (Good Morning Television, 1992a).

At the network level, ITN went from one rotating presenter to a permanent presenter, which was a big hit with viewers who really related to the anchor. However, his name recognition was not big and the recommendation was that ITN call greater attention to his name “so that viewers will more clearly link his face to his name” (Independent Television News, 1992a, p. 12). Magid generally found a lack of graphics showcasing the names of the presenters in the UK. It was a part of the ethos of not injecting personality into the newscast.

Another area that changed in terms of presenters was that they were not traditionally always trained journalists. Prebble said “in those days the news was read by actors on the BBC rather than journalists” but Sambrook said the move to “people with significant journalistic experience had already happened during the 1980s.” Purvis

explained ITN “was always using journalists as the anchors.” In the ITV regions in the 1990s, not all presenters were trained journalists. For example, Douglas’ wife, Viv Lumsden, was described by Magid as one of the star presenters for Scottish Television. Douglas said, “she trained as an actress or as a drama teacher.” From there she was asked to do radio and television but “she’s not really interested in news.”

Reporters

Reporters in the UK needed some help with their storytelling, mainly to provide a better human angle in their stories. Although several interview subjects for this study recall standups being done in the UK in the 1950s already, in the 1990s, there was a clear increase in standups, or “piece to camera” as they were referred to in the UK. There was generally a larger reporter interaction as well.

UK journalists were really good at gathering facts for a story, but Munro said they needed to “cut through a lot of the jargon” to make the stories more understandable. He stressed reporters are storytellers; they need to present facts in a narrative form that has a beginning, middle and an end. In addition, the stories needed to be set up properly with a lead-in link that flows right into the story itself.

Magid found an overall lack of a human angle in reporters’ stories; reporters were not “actively involved in relating the news” (Central Television, 1990). Instead they “often resigned their reporting duties to long winded politicians (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 5) and that “approach to news compromised the impact and clarity of the programme” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 5). It is a reporter’s job to explain and interpret the news for the viewer. They “need to use professional insight to translate the

facts and political exposition into understandable terms” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 7). Merely presenting the facts and not explaining them, does not help the audience.

In the early 1990s, Magid did not see many reporters on camera (Anglia Television, 1991; BBC Wales, 1991; Scottish Television, 1990) and that “undermined the image of a large, crusading news team” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 9). Myers said in the 1990s, reporters had to learn to use standups properly for the first time but Purvis explained standups were not new and “the archive’s littered with 1950s standups.” Purvis felt in the 1950s and 1960s, there were standups in basically every story. Page described a standup by Richard Dimpleby at the Berlin Wall in the 1960s.

A standup needs to add something (Fisher; Purvis; Simpson; Upshon). The message to the reporters was “don’t do it just because you want your mom to see you on camera,” said Upshon. “It’s got to be a value to the story.” Purvis stated “the Magid model was definitely to do more standups, trying to get the identity of the reporters known” and Prebble explained they “probably banned any report that didn’t have the reporter at some point standing up and talking to the camera.”

Viewers want to see who is speaking to them as that adds credibility while creating a rapport (BBC Wales, 1991). A reporter physically appearing in a story “can often help visually relate a message or feeling” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 9). Hargis explained how the standup needs to provide a viewer benefit. A viewer needs to be shown what is going on, “the camera is acting as their eyes, as if they’re there with you.”

In the 1990s, “reporter interaction was important, that we took people into the heart of the story,” Fisher said. “We gave them a sense of place and of the events, and I think that was really important.” He added that reporter involvement “changed quite

markedly in the 1990s.” Gibbon explained, “if the reporter’s been there, he’s been an eyewitness.” In the past, it seemed “almost an admission of failure if you had to use the reporter as an expert.” She said in addition to standups, she saw more reporters in the studio with the presenters in the 1990s.

Doing a standup as a static shot in front of a building does not add anything (BBC Wales, 1991; Sattizahn). Instead, “the reporter’s appearance in the story should always serve a purpose” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 10). A standup should only be used “if it actually adds in any way to what you’re hearing and seeing,” explained Myers. Gibbon said she would cut out standups, “unless they serve a really, really good purpose.”

In the 1990s, Chrimes said “it mattered more who the correspondent was” and foreign correspondents started to develop more. Douglas felt reporters “got a higher profile” and that is when beat reporting was more closely incorporated. The BBC traditionally had focused their premium more on if reporters “were experts in their field rather than whether they were great storytellers,” said Sambrook. He further stated the BBC at the national level has always had beat reporting. In the 1990s, the BBC worked on making reporters more polished storytellers. As a part of that, and to show their expertise, “there was quite a lot of pressure to have to do more standups with the correspondents,” said Sambrook. “Have them sitting in the studio, explaining issues. Using them as a trusted guide on views and issues.”

At ITN, the reporters were increasingly asked to do more things. For example, they did not have the single video-journalist model, but Purvis said they were sometimes asked to go out with a single person crew and to do basic edits. Because the union rules were relaxed in the 1990s, reporters no longer had to bring seven people with them to

cover a story. That added to the impact of reporters' stories because if it is a smaller crew, "you're going to get people to unfold," explained Gibbon. "They're going to reveal much more about themselves."

Topics

The interviews conducted for this study show there was not a conscious effort to cover certain news topics. It instead came down to what the news of the day was. There was, however, a conscious effort to incorporate more of a human element. As Fisher said, they "chased the big stories of the day and maybe looked to put a human angle on them."

While Magid did not advocate editorial content, they were proponents of "news you can use" and recommended regular features on the environment, medical topics and consumer news (BBC Wales, 1991; Independent Television News, 1992b, Independent Television News, 1992c). In addition, a regular consumer report was also mentioned as a good feature, as well as crime prevention and personal safety, educational topics and employment and jobs (BBC Wales, 1992; Granada Television, 1989; Scottish Television, 1991b). Audience research showed that people in the ITV regions were more interested in environmental and agriculture stories than Americans (Munro). While crime prevention and personal safety were stories the viewers seemed to want more of, for Ulster Television, coverage of violence in the region had turned many viewers off. There was a sentiment that the news "focus too much on bad news, especially in regards to the violence that occurs in Northern Ireland (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 22).

Magid found that "perhaps the greatest opportunity for Granada to better meet viewers' needs and interest lies in the area of news about the quality of education" (Granada Television, 1991b, p. 8). The majority of the viewers surveyed had been

dissatisfied with the coverage of that topic. The viewers were also looking for environmental stories and it was suggested the topic was covered more on *Granada Tonight*. One way would be to use a “signposted” environmental news strand, meaning a graphic title that identified it as a special report. Magid suggested calling it the “Green Life Report” (Granada Television, 1991b, p. 27). Overall though, Granada’s viewers were highly satisfied with ‘the balance of news, politics, sports, entertainment and other types of information featured on the program’ (Granada Television, 1991d, p. 16).

Magid also suggested signposting such as “cover story” or “inside story” for packages that helped viewers understand complex topics and its impact in an easy to understand manner. Other signposting recommendations included “follow-up” or “follow-up file” for older stories being followed up to bring viewers up to date (BBC Wales, 1992). Fisher said he saw more and better signposting when he was at Good Morning Television and the intention was “to want to make people stay.”

Westcountry was the first regional ITV station to do an hour-long newscast (Munro) and they added a section they called “Topical Features” each night. “They were not necessarily hard news driven,” explained Myers, “but might have a hard news peg, so the local output became more like a newspaper with light and shade, rather than just all being hard news.” This type of news feature “was a significant change.” They also did “far more human-interest stories, and it was all driven by what would reflect the local life.” At Granada, they “were always looking for some light and shade in a program, and you could be flexible,” said Prebble. “Those big heavy news days, you’d be a mostly news-based program. Other lighter days you’d have more sort of feature-y material.”

Research showed that ITN's viewers did not care much about politics, the queen, or the rest of the royal family (Independent Television News, 1992b; Independent Television News, 1992c). In addition, BBC's evening newscast gave "far more time to political governmental stories and items concerning the economy" than ITN (Independent Television News, 1993, p. 1). However, ITN generally provided more foreign coverage. There has always been "more foreign coverage on British Television than there is on the American equivalents," said Purvis.

As a contrast to BBC at the national level, "one of the most surprising findings is the relatively low interest viewers have in governmental coverage" (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 16) in Wales. Research showed more than one-third did not care about political stories. Magid thought that perhaps this was because it was so traditionally covered, lacked clarity, and an explanation of how viewers were affected.

Charlton's London audience wanted both entertainment and hard news. He said, "we didn't shy away from the serious stuff, but we didn't shy away from scandal and controversy either." If big stars were in town, they were interviewed, but the station also "did not avoid the grittier, harder stuff."

Weather

Respondents said weather became better focused in the 1990s, more of an integral part of the newscast. Longer forecasts were provided and the weather graphics became clearer. In most cases, a weather presenter was added to the news team as well.

Weather news was important to UK viewers, just as they were to viewers around the world. However, UK weather segments in the early 1990s were presented almost as afterthought (Anglia Television, 1991a; Page) and were not always as useful as they

could be. For example, it was not the norm to provide forecasts beyond today and tomorrow. Magid recommended providing a three to five day forecast (Scottish Television, 1990; Scottish Television, 1991b). Another recommendation to make it useful was to suggest how people may want to dress and “tell people what the temperature might be when they get up in the morning and what it might be like when they come home that evening” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 30). Like news, weather should also be localized in its coverage (Hais).

Sometimes hard to understand weather terminology was used on air, but weather needed to use straightforward elements, including easy to understand graphics. The interviewees said weather graphics became clearer and improved, mainly because of technology changes. Munro explained how “they got rid of all meteorological symbols, little smiley suns, and all the little things, funny little snow things, and made it clearer.” Forecasting was also mentioned to have become more accurate.

BBC Wales had weather maps with only temperatures and Magid explained, “it is important that names of cities and towns be added to the weather map” (BBC Wales, 1992, p. 30). In addition, adding weather videos from around the UK could be beneficial. BBC Wales implemented Magid’s weather recommendations and follow-up research showed a favorable reaction. Viewers pointed to “the programme’s improved explanation or clarity as reasons for that positive response” (BBC Wales, 1993d, p. 14).

Not all UK newscasts had a weather presenter and Magid’s overall recommendation was to add a person because it would add more credibility to the segment. Granada Television was urged to add “a credible weather presenter to *Granada Tonight* to increase the role and profile of weather reports in the programme” (Granada

Television, 1991b, p. 30). The same was suggested to BBC Wales (BBC Wales, 1991; BBC Wales, 1992), Scottish Television (Scottish Television, 1990), Central Television (Central Television 1990) and Ulster Television (Ulster Television, 1991b). A weather presenter does not have to be a meteorologist, but should be “positioned as a weather expert” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 32), and be “promoted as a vital part of the channel’s news team” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 38). Charlton said the “weather presenter became one of the presenting team” and a part of “a family of personalities you got to know” along with the two news presenters and the sports presenter. When Douglas started with BBC Scotland, they did not have weather presenters. It “went from the news presenters giving the weather to an actual weather presenter,” he said.

The weather presenter, according to Prebble, “was a role where eccentricity was encouraged.” Munro recalled how Granada and ITV’s *This Morning* had weather presenter Fred Talbot. He used to present the weather from a large map of the UK, floating in a dock in Liverpool. Talbot would jump back and forth to whatever area he was discussing.

Sports

Sports coverage needed to be more relevant, with better visuals and compelling coverage. In many cases, a separate sportscaster became a part of the news team in the 1990s. Thus the news teams in the late 1990s often consisted of two presenters, one weather presenter and one sportscaster - typical of the American local news model.

Generally speaking, UK viewers were less interested in sports than weather, a similar finding to Magid’s findings in the U.S. and Canada. However, sports were still important (Granada Television, 1990; Scottish Television, 1991b). Magid found that

“men and those in lower social classes are more likely than others to express high interest in news about sports” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 23).

Research showed the audience wanted more personally relevant sports segments (Granada Television, 1990) and local and regional coverage of table tennis, snooker, darts, pool and billiards, as well as soccer and rugby (Granada Television, 1991a). In Wales, viewers also wanted to see motor racing, road racing, boxing and tennis (BBC Wales, 1993b). Soccer generally generated the highest interest (Scottish Television, 1991b). The sports segment also needed to become better incorporated into the newscast. When the Magid staff watched BBC Wales, they found a sports segment consisting of merely one story; not enough to adequately develop viewer interest (BBC Wales, 1991).

Effective sports coverage, like news coverage, relies on compelling pictures to create an interest. Anglia Television “failed to show much video, which is the hook of successful sports coverage” (Anglia Television, 1991a). Sports also require energetic delivery and that was at times missing too. Dull sports segments that used “highlight footage and clichéd sound bites” (Central Television, 1990, p. 26) did little to captivate viewers. A sportscaster’s job is to lead the viewer through the stories and the pictures. “Visual referencing in copy is as important in sports reporting as it is in news” (Scottish Television, 1990, p. 17). A sportscaster should help lead the viewer’s eyes through the video as it “demonstrates both an understanding and a commitment to the story” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 23). Munro said while he worked with some sports people, it was mainly about performance. “They didn’t like a lot of interference from people,” he explained, and “certainly not Americans that didn’t seem to understand their sports, like cricket or rugby.”

Munro said some stations did not have a sportscaster and sports were often aired separate from the newscast. However, at Charlton's station the sportscaster became a part of the newscast team in the 1990s. Myers said sports in the Westcountry region became "far more detailed, because we could afford to cover more of it." There was also an expansion of Scottish Television's Friday *Scotsport* because more cameras became available and editing became easier. In addition "you got to hear more from the players and the prime participants," said Fisher.

Magid recommended stations consider implementing video showing the outstanding sports feats of the week, and brief scenes of funny and unusual action from sporting events (BBC Wales, 1992; Granada Television, 1989). It would help add a bit of personality to the sportscast.

Regional Coverage

Magid has always focused on strong, local news coverage in the U.S. This focus was evident in their UK recommendations as well. One aspect was "psychological localism" – where every story should be personalized to people where they live to make news relevant (George; Hais). In the UK, especially the ITV affiliates were held in high regards as the "home town" stations, and it made sense to play off of that regional advantage. A station should use a regional approach in its newsgathering (Central Television, 1990 Scottish Television, 1990) because it "helps convince viewers that it cares about their part of the region" (Anglia Television, 1991b, p. 17).

Magid was quite astonished that *Scotland Today* had not made a clear attempt to showcase its regional coverage. The newscast did not graphically identify the places of stories with location supers either, something Munro recognized as a common occurrence

in the regions. Magid recommended supers to be used, but for less known locations, to use maps instead (Scottish Television, 1990). BBC Wales also needed to better showcase locations by using datelines from an area and reporter standups (BBC Wales, 1992). In Ulster Television's case, they were not featuring enough coverage from the entire Ireland, apart from Northern Ireland. There was a "perceived imbalance of coverage in this area" (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 22). Ramsey said his advice was always "be as local as possible and then try to make it meaningful rather than just coverage."

BBC Wales, Scottish Television and Ulster Television were in contrast to Anglia Television. Anglia showed a strong commitment to coverage from all across their region, and did a good job highlighting its regional efforts with location supers and news bureaus. The "stories were also effectively related to the different counties" (Anglia Television, 1991a, p. 2)

Magid suggested BBC Wales add extra community involvement projects as a way to be viewed more as a regional station. It would also help show it was not merely an extension of BBC nationally as "it's crucial for BBC Wales to develop its own unique identity as a channel that deals with local issues and concerns" (BBC Wales, 1993, p. 12).

In Granada's viewing area, research showed a regional approach would not work very well because viewers there identified more as residents of specific towns and villages, rather than with a region. Magid recommended the station "avoid labeling or identifying itself geographically. Taking a regional identification simply doesn't fit viewers' perception of reality. Furthermore, identifying with a particular city or metropolitan area will simply offend viewers located elsewhere" (Granada Television, 1990, p. 17). Granada was told to avoid referencing a headquarters and instead use an

“around the region” type of segment. That segment would contain short items from various areas (Granada Television, 1991b; Granada Television, 1991d). Prebble remembered one item they started doing was using a “picture painted by some kid from a local primary school, just to emphasize the community.”

At the network level, most viewers understood that ITN originated in London. That was not perceived as a drawback as they provided more national and international coverage. Magid found it could actually be a promotable asset.

Promotions and Branding

There was an overall lack of promotion and proper branding in the UK, both when it came to station and newscast promotion. This may have been because of the lack of a competitive television environment. This changed in the 1990s as several stations implemented marketing and promotion plans and cross promotions started to be used. Magid argued that “proper promotions will pay major dividends for any channel willing to utilize it strongly” (Granada Television, 1990). Sattizahn explained they really had not done promotions in the UK before and they had not looked at their audience in a scientific way to market properly to them.

British viewers – as many as 44 percent of the respondents in Granada’s viewing area - wanted topical promotions that informed them of upcoming news stories and special items (Granada Television, 1990). Magid suggested cross promotions between programs and newscasts, where such cross promotion made sense (Anglia Television, 1991a; BBC Wales, 1991; Central Television, 1990; Scottish Television, 1990). As an example, Magid said the program *Scottish Frontiers on Medicine’s* presenter could introduce regular medical segments on the newscast (Scottish Television, 1990). For

BBC Wales, the recommendation was *Wales Today* cross promote with *Week In Week Out*, a current affairs program. At Central, Magid suggested shows with news stories with a timely edge in other programs should be promoted on the newscast (Central Television, 1990), while for Ulster Television, it was recommended “the last item on each daytime news bulletin contain a tease for a story that will be featured on that evening’s *Six Tonight*” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 30). This feature would “draw viewers from one programme to the next” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 30).

In addition to cross promotion, a good way to keep the audience coming back for more each night, would be “featuring multi-part reports or series on the programme. Compelling stories which can be covered over two, three or more news programmes consecutively can help attract viewers” (Ulster Television, 1991b, p. 31) from one day to the next. They help “encourage viewers to watch with greater frequency” (Independent Television News, 1992b, p. 25). For it to be effective, it has to be on compelling topics and “viewers must be convinced that if they miss one report, they will not get the whole story” (Independent Television News, 1992b, p. 25). As a part of airing a multi-report or series, it was imperative to tease and promote the next installment so the viewer could make a mental appointment to watch the following day.

For Scottish Television, the news team aspect needed to be strengthened substantially. The recommendation was that “promotional emphasis should be placed on the team of presenters and reporters who work together to bring viewers the news” (Scottish Television, 1991b, p. 35). A marketing plan for the station, centering on “Scottishness” and Scottish history, was also suggested as a way for the audience to view Scottish Television as truly their station (Scottish Television, 1991b). There was a need

for a more dominant visual identity and consistent design as well. Magid recommended the station logo with the Scottish thistle was to be incorporated into the newscast logo, as well as the news set and name supers (Scottish Television, 1990).

Granada was also offered a comprehensive marketing plan. Because viewers associated so much with their region, Magid suggested the station use concepts such as “family, home and friendly, warm people and neighbours” (Granada Television, 1991d, p. 2). For the newscast, Magid recommended pointing out “the distinctive benefits of watching Granada Tonight – personalities, style and coverage” (Granada Television, 1991d, p. 29) in their promotions.

BBC Wales was urged to develop a community outreach campaign to work on its image of being caring and involved. A positioning slogan was recommended, “along the lines of ‘We Are There For You’ to underline the importance of community caring and to increase awareness of news coverage dimension” (BBC Wales, 1993b, p. 23).

The British were not used to promotions that were not about specific stories, and Munro explained “a good generic promotion can underline the importance of the brand, difference in things that you bring that are separate from your competition.” The Magid staff also found that there were some promotions that simply did not work in the UK, such as “proof of performance promotions.” They are a “pat on the back,” essentially using language such as “we were the only station to tell you, we were first to show you” etc. Those promotions are used to show viewers they made the right choice, and to attempt to show those watching an entertainment show, but regularly watch news elsewhere, that they are missing out. George said “you cannot do that in the UK” because that is not a concept “they accept in any form whatsoever.”

Driving Forces

There were several key driving forces when it came to television news development in the UK. Respondents named the privatization movement and technology as being the larger ones. Another large force was competition. It included several categories such as between the BBC and ITV, between journalists, and from new technology such as cable and satellite. The mix between public service and commercial was viewed as good for TV development. Respondents also discussed the franchise auction and the ability to travel to view American news concepts as driving forces.

The 1991 franchise auction took place within the broader context of privatization. Most respondents mentioned it as an important force. Bell explained how “the Thatcher government had been completely obsessed with financial deregulation and the privatizing of national assets and shareholder value” and she did not think “without that movement it made a huge amount of sense to do what they did in terms of licensing.” Simpson said “TV news was the tip of the iceberg at the time. There was a big movement then to privatization ... TV news was on the periphery of all that.” The franchise auction, according to Upshon, would not have happened the way it did had the government not been “on a mission to privatize and to denationalize some of the major industries.” While the auction in most cases meant the licenses were sold to incumbents, when the government “saw money to be made, they took the opportunity,” he said.

To Magid staff, the privatization movement was instrumental. Hais said “the government decided they wanted a different, more competitive television situation than they had been used to having prior to that” and Munro explained the process in the UK to further commercialize television as a part of Thatcher’s privatization movement.

Privatization “provided the impetus,” said Munro. “Companies were open now for investment. Big investors then got into the marketplaces and invested in television, invested in the franchises.” George stated if it had not been for Thatcher, “I wouldn’t have been in the UK. Believe me. If she wouldn’t have done what she did, we wouldn’t have been there.”

The franchise auction was clearly seen as a developing force, but the respondents had different viewpoints of the importance of the auction itself. The auction “created change for the better,” said Myers, “but the government didn’t really know what they were doing. I think the outcome was lucky.” He added, “the government purely wanted to create a cash generation from ITV franchises, but the end result was better local television.” Fisher said while the franchise auction was a part of the driving force, it also came down to wanting to do things differently, “trying to build a loyal audience,” and “connecting with the audience.” The development in television news, according to Sattizahn, meant the British were more aware “that they needed to have their audience, and keep their audience, and expand their audience.” Bell stated “there was a real attempt to make bulletin news more appealing and popular, like competition drove a sort of imperative to really define the market for bulletins.” She explained the BBC during that time was on a “mission to explain” and that “it was mocked a lot, but it was actually quite revolutionary” because it was a move to truly consider the audience.

Sambrook did not feel the 1991 auction made a big difference. While it may have been a difficult franchise period, that “happened from time to time, every decade or so ... I don’t see it as a fundamental shift really,” he said. It also led to a larger integration of ITV. But, what happened said Sambrook, was that “commercial television became less

profitable.” It was no longer such a license to print money. Charlton felt differently about the auction and meant it brought change to ITV forever. “It changed its structure so more fundamentally than I think people understood,” said Charlton. “It was the beginning of a single ITV that took 15 years, but that was a ramification.” He added that “most had no idea, and I include myself, that once these franchises had been purchased, they could be bought by somebody else. That was revolutionary. That was massive change.” Chrimes felt there was an awakening that came with the auction. “It was a very different world that we emerged into afterwards,” she explained.

The auction made people realize that an Independent Television station was a business; the license had a value. While there was controversy surrounding the 1991 auction, “looking back I don’t think it was such a bad idea,” said Charlton. In the mid-1990s, “commercial television became properly commercial,” he said, as prior to that, it had been a monopoly. George also called the time prior to the auction a “commercial monopoly.” As Upshon explained, if you wanted to advertise on television in the early 1990s, you had to pay ITV as “there was no other competition.”

Several types of competition were mentioned by the respondents as driving forces. Purvis felt the “competition between BBC and ITN has served the system well;” the mix between public and private had been good. Bell stated the competition between “Sky, and BBC, and ITN was actually quite good for news.” Purvis explained “you don’t have to go downmarket to achieve commercial value” and “commercialization, as you might call it, has not necessarily been a bad thing.” In addition, Purvis clarified that Thatcher set out to break the stronghold the unions had on television by “creating new broadcasters that didn’t have a union history.” In terms of television, it was not

privatization, but rather “something a little more subtle,” said Purvis. “It’s a more radical free marketeering approach, than it is of actually selling of state assets.” Because the UK really consists of four separate nations, “there is a cohesion that comes from TV news, which is important,” said Purvis, “and I think that’s what the American networks achieve.”

Another driving force was competitiveness between journalists, with public service at the forefront. Prebble said “you wanted to have an exclusive story if you could.” But there was a strong public service ethos. Television journalists knew they were “a custodian of a public property, the public airwaves,” said Prebble. “That was a privilege, and you tried hard not to abuse it.” Charlton felt similarly. “The backbone of ITV was public service broadcasting,” he said, “and I am not sure American broadcasters get that, because American broadcasting has always been commercial.”

The increasing competition from cable, satellite and technology changes also helped drive the competitiveness and the development of television news. Munro said in particular Sky became a big competitor whereas cable has never really taken on in the UK to the extent it has in the U.S. Bell described what an eye opener it was when Sky bought the rights to the Premier Football League (soccer). She said “it would be a bit like someone like Twitter or Facebook buying all the rights to, say NBA games. It was that kind of magnitude or shock,” she explained. All of a sudden satellite was viewed as a formidable competitor. Sambrook said the new media outlets raised the game in terms of providing “a more competitive product” and Simpson stated “there was an incredible level of competition within British TV at that point in terms of a complete explosion in the number of channels.” Bell described how “the shift to the 24-hour cycle from the sort

of bulletin-based model was the biggest shift” and Chrimes also mentioned how the “arrival of 24-hour news is probably the biggest thing.”

It also came down to consumer choice. Hais described how there was “a desire on the part of consumers in Britain ... to just have a greater range of choice of what they want to watch.” This was both in terms of news and entertainment programming. In addition, because of privatization impacting the British economy positively, people had more discretionary income. While the early 1980s had been “economically very difficult in the UK,” explained Charlton, in the 1990s “people were spending more money on themselves.”

Technology was a force that the majority of respondents mentioned as key. Although satellite and cable did not have high penetration in the early 1990s – BskyB had just launched in 1990 for example - there was a definite fear that it could “provide even more competition for viewers’ attention” (BBC Wales, January 1992, p. 3). In fact, questions regarding satellite and cable, and even VHS and the remote control, were a part of most of Magid’s UK research studies. Technology “changed working practices” said Sambrook, “which freed up and allowed you to do news and journalism in a completely different way.” Technology added affordability and flexibility in newsgathering.

It is not well known, but also Magid worked with satellite and cable companies in the UK. For example, they provided consulting services to Sky TV (Munro). The company also did a product review for cable channels UK Living and Wire TV (Telecommunications International, 1994a) and an analysis of the Family Channel (Telecommunications International, 1994b). In addition, they worked with BBC World Service Television and the New York Times Company. The two companies were

interested in launching a cable channel with news and news magazine type programming (BBC World Service Television and New York Times, 1993a; BBC World Service Television and New York Times, 1993b). Magid's involvement in the UK thus went beyond terrestrial television.

Television news development was also spurred on by the ability for media personnel to travel to view the American news model. Many of Magid's clients visited Iowa and travelled with Magid staff to U.S. clients. Myers went on both Magid visits and by himself. He "did a mixture of visits, and the reason for that was, we needed to work out how advertising revenue could substantiate the spend on local news." Myers added, "American news was very good at regionality, and we looked at America in considerable depth ... I think we needed to learn more about how the American local news model worked. We used the consultants to help us achieve that." Prebble also traveled to Magid headquarters in Iowa. From there, he went with Magid staff to other stations "just to look at the way different people were doing their thing."

Seven of the journalist respondents discussed traveling on their own and viewing American newscasts. Gibbon and Chrimes recalled how they and others from TV-am were sent to Florida for two weeks to view U.S. morning television. When Gibbon came back to the UK she felt "we're so slow." She had also noticed how the writing for U.S. television was different, stating "the language was more inclusive as though we were all a part, we and the audience are all a part. We're all together, we share this." It was "us, we, not you and I." Douglas described a vacation to Florida where he encountered a television journalist working on the beach. The reporter was operating his own camera and Douglas went with him to the studio to watch the editing, something that "was

revolutionary for me because at that time we were still shooting on film.” Douglas said, “this guy was years ahead of us ... He was shooting this stuff himself, he was editing it himself, he was doing everything himself.” A normal crew for BBC Scotland at the time would have included the reporter, a cameraman, a soundman and an electrician to do the lights. Sambrook traveled to the U.S. to work with BBC’s network partners, first NBC and then ABC. He saw American newscasts, talked with people and “had a sense of what was happening in the States at that time.” Central’s Upshon was involved with both NAB and the Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA). He also travelled around the U.S. to watch newscasts and visited Magid in Iowa.

Restraining Forces

There were restraining forces that slowed down television news development. Respondents mentioned a resistance to change, money, trade unions and the auction resulting in job loss as some of those. In addition, while Magid being an American company was not outright mentioned as a hindering force, it was alluded to.

With most change, there is hesitancy. Munro felt a resistance to change was the largest item holding back news development, while Hais explained the current providers were “a little reticent to want to let more and more people into the process. They would want to limit competition to the greatest extent they could do that.” Knowledge is power and those controlling the news had power. Thus “the establishment never liked competition very much,” said Bolton. “Never liked power developing.” George explained, “I don’t think anybody went into this process gladly. They were forced to do it. Now some resisted till the very end and many of them paid the price.” Sattizahn stated “there’s always resistance to change” and added, “the fact that management hires an

outsider to come in and help in the change process, is why consultants were not necessarily welcomed with open arms.” Fisher discussed the restraining force of “normal British reticence, not to go the full way that the Americans did.” He also pointed out it would have been too much of a leap to go from what the British were doing in the 1990s directly to what the U.S. was doing during the same time period.

Money was another restraining force; news is costly. Gibbon said “stories come from the regions,” and traveling to cover a story costs money. Douglas explained he had to justify travels. Some of the respondents mentioned a financial contraction starting after the 1991 auction, which added to money constraints. Upshon pointed out how the advertising base was eroding, while Chrimes called it a fragmentation. At Central, the chief accountant had at one point questioned Upshon about the necessity of a live shot. Although he had told the accountant that going live was a “part of the structure and the grammar of the program,” he felt “that influence of the business, the bottom line came in more than anything else.”

The trade unions were a hindering force originally. Purvis discussed how “it had reached the stage where you really couldn’t make a program unless the union agreed. That changed dramatically under Thatcher in the early 90s.” Sambrook described the 1990s as “a period of diluting union power.” For Upshon, the weakening of the unions “enabled us not to be hidebound by some stupid restrictions” and Gibbon described how there could be as many as seven people on a story in the early days – two on camera, two on sound, an electrician, a driver, director and a researcher. The electrician, for example, was mandated by union rules. Gibbon said “an electrician, God knows what he was supposed to do, because usually you’d be in the middle of a field.” Prebble described

how “if anybody was going to hold up a pencil in a shot, you’d have to send a props man. We’d have to send electricians to light buildings that were already lit.”

Some respondents saw the franchise auction as a hindering force, along with the privatization movement. Myers felt a major backlash with the franchise changes because a lot of people lost their jobs all at once if their franchise bid failed. If 300 people lost their jobs, and they all had families, about 1,500 people could be affected. In a small city, that made a big difference. It “created a backlash, and the shockwave went right through the southwest of the UK for I would say, more than a year, probably 18 months,” he said. “The change of franchise was a very, very difficult time for all those people, it was really heartbreaking for them.” Myers added “it was also difficult for the new incumbent because we had to deal with the backlash.” Prebble felt both the franchise auction and the privatization movement was a hindering force for television news development. It helped push news into a phase where it was just regarded in terms of costs and it became too commercial. Munro described how a lot of people did not like Thatcher and felt “what she was doing was wrong for the country.”

While Magid being an American company was never mentioned outright to be a hindering force by any of the respondents, several interviewees alluded to it. For example, both Magid staff and Purvis brought up a *Guardian* article (Millard, 1993) that “featured a narrative that said, ‘increased commercial competition is creating a more Americanized product,’” Purvis said, and “Americans are going to run *News at Ten*.” Purvis felt that “if this article had never appeared, no one would ever have known or cared.” Had Magid been British, it would have been viewed differently. Ramsey explained, “Americans aren’t highly regarded in the UK. America is usually the center of

any joke ... the challenge to be accepted was unusually high.” He described that it could take a while for people to listen and allow him to critique and make suggestions. Ramsey said he never encountered walking “into a newsroom or broadcast center and have everybody say, ‘Oh, my God. The Magid guy is here. Our troubles are over.’ They’d look up and say, ‘Who the hell is this guy?’ It was not easy,” he said. Page explained, “it was very, very hard to break down cultural barriers.”

Munro said he “was not trying to Americanize anything, in fact, I thought it would have been a mistake.” He described it as taking “a jazz riff and putting it in the middle of a Beethoven symphony. You don’t want to do that. You want to do it your way. Do it your way, but do this, because this is going to help you.” Munro kept a low profile because some thought, “we’re going to Americanize British television. It’s going to go down market. It’s going to have stuff that’s sort of going to be silly things.”

Working in UK Television News in the 1990s

All interviewees expressed excitement to have been a part of television news in the UK in the 1990s. For many Magid staff members, it was a highlight, an unsurpassed experience. George described working in UK television as “the career highlight of my life.” He “had a front row seat on something that books have been written about, that changed the landscape of television throughout Europe, especially in the UK.” Munro called it entrepreneurial. It was an “immense amount of work,” he said. “At one time I think I had 20 or 30 clients.” It was a seven days a week type of a job, “but I loved it.” Ramsey said it was invigorating and “being part of the transformation of television in the UK in the 90s to me was exciting because you could see it happening.”

To Warwick, it was personally satisfying, especially working with the BBC. But, “the idea that I was going to go forward into this vast institution and somehow render change was daunting.” What made a difference for him was that they understood the old days were ending and that changes had to be made. Puffer called it extremely gratifying. The majority of people he worked with were attentive and “open to considering different ways of doing things than they had been accustomed to.” For Hais, as a researcher, “intellectually, I thought it was quite stimulating, because I was just comparing attitudes – both the similarities, and there were some, and the differences – between how people reacted to television in the UK and how they reacted here in the U.S.” It was a “source of pride that I was involved in something as, I think, important as this, and that I was working for a company that was so involved,” he said.

It was not only thrilling for Magid staff members, but also for UK journalists. Bolton called it exciting and a privilege to have been a part of television in that decade. There were a lot of things happening; changes moved at a fairly rapid pace. “It was pretty electric,” said Simpson. “It was very exciting at the time, because back then we were learning multi-skilling.” He “loved the hands on approach that we were given at that point, the freedom to cut our own pieces together, to voice our own pieces together.” Prior to that the union had been so strong that this would have been impossible. Charlton said it was exciting because they had new technology and were well funded. They also “were given a lot of creative freedom” and “I felt new things were possible, and it was time to be doing things in a fresh and new way.” Fisher labeled it as “mildly glamorous, and exciting, and I was doing the job I always wanted to do,” while Sambrook called it a very competitive time; the competitiveness adrenalized the experience.

Working in UK television in the 1990s was not always positive. Bolton explained how after the franchise auction, the new working environment was difficult at first. He felt “those people who get up and go and push themselves, particularly men actually in those circumstances, would probably survive. Those who were gentler, more reflective, but perhaps more insightful ... found it more difficult.” Gibbon, who was in senior management at TV-am in the early 1990s, said it was a male-dominated field. She felt “it was quite difficult to get your voice heard. I’m not shy. I don’t sit in a corner, but I still felt ... there’s a club there.” She also felt that in turn impacted story selection. As a breakfast program, the audience was primarily women at home with their young children. Gibbon thought the topics they covered did not adequately cater to them. “It felt like a battle a lot,” she said. “A good, humored battle, but a bit of a battle.” Chrimes explained how as a woman she initially found TV-am, “a much less macho environment than Fleet Street” where she had come from. But “as time went on, it became clear that there were probably some of the same pitfalls for women.” Both Chrimes and Gibbon recalled how they had planned for Gulf War coverage, and when the war broke out, they went to attend the news meeting. There, “the head of news said, it’s alright girls, but the lads are going to talk about the war,” said Chrimes. Generally as a woman “you had to be tough. You had to be pretty assertive,” she added, and “I suspect I had to fight my corner throughout my career really.” When she began at Sky News, she found it challenging and a “very macho, very bruising sort of environment.”

Did Magid Make a Difference?

It is clear television news adheres to certain similar, recurring and predictable elements (McManus, 1990; Phillips, 1976; Stephenson, Reese, & Beadle, 2005; Rose,

1979). It is also clear the format includes co-anchors who talk to each other between stories, fast-paced graphics and live shots (Sullivan, 2010). People copy patterns that work and draw an audience (Primo, 2008). The American news anchor model - using the same presenter night after night - was imported by most European countries (Bourdon, 2000). As this study showed, it was imported by the UK too.

To draw the conclusion that Magid is responsible for incorporating all changes that occurred in UK news broadcasting is taking it too far. Based on the interviews conducted, it is clear they helped integrate certain concepts, but it was not done in isolation; they were merely one driving force. There were several other forces at play, including the emergence of new and faster technology and the need for television stations to be competitive and attract viewers.

Overall Magid staff would like to believe their work was not in vain and that they made a difference. “I would like to think we made an impact,” said Munro. “I’d like to think we made it better.” Morris stated, “We produced an impact. That’s what we did. Whether it lasted ... I don’t know.” But, “just by inertia, if nothing else, we must have made a difference. A positive difference.” For Hargis, they definitely made a difference and she has UK friends that still quote her work. Puffer also thinks they made an impact with their contributions, at least creating “some competitive differences, and just a willingness to be more creative in any competitive environment.”

Some Magid staff members were more modest. Ramsey explained they had an impact but “I don’t think our impact was so massive that we radically altered the landscape.” Page believes that within the BBC, there were “too many people who were reluctant to take advice from American television consultants for there to ever have been

any huge leap forward directly related to Magid's involvement" during her time with the company in the late 1990s. The fact that the master news training classes she was involved with "were being delivered in American voices and from an American consultancy, I think mean that they were never going to be received with open arms," she said. Because the world shrunk so quickly, Sattizahn believed change "was going to happen whether we were there or not." He added that technology drives people, as does awareness and visibility, but that perhaps "we may have helped move it a little quicker."

Many of the journalists interviewed explained there was value in Magid's services. Bolton described how just talking to people outside the organization was helpful. In addition, "American skills in storytelling were and are probably unparalleled." He felt "in terms of storytelling, that had a very considerable impact" and added, "the way they told stories and the way they used television, we had a lot to learn." For Charlton, "American influence was fundamental in changing people's attitudes to the way news can be told on television. I would say that. And clearly, Frank Magid and his team were part of that transformation. They were hugely influential." Charlton also pointed out the influence of Australian television as Bruce Gyngell came to TV-am in the 1980s, ahead of Magid's entry into the UK. For Purvis, just sitting down with Magid was helpful because it forced "you to review what you were doing. Now, you might review it and decide you didn't want to change anything, but, actually, you did review it, and that was an extra value." He called it "an interesting road check" and added that "everyone copies everyone else." Some of the things people would have seen if they watched American television. Upshon said what made a difference is that news people were exposed to American television, "saw what we liked, pinched what we thought were the

best bits.” There were some things they could improve and “by exposure to the way things were done either by seeing it first hand or maybe with the American consultants, it made us more aware of what we could do.”

Fisher felt television changes would have happened without the American consultants, but “maybe not to the degree it has, and it would have been slower.” Prebble felt the same, stating it would have occurred without the consultants, but “perhaps less quickly, less effectively.” He added that “even if you didn’t adopt any of their ideas directly, it just gave you a lot of different perspectives to enable you to look at your own product in different ways.” For Prebble, Magid made a difference. “I thought they were good and helpful. I enjoyed working with them. It was refreshing. And they helped me, I think, in a number of ways.”

Gibbon explained that when a consultant is brought in, it is a third party and “it makes everybody raise the game. Also, if you’re paying for it, you’re going to listen to some of it, aren’t you?” However, overall she believes the impact of American consultants was not that significant. In terms of stylistic, pace and presentation values, Gibbon thought they “probably would’ve got there, but probably at a different pace. It probably hastened the pace of the direction in which they probably would’ve gone anyway.” At Westcountry, Myers felt while the consultants helped, they did not have a lot to do with it. He explained they helped support and present ideas, but they did not instigate the ideas. In addition, “there was a substantial amount of ideas taken from America in the 1990s ... It wasn’t plagiarism, but a lot of the good bits of American local broadcasting were brought over to the English regions in the early 1990s.” He felt as a result, “local news coverage improved.” Upshon said Central Television was “very, very

heavily influenced by American news and American programming, but that came mainly from familiarization.” Upshon had already been exposed to the American television news format to “a very large extent before the formal consultancies happened.”

Sambrook said at the BBC, Magid “helped us do what we wanted to do, but we would have probably found a way to do it anyway.” At Scottish Television, Simpson described how they “saw the writing on the wall. Magid precipitated the process. They came in, and they crystalized a few things that we had to look at. They speeded up the process.” He added, “a lot of it was obvious. We knew where we had to go. We knew the competition that we were having.” Simpson believes Magid offered their services and Scottish Television though it was a good idea. “It was a business move on their part, rather than an editorial move on ours,” he said. Fisher, also at Scottish Television in the early 1990s, felt “they brought in a lot of changes, not all of them were good.”

Lessons Learned

There were many lessons learned in the UK in the 1990s. When given the opportunity to look back and reflect, several Magid consultants explained the experience made them grow. Sattizahn said he worked in U.S. television most of his life, but the “UK taught me that United States television wasn’t necessarily good.” He was surprised by how relaxed people were about television and the lack of importance that it played overall. Sattizahn said “while it’s an art form doing television, it isn’t necessarily the focus of people’s lives in the UK.” It made him “slow down and relax, and changed my attitude about U.S. television.” Today Sattizahn does not watch local news because “I can’t stomach it. I think it’s all promotion, and very little news,” adding that “I find U.S. television news unbearable, which is why I quit working in television news.” For

Warwick, “American network news has kind of lost its way. They put agendas together that would have had the ABC’s and CBS’s of yesteryear just cringing at what they are doing today.” Ramsey said “the relevance of television news 10 years from now is going to be way different than it is today. It already is different. There is no imperative to make sure you’re sitting down, ready to watch ABC News at 6 o’clock at night.” He now gets most of his information online. “Well, 10 years from now, who knows?” Ramsey said. “Maybe they’re going to beam the story straight to your head and you won’t need a device.” He explained he is now “a little disrespectful of U.S. concepts even though that’s where I got my start.”

When analyzing what occurred in the UK, Warwick said they were trying to provide a better news experience and explained “the idea of this as an act of commercializing broadcast journalism in the UK, I don’t think ever crossed our minds. I think we were rather proud of the fact that what we were doing is instilling a better way of communicating.” He added that, “effective storytelling that is good enough will make me want to come back and watch again tomorrow and not watch the competition.” One of the biggest surprises for him was “trying to get people to understand that this is about being good and competing to be the best and attracting viewers.” He felt “part of the fabric of television news in the States was totally absent in Europe at that time.”

The UK journalists interviewed also described the importance of good storytelling. Charlton said “there were cultural differences between an American approach to news and the British approach to news, which we sometimes would butt up against a little.” However, “the main message was dynamic, picture-led, varied, surprising, and wide ranging in terms of your subject matter.” Bell explained how the

BBC's "mission to explain" was quite radical because of its efforts to consider the audience. Fisher described the importance of attempting to build a true connection with the audience. If the audience could relate, "then they were more likely to watch you, therefore advertising rates would go up," he said. Bolton added the British tend to look at the United States, even today, adding, "what you do today, we tend to do tomorrow."

The largest lesson learned and the main implication for practice is the notion of good, solid storytelling. No matter the medium, the basics need to be present – the beginning, middle and the end – and told in an effective way. To build on McLuhan's notion that the medium is the message, stories have to be told with both the medium and the audience in focus. Television programs can reach a large audience if the message fits (Warner, 1962). Communicating effectively through any medium begins with solid storytelling that caters to the needs and wants of the audience. But while storytelling involves certain entertainment aspects, if those aspects are taken too far, the audience can potentially tune out a newscast.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

“If you’re a journalist, understand how your writing has impact. Write clearly and concisely and impactfully. Cover stories that matter ... Touch the viewer at their emotional core ... Often in the UK news, the story would have all the substance, but it would be hard as hell to understand.”

Reagan Ramsey, 2017

“We’d try to get them to write the way people talk, rather than as they read in the newspaper ... You have to decide when you’re going out there and telling a story, what you’re trying to do ... People were surprised they could start analyzing storytelling.”

Tom Sattizahn, 2017

“Where the work was needed was in how to produce better stories, how to produce the broadcast itself better, how to write, how to do standups. It was just taking and overhauling all those notions and trying to bring them forward into contemporary times ... There’s nothing better than good storytelling ... We were rather proud of the fact that what we were doing is instilling a better way of communicating.”

Ned Warwick, 2017

The 1990s was a decade full of turmoil in UK television. Broadcasters were under serious pressure to evolve in order to compete. It began in earnest with the 1991 ITV franchise auction where licenses were auctioned off using a bidding process, combining a

monetary bid with a commitment they would provide high-quality programming (Henry, 1989). The quality threshold was not clearly defined and up to each bidder to propose. The auction resulted in four established license holders losing their franchises. It also indirectly resulted in today's consolidated media market. The first significant change took place only a year after the auction, as Yorkshire Television and Tyne Tees Television merged (Nisse, 1993). The notion that franchises and their accompanying licenses could be bought and sold was a byproduct of the auction that was not fully understood at the time. As Lindsay Charlton pointed out, it changed the structure fundamentally, and "it was the beginning of a single ITV that took 15 years, but that was a ramification." He added that "most had no idea, and I include myself, that once these franchises had been purchased, they could be bought by somebody else. That was revolutionary. That was massive change."

The subsequent increased competition from cable and satellite outlets also helped transform the broadcasting environment. Stations had to draw an audience and be commercially viable. The monopoly that had been there for so long was gone. Mergers and acquisitions began in earnest. Commercial pressures and competition increased rapidly, resulting in the media market landscape that can be seen in the UK today in the early part of the 21st century.

For U.S. television news, the 1960s was the medium's most important growth period (Watson, 1990). That decade was as important as the 1990s in the UK. Those time periods are thirty years apart, but this research showed the changes and growth that occurred in both countries are similar and illustrated how that was so. It also demonstrated that when it comes to marketizing news, the real transformation occurs

when storytelling is tailored to both the audience and the medium through which the news is told. If a broadcast reporter tells a story about a subject that impacts viewers in a visually appealing and easy to understand manner, the audience will tune in. That in turn attracts advertisers. This formula is what worked in the U.S., what worked in the U.K., and what has worked in television formats around the world. This is what sociologist Lloyd Warner pointed out in 1962, when he said that merely sending symbols is not sufficient; the audience also has to understand the meaning. Thus television news can reach a mass audience, if the message is properly formulated.

The 1990s was a decade when employees of American news and research consultancy company Frank N. Magid Associates could be found throughout the UK – from the headquarters of the BBC and Independent Television News, to the local regions around the country. This research points out the previously unknown extent of Magid’s actual influence in the UK. Media outlets across that country hired the company to conduct research, firm up business plans, and conduct storytelling and performance training. This research also surfaces how the art of storytelling permeated the work of the consultants, how they were aware of cultural differences, and strategically tailored their recommendations to the areas and countries they operated in. With the American news formula as a base, minor local adjustments were made to design the message to be most effective for the target audience.

Despite Magid’s vast reach and success, very little research that focuses on the consultants and their role in the UK has been conducted. Their influence has been shown through content analysis studies and limited interviews, which could show intent and, presumably, acute and telling observations of existing conditions in ways that external

content evaluations could not. Their company information has been considered a trade secret, thus neither the consultants nor their clients have wanted to share details of their endeavors. The American consultants worked with indigenous media outlets to shape television on a global scale. This is the first in-depth, comprehensive look at the consultants' efforts in shaping television news in the UK.

This study literally and figuratively arose from the depths of "The Dungeon," the nickname for the Magid archives in Iowa. It began in March 2016 when this researcher first opened the gray, fireproof door and began uncovering pieces of television history. The archival material in the dungeon provided the impetus for the study.

This research differs from many other UK television news studies in that it focused equally on the BBC and ITV, if not slightly more on ITV. Most of the available television research has centered on the BBC. ITV and its stations have often been marginalized or neglected, largely because of a "relative lack of access to archive material" (Johnson & Turnock, 2005, p. 4).

Changes in the UK during the time studied here are historically significant as other countries in Europe quickly pursued similar set-ups, also using American consultants, including Magid. The 1990s was a decade of tremendous growth and change for UK and European terrestrial television news. The changes occurred at a rapid pace and made it exciting, scary and sad, all at the same time. It was filled with highs and lows, depending on who you were and where you worked.

Contextualizing the News Transformation and Integrating the Findings

UK broadcasters did not always welcome the American consultants with open arms, even though Magid's client list was extensive. They worked with both Independent

Television and the BBC, on national and regional levels. There were evident complexities in the development of traditional television news, and stark differences between television news in the UK and television news in the U.S. in the 1990s.

The research questions that guided this study centered on why the consultants were in the UK and how they played a role in the development of television news. They focused on key concepts Magid attempted to integrate into UK television news and how those concepts are similar or different from traditional U.S. news concepts. A third area the study examined were the driving and restraining forces that played a role.

Why Magid Was in the UK

The Magid consultants were initially brought to the UK to work with Worldwide Television News in 1986, two years ahead of the White Paper. However, what made them stay in the UK comes down to one main factor – tremendous business opportunities. Those business opportunities in turn were because of the increasingly competitive environment, Magid’s infrastructure and lack of competition from other companies, the state of UK news storytelling, and Magid’s strength in local and regional television.

UK television was entering into a substantially more competitive environment and there was a clear marketplace for Magid. The American company understood true, head-to-head commercial television, something the British did not have a firm grasp of. Their broadcasting had previously been a commercial monopoly; ITV franchises had been “a license to print money.” That was all changing. “The timing was perfect,” said Magid’s Ned Warwick. “The hunger was there, the need was there and everybody kind of understood it. The old days were coming to an end.”

There was a clear appetite for Magid's services and the American company was well situated with an infrastructure to support the needs in the UK. They had tremendous business resources and backing from headquarters in Iowa. With their London office, they could react swiftly to client needs. Their company was well poised for the demand that existed. As several of the respondents stated, there was not another company like Magid operating in the UK, or even in Europe, at the beginning of the 1990s. Because Magid had no real competition in the initial stage, it was easy for them to establish a firm grasp on the UK market. Later, other consultancy firms joined in and the marketplace for consultants became crowded.

The state of television news storytelling was another factor that helped Magid. Generally, stories contained all the information, but were told in an unappealing manner, and sometimes, were hard to understand. The message was not tailored to the medium; the UK broadcasting industry was not taking full advantage of the power of the visual aspect of television. There was an overall understanding that British storytelling was dull and needed to incorporate a better marriage between words and pictures with messages tailored to the audience. The audience wanted more from their newscasts. They wanted "a more exciting, fresher type of program, which was more appropriate to 1993 than like something that was made in 1963" (Charlton). It also fit with the BBC's new mantra of being on a mission to explain things.

One of Magid's strengths has always been local television, which was perfect for the UK scenario. While there were cultural and other differences to consider, Magid understood local and regional television. The ITV stations were generally strong in their local markets and their audiences were the middle majority audience that could be seen at

the local level in the U.S. When Magid first began working with the BBC, it was at the regional level as well; that, too, played to the American company's strength. Magid's work at the network level in the U.S. helped the company relate to both the BBC and ITN, providing mutual understanding on multiple levels.

How the American Consultants Played a Role

Magid played a role in the development of UK television news in several ways. They helped clients with business and marketing plans, research, storytelling and performance training. What their work entailed depended on the client's needs.

Magid assisted several clients with business strategies and that sometimes involved staffing and facilities plans. For Westcountry, Magid helped to create the structure of the company because the upper echelon had limited television experience. In terms of marketing, there was generally a lack of American style promotion and branding, mainly because there had not been a need for it. Magid worked a lot on helping stations develop unique regional branding and marketing. They also worked on cohesive branding where the station's identity was extended to other departments, including news.

The company conducted extensive, labor intense audience research. Much of this was because their type of in-depth research had not been done in the UK before, but also because of cultural differences, for example with phone usage. When their research was incorporated into programming, it finally became about what the audience wanted versus what the broadcasters thought the audience wanted. Many times their audience research had a clear and direct impact and resulted in highly visible on-air changes.

What Magid also was good at was storytelling and performance coaching. Both centered on making people understand how visual the medium of television is and how

best to take advantage of that aspect. They conducted intensive seminars throughout the UK. The training focused on items such as storytelling basics, newscast reviews, and in-depth analysis and performance training with reporters and presenters. It was tailored to the client's needs and requests. Their training touched on all aspects of a newscast, and involved basically all staff levels – from high level managers, to talent, producers, writers and editors.

Key Concepts the Consultants Integrated

Virtually all aspects of the newscast evolved in the UK in the 1990s, from the basic building blocks of the story itself, to on-air talent roles, to the promotion of the newscast. The heart of this study's findings resides in the notion of good, visual storytelling. It is a storytelling that is tailored to the audience and the medium and understands the culture that it operates within. A story that is told well is powerful and will draw an audience.

It cannot be denied that British television news became more American in its approach in all aspects. The key television news concepts that can be seen globally clearly have an American origin. There are elements of television storytelling that are basic, such as a story having a beginning, middle and an end. But the notion of culture also means that some aspects of storytelling will be slightly different from the original American version. This study revealed dramatic changes were applied to the newscast, within a frame of sensitivity to British culture.

Overall, British journalists were good storytellers and most of the pieces were already in place. But storytelling was boring and not efficient in terms of Magid's tested and proven model. It did not convey messages effectively to its audience. Magid took a

structure that already contained the main storytelling elements and refined it. Stories began to be told in an active voice and in a conversational tone, becoming more visually driven, incorporating words and visuals into a package. Sentences built on one another. The newscast became quicker in its pace, had a more cohesive feeling, and contained a more conscious approach to the human aspect of news, meaning how news impacted the viewers.

The British had a tradition of “stacking” the newscast, a way of putting together stories that did not have anything to do with each other. That left the newscast without a sense of purpose. In the U.S., there is more of a tendency of clustering segments, making the news feel more cohesive. In the 1990s, there was a clear attempt to make the newscast feel well connected by adding elements to help guide the viewers from beginning to end. There was a well-defined effort to tailor the newscast to the audience and to make it more personal. The tone of the newscasts also evolved. It went from the rather formal British tone to a more conversational and helpful tone.

Some respondents felt that tags and transitions became more American in their style, but it was also an area that contained a clear cultural divide originally. Magid found a lack of tags and transitions and viewers needed to be better guided from one story to the next throughout the newscast. In the U.S., anchors typically use verbal cues to indicate a story is ending, but in the UK, presenters used visual cues instead. UK presenters would look down at their script or in other ways visually signal to the viewer that a story was ending and a new one was beginning. In the 1990s, tags and transitions did become more verbal in the UK and did a better job of signaling changes to the viewer.

Magid also saw tags and transitions as a way for the presenter to become more involved in the newscast, but it required more interaction between the presenters. Initially, UK presenters were only seen together in the opening and ending shots, but not during the newscast. The British produced the presenters as individuals and not as newscast teams. Showing them together more often helped make the newscast feel more cohesive, while at the same time, it made the news team more identifiable. There were more two shots used and the overall interaction increased, but not to the bantering level as in the U.S. In addition to the two news presenters being more involved in the newscast, many stations also added a weather presenter and a sports presenter, thus expanding the news team to four presenters.

Initially news presenters had been hired because they could read the news well, and not because they were journalists. Often they were actors. In the UK, the star had always been the news itself, not the presenter. In the 1990s, the job of the presenter became more demanding. All of a sudden the presenters needed to think on their feet and not merely be able to read the teleprompter. They needed to react to stories and have conversations with reporters. The presenters were also allowed, and encouraged, to bring in their personality into the job as a way to build a connection with their audience.

Another aspect that changed was that the UK originally had rotating presenters. It was something that frustrated the Magid staff because it did not allow the presenter to gain recognition and fully build a connection with the audience if they were not seen on air night after night. Their research also showed that presenters were not very well known. In the 1990s, the UK did follow the American model with permanent presenters being established at most stations.

It is clear that many aspects of the role of the presenter became more Americanized. Presenters were produced as a team, there was more interaction and two-shots, journalists were hired because the demands of the job changed, and permanent anchors were selected. Today UK presenters are well known, but not as powerful as the American news anchors are.

One area that is clearly different from the U.S. is that there is not such a focus on appearance in the UK. Someone's looks are not as important. The research also showed that the UK audience did not like presenters who looked too perfect, and especially women could feel threatened by female presenters that looked too well put together. The UK audience craved a more "ordinary" look; it made the anchors more relatable.

Just as the presenter role changed, so did the reporter role. They were brought to the forefront and became a substantial, important part of the newscast. Reporters became involved in the newscast itself and interacted more with presenters. They also began to showcase their expertise, being used as trusted guides on issues, covering more beats and being considered experts.

Standups were incorporated on a more frequent basis. That not only elevated the visibility of the reporter, but also added credibility to the story. Respondents were clear that the standup should not be done without a purpose. It needed to incorporate something significant into the story. The reporter needed to figure out a way to add an element to the story with their standup.

Reporters also worked on incorporating more of a human angle into stories. Real people affected by issues were increasingly interviewed, and while politicians were still used, they were used less and for a shorter duration. As could be expected, since action

news originally had sound bites that were not longer than ten seconds, Magid advocated for short, concise sound bites. They found that oftentimes in the UK, the reporters allowed sound bites to go on and on. What that meant was that the sound bite was doing the job of the reporter; the reporter let the sound bite tell their story. This is not effective storytelling. Sound bites should be used as supplements to the story, little sprinkles that add spice. There was a conscious effort in the 1990s to incorporate sound bites in a more effective manner and they were shortened substantially. Rarely were two-minute sound bites used anymore. However, they were still generally longer than U.S. sound bites, because that fit the UK market.

Reporter packages were initially very long. Magid found that it seemed that package length was dictated by the amount of time to fill, rather than the demand of the news subject itself. Many packages went from being three minutes to over just a minute. The main purpose was not to shorten the packages per se, but it was done in an effort to make stories clearer and more understandable. It came down to the true core of the story and what was important to convey.

There was also an increasing effort on explaining what things meant to average citizens, not just in political and legal type stories, but in all type of stories. In addition, the stories, even though they were shorter, became more complete. The archival material had the perfect example of a story about toxic shellfish that could result in paralysis. The story did not explain if these fish had made it to local markets or what the likelihood was that it was available for sale in the region. Magid said stories like these with important elements missing could potentially cause mass hysteria. Topics needed to be more completely discussed.

With the shortening of packages, the pace of the newscast changed as well. It became a faster, tighter newscast, mainly because of the increase in the number of stories that aired. Magid's research overall backed up the quicker pace, although it took the audience a little bit of time to get used to the increase in speed. Because everything had been tightened, the newscast pacing aligned more closely to the American format.

Magid team members were proponents of "news you can use," meaning topics that were important to the audience, where the viewer would learn something from watching a news story. Although news of the day was the priority, there was an increase in topics such as consumer reports, crime and personal safety, educational topics, and employment and jobs. These topics were very similar to what studies had shown the U.S. audience wanted. While Allen (2000) in his study of BBC One and Channel 4, based on national newscasts, had called education and the economy non-consultancy traits, meaning topics the consultants did not generally advocate to cover, it was clear that at the local level in the UK, Magid found these topics important. There was also an effort to provide both light and shade in a newscast, meaning both hard and soft news.

While good visuals are now considered imperative in television news, they were not being taken advantage of in the UK. Visuals often showed buildings and meeting rooms, and many times for extended periods, or from several different angles. This changed quite dramatically in the 1990s when the reporters and photographers actively sought out good pictures. There was also a better merger between words and pictures. At times in the past, the two could have sometimes been in direct conflict. What Magid worked to incorporate was "touch and go," meaning that a reporter references the video

frequently so that words and pictures are unified. This area of storytelling was significantly strengthened as reporters better understood the importance of the visuals.

Along with video, graphics became substantially more sophisticated and contemporary, much thanks to advances in technology. The visual language also became more consistent for a station with a common thread both in graphic treatment and color. Graphics better related information to help clarify issues and was used to help heighten awareness of regional coverage efforts. Over-the-shoulder graphics were used more, with story slug supers and name supers, items that are common in the U.S. newscast. In the past, presenters were not always identified with name supers. That changed as a part of the effort to make them more identifiable.

With better technology impacting graphics, the weather segments evolved and became more user friendly. Both graphics and forecasting increased in accuracy. Maps became clearer and included town and city names. Audiences were introduced to forecasts beyond today and tomorrow so they could plan their week.

As with graphics, newscast opens were refined and tied better into the station's identity and regionality. They also made it clearer what was to come in the newscast itself. Newscast teases became more sophisticated. Instead of either giving the story away or being boring or obscure, they started filling the true tease goal of capturing viewer interest. Results were seen with concepts such as "teasing short" (coming right up in the newscast) and "teasing long" (coming further down in the newscast).

There was generally a lack of American style promotion and branding in the UK, mainly because there had not been a need for it. Stations began branding themselves and becoming better at showcasing their unique regional identities. UK stations had generally

done promotions that focused on specific stories and now they began airing promotions for the station itself. One type of promotion that did not work in the UK was “proof of performance” promotions. It is a type of promotion to show that the viewer has made the right choice, telling them they are watching the station that brought them something special. That type of promotion did not fit with the British culture.

There was also a conscious effort and an increase in cross promotions between various programs and the newscasts, especially when news topics were covered in those programs. Multi-part reports were introduced, designed to keep the audience coming back evening after evening to view the full story. Both of these concepts are clearly American.

Just as promotions focused more on re-iterating a station’s regional position, work within the newscast was done to help strengthen that appeal as well. Regional coverage was clearly showcased with graphics and location supers, and there was a larger effort to cover the entire region. There were some differences in the regions in terms of what was considered local, and the Magid recommendations were slightly different depending on the region. For example, Granada’s viewers identified more as residents of specific towns versus residents of a region.

Postman (2000) argued that television is the same now in America as it is in Europe, and while there had been large differences between U.S. and UK news concepts at the beginning of the decade, by the end of the 1990s, there were not that many differences. News packages and sound bites were still slightly longer than the American news format, presenters were not made such big stars as in the U.S., and there was less “happy talk,” but as a whole, the British newscast was very similar to the U.S. newscast.

When respondents were asked if there was anything uniquely British left in the UK newscast, they had a hard time answering. One aspect that came up was how the UK still has a larger worldview than the U.S. in terms of coverage. American news coverage was seen as superficial in its approach. British television audiences still show an interest in international coverage. These findings are in line with research that showed the UK continues to have a serious domestic and foreign news agenda.

Key Driving and Restraining Forces

Identification of driving and restraining forces was done using Kurt Lewin's change theory as a basis, and in particular his transformation process and force field analysis (Lewin, 1951). It is clear the privatization movement, with the 1988 White Paper, provided a significant force leading to the "unfreezing" that in turn led to the 1991 ITV franchise auction. What followed was a transition period with many changes for UK television news. While some called it a marketization and commercialization of television, others say it was more of a way to bring it into more contemporary times.

The period focused on by the study ended in 2000 and can be viewed as the "re-freezing" in a new condition, although technically the transformation process in UK television news continues to this day. The changes that are now occurring are mostly technological adaptations, normal for any industry. The "unfreezing" in the early 1990s was different and significant, causing a major change because of all the driving forces that came together during that era. The driving forces of the movement were stronger than the restraining forces, causing the equilibrium to be upset and change. While McMahon (1986) argued for change to occur, a person has to be ready, ITV station owners in the UK had no choice but to take a part in the 1991 franchise auction and

become more competitive. Lewin understood the importance of context in his model and the UK broadcast news changes clearly occurred as a part of a larger societal movement.

Key driving forces played a role in the development of television news.

Privatization played a large role because the ITV auction took place in the broader context of the push for financial deregulation. It was a way for the government to bring in more revenue. The auction would not have happened the way it did if it had not been for that movement in society; without Margaret Thatcher's initiatives, Magid would not have been in the UK.

Along with the franchise auction came a stronger need to be competitive. The stations were aware they needed to keep and grow their audience because they were now going to have to pay fees every year. It drove the attempt to make the newscast more appealing and to consider the audience. While some argued the auction itself did not make a big difference, others said it changed ITV in ways that were not truly understood until years later. Franchises and licenses could all of a sudden be bought and sold, resulting in mergers and acquisitions. In the 1990s, UK television became properly marketized, moving from its previous status as a commercial monopoly.

Closely aligned with the need to be competitive commercially was the competitive force driving journalists. They wanted to have exclusive stories, and there was not only competition between the BBC and ITV, but competition between terrestrial television and satellite and cable was also beginning. One of the largest factors was the introduction of satellite - in particular Sky later became a formidable competitor. There was an explosion in the number of channels available to the British viewer, in addition to

competition from 24-hour news sources. Consumers now have choices, which in turn also drives competition.

Technology made it easy for British news media to view newscasts from around the world and good broadcasting concepts are quickly duplicated because they deliver results. Many UK broadcasters also travelled to the U.S., either to visit Magid or on their own. There was a general exchange of ideas and showcasing of news concepts across the continents.

There were naturally also restraining forces in UK society, meaning forces that acted to slow down the development of television news. In the early 1990s, ITV stations were forced into the new franchise auction format and therefore did not embrace the process. There is also always the normal tendency to be reticent to change. Status quo is safe and change means stepping into uncharted territory.

Money was another restraining force. Prior to the auction, franchise owners were making a lot of money and after the auction that was not always the case. Now they had to pay a yearly fee based on what they had bid for their franchise. Many had bid a lot of money, and in some cases, too much money. There was also a financial contraction after the auction. Many people had lost their jobs and it was hard for stations, especially new license holders, to deal with the backlash. In addition, covering news is expensive, not only because it involves reporters traveling within the region, but also because a station needs decent technology to be competitive. Tie that all together with an audience base that is eroding or becoming fragmentized and money becomes a very large and real constraint.

The trade unions became less and less of a hindering force. The union rules had previously made it hard to effectively – both in terms of manpower and money – cover news. But Thatcher had changed that in the early 1990s and the unions were much less of a restraining force by the mid to late 1990s.

While it was never mentioned outright as a hindering force, Magid being an American company impacted what could be done and how it was done. Several interviewees alluded to it and Magid discussed how important it was to never be too American in their approach. They used acceptable British examples first, before introducing American examples, as a way to gain trust. It was also imperative for Magid as a company to keep a low profile because it was assumed that they were out to Americanize British television news, meaning making it go downmarket.

It is evident that in British society, there were significant driving and restraining forces when it comes to the development of television news. The same can be said for the U.S. in the 1970s, where for example the FCC rules acted as a clear driving force. Changes in the development of television news should not thus be viewed in isolation. Had the FCC not acted with input of new regulations, U.S. television would likely be quite different today, just as had the 1991 ITV auction been set up as in all previous renewal years, maybe UK television would be different as well.

Surprises and Implications

Say the word news consultant, and for most American television news staff, it almost immediately has a negative connotation. News consultants have for decades been blamed for the commercialization of news and they are not always a welcomed sight at television stations. Much of this stems from changes they may have recommended,

changes that ultimately affected people in ways they perceived as negative or time consuming, and in particular for on-air talent. This study itself will most likely not be popular with television researchers in the academic community, not only because it focuses a large portion on the consultants, but also because of what the main thrust of the findings mean – that consultants’ recommendations centered on effective storytelling. As the source material – the Magid archive – was previously unavailable, it is unsurprising that the study’s findings point to new conclusions. Every effort in this study was made to let the newly available evidence provide a full and robust accounting of that time of transition.

The archival material revealed several recommendations that television news staff may be surprised to hear. Magid’s recommendations were not always about making a quick buck for the company or their clients. When reviewing a program presenting ethnic issues on Central Television, Magid declared that the show *Here and Now* demonstrated the station’s “philosophical approach to programming. While Central may not realize an immediate return on investment, the long-term effect could be much more meaningful, winning over a cross section of viewers” (Central Television, 1990, p. 16). Furthermore, while Magid analyzed their religious program *Focus*, they told Central Television not to abandon its principles in terms of what they wanted to achieve with the program, but that it should merely tell those stories in a more compelling manner. Magid also found one of Central’s debate programs well produced and well targeted and said “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it” (Central Television, 1990, p. 19). Thus, while they could have tweaked Central’s formula, and made more money by doing that, they chose not to.

The regional ITV affiliates were very much hometown stations with a loyal following and regional programming. Scottish Television, for example, had a program in only Gaelic. Magid consultants thought it was fascinating, but in their research they found that there was only a limited Gaelic-speaking audience. Magid had a simple suggestion – use subtitles so all viewers can follow along. With this modest tweak, the program was made accessible to non-Gaelic speakers as well. This small tweak made the storytelling accessible to a wider audience.

This leads to the center of this study - the passion the consultants and journalists had to tell good stories. While both consultants and journalists were making money off of the practice of storytelling, it is clear that the aim was to tell stories effectively to their audience through the medium of television. Effective storytelling attracts a larger audience and that in turn results in higher advertising revenues. In many ways, while it may not be popular, the goals of journalists and consultants were aligned. Both the material in the Magid archives and the interviews confirmed the importance and focus on good storytelling. Magid staff and British journalists wanted to tell a solid, compelling story that would make people want to watch.

British journalists were overall good storytellers. But they were boring in their approach and did not always tell stories that were effective for television. They did not know how to take advantage of the visual aspects of the medium. Magid's Terry Page said their "job was to improve their storytelling" while Reagan Ramsey said Magid's mission was to teach people "really good journalism." Those notions permeated all the interviews with the Magid staff. One can certainly argue that storytelling made both Magid and the consultants money. It also made stations, and thus journalists, money too.

Many times, the storytelling advice came down to rudimentary items with stories lacking the basic structure of a beginning, middle and end. Many stories were poorly structured. It was about making it easy for the viewer to understand what was being presented, to improve the explanation and clarity of a story. When BBC Wales added town and city names to their weather map, as per Magid's recommendation, research showed favorable reactions. Viewers pointed to "the programme's improved explanation or clarity as reasons for that positive response" (BBC Wales, 1993b, p. 14).

No matter how one views the role the television news consultants in the development of broadcast news, "they have given the audience a voice in the news process" (Allen, 2000, p. 85). Their research brought to light what the audience perceived as important. This was true in the U.S. and it was true in the UK. While they obviously made money on their research, storytelling and performance seminars, they made news understandable and accessible.

It is clear the American news format spread in the UK, with the help of American consultants. The study showed how the American news model was effectively incorporated into UK television news, with some cultural variations. It also provided insights into how the news consultants operated and what type of recommendations they gave. The results of this study can inform other researchers analyzing the spread of the American news format. It also added new knowledge regarding ITV stations and the work that was done prior to and after the franchise auction.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study, as all scholarly inquiries, had limitations. Many companies today forget that what they are doing now impacts the future and will become history

tomorrow. The focus is on the now, on today's bottom line and today's business operation. Frank N. Magid may have been too busy to focus on preserving the present. But at some point, someone made a decision to preserve their present for tomorrow's audience. While Magid has a fairly extensive archive, it was incomplete. Missing files included Yorkshire Television, Magid's first official Independent Television account. Materials involving Tyne Tees Television, TV-am, TVS and Westcountry were also missing. The company was too focused on what they were doing to save records, more focused on the present than the past.

Interviews bridged gaps in the archival material and provided more depth, but interviews rely on people's memories. Some people have better memories than others. While in-person interviews are naturally preferred, they are not always possible. These interviews were conducted via telephone, Skype, FaceTime and Zoom. That means the researcher's exposure to body language was limited, and the special type of personal connection one can often ascertain with an in-person interview, was not fully established. It also became obvious early on in the research process that most of the people available for, suitable for, and agreeing to interviews, were male. Efforts were made to interview more females to enlarge the range of observations and perspectives from being primarily a dominant male point of view to one more inclusive of multiple viewpoints. Unfortunately, many females declined or did not respond to interview requests. The lack of female interview subjects also reflected the industry at the time. Not many were in leadership positions. As Penny Chrimes described it, as a woman in television in the 1990s, "you had to be tough. You had to be pretty assertive." She added, "I suspect I had to fight my corner throughout my career really."

Cultural differences came up throughout the study. There were different words for basic items and slightly different routines in American and British broadcasting. For example, the British used body language more, while the Americans used verbal cues. The U.S. term tag is called a back reference in the UK. And do not ever call a newscast a show in the UK. It is either a newscast or a bulletin; a show means entertainment. Terminology needed to be clarified at times to be properly understood.

Several recommendations stemming from this study should be considered for future research. One is to examine exactly how Magid was involved with clients in the 1991 franchise bidding process. It is clear from the interviews they were involved with clients in the various regions and how exactly they were involved differed depending on the clients' needs. While Magid staff said they helped gather items for actual franchise bids, that was not verified in this research. A closer examination of the concrete franchise bids, coupled with additional interviews, could provide a noteworthy study into the details of the 1991 franchise bids.

Another important aspect related to the auction is the aftermath. Interview subjects working for franchises that lost their bids described walking into offices that became emptier by the day. It would be interesting to pursue what transpired at these outlets, what it did for morale and how people coped. It would also be rewarding to compare that with new franchises building their operations.

American consultants were successful in helping to produce a newscast for the masses, a newscast concept that fit an audience on a global scale, with minor local tweaks. What is furthermore available in the Magid archives will tell the story of the development of U.S. television news, from the network level to virtually every local

market across the nation. It will also help explain television across the globe because Magid had clients in basically every corner of the world. The archives include radio and newspaper clients too. It is rich media history, with many untold stories waiting to be uncovered.

It would be interesting to examine how other European markets may be similar and different to the UK market. It is anticipated a lot of the research conclusions in this study will be similar in other countries, both in Europe and around the world.

It was evident from the interviews that the UK was fairly heavily influenced by American television programming overall. Thus programming in general during this decade in the UK could be explored, both as its own study, but also in a larger context examining the spread of American news and entertainment television programming on a global scale.

This study focused on Magid's involvement in the UK. From discussions with other consultants, it was clear Magid had a heavy involvement in terrestrial television in the early 1990s, leaving the UK market too saturated with Magid staff members for competitors to enter effectively. Other American consultancy companies concentrated more on opportunities in Europe. For example, AR&D was heavily involved in Germany. Because this study does not include other consultants, future studies could focus on one of the other large consultancy companies such as McHugh & Hoffman and AR&D, or examine just how extensive the entire American consultancy effort was. It is clear that by the end of the 1990s, American consultants were essentially everywhere in Europe.

Conclusion

The American commercial television model is the “dominant model across the world” (Kishan Thussu, 2007, p. 2) today, and the American news format can be seen everywhere. But many consultants rarely watch television news today because they feel their concepts have been taken too far. While the motives of journalism seemed at odds with the motives of profitmaking from the early beginning, the consultants found a successful formula by focusing on storytelling. If a story is told well and tailored to the audience and the medium through which it is told, it will attract an audience, and that in turn will attract advertisers and make stations money. The formula is as basic as that. Given the popularity of their news format, what they came up with was desired on a global scale.

Today it appears the newscast has gone beyond storytelling, beyond explaining the news in an understandable way to a mass audience. In the beginning, television was an entertainment medium and news was not seen as a moneymaker. Then the nature of news storytelling changed, drew a mass audience because it was easy to comprehend, and in turn earned high ratings and advertisement rates. Perhaps the medium that started as a device for entertainment purposes is well under way to come full circle. News today does not merely explain the news. It also entertains. But does it entertain to the degree that the news portion is now insignificant in some cases? Has the notion of the core concept of journalistic storytelling been lost? Perhaps that explains why even those who “fixed” the newscasts originally – those television news doctors – do not watch today.

The pressure of the internet and 24-hour news certainly has not helped traditional television news outlets. It has fragmented the audience. Research shows that the UK

television audience is large, but it is also old, and the younger generation is more apt to go online (Kleis Nielsen, 2017). It is a growing trend around the world. Thus, the audience largely decides the future of television news. With a click of the remote, a television can be turned on. But with a click of a remote, a television can also be turned off.

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
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
APPENDIX A

ITV FRANCHISES PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE 1991 AUCTION

Independent Television regions prior to 1991 franchise auction



Independent Television regions after 1991 franchise auction



APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW GUIDE TEMPLATE

Today's date:

Place:

Time:

Subject's Name:

Subject's Professional Role:

Questions:

1. Please tell me about your professional background.
2. What role(s) did you have at X (company)?
3. Please tell me, in chronological order, about how you were involved in the privatization process of television in the UK.
 - a. Which accounts/television stations?
4. What was the atmosphere/working environment like?
5. What were the main changes you saw in terms of television and television news in the UK?
6. Do you believe UK television would be different if American consultants wouldn't have been involved?
7. What other people would you recommend I speak to?
8. Do you have any documents, photos or other artifacts that you believe would help me in this study and that you would be willing to share with me?
9. Is there anything we didn't touch on that you believe is important to this study?

***Please note: the interviews were tailored to each interview subject, depending on their experience/area of expertise.

APPENDIX C
RECRUITMENT TEMPLATE

Hi XXXX,

My name is Madeleine Liseblad and I am a Ph.D. candidate at the Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication. I am reaching out to you because I am writing my doctoral dissertation on the Privatization of Television in Europe and you have been identified as someone who has personal experiences with that process. It's important to me, and for my research, that I am able to interview people with personal knowledge of that historical era. I am therefore wondering if you would be willing to allow me to interview you.

I have attached a couple of documents that further explains the interview process. You would have the right to at any time withdraw from the interview if you didn't feel comfortable.

I sincerely hope you are willing to share your experiences with me. I believe literature and archival material only tell part of the story; interviews are what make research come alive.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Madeleine Liseblad

APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

Privatization of Television in Europe

I agree to be interviewed by Madeleine Liseblad. I understand she is interviewing people involved in the privatization of television in Europe. I further understand that this consent form is intended to fully inform me of what I am being asked to do and my rights as a human subject.

Research Procedure

The interview may be audio recorded and may last somewhere between 1 and 2 hours. If the researcher finds that more interview time is needed, she will work out a suitable time and date for additional interview time. Once my interview is completed, all or portions of it may be edited and transcribed. If I believe I have given an incorrect statement to Madeleine Liseblad, I will be able to provide her with an amended statement.

Confidentiality

Because the purpose of the interview is to secure specific factual information and insights about the privatization of television in Europe, allowing interviewees to remain anonymous is not an intended feature of this study. I do, however, have the right not to answer any questions that I consider uncomfortable or inappropriate. If the prospect of being personally identified in Madeleine Liseblad's study, future publications, or in the interview is a concern, I can withdraw from this study without penalty.

Withdrawal without Prejudice

Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. Each interviewee is free to withdraw consent and cease all participation in this study at any time without any penalty whatsoever.

Risks and Benefits

There are no known risks or discomforts associated with your participation in this study. Although you may not receive any direct benefit from your participation, others may benefit from the knowledge you provided to this study.

Costs and Payments

There is no cost to participate in this study, nor will you be paid for your time.

Questions and Concerns

If you have any questions or concerns about this study or the interview process, you may contact Madeleine Liseblad at MaddieL@asu.edu or her faculty advisor Dr. Leslie-Jean Thornton at leslie-jean.thornton@asu.edu.

Arizona State University, Institutional Review Board Approval

This study has been reviewed and approved by the Arizona State University Institutional Review Board. If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Institutional Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at +1 480-965-6877.

Agreement

I have read the information contained in this consent form, and Madeleine Liseblad has offered to answer any questions I may have concerning the study. I hereby consent to participate in this study.

Printed Name

Date

Signature

APPENDIX E
COPYRIGHT FORM

Madeleine Liseblad ("Author") has informed me that he/she is researching and conducting scholarly writing focusing on the privatization of television in Europe ("the Work"), and has asked me to grant interviews and to otherwise cooperate with Author in connection with the Work.

In order to assist Author in the preparation of the Work, I have agreed to be interviewed and to provide information and other materials to be used in connection with the Work, including my personal experiences, remarks, and recollections, as well as any photographs, documents and artifacts that I may choose to give to Author ("the Interview Materials").

I hereby grant and assign to Author, and his/her licensees, successors and assigns, the following non-exclusive rights in connection with the Interview Materials for use as part of the Work, or any advertising, packaging, or promotional materials for the Work, in any and all editions, versions, and media, in perpetuity and throughout the world.

- 1 The right to quote or paraphrase all or any portion of the Interview Materials, and to generally use and publish the Interview Materials, including my experiences, recollections, incidents, remarks, characters, dialogue, actions, scenes, situations, and information, as well as any photographs, documents and artifacts that I may give to Author.
- 2 The right to use my name, image, voice, likeness, and biographical data.
- 3 The right to develop, produce, distribute, advertise and promote the Work as a book or any other work in any manner that Author deems appropriate. I understand and acknowledge that Author will be the sole owner of all copyright and other rights in and to the Work.

In order to enable Author to develop the Work in any manner that Author may deem best, I hereby release and discharge the Author and his/her licensees, successors and assigns, from any and all claims, demands, or causes of action that I may have against them by reason of anything contained in the Work, or any of the above uses, including any claims based on the right of privacy, the right of publicity, copyright, libel, slander, or any other right.

I acknowledge and agree that I am not entitled to receive any form of payment from Author and/or his/her licensees, successors, and assigns.

Agreed and confirmed:

Printed Name

Date

Signature

APPENDIX F

FRANK N. MAGID ASSOCIATES' UK CLIENTS

These are some of Magid's terrestrial television news clients in the UK in the 1990s.

Regional television outlets

Anglia Television – East

BBC Northern Ireland

BBC Wales

Central Television – Midlands

Granada Television - North West

HTV - Wales and the West

Scottish Television - Central Scotland

TV-am - Breakfast area

Sunrise (changed name to Good Morning Television/GMTV) – Breakfast area

TVS - South and South East

Tyne Tees Television - North East

Ulster Television (UTV)- Northern Ireland

Westcountry Television - South West

Yorkshire TV - Yorkshire

National / “Networks”

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

Independent Television News (ITN)

In addition to traditional television news outlets, Magid also worked with cable and satellite companies.



APPENDIX G
LONG INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

Names and background information of the people interviewed for this dissertation.

Bell, Emily – Phone interview 10/18/17

Emily Bell is currently the director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism in New York. During the 1990s, she worked as a media business reporter, deputy business editor and business editor for *The Observer* in the UK. Bell has also worked for *The Guardian*.

Bolton, Roger – FaceTime interview 11/2/17

Roger Bolton worked for the BBC in various roles for over 20 years. He moved to Thames Television in 1986 and became their controller of factual programs. He held that position until Thames lost its franchise. Bolton was the editor of *This Week* when it aired the controversial program called *Death on a Rock* about the deaths of three IRA members in Gibraltar in 1988. When Thames lost its franchise, Bolton left and became an independent television producer.

Charlton, Lindsay – Skype interview 10/16/17

Lindsay Charlton worked for several ITV outlets in various roles, including as a reporter and presenter. His station experiences included Granada, Thames and the London News Network. Other major ITV posts included being the managing director for LWT, Meridian and ITV Local.

Chrimes, Penny – Phone interview 11/20/17

Penny Chrimes' first television job was at TV-am and she ended up spending a decade there. At TV-am she was an assistant editor and later a program editor. After the station lost its bid to keep the franchise, Chrimes worked for other stations, including a stint in cable television, before moving to Sky News. She worked for Sky until 2015 when she became a freelance media consultant.

Douglas, Alan – Skype interview 10/23/17

Alan Douglas is currently a freelance journalist and broadcaster. From 1978 to 1996, he worked for BBC Scotland as a television and radio presenter and reporter. His duties included anchoring their flagship evening television newscast, *Reporting Scotland*.

Fisher, Alan – Skype interview 10/7/17

Alan Fisher is currently a senior correspondent with Al Jazeera English, based in Washington D.C. From 1986-1990, Fisher worked for Grampian Television, and from 1990-1992, he was with Scottish Television. At both stations he worked as a reporter and presenter. He then moved on to Good Morning Television in various correspondent roles and worked there till 2005.

George, Joe – Phone interview 9/25/17

Joe George is retired. He worked for Frank N. Magid Associates from 1983 till 2006. His last title with the company was executive vice president, director of marketing. George's job was to bring business in the door and he was responsible for sales in Europe.

Gibbon, Barbara – FaceTime interview 10/30/17

Barbara Gibbon is currently a television consultant, after having recently left her post as Sky's director of production and operations. She went to Sky as an executive producer and spent 20 years there, but has worked for the BBC, ITV and even for a cable channel. During the 1990s, she worked for TV-am as program editor and head of features department. In her role at TV-am, she was a part of their senior management team.

Hais, Mike – Phone interview 10/4/17

Mike Hais worked for Frank N. Magid Associates from 1983 till 2006. He was the first Magid researcher to do work in the UK, initially with Worldwide Television News and then with Yorkshire Television, and his title back then was research analyst. Hais last position with Magid was as vice president, entertainment research.

Hargis, Carla – Phone interview 12/22/17

Carla Hargis focused her master's project on talent coaching and was hired by Magid as a talent/performance coach right after finishing her graduate degree. She worked for the company for six years in the mid 1990s, specializing in international news, before becoming a full-time staff member for the BBC. Hargis later became a freelance consultant and still worked with the BBC, before becoming a performance coach for Al Jazeera English.

Morris, Mackie – Phone interview 11/10/17

Mackie Morris currently runs his own company. He worked as a broadcast news faculty member at the University of Missouri for 10 years, before joining Frank N. Magid Associates as vice president, THE MAGID INSTITUTE™. His duties included leading seminars on storytelling techniques.

Munro, Charles – Zoom interviews 10/4/17

Charles Munro is currently a journalism professor at the University of Iowa. As the manager of Frank N. Magid Associates' European operations, he founded and managed the office in London. Munro worked for Magid for almost 20 years. He was a senior director of international media for the consulting company when he left in 2003.

Myers, Richard – Phone interview 10/17/17

Richard Myers currently works as a managing director in the media business. He was a senior producer for LWT in 1990s, before moving over to Westcountry TV as their executive director. He was instrumental in Westcountry's franchise bid, and helped launch and run the station.

Page, Terry – Phone interview 10/26/17

Terry Page currently works for the Foreign Press Association in London. Her first television job was with Worldwide Television News in South Africa. In the early 1990s, Page worked for the London bureau of ABC News, before joining Frank N. Magid

Associates in the mid-1990s. At Magid, she worked with their television master class seminars.

Prebble, Stuart – FaceTime interview 10/31

Stuart Prebble currently heads a television production company. He started his career with the BBC before joining ITV's Granada Television. While at Granada, Prebble was a reporter and a producer, including producer for *World in Action*. His next role was as Granada's controller of factual programs. From there Prebble became ITV's controller of factual programs, chief executive of Granada Sky Broadcasting (joint venture between Sky and Granada), chief executive of ITV Digital, and later chief executive of ITV.

Puffer, Jeff – Phone interview 12/07/17

Jeff Puffer is a long-time Magid employee and began working for the company in mid 1985. He is a senior communications consultant and as such works a talent coach. Puffer came to Magid after having worked in radio for ten years, including five years in radio in his hometown Chicago. His academic training is as a teacher specializing in speech and drama.

Purvis, Stewart – Phone interview 10/18/17

Stewart Purvis is currently a non-executive member of Channel 4's board. He began his career as a BBC news trainee, but worked for ITN for 31 years. His last role was as chief executive and he oversaw news for ITN, Channel 4 and Channel 5. Prior to that he was their editor-in-chief. Purvis has also held the role of content regulator with Ofcom.

Ramsey, Reagan – Skype interview 10/30/17

Reagan Ramsey was a television news director before joining Frank N. Magid Associates. In the 1990s, he worked as a senior international consultant and as such had a wide role that included different tasks depending on client and country.

Sambrook, Richard – Phone interview 11/8/17

Richard Sambrook is a professor of journalism at Cardiff University and a senior research associate at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism in the UK. In the early 1990s, he was a news editor with BBC News before getting promoted to the head of newsgathering. As the head of newsgathering, Sambrook oversaw radio and television correspondents, intake operations, camera crews and satellite operations. From that position he was promoted to director of UK news and then director of global news before leaving the BBC in 2010.

Sattizahn, Tom – Phone interview 11/10/17

Tom Sattizahn worked for Frank Magid Associates as a manager, international client services. He was with the company for 18 years from 1978 till 1996. He had lived in Australia and worked with Magid clients there, prior to helping the company in the UK.

Simpson, Angus – FaceTime interview 10/18/17

Angus Simpson is currently a senior program producer with Scottish Television. He began his television career at Border Television before moving to Scottish Television. In the 1990s, he was a reporter and presenter for various programs on Scottish Television, including their lunchtime newscast and their flagship evening newscast, *Scotland Today*.

Upson, Laurie – Skype interview 11/16/17

Laurie Upshon spent 35 years as a journalist, mainly in various roles at ITV stations. He came to Central Television as an editor in the mid-1980s, and in the 1990s became their controller of news. At that time, Central had three regional bureaus. Before Upshon left Central, he was their controller of news and operations.

Warwick, Ned – Phone interview 11/8/17

Ned Warwick oversaw coverage of Europe, the Middle East and Africa for ABC News in London in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, he was hired by Frank N. Magid Associates as a senior international consultant. Warwick had previously been a Magid client as a

news director in the U.S. so he was familiar with the company prior to becoming an employee. He worked primarily with media training for the BBC in London, but also with BBC in the regions and various ITV stations.