

Watching the Watchmen: How Videos of Police-Citizen Encounters Influence
Individuals' Perceptions of the Police

by

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A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Approved April 2017 by the
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ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

May 2017

ABSTRACT

Recently, there has been an upsurge in highly publicized negative police-citizen encounters, contributing to the current crisis in police legitimacy. These encounters, mostly filmed and disseminated by citizens, provide a new type of vicarious experience through which the viewer can assess police-citizen interactions, potentially shaping their perceptions of the police. These recordings have sparked national conversations and protests regarding police behavior and treatment of minority citizens. An area that has received less attention, however, is what effect viewing video recordings of less contentious police-citizen interactions has on public perceptions of police. To that end, this study seeks to address the knowledge gap through experimental methodology. Using actual footage of a variety of police-citizen encounters, this study examines the impact of viewing videos of police encounters on individuals' perceptions of police legitimacy, procedural justice, estimates of police misconduct, and their willingness to cooperate with police. Also examined are the impact these videos have on support for officer body-worn cameras and willingness to film the police. The findings indicate the impact of viewing police-citizen encounters on individual perceptions and attitudes are primarily linked to the content – whether positive, negative or neutral – of the video. Specifically, positive videos depicting procedurally just encounters increased perceptions of procedural justice, decreased estimations of police misconduct and increased support for officer body-worn cameras. Viewing negative videos, however, decreased perceptions of police legitimacy, distributive fairness, and procedural justice while increasing estimations of police misconduct and willingness to film the police in the future. The effects of the video encounters on perceptions of police were not lasting and were not

stable when respondents were surveyed again two weeks later. Lasting effects were found for individuals' self-reported willingness to film the police in the future. Given these findings, the process-based model of policing should consider also incorporating digital vicarious experiences when examining factors impacting perceptions of police.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my mother.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While a Ph.D. is conferred on one person, it is never a solo effort. Behind any dissertation is a long line of individuals guiding and supporting the effort along the way. My experience has been no different, and I would like to thank those individuals who made this possible.

To begin, I would like to thank my committee Drs. Danielle Wallace, Michael White, and Charles Katz for their support and guidance during this project. With special acknowledgement to my chair, Dr. Wallace who has had me on her heels since even before I began at Arizona State University.

I would like to thank Dr. Gray Cavender who was equal parts drill sergeant and cheerleader, constantly pushing me forward, always encouraging me over the next mountain, and never letting me lose sight of what was important. Your mentorship and guidance has been truly invaluable.

To my friends and colleagues at Arizona State University, I am grateful for the camaraderie and support. To Dr. Richard Moule and Ms. Jessica Huff, I am grateful for all of the time spent discussing projects and trading ideas. To Ms. Shannon Stewart special thanks are owed, for the countless hours of conversation and support.

My partner Britta Martin, for whom I am especially grateful. You've spent more hours listening to me excitedly discuss police misconduct, video surveillance, and social media than any sane person should- the mark of real friendship and love. Thank you for all of the support and laughter- especially the laughter.

Last, but most certainly not least, I would like to thank my mother, Karen Parry, for her continuing support, love, and unwavering belief in me and my success.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Police-citizen encounters may potentially have far reaching effects on citizens' perceptions of police and by extension, their willingness to cooperate with police officers. These effects are found among those directly involved in police-citizen encounters, as well as those who witness encounters (Mastrofski, Reisig, & McCluskey, 2002; Skogan, 2005). Disrespectful and aggressive behavior by police has been found to negatively impact citizens' perceptions, trust of police, and belief that the police are a legitimate authority and should be obeyed (Fyfe, 1988; Friedrich, 1980; Paternoster, Bachman, Brame, & Sherman, 1997; Skogan, 2006, Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2003). Individuals who perceive the police to be more legitimate are more likely to comply with the law and directives from the officer and to cooperate with officials by providing information, such as reporting crimes (Tyler, 1990).

Humans are not blank slates where a single encounter with police is all that is needed to create an attitude or overall orientation regarding police and their legitimacy as an authority. That is to say, attitudes and perceptions of the police are not formed in a vacuum; they are influenced by a variety of factors including: age, race, education, class and prior personal experiences with the police (Hurst & Frank, 2000; Johnson & Kuhns, 2009; Weitzer, 2002). In addition to individual characteristics, the most commonly discussed mechanism through which attitudes and perceptions of police are formed and shaped is through direct personal experiences with the police (Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005). Individuals who have negative personal experiences

with police officers (such as being treated unfairly) will have corresponding negative perceptions of the police. Conversely, while those who experience positive encounters (such as being treated with respect or feeling listened to) will have positive perceptions of the police. This relationship holds even when the overall outcome of the encounter is undesirable, such as with an arrest (White, Mulvey & Dario, 2016).

While it is true that direct personal experiences with police can greatly impact or shape individuals' opinions, attitudes, and perceptions, the fact is that most Americans have very little direct personal experience or contact with police officers (Gaines & Kappeler, 2011). Given this, it is important that researchers explore the effects of vicarious or non-direct experiences with police. Vicarious experiences with police can be garnered from virtually anywhere including stories from friends and family who have had personal experiences (Rosenbaum, et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005), the news media (Dowler, 2002; Weitzer, 2002), as well as popular entertainment such as television programs (Eschholz, Blackwell, Gerts, & Chiricos, 2002; Surette, 2014).

Of particular importance in today's society is the ability of mobile communication devices and the Internet to give voice to individuals' personal experiences with police as well as shape others' perceptions of the police. Using mobile recording devices such as the cameras in many cell phones, individuals can record, post, and share almost any aspect of their personal lives and experiences, including their encounters with police. Historically, the police constructed and managed their public image through their relationship with mass media outlets such as newspapers, radio, and televised news programs (Chermak, 1995; Goldsmith, 2010; Guffey, 1992; Manning, 2001). However, the proliferation of personal video recording devices has the ability to make much of that

constructed façade meaningless in light of encounters recorded and disseminated by the public (Brown, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010).

Citizens across the United States are recording and sharing videos of police-citizen encounters at an incredible rate (Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer, 2015; Young & Ready, 2015). Filming and sharing videos of police-citizen encounters online is so prevalent there is now even a word for the activity: “cop-watching” (Schaefer & Steinmetz, 2014). A simple keyword search of the video sharing site Youtube.com using the term “police” returns approximately 18.6 million results (as of 6/21/15), with premade suggested categories of “police harassment,” “police chases,” and “police brutality” (two years later the number of returns reached over 38.6 million). In addition to video sharing sites like Youtube.com, there are entire websites dedicated to supporting those who record police and distribute the videos (e.g. copwatch.com, copblock.org, and pinac.org). Where before individuals could only hear about real-world interactions with police from friends and relatives or by experiencing it firsthand, through the use of cell phone cameras, interactive applications (commonly referred to as apps) and file sharing sites, individuals can now record and share encounters with police instantaneously, thereby creating vicarious first person witnesses of all who view the recordings.

In the past, the ability for news stories to affect or even reach individual citizens has been limited to a local level for all but major events (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). As technology has advanced, the reach of local events has also increased (Starr, 2005). Today, individuals may post footage of their encounters with police allowing the untrained viewer to make their determinations regarding the incident, without a narrative by reporters or the police themselves. Through the Internet and social media, an

inflammatory video can go “viral” in a matter of moments, reaching millions of viewers in just a few hours or days, and seemingly minor local events can be seen across the country.

Today, Rodney King, Freddie Gray, Eric Garner, Walter Scott, and Oscar Grant, are household names because a bystander filmed their violent encounter with police and distributed the footage to social and/or mass media. These incidents represent extremely visceral encounters with police that resulted in catastrophic injury or death for the citizen involved. The public consequences of communities viewing such videos en masse are clear. Recent citizen-generated videos of police-citizen encounters have resulted in officers being reassigned, suspended, fired, sued, and in some cases, criminally prosecuted (see: Baker, 2015; Laughland & Swaine, 2015; Miller, Bever, & Kaplan, 2015; Southall, 2015). Videos of police-citizen encounters have also resulted in citywide drops in citizen satisfaction with police (Weitzer, 2002), served as a rallying point sparking organized protests (Cole-Frowe & Fausset, 2015; Smith & Tangel, 2014), and in more extreme cases, resulted in large scale rioting (Calvert & Maher, 2015).

Despite increased scholarly attention on the role of media in public perceptions of law enforcement, it remains unclear what impact the vicarious experiences offered via viewing videos of police-citizen encounters has on perceptions of police on an individual level. Further, it is unclear if vicarious experiences offered by video can create momentary or lasting influences in individuals’ perceptions. This represents a major gap in the literature given that the majority of police-citizen encounters do not result in use of force by police officers (Hickman, Piquero & Garner, 2008). While multiple studies have attempted to explain how vicarious experiences with police can impact citizen’s views of

police, few researchers have examined the impact of vicarious experiences garnered via video recordings of police-citizen interactions (Brunson, 2007; Chermak, McGarrell, & Gruenewald, 2006; Eschholz et al. 2002; Jefferis, Kaminski, Holmes, & Hanley, 1997; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer, 2002).

The purpose of this dissertation is to expand policing literature by examining the individual level effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters. Specifically, I will focus on the interplay between 1) general attitudes of trust in police and police legitimacy, as well as support for video surveillance of and by the police and 2) viewing a variety of video recorded police-citizen encounters, including use of force and verbal encounters. This will be accomplished through an online survey experiment, where respondents will be asked questions regarding their perceptions of police and video surveillance with videos of police-citizen encounters acting as the experimental stimuli. By questioning participants on their views and opinions both before and after showing videos of various police-citizen encounters, I will explore how these recordings may affect the public's perceptions, opinions and behaviors towards police. Importantly, in this study I manipulate the nature of police behaviors shown in each video group to assess the impact of viewing different types of police behavior towards citizens on individual perceptions of the police.

In this dissertation I explore the following questions regarding the effects of becoming a vicarious witness to police-citizen encounters through viewing video recordings.

1. What effect does viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters have on individuals' perceptions of the police, including perceptions of police legitimacy, perceptions

- of police misconduct, and their willingness to cooperate with the police? Do the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters vary by content of the video shown?
2. Does viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters influence individuals' levels of support for video surveillance of police through officer body-worn cameras (BWCs) and citizen produced mobile video recordings? Do the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters vary by content of the video shown?
 3. Are the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters lasting or do they decay over time?

1.2 Significance of the research

Video technology penetrates multiple aspects of life: cell phones, closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance, BWCs, etc., are near omni-present in today's society. As such, it is conceivable that any police-citizen interaction will be recorded and shared on social media. Recently, a string of videos on the internet, showing graphic depictions of police physically harming citizens, achieved "viral" status, meaning they were widely shared and seen in a short amount of time. These videos present a special challenge to police departments wishing to manage their public image and improve community relations (Goldsmith, 2010).

First, the videos are typically presented without context of the whole encounter, given that individuals filming the encounter often do not record or share an entire encounter from start to finish (Young & Ready, 2015). Secondly, exposure to police-citizen encounters is no longer limited by time or space as a video of a police-citizen

encounter may be viewed multiple times, live as it is happening, or months or years after the event. As Brucato (2015, p. 457) stated “tevisual images allowed geographically, temporally, and socially distant viewers to see a fundamental aspect of policing.” This means, that while the police may be able to influence their message at a given time, they have no influence over videos still circulating from past events or videos from other jurisdictions. Finally, both the sheer number of videos of police-citizen encounters shared online and the often negative content of the videos may lead citizens to overestimate the frequency that negative incidents are occurring, which may prejudicially sway individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and opinions of the police (Miller, 2016).

In addition to challenges these videos present to police departments’ image management, they also present implications for social activism. Importantly, these videos may represent a boon for social movements focused around policing issues (e.g. Black Lives Matter) wishing to reach a wider audience, by conveying a visceral demonstration of their message through video footage of actual police-citizen encounters. These videos can present the movements’ narrative of strained police-citizen relations (such as the case of a Black man being mistreated by a white police officer), allowing those who do typically do not experience mistreatment by the police, to *see* the state of police treatment of minorities (Brunson, 2007; Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, 2014; Schafer, Huebner, & Bynum, 2003). Further, videos of police-citizen interactions may act as a type of cognitive frame for citizens creating, a lens through which police are understood (Snow & Benford, 1992).

In examining the impact of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters on individuals’ perceptions of police and support for video surveillance conducted of and

by the police, I hope to expand the current literature regarding the traditional model of process-based policing and vicarious experiences. This research contributes not only to the fields of criminology and criminal justice, but also to the fields of media studies and public administration.

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation is organized around various aspects concerning viewing video recordings of police citizen encounters. Chapter two discusses relevant literature and includes discussions of the role of police and police legitimacy, and the role of personal and vicarious encounters in shaping perceptions of the police. The prevalence and use of officer-worn cameras and citizen journalism with recent studies on each highlighted. Also presented in chapter two are theoretical explanations of how video-recordings may influence public opinions and attitudes.

Chapter three is focused entirely on methodology and analytic strategy. This dissertation centers on an online survey experiment with video interventions. In chapter three, the experiment, video interventions, validation methods, and study variables are detailed in-depth. Sample characteristics are described and the overall analytic strategy used to address each of the research questions is also discussed.

Chapter four examines how perceptions of the police may be influenced by viewing video recordings of actual police-citizen encounters. Respondents' perceptions of police legitimacy and procedural justice, their willingness to cooperate with the police and their estimates of police misconduct are examined both before viewing the video interventions and after.

Chapter five examines the impact of viewing video recordings of actual police-citizen encounters has on support for surveillance of and by the police. Specifically, respondents' support for officer-worn cameras as a tool to ensure officer and citizen safety and support for officer-worn cameras as a tool to ensure police accountability. Also examined is the effect of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters on respondents' willingness to film the police.

Chapter six examines the durability of any changes in perceptions and opinions caused from the video exposures. Using the results of a delayed post-test survey conducted two weeks after the initial survey, chapter six examines whether or not any changes in perceptions and opinions are stable or if they decay over time.

Chapter seven summarizes the important findings and discusses policy implications of each. Limitations to the research are addressed. Directions for future research are also discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Role of the Police

In practice, the duties of police in American society are quite extensive, in fact, the American Bar Association (ABA) has identified a total of eleven diverse responsibilities the police must address. According to the ABA, police today are responsible for 1) identifying and apprehending criminal offenders, 2) preventing and deterring crime, 3) aiding those in danger of harm, 4) ensuring individuals' constitutional rights are protected, 5) facilitating the movement of both people and vehicles, 6) assisting those who cannot care for themselves, 7) resolving conflict, 8) identifying governmental and law enforcement problems, 9) creating and maintaining a sense of security in communities, 10) promoting and preserving public order, and 11) providing other services as needed (American Bar Association, 1980, Standard 1-2.2). Broadly, these responsibilities fall under three large themes: enforcement of laws, maintenance of social order, and assisting citizens with problems (Bittner, 1967; Manning, 1978, Van Maanen, 1978). However these responsibilities can often conflict with each other, causing both officer stress and public dissatisfaction (Skolsnick, 1966).

While there is some agreement on the broad duties of the police, researchers, citizens, and police alike hold conflicting views of the *role* of police leaving no clear consensus of what exactly their role should be. This is largely due to the fact that any definition of the police role is ultimately dependent on the mission of the police, and there are multiple perspectives on their overall mission. While there are many conflicting

views, central to each are concepts concerning crime-control, order maintenance and use of force.

For example, Van Maanen (1978), believed that the police represent moral order and as such are meant to protect the righteous against the wrong. Manning (1978) stated that police often see their mission to be the efficient apolitical enforcers of the law. Far from being apolitical, Gerda and colleagues (1982) viewed the police as enforcers of laws created for the benefit of the wealthy and powerful with the purpose of controlling the masses. In contrast to these, Bittner (1967) viewed the police simply as solvers of problems that might require the use of coercion or physical force. Further complicating the issue is the rhetoric and imagery surrounding the myth that the primary purpose of police is to fight crime.

According to Van Maanen (1978) the police view themselves engaged in a perpetual struggle with those who wish to disrupt the order of society. These officers see themselves as separate and apart from much of society, lending to the notion that they are soldiers fighting a war, tasked with upholding a moral mandate. When these officers have their authority questioned or challenged they are tasked with correcting the individual by exerting their power and control over the citizenry, often with the use of physical force, arresting the individual, or both. Under this view of police, crime-control is a secondary priority compared with maintaining social control and order.

Others have seen the role of the police as less morally based and more politically motivated. For example, Gerda et al.'s (1982) conceptualization of the role of police, is that the police act as a physical arm of the political system ensuring control over the public. In this conceptualization, crime is seen as a political issue, where the middle

class's fear of crime must be soothed to maintain order. Police accomplish this largely by concentrating their efforts on controlling the lower classes (particularly minorities) and those who openly dissent. This orientation can result in the selective enforcement of laws, where those individuals who uphold the majority views and opinions are treated more leniently. It may also result in officers acting directly for the benefit or on the behalf of the powerful and wealthy, such as by forcefully breaking up union meetings or picket lines that interrupt corporations doing business. In doing so, they further distance themselves socially from those they interact with the most often: those in poor urban communities.

While the role of the police may be still a debated subject, Bittner (1967; 1970) has put forth a most convincing argument of how it should be seen, given that most police work has very little to do with crime-fighting (Wilson, 1968) and much more to do with assisting citizens manage the everyday problems they encounter. In fact, Bittner claimed that "no human problem exists or is imaginable... that could not become the proper business of the police" (Bittner, 1974, p. 30). Bittner (1970) acknowledged that the police engage in both fighting crime and the maintenance of social order, however, he saw their role more heavily as one of problem solvers. He suggested that given the police spend only a small amount of their time actively dealing with crimes, their role should not be viewed primarily as crime control. Instead, he argued that the majority of the officer's time was spent on non-criminal events and problem solving, such as mediating disputes between neighbors, issues of public order and nuisance complaints, traffic control, and dealing with the mentally ill.

Bittner (1967) saw the police as mandated to “keep the peace” rather than strictly “enforce the law.” This approach, while recognizing that laws must be enforced when serious crimes occur, sees officers as public agents tasked with reducing the misery and harm in a community. This can be done by problem solving and mediating situations where arrest is not a necessity. In fact, according to Bittner (1967), arrests or use of force that were not absolutely necessary should be taken as evidence of poor police work on the part of the officer.

Alternatively, the conceptualization of police as defenders of the innocent from harm and punishers of the guilty- is a caricature of reality that many citizens and police officers have adopted as truth. The concept of police as crime fighters has the potential to become problematic if police internalize the idea that they are a “thin blue line” that separates the innocent from the evils of the criminal element. The need to protect citizens may lead police officers to misuse or over-use force as well as make unnecessary arrests of those who they consider worthy of the mantle of “criminal.” Further, the “thin blue line” myth can create a sense in the officers that they are all that keeps the wolves from the sheep, creating permission to use any means necessary to ensure that protection (Klockers, 1980). This orientation can create a situation, sometimes referred to as the “Dirty Harry problem,” where officers become so driven by their perceived mission that they not only engage in abuse of force against suspects, but also bend rules and violate laws in an effort to punish those they perceive as guilty (Klockers, 1980). This orientation may serve to further distance officers from the rest of society as they may view the world as a series of potential threats to be combated or protected against (Kappeler et al., 2001).

Taken to an extreme, the idea that the primary purpose of the police is fighting crime can create the image that they are soldiers in a war; an image that many officers have adopted and internalized (Manning, 1978). This is particularly problematic as it can prevent police from building relationships and making connections within the community they serve, and it can impart the idea of citizens as potential enemies (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Public declarations war by elected officials charge police to engage in unwinnable battles against vague or poorly defined concepts, and serve to further polarize police-community relationships (e.g. Wars on Crime, Drugs, and Terror). Not only does the war model of police implicitly encourage violence with its rhetoric (eg. If police are soldiers, citizens naturally become the enemy), but the officers may experience frustration by fighting in an unending and unwinnable war. According to Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) the danger of this model is that it encourages the misuse and abuse of police violence towards those deemed as enemies, often minority residents in inner cities. Structurally, the quasi-military organization of the police has made the cops-as-soldiers mindset easily adopted by police and is further encouraged by such things as the federal government issuing surplus military equipment to local police such as assault rifles and anti-mine personnel movers.

In reality, only a small fraction of what the police do on a daily basis actually falls under the umbrella of “crime-fighting” (Wilson, 1968). In fact, the majority of the work police officers actually engage in can be best described as “social work” as they deal with minor issues, mediate disputes, and interact with the mentally ill and homeless (Bittner, 1967).

Because of the seemingly incompatible demands of the different roles they are expected to fill, Manning (1978) has declared that police operate under an impossible mandate. The impossible mandate refers to police being tasked with eradicating the social problem of crime without the tools or ability to address the underlying issues. Instead, to be viewed as efficient, officers must act as soldier bureaucrats, efficiently enforcing laws and maintaining order. In most departments, arrests and compliance are highly valued by departments as they represent quantifiable measures of success. Often today, officers are rewarded for making arrests or writing tickets, with little discussion regarding if that is what the situation truly warrants.

The roles and expectations of police continue to evolve and change with society's needs. Recently, a report by the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) declared that officers should be "guardians of human and constitutional rights" (p. 45). The role of police-as-guardian represents a marked departure from other roles encouraging officers to see themselves as protectors *and* members of a community not separate and apart from those they serve (Rahr & Rice, 2015). The police today are faced with conflicting role expectations and missions: crime fighter, public servant, moral authority, agent of social control, problem solver, and guardian. Whichever role officers and departments choose to embrace, it is clear that it will have consequences for the communities they serve (President's Task force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).

2.2 Police coercion and use of force

Police occupy a unique position in society, largely due to the fact that no other group is tasked with the ability and responsibility to use physical force against citizens (Bittner, 1970). Albert J. Reiss Jr. (1973, p. 2) famously stated that the police in the

United States “possess a virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of force over civilians.” Put differently, very few other individuals or groups have the legal right to use physical force on others besides the police. According to Bittner (1970), force and coercion are at the core of police work. Even in Bittner’s (1967) view of police as solvers of human problems, police may be called on to use physical force to solve those problems.

Officers’ responsibility and authority to use force against members of the public comes directly from the citizens they serve in what has been called the “social contract” (Reiman, 1985). In brief, the social contract is a largely unspoken agreement by citizens that confers on the police power and authority over them in the understanding that they will use it to work to control and investigate crime (Reiman, 1985). Under Gerda et al.’s (1982) view of police, force or the threat of force must be constantly present in order to gain the public’s compliance. Issues arise when physical force is used unnecessarily on individuals or used excessively, such as the case with “street justice” (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). “Street justice” or vigilante justice where individuals who are seen to resist or insult the authority of the police are physically abused by police in an effort to teach them a lesson and assert dominance (Van Maanen, 1978; Buerger, & Mazerolle, 1998; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2001) has defined use of force by police as “the amount of effort required by police to compel compliance from an unwilling subject.” (p.1). In their comprehensive report on the subject, the IACP (2001, p. 66-67) also detailed categories or types of force that are employed by officers: physical force (no weapon), chemical force (pepper spray or Mace), electronic force (TASER and other electronic control devices), impact force (batons and saps) and firearm

or lethal force (such as chokeholds). Use of force is seen as a continuum where officers' actions are guided by the situation they are presented, with departments having policies dictating what type of force should be used in response to specific citizen actions (Terrill & Paoline, 2013). Use of force by police generally falls into two categories: reasonable or excessive force (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The IACP (2001, p. 1) has defined excessive force as the application of any amount of force greater than what is needed to gain compliance from the suspect. However, there is no consensus regarding where exactly the tipping point between reasonable and excessive force lies, with neither officers nor citizens agreeing on the correct amount of force officers should use against citizens (Johnson & Kuhns, 2009).

While there is no universal agreement on the use of force by police officers, most police departments have policies set in place expressing when and how any force can be employed and against whom (IACP, 2001; Terrill & Paoline, 2013). Additionally, the Supreme Court has offered guidelines on assessing the appropriateness of use of force by police (*Graham v. Connor*; *Tennessee v. Garner*). *Tennessee v. Garner* (471 U.S. 1, 1985) dictates when officers may use lethal force against citizens, specifically, it requires that for lethal force to be justified in use a citizen must pose a significant risk to the safety of the officer or others. *Graham v. Connor* (490 U.S. 386, 1989) created an "objective reasonableness standard" for use of force by law enforcement under which their actions are judged. Writing for the majority in *Graham v. Connor* (90 U.S. 396, 1989), Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that police officers must consider three things when using force against a suspect: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” While officers are asked to take many factors into account when using force, their actions are judged by the court on a case-by-case basis, examining the totality of the circumstances but heavily weighing the perceptions of the officer in the moment.

Generally speaking, physical force is used as a technique designed to gain compliance from suspects who are offering resistance and who represent a threat to the safety of the public (IACP, 2012). However, scholars have recorded less altruistic motives for officer use of force, such as punishing offenders who they perceive to disrespect either the officer or the department, gaining status within the department, punishing those seen as guilty, as well as the release of built-up emotional stress or frustration (Hunt, 1985; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1953). Officially, these other reasons and motivations for police use of force are often denounced by departmental administration as not typical practice and against official policy (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).

While the ability to exercise force against citizens has been a constant in policing, how it has been applied and regulated varies over time (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). Scholars have identified three eras in the history of police surrounding the use of force: 1) the era of non-regulation; 2) the era of self-regulation; and 3) the era of external regulation (Alpert & Dunham, 2004). During the era of non-regulation, police officers operated largely without oversight or specific policies governing when and against whom force could be used. The era of self-regulation was ushered in by the larger movement by police leaders to professionalize the police force. During this era police leaders set standards of behavior for officers that included policies on the use of force against

citizens. The era of external regulation, the current era of regulation, involves entities outside the police department which review use of force incidents as well as guide official policy on how and when it is exercised. Outside entities include citizen review boards, blue ribbon commissions, and the courts; however, an argument could be made that increasingly the average citizens are gaining more of a voice in these matters than ever before through the influence of mass media and social media (Chermak et al., 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer, 2002).

Despite the massive amount of attention it receives by both scholars and the media, it is estimated that less than 2% of police-citizen contacts involve the use of force by officers (Hickman, et al., 2008). Despite the relative rarity of use of force incidents, the subject remains an important factor influencing public perceptions of the police (Locke, 1985). Friedrich (1980) asserted that the use and misuse of force by police has the potential to have injurious effects on a societal level as well as on an individual level. On a societal level, use of force incidents by police have been linked to riots and civil unrest, weakened community relations, and resulted in costly civil suits (Fyfe, 1988; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). On an individual level, consequences have included injury, loss of life, and emotional and psychological trauma. Rosenbaum et al. (2005) reported that excessive force by police can greatly and negatively impact an individual's perceptions and trust in police. Additionally, citizens' perceptions of what qualifies as justified use of force compared to excessive or unnecessary use of force may differ greatly from official sanctioned policy within police departments, further inflating feelings of frustration and mistrust between individuals and the police (Johnson & Kuhns, 2009; President's Task force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).

2.3 Process-Based Model of Policing

Police may use physical force to overcome resistance and gain compliance from individuals, however, when compliance is achieved through threat or use of force it is often temporary (Ferdik, Wolfe, & Blasco, 2014). However, while use of force or intimidation may garner temporary compliance it may also result in citizens becoming resentful and distrustful of police (Ferdik et al., 2014; Reisig, McCluskey, Mastrofski, & Terrill, 2004; Wolfe, 2011). Further, this sort of tactic is not only costly but time consuming, diverting the police from other duties. In order for the police to operate effectively, solve problems, respond to crime and maintain order, lasting and voluntary compliance and cooperation from the public is necessary (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 1990; Wolfe, 2011).

A major avenue for police to achieve long-term voluntary compliance and cooperation is through what is deemed the process-based model of policing (Reisig et al., 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990). According to Gau (2012), the process-based model of policing focuses on “gaining citizen’s trust and compliance through fair practices and high-quality treatment rather than through the rigorous law enforcement and manufactured fear that underpin deterrence-based policing styles” (p. 761). Through the process-based model, citizen’s views of the police are shaped and individuals come to view the police as a legitimate authority. Legitimacy can be defined as “a property of an authority that leads people to feel that the authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed” (Sunshine & Tyler 2003, p. 514). Largely, legitimacy is considered necessary for police work as it generates voluntary

compliance from citizens rather than police generating compliance through force or fear (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Tyler, 1990).

When police and the law are viewed as legitimate, individuals are more likely to voluntarily obey the directives of law enforcement and follow legal regulations even when officers are not present to act as a deterrent (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Conversely, when police are viewed as illegitimate, individuals may break laws more frequently as well as view the police and criminal justice system with distrust. Another outcome of the process-based model and police legitimacy is the increased likelihood that citizens will cooperate with police by providing information on crimes as well as their own victimization (Gau, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Public cooperation with law enforcement is vital for the police effectiveness as police cannot control crime without information from the public (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Tyler, 1990; Wolfe, 2011).

In their comprehensive review of legitimacy in policing, Mazerolle and colleagues (2013b) put forth a theoretical model of the different causal pathways to police legitimacy. The model consists of five major pathways through which legitimacy can be obtained (or lost) by a department. These pathways include: performance and crime control, the law itself, tradition and reputation of the department, distributive justice, and procedural justice. The first pathway to legitimacy Mazerolle et al. (2014) identified involves effective police performance and having the public perceive them as being effective at their jobs. For police to be considered effective they must (or at least give the appearance to) prevent crime and maintain social order (Mazerolle et al., 2014). In preventing and controlling crime, police must be seen to be enforcing laws that are also viewed as legitimate. Second, when the public views a law or other legal directives

as unjust they are less likely to view those enforcing the laws as legitimate authorities (Mazerolle et al., 2013b). A third pathway that police legitimacy may be achieved is through tradition. Put simply, police may be seen as legitimate because they have been seen as legitimate in the past. The police have historically been seen as “symbolic representatives of social order and cohesion.” (Mazerolle et al., 2013b, p. 21). Fourth, being perceived as being distributively just is another competing pathway through which police may achieve legitimacy. Distributive justice, also called distributive fairness, refers to how fairly and evenly groups and individuals are treated (Reisig et al., 2007). That is, when all people are treated the same by the police with no group or groups being seen to be favored over others, distributive justice has been achieved. According to Sunshine and Tyler (2003, p. 517) “the distributive justice argument is that people will be more willing to give power to legal authorities when they feel that those authorities deliver outcomes fairly to people and groups.”

While all of the pathways play an important role in how legitimacy may be obtained by police, procedural justice has received the most scholarly attention (Mazerolle et al., 2013b). According to Hinds and Murphy (2007), procedural justice refers to how people interpret the treatment they receive when dealing with others, and rests largely on how the decisions are reached in those transactions. Perceptions of procedural justice in policing are based on several elements: citizen participation, quality of treatment, and quality of decisions (Mazerolle et al., 2013a; Reisig et al., 2007). For an encounter to be viewed as procedurally just, citizens must feel they are participating in the exchange, and that their voice is being heard. Further, citizens must feel they are treated with both dignity and respect (Reisig et al., 2007). Finally, police are considered

procedurally just when they show themselves to be objective in their decisions and how fair they treat citizens (Reisig et al., 2007).

The concept of procedural justice can be applied to almost any situation with a power differential involved; when it is applied to dealing with police officers and other legal authorities, favorable perceptions of procedural justice can lead to the police being viewed as more legitimate. When police are viewed as a legitimate authority, citizens are more likely to voluntarily comply with law enforcement (with law abiding behaviors) and cooperate (by providing information) (Mazerolle, Bennett, et al., 2013). This is commonly referred to as the process-based model of police legitimacy (Reisig et al., 2007).

In the process-based conceptualization of legitimacy, police gain and lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public through the interactions they have with citizens (Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2003). When people judge the police to act in procedurally just ways, they are more likely to view the police as legitimate authorities (Mazerolle et al., 2013a; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2003). Primarily, citizens base these assessments of procedural justice and the police on a number of factors including: overall officer demeanor and professionalism; the perceived fairness of the decision making, and the overall respectfulness of the officer towards the citizen (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Mazerolle et al., 2013b; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Individuals who view the police as legitimate are more likely to obey laws, comply with directives from officers, and cooperate with police by offering information (Donner, Maskaly, Fridell, & Jennings, 2005; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2006).

Individuals who have been treated in a professional and procedurally just manner are generally more satisfied with the police regardless of the outcome of the encounter (Gau, 2011; White et al., 2016). It is generally assumed that positive and professional treatment will increase citizen's perceptions of legitimacy and negative treatment will lower perceptions of legitimacy (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990). Skogan (2006), however, found that the impact of interactions with police was not uniformly balanced and that there is a larger impact on perceptions of legitimacy when citizens reported a negative encounter with police. That is, when citizens are treated in procedurally unjust manner, feel they have not been listened to, or the officer is making decisions arbitrarily, they tend to feel worse about the police even when the outcome is in their favor, such as being given a warning instead of a ticket at a traffic stop (Gau, 2011; Epp et al., 2014). While both positive and negative police interactions can affect perceptions of police legitimacy, the negative encounters appear to be most impactful (Skogan, 2006). That is not to say that positive police-citizen interactions are not important as researchers have found that despite the asymmetrical relationship, positive encounters with police can improve confidence, trust, and community engagement of citizens (Bradford, Jackson & Stanko, 2009; President's Taskforce on 21st Century Policing, 2015).

Police legitimacy is a multifaceted concept, with ongoing debates in the literature as to what exactly legitimacy represents and how it should be operationalized (Nix, Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2014). For example, Tankebe (2013) argued that police legitimacy is comprised of four concepts: distributive fairness, procedural fairness, police lawfulness, and police effectiveness. Further, Tankebe (2013) suggests that constructs of procedural justice are components of police legitimacy, whereas Tyler (1990) argued that

procedural justice was a precursor to police legitimacy. Additionally, Tyler (1990, 2004, 2006) explicitly includes obligation to obey as *part* of legitimacy while Tankebe (2013) argued that it was an *outcome* of the police being viewed as legitimate. Generally speaking, however, scholars tend to focus on two factors when considering police legitimacy: obligation to obey the law and trust in the police (Reisig et al., 2007; Reisig, Tankebe, & Mesko, 2012; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002).

Drawing from Weber, Tyler (1990) postulated that obligation to obey was a major component of police legitimacy. According to Tyler (1990, p. 27) obligation to obey is the “perceived obligation to comply with the directives of an authority, irrespective of the personal gains or losses associated with doing so.” Tyler and Huo (2002, p. 102) suggested that obligation to obey was integral to legitimacy as legitimate authorities are those which are seen as entitled to be obeyed. One issue that has been raised regarding the inclusion of obligation to obey as a dimension of police legitimacy, however, is the concern that obedience may be a function of fear over potential outcomes an act as a method of self-preservation rather than out of deference to the law and authority (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2003; Tankebe, 2009; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010).

Trust in the police is a relatively more complex construct compared to obligation to obey in terms of legitimacy, and its inclusion in the model much more contested. In her work looking at community-police relations, Stoutland (2001) found trust to be a multi-layered construct and differentiated between four factors: shared priorities, respect, dependability, and competency. These four factors represent issues associated with outcomes of policing (dependability and competency) and police treatment of citizens (respect and shared priorities) (Hawdon et al., 2003). Further, trust has been

conceptualized as involving “inferences about the intentions behind actions, intentions that flow from a person’s unobservable motivations and character” (Tyler & Huo, 2002 p. 61). Because of the subjective and emotional nature involved in trust, many scholars have argued against the inclusion of trust in police legitimacy (e.g. Barbalet, 2009; Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Kaina, 2008) largely because trust is considered to be a projection of future desires while legitimacy is designed to assess current feelings and beliefs (Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Reisig et al., 2012).

Theoretically, the original formulation of police legitimacy conceptualized legitimacy as being comprised of two subscales: obligation to obey the law and trust (Tyler, 1990; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Hou, 2002). In practice, however, many researchers have empirically tested how the two concepts fit together often finding they do not. For example, White and colleagues (2016) examined police legitimacy as both obligation to obey and trust in police, however they found that while trust and obey loaded together in factor analysis, trust also loaded with procedural justice items, indicating that it could not be considered fully separate constructs. Similarly, Gau (2011) found that trust measures were more closely aligned with procedural justice. Gau (2013) further suggested that procedural justice may enhance trust which may then enhance individuals’ feelings of obligation to obey. Likewise, while Hough et al. (2010) found that procedural justice perceptions enhanced feelings of trust in the police, but that trust did not empirically measure legitimacy rather they argued it was a predictor to legitimacy. Similarly, Nix et al. (2014) measuring trust with a single item, found that procedural justice and collective efficacy shaped trust in police. Johnson et al. (2014) argued that including trust as a conceptual part of legitimacy when it in fact was more

closely linked with procedural justice was creating a tautologically flawed argument. Avoiding this issue, others have reconceptualized police legitimacy, such as Murphy and Cherney (2011) who conceptualized legitimacy as confidence, respect, and trust for police. This conceptualization is in line with conclusions that Reisig, Tankebe, and Mesko (2012) drew finding that trust was a strong predictor of the traditional legitimacy outcome of cooperation where obligation to obey was not.

Additionally, issues have been raised by researchers concerning the universality of definitions and measurement of elements of the process-based model. Specifically, recent research has found that cultural and historical contexts in developing and post-colonial countries challenges the underlying assumptions that the process-based model universal. Tankebe (2009) argued that while the ultimate outcomes may be similar, such as feelings of obligation to obey the law, the underlying reasoning for doing so may be vastly different depending on the cultural context. Tankebe (2009) applied Sunshine and Tyler's (2003) process-based model in Ghana and found it lacked validity as public cooperation with the police was not shaped by perceptions of officer fairness but rather were grounded in perceptions of officer effectiveness. Further, Tankebe (2009) suggested that obligation to obey in Western-developed democracies may be due to recognizing the moral authority of the police, where in developing countries the drive may be out of other concerns such as fear of physical harm or other reprisals (Tankebe, 2009). Similarly, Johnson and colleagues (2014, p. 970) concluded that "citizens may feel obligated to obey legal authorities for reasons unrelated to legitimacy." In further support of the notion of cultural definitional issues in the process-based model, Tankebe, Reisig and Wang (2016) compared outcomes from surveys conducted in the United States to those

taken in Ghana and found a strong empirical link between legitimacy and cooperation and compliance in the US but found very weak correlations between the two in Ghana. While not examining the process-based model on an international or cross-national scale, Maguire and Johnson (2010) argued that community context was an important consideration when examining perceptions of police. They argued that neighborhoods and communities may have differential experiences and interactions with police that should be accounted for when measuring perceptions of police. An additional issue related to context and the process-based model was raised in a recent study, Maguire, and colleagues (2016) conducted an experiment examining the impact of exposure to positive and negative police-citizen encounters on the process-based model using both global and encounter specific measures. They found that exposure to a single police-citizen encounter affected perceptions towards the specific officer involved in the encounter more strongly to officers in general.

Another issue raised by researchers involves how constructs in the process-model are operationalization and measured. In their review of prior research, Johnson et al. (2014) remark on the inconsistent nature of measurement and operationalization in legitimacy research, stating that while most research treats legitimacy as a single construct some have operationalized it as having as many as four different dimensions or subscales (see Tankebe, 2013). Other researchers have raised questions about how measures are operationalized, specifically procedural justice and police legitimacy. Maguire and Johnson (2010) argued in their critique of Tyler and Hou's (2002) work, that measurements were often fundamentally flawed as the scales constructed to represent the concepts conceptually overlapped. For example, questions commonly used in

legitimacy scales often address questions of fairness or equal treatment, while, questions commonly used for procedural justice scales tend to include questions relating to the fair and professional treatment by police. They argue that these two constructs are so closely aligned that they overlap, essentially measuring the same underlying concepts by using what they deem redundant information (Magurie & Johnson, 2010). Johnson et al. (2014) found similar results concluding that trust and procedural justice were conceptually separate but empirically were not.

Despite the theoretical and methodological debates over inclusion of obligation to obey and trust in the police, both have found empirical support in the literature as effective predictors of cooperation with law enforcement (see: Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In line with of Sunshine and Tyler (2003) and Tyler and colleagues' (2010) work, in this dissertation I operationalize police legitimacy as both the obligation to obey and trust in the police, however, in light of the methodological debate in the literature I also test these concepts separately in Chapter 4. Theoretical and methodological arguments aside, the ordering and inclusion of concepts related to legitimacy is ultimately an academic argument as police departments are less concerned with how each construct fits together and more concerned with enhancing each piece. That is to say, being viewed as legitimate authorities, increasing public support and trust as well as ensuring cooperation and compliance from the public are all important to departments wishing to increase their overall effectiveness and improve community relations.

2. 4 Direct and indirect experiences with police

Individuals form their attitudes and perceptions of police from both direct and indirect experiences (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Direct experiences include in-person contact with police, which can be voluntary, such as when calling officers for assistance, and involuntary, such as in the case of traffic stops (Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Unsurprisingly, individuals who experience voluntary direct contact with police report better attitudes about police than those who have involuntary contacts (Decker, 1981). Indirect or vicarious police contact can be characterized as one where the information is learned from outside sources and not personally experienced firsthand (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Vicarious experiences can be garnered through stories from friends and family, news media, popular film and television programs (Eschholz et al., 2002; Horowitz, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005; Warren, 2011).

Given that the majority of individuals do not come into regular contact with police, indirect experiences are likely powerful events shaping the public's views (Eith & Durose, 2011; Horowitz, 2007). Hawdon (2008) stated that most individuals formed their general opinions about police without having any direct experience with them. Furthermore, individuals will draw on the information vicariously obtained from other sources to evaluate the police when they do eventually encounter a police officer or other legal authority directly (Warren, 2011). An illustration of this can be found in Warren's (2011) recent work where she reported that individuals who had heard about negative experiences with police were four times more likely to report being disrespected by the police officer.

There has been much scholarship examining the effects of exposure to celebrated cases of police misconduct in the news media on public perceptions of police (Eschholz et al., 2002; Sigelman, Welch, Bledsoe, & Combs, 1997; Weitzer, 2002). Repeated or long-term exposure to news media coverage of dramatic events involving police misconduct have been found to not only reduce general attitudes towards police (Weitzer, 2002), but also lead individuals to believe that police misconduct and corruption is a common-place occurrence (Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Rosenbaum et al. (2005) found that individuals' perceptions of the police are affected by others' negative experiences. Similarly, Weitzer and Tuch (2005) found that residing with someone who had a negative experience with police is linked with lower levels of trust and confidence in police. In terms of social media, videos of police-citizen encounters getting the most attention on social media are almost universally negative and violent, given Skogan's (2006) work, have a potentially higher likelihood of altering perceptions given their content. Take the video of Eric Garner, where he is shown being asphyxiated in the course of an arrest. This incident exposed viewers to a visceral negative encounter where police were shown to have caused the death of an unarmed man. Given that the most common type of contact with the police are routine traffic stops this type of exposure to police (through video) may also prove important in shaping individuals' perceptions. That is not to say that every individual will react to a vicarious experience equally. In fact, Eschholz and colleagues (2002) found that viewing documentary style films and television programs negatively affected viewers' opinions and attitudes among African-Americans, but positively affected white viewers' opinions.

2. 5 The “New Visibility”

According to Manning (1980, p. 21), “the police role conveys a sense of sacredness or awesome power that lies at the root of political order and authority.” This “sacred canopy” as Manning called it, put police on a pedestal to be revered and obeyed (Manning, 1980). In the past, society readily accepted the narrative crafted by the police and the media (Goldsmith, 2010). Throughout history, police departments have deliberately chosen what information to share with the news media and what to conceal, and have shaped the narrative they present to the public (Brown, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010). The traditional media, biased in favor of police and with limited information, often reported on incidents of misconduct when they were simply too big to ignore or the narrative offered by the police too unbelievable (Brown, 2015). However, with the advent and proliferation of mobile technologies, the police no longer hold the monopoly on information and have lost some control over their narrative as citizens have begun to film and share encounters with police (Brown, 2015; Brucato, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010). Citizens filming and sharing their police encounters with others has the potential to do more than simply reframe the traditional police narrative. As Goldsmith (2010) aptly noted, technology in the hands of average citizens has the ability to “alter the public visibility of policing and thereby to impact upon public perceptions of policing and challenge existing mechanisms for police accountability” (p. 916).

Citizen Journalism

When average citizens take up the tools and technology in their possession, such as smartphones and the Internet, to document events and disseminate them, it is referred to as citizen journalism (Allan, 2009). Before such advancements in technology such as

smartphones, digital recorders, and Web 2.0, individuals mainly relied on traditional mass media outlets for information (Macnamara, 2010). However, with these advancements in technology, “the average Joe is now a walking eye on the world, a citizen journalist, able to take a photo, add a caption or a short story and upload it to the Internet for all their friends, and usually everyone else, to see.” (Peat 2010, para. 5). While reporting can be written accounts or blogs, citizen journalism often employs videography or photography in its documentation of events (Allan & Thorsen, 2009). According to Brown (2015), citizen journalism can trace its popularity to three factors: 1) the availability of mobile communication devices (typically cell phones) capable of both capturing events and uploading them, 2) the accessibility of file and video sharing sites like Youtube.com, and 3) an overall awareness by citizens of the effectiveness of this means of communication. Furthermore, Internet social media sites such as Youtube, Instagram, Flickr, Twitter, and Facebook have created an environment where citizen journalists can have direct access to audiences, allowing for the sharing of stories and events without facilitation (or narratives) of traditional media (Brucato, 2015; Doyle, 2011).

While citizen journalism refers to individuals creating records of *any* news-worthy event, it is often associated with acts that can be deemed *sousveillance* (counter-surveillance), or average citizens surveil or watch those in authority (Kohn, 2010; Mann & Ferenbok, 2013; Toch, 2012). *Sousveillance* is a type of observation of authority. Contextually, if surveillance (from the French meaning “oversight”) is when those in power or authority observe those without, such as police video recording encounters with citizens; *sousveillance* (meaning undersight) is when those without power (citizens)

observe those in power and authority (Mann & Ferenbok, 2013). *Sousveillance* then in this context is citizens' observations, recording, and documentation of the police. When citizen journalists purposefully turn their attention to observing or reporting on police behaviors and police-citizen encounters it is typically referred to as "cop-watching" (Schaefer & Steinmetz, 2014).

The practice of cop-watching as a type of *sousveillance* was initiated as a form of protest against the power of the state in the 1960's with the goal of holding the police accountable for their actions (Toch, 2012). Cop-watching includes the observing and recording of all types of encounters ranging from mundane traffic stops to violent arrests, and now often involves audio/visual documentation (Simonson, 2016). According to Schaefer and Steinmetz (2014), cop-watching accomplishes three things: 1) it monitors everyday encounters, 2) it exposes misconduct and 3) it challenges the traditional narrative put forth by police. In recent years a variety of websites and social media groups have been created with the purpose of supporting and training would-be cop-watchers as well as acting as a platform for sharing documentation of police-citizen encounters (see PINAC, CopBlock, CopWatch, Film the Police; Bock, 2016; Yesil, 2011).

The most famous example of citizen journalism *cum* *sousveillance* can be found when George Holliday filmed Rodney King's violent arrest by Los Angeles police officers (Brown, 2015; Yesil, 2011). The incident involved 23 officers in total, with four officers brutally beating King after he fled from police (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The incident was filmed by George Holliday who had been woken up by the sounds of the altercation between King and the officers. He recorded a total of 8 minutes' worth of the encounter

between King and the police from his balcony window (Robinson, 2011; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The next day he tried to turn the footage in to the police department, who were uninterested in his footage (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Having been rebuffed by the police department, Holliday turned it in to a local news station who aired the footage (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Although grainy from both distance and low light, four officers can be seen landing a series punches, kicks, and baton strikes to a prone King (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). The footage was picked up by national media outlets and “served as one of the first and most widely viewed examples of the power of mobile recorded image” (Yesil, 2011, p. 280). As a result of the evidence captured (and the publicity it received), state and federal charges were brought against the four officers who beat King (two of whom were convicted federally), LA police Chief Darryl Gates resigned, city-wide rioting in Los Angeles occurred, and a \$3.8 million payment to King from the city was ordered (Ortiz, 2015; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). In addition to the departmental fallout, the publication of the incident sparked a national discussion on police use of force and police treatment of minorities (Robinson, 2011). Lastly, the incident served as a “massive further stimulus to amateur photographers,” encouraging citizens to not only watch the police but to hold them accountable (Doyle, 2003, p. 74).

Another pivotal event for contemporary citizen journalism and cop-watching occurred on July 17, 2014, when Ramsey Orta recorded the arrest and ultimately death of Eric Garner at the hands of New York City police officers (Brucato, 2015; Mathias, 2016). Officers approached Garner, who had been selling untaxed cigarettes, running afoul of New York state tax law (Snyder et al., 2017). Garner who felt he was being harassed and singled out, argued with the officers about his treatment (Snyder et al.,

2017). An officer put Garner in a chokehold and brought him to the ground, at which point six other officers surrounded and handcuffed Garner (Goodman & Mueller, 2015; Snyder et al., 2017). During this time, Garner, who repeatedly said he could not breathe, became unresponsive and ultimately died of asphyxia caused by the chokehold and the weight of the arresting officers (Goodman & Baker, 2014; Powell, 2016). In the aftermath of Garner's death, Officer Pantaleo, who initiated the chokehold was taken off of active duty while the case was being investigated by a grand jury (Feuer & Apuzzo, 2016). When the grand jury declined to indict Pantaleo on any criminal charges, a series of large, albeit peaceful, protests swept across New York (Goodman & Baker, 2014). Although not the movement's genesis, the video evidence of Eric Garner's treatment at the hands of the New York police helped to galvanize the Black Lives Matter movement, bringing it to a more prominent position on the national stage with Garner's last words "I can't breathe" frequently used as a cry by protestors (Blacklivesmatter.com; Goodman & Mueller, 2015; Wasserman, 2014).

Similar to the Rodney King incident, the footage of Garner's encounter with police acted as a flashpoint encouraging others to engage in citizen journalism (Wasserman, 2014). This is exemplified by Ramsey Orta, who stated that because of the video he captured individuals were "pulling out their cameras and filming police brutality around the world" (quoted in Mathias, 2016).

Officer Body-Worn Cameras

Citizens are not the only ones filming police encounters, however, as departments have long since had a set of video and audio recording tools at their disposal as well (Rosenblatt et al., 2004). Although not currently as prevalent those available to citizens

(such as smartphones), the video recording tools available to police include CCTV, on-car cameras (commonly referred to as dashboard cams) and officer body-worn cameras (White, 2014). Dashboard cameras have been in use since the 1960's however it wasn't until the 1980's they became popular among departments (Rosenblatt et al., 2004). Police departments first began using dashboard video systems to document traffic stops in response from pressure from community groups and elected officials to increase arrests and convictions of drunk drivers (Rosenblatt, et al., 2004).

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) have emerged as one of the newest technological innovations available to police (White, 2014). A body-worn camera is a small video and audio recording device that can be affixed to an officer's uniform or worn on the side of glasses (Stanley, 2015). Just as the footage from citizen journalists offer the citizen's point of view, the BWC provides events from the officer's perception. Originally introduced in the United Kingdom, they have begun to be adopted by police departments in the United States, with a surge in demand following highly publicized police-citizen encounters (Pickler, 2014; White, 2014). Similar to the implementation of dashboard cameras, BWCs owes much of their popularity to public outcries for increased transparency and accountability on the part of police after high profile cases involving claims of police brutality. For example, following the death of Michael Brown at the hands of police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, MO, the White House received a petition calling for BWCs to become mandatory for police officers; within a week of creation, the petition had surpassed the needed number of signatures to trigger a response from the government (Raghavan, 2014). By September 2015, the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of a grant program designed to help police

departments purchase and maintain BWCs with the expressed goal of increasing officer accountability and transparency as well as repairing police-community relationships (USDOJ, 2015). In the first two years of that program, US DOJ has awarded more than 170 agencies with grants totaling nearly \$40 million.

As of 2013, a third of all local police departments were using BWCs in some capacity (Reaves, 2015). According to Coudert and colleagues (2015), the general goals for departments adopting BWCs are three-fold: increasing transparency of police behavior, deterring misconduct among officers, and improving community relationships and strengthening trust in the police (p. 750). Whether these goals are being met or not has yet to be fully examined, however, preliminary evidence by researchers appears to be promising (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; White, 2014). Furthermore, preliminary evidence appears to indicate that the both officers and citizens alike may be altering their behavior in the presence of a recording device (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Brown, 2015; Keoun, 2000; White, 2014). Posited as the camera's "civilizing effect," researchers have found the presence of BWCs during a police-citizen encounter decreases the number of civilian complaints against officers (Jennings, Fridell, & Lynch, 2014; Katz, Kurtenbach, Choate, & White, 2015; White, 2014). Some studies report that use of BWCs produces decreases in officer complaints as large as 88% (Farrar & Ariel, 2013).

Scholars have posited many benefits of BWCs beyond lowering citizen complaints. For example, recording police-citizen encounters creates unbiased accounts of events and serves as evidence in court cases (Maghan, O'Reilly, & Shon, 2002; Merola, Lum, Koper, & Scherer, 2016; Morrow, Katz, & Choate, 2016; Stanely, 2015). When complaints do happen, recordings may be used to either clear officers of unfounded citizen complaints,

thereby limiting liability and monetary losses for police departments or establish that the problematic behavior did in fact occur (Keoun, 2000, Rosenblatt, et al., 2004). As an accountability tool, BWCs offer the “potential to serve as a check against the abuse of power by police officers” (Stanley, 2015, para 5). In control-trials, researchers have found a marked decrease in use of force incidents among officers who were assigned BWCs to wear compared to the control group (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Farrar & Ariel 2013; Jennings et al., 2015). However, it should be noted that there is some evidence that officer’s decision to not engage in physical force may be due less to any civilizing effect of the BWC and may be due more to the officer second-guessing the encounter out of fears of coming under media scrutiny (Hawkins, 2016; Valencia, 2015).

While citizen journalism and cop-watching have forever altered the police department’s control over their message and image, BWCs may offer police departments the opportunity to retake some control over their narrative. Acting as a counter balance to citizen journalism, BWCs serve not only as an accountability tool for officers but the technology also allows departments to offer their perspective of events and refute potentially biased or edited citizen footage.

2. 6 Influencing the Public – Theoretical Explanations

Social Cognitive Theory

There are numerous theoretical explanations regarding the mechanisms by which mass and social media can influence public opinions, attitudes and behaviors. Two in particular stand out: social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986; 2004) and cultivation theory (Gerbner, 1966). With its roots in social learning theory, social cognitive theory is a psycho-social theory originally developed by Albert Bandura in 1986 to explain how

children both learn and model behaviors through observational means. According to Bandura (2001), observational learning occurs by several modeling mechanisms: live, instructional or symbolic. Live modeling occurs when an individual is physically present to see demonstrated behavior or skills. Instructional modeling occurs when an individual is given verbal or written instructions, descriptions, or other explanations of behaviors. Symbolic modeling occurs when behaviors and values are obtained through observing fictional characters or real individuals displaying particular behaviors. These observations most often occur through video technology such as entertainment media (film or television) or reality based sources (news reports or user generated Internet videos). Symbolic modeling can also occur through exposure to printed material as well such as books, newspaper or magazine articles (Bandura, 2004). As the number of exposures or observations increase or when the event is particularly powerful or emotionally triggering, the more likely an individual will identify with those observed behaviors (Bushman, 1998). The more a person identifies with both the individuals and actions observed, the more firmly the observed behavior will be encoded into an individual's memory for later use, and the more likely those behaviors will influence the person's own behaviors and attitudes (Bushman, 1998).

The process of encoding occurs through the development of mental and emotional scripts that direct behaviors (Bushman, 1998). According to Bushman (1998), the actual encoding process of a behavior is called a vignette, which consists of both perceptual and conceptual representations of the behavior or event witnessed. A script is made up of several vignettes compiled over time, after multiple events or behaviors have been witnessed. Once the script has been created it is stored in an individual's psyche. When

that individual encounters a similar situation or emotional state, the script is called upon as a guide for behavior or action (Bushman, 1998).

Cultivation theory

Drawing on the underlying principles of social cognitive theory, cultivation theory seeks to expand the understanding of the internalization and processing of observed actions or concepts. To date, the cultivation model is one of the most often used theories by scholars seeking to examine media effects (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010). Cultivation theory posits that long-term exposure to messages, images, and patterns will ultimately result in a fundamental shift in an individual's belief structure, attitudes, and perceptions of reality (Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Spignorielli, & Shanahan, 2002). Similar to social cognitive theory, cultivation theory has traditionally been used in studies of viewing violence and aggression, and it has been used in a variety of fields (Chory-Assad & Tomborini, 2003; Felson, 1996; Podlas, 2002). Cultivation theory's original incarnation focused largely on television viewership as a whole, messages of crime and violence, and aggressive behaviors (Gerbner & Gross, 1979). Specifically, cultivation theory argues that individuals' opinions and perceptions of reality can be linked to the effects of long-term exposure to particular messages. In its most basic form, cultivation theory assumes that multiple or long-term exposures to images, scenes or events will result in the internalization of the messages and definitions presented (Gerbner & Gross, 1979; Gerbner et al., 2002). Most often, cultivation theory is used to examine attitudes and opinion shifts as a result of exposure to fictional images or scenes. The original conceptualization of cultivation theory assumed that television messages en masse contained the largest effect; however, more recent scholarship has

found genre specific programming to have a stronger influence (Podlas, 2002; Segrin & Nabi, 2002; Woo & Dominick, 2002). For example, Chory-Assad & Tamborini (2003) found that viewing fictional programs depicting physicians behaving and making poor choices of romantic partners lowered individual's perceptions of their personal doctors. Similarly, Podlas (2002) found that viewing reality-style courtroom shows where judges often berated defendants and injected their personal opinions throughout the proceedings, negatively affected individuals' opinions of the court system and increased levels of fearfulness about the criminal justice system in the real world.

2.7 Current study

Technology and perceptions of the police have become inextricably linked given the ubiquity of smart phones and social media (Campeau, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010). Over the last several years, the US has seen a string of highly publicized, often lethal police-citizen encounters as a result of citizens filming police and sharing the encounter with others via the Internet (Weitzer, 2015). There has been a great deal of scholarship examining perceptions of police and police legitimacy (Donner et al., 2015; Mazerolle et al., 2013a; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2006; White et al., 2016), the impact of media consumption on perceptions of police (Eschholz et al., 2002; Sigelman et al., 1997; Weitzer, 2002), as well as the effects of direct and vicarious contact with police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Carr et al., 2007). Missing from the literature is an examination of the effects of citizen-generated media depicting how police-citizen encounters act as a new type of vicarious experience through which citizens' perceptions of police can be shaped. This is particularly troubling given the clear effect that user-generated videos of police have had on communities, as evidenced by rioting and protesting that followed the

release of highly publicized videos such those depicting the deaths of Eric Garner, Walter Scott, and Oscar Grant.

Recently, Weitzer (2015) stated that highly publicized video recordings of violent police-citizen encounters may have a cumulative effect, where reactions to a video or event may prime an individual's perceptions of the next video or encounter. As Weitzer (2015, p. 3) stated: "such increased display of visual images gives the impression, as one woman at a protest exclaimed, that police brutality is a 'skyrocketing epidemic'." If this is true, then the current project is all the more needed as fatal police-citizen encounters between police and citizens account for a small fraction of all outcomes (Liederbach & Taylor, 2014). While everyday police-citizen encounters may not invoke the same visceral reaction, there are, quite simply, more of them to be experienced, recorded, and shared. If Weitzer (2015) is correct and there is a cumulative effect of watching police-citizen encounters, then recordings of everyday occurrences may very well represent the start of a digital avalanche poised to damage police legitimacy.

As Murphy (2013, p. 319) noted, "with each passing day more incidents involving police officers, private citizens, and video cameras are emerging on the Internet making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil and criminal dockets." Despite this, little is known about the vicarious effects viewing these videos offer. In this dissertation I will expand the literature using an online survey experiment, which asks respondents about their perceptions of police and support for video surveillance of police before and after they view videos of encounters between police and citizens. In doing so, I will explore the vicarious effects of witnessing commonplace police-citizen encounters. Specifically, I

will examine if remotely viewing every day, non-fatal encounters with police impacts perceptions of police and attitudes toward video surveillance measures.

CHAPTER 3

DATA AND METHODS

How does the viewing of vicariously witnessing a police-citizen encounter impact individuals' perceptions of the police? To answer this question, I designed a survey experiment where individuals were questioned regarding their perceptions of police both before and after being shown a video of police-citizen encounters. The experiment included a pre-test, video stimuli, immediate post-test and for those respondents who opted in, a second post-test two weeks later. Respondents were questioned on a series of measures regarding the police and filming and then shown one of four randomized videos, following the viewing of the video they were again questioned regarding their views. To test the durability of any changes, a second survey was offered to respondents two weeks following the close of the first survey. Potential learning effects between the pre-test and the post-tests were addressed by randomizing the ordering of both question blocks and items within each block. Both the initial and follow-up surveys were conducted in October 2015. As such, this experimental design is the good vehicle for understanding the impacts of the vicarious experiences viewing police-citizen interactions.

3.1 Research Questions

The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of viewing police-citizen encounters has on individuals' perceptions of police overall and their support for video technology use. To understand these issues, three research questions are examined.

RQ1a: What effect does viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters have on individuals' perceptions –whether positive or negative – of police? RQ1b: If viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters does have an impact, does the content of the video have a differential effect?

RQ2a: Does viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters influence individuals' levels of support for video surveillance of the police? RQ2b: If viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters does have an impact, does the content of the video have a differential effect?

RQ3a: Are the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen interactions lasting or do they decay over time? RQ3b: If the effects of viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters are lasting, does the content of the video have a differential effect?

3.2 Sample and Procedure

Respondents for this study were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Amazon, Inc., Seattle, WA). MTurk, is an online crowdsourcing labor market that connects workers (our research participants) with tasks set by requesters (Bohannon, 2011). Tasks (be they assignments or surveys) are advertised through the creation of a Human Intelligence Task (HIT). HITs provide information to MTurk workers regarding the parameters of the task as well as the rate of compensation if any. This system allows individuals to opt into tasks and ignore those they do not want to take or participate in. Acceptance of a HIT does not automatically equate to participation and workers can close out the task or leave it unfinished if they do not want to complete it. As a sample, MTurk is a convenience sample, more diverse than typical student samples but less diverse than a national sample (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012).

Initially adopted by researchers in psychology, MTurk has found increased popularity in use throughout the social sciences in recent years (Bernisky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015). Researchers have found data gathered from MTurk workers to be a reliable source of quality information producing similar results to other forms of convenience samples (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Holden, Dennie, & Hicks, 2013; Mullinix et al., 2015; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In terms of experimental survey research, Bernisky et al. (2012) found that MTurk workers responded to experimental stimuli similarly to other respondents. Crump and colleagues (2013) reported similar conclusions when they replicated ten separate studies using MTurk respondents.

For the current study, a HIT was advertised as “Study in Criminology” and provided details about the purpose and nature of the study, expected length of time for completion, and compensation for participation. The HIT was restricted to U.S. residents 18 years or older who had at least a 95% approval rating and at least 100 approved HITs on MTurk. Restricting research to workers with high reputations is an effective way to ensure high-quality data and is often practiced in survey research (Hauser & Schwarz, 2016; Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). Once individuals accepted the HIT they were presented with a URL link to the Qualtrics hosted online survey. Per IRB protocol, respondents were first shown the informed consent page detailing the purpose of the research, rate of compensation, estimated time for completion, and information for how to contact the researchers if they had questions. Continuing forward to the next page was taken as informed consent to participate in the study. To recruit respondents for the follow-up survey, respondents who completed the initial survey were asked if they would

like to participate in the delayed post-test survey. Those who indicated “yes,” were asked to provide their unique ID assigned by MTurk at the end of the survey. Only respondents who expressly stated that they would like to be contacted for the follow-up were invited to participate in the follow-up study. Respondents were compensated \$1.65 for completing the initial survey and \$0.50 for completing the follow-up survey. The rate of compensation was consistent with suggested best practices for MTurk research (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor, 2010).

Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, (2009) suggest that self-directed surveys such as those delivered online are vulnerable to inattentive survey takers who may be hurrying through the survey and/or not fully reading the questions. To identify suspect data they suggest that instructional manipulation checks (IMC) be included which look similar to other questions but specifically requests the respondent choose a particular answer thus proving they have been fully reading the survey. Given that a single IMC question is insufficient for assessing respondent attention, multiple IMC questions were included in both the initial and follow-up surveys (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2014). In line with best practices, the initial survey had a total of ten IMC questions mixed in with the actual research questions and the follow-up survey had five IMC questions (Berinsky, et al., 2014; Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Any respondent who failed more than two of the checks in the initial survey or more than one in the follow-up survey were not included in the study sample (n=16).

A total of 670 individuals opened the url link to the initial survey, 9 individuals declined to move past the consent page, and 45 stopped taking the survey before completion. Additionally, total of 16 respondents failed two or more of IMC questions

and were excluded from the final sample, leaving a total of 600 individuals who completed the initial survey. A total of 507 individuals opened the url link to the follow-up survey and continued to complete the survey. Examination of the IMC questions found 7 who failed the attention checks and were excluded from the final sample leaving a total of 500 individuals who completed the follow-up survey. Of the 500 who completed the final survey, only 458 cases could reliably be matched to the initial survey. As such, the follow-up survey had a total of 458 individuals in the sample.

3.3 Dependent Variables

Obligation to Obey the Law is conceptualized as the belief that laws should be observed and legal directives by law enforcement should be followed. *Obligation to Obey the Law* is operationalized with the following items: 1) disobeying the police is seldom justified; 2) it is difficult to break the law and keep one's self-respect; 3) you should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong; and 4) you should do what the police tell you even if you disagree. *Obligation to Obey the Law* is an additive scale, where higher scores indicate higher feelings towards voluntary compliance with police officers and the law. All items related to *obligation to obey the law* scale were summed ($\alpha = .815$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 2.582). The scale was standardized.

Trust in the Police is conceptualized as “beliefs about the degree to which the police are honest and care for the members of the communities they police” (Tyler, 2005, p. 324). The *trust in the police* scale is operationalized using a six-item scale: 1) most police officers in my community do their job well; 2) police in my community have too much power; 3) all things considered, I respect most police officers and the job they do;

4) people's basic rights are well protect by the police; 5) the police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for my community; 6) most police are honest and trustworthy. All answers were coded with a 4 point Likert scale with responses which range from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." *Trust in the Police* is an additive scale, where higher scores reflect higher levels of general trust of the police. Item 2 was reverse coded. All items related to *trust in police* were summed ($\alpha = .904$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 5.004). The scale was standardized.

Police Legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 2, police legitimacy is a multifaceted concept, as such its complexities require a combination of measurements (Reisig et al., 2007). For this study, police legitimacy is conceptualized as the "a property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that an authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed" (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, p. 514). *Police Legitimacy* is operationalized as a summation of two separate subscales: *obligation to obey the law* and *trust in the police* (Reisig et al., 2007; White et al., 2016). Responses from both the *obligation to obey the law* and *trust in the police* subscales were summed to create the *police legitimacy* variable ($\alpha = .918$), where higher scores indicate more positive view of police and greater belief in the legitimacy of police as an institution. All scales are standardized.

Procedural Justice. *Procedural Justice* is conceptualized as the belief that police treat citizens with dignity and respect (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). *Procedural Justice* is operationalized as a six-item scale and includes the following items: 1) the police treat people with respect; 2) the police take time to listen to people; 3) police treat people fairly; 4) police are courteous to citizens they come into contact with; 5) the police

respect citizen's rights and 6) police generally act professionally. *Procedural Justice* is an additive scale, where higher scores indicate a greater belief that police treat citizens with dignity and respect. All responses in the *procedural justice* subscale were summed ($\alpha = .881$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 4.261). The scale was standardized.

Distributive Fairness. Adopting Reisig and colleagues' (2007) definition, *distributive fairness* is conceptualized as the belief that police both treat citizens and deliver services fairly and consistently to all members of a community. *Distributive Fairness* is operationalized using a three-item scale: 1) police make sure citizens receive the outcomes they deserve under the law; 2) police provide the same quality of service to all citizens and 3) police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people. All questions were 4 point Likert scale with responses ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." *Distributive Fairness* is an additive scale, where higher scores indicate greater belief that police are distributively fair. All responses related to *Distributive Fairness* scale were summed ($\alpha = .894$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 2.475). The scale was standardized.

Cooperation with the Law. *Cooperation with the Law* is conceptualized as respondents' willingness to contact the police under a variety of differing situations such as reporting crimes or suspicious activities. *Cooperation with the Law* was developed from an eight-item scale originally taken from the Arrestee Reporting Information Network (AARIN) survey project (White et al., 2016). *Cooperation with the Law* was operationalized by asking respondents how likely they would be to: 1) call the police to report a theft/burglary where you were a victim; 2) call the police to report a minor

(misdemeanor) crime; 3) call the police to report a serious (felony) crime; 4) report suspicious activity near your house/apartment/residence; 5) report suspicious activity in your neighborhood; 6) provide information to police to help find a suspected criminal; 7) provide information to police anonymously to help find a suspected criminal; and 8) call the police to report an accident. All items in the cooperation inventory were measured using a 4-point Likert scale where responses range from “Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely.” *Cooperation with the Law* is an additive scale, where higher scores reflect an overall greater willingness to contact or cooperate with the police. All responses related to Cooperation with the Law were summed ($\alpha = .922$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 5.557). The scale was standardized.

Estimations of Police Misconduct. *Estimations of Police Misconduct* is conceptualized as an overall estimation of the frequency in the amount of misconduct that police engage in. *Estimations of Police Misconduct* is operationalized using a five-item scale (Dowler & Zawilski, 2007; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004), where respondents were asked to estimate how often they think the following behavior occurs: 1) police officers distort the truth while testifying in a trial to help get a conviction; 2) police officers bend the rules to get a confession from a person accused of a crime; 3) police officers physically abuse those who are accused of a crime; 4) police officers use insulting language against citizens they stop; and 5) police officers stop people on the streets without good reason. All five items were measured using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “Never” to “Very Often.” *Estimations of Police Misconduct* is an additive scale and was coded so that higher scores reflect higher estimations of the amount of misconduct police officers engage in. All responses related to Estimations of Police Misconduct were summed ($\alpha =$

.917). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 4.239). The scale was standardized.

Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras. Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras is conceptualized as generalized support for the use of body-worn cameras by police in the course of their work with the community. *Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras* is operationalized as a seven-item scale and included the following items: 1) The use of body-worn or handheld video recording devices by police infringes on my privacy; 2) When police use body-worn cameras it increases police accountability; 3) When police use body-worn or handheld video recording devices it increases OFFICER safety; 4) When police use body-worn or handheld video recording devices it increases CITIZEN safety; 5) Officer body-worn cameras will improve public trust in the police; 6) If I was stopped by an officer I would prefer they use a body-worn camera; and 7) Footage from officer worn cameras should be available to the public. All items were measured using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” All responses were coded so that higher scores reflect an overall greater support for officer worn cameras. Item 1 was reverse coded. Upon factor analysis, two separate concepts regarding officer worn cameras became clear: issues of safety and trust/accountability between the public and the police. Items 3 and 4 were summed ($\alpha = .628$) to create *Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras to Increase Safety*. As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 1.458). Items 2, 5 and 6 were summed ($\alpha = .706$) to create *Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras to Increase Accountability*. As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 2.149). Items 1 and 7 were dropped from analysis. Both scales were additive scales,

where higher scores indicate greater support for body-worn cameras. Both scales were standardized.

Willingness to Film the Police. *Willingness to Film the Police* is conceptualized as how likely a person felt they were to film the police in the future. *Willingness to Film the Police* is operationalized through an eight-item scale adapted from Farmer, Sun and Starks (2015) and where respondents were asked what was their likelihood of engaging in the following behavior: 1) you would use a personal device to make a recording in your next encounter with law enforcement; 2) you would record a stranger's interaction with police; 3) you would be willing to use a personal recording device such as a cell phone to record police–citizen encounters even if there is no police misconduct involved; 4) you would use a recording device to make a recording of a police–citizen encounter if you witness police misconduct; 5) you would use a personal device to make a recording if police are engaging use of force against a citizen; 6) you would use a personal device to record if police are engaging in verbally inappropriate behavior directed toward you; 7) you would use a personal device to record police if police are engaging in verbally inappropriate behavior directed toward a stranger; and 8) refuse to record any police–citizen encounters. All items were measured using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “Very Likely” to “Very Unlikely.” *Willingness to Film the Police* is an additive scale, where higher scores reflect a greater willingness to video record police officers. Item 8 was reverse coded. All responses related to Willingness to Record Police were summed ($\alpha = .885$). As a validity check, all items loaded on a single factor (Eigenvalue = 4.657). The scale was standardized.

Appendix B displays a full list of the factor loadings per item for all dependent variable scales.

3.4 Video Stimuli

Remotely Witnessing Police-Citizen Encounters

To test the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen encounters on respondents' perceptions, videos of actual police-citizen encounters were embedded in the survey and respondents were asked questions both before and after viewing the stimuli. Respondents were shown one of four randomly selected videos: Positive-Verbal Encounters, Use of Force Encounters, Negative-Verbal Encounters, or Police- No Citizen Encounters. For statistical analyses, each video is represented by a dummy variable where 1 = video watched, 0 = not watched.

To avoid influencing respondents and ensure that no one narrative was shown regarding the nature or content of police-citizen relationships (such as an African-American citizen being mistreated by a white officer), each video had four different situations, depicting different citizens and officers. Care was taken to ensure that scenes shown in the videos represent a variety of both racial and gender backgrounds. The decision to include clips rather than one encounter was made for several reasons. Most importantly, having one clip depicting a prolonged violent encounter between a police officer and citizen could be considered as psychological harm to respondents. Second, I was worried that the impact of watching a sustained violent encounter would drive the results too much and not be comparable to a sustained verbal encounter, thereby skewing results. Deciding that clips of violence were necessary meant that clips for the other videos were also necessary to make them as similar for comparison purposes as possible.

The addition of the clips offered the ability to show different racial and gender dynamics and work to counteract results being driven by any preconceived notions about police-citizen encounters (such as suspects who are always African-American males and police officers who are always white males).

The video clips were all found on Youtube.com using directed key word searches. Searches were done by combining key subject terms: “police” and “cop” with relevant content topic terms (and relevant variations) such as “brutality,” “beating,” “hit,” “kick,” “violence,” “use of force,” “physical abuse,” “best ever,” “nice,” “great,” “pulled over,” “amazing,” “yells,” “angry,” “tantrum,” “ballistic,” “abusive,” “abuse” and “aggressive.” Once a video is selected YouTube provides a suggested and related video list, which were also examined for potential use.

Four clips representing each of the categories of videos were edited together using Camista Video editing software (Techsmith, Okemos, Michigan). In total, each video is less than one minute in length, enabling the video to mimic a viral video that might be shared on social media. Viral videos tend to be short videos that are easily shared through social media or direct linked via email (Cheng, Dale, & Liu, 2007). While some videos selected included foul language or physical violence (the specific nature of each video will be discussed in the coming section), none showed extreme violence such as blood or severe or fatal injuries. This reduced potential psychological or emotional harm to the respondents. Each of the videos are described in-depth below.

Positive-Verbal Police-Citizen Encounters (Video 1)

The first video can be characterized as a series of positive verbal police interactions. The video consists of four short clips (see description above) of police

verbally interacting with citizens, in a professional and polite manner. The first clip is of a white female officer checking to make sure a stopped motorist is alright. The second clip is of an African-American male officer reminding protesters to stay behind a barricade, expressing concern for their safety and support for their right to protest. The third clip is of a white male officer explaining DMV rules regarding motorcycle modification to two male motorcyclists. These videos were selected because the author deemed that the officers displayed both high levels of professionalism and effective communication by the officers. The fourth clip is of a white male officer explaining to an upset crowd that he cannot tell them the reason behind an arrest out of respect for the individual's privacy. The total video length is 0:50 and can be viewed at the following link: www.youtube.com/v/DK5oCL7JP1c.

Police Use of Force Encounters (Video 2)

The second video is four short clips of police using force against individuals. The first clip is of a white male officer who kicks a handcuffed white female in the head after she tries to kick him in the leg, knocking her unconscious. The second clip is of a white male officer who pushes over a white male in a motorized wheelchair after he appears to run over the officer's foot. The third clip is of two white male officers attempting to subdue an African-American male while he is in the prone position on the ground. One officer kneels on the suspect's head and neck while the other pulls his hands behind his back. The fourth clip is of two male officers (one white and one African-American) stopping an African-American male at a bus stop. In the clip, the white officer blocks the citizen from leaving while the African-American officer repeatedly punches the individual in the face. These videos were selected because the author deemed that the

force used by the officers qualified as excessive, retaliatory, or “greater than what is needed to gain compliance” (IACP, 2001, p.1). The total video length is 0:33 and can be viewed at the following link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kP5FFZMgZS4>.

Negative Verbal Police-Citizen Encounters (Video 3)

The third video is of four short clips of police officers verbally interacting with a citizen in a negative manner. The first clip takes place in public during the day and shows a white male officer yelling at and threatening to assault an unseen individual because, as the officer states, he feels the individual did not show proper respect to the officer personally or his position as a law enforcement officer. The second clip is of a white male officer who is about to conduct a search of a white male individual’s vehicle, and while talking to the individual the officer uses foul language and calls the individual an “asshole.” The clip takes place at night in a deserted parking lot and is filmed by the citizen interacting with the officer. The third clip is captured by the on-car camera (dashboard camera) of a white male officer who verbally berates an unseen motorist who he had stopped. The motorist refuses to give the officer consent to search the vehicle, and the officer responds by yelling, swearing, and flashing a rude hand gesture at the motorist. The fourth clip is of an African-American male officer who confronts a teenage African-American male while he is walking on the street with a group of other teens. The officer approaches the teen and threatens to physically attack him for looking at the officer. The total video length is 0:51 and can be viewed at the following link: www.youtube.com/v/TzI32vct--s.

Control – No Police-Citizen Encounters (Video 4)

The fourth video has four short clips of police doing their day to day jobs and do not show police-citizen interactions. The first clip shows a white male officer typing on a computer at a work station located in the reception area of a police department. The second clip shows an African-American male officer walking on patrol near townhomes and small businesses in an unknown city. The third clip shows a white male officer walking on patrol around a business district in an unknown city. The fourth clip is of a white male officer packing his duty bag in preparation for a shift. None of the officers in any of the four clips are seen to be interacting with civilians at any time during the compilation. The total video length is 0:41 and can be viewed at the following link: www.youtube.com/v/D3NbMgHd2e4.

3.5 Validation of Video Stimuli

Prior to conducting this study, face and content validity of the stimuli was confirmed, using an expert panel of 111 current and former police officers to assess the content at categorization of each video. The validation study took a multi-stage approach to ensuring validity of stimuli. Stage one established base validity with directed close-ended questions regarding the content of the videos (e.g. “Are police interacting with citizens?” “Are police using physical force against citizens?”). In the second stage, respondents were asked to categorize each video as positive, negative or neutral as well as rate the officer’s behavior in each. Stage three included qualitative questions regarding the content and consistency of each video. Responses from all three stages of validation were found to be consistent with researcher categorizations of the videos. Majority agreement among the expert panel (current and former police officers) was used to

determine the face and content validity of each. The majority (85.6%) of the officers categorized video intervention 1, *Positive-Verbal Encounters Video* as “positive” with 14.4% indicating they felt the clips were “neutral.” Officers were in 100% agreement that Video 1 included police officers interacting with citizens and that there was no use of force depicted. Video Intervention 2, *Use of Force Encounters Video* was categorized as “negative” by 92.8% and as “neutral” by 7.2%. Officers were in 100% agreement that Video 2 included police officers interacting with citizens and that the clips showed physical force used against citizens by officers. The majority (93.7%) of the officers categorized video intervention 3, *Negative-Verbal Encounters Video* as “negative,” 5.4% categorized it as neutral and 0.9% (1 officer) categorized it as “positive.” Officers were in 100% agreement that Video 3 included police officers interacting with citizens and that there was no use of force depicted. The majority (69.4%) of the officers categorized the clips in video intervention 4, *Control- No Police-Citizen Encounters Video* as “neutral” and 30.6% categorized it as “positive.” Officers were in 100% agreement that Video 4 did not include any citizens interacting with police officers and there was no use of force depicted. Qualitative analysis of officers responses to questions asking them to explain what they had viewed also fell in line with the quantitative results, with each categorization receiving similar results.

3.6 Control variables

Demographics. In addition to the dependent and independent variables, multiple control variables were included for analysis to avoid possible spurious results. These include demographic characteristics as well as other individual level characteristics that are associated with perceptions of police.

Age. This variable is conceptualized as how old a person is at the time of taking part in the study and is operationalized as a continuous number representing the number of years a person has lived. Prior research on police perceptions has suggested that there is an inverse relationship between age and perceptions, with younger individuals holding less favorable views of police than their older counterparts (Schafer et al., 2003). While support for this assertion has been inconsistent age remains an important variable to account for when modeling perceptions of police (Schafer et al., 2003).

Race and Ethnicity. Race is measured as a respondent's self-identified race though two categories: Racial or ethnic minority =1 and White = 0. The racial or ethnic minority variable was populated if an individual identified themselves as one of the following: Asian, African-American, Hispanic, Native American/Native Alaskan, or Other. Racial and ethnic minorities are generally reported to have less positive interactions with police and tend to hold more negative views of law enforcement (Brunson, 2007; Decker, 1981; Huebner, Schafer, & Bynum, 2004; Tyler, 2005; Tuch, 2004; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005).

Gender. This variable is conceptualized as the phenotypical sex of the respondents. This variable is operationalized as a dummy variable where 1=Male and 0=Female. Prior research suggests that males and females differ in their views and assessments of police (Schafer et al., 2003).

Education level. This variable is conceptualized as whether or not the respondent had achieved a 4 year college degree where 1= yes and 2= no. This inclusion is valuable as a control as Hinds and Murphy (2007) found that education impacts citizen's

perceptions and decision making about police, with people who report less education viewing the police more favorably.

Socio-Economic Status. This variable is conceptualized as the respondent's yearly household income, with potential of 5 responses ranging from "less than \$15,000" to "more than \$60,000." Socio-economic status is an important variable to control for as individual interactions with police (and perceptions of those interactions) can vary based on neighborhood and class status, as individuals living in lower-class neighborhoods often come in to more contact with officers compared to wealthier counterparts (Weitzer, 1999).

Law Enforcement Employment and Exposure. Two dummy variables were included to capture whether or not the participant was 1) currently a member of a law enforcement agency or if they had worked for one in the past and 2) if they had family or close friends who are currently employed or retired from law enforcement (1= yes, 0=no). These variables were then collapsed together to capture if either they or someone close to them had ever been employed by a law enforcement agency (1= yes, 0 = no). This variable was included because researchers have found that those engaged in police work have been socialized to show solidarity and support for other officers (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998; Smith & Hawkins, 1973). According to Kappeler et al. (1998) this socialization occurs not only at the academy but throughout an officer's career. Therefore, it is important to control for both current and prior law enforcement employment experience when specifically asking individuals questions regarding issues of police. Not only is there the potential for officers to perceive situations differently than the public due to their training and socialization (Skolnick, 1966), but officers and their

relatives often adopt views that are generally supportive of police (Kirschman, 2006; Morin, Parker, Stepler, & Mercer, 2017).

Police Contact. Respondents were asked whether or not they had been arrested or detained by police in the last year (1 = yes, 0 = no) and if anyone close to them has had such an experience (1 = yes, 0 = no). Respondents were also asked: “have you ever been stopped by police for no reason (no crime or traffic infraction occurred)?” This was measured as a dummy variable where 1= yes and 0 = no. Additionally, in the follow-up survey, respondents were asked if in the last two weeks they: 1) had any contact with police officers for any reason; 2) been arrested; and 3) been stopped by police for no reason (no crime or traffic infraction occurred), and measured as dummy variables where 1 = yes and 2 = no. Prior contact with police, both personal experiences (direct) and vicarious experiences (indirect), have been shown to impact individual’s perceptions of police (Brown & Benedict, 2002; Brunson, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Additionally, not only is police contact in general important for shaping individuals’ attitudes towards police but the perceived reasoning and fairness behind the contact may be equally important (Epp et al., 2014).

Criminal Justice Media Exposure. Respondents were asked how often they followed police or criminal justice related stories on Internet websites. The single item was measured with responses including: “Never,” “Rarely,” “Sometimes” and “Often.” This is important to control for as media exposure has been found to be influence individuals’ perceptions of police (Dowler & Zawilski, 2007).

Police Accountability Websites. Respondents were asked if they “Ever visited copwatch.com or copblock.com?” and was measure as 1= yes 0=no. To address the time

between surveys, respondents in the follow-up survey were also asked to answer if they had visited such sites in the two weeks prior to taking the follow-up survey. This represents a potentially important inclusion as a control as these websites are devoted to distributing citizen-made video recordings of police, which may indicate prior low opinions of law enforcement.

Social Media Exposure. Respondents were asked how often they visit social media websites (such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter) in an average month. The single item was measured with responses that included: “Never,” “Once a week,” “A couple of times a week,” “At least once a day,” and “Several times a day.” Responses were then collapsed into a dummy variable where 1 = daily social media use and 0 = no daily social media use. Given the amount of people currently using social media and the prevalence of policing related stories being shared via social media (eg. Facebook, YouTube, etc.), the amount of regular exposure to social media represents an important variable to control for (Qualman, 2010; Simpson, 2016).

Filming the Police. Respondents were asked about their prior experiences recording police-citizen encounters with a single item “Have you ever filmed the police?” Respondents participating in the follow-up survey were also asked “In the last two weeks, have you filmed the police?” Both questions were measured as dummy variables where 1 = yes and 0 = no. Given that one of the outcome measures for this study is likelihood of filming the police in the future and support for filming, it is important to control for prior behavior.

Self-Control. Self-control is represented by a single question adapted from the Brief Self-Control Scale and used by Reisig and Holtfreter (2013) which addresses the

major dimensions of self-control of risk taking and impulsivity (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2014). The question was “I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun” and is measured using a 4-point Likert scale where responses ranged from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” with higher scores indicating lower self-control. Self-control is an important control to the study as individuals with low self-control are likely to be impulsive and rush to judgment, and could potentially skew the results of the experiment if not controlled for (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).

3.7 Sample Characteristics

The overall sample for this study is fairly evenly split between women (46%) and men (54%). The majority of the sample reported being white (85%) with racial and ethnic minorities making up only 15% of the sample. With respect to the individual racial and ethnic breakdown of the sample, 85% were White, 5% were African-American, 7% were Asian, 0.83% were Native American, and 1.5% reported being of another race. The majority sample reported being non-Hispanic (95%). The majority (59%) of respondents reported a household income between \$15,001 and \$60,000 a year and 30% reporting incomes greater than \$60,000. While the educational backgrounds of the respondents were varied, 48% reported having achieved at least a bachelor’s degree. Respondents ranged in age from 20 to 76 years old, though average was 37 (SD = 10.92). Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics

	Video 1 Positive- Verbal (n=152)	Video 2 Use of Force (n=151)	Video 3 Negative- Verbal (n=150)	Video 4 Police-No Citizens (n=147)	Total Sample (N=600)
Race					
African American	5.92% (9)	5.96% (9)	4.67% (7)	4.76% (7)	5.33% (32)
Asian	7.24% (11)	4.64% (7)	6.67% (10)	9.52% (14)	7.00% (42)
Native American	0.66% (1)	0.66% (1)	0.67% (1)	1.36% (2)	0.83% (5)
White	88.53% (130)	87.42% (132)	86% (129)	82.31% (121)	85.33% (512)
Other	0.66% (1)	1.32% (2)	2.00% (3)	2.04% (3)	1.50% (9)
Hispanic					
Yes	5.92% (9)	1.99% (3)	5.33% (8)	7.48% (11)	5.17% (31)
No	94.08% (143)	98.01% (148)	94.67% (142)	92.52% (136)	94.83% (569)
Sex					
Male	59.87% (91)	52.98% (80)	49.33% (74)	52.38% (77)	53.67% (322)
Female	40.13% (61)	47.02% (71)	50.67% (76)	47.62% (70)	46.33% (278)
Education					
College Grad	48.03% (73)	49.67% (75)	45.33% (68)	53.74% (79)	49.17% (295)
Not a College Grad	51.97% (79)	50.33% (76)	54.67% (82)	46.26% (68)	50.83% (305)
Household Income					
Less than \$15,000	10.53% (16)	9.93% (15)	12% (18)	10.2% (15)	10.67% (64)
\$15,001-\$30,000	20.39% (31)	22.52% (34)	27.33% (41)	21.09% (31)	22.83% (137)
\$30,001-\$50,000	25% (38)	27.15% (41)	24.67% (37)	27.89% (41)	26.17% (157)
\$50,001-\$60,000	13.16% (20)	7.95% (12)	9.33% (14)	10.2% (15)	10.17% (61)
More than \$60,000	30.92% (47)	32.45% (49)	26.67% (40)	30.61% (45)	30.17% (181)
Age					
Range	20-68	21-71	21-64	20-76	20-76
Mean	37.23 (10.79)	37.75 (11.60)	36.21 (10.65)	36.03 (10.62)	36.81 (10.92)

The majority (89%) of the sample reported that neither they nor any close friends or family worked for a law enforcement agency. A fifth (20.83%) of the sample reported having been arrested at some time in their lives, and 8% reported that a close friend or family member had been arrested in the last year. The majority (83%) of respondents reported that they had never had unnecessary police contact and only a small percentage (4%) of the sample reported having ever filmed the police. Most (67.33%) of the respondents reported that they used social media on the daily basis. While nearly 60% of the sample reported that they follow criminal justice related stories on the internet, only 7% reported visiting police accountability websites. Respondents scored an average of 2.17 (SD=.840) on the self-control scale. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.

Table 2. Control Variables

		Video 1 Positive- Verbal (n=152)	Video 2 Use of Force (n=151)	Video 3 Negative- Verbal (n=150)	Video 4 Police-No Citizens (n=147)	Total Sample (N=600)
LEO						
	Yes	9.21%	11.26%	12%	10.2%	10.67%
	No	90.79%	88.74%	88%	89.8%	89.33%
Ever Arrested						
	Yes	15.13%	22.52%	27.33%	18.37%	20.83%
	No	84.87%	77.48%	72.67%	81.63%	79.17%
Vicarious Arrest						
	Yes	10.53%	7.28%	8.67% 91.33%	4.08%	7.67%
	No	89.47%	92.72%		95.92%	92.33%
Stop w/o Cause						
	Yes	15.13%	21.19%	18.67%	11.56%	16.67%
	No	84.87%	78.81%	81.33%	88.44%	83.33%
Film the Police						
	Yes	3.29%	2.65%	5.33%	3.40%	3.67%
	No	96.71%	97.35%	94.67%	96.60%	96.33%
Social Media Use						
	Yes	66.45%	62.91%	70.67%	69.39%	67.33%
	No	33.55%	37.09%	29.33%	30.61%	32.67%
Police accountability websites						
	Yes	4.61%	7.28%	8.00%	8.16%	7.00%
	No	95.39%	92.72%	92.00%	91.84%	93.00%
CJ Stories						
	Yes	54.61%	60.93%	62.00%	60.54%	59.50%
	No	45.39%	30.07%	38.00%	39.46%	40.50%
Self-control						
	Range	1-4	1-4	1-4	1-4	1-4
	Mean	2.16 (.838)	2.18 (.865)	2.19 (.808)	2.15 (.855)	2.17 (.840)

3.8 Analytic Strategy

The analysis for research question 1 proceeds in two stages. First, multiple OLS regressions were conducted for each of the measures associated with perceptions of the police (Obligation to Obey the Law, Trust in Police, Police Legitimacy, Distributive Fairness, Procedural Justice, Cooperation with the Police, and Estimations of Police Misconduct). Each regression used the pre-test scores to predict the post-test scores, in addition to examining the effects of the video interventions on the post-test scores. The second stage replicates the first with the addition of demographic variables and control

variables. To address research question 1, a total of 16 regressions models will be conducted. The following equation generally summarized the models used in Stage 1 testing the first research question:

$$PostTest = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PreTest + \beta_2 TxGroup + e$$

Where β_0 is the intercept, β_1 represents the effect of the pre-test scores, β_2 represents the effect of the video categories on the outcome, and e represents the residual. Equation 2 generally summarizes the models used in Stage 2 of this analysis:

$$PostTest = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PreTest + \beta_2 TxGroup + \beta_3 \left(\sum Controls \right) + e$$

Where β_0 is the intercept, β_1 represents the effect of the pre-test scores, β_2 represents the effect of the video categories on the outcome, β_3 represents the sum of the control variables, and e represents the residual.

Research question 2 analysis proceeds in two stages. First, multiple OLS regressions were conducted for each of the measures associated with video recordings of and by the police (Support for Filming the Police and Support for Officer Worn Cameras). Each regression used the pre-test scores to predict the post-test scores, in addition to examining the effects of the video interventions on the post-test scores. The second stage replicates the first with the addition of demographic variables and control variables. To address research question 2, a total of 6 regressions will be analyzed. The following equation generally summarized the models used in Stage 1 testing the first research question:

$$PostTest = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PreTest + \beta_2 TxGroup + e$$

Where β_0 is the intercept, β_1 represents the effect of the pre-test scores, β_2 represents the effect of the video categories on the outcome, and e represents the residual. Equation 2 generally summarizes the models used in Stage 2 of this analysis:

$$PostTest = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PreTest + \beta_2 TxGroup + \beta_3 \left(\sum Controls \right) + e$$

Where β_0 is the intercept, β_1 represents the effect of the pre-test scores, β_2 represents the effect of the video categories on the outcome, β_3 represents the sum of the control variables, and e represents the residual.

To address research question 3, a total of 11 regressions were conducted (1 for each of the outcome variables of examined in the first two research questions). Each regression used the post-test scores (post-test at time 1) to predict the follow-up post-test scores (post-test at time 2), in addition to examining the effects of the video interventions as well as demographic variables and control variables on the follow-up post-test scores.

This equation generally summarizes the models used for this analysis:

$$Followup PostTest = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PostTest + \beta_2 TxGroup + \beta_3 \left(\sum Controls \right) + e$$

Where β_0 is the intercept, β_1 represents the effect of the post-test scores from time 1, β_2 represents the effect of the video categories on the outcome, β_3 represents the sum of the control variables, and e represents the residual.

CHAPTER 4

PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE

4.1 Introduction

Prior research has shown that public perceptions of police are affected by a great number of demographic and situational factors. As discussed in chapter 3, younger people, racial and ethnic minorities, and those with lower levels of education, all tend to perceive law enforcement more negatively than their counterparts (Brunson, 2007; Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Huebner et al., 2004; Schafer et al., 2003; Tyler, 2005; Tuch, 2004; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Additionally, individuals' perceptions of the police are also heavily influenced by the behavior of the police themselves (Mazerolle et al., 2013a, 2013b; Tyler 2006). Perceptions of the police hinge on a variety of factors including officer demeanor, use of force, and fair and respectful treatment of citizens (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Favorable perceptions of the police have been linked with voluntary compliance with both the law and the police as well as willingness to provide information to the police (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Further, in the process-based model of policing, perceptions of police legitimacy are directly linked to the behavior of officers and their treatment of citizens (Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2003).

As a means to increase positive perceptions of police, voluntary compliance, and cooperation with law enforcement, research on the process-based model of policing typically focuses on impact of *personal encounters* with police (Tyler, 2006; Mazerolle et al., 2013a, 2013b). Recently however, the impact of vicarious experiences have been incorporated into examinations of the process- based model (Brunson, 2007; Rosenbaum

et al., 2005). While citizen perceptions of the police have received a great deal of attention from researchers (see Donner et al., 2015; Mazerolle et al., 2013a; Reisig et al., 2007; Tyler, 2006; White et al., 2016), very little research has focused on the contributions of media and video technology – a form of vicarious experience – in shaping citizen perceptions of police, particularly, how viewing media encounters of police-citizen encounters can act as a type of vicarious experience shaping individuals’ perceptions of police. This oversight is problematic given the prevalence and popularity of videos of police-citizen encounters available on social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and Twitter. For instance, YouTube.com has 37,700,000 returns on a search for “police” and 1,940,000 returns for “police citizen” (as of 2/3/17). While many of these videos have gone largely unnoticed, several have gained national and in some cases even global attention (Vale, 2014). The large-scale effects of these videos are clear: officers have been charged with crimes due to video documentation and citizens have protested, even rioted (Calvert & Maher, 2015; Cole-Frowe & Fausset, 2015; Smith & Tangel, 2014). What remains unclear is: what are the individual level effects of vicariously witnessing police-citizen encounters on perceptions of police?

4.2 Current Study

In this chapter I will explore these issues by surveying respondents regarding their perceptions and beliefs of the police both before and after asking them to view a randomly selected video involving law enforcement officers. Drawing on theories of process-based policing, social cognition, and media effects I will address the following research questions:

- 1) What effect does viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters have on individuals' perceptions of police legitimacy, procedural justice, police misconduct and their willingness to cooperate with police?
- 2) If there are perceptual or willingness to cooperate effects, do those effects vary by content of the video shown?

4.3 Variables

As discussed in Chapter 3, all items discussed below were measured on 4-point Likert scales indicating whether respondents (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, or (4) strongly agree with each statement. Higher scores are indicative of more positive views of police. Factor analysis was conducted on each of the outcome variables promax rotation. All scales loaded on a single factor apart from police legitimacy which loaded on two (obligation to obey the law and trust in police).

Obligation to Obey is a four-item summed scale designed to gauge participants' belief that they should obeying commands and directives from law enforcement officers ($\alpha = .813$). Trust in Police is an eight-item scale designed to gauge respondents' belief that police can be trusted ($\alpha = .904$). The Police Legitimacy thirteen-item additive scale using the subscales of obligation to obey and trust in the police. The scale is designed to gauge individuals' perceptions that the police are a legitimate authority and by extension one that should be obeyed voluntarily. Predictably the scale loaded on two distinct factors ($\alpha = .920$, avg. inter-item $r = .597$). Distributive Fairness is a three-item summed scale measuring the degree to which individuals felt that police were consistent with their treatment of citizens ($\alpha = .894$). Procedural Justice is a six-item summed scale measuring

the degree to which individuals felt that the police acted professionally and fair ($\alpha = .947$). Cooperation with the Law is a nine-item summed scale measuring how willing an individual would be to voluntarily provide information to law enforcement ($\alpha = .922$). Estimations of Police Misconduct is a six-item summed scale measuring the amount of misconduct an individual estimated the police engaged in ($\alpha = .917$). Because they were discussed extensively in Ch. 3, I refrain from recounting the measurement of the control variables. However, for ease of reading, the control variables include: age, gender, race, education, income, personal and vicarious arrest history, law enforcement employment, being stopped by police without cause, daily social media use, visiting police accountability websites, following criminal justice stories, and self-control.

4.4 Analytic Strategy

To examine if the exposure to videos of police-citizen encounters influenced individual perceptions of law enforcement, and whether content of the video encounter influenced perceptions, the current study uses a randomized four-group pretest-posttest design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Shadish et al., 2002). Respondents were randomly assigned into one of the four intervention groups with the fourth video acting as the control or reference category: 1) Positive-Verbal Encounters; 2) Use of Force Encounters Video; 3) Negative-Verbal Encounters Video; 4) Police, No Citizen Encounters Video. All respondents were surveyed regarding their perceptions of law enforcement, asked to view a short video (See Chapter 3 for in-depth description of each video), and again then re-surveyed on each of the measures immediately following the viewing of the video intervention.

Analysis proceeds in two stages. First, multiple linear regressions were conducted for each of the measures associated with perceptions of the police (Obligation to Obey the Law, Trust in Police, Police Legitimacy, Distributive Fairness, Procedural Justice, Cooperation with the Police, and Estimations of Police Misconduct). Each regression used the pre-test scores to predict the post-test scores, in addition to examining the effects of the video interventions on the post-test scores. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were conducted on each of the stage one models. VIFs ranged from 1.00 to 1.53 with a mean VIF of 1.39, which indicate no issues of multicollinearity. The second stage replicates the first with the addition of demographic variables and control variables. Model diagnostics for stage two reveal VIF scores ranging from 1.03 to 1.57 with a mean VIF of 1.20, which indicate no issues of multicollinearity. All analyses were conducted using SPSS 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) and STATA 14 (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP).

4.5 Results

Table 3 displays the results for obligation to obey the law using two regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test obligation to obey the law scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the obligation to obey the law post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables. To begin with, Model 1 represented a good fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was 0.803, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 80.3% of the total variance in the post-test scores for obligation to obey the law. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-test obligation to obey the law scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .913$,

$p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .913 higher on their post-test score. None of the video interventions were statistically significant in predicting post-test scores in Model 1.

Model 2 displays the regression results for obligation to obey the law pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .811, showing that the variables explaining 81.1% of the variation in the post-test scores. While dropping slightly in effect size, the pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test legitimacy scores ($\beta = .883$, $p < .01$). Once again, none of the video interventions were statistically significant in predictors of post-test obligation scores. Additionally, only one control variable was significantly associated with predicting the post-test scores. Low self-control was also significantly associated with lower obligation to obey the law post-test scores ($\beta = -.053$, $p < .01$). There is a negative relationship between self-control and post-test obligation to obey: for every 1 unit decrease in self-control, there is a 0.053 standard deviation decrease in post-test obligation to obey the law scores.

Table 3. Obligation to Obey the Law

VARIABLES	Obligation to Obey Model 1		Obligation to Obey Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.913**	(0.019)	0.883**	(0.021)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.064	(0.042)	0.060	(0.042)
Use of Force Video	-0.000	(0.042)	-0.006	(0.042)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.037	(0.042)	-0.035	(0.042)
Age			0.000	(0.001)
Male			-0.047	(0.032)
Racial Minority			-0.047	(0.038)
Education			-0.049	(0.031)
Income			0.001	(0.011)
LEO in Family			-0.007	(0.049)
Arrest History			-0.018	(0.041)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.043	(0.057)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.011	(0.043)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.023	(0.081)
Daily Social Media Use			-0.016	(0.033)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.062	(0.063)
Follow Criminal Justice News			-0.061	(0.032)
Low Self-Control			-0.053**	(0.019)
Constant	-0.007	(0.030)	0.224*	(0.090)
R-squared	0.803		0.811	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4 displays the results for trust in the police using two regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test trust in the police scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of viewing the video interventions. Model 2 predicts trust in the police post-test scores using the pre-test scores and viewing the video interventions but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Overall, Model 1 represented a good fit for the data; with a Pearson's R^2 of 0.838, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 83.8% of the total variance in the post-test scores for trust in the police. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-test trust in the police scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .922$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .922 higher on their post-test score. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower trust in the police post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .131 standard deviations in their post-test trust in police scores ($\beta = -.131$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower trust in police post-test scores ($\beta = -.094$, $p < .05$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .094 standard deviations in their post-test trust in police scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for trust in the police pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .846, showing that the variables explaining 84.6% of the variation in the post-test scores. The pre-test scores for trust in the police were again the stronger predictor of post-test scores ($\beta = .901$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score, an individual was .901 higher on their post-test trust in the police scores.

Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower trust in the police post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .130 standard deviations in their post-test trust in police scores ($\beta = -.130$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower trust in police post-test scores ($\beta = -.089$, $p < .05$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .089 standard deviations in their post-test trust in police scores compared to those who saw the control video. Additionally, visiting police accountability websites was significantly associated with lower post-test trust in the police scores ($\beta = -.194$, $p < .01$). Respondents who indicated that they visited police accountability websites were .194 standard deviations lower in their post-test trust in the police scores than those who do not visit police accountability websites.

Table 4. Trust in the Police

VARIABLES	Trust in Police Model 1		Trust in Police Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.922**	(0.017)	0.901**	(0.019)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.028	(0.038)	0.014	(0.039)
Use of Force Video	-0.131**	(0.039)	-0.130**	(0.038)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.094*	(0.039)	-0.089*	(0.038)
Age			-0.000	(0.001)
Male			0.032	(0.029)
Racial Minority			-0.021	(0.035)
Education			-0.054	(0.028)
Income			0.004	(0.010)
LEO in Family			0.051	(0.044)
Arrest History			-0.026	(0.037)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.046	(0.052)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.070	(0.039)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.085	(0.074)
Daily Social Media Use			0.021	(0.030)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.194**	(0.057)
Follow Criminal Justice News			0.002	(0.029)
Low Self-Control			0.005	(0.017)
Constant	0.050	(0.027)	0.069	(0.081)
R-squared	0.838		0.846	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5 displays the results for police legitimacy using two regression models. As discussed in Chapter 3, the police legitimacy variable was created by summing the obligation to obey scores with the trust in the police scores. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test police legitimacy scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of viewing the video interventions. Model 2 predicts police legitimacy post-test scores using

the pre-test scores and viewing the video interventions but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented a good fit for the data; with a Pearson's R^2 of 0.867, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 86.7% of the total variance in the post-test scores for police legitimacy. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-test police legitimacy scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .936$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .936 higher on their post-test score. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower police legitimacy post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .077 standard deviations in their post-test police legitimacy scores ($\beta = -.077$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower police legitimacy post-test scores ($\beta = -.072$, $p < .05$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .072 standard deviations in their post-test police legitimacy scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for police legitimacy pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .872, showing that the variables explaining 87.2% of the variation in the post-test scores. While dropping slightly in effect size, the pre-test scores in Model 2 remained the strongest predictor of post-test legitimacy scores ($\beta = .911$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score,

an individual was .911 higher on their post-test police legitimacy scores. Viewing video intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower police legitimacy post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .079 standard deviations in their post-test police legitimacy scores ($\beta = -.079$, $p < .05$).

Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower police legitimacy post-test scores ($\beta = -.069$, $p < .05$).

Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .069 standard deviations in their post-test police legitimacy scores compared to those who saw the control video. Two control variables were also significantly associated with predicting the post-test police legitimacy scores. Education was significantly associated with lower police legitimacy post-test scores ($\beta = -.050$, $p < .05$). Individuals who reported having attained at least a four-year college degree had post-test police legitimacy scores that were .050 standard deviations lower than their counterparts who did not have a college degree. Visiting police accountability websites was significantly associated with lower post-test police legitimacy scores ($\beta = -.132$, $p < .01$). Respondents who indicated that they visited police accountability websites were .132 standard deviations lower in their post-test police legitimacy scores than those who do not visit police accountability websites.

Table 5. Police Legitimacy

VARIABLES	Legitimacy Model 1		Legitimacy Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.936**	(0.015)	0.911**	(0.017)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.042	(0.032)	0.033	(0.032)
Use of Force Video	-0.077*	(0.032)	-0.079*	(0.032)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.072*	(0.032)	-0.069*	(0.032)
Age			-0.000	(0.001)
Male			0.003	(0.024)
Racial Minority			-0.029	(0.029)
Education			-0.050*	(0.023)
Income			0.001	(0.009)
LEO in Family			0.025	(0.037)
Arrest History			-0.020	(0.031)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.043	(0.043)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.044	(0.032)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.055	(0.061)
Daily Social Media Use			0.006	(0.025)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.132**	(0.048)
Follow Criminal Justice News			-0.021	(0.024)
Low Self-Control			-0.016	(0.014)
Constant	0.027	(0.023)	0.134*	(0.068)
R-squared	0.867		0.872	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 6 displays the results for distributive fairness using two regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test distributive fairness scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the distributive fairness post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented a good fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was 0.803, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 80.3% of the total variance in the distributive fairness post-test scores. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-test of distributive fairness scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .909$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .909 higher on their post-test score. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower distributive fairness post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .088 standard deviations in their post-test distributive fairness scores ($\beta = -.088$, $p < .05$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower distributive fairness post-test scores ($\beta = -.159$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .094 standard deviations in their post-test distributive fairness scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for distributive fairness pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .810, showing that the variables explaining 81% of the variation in the distributive fairness post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test distributive fairness scores ($\beta = .880$, $p < .01$). where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .880 higher on their distributive fairness post-test score. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower

distributive fairness post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .088 standard deviations in their post-test distributive fairness scores ($\beta = -.078$, $p < .05$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower distributive fairness post-test scores ($\beta = -.144$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .094 standard deviations in their post-test distributive fairness scores compared to those who saw the control video. Of the control variables, the only statistically significant predictor of distributive fairness post-test scores at the .05 level was following criminal justice news stories ($\beta = -.069$, $p < .05$). Respondents who reported following criminal justice news stories had post-test distributive fairness scores that were .069 standard deviations lower than their counterparts.

Table 6. Distributive Fairness

VARIABLES	Distributive Fairness Model 1		Distributive Fairness Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.909**	(0.019)	0.880**	(0.020)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.042	(0.037)	0.034	(0.037)
Use of Force Video	-0.088*	(0.037)	-0.078*	(0.037)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.159**	(0.037)	-0.144**	(0.038)
Age			0.000	(0.001)
Male			0.034	(0.028)
Racial Minority			-0.004	(0.034)
Education			-0.051	(0.027)
Income			0.009	(0.010)
LEO in Family			0.026	(0.043)
Arrest History			-0.051	(0.036)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.000	(0.050)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.057	(0.038)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.111	(0.072)
Daily Social Media Use			0.048	(0.029)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.017	(0.055)
Follow Criminal Justice News			-0.069*	(0.028)
Low Self-Control			-0.028	(0.017)
Constant	0.051	(0.026)	0.115	(0.079)
R-squared	0.803		0.810	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 7 displays the results for procedural justice using two regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicating the post-test procedural justice scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test procedural justice scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the procedural justice post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented a good fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was .854, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 85.4% of the total variance in the post-test scores for procedural justice. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-procedural justice scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .938$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .938 higher on their post-test score.

All three video encounters had a statistically significant effect on the post-test procedural justice scores. Viewing video intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher procedural justice post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video had post-test procedural justice scores that were .091 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .091$, $p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower procedural justice post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .171 standard deviations in their post-test procedural justice scores ($\beta = -.171$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower procedural justice post-test scores ($\beta = -.215$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .215 standard deviations in their post-test procedural justice scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for procedural justice pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .860, showing that the variables

explaining 86% of the variation in the procedural justice post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test procedural justice scores ($\beta = .917, p < .01$). where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .917 higher on their procedural justice post-test score. All three video encounters were again statistically associated with predicting the post-test procedural justice scores. Viewing video intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher procedural justice post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video had post-test procedural justice scores that were .085 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .085, p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower procedural justice post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had a decrease of .167 standard deviations in their post-test procedural justice scores ($\beta = -.167, p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with lower procedural justice post-test scores ($\beta = -.207, p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had a decrease of .207 standard deviations in their post-test procedural justice scores compared to those who saw the control video. Three control variables were statistically associated with post-test procedural justice scores. Education was significantly associated with lower post-test procedural justice scores ($\beta = -.072, p < .05$). Individuals who reported having attained at least a four-year college degree had post-test procedural justice scores that were .072 standard deviations lower than their counterparts who did not have a college degree.

Being a law enforcement officer or having one in the family was significantly associated with higher post-test procedural justice scores ($\beta = .093$, $p < .05$); where individuals who were officers or had one in the family had procedural justice post-test scores that were .093 higher than those who did not. Additionally, having prior experience filming the police was significantly associated with lower procedural justice post-test scores ($\beta = -.202$, $p < .01$); individuals who reported filming the police in the past had procedural justice post-test scores that were .202 standard deviations lower than their counterparts.

Table 7. Procedural Justice

VARIABLES	Procedural Justice Model 1		Procedural Justice Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.938**	(0.016)	0.917**	(0.018)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.091*	(0.040)	0.085*	(0.041)
Use of Force Video	-0.171**	(0.040)	-0.167**	(0.041)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.215**	(0.041)	-0.207**	(0.041)
Age			-0.000	(0.001)
Male			0.044	(0.031)
Racial Minority			0.032	(0.037)
Education			-0.072*	(0.030)
Income			0.007	(0.011)
LEO in Family			0.093*	(0.047)
Arrest History			0.008	(0.039)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.065	(0.054)
Stop w/o Cause			-0.045	(0.041)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.202**	(0.078)
Daily Social Media Use			0.041	(0.032)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.118	(0.060)
Follow Criminal Justice News			-0.032	(0.031)
Low Self-Control			-0.002	(0.018)
Constant	0.074*	(0.029)	0.070	(0.086)
R-squared	0.854		0.860	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 8 displays the results for cooperation with the police using two separate regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test cooperation scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor as well as considers the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the cooperation post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Overall, Model 1 represented a good fit for the data; with a Pearson's R^2 of 0.864, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 86.4% of the total variance in the post-test scores for cooperation with the police. In Model 1, the strongest and only statistically significant predictor of post-test cooperation scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .970, p < .01$) where for every one standard deviation increase in the respondent's pre-test score, their post-test cooperation score was .970 standard deviations higher. None of the video interventions were statistically significant in predicting post-test scores for cooperation. However, Video Intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video approached significance ($p .078$).

Model 2 displays the regression results for cooperation with police pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .866, showing that the variables explaining 86.6% of the variation in the cooperation post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test cooperation scores ($\beta = .970, p < .01$). where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .970 higher on their cooperation post-test score. Once again, none of the video

interventions were significant, and none of the control variables were statistically significant predictors of cooperation post-test scores at the .05 level.

Table 8. Cooperation with the Police

VARIABLES	Cooperation Model 1		Cooperation Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.970**	(0.016)	0.970**	(0.018)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.062	(0.035)	0.055	(0.036)
Use of Force Video	-0.049	(0.035)	-0.048	(0.036)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.039	(0.035)	-0.040	(0.036)
Age			0.002	(0.001)
Male			-0.005	(0.027)
Racial Minority			0.033	(0.033)
Education			-0.031	(0.026)
Income			0.000	(0.010)
LEO in Family			-0.003	(0.041)
Arrest History			-0.011	(0.034)
Vicarious Arrest			-0.018	(0.048)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.008	(0.036)
Ever Filmed Police			0.024	(0.069)
Daily Social Media Use			0.024	(0.028)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.101	(0.052)
Follow Criminal Justice News			-0.010	(0.027)
Low Self-Control			0.017	(0.016)
Constant	0.006	(0.025)	-0.097	(0.076)
R-squared	0.864		0.866	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 9 displays the results for estimations of police misconduct (hereafter referred to as misconduct) using two separate regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test misconduct scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor as well as considers the

effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the misconduct post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented a good fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was .872, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 87.2% of the total variance in the post-test misconduct scores. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-test misconduct scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .953$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .953 higher on their post-test score.

All three video encounters had a statistically significant effect on the post-test misconduct scores. Viewing video intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with misconduct post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video had post-test scores that were .089 standard deviations lower ($\beta = -.089$, $p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher misconduct post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had an increase of .090 standard deviations in their post-test misconduct scores ($\beta = .090$, $p < .05$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with higher misconduct post-test scores ($\beta = .103$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had an increase of .103 standard deviations in their post-test procedural justice scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for estimations of police misconduct pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .878, showing that the variables explaining 87.8% of the variation in the misconduct post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test misconduct scores ($\beta = .931$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .931 higher on their misconduct post-test score.

In the full model, all three video encounters continued to have a statistically significant effect on the post-test misconduct scores. Viewing video intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower misconduct post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video had post-test misconduct scores that were .086 standard deviations lower ($\beta = -.086$, $p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher misconduct post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had an increase of .096 standard deviations in their post-test misconduct scores ($\beta = .130$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with higher misconduct post-test scores ($\beta = .103$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had an increase of .103 standard deviations in their post-test misconduct scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Additionally, two control variables were statistically associated with post-test misconduct scores: education and low self-control. Education was significantly

associated with higher misconduct scores ($\beta = .065$, $p < .05$). Individuals who reported having attained at least a four-year college degree had post-test misconduct scores that were .065 standard deviations higher than their counterparts who did not have a college degree. Low self-control was also significantly associated with higher post-test estimations of police misconduct scores ($\beta = .045$, $p < .01$). There is a positive relationship between self-control and post-test misconduct scores: for every 1 unit decrease in self-control, there is a 0.045 standard deviation increase in post-test misconduct scores.

Table 9. Estimations of Police Misconduct

VARIABLES	Misconduct Model 1		Misconduct Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.953**	(0.015)	0.931**	(0.017)
Positive-Verbal Video	-0.089*	(0.036)	-0.086*	(0.036)
Use of Force Video	0.090*	(0.036)	0.096**	(0.036)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.103**	(0.036)	0.103**	(0.036)
Age			-0.001	(0.001)
Male			-0.022	(0.027)
Racial Minority			0.063	(0.033)
Education			0.065*	(0.026)
Income			-0.010	(0.010)
LEO in Family			0.016	(0.041)
Arrest History			-0.041	(0.034)
Vicarious Arrest			0.089	(0.048)
Stopped w/o Cause			0.006	(0.036)
Ever Filmed Police			0.042	(0.069)
Daily Social Media Use			-0.036	(0.028)
Police Accountability Websites			0.073	(0.053)
Follow Criminal Justice News			0.044	(0.027)
Low Self-Control			0.045**	(0.016)
Constant	-0.026	(0.026)	-0.115	(0.076)
R-squared	0.872		0.878	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

4.6 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the effects of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters on respondents' perceptions of police. This was accomplished with a survey experiment where individuals were questioned on their views and opinions of police both before and after being shown a randomly selected video of police-citizen encounters. Linear regressions were conducted predicting the post-test scores using the pre-test scores, video interventions, and control variables.

Consistently, the pre-test scores were always the best and strongest predictors of the post-test scores for every outcome examined. Viewing the video encounters of police-citizen interactions appears to influence on perceptions of the police. With the exception of an individual's obligation to obey the law and their willingness to cooperate, each perceptual outcome was influenced to some extent by one or more of the videos. Viewing video intervention 1, the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher perceptions of procedural justice and lower estimations of police misconduct compared to those who saw the control video.

The two less desirable police-citizen encounter videos (Video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video and video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video) were both significantly associated with lower post-test scores for trust in the police, police legitimacy, procedural justice, and higher estimations of police misconduct. These relationships held in both Model 1 and Model 2 with the introduction of control variables. Additionally, viewing video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with lower post-test distributive fairness scores in both models.

Of the control variables included in the model, visiting police accountability websites was associated with lower post-test scores for both trust in the police and police legitimacy, while following criminal justice news stories in general was associated with lower post-test distributive fairness scores. Having a four-year college degree was associated with lower post-test procedural justice scores and higher estimations of police misconduct, compared to individuals who did not have a four-year college degree. Additionally, individuals who reported they were a law enforcement officer or had one in

their family had higher post-test procedural justice scores than those who did not. Individuals who reported prior experience filming the police had lower post post-test procedural justice scores compared to those who had not ever filmed the police. Finally, low self-control was associated with lower obligation to obey the law post-test scores, and higher estimations of police misconduct. None of the control variables were associated with the post-test scores for cooperation.

From the results presented here it is clear that viewing video encounters of police officers and citizens interacting has an effect on perceptions of the police. However, there are individual level characteristics that also influence decisions and attitudes about the police and the interpretations of the videos. As far as the videos are concerned, the results presented in this chapter demonstrates that viewing positive videos of police-citizen interactions (such as those where police are seen treating citizens in a procedurally just manner) may lead to higher perceptions of procedural and lower estimations of police misconduct. Whereas viewing negative videos of police-citizen interactions (such as police using force against citizens and behaving unprofessionally towards citizens) lowers overall perceptions of police and increases estimations of police misconduct. Citizen's lowered trust and perceptions of police legitimacy may in turn eventually develop into unfavorable behaviors when dealing with police such as non-compliance with police directives and disregard for laws (Tyler, 2006; Mazerolle et al., 2013a, 2013b). An in-depth discussion of the implications of the results is presented in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 5

PERCEPTIONS OF FILMING AND BODY-WORN CAMERAS

5.1 Introduction

One of the biggest pushes for videos as a tool for police accountability came after a police-citizen incident in Ferguson, MO that occurred on August 9th, 2014, where neither citizens nor police officers filmed the incident (some videos do exist of the incident were shot from a distance). The incident involved Michael Brown, an unarmed 18-year old African-American man who was shot and killed by Darren Wilson, a white Ferguson police officer (Pearce, 2014). Brown's death was followed by weeks of protests and rioting (both locally and nationally) largely fueled by existing community tensions and community anger at police handling of the incident (Craven, Stewart, & Reilly, 2015; Sanchez & Lawler, 2015).

Unfortunately, the incident above was not a singular event, though its circumstances were unique: there was no video of the event. Similar events though had been thoroughly documented by the public. Due to citizens' filming of police-citizen encounters, the Internet, and social media, the nation watched Eric Garner asphyxiate during the course of his arrest (Smith & Tangel, 2014), Walter Scott get shot eight times as he attempted to flee from an officer (Swaine, 2015) and Oscar Grant be shot in the back by an officer as he lay prone on the ground (MacAskill, 2010). These events, filmed by observers, while initially posted online, were soon picked up by the news media and shown nationally. The videos and their associated events have resulted in debates regarding police-race relations, as well as widespread protesting and rioting. Because of these highly publicized videos and coupled with calls for accountability, police officers

have been fired or resigned and some have been criminally charged for their actions (Baker, 2015; Laughland & Swaine, 2015; Miller et al., 2015; Southall, 2015). As part of the response to the outrage over these events, police departments quickly began adopting body-worn cameras (BWCs) (Jennings et al., 2014; Peter & Weiner, 2014; White, 2014). By December 2014, President Obama committed \$75 million to help police departments purchase 50,000 body-worn cameras (Hermann & Weiner, 2014).

While BWCs seem to be an answer to police accountability and hopefully result a reduction in the horrific events described above, there is little research regarding citizen filming of police-citizen encounters. Most research in the area of filming police-citizen encounters focus on BWCs, and their associated issues such as implementation (Drover & Ariel, 2015; Sousa, Coldren, Rodriguez, & Braga, 2016), officer perceptions (Gaub et al., 2016; Jennings et al., 2014), and encounter outcomes (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Brown, 2015; Keoun, 2000; White, 2014). When citizens are considered in the same breath as BWCs, it is often related to behavioral outcomes such as lessening complaints or use of force incidents (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Barak, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015; Ready & Young, 2015). Only recently have researchers begun to turn their attention to citizens' support for BWCs (Crow, Snyder, Crichlow, & Smykla, 2017; White, Todak, Gaub, 2017), and to-date none have examined how exposure to video recordings of police citizen encounters may influence citizen support for officer worn cameras. Similarly absent from the literature are in-depth discussions regarding citizens' support for and willingness to film the police (for an exception, see Farmer, Sun, & Starks, 2015), and again, none to date examine the influence of vicarious exposure to

police-citizen encounters via video recordings on individuals' willingness to film future police encounters.

5.2 Current Study

I examine these issues by surveying respondents' regarding their support for video surveillance of and by the police both before and after asking them to view a randomly selected video intervention. In this chapter I address the following questions:

- 1) What effect does viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters have on individuals' support for officer body-worn cameras and willingness to film the police compared to those who only view videos of police behavior that does not involve others?
- 2) If there are effects, do those effects vary by content of the video shown?

5.3 Variables

As discussed in Chapter 3, all items were measured on 4-point Likert scales. Willingness to Film responses included: (1) very unlikely, (2) unlikely, (3) likely and (4) very likely. Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras included the following responses: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) agree, or (4) strongly agree. Higher scores are indicative of more positive views towards video surveillance of and by police. Factor analysis was conducted on each of the outcome variables promax rotation. Willingness to Film loaded on a single factor, while Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras loaded on two factors: accountability and safety.

Willingness to Film is an eight-item summed scale designed to gauge respondents' willingness to film the police in the future ($\alpha = .813$). *Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras to Increase Safety* (hereafter referred to as BWC - Safety) is a two-

item summed scale designed to gauge respondents' belief that the use of officer body-worn cameras by police will increase safety for police and citizens ($\alpha = .628$). *Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras to Increase Accountability* (hereafter referred to as BWC - Accountability) is a three-item summed scale which assesses respondents' belief that the use of BWCs by police will increase public trust in police and ensure police accountability ($\alpha = .706$). For an in-depth discussion of each variable and the questions used in creating the scales, please see Chapter 3.

Because they were discussed extensively in Ch. 3, I refrain from recounting the measurement of the control variables. However, for ease of reading, the control variables include: age, gender, race, education, income, personal and vicarious arrest history, law enforcement employment, being stopped by police without cause, daily social media use, visiting police accountability websites, following criminal justice stories, and self-control.

5.4 Analytic Strategy

To examine if the exposure to videos of police-citizen encounters influenced individuals' support for video surveillance of and by the police, and whether content of the encounter influenced that support, the current study uses a randomized four-group pretest-posttest design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Shadish et al., 2002). Respondents were randomly assigned into one of the four intervention groups with the fourth video acting as the control or reference category: 1) Positive-Verbal Encounters; 2) Use of Force Encounters Video; 3) Negative-Verbal Encounters Video; 4) Police, No Citizen Encounters Video. All respondents were surveyed regarding their support for video surveillance of and by the police, asked to view a short video (See Chapter 3 for in-depth

description of each video), and again then re-surveyed on each of the measures immediately following the viewing of the video intervention. Analysis proceeds in two stages. First, multiple OLS regressions were conducted for each of the video surveillance measures (Willingness to Film the Police and Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras). Each regression used the pre-test scores to predict the post-test scores, in addition to examining the effects of the video interventions on the post-test scores. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were conducted on each of the stage one models. VIFs ranged from 1.00 to 1.52 with a mean VIF of 1.39, which indicate no issues of multicollinearity. The second stage replicates the first with the addition of demographic variables and control variables. Model diagnostics for stage two reveal VIF scores ranging from 1.03 to 1.56 with a mean VIF of 1.19, which indicate no issues of multicollinearity. All analyses were conducted using SPSS 22 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) and STATA 14 (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP).

5.5 Results

Table 10 displays the results for willingness to film the police using two regression models. Models 1 and 2 display the regression results predicting the post-test willingness to film scores. Model 1 predicts the post-test scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts the willingness to film post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented a good fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was 0.835, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 83.5% of the total variance in the post-test scores for willingness to film the police. In Model 1, the strongest predictor of post-

test willingness to film scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .942, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .942 higher on their post-test score. Two video interventions were significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had an increase of .099 standard deviations in their willingness to film scores ($\beta = .099, p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, or the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores ($\beta = .167, p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had an increase of .167 standard deviations in their post-test willingness to film scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for willingness to film the police pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also a good fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was 0.837, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 83.7% of the total variance in the post-test scores for willingness to film the police. In Model 2, the strongest predictor of post-test willingness to film scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .932, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .932 higher on their post-test score. The two video interventions remained significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores. Viewing video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores compared to those who saw the control video. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video

had an increase of .100 standard deviations in their willingness to film scores ($\beta = .100$, $p < .01$). Viewing video intervention 3, or the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with higher willingness to film post-test scores ($\beta = .168$, $p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had an increase of .168 standard deviations in their post-test willingness to film scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Table 10. Willingness to Film the Police

VARIABLES	Support for Filming Model 1		Support for Filming Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.942**	(0.017)	0.932**	(0.019)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.036	(0.037)	0.034	(0.037)
Use of Force Video	0.099**	(0.037)	0.100**	(0.037)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.167**	(0.037)	0.168**	(0.037)
Age			-0.001	(0.001)
Male			0.027	(0.028)
Racial Minority			-0.014	(0.034)
Education			-0.010	(0.027)
Income			0.005	(0.010)
LEO in Family			0.030	(0.043)
Arrest History			-0.033	(0.036)
Vicarious Arrest			0.048	(0.050)
Stopped w/o Cause			-0.008	(0.037)
Ever Filmed Police			-0.016	(0.072)
Daily Social Media Use			0.002	(0.029)
Police Accountability Websites			0.086	(0.055)
Follow Criminal Justice News			0.020	(0.028)
Low Self-Control			0.004	(0.016)
Constant	-0.076**	(0.026)	-0.100	(0.079)
R-squared	0.835		0.837	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 11 displays the results for support for officer body-worn cameras to increase accountability (BWC – Accountability) using two regression models. Model 1 displays the regression results predicting the post-test BWC – Accountability scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts BWC – Accountability post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented an acceptable fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was .687, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 68.7% of the total variance in the post-test BWC – Accountability scores. In Model 1, the stronger predictor of the post-test BWC – Accountability scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .879, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .879 higher on their post-test score. Additionally, two videos were statistically associated with higher post-test BWC – Accountability scores: the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video and Negative-Verbal Encounters Video. Viewing video intervention 1, Positive-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher BWC – Accountability post-test scores. Respondents who viewed the Positive-Verbal Encounters Video had post-test BWC – Accountability scores that were .111 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .111, p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Viewing video intervention 3, or the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video, was also significantly associated with higher BWC – Accountability post-test scores ($\beta = .127, p < .01$). Respondents who viewed the third video intervention had an increase of .127 standard deviations in their post-test BWC – Accountability scores compared to those who saw the control video.

Model 2 displays the regression results for BWC – Accountability pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also an acceptable fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .696, showing that the variables explaining 69.6% of the variation in the BWC – Accountability post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test BWC – Accountability scores ($\beta = .879, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .879 higher on their BWC – Accountability post-test scores. The two video interventions were no longer significant in the full model, however one control variable was statistically associated with higher BWC – Accountability post-test scores. Respondents who reported having been stopped by police without cause (no crime or traffic infraction occurring) had BWC – Accountability post-test scores that were .148 standard deviations higher than their counterparts ($\beta = .148, p < .01$).

Table 11. Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras – Accountability

VARIABLES	BWC - Accountability Model 1		BWC - Accountability Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.879**	(0.024)	0.876**	(0.025)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.111*	(0.055)	0.103	(0.056)
Use of Force Video	0.087	(0.055)	0.063	(0.056)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.127*	(0.056)	0.102	(0.056)
Age			-0.001	(0.002)
Male			-0.064	(0.042)
Racial Minority			-0.020	(0.051)
Education			-0.070	(0.041)
Income			0.001	(0.015)
LEO in Family			-0.037	(0.065)
Arrest History			0.024	(0.054)
Vicarious Arrest			0.059	(0.075)
Stopped w/o Cause			0.148**	(0.056)
Ever Filmed Police			0.053	(0.107)
Daily Social Media Use			-0.054	(0.044)
Police Accountability Websites			-0.007	(0.082)
Follow Criminal Justice News			0.044	(0.043)
Low Self-Control			0.007	(0.025)
Constant	-0.082*	(0.040)	-0.009	(0.118)
R-squared	0.687		0.696	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 12 displays the results for post-test support for officer body-worn cameras to increase safety (BWC – Safety) using two regression models. Model 1 displays the regression results predicting the post-test BWC – Safety scores using the pre-test scores as the main predictor and includes the effects of the video interventions. Model 2 predicts BWC – Safety post-test scores using the pre-test scores and video interventions, but also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

Model 1 represented an acceptable fit for the data overall; the Pearson's R^2 was .697, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 69.7% of the total variance in the post-test BWC – Safety scores. In Model 1, the stronger predictor of the post-test BWC – Safety scores was an individual's pre-test scores ($\beta = .877, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .877 higher on their post-test score. None of the video interventions were statistically associated with post-test BWC – Safety scores.

Model 2 displays the regression results for BWC – Safety pre- and post-test scores, video interventions and includes both demographic and control variables. Model 2 is also an acceptable fit for the data. The Pearson's R^2 was .707, showing that the variables explaining 70.7% of the variation in the BWC – Safety post-test scores. The pre-test scores in Model 2 were again the strongest predictor of post-test BWC – Safety scores ($\beta = .869, p < .01$). where for every point higher in their pre-test score an individual was .869 higher on their BWC – Safety post-test scores. None of the video interventions were statistically associated with post-test BWC – Safety post-test scores, however one control variable was statistically associated with higher post-test scores. Respondents who reported having a close friend or relative who was arrested in the last year had BWC – Safety post-test scores that were .199 standard deviations higher than their counterparts ($\beta = .199, p < .01$).

Table 12. Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras - Safety

VARIABLES	BWC - Safety Model 1		BWC - Safety Model 2	
	B	SE	B	SE
Pre-Test Scores	0.877**	(0.024)	0.869**	(0.024)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.033	(0.057)	0.023	(0.058)
Use of Force Video	-0.045	(0.058)	-0.059	(0.058)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.050	(0.058)	-0.074	(0.058)
Age			-0.001	(0.002)
Male			-0.074	(0.044)
Racial Minority			-0.059	(0.053)
Education			-0.065	(0.042)
Income			0.008	(0.016)
LEO in Family			-0.068	(0.067)
Arrest History			0.010	(0.056)
Vicarious Arrest			0.199*	(0.078)
Stopped w/o Cause			0.028	(0.058)
Ever Filmed Police			0.108	(0.111)
Daily Social Media Use			0.035	(0.045)
Police Accountability Websites			0.028	(0.085)
Follow Criminal Justice News			0.049	(0.044)
Low Self-Control			0.008	(0.025)
Constant	0.016	(0.041)	0.019	(0.123)
R-squared	0.697		0.707	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

5.6 Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the effects of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters on respondents' support for surveillance of and by the police. This was accomplished with a survey experiment where individuals were questioned on their views and opinions regarding their support for officer body-worn cameras and their own willingness to film the police both before and after being shown a randomly selected video of police-citizen encounters. Support for officer body-worn cameras fell into two

categories: accountability and safety. Linear regressions were conducted predicting the post-test scores using the pre-test scores, video interventions, and control variables.

Consistently the pre-test scores were the best and strongest predictors of the post-test scores for every outcome examined. However, viewing the video encounters of police-citizen interactions appear to exert some influence on individuals' willingness to film the police as measured by their post-test scores.

The two less desirable police-citizen encounter videos (Video Intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video and video intervention 3, the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video) were both significantly associated with increased willingness to film the police in the future. These relationships held in both Model 1 and Model 2 with the introduction of control variables. While the viewing the videos appears to influence individuals' post-test scores for willingness to film the police, they did not exert much of an influence on support for BWCs in the full models. Both of the verbal encounters videos (Video 1 and Video 3) were significantly associated with higher support for BWC – Accountability, however the association was not stable and lost significance at the .05 level once control variables were also considered. None of the videos were statistically associated with the post-test scores for BWC – Safety.

Of the control variables included in the models, being stopped by police without cause (no crime or traffic infraction occurring) was associated with higher support for BWC – Accountability, while experiencing a close friend or relative arrested in the past year was associated with higher support for BWC – Safety.

Taken together, results presented here has shown that viewing video encounters of police and citizens interacting has a mixed effect on individuals' support for video surveillance

of and by the police. In particular, viewing negative police-citizen interactions (verbal and use of force) is associated with increased willingness to film the police. Support for BWCs however, was not influenced by the videos once other factors were considered. An in-depth discussion of the implications of these results is presented in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 6

DURABILITY OF VIEWING POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

6.1 Introduction

Perceptions of the police are not static: they evolve and change over time, with each new experience adding to a person's cumulative understanding of police (Tyler, Fagan, & Geller, 2014). Given the results of the previous chapters, it is possible that the fluid nature of perceptions of the police can be influenced by vicarious experiences with the police, like viewing videos online of police-citizen encounters. Researchers have found that individuals form their opinions and attitudes of police before having ever personally interacted with them (Braga et al., 2014; Hawdon, 2008), as attitudes are formed from vicarious experiences (Brunson, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Just as other vicarious experiences (such as stories from friends and family) with police coalesce to shape individuals' perceptions of police (Brown & Benedict, 2002; Browning et al., 1994; Brunson, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2005), another potential avenue for vicarious experiences of police lies in the videos produced by citizen journalists in the pursuit of sousveillance.

The results of the experiment discussed in chapters 4 and 5 offer insight into the power of media and citizen journalism for shaping perceptions of police. However, further investigation into the longevity of the effects is warranted. Longitudinal examination is required to gauge if vicarious experiences with police garnered through watching a single viewing of a video recording of police-citizen encounters can exert a lasting effect on perceptions. In other words, can videos of police-citizen encounters act

as agents of change or are changes simply the result of momentary emotional priming (Kappler, 1960; Perse & Lambe, 2016)?

6.2 Current Study

I will address these issues by questioning respondents a third time about their perceptions and beliefs regarding the police and support for video surveillance two weeks following the initial survey. In this chapter I will address the following research questions:

- 1) Are the effects of viewing video recordings of police-citizen interactions lasting or do they decay over time?
- 2) If the effects of viewing recordings of police-citizen encounters are lasting, does the content of the video have an effect?

6.3 Variables

As discussed in Chapter 3, all outcome variables were measured on 4-point Likert scales, where higher scores were indicative of more positive views of police or higher support for BWCs and filming the police. The scales constructed for the follow-up survey matched the initial survey. All variables from chapters 4 and 5 were included as outcomes for examination in this chapter.

The variables from chapter four include all variables related to perceptions of the police, which include: Obligation to Obey the Law, Trust in Police, Police Legitimacy, Distributive Fairness, Procedural Justice, Cooperation with the Law, and Estimations of Police Misconduct. Variables from chapter five include: Willingness to Film the Police and Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras to Increase Accountability (BWC – Accountability) and Safety (BWC – Safety). Control variables included all those used in

the initial survey: age, gender, race, education, income, personal and vicarious arrest history, law enforcement employment, being stopped by police without cause, daily social media use, visiting police accountability websites, following criminal justice stories, and self-control. Respondents in the follow-up sample were asked five additional questions to address the time between surveys. In addition to the initial survey control variables, respondents in the follow-up sample were also asked if they had in the last two weeks: 1) had any contact with the police; 2) been arrested; 3) been stopped by police without cause (no crime or traffic infraction); 4) filmed the police interacting with citizens; and 5) visited police accountability websites. All additional questions were dummy variables where 1 = yes and 0 = no. For an in-depth discussion of each variable and the questions used in creating the scales, please see Chapter 3.

6.4 Follow-up Sample Characteristics

As discussed in Chapter 3, the follow-up survey had a total of 458 respondents. The follow-up sample characteristics remained very similar to the initial survey sample. The sample remained fairly evenly split between women (46%) and men (54%). The racial and ethnic breakdown of the sample remained the same as the initial survey sample: 85% were White, 5% were African-American, 7% were Asian, .66% were Native American, and 1.75% reported being of another race. The majority of the follow-up sample reported being non-Hispanic (95%). There was a downward shift in reported income of the respondents who participated in the follow-up survey with the majority (56.7%) of respondents reporting a household income between \$15,001 and \$60,000 a year (down from 59% in the initial survey), 31.66% reporting incomes greater than \$60,000 and 11.57% reported income of less than \$15,000. The educational background

of the follow-up respondents also saw a slight shift from the initial survey respondents with 52% reporting having achieved at least a bachelor's degree (up from 48% in the initial survey). Both the average age and age range of respondents for the follow-up survey matched the initial survey respondents with where respondents age ranged 21 to 76 years old, with an average of 37 years old (SD = 10.72). Summary statistics are provided in Table 13.

Table 13. Follow up Demographic Characteristics

	Follow-up Video 1 Positive- Verbal (n=121)	Follow-up Video 2 Use of Force (n=116)	Follow-up Video 3 Negative- Verbal (n=107)	Follow-up Video 4 Police-No Citizens (n=114)	Follow-up Total Sample (N=458)	Initial Sample (N=600)
Race						
African American	5.79%	5.17%	5.61%	4.39%	5.24%	5.33%
Asian	9.09%	3.45%	5.61%	9.65%	6.99%	7.00%
Native American	0.83%	0.00%	0.00%	1.75%	0.66%	0.83%
White	83.47%	89.66%	86.92%	81.58%	85.37%	85.33%
Other	0.83%	1.72%	1.87%	2.63%	1.75%	1.50%
Hispanic						
Yes	5.79%	1.72%	4.67%	7.02%	4.80%	5.17%
No	94.21%	98.28%	95.33%	92.98%	95.20%	94.83%
Sex						
Male	61.98%	49.14%	53.27%	50.00%	53.71%	53.67%
Female	38.02%	50.86%	46.73%	50.00%	46.29%	46.33%
Education						
College Degree	51.24%	53.45%	45.79%	57.02%	51.97%	49.17%
No College Degree	48.76%	46.55%	54.21%	42.98%	48.03%	50.83%
Household Income						
Less than \$15,000	10.74%	11.21%	14.02%	10.53%	11.57%	10.67%
\$15,001-\$30,000	20.66%	23.28%	24.30%	20.18%	22.05%	22.83%
\$30,001-\$50,000	24.79%	22.41%	24.30%	29.82%	25.33%	26.17%
\$50,001-\$60,000	13.22%	7.76%	7.48%	8.77%	9.39%	10.17%
\$60,000+	30.58%	35.34%	29.91%	30.70%	31.66%	30.17%
Age						
Range	20-68	22-71	21-64	21-76	21-76	20-76
Mean	37.19 (10.01)	37.83 (11.48)	37.39 (10.88)	35.76 (10.54)	37.04 (10.72)	36.81 (10.92)

The majority (89.5%) of the follow-up sample reported that neither they nor any close friends or family worked for a law enforcement agency. A total of 20.1% of the respondents in the follow-up sample reported having been arrested at some time in their lives, and 7.64% reported that a close friend or family member had been arrested in the last year. The majority (82%) of respondents in the follow-up sample reported never having been stopped by the police without cause (no crime or traffic infraction) a slight decrease from the initial sample (83%). Again, only a small percentage (3.28%) of the sample reported having ever filmed the police. The majority (68%) of the follow-up sample reported that they used social media on the daily basis. The majority (60.26%) of the follow-up sample reported that they follow criminal justice related stories on the internet, this represented a slight increase from 59% of the initial survey respondents. The number of respondents who reported visiting police accountability websites remained the same at 7% of both the initial and the follow-up samples. Respondents' self-control scores in both the initial and follow-up samples remained similar where respondents scored an average of 2.19 (SD=.822). Summary statistics are provided in Table 14.

Respondents in the follow-up survey were asked questions regarding the last two weeks regarding any direct contact with police. Of the 458 individuals in the follow-up sample: 21 respondents (4.59%) reported having had any contact with the police in the time between the two surveys and none reported having been arrested. Three individuals who reported having contact with the police stated they had been stopped without cause (no crime or traffic infraction). Additionally, none of the respondents reported having filmed any police-citizen encounters. Summary statistics are provided in Table 15.

Table 14. Follow-up Control Variables

		Follow-up Video 1 Positive- Verbal (n=121)	Follow-up Video 2 Use of Force (n=116)	Follow-up Video 3 Negative- Verbal (n=107)	Follow-up Video 4 Police- No Citizens (n=114)	Follow-up Total Sample (N=458)	Initial Total Sample (N=600)
LEO –							
	Yes	10.34%	10.34%	12.15%	10.53%	10.48%	10.67%
Ever Arrested –							
	Yes	17.36%	18.97%	25.23%	19.30%	20.09%	20.83%
Vicarious Arrest							
	Yes	10.74%	6.90%	8.41%	4.39%	7.64%	7.67%
Stopped w/o Cause –							
	Yes	16.00%	23.39%	19.85%	11.67%	17.80%	16.67%
Film the Police -							
	Yes	4.13%	3.45%	1.87%	3.51%	3.28%	3.67%
Social Media Use							
	Yes	66.12%	63.79%	68.22%	72.81%	67.69%	67.33%
Police Accountability Websites –							
	Yes	4.96%	7.76%	6.54%	8.77%	6.99%	7.00%
CJ Stories on Internet –							
	Yes	52.89%	58.62%	69.16%	61.40%	60.26%	59.50%
Self-control							
	Range	1-4	1-4	1-4	1-4	1-4	1-4
	Mean	2.19	2.22	2.17	2.18	2.19	2.17
	SD	(.809)	(.855)	(.758)	(.867)	(.822)	(.840)

Table 15. Additional Follow-up Control Variables

	Follow-up Video 1 Positive- Verbal (n=121)	Follow-up Video 2 Use of Force (n=116)	Follow-up Video 3 Negative- Verbal (n=107)	Follow-up Video 4 Police-No Citizens (n=114)	Follow-up Total Sample (N=458)
Any Police Contact					
–					
Yes	5.79%	3.45%	4.67%	4.39%	4.59%
Arrested –					
Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Neg. Police Contact					
Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.009%	0.00%	0.006%
Film the Police					
Yes	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Police Accountability Websites –					
Yes	2.50%	4.31%	2.80%	1.75%	2.84%

6.5 Analytic Strategy

In the initial survey, respondents were randomly assigned into one of the four intervention groups with the fourth video acting as the control or reference category: 1) Positive-Verbal Encounters; 2) Use of Force Encounters Video; 3) Negative-Verbal Encounters Video; 4) Police, No Citizen Encounters Video (See Chapter 3 for in-depth description of each video). All respondents were surveyed regarding their perceptions of law enforcement, support for officer body-worn cameras (BWCs) and their willingness to film the police both before and after being asked to view one of the four. To examine if

the effects of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters is lasting, participants who indicated they would like to be included in a follow-up survey were again asked about their perceptions of law enforcement, support for officer body-worn cameras (BWCs) and their willingness to film the police.

A total of 11 regressions were conducted to examine if the effects of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters was lasting. Each regression used the respondent's post-test scores from the initial survey to predict the follow-up post-test scores, while examining the effects of the video interventions, as well as the demographic and control variables.¹ Model diagnostics reveal VIF scores for each of the regression models ranging from 1.06 to 1.59 with a mean VIF of 1.22, which indicate no issues of multicollinearity. All analyses were conducted using STATA 14 (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP).

6.6 Results

Table 16 displays the results of regressions predicting the follow-up post-test scores for obligation to obey, trust in the police, and police legitimacy using the post-test scores from the initial survey. Each model displays the regression results predicting the follow-up post-test scores using the initial post-test scores as the main predictor, video interventions, and also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

The model predicting the obligation to obey follow-up scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .694, showing that the variables in the model explain 69.4% of the total variance in the follow-up obligation to obey scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up obligation to obey scores was an individual's post-test

¹ Follow-up control variables for arrest and filming were dropped from the regressions due to lack of variability.

scores ($\beta = .751, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .751 higher on their follow-up test score. Additionally, four control variables were significantly associated with predicting the follow-up obligation to obey scores. Age was significantly associated with higher follow-up obligation to obey scores, where for every year older an individual was, their follow-up obligation to obey score was .006 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .006, p < .01$). Individuals who reported having attained at least a four-year college degree had follow-up obligation to obey scores that .100 standard deviations lower than their counterparts that did not have a college degree ($\beta = -.100, p < .05$). Income level was associated with higher follow-up obligation to obey scores, where for every income category higher a person was their obligation to obey follow-up scores were .032 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .032, p < .05$). Additionally, visiting police accountability websites was significantly associated with lower follow-up obligation to obey scores, with individuals who reported having visited those sites had follow-up obligation to obey scores that were .210 standard deviations lower than those who did not visit such websites ($\beta = -.210, p < .05$).

The model predicting the trust in police follow-up scores represented a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .817, showing that the variables in the model explain 81.7% of the total variance in the follow-up trust in the police scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up trust in police scores was an individual's post-test scores from ($\beta = .898, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .898 higher on their follow-up test score. In this model, none of the video interventions were significantly associated with the follow-up scores for trust in the

police. Additionally, none of the control variables were significantly associated with the follow-up scores for trust in the police.

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the police legitimacy variable was created by summing the obligation to obey scores with the trust in the police scores (here it was done using the follow-up scores). The model predicting police legitimacy follow-up scores represented a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .825, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 82.5% of the total variance in the follow-up police legitimacy scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up police legitimacy scores was an individual's post-test scores from ($\beta = .884$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .884 higher on their follow-up test score. In this model, none of the video interventions or control variables were significantly associated with the follow-up police legitimacy scores.

Table 16. Follow-up Obligation to Obey, Trust, and Police Legitimacy

VARIABLES	Follow-Up Obey		Follow-Up Trust in Police		Follow-Up Police Legitimacy	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post-Test Scores	0.751**	(0.030)	0.898**	(0.024)	0.884**	(0.024)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.051	(0.062)	0.066	(0.049)	0.053	(0.044)
Use of Force Video	-0.051	(0.061)	-0.054	(0.048)	-0.055	(0.043)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.015	(0.062)	-0.023	(0.049)	-0.008	(0.044)
Age	0.006**	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)	0.003	(0.002)
Male	0.023	(0.047)	-0.031	(0.037)	-0.008	(0.033)
Racial Minority	-0.053	(0.057)	0.019	(0.045)	-0.005	(0.040)
Education	-0.100*	(0.045)	0.042	(0.036)	-0.008	(0.032)
Income	0.032*	(0.016)	0.001	(0.013)	0.011	(0.012)
LEO in Family	0.029	(0.072)	0.067	(0.057)	0.047	(0.051)
Arrest History	-0.105	(0.061)	-0.039	(0.049)	-0.058	(0.043)
Vicarious Arrest	0.004	(0.083)	0.031	(0.066)	0.029	(0.059)
Stopped w/o Cause	0.065	(0.061)	0.067	(0.049)	0.060	(0.043)
Ever Filmed Police	-0.045	(0.126)	0.095	(0.099)	0.060	(0.089)
Daily Social Media Use	0.036	(0.048)	-0.003	(0.038)	0.025	(0.034)
Police Accountability Websites	-0.210*	(0.094)	0.014	(0.075)	-0.049	(0.067)
Follow Criminal Justice News	-0.006	(0.047)	-0.034	(0.037)	-0.020	(0.033)
Low Self-Control	-0.032	(0.028)	-0.006	(0.022)	-0.004	(0.020)
Recent Contact with Police	0.058	(0.112)	0.057	(0.089)	0.042	(0.079)
Recent Stopped w/o Cause	0.098	(0.293)	0.022	(0.233)	0.081	(0.207)
Recent Police Acct. Websites	-0.076	(0.139)	-0.072	(0.111)	-0.072	(0.099)
Constant	-0.231	(0.134)	-0.074	(0.106)	-0.143	(0.094)
R-squared	0.694		0.817		0.825	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 17 displays the results of regressions predicting the follow-up post-test score for distributive fairness, and procedural justice using the post-test scores from the initial survey. Each model displays the regression results predicting the follow-up post-test scores using the post-test scores as the main predictor, video interventions, and also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

The model predicting the follow-up distributive fairness scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .650, showing that the variables in the model explain 65% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up distributive fairness scores was an individual's post-test scores from ($\beta = .929, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .929 higher on their follow-up test score. In this model, none of the video interventions were significantly associated with the follow-up scores for distributive fairness. Two control variables were also associated with distributive fairness follow-up scores. Individuals who reported having attained at least a four-year college degree had follow-up distributive fairness scores that .145 standard deviations lower than their counterparts that did not have a college degree ($\beta = -.145, p < .01$). Income level was associated with higher follow-up distributive fairness scores, where for every income category higher a person was their obligation to obey follow-up scores were .046 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .046, p < .05$).

The model predicting the follow-up procedural justice scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .825, suggesting that the variables in the model explain 82.5% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up procedural justice scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .880, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .880 higher on their follow-up test score. None of the video interventions were associated with the follow-up scores for procedural justice. One control variable was associated with follow-up procedural justice scores. Respondents who reported having visited police accountability websites in the previous two weeks had follow-up procedural justice

scores that were .351 standard deviations lower than those who did not visit such sites ($\beta = -.351, p < .01$).

Table 17. Follow-up Distributive Fairness and Procedural Justice

VARIABLES	Follow-Up Distributive Fairness		Follow-Up Procedural Justice	
	B	SE	B	SE
Post-Test Scores	0.929**	(0.040)	0.880**	(0.023)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.086	(0.076)	0.066	(0.053)
Use of Force Video	-0.068	(0.074)	-0.098	(0.052)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.012	(0.075)	-0.060	(0.053)
Age	0.004	(0.003)	0.002	(0.002)
Male	-0.021	(0.057)	0.008	(0.040)
Racial Minority	0.040	(0.069)	-0.035	(0.049)
Education	-0.145**	(0.055)	-0.028	(0.039)
Income	0.046*	(0.020)	0.008	(0.014)
LEO in Family	0.054	(0.088)	0.007	(0.062)
Arrest History	-0.138	(0.075)	-0.089	(0.053)
Vicarious Arrest	0.106	(0.101)	0.033	(0.072)
Stopped w/o Cause	-0.020	(0.075)	-0.022	(0.053)
Ever Filmed Police	-0.076	(0.153)	0.254	(0.108)
Daily Social Media Use	0.037	(0.059)	0.019	(0.042)
Police Accountability Websites	-0.158	(0.113)	-0.009	(0.081)
Follow Criminal Justice News	-0.042	(0.058)	-0.059	(0.041)
Low Self-Control	-0.050	(0.035)	0.001	(0.024)
Recent Contact with Police	-0.212	(0.137)	0.115	(0.097)
Recent Stopped w/o Cause	0.246	(0.358)	-0.378	(0.253)
Recent Police Acct. Websites	-0.138	(0.170)	-0.351**	(0.120)
Constant	-0.050	(0.163)	-0.015	(0.115)
R-squared	0.650		0.825	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 18 displays the results of the regressions predicting the follow-up post-test scores for cooperation with the police and estimations of misconduct using the post-test scores from the initial survey. Each model displays the regression results predicting the follow-up post-test scores using the post-test scores as the main predictor, video interventions, and also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

The model predicting the follow-up cooperation scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .777, showing that the variables in the model explain 77.7% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up cooperation scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .836$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .836 higher on their follow-up test score. None of the video interventions were associated with the follow-up scores for cooperation. One control variable was associated with follow-up cooperation scores. Individuals who reported having a close friend or family member who had been arrested had follow-up cooperation scores that were .194 standard deviations lower than those who did not ($\beta = -.194$, $p < .01$).

The model predicting the follow-up estimations of misconduct scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .719, showing that the variables in the model explain 71.9% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up estimations of misconduct scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .785$, $p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .785 higher on their follow-up test score. None of the video interventions were associated with the follow-up scores for estimations of misconduct. One control variable was associated with follow-up estimations of misconduct scores. Being stopped

without cause was also associated with higher follow-up estimations of misconduct scores ($\beta = .172, p < .01$). Respondents who reported having been stopped by police without cause (no crime or traffic infraction occurring) had follow-up estimations of misconduct scores that were .172 standard deviations higher than those who did not report any such contact with police.

Table 18. Follow-up Cooperation and Estimations of Misconduct

VARIABLES	Follow-Up Cooperation		Follow-Up Misconduct	
	B	SE	B	SE
Post-Test Scores	0.836**	(0.048)	0.785**	(0.029)
Positive-Verbal Video	0.062	(0.103)	0.014	(0.062)
Use of Force Video	-0.092	(0.103)	0.018	(0.061)
Negative-Verbal Video	-0.085	(0.101)	0.044	(0.061)
Age	0.002	(0.003)	-0.003	(0.002)
Male	-0.017	(0.078)	-0.075	(0.047)
Racial Minority	-0.034	(0.092)	0.007	(0.057)
Education	-0.017	(0.074)	0.020	(0.045)
Income	0.021	(0.028)	-0.007	(0.016)
LEO in Family	0.044	(0.114)	-0.133	(0.072)
Arrest History	-0.038	(0.096)	0.080	(0.061)
Vicarious Arrest	-0.194**	(0.134)	-0.016	(0.083)
Stopped w/o Cause	-0.074	(0.100)	0.172**	(0.061)
Ever Filmed Police	-0.076	(0.186)	0.015	(0.126)
Daily Social Media Use	0.049	(0.078)	0.005	(0.049)
Police Accountability Websites	-0.094	(0.146)	0.173	(0.094)
Follow Criminal Justice News	-0.016	(0.077)	0.016	(0.047)
Low Self-Control	-0.041	(0.045)	-0.008	(0.028)
Recent Contact with Police	0.029	(0.176)	0.036	(0.112)
Recent Stopped w/o Cause	0.081	(0.818)	-0.444	(0.294)
Recent Police Acct. Websites	0.096	(0.225)	0.057	(0.140)
Constant	0.035	(0.214)	0.133	(0.134)
R-squared	0.777		0.719	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Table 19 displays the results of the regressions predicting the follow-up post-test scores for willingness to film and support for officer body-worn cameras (BWC – Accountability and BWC – Safety) using the post-test scores from the initial survey. Each model displays the regression results predicting the follow-up post-test scores using the post-test scores as the main predictor, video interventions, and also considers the effects of the demographic and control variables.

The model predicting the follow-up willingness to film scores represents a good fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .736, showing that the variables in the model explain 73.6% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up willingness to film scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .823, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .823 higher on their follow-up test score. Viewing video intervention 2, Use of Force Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher follow-up willingness to film scores. Respondents who viewed the Use of Force Encounters Video had follow-up willingness to film scores that were .201 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .201, p < .01$), compared to those who saw the control video. Income level was associated with lower follow-up willingness to film scores, where for every income category higher a person was their willingness to film follow-up scores were .033 standard deviations lower ($\beta = .033, p < .05$). Additionally, having previously been arrested was significantly associated with higher follow-up willingness to film scores. Respondents who reported having been arrested previously had follow-up willingness to film scores that were .123 standard deviations higher than those who did not report any such contact with police ($\beta = .123, p < .01$).

The model predicting the follow-up BWC – accountability scores represents a moderate fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .598, showing that the variables in the model explain 59.8% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up BWC – accountability scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .686, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .686 higher on their follow-up test score. Viewing video intervention 3, Negative-Verbal Encounters Video was significantly associated with higher follow-up BWC – accountability scores. Respondents who viewed the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video had follow-up BWC – accountability scores that were .142 standard deviations higher ($\beta = .142, p < .05$), compared to those who saw the control video. Age was significantly associated with lower follow-up BWC – accountability scores, where for every year older an individual was, their follow-up BWC – accountability score was .007 standard deviations lower ($\beta = .007, p < .01$). Individuals who reported having a close friend or family member who had been arrested had follow-up BWC – accountability scores that were .208 standard deviations lower than those who did not ($\beta = -.208, p < .05$). Additionally, individuals who reported following criminal justice news stories had follow-up BWC – accountability scores that were .123 standard deviations higher than those who did not follow criminal justice news ($\beta = .123, p < .05$).

The model predicting the follow-up BWC – safety scores represents a moderate fit for the data; the Pearson's R^2 was .533, showing that the variables in the model explain 53.3% of the total variance in the follow-up scores. In this model, the strongest predictor of follow-up BWC – safety scores was an individual's post-test scores ($\beta = .688, p < .01$), where for every point higher in their post-test score an individual was .688

higher on their follow-up test score. In this model, none of the video interventions were significantly associated with the follow-up scores for follow-up BWC – safety scores. Age was significantly associated with lower follow-up BWC – safety scores, where for every year older an individual was, their follow-up BWC – safety score was .009 standard deviations lower ($\beta = .009, p < .01$). Individuals who self-reported being a racial or ethnic minority had follow-up BWC – safety scores that were .154 standard deviations lower than their white non-Hispanic counterparts ($\beta = -.154, p < .05$). Additionally, individuals who reported following criminal justice news stories had follow-up BWC – safety scores that were .127 standard deviations higher than those who did not follow those types of news stories ($\beta = .127, p < .05$).

Table 19. Follow-up Willingness to Film and Support for Officer Body-Worn Cameras

VARIABLES	Follow-Up Film		Follow-Up BWC - Acct.		Follow-Up BWC - Safety	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Post-Test Scores	0.823**	(0.027)	0.686**	(0.030)	0.688**	(0.034)
Positive-Verbal Video	-0.062	(0.054)	-0.018	(0.071)	0.028	(0.084)
Use of Force Video	0.201**	(0.053)	0.081	(0.069)	0.108	(0.082)
Negative-Verbal Video	0.083	(0.053)	0.142*	(0.070)	0.046	(0.083)
Age	-0.003	(0.002)	-0.007**	(0.003)	-0.009**	(0.003)
Male	-0.028	(0.041)	-0.043	(0.053)	-0.014	(0.064)
Racial Minority	0.080	(0.049)	-0.036	(0.065)	-0.154*	(0.076)
Education	0.043	(0.039)	-0.023	(0.051)	-0.017	(0.061)
Income	-0.033*	(0.014)	-0.032	(0.018)	-0.010	(0.022)
LEO in Family	0.021	(0.062)	-0.082	(0.082)	0.041	(0.097)
Arrest History	0.123*	(0.053)	0.001	(0.070)	0.102	(0.082)
Vicarious Arrest	-0.125	(0.072)	-0.208*	(0.095)	-0.171	(0.112)
Stop w/o Cause	-0.001	(0.053)	0.011	(0.070)	-0.031	(0.082)
Ever Filmed Police	-0.011	(0.110)	0.067	(0.143)	0.020	(0.169)
Daily Social Media Use	0.001	(0.042)	0.076	(0.055)	0.031	(0.065)
Police Accountability Websites	0.011	(0.081)	0.027	(0.105)	0.172	(0.124)
Follow Criminal Justice News	0.063	(0.041)	0.123*	(0.054)	0.127*	(0.063)
Low Self-Control	-0.013	(0.024)	0.013	(0.032)	0.003	(0.038)
Recent Contact with Police	0.038	(0.097)	-0.109	(0.128)	-0.078	(0.151)
Recent Stop w/o Cause	0.204	(0.255)	-0.017	(0.335)	-0.226	(0.395)
Recent Police Acct. Websites	0.188	(0.121)	0.250	(0.159)	0.210	(0.188)
Constant	0.162	(0.116)	0.202	(0.152)	0.242	(0.180)
R-squared	0.736		0.598		0.533	

Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

6.7 Summary

In this chapter, I examined whether or not the perceptual and attitudinal changes that occurred as a result of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters were lasting. This was accomplished using the results of two surveys: 1) the initial survey experiment, and 2) a follow-up survey two weeks after the close of the initial survey where individuals were again questioned about their views on police and video surveillance. Linear

regressions were conducted predicting the follow-up scores for all of the outcome measures (see Chapters 4 and 5) using the post-test scores from the initial survey, video interventions and control variables.

Overall, it appears that much of the effects of viewing a video of police-citizen encounters on perceptions of the police and support for video surveillance of and by the police have dissipated after two weeks. However, two outcomes from the follow up remain impacted by viewing videos: willingness to film and BWC – accountability. Individuals who saw the Use of Force Encounters Video had higher willingness to film scores in the follow-up survey two-weeks later, and individuals who saw the Negative-Verbal Encounters Video had higher BWC – Accountability scores. Additionally, there were individual level characteristics that influenced follow-up perceptions of the police and support for video surveillance. For this sample, and largely in line with research, older, wealthier, and less educated individuals viewed the police more favorably and had less support for video recordings of or by the police than their counterparts (Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Schafer et al., 2003). Additionally, prior personal or vicarious negative experiences with police (arrest history, vicarious arrest, and being stopped without cause) were also found to impact the follow-up outcome scores. As discussed in Chapter 2, an individual's direct experiences with police have a great impact on shaping their opinions and perceptions about police general and may in turn effect future encounters with police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). An in-depth discussion of the implications of the results is presented in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

7.1 Discussion and Summary

Favorable perceptions of police are linked with higher rates of voluntary cooperation and compliance with law enforcement (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Tyler, 1990). Perceptions of the police are formed through direct and vicarious experiences, and most individuals in the US today have very little direct contact with police (Gaines & Kappeler, 2011). In the past, vicarious experiences consisted of friends and family relating stories of police encounters (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005; Warren, 2011). Today, a personal relationship is no longer needed to share experiences with the police with others. Because of technological advancements such as smartphones, social media, and the Internet, experiences can be shared with millions of strangers. These experiences may have just happened, they may have been years ago. Regardless, because of social media and video sharing sites, the police encounter is shared widely and often without context.

Despite these important consequences for the police, policing research has yet to fully explore how media, particularly media generated by citizens (such as when they record and share their encounters with police) is associated with perceptions – both good and bad – of the police. My work in this area represents a first step towards understanding this potential relationship using experimental methods and video recordings of actual police-citizen encounters. Through the use of experimental methods and footage from actual police-citizen encounters, I found that viewing videos of encounters significantly impacts individuals' perceptions of law enforcement and

willingness to film the police. Further, my results show that the directionality of the impact is dependent on content of the encounter. Several important results inform the relationship between individuals watching videos of police-citizen interactions and their later perceptions of the police.

My research establishes that in the short-term, individuals' perceptions of the police are impacted by viewing videos of police-citizen encounters. Viewing negative videos of police-citizen interactions where police use force against citizens or behave unprofessionally was associated with lower overall perceptions of police, and viewing positive encounters with police were associated with higher perceptions of police. This is largely in line with what has been seen in policing literature in terms of perception research and vicarious experiences (Jefferis et al., 1997; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Skogan, 2006). Researchers have found that hearing about personal negative encounters with police from close friends and family lowers individuals' confidence in police and affects future interpretations of police behavior (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005).

For this sample, viewing negative videos of police-citizen encounters had no effect on how individuals perceive the police, two weeks later. This indicates that social media and citizen journalism may not be as detrimental to departmental image as many police officials fear, as the effects of viewing videos of police-citizen encounters on perceptions appears fleeting. According to the process-based model, both positive and negative experiences should impact future perceptions. This wasn't the case, however, for the encounters presented in this study. Potentially, these findings indicate that there is a limited time frame that videos can cause damage to police departments' public image

and/or community relationships. Additionally, these findings may indicate that there is a differential effect for personal vicarious and digital vicarious experiences, as the nature of the digital encounter offers social and temporal distance from the event and lacks a personal connection to those involved in the incident or encounter (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005).

I make this conclusion with caution, however, for two reasons. First, the encounters shown in the videos, were non-graphic and non-lethal. The relatively benign nature of encounters may be masking effects that may be found in more visceral material, such as the videos shared on social media depicting the deaths of Walter Scott who was shot in the back as he fled police, or Eric Garner who was asphyxiated during the course of his arrest (Goodman & Baker, 2014; Powell, 2016; Swaine, 2015). Both videos received widespread attention and inspired a multitude of protests (Goodman & Baker, 2014; Holpuch, 2015). Thus, changes in the perceptions of the police may be more lasting if the material is stronger. Cultivation theory would suggest this is the case (Gerbner & Gross, 1979; Gerbner et al., 2002), though this is untested in police work. Second, not tested here is the cumulative effect of viewing the same video of a police-citizen encounter, or viewing similar videos over time. What was presented here was a first step in understanding the effects and limits of digital vicarious experiences on changes in perceptions of police, thus, more work on the durability of this effect should be done.

My research also demonstrates that viewing negative police encounters increases individuals' willingness to film the police in future encounters. Individuals' willingness to film the police was impacted in the short-term as a result of viewing the negative

verbal encounters video or the use of force encounters video. Individuals who viewed the use of force video had higher willingness to film the police scores two weeks later. This finding is supported by recent work by Farmer and colleagues (2015), which examined the reasons why people engage in filming the police. Using a survey of college students, Farmer et al. (2015) found that often individuals felt that filming the police was a way of ensuring social justice and acted as a deterrent preventing unprofessional behavior on the part of the officer.

Finally, I found that despite the immediate post-test results showing that viewing positive videos of police-citizen encounters was associated with favorable some perceptions of police, the effects did not hold two weeks later. Given that the majority of the sample were white, were of higher economic standing, had never been arrested, and reported having never been stopped by police without cause, the positive-verbal encounter video may more closely mirror their own experiences with police in the short-term. However, psychology research has shown an internalized bias towards remembering negative events, which may explain why the positive video did not have any effect in the follow-up (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). While potentially discouraging to police departments looking for simple solutions to regaining control over their public image and narrative, it is encouraging from a social cognitive cultivation theory perspective, where the initialization of concepts and definitions occur in part when the content of the message is particularly meaningful or visceral to the viewer (Bushman, 1998; Gerbner et al., 2002). The visceral or upsetting messages contained in videos of officers using force or acting unprofessionally towards citizens

may ultimately be internalized as definitions associating police with brutality and demeaning treatment of citizens.

Additionally, for respondents who visit police accountability websites, their perceptions of police were lower than those who had not. Police accountability websites such as *CopWatch*, *CopBlock*, and *Photography is Not a Crime* focus almost exclusively on presenting negative video footage of police-citizen encounters, often depicting violent encounters between the police and citizens. The fact that these websites was correlated with unfavorable perceptions of police in both the initial and the follow-up survey lends support to the assertion that legitimacy is not a static construct but rather flexible and the result of cumulative experiences with police (Tyler et al., 2014). Further, the association between the websites and lowered perceptions is in line with cultivation thesis, which states that individuals' repeated exposure to images or messages will result in the internalization of the messages (Gerbner & Gross, 1979; Gerbner et al., 2002). In this case, repeated exposure to negative imagery from actual police-citizen encounters may be shaping individuals' perceptions of police generally.

7.2 Implications

The findings I have presented here have several important implications for both theory and practice, as well as several implications for social movements. To begin, I found support for a negativity bias in viewing police-citizen encounters. This is in-line with what Baumeister and colleagues (2001, p. 323) referred to as “positive-negative asymmetry effect,” where negative experiences are more psychologically powerful than positive ones. Overall they determined that “bad impressions and bad stereotypes are quicker to form and more resistant to disconfirmation than good ones” (Baumeister et al.,

2001, p. 323). Skogan (2006) found similar results when examining the differential impact of individuals' positive and negative personal experiences with the police. My findings extend this work to include digital experiences as well. While the positive videos were impactful, the two negative videos examined here (use of force and negative-verbal encounters) impacted far more outcomes.

Researchers interested in the process-based model of policing may do well to expand definitions of vicarious experiences, and specifically consider the role of technology enhanced experiences, in addition to personal experiences in their research. The process-based model of policing has traditionally focused on the effect of direct and vicarious personal experiences with police for shaping individuals' views of police (Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Tyler, 2006; Warren, 2011; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). However, as technology continues to advance, we are becoming a society where technology and media serve as pathways to communication and learning. Through technology and media, individuals are able to gain insight into others' experiences and gain knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible (Brown & Rafter, 2013). Through the videos of police produced by citizen journalists, individuals may have vicarious experience with the police that is digitally based, representing a new type of vicarious experience.

Digital or video vicarious experiences offer several unique features which set them apart from traditional in-person vicarious experiences. First, a digital vicarious experience can be shared far past a person's circle of friends and family. Thus, transmission of vicarious experiences of police contact is not limited to your social network, or even your networks on social media, but limited instead by the confines of social media. Second, once shared to social media, the video representing the vicarious

experience is a permanent construct. While the videos can be deleted or taken down, they can also be captured and saved by programs. This allows for the transmission of vicarious experiences with the police through a particular video to remain nearly timeless. Third, videos can be replayed, playing the *exact same set of events* each time, unlike a story that is retold over time where details can be forgotten or embellished. The narrative presented in a video will never change, the interpretation may change, but the events presented will not. This means that it will be more difficult to embellish or exaggerate the events captured on film and shared. Additionally, envision the consequences of the Rodney King or Eric Garner videos for vicarious experiences with the police. Because of the news and social media, generations of individuals have seen those videos repeatedly, solidifying that vicarious experience for them. A nation watched as an African American man was mistreated at the hands of police officers. Public outcry was so great following each of the videos (King and Garner) that national discussions on use of force, police-minority relations, and police accountability occurred and official inquiry into the officers' actions took place. Additionally, because of the amount of airtime and reach they were given through the news media and later the Internet incidents like King and Garner have become part of our public history with adoptions of phrases like "I can't breathe" becoming part of our cultural knowledge. Further, videos can be digitally enlarged or enhanced to show more detail, paused and advanced frame by frame allowing for in-depth deconstruction of an encounter. All of which allows the police, courts, and even average citizens the ability to dissect and analyze incidents long after the fact. Finally, individuals filming decide every aspect of a videos message, including when to start and stop filming, where and if to edit the footage, and what context if any to provide to the

video when uploaded. This can potentially compound the problem of image management for police. Research has found that context, camera angles, and point-of-view, can affect individual's perceptions and judgements regarding the viewed footage (Lassiter & Irvine, 1986; Mandell & Shaw, 1973; Ratcliff, Lassiter, Schmidt, & Synder, 2006). Footage may be manipulated and edited to show events in a particular light and create priming effects leading the viewer to draw specific conclusions (Roskos-Ewoldsen, Roskos-Ewoldsen, & Carpentier, 2002; Scheufele, 2000).

Citizen involvement in sousveillance has been growing at a tremendous rate over the last number of years, with numerous citizen groups dedicated to filming the police (Contreras & Hajela, 2016), and the implications of such are enormous. As such, police departments should be encouraged to adopt formal and informal policies instructing officers to behave as if they are constantly being filmed, because in today's society, they most likely are. Gone are the days where a single officers' mistreatment of an individual could go unnoticed and undocumented. Now every action and word may be on display, not just to the citizen, but to the entire nation. These incidents, may be live streamed or posted after the incident, and may be reviewed, dissected, and critiqued ad nauseum. Further, because most borders do not apply to the Internet and social media, officers' actions and behaviors have repercussions not just for their local communities but for police at large and may even encourage individuals to engage in cop-watching around the globe. As I have shown, depending on the content of the interaction, viewing videos of police-citizen encounters can both positively and negatively impact individual's perceptions of the police and an individual's willingness to film the police. Given this, officers should be instructed to be mindful of their treatment of citizens and to always

treat citizens in a professional and procedurally just manner. Officers who violate these professional standards should be offered trainings designed to help them manage people more effectively or given positions where they will have fewer opportunities to interact with the public. Further, departments would do well to educate their officers on the impact their actions may have on citizen's attitudes and behaviors towards police, as well as how their city, state or even the nation is perceived by others.

Additionally, police departments should consider adopting a proactive approach to releasing footage of police-citizen encounters. While the negative videos in my experiment did have an effect on individual perceptions of police, the positive videos were associated with higher procedural justice scores and lower estimations of misconduct. While it is true that with the popularity of citizen journalism and sousveillance, the police have lost much of the hold they had over the traditional narrative of police and police-involved incidents (Goldsmith, 2010). However, by proactively releasing positive or even 'neutral' encounters, departments may redirect the current narrative and move towards addressing the legitimacy crisis currently faced by police today (Miller, 2016). Miller (2016, p. 261) placed the cause for the current legitimacy crisis on the "effects of a mass audience focused on the actions of a small number of LEAs and police officers involved in high-profile lethal shootings." It is easy to understand the effects these videos may have as they are difficult to watch without having a reaction. However, these videos are not an accurate depiction of the majority of police-citizen encounters as most are relatively benign (Hickman, et al., 2008). Given this, releasing footage of the everyday encounters depicting officers behaving in a

procedurally just and professional manner may not eliminate the damage done by high profile incidents, but they may act as a counter-weight.

Further, citizens filming of the police may generate changes in behavior by the police: Brown (2015) found that police officers take the presence of citizens with recording devices into account when making decisions. Brown (2015) also found that the presence of a citizen journalist decreased the likelihood of use of force by the police. This finding is similar to research on officer body-worn cameras which found decreases in use of force and decreases in citizen complaints when officers use cameras to record interactions with citizens (Ariel et al., 2015; Farrar & Ariel, 2013; Jennings et al., 2014; White, 2014). In this respect, while it may be a nuisance to officers to have bystanders filming, it may potentially herald more positive outcomes as far as the citizens are concerned (Brown, 2015). It is, however, worth noting that there is some anecdotal evidence to suggest that some officers may be hesitating to use necessary force against suspects out of fear of a media backlash and being filmed by bystanders (Hawkins, 2016; Valencia, 2014). To address this issue and others, officers should be offered specialized training preparing them on dealing with those situations. As the number of citizens filming police continue to grow (Contreras & Hajela, 2016), officers should be given specific training on how to handle situations where individuals are filming them. Where before, a public information officer would handle dispensing information to traditional media journalists, citizen journalism has changed the way officers interact with the media. As such, all officers should have training that instructs them not only on how to treat people in a professional and procedurally just way, but also how to speak to individuals while on film. This may include just fielding questions to how to handle

instigating tactics from those less scrupulous citizen journalists wishing to catch an officer in a moment of bad behavior. Further, departments should have clear policies that are communicated to line officers regarding the laws surrounding citizens filming officers in both public and private spaces.

While there may be some pushback or resentment from officers, video recordings are a valuable tool to help citizens hold police accountable as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993) observed: “in the absence of videotapes or other objective recording of gratuitous violence, brutality rarely causes public controversy and is extremely difficult to prove” (p. 19). That is not to say that citizen journalism and policing must be at odds, there are many instances of departments turning to citizens for help during investigations; for example during the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, the Boston Police Department “crowd-sourced” their investigation by appealing to those in attendance to submit videos of the race and aftermath (Wall & Linnemann, 2014).

Finally, videos of police-citizen encounters hold several implications for social movements in today’s technology driven society. Videos of police-citizen encounters, particularly negative ones depicting unfair or violent treatment towards minorities, may serve to galvanize social and political movements focused on addressing police abuse of authority and racial justice. Increasingly, these movements, such as Black Lives Matter, use social media to mobilize activists, organize events and maintain interest (Chermega, 2016; Shirky, 2011). Videos uploaded to social media and re-shared by followers may assist in the recruitment of new activists and help to solidify narratives and messages the movement. The narratives provided by video recordings of police-citizen encounters may act as a cognitive frame through which all police are viewed (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Effective narratives for communication rely on emotional or visceral messaging, often personal experiences to convey messages and definitions (West & Turner, 2013).

Narratives and cognitive frames help individuals identify with specific problems or causes (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Further, while videos may help a movement solidify the resolve among its base, they may also help to create allies of those who would otherwise be unaffected by the issue. This is particularly salient for movements like Black Lives Matter as it continues to gain legitimacy among white supporters. Most white individuals will have very few negative personal or traditional vicarious experiences with the police given that 1) whites come into contact with police less than other racial groups, 2) are generally satisfied with how they have been treated by police when they do come into contact with them, and 3) tend to have racially homogenous friendship groups (Epp et al., 2014; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). For whites who may not have any negative experiences (direct or vicarious) video recordings offer a visceral demonstration of the racial differences in treatment by police, and may in turn increase global support and awareness of the issues.

7.3 Limitations

Several limitations are associated with the research presented here. The first limitation lies in the demographics of the sample. The sample of respondents used here is comprised largely (85.33%) of those who self-identified as white non-Hispanics, with 7% identifying as Asian, and 5.3% identifying as African-American. However, according to the 2010 US Census, 63.7% of the US population is white non-Hispanic, 4.8% identify as Asian, and 12.6% are African-American. While typical of MTurk samples (Berinsky et al. 2012), the racial skewedness of the study sample may present some issues for

generalizability of the findings to the larger population. Future research should be mindful of this when constructing online survey experiments using crowdsourcing sites such as MTurk and correct for it by specifically targeting racial groups for recruitment in experiment.

Another limitation related to the generalizability of the results may be in the structure of the convenience sample and the opt-in nature of the research. Because of the nature of the MTurk system and the use of HITs to advertise surveys it is unknown how many people viewed the HIT but did not participate (in effect being invited to participate but declined). Further, because of the opt-in acceptance, individuals who may be more or less affected by viewing videos of police-citizen encounters may have declined participating.

Additionally, this work draws heavily from traditional Tylerian conceptions and measurements of the process-based model of policing. This may pose a potential limitation however as Maguire and Johnson (2010) pointed out traditional measurements and scales of concepts often conceptually overlap. Since exploratory factor analysis was conducted and not confirmatory factor analysis of measures, there may indeed be issues of information redundancy occurring between constructs.

Finally, there was attrition between the initial survey and the follow-up, where the total sample size dropped to 458 from 600. Chapter 6 analysis concluded that all of the models examined were a poor fit for the data and that for most of the videos and outcomes, viewing videos of police-citizen encounters had no effect 2 weeks later (the exception was viewing the positive verbal video was associated with higher cooperation and BWC - Safety scores). However, a post-hoc power analysis indicates that a sample of

150 respondents per group was needed in order to reliably detect effects. The follow-up sample did not achieve this number, instead had between 107 and 121 per group. This may have caused a type II error to occur. Because such attrition is common in longitudinal research, future research should take into account the possibility of such attrition to ensure a large enough sample size to detect effects (Plewis, 1985).

7.4 Directions for Future Research

The experiment I have presented here represents an important first step in bridging policing research and media effects by examining how viewing police-citizen encounters can act as vicarious experiences influencing opinions and perceptions regarding the police. That said, there are several avenues of research that should be explored further.

The first direction for future research is an examination of the cumulative effects of viewing police-citizen encounters. Respondents were only shown the videos used here once. However, when a video of a police citizen encounter goes viral it is generally not seen just once, it is carried on several different news networks both online and on television, and can even get written about in the printed news media. The Rodney King beating and the subsequent fallout was in heavy rotation in both local and national news for thirteen months (Cannon, 1999). Additionally, even when a video isn't viral and/or getting widespread attention, videos on YouTube and other social media sites can be replayed more than once. As such, researchers would do well to consider the effects of repeated exposure to videos of police-citizen encounters on perceptions of police and support for video recording of and by the police.

Another area that researchers should consider is how the content of the videos shape individuals' perceptions. The videos I used in this study were relatively innocuous compared to the content of most viral videos of police citizen encounters (such as the shooting deaths of Walter Scott and Oscar Grant). The use of force video in this experiment did not show police using any weapons or tools against citizens. It also did not show any blood or other signs of physical injury, and while the respondents were unaware of the outcomes of the videos, research was done to ensure that none of the citizens in the videos suffered any lasting effects of the encounters. While this approach was appropriate for the foundational work this experiment represents, future research should be to examine the effects of different encounters and more visceral videos on perceptions.

Researchers would also do well to examine the temporal limits for the effects of digital vicarious experiences of police-citizen encounters. I found effects both positive and negative on perceptions of police and support for video surveillance immediately after the video exposures. However, when respondents were questioned again two weeks later, the effects had all but disappeared (with the exception of willingness to film and support for BWC – accountability). This may be an artifact of the content or length of the videos, but it may also be due to the length of time between testing. Future research should examine these issues to pinpoint optimum timeframes where videos may be impactful.

Finally, researchers should consider the impact of context in creating narratives and influencing perceptions of police. I provided no context or information regarding why the events were occurring in the videos. While it was helpful in creating a baseline

understanding of the effects of viewing police-citizen encounters, when videos are shared on social media they typically will have contextual clues (such as a title) and often a short narrative explaining what is being shared. Research should focus on how the inclusion of this information can provide priming effects prepping the viewer before they play the video.

7.5 Conclusion

I began by asking if viewing videos of police-citizen encounters impacted individuals' perceptions of police and support for video surveillance. This study finds some evidence that this is the case. Naturally, watching a video of a police officer berating or hitting citizen impacts individuals' perceptions of officers. These are visceral videos, reactions are expected and natural. I find that the greatest impact across the outcomes examined was found in watching negative police-citizen encounter videos. Watching negative police-citizen encounters results in more unfavorable perceptions of police and increases willingness to film the police.

In today's current climate, technology, the media, and institutional legitimacy are inextricably linked, particularly in the case of law enforcement. The ubiquity of mobile technology such as smart phones makes it possible for most individuals to record and share their experiences with police, sometimes even as they are happening. Citizen journalism through new technologies coupled with a series of highly publicized police-citizen encounters have come together to create what Goldsmith (2010) has called the new visibility for police. Citizen journalism and sousveillance offer citizens a way to hold police accountable for their behavior towards the public and challenge the traditional police narrative (Goldsmith, 2010; Simonson, 2016; Toch, 2012). Further, citizen

journalism gives a perspective often overlooked as traditional news media tends to align heavily with police depiction of events and largely ignores citizen's perspectives in police-citizen encounters (Brucato, 2015; Chermak, 1995).

Previously, the reach of vicarious experiences has been limited to social circle of friends and family, however, the proliferation of citizens filming their encounters with police have changed how experiences are shared. Videos created by ordinary citizens of their encounters with police offer a new type of vicarious experience through which individuals' perceptions and attitudes can be shaped or reinforced. In this dissertation I demonstrate this link through the inclusion of video recordings of police-citizen encounters as a type of vicarious experience through which perceptions can be shaped. By taking the role of technology in producing vicarious experiences a more holistic account of the factors influencing perceptions of the police is created as events no longer need to be witnessed in-person; they can now be witnessed as they occur while hundreds of miles away.

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APPENDIX A

IRB APPROVAL LETTER – PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE



EXEMPTION GRANTED

Michael White
Criminology and Criminal Justice, School of
602/496-2351
Michael.D.White.1@asu.edu

Dear Michael White:

On 10/9/2014 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	The Impact of viewing police-citizen encounters on perceptions of police legitimacy.
Investigator:	Michael White
IRB ID:	STUDY00001658
Funding:	None
Grant Title:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Police-citizen encounters Informed consent 10.3.pdf, Category: Consent Form;• Police-citizen encounters IRB 10.2.docx, Category: IRB Protocol;• Police-citizen encounters Online Survey Questions 10.3.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions);• Police-citizen encounters Online Survey Follow Up Questions 10.3.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions);

The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 10/9/2014.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

APPENDIX B
DEPENDENT VARIABLE SCALES

	Factor Loading	Cronbach	Eigen
Obligation to Obey		0.815	2.582
1. you should do what the police tell you even if you disagree	0.83		
2. disobeying the police is seldom justified	0.835		
3. it is difficult to break the law and keep one's self-respect	0.71		
4. you should accept police decisions even if you think they are wrong	0.832		
Trust in Police		0.881	4.261
1. most police officers are honest and trustworthy	0.877		
2. most police officers in my community do their job well	0.859		
3. all things considered, I respect most police officers and the job they do	0.876		
4. police in my community have too much power	0.464		
5. police treat racial and ethnic minorities with less respect than White/Caucasian citizens	0.502		
6. police can be trusted to make decisions that are right for your community	0.891		
7. people's basic rights are well protected by the police	0.850		
Procedural Justice		0.947	4.747
1. the police treat people with respect	0.894		
2. the police take time to listen to people	0.852		
3. police treat people fairly	0.915		
4. the police respect citizen's rights	0.888		
5. police are courteous to citizen they come into contact with	0.901		
6. police generally act professionally	0.885		
Distributive Fairness		0.894	2.475
1. police make sure citizens receive the outcomes they deserve under the law	0.873		
2. police provide the same quality of service to all citizens	0.929		
3. police enforce the law consistently when dealing with all people	0.922		

	Factor Loading	Cronbach	Eigen
Estimations of Misconduct		0.917	4.239
1. distort the truth while testifying in a trial to help get a conviction	0.861		
2. bend the rules to get a confession from a person accused of a crime	0.851		
3. physically abuse those who are accused of a crime	0.822		
4. use insulting language against citizens they stop	0.831		
5. stop people on the streets of without good reason	0.867		
6. engage in racial profiling	0.809		
Cooperation		0.922	5.557
1. report a theft/burglary where you were a victim	0.804		
2. report a minor (misdemeanor) crime	0.711		
3. call the police to report a serious (felony) crime	0.781		
4. report suspicious activity near your house/apartment/residence	0.799		
5. report suspicious activity in your neighborhood	0.817		
6. provide information to police to help find a suspected criminal	0.843		
7. provide information to police anonymously to help find a suspected criminal	0.819		
8. report an accident	0.748		
Willingness to Film the Police		0.885	4.65
1. make a recording in your next encounter with law enforcement	0.771		
2. record a stranger's interaction with police	0.819		
3. record police-citizen encounters even if there is no police misconduct involved	0.625		
4. make a recording of a police-citizen encounter if you witness police misconduct	0.855		
5. make a recording if police are engaging use of force against a citizen	0.841		
6. make a recording if police are engaging in verbally inappropriate behavior directed toward you	0.846		
7. make a recording if police are engaging in verbally inappropriate behavior directed toward a stranger	0.87		
8. refuse to record any police-citizen encounters	0.297		

	Factor Loading	Cronbach	Eigen
BWC- Accountability		0.728	2.149
1. when police use body-worn cameras it increases police accountability	0.774		
2. officer body-worn cameras will improve public trust in the police	0.68		
3. if I was stopped by an officer I would prefer they use a body-worn camera	0.611		
BWC- Safety		0.628	1.458
1. when police use body-worn or handheld video recording devices it increases OFFICER safety	0.676		
2. when police use body-worn or handheld video recording devices it increases CITIZEN safety	0.676		