Medieval Rhetoric and Civic Identity

by

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ABSTRACT

Rhetoric has traditionally enjoyed a close connection with ideals of citizenship. Yet, the rhetorical traditions of the medieval period have generally been described as divorced from civic life, concerned instead with theories of composition in specific genres (such as letters and sermons) and with poetics. This view is the product of historiographical approaches that equate rhetoric either theories and practices of speech and writing intended for state-sponsored civic forums, or alternatively with rules governing future speech or literary production. Consequently, the prevailing view of the medieval period in rhetorical studies is a simplified one that has not evolved with changing practices of analysis in the field of rhetorical studies. This dissertation contends that by employing alternative modes of historiography, historians of rhetoric gain a more accurate conception of medieval rhetoric's civic roles, revealing the discipline's role in shaping the individual and their relationship to civic and political institutions.

Organized around an introduction, a broad discussion of later medieval rhetoric and political thought (950-1390), four case studies, and a conclusion, this dissertation begins by identifying historiographical trends that have associated medieval rhetoric with technical treatises, minimizing connections to civic life. Challenging these assessments through a close reading of texts of rhetorical theory, political philosophy, and technical treatises, it contends that medieval rhetoric influenced activities such as grammatical education, didactic art, and political theory to inform practices of citizenship. Focusing specifically on representations of labor, this dissertation show that these venues idealized the political participation of manual laborers within an otherwise discursive theory of civic life that drew from both Aristotelian and Ciceronian sources.

DEDICATION

To my wife Rachel, my companion in all things.

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INTRODUCTION

In the first few sections of Isocrates's *Nicocles* (a portion of the text often referred to as the "Hymn to *Logos*"), Isocrates praises the potential of speech to unify people in cities and other communities, defending eloquence against those who, like Plato, viewed rhetoric as damaging to civic society. The *Hymn* is, in many ways, the beginning of a long tradition that associates rhetorical education and eloquence with civilization and communal life, positioning rhetoric as a natural consequence of humans' capacity for speech. This passage is worth quoting at length. Isocrates states:

> But the fact is that since they [those who see eloquence as dangerous] have not taken the trouble to make distinctions after this manner in each instance, they are ill-disposed to all eloquence; and they have gone so far astray as not to perceive that they are hostile to that power which of all the faculties that belong to the nature of man is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things base and honorable; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul. With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts; and, while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skillfully debate their problems in their own minds. And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those

> who have the most wisdom. Therefore, those who dare to speak with disrespect of educators and teachers of philosophy deserve our opprobrium no less than those who profane the sanctuaries of the gods.[1] (*Nicocles* 3.5-3.9)

While Isocrates went essentially unread throughout the Western Middle Ages, in this passage he could not have expressed a more medieval sentiment. Throughout medieval Europe, essentially Isocretean arguments about the purpose and utility of rhetoric were employed to defend the continued study of the discipline as an essential part of the Trivium.

Even as the uses and applications of rhetoric changed within medieval society and culture, traditional justifications continued to be offered in the discipline's defense, in no small part because the authorities on rhetoric that *were* read—chiefly Cicero and Boethius but to some extent Aristotle as well—essentially reinterpreted the Isocretean *Hymn*. While the sources of these arguments for medieval rhetoricians were traditions of thought drawing from the political and ethical writings of Aristotle, Boethius's woks on the topics, and the early rhetorical works of Cicero, they shared a view that rhetoric and speech played a key role in the organization of human beings into more complex political and economic units, eventually resulting in the founding of cities and the beginnings of an organized civic life. For instance, Aristotle makes similar observations about the utility of speech in the *Politics:*

> For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, can indicate pain and

[1] Most translations of classical and medieval texts, with some exceptions, are from accepted scholarly translations of the original work, noted in the bibliography. In some cases, no accepted scholarly translation is available, and in these cases I have indicated that the translation is my own with a footnote. Quotations from works of Middle English have not been translated, but have been glossed to aid readers who are unfamiliar with the language.

> pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is painful and pleasant and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state. (1.1.10-11)

Like Isocrates, Aristotle sees speech as a manifestation of human beings' essential nature, and thus as an indication of their ideal relationship to one another (that is, since human beings are given the power of speech, it is right and necessary for speech to be used in pursuit of human goals, in this case the founding of communities and cities). Necessary for this more complex organization is the external expression of concepts that extend beyond mere sensation—something even animals can communicate through their voices and cries (for example, a cry of pain). Human speech surpasses these forms of communication because it is capable of expressing the abstract qualities that allow for complex societies to function through a social and civic consensus.

Cicero too makes similar observations in the introduction to *De Inventione*, one of the most widely used texts on rhetoric in the Middle Ages. Indeed, as John Ward notes, it was not uncommon for the introductory sections of *De Inventione* to be copied and bound with other manuscripts independently of the rest of the text. This observation is an important one because the sections to which Ward refers are those in which Cicero treats the origins of human eloquence and thus of rhetoric itself—a myth in which a wise rhetor gathers his uncivilized brethren and introduces them to honorable, communal life. This tendency to copy one important section should suggest the importance of such "founding

myths" for the discipline of rhetoric as taught in the medieval period. In this section,

Cicero writes:

> Moreover, if we wish to consider the origin of this thing we call eloquence—whether it be an art, a study, a skill, or a gift of nature—we shall find that it arose from most honourable causes and continued on its way from the best of reasons. For there was a time when men wandered at large in the fields like animals and lived on wild fare; they did nothing by the guidance of reason, but relied chiefly on physical strength; there was as yet no ordered system of religious worship nor of social duties; no one had seen legitimate marriage nor had anyone looked upon children whom he knew to be his own; nor had they learned the advantages of an equitable code of law. And so through their ignorance and error blind and unreasoning passion satisfied itself by misuse of bodily strength, which is a very dangerous servant. At this juncture a man—great and wise I am sure— became aware of the power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great achievements if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction. Men were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats when he assembled and gathered them in accordance with a plan; he introduced them to every useful and honourable occupation, though they cried out against it at first because of its novelty, and then when through reason and eloquence they had listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a kind and gentle folk. To me, at least, it does not seem possible that a mute and voiceless wisdom could have turned men suddenly from their habits and introduced them to different patterns of life. Consider another point; after cities had been established how could it have been brought to pass that men should learn to keep faith and observe justice and become accustomed to obey others voluntarily and believe not only that they must work for the common good but even sacrifice life itself, unless men had been able by eloquence to persuade their fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason? Certainly only a speech at the same time powerful and entrancing could have induced one who had great physical strength to submit to justice without violence, so that he suffered himself to be put on a par with those among whom he could excel, and abandoned voluntarily a most agreeable custom, especially since this custom had already acquired through lapse of time the force of a natural right. (*De Inventione* 1.2.2-3)[2]

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2. Ac si volumus huius rei quae vocatur eloquentia, sive artis sive studi sive exercitationis cuiusdam sive facultatis ab natura profectae considerare principium, reperiemus id ex honestissimis causis natum atque optimis rationibus profectum.Nam fuit quoddam tempus cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur et sibi victu fero vitam propagabant, nec ratione animi quicquam, sed pleraque viribus corporis administrabant; nondum divinae religionis, non humani offici ratio colebatur, nemo nuptias viderat legitimas, non certos quisquam aspexerat liberos, non, ius aequabile quid utilitatis haberet, acceperat. Ita propter errorem atque inscientiam caeca ac temeraria dominatrix animi cupiditas ad se explendam viribus corporis abutebatur, perniciosissimis satellitibus.

In these three passages, we may see the continued relevance and appeal of a few fundamental themes, crossing Greek and Roman culture: first, speech as central to human civic or communal identity; second, speech as means of humanity's collective survival and success; and finally, the need for speech to be tempered by intellect, wisdom, and a sense of obligation to others. We might view each of these passages as affirming and appealing to a sense of *civic identity*, an understanding of how one relates to others within a community and to that community's civic institutions. As Takis Poulakos suggests, key to this self-organization was a "collective self-understanding" that informed the group as to the possible and desirable forms of civic and political participation: that is, rhetoric and speech defined and reinforced ways of engaging with communal problems and participating in cultural institutions (1997, 21). This dissertation investigates the idea of a distinctly medieval relationship between rhetoric and civic identity, suggesting that rhetoric continued to be studied under the auspices of a wider civic, moral, and religious

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Quo tempore quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens cognovit quae materia esset et quanta ad maximas res opportunitas in animis inesset hominum, si quis eam posset elicere et praecipiendo meliorem reddere; qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam compulit unum in locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam primo propter insolentiam reclamantes, deinde propter rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et immanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos. Ac mihi quidem videtur hoc nec tacita nec inops dicendi sapientia perficere potuisse ut homines a consuetudine subito converteret et ad diversas rationes vitae traduceret. Age vero, urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iustitiam retinere discerent et aliis parere sua voluntate consuescerent ac non modo labores excipiendos communis commodi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent, qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea quae ratione invenissent eloquentia persuadere potuissent? Profecto nemo nisi gravi ac suavi commotus oratione, cum viribus plurimum posset, ad ius voluisset sine vi descendere, ut inter quos posset excellere, cum eis se pateretur aequari et sua voluntate a iucundissima consuetudine recederet quae praesertim iam naturae vim obtineret propter vetustatem.

education program akin to the study of *paideia* in antiquity, which defined the individual's civic and political obligations to others and to society itself. Rhetoric, along with other essentially ethical disciplines (such as moral philosophy) that sought to understood human culture and social interactions, helped to define the activities one participated and relationships one had to other members of a given civic and political culture.

The following chapters contend that the Isocretean conception of rhetoric as a form of education and political expression that furthers civic identity and aides in the resolution of practical issues continued well into the Middle Ages. In furthering this argument, I necessarily challenge past scholarship that has focused predominantly on medieval rhetorical theories oriented toward the composition of texts in certain limited genres, a tradition I will consider more fully momentarily. However, at this juncture I wish only to suggest that, while I intended to challenge the relative historiographic weight afforded to these traditions, these traditions obviously existed and represent a crucial aspect of medieval rhetoric. Here, I wish only to highlight an alternative strand of thought that in attempted to provide an intellectual justification for these forms of composition, situating them within a moral-philosophical framework. Specifically, in this dissertation I have sought to investigate medieval rhetoric's role in cultivating political subjectivities. Drawing from Kathleen Lamp's discussion of rhetoric in non-democratic societies, I view medieval "culture [as] heavily influenced by rhetorical theory" with the goal of examining how "in turn, culture guided civic participation and rhetorical practice" (Lamp 2013a, 5). In contrast to past studies of the rhetoric of the Middle Ages, I seek to

discover and understand the ways in which rhetoric interacted with civic identity across cultures and classes to define modes of public participation.

In particular, I examine specific moments in which the medieval third estate—manual laborers, as opposed to clergy or nobility—became the subject of rhetorical theory or practice with the goal of constructing ideals of citizenship for that group. My goal in doing so is two-fold: first, to demonstrate that medieval rhetoric continued to function as a civic art tasked with creating, maintaining, and occasionally subverting accepted civic norms; and second, to better understand how medieval rhetorical theory aided in "constituting citizenship as an embodiable *topos*" where the ideal of civic "labor functions as a discursive performance of citizenship" not only for elite groups but also for everyday medieval citizens (Keohane 2016, 67). While several scholars, particularly Kellie Robertson, have argued for the importance of labor in indexing medieval identity, these studies have typically remained focused on either late medieval England, literary depictions of labor, or both (Robertson and Uebel 2004; Robertson 2006). Comparatively less attention has been paid to the role labor played in medieval rhetorical theory and in establishing a sense of identity in earlier periods of England and in continental contexts. The goal of this study is thus to contribute to growing interest in these questions while highlighting the unique role rhetoric played in defining medieval civic identity.

In doing so, I hope to follow the lead of Alex Novikoff, who has investigated the spread of scholastic disputation, "especially its extension into other, related spheres of cultural activity that did not immediately depend on the schools in which it first developed" (2013, 3). My argument is that rhetoric continued to function as an important aspect of the training and education of citizens, and that the ideals of what I will term—

following John O. Ward— "generalized rhetoric" (the forms of broad rhetorical theory and practice most commonly found in medieval schools and universities) influenced other forms of education beyond the spheres of those schools. Rhetoric was key in constructing an idealized civic identity in service of both secular and religious goals at a variety of levels. This type of identity formation took many forms and occurred in many venues, including grammatical education, didactic popular art, and technical translation. In forwarding this argument, I intend to make a case for the continued civic functions of the art of rhetoric in the Middle Ages broadly.

Overview of Chapters

In the following chapters, I develop individual case studies meant to illustrate my wider historiographic argument—in uniting a series of case studies through a common framework, I aim to demonstrate two things: first, that medieval civic identity was not static and varied across time and space; rather, it attended to local trends and concerns, adapting to unique circumstance. Second, I show that attending to historical identity is a productive historiographical orientation in many instances, rather than in closely defined times or places. In Chapter 2 (Literature Review), I make the case that past approaches to the study of medieval rhetoric have two fundamental shortcomings—namely, that past studies have afforded too much importance to practical genres such as the composition of letters, poetic texts, and sermons, and furthermore that dismissive attitudes toward epideictic forms of rhetoric have limited the research methods that scholars in the history of rhetoric have been willing to employ in their studies of the period.

In Chapter 3 (Methodology and Limitations), I suggest that studies of medieval rhetoric take their methodological and historiographical cues from studies of rhetoric in other historical periods, namely the classical period. Since historians of rhetoric working this era have tended to embrace modes of research that attend more carefully to contextual, architectural, and archeological forms of evidence, their studies offer methods that can be applied to the study of rhetoric in medieval culture as well, resulting in new insights. The remaining chapters each address medieval civic identity in different ways, serving as a specific example of rhetoric and its influence on civic identity and public participation. Chapter 4 begins by examining the idea of medieval citizenship and civic identity broadly with the goal of demonstrating that medieval society also sought to produce both citizens and ideals of citizenship. By drawing from commentaries on Aristotle's *Politics,* commentaries on Cicero's *De Inventione,* and original political treatises such as John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, I argue that medieval thinkers understood citizenship as a relevant concept, and that speech, communication, and rhetoric were understood as central to an orderly and beneficial civic life. I then briefly relate these commentaries to contemporary philosophy that has theorized the experience of the citizen and civic subjectivities as dependent on cultural structures and systems of thought that influence social ideals and behavior. In doing so, I aim to show that while persuasion in medieval society is often viewed as depending largely on appeals to authority or open coercion, especially when directed toward everyday audiences, rhetoric was in fact frequently directed at the lowest classes to model desirable modes of behavior. Moreover, even when manual laborers were not the audience of rhetorical practice, they were in fact frequently invoked as a type of model citizen who completes

their labor in service of the common good. In this way, the silent laborer is held up and idealized as a model citizen, providing an exemplar to members of other social classes as well.

In Chapter 5, I focus on early rhetorical instruction in an Anglo-Saxon monastic context to show how appeals to everyday labor were connected to idealized forms of civic participation. Specifically, I argue that the early childhood pedagogical text Ælfrīc's *Colloquy*—a text wherein young monastic learners debate the merits of their professions in terms of their value to society—shows the influence of both the pedagogical methods and moral and civic focus of the *progymnasmata* of antiquity. By investigating pedagogical texts and their relationship to classical forms of rhetorical instruction, my analysis suggests that Anglo-Saxon rhetorical education served to idealize relationships between multiple tiers of society by working in concert with early grammatical instruction. By asking students to compose speeches and texts as if they were members of other professions, Anglo-Saxon rhetorical education sought to build understanding and empathy across classes to promote social unity in service of religious ideals outlined in the *Rule of Benedict*.

Chapter 6 argues for the influence of Brunetto Latini's *Li Livres Dou Tresor*'s discussions of manual and verbal labor on the rhetorical tradition of 13th and 14th century England. Specifically, building from James J. Murphy's consideration of Latini's impact on Gower's *Confessio Amantis*, I suggest that Latini's encyclopedic work had immense influence on Middle English authors such as John Trevisa and Geoffrey Chaucer, who advocated for vernacular composition in their *Dialogue Between the Lord and Clerk on Translation* and *Treatise on the Astrolabe*, respectively. Drawing from

manuscript distributions first observed by other scholars such as Julia Bolton Holloway, I suggest Latini's treatment of rhetoric would have been an important text for late medieval England's understanding of both the art of rhetoric and its relationship to civic life. More specifically, this chapter suggests that by combining Ciceronian rhetoric and Aristotelian moral and political philosophy, Latini represented rhetoric as a politically neutral Aristotelian *techne*. In doing so, Latini defended rhetoric by comparing the civic labor of rhetoricians and politicians to the innocuous civic participation of manual laborers, such as that modeled in Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* and the windows of Chartres (to be discussed in a later chapter). However, at the same time, the Florentine rhetorician participated in an on-going philosophical tradition that questioned Aristotle's exclusion of *chirotechnai*, or manual laborers, from civic society. This chapter, then, examines the political and ethical implications of the inclusion of laborers within political systems and the identification of rhetoric and other language arts as *techne*—a category Aristotle devalued in comparison to arts associated with practical reason. Latini's works, which collapse the distinction between *phronesis* and *techne* even as they borrow from Aristotelian thought, position rhetoric as a teachable and civic art concerned with securing the common good. This collapse, I contend, has important implications for both the Italian communes to which Latini refers, as well as later medieval movements advocating for increased translation and access to knowledge.

Chapter 7 represents a shift in both textual focus and approach, as in this half, I turn my attention to fewer theoretical and pedagogical treatises and more toward specific instances of rhetorical practice directed toward popular audiences. Specifically, this chapter examines the civic messages of the stained-glass windows of Chartres cathedral,

which portray farmers, wine-sellers, coopers, wheelwrights, and other manual laborers. It begins by illustrating the frequent reference to images and persuasion throughout the early Middle Ages in the writings of Bernard of Clairvaux and Basil the Great to suggest that visuals were viewed as important modes of communication for popular audiences, and that these messages were informed by rhetorical theory and concerned with modeling civic and religious behavior. Then, situating the works of John of Salisbury and Thierry of Chartres within the context of the well-known Chartres cathedral school, I argue that their writings provide evidence that the cathedral's windows functioned as rhetorical artifacts which idealize labor in service of religious ideals, relying on Ciceronian mnemonics and Aristotelian *phantasia*. Through a contextual consideration of the Chartres windows, I suggest that when interpreted in light of the fourth crusade the windows show a concern for modeling modes of citizenship that associate manual labor with higher, religious goods, as well as normalizing and justifying the looting of Byzantine relics that were brought back to Western cathedrals such as Chartres.

In Chapter 8, I analyze the rhetorical activity associated with pilgrims at a medieval shrine with the goal of examining the available evidence of rhetorical activity in terms of the "symbolic acts, rituals, practices, events [that] might help us understand the persuasive practices of a largely oral and performative people" (Fredal 2002, 593). I examine an instance of medieval vernacular discourse in its original context, focusing not on the prevailing approaches to rhetorical theory common within the period, but rather on creating an (always tentative and provisional) description of the actual rhetorical practices of a marginalized group of people, as represented through available sources—in this case, the practices attributed to visitors to a monastic shrine to Saint Leonard, the

patron saint of the imprisoned. In doing so, I argue that popular ritual practices in the Middle Ages functioned as performative claims to citizenship, and that those claims speak to an internalized civic identity that was actively claimed by everyday groups of people. These claims position the suffering of the body as a marker of virtuous public and civic behavior, offering an implicit critique of elite behavior and abuses of power. However, I also suggest that the vernacular rhetorical practice which I attempt to critique is enabled by elite literate practices that accommodated vernacular rhetorical production within an existing system of circulation, speaking to the need to take seriously the capability of official forms of discourse to represent the rhetorical production of marginalized groups.

Finally, in Chapter 9, I offer a framework for approaching the place of rhetoric in non-democratic civic life based on the preceding chapters. Here, I argue that by considering rhetoric's place in educational systems, its relationship to academic access, and to forms of vernacular cultural expression, scholars in the history of rhetoric can better understand rhetoric's role in building and maintaining communities with values diverging from Greco-Roman society. These varied elements allow one to better understand rhetoric's role in constructing civic identity and, in doing so, challenge the oft advanced claim that medieval rhetoric served only limited civic purposes.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Rhetoric had a civic role in the Middle Ages, though it is fair to say that it was not the role it had in antiquity. This difference, however, has often been misinterpreted by historians of rhetoric as loss. Indeed, the Middle Ages have often been perceived as an era of lack and decay, primarily because rhetoric is often seen as losing its connections to political and civic life after the decline of the Roman Empire. In this review of literature, I intend to suggest that the lack of attention given to the civic aspects of medieval rhetorical theory and practice stems primarily from two assumptions: first, the assumption that due to a lack of democratic societies, there were no "rhetorical" audiences (in Lloyd Bitzer's sense)[3] in the period, and thus no purposes to which rhetoric might be applied; and second, the assumption that rhetoric and its disciplinary history are best studied as a series of theoretical texts, whose influence on each other should be reconstructed. As Susan Jarratt observed in the first "Octalog," "historians of rhetoric have taken as their materials for the most part texts explicitly calling themselves 'rhetorics'" (Octalog 1988, 9). That is, little attention has generally been paid to texts that fall outside the explicitly named and defined canon of texts of rhetorical theory—this is particularly true of the scholarship in the history of rhetoric focusing on the medieval period. These assumptions—a lack of rhetorical audiences and the need to trace

3. Bitzer argues that audiences are "rhetorical" when "The rhetor alters reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such a character that the audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of change." See Bitzer, Lloyd F. 1968. "The Rhetorical Situation." *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 1.1: 4.

theoretical influence—pervade much of the scholarship in the history of rhetoric focusing on the Middle Ages.

The force of these assumptions is perhaps clearest in rhetorical studies' more recent attempts to offer bird's-eye views of rhetoric's disciplinary development. For instance, Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg's *The Rhetorical Tradition*, arguably the standard text for teaching the history of Western rhetoric, asserts that "during this thousand year span [the Middle Ages], much Greco-Roman learning was lost, Christian leaders frequently denounced what was left, and Greco-Roman public forms of rhetoric all but disappeared," ignoring many medieval theoretical advancements and overlooking the period's reliance on classical texts (1990, 431). Similarly, in a chapter titled "Medieval Fragmentation," Brian Vickers argues that rhetoric can only maintain its integrity as "a discipline essential to the life of a democracy," under certain social conditions, and that "When emperors or dictators rule . . . rhetoric's role in society inevitably declines" (1988, 214).

Historian of rhetoric George Kennedy furthers a similar argument, heavily privileging what he refers to as "primary rhetoric," or forms of rhetoric concerned with deliberative and judicial issues. Kennedy also suggests that rhetoric is necessarily tied to the democratic state, noting that "With the end of orderly civic and economic life [in Late Antiquity] . . . the reasons for rhetorical education in its traditional form declined" (1999, 196). Instead, Kennedy positions the rhetorics of the Middle Ages as largely literary and epideictic modes reminiscent of the sophistic discourses of antiquity. The prevailing narrative in most histories of rhetoric is that the Middle Ages represent a significant decline for rhetoric's status as a discipline—a decline in which rhetoric loses any claims

to civic life and becomes concerned primarily with poetic style and the composition of letters and sermons.

However, this perception of decline is largely a function of how one defines rhetoric. Rhetoric in these above cases is limited to the application of theoretical precepts to speech delivered within state sanctioned deliberative and judicial bodies—a definition that excludes large portions of antiquity, in addition to most of the Middle Ages. Consequently, these interpretations assume that rhetoric should be narrowly defined in terms of its nearly mythical Greek origins: "as oral persuasion in service of the polis," as a vital and necessary component of an idealized democratic state which is supported through deliberative and judicial institutions (Donavin 1996, 51). This definition is problematic, for several reasons. First, as mentioned above, large portions of antiquity could hardly be described as hosting democratic societies, or even state-sanctioned deliberative bodies, yet these same cultures also developed complex rhetorical traditions, particularly poetic, pedagogical, and epideictic traditions (Walker 2000; Walker 2011; Pernot 2014). Furthermore, such a definition glosses over the fact that when rhetoric and democracy co-existed in antiquity, the democratic process was open to only a select few; political participation was limited exclusively to landed and wealthy men who could claim citizenship in either a Greek polis or Republican Rome. Women, slaves, the poor, and foreign non-citizens all lacked access to conventional forms of democratic political participation, and thus, in Vickers and Kennedy's estimation, the ability to engage with or produce "rhetoric."

Historians of rhetoric focusing more narrowly on the Latin Middle Ages have not generally strayed far from such claims, with many following the assessment of Martin

Camargo, who has gone so far as to say that medieval rhetoric had "little to no connection vital to civil life" (1983, 101). Similar assessments of medieval rhetoric's civic roles can be seen in even the earliest studies of medieval rhetoric. For instance, one of the earliest treatments of the medieval liberal arts is Paul Abelson's *The Seven Liberal Arts*, which examines the development of the medieval Trivium and Quadrivium. Abelson defines rhetoric in the period as intimately tied to the composition of letters in prose. It is worth quoting Abelson at length, as his assessment of the place of rhetoric in medieval culture finds expression in much other early 20th century work. Abelson begins his chapter on rhetoric:

> While in the other branches [of the liberal arts], grammar especially, the methods and ideals of the later Empire were largely followed, being modified only to meet the changing requirements of new conditions, the study of rhetoric assumed an entirely new character. On the one hand the old practical rhetorical training of the Roman period was almost entirely discarded or was reduced to a mere mastery of the technical rules of the science. On the other hand, one insignificant phase of classical rhetoric—the study of the Epistle and "Dictamen"—was overemphasized and developed to such an extent as to displace in the curriculum the study of rhetoric proper. (1965, 52)

By "rhetoric proper" Abelson means civic oratory, a genre largely replaced by the epistles and *dictamen* that he notes dominated university level rhetorical instruction in Northern Europe and Italy. After noting the replacement of oral civic genres with arts of letter writing, Abelson next addresses the availability of various rhetorical treatises from the classical and medieval periods, with specific reference to Cicero. Though Cicero and Quintilian were available and read in the medieval period, Abelson finds fault with medieval educators for not drawing from these resources, relegating them in his eyes primarily to a role as models of Latin style. The remainder of Abelson's chapter on rhetoric discusses the rise of letter-writing, which developed through a need for

professionally trained and literate individuals to administer civil society. In Italy in particular, Abelson notes, letter-writing would develop as its own important academic subject and professional occupation, eventually becoming an entirely separate field of study, the arts of notary. While Abelson treats this change as a dramatic shift unique to the Middle Ages, it is worth noting that rhetoric, as a subject of formal study, had been an avenue by which one might secure government work or advance themselves financially or politically since the classical period, as has been argued by Jeffrey Walker (2011, 220).

Abelson's study perhaps overemphasized the importance of letter-writing to the detriment of other aspects of medieval rhetorical study. Louis J. Paetow's *The Arts Course and Medieval Universities* gave a relatively more complete picture of the teaching of rhetoric within the universities of Northern Europe, however (1910). The main contribution of this work stems from its thorough treatment of the development of the university as a site of learning and the various changes these institutions underwent over time. In Paetow's assessment, rhetoric—and essentially all other of the liberal arts—are subsumed under dialectic or logic in the medieval university. Logic in this tradition is taught almost entirely through the works of Aristotle, such as the *Analytics* and the other texts of the *Organon*. Given the period and geographical focus of Paetow's study, his claims are clearly influenced by the rising prominence of the Scholastic philosophers. The Scholastic method, Paetow suggests, served to limit rhetoric's role within the university setting, as it encouraged closer attention to logic, dialectic, and the more philosophical works of Aristotle preserved from the classical period. Along with the Scholastic's renewed interest in logic and the works of Aristotle also came a renewed

interest in what we might call empirical science. Paetow thus concludes that rhetoric and grammar were neglected as other intellectual pursuits such as these rose in prominence within the universities. Both grammar and rhetoric were still taught, but Paetow sees these subjects as rather barren in the period, though important if one is to understand the resurgence of classical thought in the Renaissance. Thus, the narrative which Paetow offers is one in which rhetoric functions only as an art subsumed to the more prominent study of dialectic.

Charles Sears Baldwin's *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* was somewhat more influential in the field than the previously mentioned studies. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the title of Baldwin's work, Baldwin sees medieval rhetoric as fundamentally concerned with issues of style and the use of figures, concerned only with embellishment. In Baldwin's view, medieval rhetoric was a descendant of the sophistic discourse of antiquity, which he associated more with style than invention. This sentiment will become an often-repeated one in scholarship covering the period. As Martin Camargo notes, the literary evidence of the Middle Ages—in which fictional characters comment upon or express their feelings about rhetoric—likely contributes to this perception as well. Camargo states:

> There is no shortage of medieval testimony that seems to confirm Baldwin's equation of medieval rhetoric with stylistic ornament . . . to the unlearned ('burel') Franklin [of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales], Cicero is at best a name and rhetoric is the flowery, painted speech he deems more appropriate . . . he is clearly expressing the 'man on the street's' conception of rhetoric, which is not much different from the popular conception of rhetoric in the twenty-first century. (2003, 27)

Camargo is quick to suggest that the opinion of the Franklin should not serve as evidence of rhetoric's wider social or civic functions, however. He sees that the Franklin's views of

rhetoric are tied to his character—his opinions are part of his dramatic and fictional role, a function of his background and that character's place in society and less a commentary on the art itself. Moreover, it is worth noting as well that in Middle English, a Franklin is one who is a free person—in other words, not a serf. That the Franklin has even heard of Cicero is perhaps a testament to rhetoric's continued role in public life, if Chaucer's compositions are to be taken as a form of evidence pertinent to medieval society and the social world. Thus, Camargo divorces the Franklin's opinion from what he sees as rhetoric's place in medieval society. Baldwin, on the other hand, is less certain. Like many other scholars cited above, Baldwin connects stylistic embellishment with the degradation of public forms of oratory and the societies that foster them. He states:

> But what subject matter of real significance has oratory when it is barred from discussion of present policy? Here appears a strong external cause of the spread of sophistic [rhetoric]. The sophistical trend, already marked, was furthered by the narrowing of public discussion. Of the three fields of oratory distinguished by Aristotle, deliberative, forensic, and occasional, the first was restricted by political changes. It faded with democracy . . . the only field left free was the third, occasional oratory, encomium, or panegyric, the commemoration of persons and days, the address of welcome, the public lecture. (1959, 5)

Removed from the pressing concerns of civil society, rhetoric becomes concerned with personal display, a fault Baldwin ascribes to the sophistic traditions but sees as magnified by the spread of non-democratic societies throughout the Middle Ages. As sophistic rhetoric rose in prominence during the Second Sophistic, Baldwin argues, it became entrenched in the late antique educational systems that would, in some form, carry on into the Middle Ages. As such, the medieval pedagogical tradition is essentially one of display and is divorced from the more philosophical tradition that Baldwin associates with Aristotle, Cicero's *De Oratore* and Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*.

However, Baldwin sees elements of civic oratory in the medieval period in the *dictamen* but also in preaching. The exemplar in this regard is St. Augustine who, per Baldwin, revived the "ancient idea of moving men to truth; and it gives to the vital counsels of Cicero a new emphasis for the urgent tasks of preaching the word of God" (1959, 51). Thus, while rhetoric and traces of the classical tradition can be found in the pedagogical tradition of the Middle Ages, they find a clearer expression, per Baldwin, in preaching and *dictamen*; rhetoric in the period can therefore be concerned with a certain form of civic oratory, and not just the composition of documents, but that oratory is limited only to the pulpit. Anything beyond this must be thought of as an essentially sophistic discourse primarily concerned with display, divorced from political and civil matters.

Baldwin was not the first to draw conclusions about the place of rhetoric in medieval society from the pages of Chaucer, however. John M. Manly's *Chaucer and the Rhetoricians* took up this task some years earlier. Manly and Baldwin share many of the same views of medieval rhetoric; for both, rhetoric is about the composition of documents, poetic and official. Manly argues that the influence of rhetorical theory can be seen in Chaucer's work, and concludes that Chaucer therefore likely studied rhetoric at some length. Given Chaucer's status at court, this would not be surprising, though scholars of medieval rhetoric such as James J. Murphy have disputed this claim (1964). However, in contrast to Baldwin, Manly's analysis extends beyond the instances in which Chaucer's characters mention rhetoric or rhetorical terminology. Rather, he seeks to illuminate how medieval rhetoric as a system of thought aided in Chaucer's compositions. In defining medieval rhetoric, Manly offers little beyond other reductionist views of

rhetoric in the period. He states "Fortunately for our inquiry, the Middle Ages knew only one rhetorical system and drew its precepts from few and well-known sources. Moreover, there was little development of the doctrines or variety in the modes of presentation" (1926, 5). The chief source of these doctrines was likely Geoffrey of Vinsauf, who Manly suggests offers many of the figures and structures employed by Chaucer in his creative works. Geoffrey's precepts and Chaucer's implementation serve as exemplars for this form of medieval rhetoric. Manly then breaks down medieval rhetoric into 3 main concerns: arrangement, amplification/abbreviation, and style and ornamentation. Like many other historians of rhetoric dealing with the period, Manly identifies one strand of medieval rhetoric and aligns it with a sophistic rhetoric of display. Prose and poetic compositions from the period are defined by these concerns. Manly then analyzes a variety of Chaucer's works to demonstrate the effect of these three categories, with special attention paid to style and ornamentation.

James J. Murphy's *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* marked a turning point in scholarship on medieval rhetoric. As Martin Camargo notes, the book "put an end to the most extreme reductionist histories . . . [providing] a much richer, more balanced image of medieval rhetoric" (2003, 26). In *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,* Murphy defines rhetoric as the establishment of rules or precepts to govern the production of future discourse. Within the first page of his text, Murphy declares his intention to focus on such practical instructive treatises; he states "Any study of the development of Western theories of communication must begin with the first impulses toward laying down precepts . . .. The most prescriptive of these arts is that of rhetoric" (1974, 1). Tracing medieval developments from their earliest Classical antecedents, Murphy eventually subdivides the

rhetoric of the Middle Ages into three main categories of medieval rhetorical arts—the *ars poetriae*, or arts of grammar and composition, the *ars dictaminis*, or arts of letter writing, and finally the *ars praedicandi,* or arts of preaching. These genres thus came to dominate scholarship in medieval rhetoric.

The development of these categories, as Martin Camargo notes, "licensed a broader sort of reductionism that represented medieval rhetoric as consisting essentially of three 'arts' . . . as embodied in the textbooks used to teach them" (2003, 27). Sharon Crowley also referred to this reductionism in her speech at the first Octalog: "Professor Murphy has taught us that there are three major traditions in medieval rhetoric: the art of letter writing, the art of sermon making, the art of poetry making. It strikes me that it's very easy to turn that into an exam question: What are the three major traditions of medieval rhetoric? I'm sure Professor Murphy doesn't intend to have that happen to his work; we certainly wouldn't want that to happen to any of our work. But it does" (Octalog 1988, 14).

The trend Camargo and Crowley refer to speaks to both the continued influence of Murphy's scholarship, and the impact of his historiographical frame on the sub-field of medieval rhetoric. While it may not have been the intent of Murphy or the field at large, these three categories typically replace Aristotle's three genera of rhetoric as a convenient shorthand and taxonomy for discussing the generic conventions of the rhetoric of the Middle Ages, and many notable scholars have defined their work in terms of these categories. Martin Camargo, for instance, has largely focused on the *ars dictaminis*; Marjorie Curry Woods, despite offering serious challenges to the aforementioned

orientations toward the period has largely focused on preceptive[4] Latin grammars and prose composition, as part of the medieval pedagogical tradition writ large (Camargo 1991; Camargo 1995; Woods 2010).

While Murphy's three major categories did make room for new scholarship in a variety of areas by emphasizing that medieval rhetoric was not solely concerned with style, it also ultimately encouraged a view that sought texts and modes of study that conformed to Murphy's three aforementioned arts—preaching, letter writing, and grammatical education—and that also privileged attention to theoretical texts focused on preceptive advice for discourse and composition. Yet, even though this taxonomy proved ultimately to be limiting, as Camargo has noted, Murphy's text also helped both to expand knowledge of the arts of letter writing and provided one of the first major discussions of the importance of preaching to the rhetoric of the period, dealing with the subject in considerably more detail than earlier treatments. Thus, one of the book's major contributions is that it helped to shift the field away from the sole study of *dictamen* or compositional instruction concerned with issues of style that characterized the earlier studies mentioned here. Murphy also identified several distinct traditions of rhetoric surviving in the Middle Ages, rather than the lone sophistic tradition identified by Baldwin and alluded to by Manly and others (though the sophistic tradition is still acknowledged by Murphy as well). Furthermore, by beginning with a chapter on the survival of the classical tradition, Murphy also demonstrates how foundational this culture of rhetoric was to medieval education. However, his book also largely ignored

[4] Preceptive treatises offer rules informing future production of text or speech.

some prominent Ciceronian and Boethian strands of medieval rhetoric, which perhaps provided the clearest connection to the rhetorical theories of the classical period. Cicero's works experienced a remarkable survival in the period, and were also the subject of a rich tradition of commentary and integration into other texts. While Murphy's work did not fully address this phenomenon, it would later be more fully explored by other scholars, such as John O. Ward.

More recently, Thomas Conley's *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* is one of the few recent and broad overviews of the history of rhetoric to view the Middle Ages as complex, interesting, and unique in its own ways. As Conley notes, "the history of rhetoric in the West is marked by a succession of intellectual upheavals no less striking than the cultural and political ones" (1994, 72). Conley tentatively divides the Middle Ages into three periods, but notes that such a strategy is only superficially effective. The first period is defined by St. Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine* and represents an attempt to preserve elements of Ciceronian rhetorical theory and practice; the encyclopedic works of Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville and Martianus Capella are representative of this period as well. The second period deals with a more speculative form of rhetoric arising during the 11th and 12th centuries, closely associated with Scholastic philosophy. As in other assessments of this sub-period in the Middle Ages, Conley associates this form of speculative rhetoric with the rising prominence of dialectic and increased interest in the Boethian strand of rhetoric, again at the expense of Cicero's more civically-minded works. Finally, Conley's third period encompasses the practical rhetorics and treatises dealing with letter-writing, preaching, notary, and other arts tailored to specific social functions or institutions.

Yet, as Conley notes, "while it is clearly possible to proceed in this manner, the more one examines the available material, the less advisable it seems to do so" (1994, 73). The traditions Conley defines, though certainly visible within the period, exist independently of one another in different geographic areas at different times; early treatises show the character of later periods, and vice versa. Thus, Conley exposes one of the major problems with most historiographical approaches to the rhetoric of the Middle Ages; the period is enormous and varied, dispersed spatially, culturally, chronologically, and theoretically in ways that make any unitary conception of the period impossible. However, Conley's final assessment before attempting to survey the period is worth quoting at length:

> Medieval rhetoric was far more than a mere transmission of mummified traditions that were poorly understood by those who transmitted them. The Middle Ages are often represented as stagnant and backward, well deserving of the contempt Renaissance scholars were to heap upon them. It is clear, however, that such a representation fails dismally to do justice to the intellectual complexity and sophistication of medieval rhetorics. (1994, 73)

Conley's assessment of medieval rhetoric is telling; much of the scorn, or at the very least disinterest, directed toward medieval rhetoric stems from (largely Early Modern) misunderstandings about medieval rhetoric's character.

These misunderstandings are the product of Renaissance critiques which allowed the humanists of that time to distance themselves from what they saw as dense and restrictive Scholasticism. However, even early studies of medieval rhetoric have discovered a continued role for rhetoric in Scholastic philosophy. Richard McKeon's "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," offers one of the most potentially productive orientations toward the study of rhetoric in the Middle Ages for precisely this reason; the analysis of

rhetoric's role in medieval intellectual culture is not much influenced by Renaissance critiques of the period. Despite its distant publication date, McKeon's article offers a progressive and enlightening view of the period compared to even later writings on the subject. For instance, McKeon takes great care to establish that the history of rhetoric is one constantly shifting definitions. He states:

> Rhetoricians from Cicero to Ramus have in common a persistent care in defining their art, and it seems plausible that a history of rhetoric traced in terms of its matter and function, as successively specified, might follow the sense of altering definitions, the differentiation of various conceptions of rhetoric itself, and the spread of the devices of rhetoric to subject matters far from those ordinarily ascribed to it. (1942, 3)

In short, unlike many of those who would later study the period, McKeon recognizes that the prevailing views of classical Greek and Roman rhetoric do not accurately describe the rhetorical activity of the Middle Ages. Medieval rhetoric is not the civic rhetoric of the Greco-Roman world, but neither is it without its own civic functions.

As McKeon notes, while rhetoric stands as its own subject, it "nonetheless must be discussed in application to some subject matter" but that this subject matter might range from dialectic, to theology, to politics (1942, 4-5). As such, rhetoric, he suggests, was more far reaching than often imagined; the questions rhetoric addressed "were not technical questions which were discussed by a few learned men, but distinctions which entered into all parts of medieval culture and life" (1942, 11). In these ways, McKeon's work foreshadows later studies by scholars such as Mary Carruthers, Alex Novikoff, John O. Ward, and Rita Copeland, who have investigated rhetoric's influence on diverse subjects such as monastic composition, mnemonics, disputation, and translation theory. McKeon's view, as well as the works of Carruthers and Copeland, represent a productive

strand in the history of medieval rhetoric to which this study seeks to contribute; in short, these works all seek to expand the "something else" that rhetoric can be considered in relation to. Such studies attempt to challenge modern scholarship which "has tended to visualize medieval critical discourses on the terms of grand scientific réctis inherited from the nineteenth century: the macro-structures of theology, learned systems of exegesis, philology, and the subdisciplines . . . of poetics, stylistics, and literary history" (Copeland 1996, 5). Rather, following Susan Jarratt's discussion of sophistic historiography, this study attempts to expand rhetoric's focus beyond theoretical texts or public oratory and into a variety of genres: it seeks "a redefinition and consequent expansion of the materials and subject matter of rhetorical history" (1991, 12). The next chapter will discuss how this study seeks to make its claims in more detail, providing a discussion of its methodology and limitations.

CHAPTER 3

METHOD, LIMITATIONS, AND APPROACH

Like any wide-ranging study, this dissertation has several limitations. First and foremost, it is important to recognize that the arguments here are not meant to be exhaustive or fully comprehensive. Rather, the introduction and case studies presented are intended to demonstrate a common concern across the later Middle Ages for rhetoric and its relationship with civic identity, in several different times and locations, to argue for the utility of exploring an approach to the history of rhetoric that continues to regard medieval rhetoric as civic. The spatial and temporal distribution of my studies is a purposeful choice intended to emphasize the wide-ranging possibility of such an approach to historiography for the Middle Ages, an organizational structure indebted to Conley's observation that it is difficult to forward meaningful broad categories when describing the rhetorical traditions of the Western Middle Ages (an arbitrary periodization that spans an entire continent and a whole millennium). Closely researched yet disparate case studies, united by a common concern and framework, seem the best way to cope with this difficulty.

Moreover, while I suggest that a distinct thread of civic rhetoric existed throughout the later Middle Ages, I do not intend to disprove the existence or diminish the importance of other genres of rhetorical theory and practice, such as preaching or letter writing, as these strands of medieval rhetoric clearly existed and had their own unique goals and functions. Rather, I wish only to suggest that an additional category of rhetorical theory and practice exists, primarily in the Scholastic and commentary traditions that continued to emphasize rhetoric's civic roles. The case studies presented

here, then, are meant not only to inform understanding of the historical and cultural moments they investigate, but also to suggest possibilities for considering similar themes in other places and times. In this way, the studies are meant more to be illustrative than comprehensive.

In terms of focus, this study is also limited in that is largely treats what John Ward terms a generalized approach to rhetoric, as mentioned above. As Ward notes, such texts have a few main defining features:

> These texts will have been used in the formal study of preceptive rhetorical theory in the cathedrals, monasteries, universities, *studia,* chanceries, households and other consumption points of the middle ages, and they will display a *generalized orientation.* They will not have been written solely to serve a *particular applied art* within the broad field of rhetoric, but will have been addressed in general to the topic of oral and written persuasion in various social contexts. Such texts will not, by and large, be texts on the art of letter writing, or on the composition of specific legal and business documents and instruments, or the composition of sermons or prayers, or the art of writing competent verse *ecphrases,* epics or panegyrics. (1995, 56-7, emphasis original)

In contrast to Ward's own study, however, this dissertation does consider some treatises touching on rhetoric's role in ethics and political and civic matters, a necessity given its subject matter. However, like Ward's own study, this dissertation rarely focuses on what Conley terms the "practical rhetorics," or those forms of rhetoric associated with preaching, letter writing, and notary mentioned above. This choice is deliberate; generalized rhetoric represents the art as it was likely taught in the lower levels of schools of all levels—that is, in cathedral schools, monasteries, and in the Arts course of the medieval university, since many other degrees required the completion of the Arts course first (Leff 1968). In primarily considering such forms of rhetoric, this study remains focused on those levels of education that were most commonly accessible to students

from a variety of backgrounds, and therefore those contexts in which cultivating a defined civic identity and political subjectivity would be most important.

As perhaps is clear from the review offered above, criticisms regarding the importance or relative prestige of medieval rhetoric in relationship to the other arts of the Trivium abound in early scholarship focused on the subject. It is perhaps an oft-repeated commonplace that medieval rhetoric lacked civic roles, or was subordinated to logic broadly, or dialectic more specifically, or to law, exegesis, or some other pursuit, as if this were grounds to dismiss with the study of rhetoric in the period entirely.

While I believe it is safe to say that such attitudes are changing, I nonetheless feel compelled to offer at least some defense here. The subordination of an art to another does not diminish the art's utility to a culture—rhetoric, for instance, can simultaneously operate as subordinate to dialectic while maintaining a civic focus, for instance. I operate under the assumption that rhetorical theory and practice is worthy of in-depth study even if ostensibly subordinated to some other end. As John Ward himself notes:

> [Richard McKeon] meant to imply that while we can write about medieval rhetoric in terms of the applied arts of poetry, letter writing, and preaching (for example), we cannot write about rhetoric in the ancient, general guise, since the context for such an art ceased to exist in the middle ages. In fact, however, the continued currency of generalised [sic] texts of Ciceronian rhetorical theory . . . belies this often repeated view. (1995, 58).

Following Ward, this study takes rhetoric to be one part of a broader set of overlapping and intermingling set of academic and social practices; it seeks to recognize that rhetoric existed alongside other philosophic approaches to language and discourse, interacted with and was influenced by those approaches, and ultimately played a role in the development and evolution of a seemingly disparate and unconnected set of practices. Working in

concert with logic, ethics, and other fields, rhetoric's role was not limited to poetic composition, stylistics, or ornamentation. Just as in antiquity, medieval rhetoric existed in a variety of forms—rhetoric as educational program, rhetoric as philosophic inquiry, rhetoric as system of civil thought, rhetoric as *techne.* This study seeks to recognize and accept these competing traditions running throughout the period, though it remains focused on those discussions of rhetoric most concerned with cultivating a specific civic subjectivity.

As such, this study does not attempt to associate medieval rhetoric's overall character with a specific text or set of texts, but rather attempts to trace the changing approaches to the art throughout the period in conjunction with other cultural practices; as Alex Novikoff has argued regarding the evolution of Scholastic disputation, "a more profitable approach will be to trace the development of disputation on the frontiers between private and public spheres and between learned and popular audiences" with an eye toward how concepts and approaches common to one disciplines permeated other aspects of civic life (2013, 4).

What Novikoff describes is closely related to what Debra Hawhee and Christa J. Olsen term "pan-historiography." Hawhee and Olsen define pan-historiography as "writing histories whose temporal scope extends well beyond the span of individual generations" but "can also refer to studies that leap across geographic space, tracking important activities, terms movements, or practices." My method thus adopts a syncretic approach informed by traditional studies of medieval rhetoric relying on manuscript evidence, textual reception and exegesis, as well as contemporary approaches to rhetorical historiography attentive to contextual detail and vernacular cultural and

rhetorical practices. This study takes seriously Rita Copeland's suggestion that historians of medieval thought "reimagine textual and historical relations in smaller, more local, and yet synchronically more complex terms" (Copeland 1996, 5). In doing so, I hope to contribute to scholarship in the history of rhetoric by examining medieval rhetorical practices as they manifested social, historical, and disciplinary moments through the help of a variety of forms of evidence.

One of the main ways by which I have sought to accomplish this goal is to broaden common scholarly assumptions about what counts as a rhetorical artifact. Adopting the historiographical approach of "archaeological rhetoric" from Richard Leo Enos, this dissertation seeks to expand its objects of analysis beyond traditional texts within the book and manuscript tradition, a goal I view as contributing to the sophistic historiography offered by Jarratt as well.

By considering alternative forms of evidence not in place of but rather alongside traditional textual sources such as manuscripts and commentaries, historians of rhetoric can more richly conceptualize the domains in which rhetoric was taught and practiced, thus expanding the material and subject matter associated with rhetoric as a discipline. As Enos notes, methods in the history of rhetoric "can be enriched considerably by assimilating such nontraditional resources as archaeological evidence into our research" (2013, 9). In light of Enos' suggestion, the primary research questions of this study will be addressed through my close consideration of a variety of rhetorical artifacts, ranging from pictorial stained glass windows to complex technical treatises describing scientific instruments. I do so to respond directly to Patricia Bizzell and Susan Jarratt's suggestion that historians of rhetoric "examine the rhetorical activity of a particular historical period

in depth, with traditional, non-traditional, and new texts providing contexts for each other, and all embedded in much thicker historical and cultural contextual descriptions than scholarship has provided heretofore" (2004, 23).

My general method and approach has thus been to take as my starting point a text, artifact, or cultural practice that has not been viewed as traditionally rhetorical, yet shows possible influences of rhetoric as a broadly applicable intellectual practice. By way of example, consider the argument pursued in Chapter 5—that rhetorical exercises resembling the *progymnasmata* aided monastic students in their development of a rhetorical civic identity. Making the case for this line of reasoning involves detailing the available works of grammatical and rhetorical theory available to Ælfrīc as he composed his *Colloquy*—this means situating a text and a historical person within a specific time, place, and culture influenced by material phenomena.

Examples of such phenomena might include political climate, availability of texts, or typical educational approaches and practices; approaching both the *Colloquy* itself and the possible available works of rhetorical and grammatical theory critically in an effort to demonstrate or infer points of similarity and possible influence; and finally, contextualizing the *Colloquy* and the pedagogical approach it represents within a larger social and civic system that values and privileges certain social relationships over others. Investigating this type of contextual information requires ranging broadly from the original source material. For instance, Asser's life of Ælfred provides contextual information about the general pedagogical approach of Anglo-Saxon culture, especially in regards to the arts of discourse. Similarly, the widely-read *Rule of Saint Benedict* helps to situate the *Colloquy* within a more specific monastic sub-culture of grammatical and

rhetorical instruction, thereby illuminating not only the pedagogical approach associated with the *Colloquy* as an educational text, but also the social and civic messages associated with this form of instruction. Lastly, a unique multi-modal medieval text known as the *Monastery Plan of Saint Gall* further suggests that the *Colloquy's* themes of vernacular labor and cross-class unity are tied to religious, social, and civic ideals.

The text or artifact in question serves as a locus for further investigation, contextualization, and interpretation, which then draws on a wide variety of available sources to make conclusions based on probabilistic reasoning and analysis. This approach plays out somewhat differently in each chapter, but all the chapters share a common concern with rhetoric's intersection with civic identity and on combining traditional methods in the history of rhetoric with newer approaches focused on drawing from a wider body of evidence.

Expressed as a series of questions, my line of thought might proceed somewhat as follows: 1. How has a phenomenon, not typically understood as civic or rhetorical, traditionally been interpreted? 2. What theories, practices, and opinions regarding rhetoric and civic life circulated within this time and place? What connections did this culture perceive between rhetoric and the text, artifact, or practice under investigation? 3. What forms of evidence beyond texts of rhetorical theory exist within this period, and what do those forms of evidence offer historians of rhetoric? Do they complicate, question, reaffirm, defend, or disprove current opinion or assumptions? 4. Taken together, what do these forms of evidence tell us about the civic activities and relationships within this time and place? How did rhetoric interact with other forms of civic activity, and in what way might rhetoric have influenced the daily practices of citizenship of everyday people? In

considering these questions, I better theorize how medieval rhetoric continued to define and shape ideals of civic behavior and identity. In doing so, I also show that rhetoric was adapted to suit the civic needs of non-democratic societies emphasizing cooperation and unity, with labor serving as a potent *topos* for reaffirming the civic value of laborers and other everyday people.

CHAPTER 4

EITHER A BEAST OR A GOD: RHETORIC AND THE MIDDLE COURSE

"Man is by nature a political animal," Aristotle famously proclaims in the introductory sections of the *Politics* (1253a); any person "incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal [i.e. a beast] or a god" (1253b). Echoing the Isocratean "Hymn to *Logos,*" this statement held remarkable sway with many later medieval thinkers, particularly those interested in the intersections of rhetoric and civic life. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and John Trevisa would all repeat this same phrase with only minor variations in their own works or commentaries. Suspended between an undesirable state of savagery and a state of divinity few could ever hope to achieve, orderly civic life in cooperation with others was viewed as the prime expression of humanity, as one of the highest goods that might be achieved in the realm of mortal and secular affairs. In many ways mirroring Aristotle's injunction to "find the mean" between two extremes in the pursuit of virtue, civic association with others was understood as a moderate course between an undisciplined and solitary existence, and a highly regulated hermetic existence beyond the realms of normal human relations. This dissertation is an attempt to understand the role that rhetoric played in pursuing this middle course.

To understand this middle course, it is worth examining the extremes that Aristotle identifies: that is, divinity and savagery. In the Middle Ages, to live a hermetic life was not necessarily something to be condemned. Indeed, it was often worthy of praise, if unattainable for most people. For instance, Thomas Aquinas, in his own commentary on Aristotle's *Politics,* notes that "if a man is such that he is not political on account of

nature, either he is bad, as when this happens as a result of the corruption of human nature, or he is better than man, namely, in so far as he has a nature more perfect than that generally found in other men, in such a way that by himself he can be self-sufficient without the company of men, as was the case with John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit" (1.1.35).[5] The exemplars of this form of solitary life for Aquinas are the very saints themselves, by definition exceptional people and certainly not the yardstick by which others were to be fairly measured (though, of course, their lives and actions were frequently used to communicate moral and ethical messages in an attempt to inspire others to good).

The other end of the continuum—a solitary and savage life—was indeed something to be condemned. Many "medieval writers at times displayed a firm conviction that effective communication was the cornerstone of all human knowledge" (Ward 1995, 274). People living alone and without need to interact with others by means of speech might well be regarded as neglecting the qualities which mark them as human, as speech and cooperation with others was natural to humanity, and key to an ordered civic existence. For example, the Anglo-Saxons used the term *reordberend,* or "speech-bearers," as a general term to describe human beings.

The commentaries of Thomas Aquinas are also instructive in terms of illustrating this opinion: commenting on Aristotle's *Politics,* he demonstrates that speech is a vital

5. Sed si aliquis homo habet quod non sit civilis propter naturam, necesse est quod vel sit pravus, utpote cum hoc contingit ex corruptione naturae humanae; aut est melior quam homo, inquantum scilicet habet naturam perfectiorem aliis hominibus communiter, ita quod per se sibi possit sufficere absque hominum societate; sicut fuit in Ioanne Baptista, et beato Antonio heremita.

method by which common human problems are solved. Aquinas notes: "among human acts some are performed every day, such as eating, warming oneself at the fire, and others like these, whereas other things are not performed every day, such as buying, fighting, and others like these. Now it is natural for men to communicate among themselves by helping one another in each of these two kinds of work" (*Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics* 1.1.26).[6] Speech, then, aides all people in their daily and occasional labors. All humans, Aquinas suggests, have recourse to communication with others in their daily lives. Later in this section, Aquinas—following Aristotle—further confirms that speech itself is both what makes one human and facilitates an orderly and just society (again, there are strong allusions to the Hymn to *Logos*):

> Human speech, on the other hand, signifies what is useful and what is harmful. It follows from this that it signifies the just and the unjust. For justice and injustice consist in this, that some people are treated equally or unequally as regards useful and harmful things. Thus speech is proper to men, because it is proper to them, as compared to the other animals, to have a knowledge of the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, and other such things that can be signified by speech. Since language is given to man by nature, therefore, and since language is ordered to this, that men communicate with one another as regards the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust, and other such things, it follows, from the fact that nature does nothing in vain, that men naturally communicate with one another in reference to these things. But communication in reference to these things is what makes a household and a city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and political animal. (Aquinas, *Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics* 1.1.37)[7]

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6. Actuum autem humanorum quidam sunt quotidiani, sicut comedere, calefieri ad ignem, et alia huiusmodi. Quidam autem non sunt quotidiani, sicut mercari, pugnare, et alia huiusmodi. Naturale est autem hominibus, ut in utroque genere operum sibi communicent seinvicem iuvantes.

7. Sed loquutio humana significat quid est utile et quid nocivum. Ex quo sequitur quod significet iustum et iniustum. Consistit enim iustitia et iniustitia ex hoc quod aliqui adaequentur vel non aequentur in rebus utilibus et nocivis. Et ideo loquutio est propria hominibus; quia hoc est proprium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant cognitionem boni et mali, ita et iniusti, et aliorum huiusmodi, quae sermone significari

Here, Aquinas traces speech back to an Aristotelian first principle—that nature does nothing in vain—to demonstrate the centrality of speech to human existence.

However, despite the frequent citation of Aristotle's *Politics* on humanity's political and domestic nature throughout the later Middle Ages, the accepted medieval authority on speech's relationship to the civic community was without doubt Cicero, whose mytho-historical account of the union of wisdom and eloquence in the introduction to *De Inventione* enjoyed widespread popularity throughout medieval Europe (it was often copied and transmitted within manuscript collections independently of the treatise as a whole). Moreover, Cicero's text had a much longer tradition of transmission and commentary throughout the Middles Ages than did any of Aristotle's works (Ward 1995). The result of this long tradition was that Aristotle's observations were in many ways absorbed or reconciled with Cicero's own, at least in the cases of rhetoric and civic life. Though Aristotle and Cicero had some divergent conceptions of the role of rhetoric and society, medieval commentaries often attempted to find the common ground between them. The Florentine rhetorician Brunetto Latini, for instance, directly connects Cicero and Aristotle's theories of rhetoric. He states:

> Aristotle, who is absolutely trustworthy and greatly improved and refined this art [rhetoric], since he wrote a book on invention and another on speech, claims that rhetoric concerns three kinds of subject matters, each being a genus with its subdivisions, and these are the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial. . .. This being also Tullius's opinion, it can be concluded that the art of rhetoric consists of these three sorts of things. (2016, 19.3)

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possunt. um ergo homini datus sit sermo a natura, et sermo ordinetur ad hoc, quod homines sibiinvicem communicent in utili et nocivo, iusto et iniusto, et aliis huiusmodi; sequitur, ex quo natura nihil facit frustra, quod naturaliter homines in his sibi communicent. Sed communicatio in istis facit domum et civitatem. Igitur homo est naturaliter animal domesticum et civile.

Both Aristotle and Cicero were interested in the place of speech in human communities, perhaps providing the impetus for medieval thinkers to build connections between the two famous figures. Medieval thinkers interpreted these connections variously. As Cary Nederman has suggested, Cicero's conception of the ideal orator developed in *De Inventione* "constituted a necessary ingredient in the foundation and perpetuation of human social relations" in medieval society (1994, 79). Within Cicero's account of the origin of civic life, rhetoric is positioned as a civilizing force that first compelled humans to live together and govern one another through reason, rather than solely through brute force. Mary Carruthers identifies the formation of cities through reason described in *De Inventione* as "the originary act of persuasion," noting that Cicero argues that "ever since humans have worked together voluntarily for their common good, persuaded by eloquence to act upon the social truths that they had discovered through reason" (2013, 115).

To the medieval mind, rhetoric is therefore the origin of cities and orderly communities, and it thus dovetailed well, I would suggest, with Aristotle's own observations about civic life in the *Politics*. Cicero's account of the founding of cities was expanded and elaborated upon frequently by other medieval writers and commentators as well: as John Ward observes, medieval commentators frequently lavished the opening sections of *De Inventione* with one hundred to two hundred and fifty percent more words of commentary than the text itself contained (1995, 142 note 297). This section is also often integrated within independent and otherwise original rhetorical treatises. As Matthew Kempshall suggests, drawing from his reading of Alcuin of York's adaptation of

Cicero's founding myth in *Disputatio de Rhetorica et de Uirtutibus*, in the Middle Ages "Rhetoric is necessarily involved in everything which distinguishes humankind's existence in communities, in everything which differentiates it from a purely animal existence" (2008, 12). Rhetoric, in short, was perceived as the very origin of civilized life.

Alcuin was certainly not the only medieval scholar to find inspiration in Cicero's founding tale of both cities and rhetoric; similar attitudes can be seen throughout the Middle Ages, particularly within the rich and expansive commentary tradition of Cicero's *De Inventione*. Thierry of Chartres, for instance, remarks that through the art of rhetoric and the union of wisdom and eloquence, "savagery was driven out, cities were built, and many other good things came about" (2009, 422). The hero of Cicero's mythical founding tale is, as Thierry observes, "the wise man [who] began to use eloquence" and "drove out the savagery and brought men together to live by law" (2009, 422). Brunetto Latini, writing over a century after Thierry's own commentary, imagines this mythical rhetor as addressing his fellow people in this way: "he taught them about useful things, saying 'Live well together, help each other, and you will be safer and stronger. Build cities and villages" (2009, 767). Aquinas too refers to this mythical founding in his commentary on Aristotle's *Politics:*

> Then he treats of the foundation of the city and infers from what has been said that there is in all men a certain natural impulse toward the city, as also toward the virtues. But nevertheless, just as the virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics, in the same way cities are founded by human industry. Now the man who first founded a city was the cause of the greatest goods for men. For man is the best of the animals if virtue, to which he has a

> natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals. (1.1.40-41)[8]

Rhetoric is thus closely tied to the emergence of both cities and civic life itself in these accounts. Yet, just as in the acquisition of virtue, Aquinas and others observe that humanity must be instructed by others to reach their potential as city-dwellers working cooperatively with others. Civic life is the natural state of humanity but to live together peacefully still requires instruction.

Speech is the means by which this instruction might occur: such a beneficial turn of events as the emergence of cities, Thierry notes, "could never have come about through a mute wisdom without resources, that is, which persuades without words" (2009, 424). Rhetoric, then, must intervene and bring reason and wisdom to speech as well as to civic behavior. In his commentary and adaptation of Cicero's *De Inventione,* Brunetto Latini notes that rhetoric allows one "to create stable friendships through eloquence and wisdom" (2009, 762) and that doing so is necessary for tasks such as "constructing cities, castles, and homes, and establish[ing] good customs, and observing justice and living in an orderly fashion (2009, 767). Rhetoric and eloquence thus caused citizens to "become accustomed to obey others voluntarily and believe not only that they must work for the common good but even sacrifice life itself" (Thierry of Chartres 2009, 424). In this way, the common citizen is able to serve their teleological purpose in

8. Deinde cum dicit natura igitur quidem etc., agit de institutione civitatis; concludens ex praemissis, quod in omnibus hominibus inest quidam naturalis impetus ad communitatem civitatis sicut et ad virtutes. Sed tamen, sicut virtutes acquiruntur per exercitium humanum, ut dicitur in secundo Ethicorum, ita civitates sunt institutae humana industria. Ille autem qui primo instituit civitatem, fuit causa hominibus maximorum bonorum. Homo enim est optimum animalium si perficiatur in eo virtus, ad quam habet inclinationem naturalem.

relationship to the broader community; society, bolstered by the support of all its citizens, "seeks the highest among all human goods, for it aims at the common good, which is better and more divine than the good of one individual" (Aquinas *Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics*, 1.1.11).[9] Within such conceptions of civic life and citizenship, rhetoric plays a key role in moving citizens as one in pursuit of common goals. It communicates the values and ends of medieval citizenship and civic identity.

Medieval Civic Identity

We are perhaps not accustomed to associating the terms "medieval" and "citizenship." Indeed, the word "medieval" regrettably carries a popular connotation of something backward, barbaric or cruel (one need only to consult the recent headlines involving the Islamic State for an example of this usage).[10] Yet medieval society possessed a varied and distinct conception of citizenship—or rather, perhaps more precisely, medieval societies exhibited a variety of related theories of citizenship (for it would be a misrepresentation to suggest practices of citizenship were in any way

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9. Est ergo coniectatrix principalissimi boni inter omnia bona humana: intendit enim bonum commune quod est melius et divinius quam bonum unius, ut dicitur in principio Ethicorum.

10. For instance, Noah Feldman called ISIS a "neo-medieval" movement: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-08-16/islamic-state-s-medieval-morals

Graeme Wood also ties ISIS to medieval religious practices: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/

Some medieval scholars have attempted to dispel this view, notably Bruce Holsinger in his contribution to a Washington Post article: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/10/10/is-the-islamic-state-medieval-a-medievalist-says-no/?utm_term=.22b9d69676ad

monolithic). For instance, Nezar AlSayyad and Ananya Roy argue that medieval "citizenship [was] linked to either patronage (as in the bishop) or to associational membership (as in the guild) and in both cases it is fundamentally about protection" from others and occasionally even from the state (2006, 3). Thomas Aquinas defined the citizen broadly, noting that the citizen is "not the one who participates in the administration of justice or in the assembly but the one upon whom the deliberative or judicial function can be conferred" (*Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics* 3.1.355).[11] In short, Aquinas argues that the capacity to engage in a civic function, not the possession of an office, was what made one a citizen. Brunetto Latini suggests that "people cannot be called citizens of the same Commune merely because they live together within the same city walls, but only if they agree to live according to the same rules" (2016, 2.4). For Latini, then, citizenship is dependent on assent to a rule of law. Similarly, one might also have varying rights based on whether they belonged to a monastic order or served as a member of the clergy: ecclesiastical courts frequently clashed with secular courts over matters of jurisdiction, meaning claims of citizenship might impact how and where one went to trial as well as the crimes that might be levied against them.

However, citizenship and the rights and duties associated with it extended beyond judicial settings and into deliberative ones as well: local lords relied on advisers (given authority to speak and therefore granted rights and responsibilities as part of their position near a ruler), and kings undertook a process of counsel, as can be seen in the case of Alcuin, among others (Ramsey 2012). In short, medieval communities were filled

11. non enim ille qui participat iudicio et concione, sed ille qui potest constitui in principatu consiliativo vel iudicativo.

with opportunities for rhetoric to be put to practical use, and these opportunities were closely related to medieval theories of civic identity—that is, to the systems of obligation, responsibility, and rights that accompanied forms of medieval citizenship. One commonality of these theories is the role that rhetorical theory, practice, and education played in instructing the citizen and constituting a form of civic identity—rhetorical instruction often served as a guide to one's relationship to others, to one's place in social orders and political institutions, and to one's relationship to different forms of knowledge. Rhetoric helped to mediate one's relationships to such concepts through training, theory, and instruction. Moreover, rhetorical theory and practice idealized certain types of relationships, and in doing so created subjectivities to be embraced (and sometimes rejected) by medieval citizens.

Medieval rhetorical practices would have influenced practices of citizenship in two primary spheres: the epideictic and the educational. While ostensibly quite different forms of rhetoric that inhabit different spheres, the two are closely related. While the earliest scholarship in the history of medieval rhetoric tended to dismiss epideictic forms of discourse as mere display divorced from civic issues, recent scholarship has characterized epideictic as "the central and indeed fundamental mode of rhetoric in human culture" (Walker 2000, 9-10). Within this understanding, epideictic functions as a method of articulating and normalizing the commonly held values and beliefs of a given culture. To display and lead others to place faith in similar cultural values, the epideictic orator is "less concerned with material realities than with the abstract propositions he aims to affirm" (Duffy 1983, 91). This does not mean that epideictic statements must therefore be divorced from reality, but rather that an epideictic understanding of rhetoric

and discourse allows for the idealization of civic structures that may no longer be tied directly to the governance of a state.

Arguably a similar process has occurred in the United States, wherein instruction in rhetoric, reasoning, and argumentation is often justified by asserting the need for citizens to effectively express their views on civic matters—despite the fact that very few formal civic institutions of any consequence exist wherein the average person might express their opinion. The assertion is rather primarily an epideictic assertion about free speech and widespread political participation as a value of our civic culture and identity. Education and epideictic are thus related because it is often through educational institutions and structures that values are shared and instilled in citizens through a process of enculturation.

Throughout the Middle Ages, the association between rhetoric and the civic ideal continued, even as opportunities for formal oratory in the Greek and Roman models waned. Rather, rhetoric remained a central component of education and helped to theorize the relationships between different tiers of society. A cursory survey of definitions of rhetoric throughout the Middle Ages demonstrates the importance that civic ideals continued to hold in the period: Martianus Capella (CA 420-490), for instance, describes the allegorical Lady Rhetorica as having "brought under her control . . . the senate, the public platforms, and the law courts, and in Athens had at will swayed the legislative assembly, the schools, and the theaters" (2009, 159). Cassiodorus (CA 562) defined rhetoric as "expertness in discourse on civil questions" and noted that by "speaking suitably in order to persuade" the orator address civic and community questions that are important for all to understand in order to make decisions communally

(2009, 224). Isidore of Seville (CA 625) suggests that "Rhetoric is the science of speaking well on civic questions" and that "eloquence is a flow of words, designed to persuade people to the just and good" (2009, 241). Alcuin of York (CA. 790-800), clearly drawing on Cicero's *De Inventione,* writes that rhetoric "totally resides in political questions" and that through the influence of this art "a certain man, obviously great and wise" drove humanity "together in one place and assembled them, and he got them to do every individual useful and honorable thing" (2009, 288).

In his own commentary on Cicero's *De Inventione*, Thierry of Chartres confidently declares rhetoric to be a part of civic science:

> Now, we call 'civil reasoning' whatever the civil community either speaks or does according to reason . . . we also call 'civil reasoning' the science of both speaking and acting according to reason, and this very reasoning is called civil science, of which a constitutive and most important part is called rhetoric. Now wisdom, that is, the comprehension of things according to their nature, and rhetoric comprise civil science. Thus, unless one were both wise and eloquent, he could not be said to have mastery of civil science. (2009, 412)

Honorius of Autun declares that rhetoric deals with "histories, fables, books of oratory, and ethics," thus combing skill in speech with appropriate conduct and behavior (quoted in Ward 1995, 130). Taking a more practical view and discussing the applications of rhetoric to preaching, Thomas of Chobham (CA 1220), in his *Summa De Arte Praedicandi* notes that "rhetoric is the art of speaking in an orderly fashion with the aim of persuading," but that "the whole intention of the preacher ought to be to persuade men to value what is honorable and useful to them, and to dissuade them from doing what is dishonest and harmful" (2009, 625).

Giles of Rome (CA 1272), in his early and widely read commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, makes the moral and ethical components of rhetoric even more explicit:

> Rhetoric is a kind of dialectic applicable to civil affairs . . . its business is what concerns morals: this concern is justly called politics. From what has been said it follows that the Philosopher thinks that rhetoric is a part of dialectic applicable to civil morals, as he says. (2009, 805-6)

At risk of descending into an Erasmus-level appeal via copia, I believe it is sufficient to say that rhetoric continued to be regarded as civic, whether the source of that understanding was Ciceronian, Aristotelian, or Boethian. That is not to say that other understandings of rhetoric did not exist—without doubt they did—but a strong civic strand still seems to exist in the period, particularly within general rhetorical treatises. But why? Given the lack of formalized deliberative and judicial bodies facilitated by the state, what benefit did medieval writers derive by continuing to define rhetoric in this way? To my mind, the answer to this question cannot simply be that medieval authors slavishly held to the definitions of antiquity. To believe this would require discounting the achievements of a sophisticated intellectual culture.

Rather than understanding rhetoric as a theoretical system solely intended to guide the production of speech and writing, I suggest that in the above cases, rhetoric is a system of thought that facilitates the formation and maintenance of civil communities through speech and persuasion and their relationship to idealized civic identities. Rhetoric, as an exercise of power not dependent on force, functions much as Cicero suggests—as a way of assembling diverse groups in service of common goods and ideals. Rhetoric allows speech and other forms of communication to signify the attributes necessary for an orderly civil society—ideas of justice, good, and wisdom. The civic rhetoric of the Middle Ages was thus an epideictic form of rhetoric, concerned with

modeling cultural values and locating citizens within a system of class relations even as it served goals related to the production of writing or speech.

Drawing on the rhetorical traditions of antiquity while simultaneously contributing unique theoretical and practical advancements and applications, medieval rhetoric functioned as a civic art tasked with communicating, maintaining, and occasionally subverting visions of citizenship and civic identity in relation to the wider community. Though varied and multivalent, I argue that the rhetorical traditions of the Western Middle Ages exhibit a distinct strand of theory and practice concerned primarily with rhetoric's role in influencing ideal forms of citizenship and public behavior. Understood in this way, medieval rhetoric plays a central role in the maintenance and evolution of civic society: it worked in concert with other disciplines, such as moral philosophy, grammar, and ethics to "[teach] the citizen how he ought to behave and how he ought to expect others to behave towards him" as part of an internalized civic identity (Ober 2001, 175). Civic identity, then, refers to the logical and affective responses of individuals to the social, cultural, and political ideals and beliefs that structure relationships and behaviors within communities.

The primary sites where this identity formation would occur were educational, understood as broadly as possible (that is, including formal educational institutions such as cathedral schools and universities, as well as less formalized settings such as sites of preaching and religious rituals, or dramatic performances). When I say education, then, I do not solely mean the communication of technical concepts or precepts, but rather a form of capacitation and enculturation similar to the ends of classical *paideia* (Hauser 2004). Since medieval education drew heavily on its classical predecessors to achieve its

ends, it is perhaps unsurprising that it should share some similar goals. Medieval education, as Stephen Jaeger writes, was tasked in certain periods with developing the "personalities [of students] and in the cultivation of personal qualities" (1994, 4). John O. Ward observes a similar phenomenon, noting that "precise preceptive rules were never written for all aspects of the art of rhetoric—as Cicero himself complained—and in many cases instruction seems to have been by way of model or exemplar rather than by theoretical, preceptive treatise" (1995, 52). In a sense, this means that education exhibited a performative dimension meant to structure conduct as much as to disseminate knowledge: education was focused on modeling idealized forms of public behavior and social standards as much as it was about communicating formal knowledge; rhetorical education in particular was thus not a "theoretical 'capacity' without reference to any specific social environment, but an important part of a corpus of attitudes, behaviors, skills, and sciences that kept civil society alive" (Ward 1995, 275). While this educational approach is typically associated with the Renaissance, similar values and pedagogical practices circulated in the medieval period as well.

Such an educational focus was commonplace not only in the lower cathedral schools, but also in the context of Scholastic universities and disputation; discussing the pedagogical approaches to disputation, Alex Novikoff has suggested that "One of the defining features of the medieval culture of disputation . . . is its passage from a philosophical and pedagogical ideal to a model of representational performance" (2013, 5). Rhetorical education, closely related as it was to disputation as a practice, shared many similar qualities. Alcuin of York, as Jaeger observes, directly connected rhetoric and the embodiment of virtue as key to the successful administration of civil society by

the king and his advisers (1994, 30-31). Rhetorical education was therefore both bodily and charismatic, pertaining to the living embodiment of knowledge and philosophy rather than solely to the textualization of those concepts, and thus often leaving little in the form of written record by which to understand it (Jaeger 1994, 7-8). Based on his studies of the Ciceronian tradition in the Middle Ages, John Ward notes that some broad generalizations are therefore able to be made about those who learned rhetorical theory:

> The broadest and most basic assumptions we can therefore make about the educational standards and expectations of the commentators and their audience may be set out thus: . . . glossators assumed in their students a familiarity with and interest in canon and civil law, legal theory, ethical and moral issues, [and] monastic and religious usages and customs. (1995, 65)

These educational standards speak to the level of interconnection perceived between rhetoric and social, political, and civic relationships. Students would be expected not only to learn the theories that made up the content of an art, but to connect those precepts to day-to-day activities and social behaviors. Like their predecessors in antiquity, medieval students of rhetoric were tasked with tailoring their writing and speech to the social values and customs of their society. Indeed, this should not be surprising, as education has frequently been connected with ideals of citizenship and public participation across cultures. Amy Wan concisely notes that "Education trains citizens. And it eases anxieties about citizenship because it offers structured, institutionalized, and routinized spaces for the widespread production of citizens and communication of citizenship ideals" (2014, 2).

While Wan focused her study specifically on the United States, she also notes the existence of broader patterns of "cultural citizenship" that refer to one's social status in relation to a given community. "Cultural citizenship," Aihwa Ong argues, is a "dual

process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society. Becoming a citizen depends on how one is constituted as a subject who exercises or submits to power relations" (1996, 738). It is my argument that Wan and Ong's observations are generalizable across time and space: education, whatever forms it may take, influences practices of citizenship, whatever forms they themselves may take. The existence of contemporary civic institutions is not a prerequisite for understanding cultural citizenship in this way. More specifically to this study, my suggestion is that by considering rhetoric's influence on a variety of other disciplines and public practices, including grammatical education, popular art, and advocacy for widespread translation and education, it is possible to better understand the charismatic and embodied qualities of rhetorical and civic education of the later Middle Ages (950-1390). In doing so, historians of rhetoric gain a more complete understanding of both medieval citizenship and civic identity, as well as their relationship to rhetorical theory and practice.

Medieval Citizenship

All forms of government and society produce citizens, in one form or another. While the term 'citizen' may conjure images of dutiful voters and engaged activists partaking in the democratic process, this is but one manifestation of citizenship (a term that, at its heart, simply expresses the existence of certain rights and responsibilities in relation to a community or state). Rare is the society that does not grant its members at least some rights, responsibilities, and privileges—in late medieval England, for example, even the simplest day laborer could expect the right to gather firewood from the King's forest "by hook or by crook," or to be received at a local lord's manor for a feast after

certain days of plowing and farm labor (Hanawalt 1986, 50; 59). This is nothing if not a formalized system of obligations, rights, and responsibilities to others. It is therefore insufficient to maintain, as some earlier histories of rhetoric have, that only democratic republics or similar systems of government produce forms of citizenship and therefore forms of civic rhetoric. All societies possess systems of obligation and social relations, structures that determine and limit the roles one should play within a given social system, as defined by that culture's power relations.

Throughout the Western Middle Ages, one of the most common metaphors to express these interrelated relationships was the so-called "organic analogy" of the body politic. Thomas Aquinas notes that "it is clear then that the whole is naturally prior to the parts of matter, even though the parts are prior in the order of generation. But individual men are related to the whole city as are the parts of man to man. For, just as a hand or a foot cannot exist without a man, so too one man cannot live self-sufficiently by himself when separated from the city" (*Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics* 1.1.39).[12] Similarly, John of Salisbury's famous discussion of the body politic likens each aspect of civil society to an organ:

> The place of the head in the body of the commonwealth is filled by the prince, who is subject only to God and to those who exercise His office and represent Him on earth, even as in the human body the head is quickened and governed by the soul. The place of the heart is filled by the Senate, from which proceeds the initiation of good works and ill. The duties of eyes, ears, and tongue are claimed by the judges and the governors of provinces. Officials and soldiers correspond to the hands. Those who always attend upon the prince are likened to the sides. Financial officers and keepers (I speak now not of those who are in charge of the

12. ic igitur patet, quod totum est prius naturaliter quam partes materiae, quamvis partes sint priores ordine generationis. Sed singuli homines comparantur ad totam civitatem, sicut partes hominis ad hominem. Quia sicut manus aut pes non potest esse sine homine, ita nec unus homo est per se sufficiens ad vivendum separatus a civitate.

> prisons, but of those who are keepers of the privy chest) may be compared with the stomach and intestines, which, if they become congested through excessive avidity, and retain too tenaciously their accumulations, generate innumerable and incurable diseases, so that through their ailment the whole body is threatened with destruction. The husbandmen correspond to the feet, which always cleave to the soil, and need the more especially the care and foresight of the head, since while they walk upon the earth doing service with their bodies, they meet the more often with stones of stumbling, and therefore deserve aid and protection all the more justly since it is they who raise, sustain, and move forward the weight of the entire body. Take away the support of the feet from the strongest body, and it cannot move forward by its own power, but must creep painfully and shamefully on its hands, or else be moved by means of brute animals. (*Policraticus* 5.2)[13]

Brunetto Latini makes similar observations in his *La Rettorica,* noting that "In the organization of cities, deeds involve what can be made by means of hands and feet, such as the arts of smiths, tailors, weavers; words concern rhetoric and other disciplines related to speech. Therefore, the science of politics is general and includes rhetoric as one of its parts" (2016, 17.3).

In the cases of John of Salisbury, Aquinas, and Latini, the "husbandmen"—the medieval equivalent of Aristotle's *chirotechnae*—are integrated into a system of civic life that does not devalue their manual labor, as in many Aristotelian theories of civic life, but

13. Princep uero capitis in re publica optinet locum uni subiectus Deo et his qui uices illius agunt in terris, quoniam et in corpore humano ab anima uegetatus caput et regitur. Cordis locum senatus optinent, a quo bonorum operum et malorum procedunt initia. Oculorum aurium et linguae officia sibi uendicant iudices et praesides prouinciarum. Officiales et milites manibus coaptantur. Qui semper adsistunt principi, lateribus assimilantur. Quaestores et commentarienses (non illos dico qui carceribus praesunt, sed comites rerum priuatarum) ad uentris et intestinorum referet imaginem. Quae, si immensa auiditate congresserint et congesta tenacius reseruauerint, innumerabilies et incurabiles generant morbos, ut uitio eorrum totius corporis ruina immineat. Pedibus uero solo iugiter inherentibus agricolae coaptantur, quibus capitis prouidentia tanto magis necessaria est, quo plura inueniunt offendicula, dum in obsequio corporis in terra gradiuntur, eisque iustis tegumentorum debetur suffragium, qui totius corporis erigunt sustinent et promouent molem. Pedum adminicula robustissimo corpori tolle, suis uiribus non procedet sed aut turpiter inutiliter et moleste manibus repet aut brutorum animalium ope mouebitur.

rather utilizes it to justify their inclusion. Labor in service of the community, be it manual labor or more abstract forms of mental or verbal labor, is the goal of all citizens of the ideal community. As Aquinas later states in his commentary:

> different citizens having dissimilar functions and dissimilar positions by means of which they exercise their proper operations in the city, the common work of all is the safety of the community; and this community consists in the order of the regime. Hence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen as citizen is considered in relation to the regime, so that the good citizen is the man who works well to preserve the regime. (*Commentary* on Aristotle's *Politics* 3.3.366)[14]

Labor thus becomes a *topos* that reaffirms an aspect of civic identity, one that rhetorical theory and culture also sought to reaffirm to idealize certain forms of public behavior, as I will attempt to demonstrate throughout this study.

One function of rhetoric, then, is to work in concert with civil society to promote distinct visions of civic identity and public behavior. As Michel Foucault has argued, government can be thought of most simply as pertaining to the "conduct of conduct;" a complex system in which infrastructure, social imaginaries, and cultural institutions work in concert to create and maintain a sense of citizenship (102; see footnote 56 in Cruikshank 1999). Governance, then, functions by "constituting the needs and interests of others to fulfill their human potential" (Cruikshank 1999. 40). Building from Foucault's work, Barbara Cruikshank has further argued that "the subjectivity of the citizen is the object and the outcome of government" (1999, 40). In Cruikshank's view, the exercise of political and state power does not limit the subjectivity of the citizen; rather, in acting to

14. Ita etiam cum sint diversi cives habentes dissimilia officia, et status dissimiles in civitate, opus commune omnium est salus communitatis: quae quidem communitas consistit in ordine politiae. Unde patet, quod virtus civis inquantum est civis, consideretur in ordine ad politiam; ut scilicet ille sit bonus civis, qui bene operatur ad conservationem politiae.

constitute identity, it promotes a *particular* subjectivity that often serves the state's goals. As Ong notes, this means that citizenship is "a cultural process of 'subjectification,' in the Foucaldian sense of self-making and being-made by power relations" and social institutions (1996, 737).

In this way, Cruikshank views the exercise of power not as inherently oppressive but rather as selectively cultivating forms of subjectivity and identity (though of course doing so does not obviate the possibility of oppression). In the Middle Ages, education at a variety of levels would have installed social and political values that sought to cultivate forms of subjectivity. For instance, even while attending a prestigious and intercultural university such as the University of Paris, Arts students would still have been expected to divide themselves by their various "nations" (at Paris these included Norman, Picard, French, English, and German) and follow the familiar laws and codes of conduct associated with each (Leff 1968). Similarly, in the next chapter of this study, I suggest that early Anglo-Saxon education was concerned with modeling and structuring the civic relationships between monks and laborers, who frequently would have worked alongside one another. These example, I suggest, indicate that it is not anachronistic to understand medieval society in similar ways. John Ward has also made some similar (yet very general) observations, noting that 12th century thinkers "saw rhetoric as a controlling, shaping factor in social arrangements" and that rhetoric could be located wherever there was opportunity "for exerting influence and gaining some end" (Ward 1995, 276).

Foucault, however, attributes increased interest in government and citizenship as a general problem to the 16th century, positioning the Middle Ages and antiquity as concerned primarily with the *speculum principis* (mirror for princes) genre and thus

largely ignoring governance and citizenship as a distinct or complete art (1992, 87-89). Ostensibly in contrast to the *speculum principis,* Foucault notes that a complete art of government seeks "to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards direction" to relate the governance of oneself, one's domestic sphere, and the realm of government proper. Each sphere works in concert with the other to ensure good governance for the whole. It is this relationship between the various tiers of governance that he identifies as one of the keys to a complete art of government, though he pays particular attention to the economic dimension of this relationship. I invoke this inconsistency note to necessarily criticize Foucault, but rather as a typical example of the ways in which medieval society is imagined as lacking theorized understandings of political and civic relationships.

For instance, drawing from the writings of La Mothe Le Vayer, Foucault notes that these numerous spheres suggest that governance extends beyond the traditionally political and into family life, religious institutions, labor organizations, and other realms (1992, 90-91). Each represents a distinct version of governance. For example, a good ruler must virtuously rule oneself as well as attend to their domestic obligations in a similar manner to be successful politically. Similarly, when the government proper is functioning well, the domestic sphere will be well governed and citizens will behave properly (1992, 92). The introduction of domestic economy to the art of government (which Foucault eventually simplifies to economy in general) is, for him, the hallmark of evolving early modern understandings of governance; economy allows for citizens and territory to be considered together as a complex of "things," such as climate, irrigation, customs, and habits (1992, 93).

While Foucault further refines this theory throughout his text, he is misguided, I believe, in his observation that this approach is a novel development of the early modern period. First, the typology of governance Foucault observes in La Mothe Le Vayer's works (governance of one's moral behavior, governance of one's domestic sphere, governance as politics proper) is painfully Aristotelian and can hardly be categorized as a novel development. Indeed, it is exactly this typology that dominates the *speculum principis* texts which Foucault is at pains to contrast to early modern developments in the art of government. The tiered approach to governance Foucault views as a novel development of the early modern period was already the dominant approach to political theory throughout the later Middle Ages, which was itself heavily influenced by the Aristotelian tradition of antiquity. How, then, can one draw a meaningful distinction between theories of citizenship between the two periods based on this evidence?

Second, I suggest that a similar view of politics as concerned with the relationship of people to one another and to social and cultural institutions was already an important component of medieval rhetorical theory and practice, though this role has been obscured by historiographical bias that privileges state sanctioned forms of oratory over more abstract discussions of rhetoric's relationship to the civic that manifest more clearly in academic discourse and elements of daily life. In these more abstract scenarios, rhetoric is one of many "structuring structures" that helps to define a certain citizen subjectivity and civic identity (Bourdieu 1990, 53; 1989, 18) rather than a system of precepts intended to hide the production of speeches and texts within state sponsored venues for agonistic speech. Again, this is not to suggest that there was no tradition of theoretical guides to speech and communication in the Middle Ages. Rather, I mean only to identify an

additional strand of rhetorical theory with a different set of values and goals: that of cultivating forms of meaningful public participation and relationships.

Understanding rhetoric in this way is important because it helps us, as rhetoricians, to better understand how educational and civic institutions shape public participation and civic engagement. As such, while I advocate for medieval rhetoric to be more broadly understood as civic, I do not wish to suggest that historiography should be confined to forms of civic oratory and should ignore epideictic and other forms of literary discourse or the discourse of the marginalized. Indeed, I wish to suggest precisely the opposite: rhetoricians should seek out these forms of discourse and attempt to understand their place within broader civic culture, and understand each as contributing to a general culture of public participation and behavior.

My point is that these forms too represent articulations of civic and cultural values and should be analyzed as such, rather than as merely ornamental, educational, literary, or public displays. The result would be a purposeful broadening of what counts as "civic" within a given cultural context. This approach is partly derived from the field of rhetorical studies' changing attitudes toward epideictic discourse. As Jeffrey Walker has argued:

> [epideictic] shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the fundamental grounds, the "deep" commitments and presuppositions, that will underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic forums. As such, epideictic suasion is not limited to the reinforcement of existing beliefs and ideologies, or to merely ornamental displays of clever speech (though clearly it can serve such purposes as well). Epideictic can also work to challenge or transform conventional beliefs— plainly the purposes of Plato's dialogues, Isocrates' panegyrics, what remains of Gorgias's epideictics. (2000, 10)

While civic rhetorics have often taken as their subject the oratorical production of privileged men, my suggestion is that we view the epideictic, pedagogical, and everyday rhetorical practices of a variety of groups (and messages intended for many different groups) as equally important to a broader sense of civic identity and thus as important forms of evidence for historians of rhetoric. In such an approach, these forms all contribute to the "deep commitments" that constitute a sense of civic identity. Any given culture's civic identity is likely to vary, and even a relatively homogenous culture is likely to exhibit variation across time or across class. In this way, even time periods and geographic locations that have been ignored by past scholars due to their lack of formal deliberative and judicial bodies can be understood as possessing rhetorical practices of public culture and civic identity. It is in this spirit that I offer the following chapters: as illustrative of rhetoric's continued civic influence on a variety of cultures, audiences, and forms of public life throughout the Western Middle Ages.

CHAPTER 5

MONASTIC EDUCATION AND CIVIC IDENTITY

Ora et Labora—"Pray and Work," medieval Benedictine motto

Education, especially early education, is among the most straightforward ways in which rhetorical practice can help to define and sanction civic identities. In this chapter, I suggest that elements of Anglo-Saxon rhetorical education carried out in monastic contexts show a concern for modeling relationships between classes and appropriate modes of public participation. Specifically, I suggest that by drawing on elements of the classical *progymnasmata*, or preliminary exercises in writing and rhetoric, Anglo-Saxon rhetorical instruction contributed to an educational program similar to classical *paideia (*education intended to prepare the ideal citizen).

While the continued importance of classical rhetoric to the teaching of the language arts in the medieval period is well-defined (Murphy 1974; Cox and Ward 2006), less consensus has been achieved on the transmission and influence of the *progymnasmata,* or preliminary exercises of antiquity, in the medieval peirod. As Manfred Kraus notes, "The question of how much of the ancient set of *progymnasmata* eventually passed into the medieval classroom is still a hotly debated issue" (2013, 176). Kraus argues that no strong manuscript evidence exists to support pedagogical use of the *progymnasmata.* Rather, he sees them as something of an intellectual curiosity, stating, "there is no hint of practical exercise . . . [as in the *Etymologies* of Isidore] the treatment remains entirely theoretical" (Kraus 2013, 184). Yet, Kraus also recognizes the influence of the exercises on various medieval texts that were intended for the classroom, stating, "There can be little doubt that compositional exercises similar in character and complexity to their

precursors . . . were widely practiced in the Middle Ages" (2013, 189). Despite this admission, Kraus is ultimately skeptical of any strong or direct connection between the *progymnasmata* and medieval classroom exercises or texts. Lack of manuscript evidence and the transition of the exercises from a rhetorical to a grammatical focus ultimately leads him to conclude that the *progymnasmata* as a sequenced set of exercises "could not have persisted, but [were] split up into smaller units that may themselves have had an independent afterlife in the medieval classroom, but were entirely open for any kind of recombination" (Kraus 2013, 192).

In this chapter, I focus on how the recombination of exercises related to the *progymnasmata* may have influenced medieval civic identity. Specifically, by examining the pedagogical text Ælfrīc's *Colloquy,* an Anglo-Saxon model text written between 987 and 996 CE, I suggest that the *Colloquy* speaks to a continued focus on early rhetorical education as a method of modeling idealized civic identity based in class and labor. I advance this argument through a comparison of the *Colloquy* to theoretical descriptions of three exercises found in ancient texts describing the *progymnasmata*: fable, speech in character *(ethopoeia*)*,* and thesis. The similarities of the *Colloquy* to exercises described in descriptions of the *progymnasmata* suggests that the *Colloquy* may have been intended for use in a rhetorical education program, introduced in concert with forms of grammatical education.

Beyond the mere presence of progymnasmatic features, the *Colloquy* also advances a moral version of the uses of rhetoric based in Benedictine ideals of communal living. Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* is similar to the ancient *progymnasmata* in pedagogical, moral, and rhetorical goals: a variety of exercises are used to demonstrate a student's progression

through the educational program, as well as to suggest a moral standard for the goals of education and the uses of rhetoric expressed through the exercises and their sequencing (Gibson 2014). Beyond instructing students in penning their own compositions or identifying rhetorical techniques, the *Colloquy* sought to model a distinctly Benedictine form of public engagement, which in turn was meant to suggest an idealized civic identity to be internalized by young students as they acquired Latin literacy.

To facilitate comparison between the *Colloquy* and the *progymnasmata* of antiquity, a set of classical texts—namely, Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes and Isidore of Seville's entries on the *progymnasmata*—are used to illuminate the *Colloquy* as a rhetorical and civic exercise which adapts the *progymnasmata* to a particular historical, cultural, and social context: Anglo-Saxon England. Before directly comparing theoretical treatments of the *progymnasmata* and the *Colloquy,* I first offer a description of the *Colloquy* itself, an explanation of the nature and role of the *progymnasmata* in classical and medieval education, and a historical overview of manuscript distribution and the nature of grammatical and rhetorical education in Anglo-Saxon England. I do so to explore the similarities in education described in late antiquity and the Anglo-Saxon period.

The *Colloquy*

Many passages of the *Colloquy* show influence from progymnasmatic texts that may have affected their composition, and the various sections of the *Colloquy* may have been used as model texts for young students moving through such an educational program. The *Colloquy* was likely a model on which other students would base their own

compositions, used by an instructor to demonstrate rhetorical techniques which students would then try themselves. The essential conceit of the text is that a group of students have gathered to receive instruction from their master.

The *Colloquy* begins with the hypothetical students imploring their teacher to instruct them in Latin. The students claim they are ignorant of the language, and do not care what topics they speak of, so long as they learn. The teacher agrees to instruct them in speaking, and asks to know their own professions. Various students speak up, and each responds in turn: one describes himself as a plowman, another a shepherd, another an ox-herd, another a hunter. Each describes the kind of work they engage in daily. As the dialogue continues, the questions posed to the students become more complex. The master asks the hunter who he owes service to; he asks the fisherman whether he would like to catch a whale. The students respond in turn, taking great care to craft responses reasonable to their character, until the conversation takes a more philosophical turn. The master asks the tanner what value his craft has for society. This line of questioning continues for the saltier and the cook. They offer arguments for their usefulness, explaining the many benefits that society derives from their crafts.

Finally, the master asks one of the students, who is tasked with acting out the role of a lawyer, to settle the dispute that has arisen between the students. The master asks this student, "What[15] say you, wise man? Which among these arts seems superior to you?"[16] (Ælfrīc 1966, 38-9). The lawyer responds with a bit of flattery (given that the master was

15. All translations from the *Colloquy* are my own, from the Latin.

16. Quid dicis tu, sapiens? Que ars tibi uidetur inter istas prior esse?

almost certainly a monk), stating "I say to you, that it seems to me the service of God holds supremacy among the arts mentioned, just as it is read in the Gospel: 'first seek the kingdom of God and his justice, and all things will be added to you'"[17] (Ælfrīc 1966, 39).

The master, perhaps sensing this attempt to appease him, asks the lawyer instead to determine what *secular* skills are most useful. The lawyer responds with an extended speech, at once offering a clear answer and elaborating on the difficulty of the question:

> Agriculture, because the plow feeds all of us. The blacksmith says: from where, plowman, do you have the plowshare or the coulter, or the goad, if not from my craft?:[18] From where the fisherman's hook? Or the shoemaker's awl, or the tailor needle? Is it not from my own work? The counselor responds: indeed you tell the truth, but every one of us would rather eat and be guests of the valued plowman than you, because the plowman gives us food and drink; you, what do you give us from your art except iron sparks and the sound of the beating of hammers and the blowing of bellows? The carpenter says: which of you does not make use of my craft, when I build your homes and all of your diverse vessels and ships? The blacksmith responds: O, carpenter, why speak this way, seeing that without my skills you cannot make one window strong?[19] (Ælfrīc 1966, 39-41)

As is clear from the passage, the dialogue quickly devolves into an argument regarding the merits of the different professions. The students advance various arguments in favor

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17. Dico tibi, mihi uidetur seruitium Dei inter istas artes primatum tenere, sicut legitur in euangelio: "Primum querite regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et hec omnia adicientur uobis"

18. It is unclear from the manuscript whether the smith is interjecting here, or if the lawyer is merely speaking as the smith and other craftspeople: an impersonation within an impersonation.

19. Agricultura, quia arator nos omnes pascit. Ferrarius dicit: unde aratori uomer aut culter, qui nec stimulum habet nisi ex arta mea? Unde piscatori hamus? Aut sutori subula, siue sartori acus? Nonne ex meo opere? Consiliarius respondit, uereum quidem dicis, sed omnibus nobis carius est hospitari apud te aratorem quam apud te, quia arator dat nobis panem et potum; tu, quid das nobis in officina tua nisi ferreas scintillas et sonitus tundentium malleorum et flantium follium? Lignarius dicit: quis uestrum non utitur arte mea, cum domos et diuersa uasa et naues omnibus fabrico? Ferrarius respondit: O, lignarie, cur sic loqueris, cum nec saltem unum foramen sine arte mea uales facere?

of their own usefulness to society. Eventually, the lawyer steps in to settle the matter. He exhorts the other students to end their argument, and then moves to reaffirm the value of each laborer within the social system of the three estates. The lawyer states, "If you be priest, or monk, or layman, or solider, exercise yourself in this, and be what you are; because it is a great damage and shame for a person to be unwilling to be what they ought to be"[20] (Ælfrīc 1966, 41-2).

The lawyer thus concludes his speech, and the other students are asked to evaluate it. Finally, the monk asks the students why they wish to learn, and what type of learning they wish to have. He asks, "How do you want to be wise? Do you wish to be shape-changers, clever in speaking, sly, full of cunning, good speakers and poor thinkers, devoted to pleasant words and to lying in many forms. . .?"[21] (Ælfrīc 1966, 43). They respond: "We wish to be simple and without hypocrisy, and wise in order to avoid evil and accomplish good"[22] (Ælfrīc 1966, 43). The students continue their conversation, which is largely focused on conforming to a monastic schedule (when to sleep and when to rise; what to eat and how much of it, etc) before the text concludes.

These passages illustrate some key aspects of moral and rhetorical education through the *progymnasmata*; first, a concern for the invention of good arguments and

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20. Siue sis sacerdos, siue monachus, seu laicus, seu miles, exerce temet ipsum in hoc, et esto quod es; quia magnum dampnum et uerecundia est homini nolle esse quod est et quod esse debet.

21. Qua sapientia? Uultis esse uersipelles aut milleformes in medaciis, astuti in loquelis, astuti, uersuti, bene loquentes et male coitantes, dulcibus uerbis dediti . . .

22. Uolumus esse simplices sine hipochrisi, et sapientes ut declinemus a malo et faciamus bona.

moral reasoning, not merely pleasing speech or the acquisition of another language; and second, a variety of progymnasmatic elements, including fable, speech in character, theoretical theses, and others. The *Colloquy* is thus a complex document, one that serves not only as a language learning tool, but one that also addresses the role of rhetoric and grammar within medieval society, a goal the *Colloquy* shares with the *progymnasmata* of antiquity.

Goals of the Progymnasmata

The *progymnasmata* are a series of 14 related exercises that were intended to prepare young students for future study and more complex declamations delivered within the rhetoric classroom and beyond. The exercises frequently served to bridge the gap between grammatical and rhetorical education, offering a graded series of activities that built from prior knowledge and experience by circling back to older forms once new techniques had been introduced to the student (Walker 2011). The *progymnasmata* typically begin with the simplest of exercises, the composition of fables or anecdotes. Through these exercises, young students would have the opportunity to both practice their grammar and vocabulary in compositions while also reinforcing social norms through morally-inflected tales and sayings.

These exercises "helped to cultivate the student's moral sensibility through performative repetition and reinscription of received wisdom" (Walker 2011, 100). Indeed, in *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity,* Jeffrey Walker suggests that "'rhetoric's' major, culture-shaping role in this tradition is to disseminate public, popular discourse concerning 'the right' in various matters of cultural, [and] ethical" concern (Walker 2000,

133). The moral emphasis of the *progymnasmata* extended well beyond the earliest exercises, however. Fables and anecdotes led to the composition of proverbs or maxims, pithy sayings that expressed advice or traditional beliefs. Students would then learn to critique earlier compositions by either attacking or confirming narratives, fables, or maxims on a variety of criteria, such as believability or appropriateness. More complex exercises would ask students to compose commonplaces, *encomia*, impersonations of historical figures, or to attack or defend laws. Thus, the goal of progressing through a set of *progymnasmata* was not only to improve the student's skill in writing and rhetoric, but also to reinforce the values and forms of public participation and wider Greco-Roman culture.

Traditionally, the *progymnasmata* occupied a contested space between the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric, a trend that continued into the medieval period as well. In antiquity, the *progymnasmata* seem to have been taught by rhetoricians, but this had begun to change even in Quintilian's time. Instead, grammarians increasingly taught most of the exercises, a fact Quintilian laments (*Institutio Oratoria* 2.1.4). This trend—the passing of formerly rhetorical instruction to the grammarian—would continue in the Middle Ages as well. As Gabriele Knappe notes, "In order to understand the nature of Anglo-Saxon rhetorical learning it is first necessary to consider . . . the specific literary culture of the time—the age of the *grammaticus*" (Knappe 1998, 6). As such, any discussion of rhetoric in the Anglo-Saxon period must consider the tradition of rhetoric as transmitted through the study of grammar.

Elements of rhetorical education were frequently transferred to the *grammaticus* in the Middle Ages, particularly exercises focused on literary content, including the

progymnasmata. A.P. Church has noted the influence of the *progymnasmata* on the language and literary culture of the Anglo-Saxons, particularly in regard to grammatical instruction. Church suggests that Knappe makes too weak a claim regarding the importance of the *progymnasmata* through the study of grammar; he notes, "Clearly her own conclusions about the transmission of rhetoric should have led her [Knappe] to consider the possible application of specific rhetorical elements . . . through the conduit of grammar" (Church 2000, 54-5). Ultimately, Church is if anything more optimistic regarding the *progymnasmata* and their influence on Anglo-Saxon literary culture than Knappe, stating, "[a]lthough any understanding of Anglo-Saxon education is destined to be incomplete given the lack of primary sources outlining its complete extent, there is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest that some vestige of the *progymnasmata* was probably available to Anglo-Saxons" (Church 2000, 77).

Following Church and his method of searching for evidence of the *progymnasmata* through references in other literary and pedagogical texts, I aim to investigate the influence of the exercises on other literary and pedagogical artifacts of Anglo-Saxon culture. As the *progymnasmata* exercises were transferred into a different pedagogical tradition, they undertook a degree of transformation. As such, I will proceed by exploring the manuscript availability and educational context of progymnasmatic sources before considering the *Colloquy* as an indirect reference to the exercises of antiquity (Lanham 1992).

Manuscript Evidence and Educational Context

While manuscript transmission and reception is not my primary concern, a survey of manuscript distribution does help establish the intellectual context in which the work may have been composed and utilized. Ælfrīc would have been a well-educated man for his time, with access to a variety of texts. By 987, he oversaw teaching at the monastery of Dorset; by 1005, he was abbot of Eynsham (Law 1987). In addition to educational works, Ælfrīc wrote homilies, saints' lives, and translated the works of other well-known Anglo-Saxon authors such as the Venerable Bede (Law 1987). Since Ælfrīc's position at Dorset was largely pedagogical, he drew on trusted educational sources commonly available in monastic settings to compose his *Grammar*, *Colloquy* and *Glossary*. Indeed, in the Latin preface to his *Grammar*, Ælfrīc admits his debt to Priscian's grammars and later sections of his own *Grammar* are clearly based on sections of Isidore's *Etymologies* (Law 1987).

Thus, there is clear manuscript evidence of grammatical, if not rhetorical, educational texts from Anglo-Saxon England (Knappe 1998; see also appendix of Kraus 2013). However, the level of distinction between grammatical and rhetorical texts in the Middle Ages has been questioned by a number of scholars, who note the numerous ways those teaching traditions intersect. Rather than viewing grammar and rhetoric as clearly demarcated disciplines, it is more accurate to view them as related, overlapping, and complimentary.

By the medieval period, grammar was considered foundational to all language study. As Rita Copeland and Ineke Sluiter have suggested:

> In the Middle Ages, the arts of grammar and rhetoric were often more inclusive . . . grammar embraced not only language and linguistic thought but literature and the analysis of literary texts. The art of rhetoric entailed mastery of form and style in any kind of writing . . . they were the basic components of pedagogy at almost every level. (2009, 1)

While both fields represented distinct categories of knowledge, each contributed to the study of the Trivium; as such, "Grammar, logic, and rhetoric may be seen as three divisions of the genus of eloquence," with grammar facilitating more advanced linguistic study in all other disciplines (Copeland and Sluiter 2009, 21). Isidore of Seville advanced a similar view: "Grammar is the knowledge of speaking correctly, and is the origin and foundation of liberal letters" (*Etymologies* 1.5.1). Isidore's view in many ways became commonplace; John of Salisbury would later claim, "Grammar is the cradle of all philosophy, and in a manner of speaking, the first nurse of the whole study of letters" (*Metalogicon* 1.13). Concerned with far more than the production of correct writing and speech, “grammar worked in concert with textual analysis" (Copeland and Sluiter 2009, 19). As such, recent scholarship in this history of rhetoric has sought to explore the connections between the arts of the Trivium. Gabriele Knappe, for instance, has argued that "the main influence on rhetorical strategies in Anglo-Saxon literature has its foundation in the rhetorical aspect of grammar teaching" (Knappe 1999, 20). In another essay exploring the subject, Knappe argues "grammars seem from very early on to have a distinct tradition from the rhetorical treatises; but it is not impossible that they originate in rhetorical teaching" (Knappe 1998, 10). Grammatical and rhetorical study, then, are intimately related; at the least it would not be possible to study one without the other, and Knappe suggests that medieval grammar may in fact have been informed by the study of classical rhetoric.

It thus seems necessary to consider the nature and character of grammatical education alongside rhetorical education in antiquity and Anglo-Saxon England to better understand how those traditions intersect. Jeffrey Walker, in summarizing the typical trajectory of grammatical and rhetorical education in antiquity, notes that "Elementary education. . .extended from roughly age seven to fourteen" and focused primarily on "basic literacy training and the study of literature"(2011, 4). Students would then study with rhetoricians, who would provide instruction in "*progymnasmata* [and] the basic elements of discourse" (Walker 2011, 4). The *progymnasmata* themselves revolved around activities such as "listening to readings, reading aloud, paraphrase, elaboration" and many others, with the goal of developing "an internalized knowledge, a habitude, a crafted intuition, [and] a trained capacity for improvisational invention" (Walker 2011 26, 37). I offer the following examples from John Asser's life of King Ælfrēd to illustrate the educational context of Anglo-Saxon England and its similarities to the methods and goals of early education in antiquity. Asser discusses the education of the king and his children several times, and while the discussion is not pedagogically detailed, it does offer some points of comparison between educational practices of the classical period and Anglo-Saxon England. These comparisons help to illuminate the similarities between these two periods, as well as the intersections of grammatical and rhetorical education.

King Ælfrēd (849-899) was the first Anglo-Saxon king of record to establish court schools similar to those of continental Europe, specifically modeled on those of Charlemagne, who, along with Alcuin of York, typically figure into the traditional narrative of medieval rhetorical history. However, unlike many schools of Europe, Ælfrēd's schools educated not only the children of elite nobles, but also "a good many of

lesser birth" who may have intended to enter the clergy and would require the appropriate literacy training (Asser 1983, 28–29). Indeed, monasteries—the typical centers for grammatical education in the medieval period—also often drew members not just from the elite, but from many tiers of society, particularly sons who never stood to inherit property, or even orphans, meaning that literate education did not solely reflect the values of the elite. The Rule of St. Benedict (Chapter 59), for instance, recommends that monasteries accept children from the poorest families to join monastic life, without even the need for the typically required tithe. Thus, schools such as those established by Ælfrēd would have potentially been tasked with the education of students from a variety of backgrounds who would need literacy training to join the clergy. In short, grammatical and rhetorical education may not have been the sole purview of the elite; students from a variety of backgrounds would be expected to learn together, whether at court or in monasteries. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that rhetorical education from the period focused on issues of civic identity as well.

King Ælfrēd's educational program emphasized not only the practical need for literacy, but also the moral and spiritual benefits of learning. He saw improving educational opportunities as one of his main duties as a ruler. Ælfrēd was not alone in his thinking; a concern for the moral implications of grammatical education in Anglo-Saxon society can be traced back to the Venerable Bede, who, as Janet Coleman has argued, lumped all arts of discourse within the field of grammatical study (1992). Since grammar helped to facilitate the discovery of Christian truth, it was both the foundation of a monastic literate education, and a religious and social ideal to aspire to. Thus, while it may seem that Ælfrēd implies only that individuals had difficulty understanding church

sermons in his *Preface,* he perceives the social ills caused by illiteracy as far more severe, and moreover indicative of a wider variety of moral problems. Ælfrēd continues: "Think what punishments came upon us in this world then when we neither loved learning ourselves nor allowed it to other men: we loved only to be called Christians, and very few loved the virtues" (Treharne 2010, 15).

In response to this perceived moral need, Ælfrēd suggests that some books be translated into English, so that they might be easier to understand, and that more young people be tasked with learning to read and copy Latin (but only after instruction in their native language of Old English). To facilitate the learning and application of both Latin and the vernacular Old English, Ælfrēd recommended the production of certain books, to be sent to other monastic and court schools (Treharne 2010). This recommendation set the stage for Ælfrīc's own intellectual contributions. Both would focus on building basic literacy in both Latin and the vernacular; both would closely tie grammatical and rhetorical education to morality and religion. Thus, one can take away two important ideas about learning in the Anglo-Saxon period from Ælfrēd's writings: first, the perception that society suffers when learning is in decay, and second that education and its value are located primarily in the group, rather than in the individual. The learned individual is expected to share knowledge, encouraging others to better understand sermons and church services, and the arts of discourse.

King Ælfrēd was illiterate throughout much of his rule of England, though he would later acquire literacy in both Old English and Latin and translate a variety of Latin religious and intellectual works into the vernacular. John Asser's life of Ælfrēd reports that the king regretted his lack of education early in his rule, and thus resolved to gather a

group of learned men from both England and continental Europe to improve educational opportunities, a goal that extended beyond the nobility and into monastic and vernacular circles. Ælfrēd's children thus received a thorough education. Asser notes:

> Æthelwerd, the youngest of all, as a result of the divine wisdom and remarkable foresight of the king, was given over to training in reading and writing under the attentive care of teachers, in company with all of the nobly born children of virtually the entire area, and a good many of lesser birth as well. In this school, books in both languages—that is to say, Latin and English—were carefully read; they also devoted themselves to writing, to such an extent that, even before they had the requisite strength for manly skills (hunting, that is, and other skills appropriate to noblemen), they were seen to be devoted and intelligent students of the liberal arts.[23] (Asser 1983, 90)

The children in these schools were educated at a young age, where they appear to have practiced both reading and producing compositions. Asser continues by describing the children as eager readers, who make use of texts in both Latin and the vernacular. He notes in a later section that the king too enjoyed learning and even reciting poetry, especially learning Saxon poems by heart.

This sections highlights the relative similarities between the early educational program described by Walker and the educational system which seems to have been in place in Anglo-Saxon England. Both emphasized early childhood study in poetry and prose works, hearing the readings of others, memorization, reciting readings oneself, producing poetic and prose compositions, and working with other educators in particular

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23. Translation is from Keynes and Lapidge. Aethelweard, omnibus iunior, ludis literariae disciplinae, divino consilio et admirabili regis providentia, cum omnibus pene totius regionis nobilibus infantibus et etiam multis ignobilibus, sub diligenti magistrorum cura traditus est. In qua schola utriusque linguae libri, Latinae scilicet et Saxonicae, assidue legebantur, scriptioni quoque vacabant, ita, ut antequam aptas humanis artibus vires haberent, venatoriae scilicet et ceteris artibus, quae nobilibus conveniunt, in liberalibus artibus studiosi et ingeniosi viderentur.

fields according to their specialty. The only major difference is that Asser does not specifically mention rhetoric or the *progymnasmata*. As such, it does not seem improbable that rhetorical and grammatical education could have co-existed in Anglo-Saxon England, as Knappe and others have argued. As would be the case throughout medieval Europe, rhetoric and grammar seem to be complimentary fields of study in Anglo-Saxon England.

Opposition to this claim has mainly focused on the absence of concrete manuscript evidence, as mentioned above (Kraus 2013). While Knappe also admits a lack of concrete manuscript evidence of the ancient *progymnasmata* in Anglo-Saxon England, she nonetheless persuasively argues for the influence of Priscian's adaption of Hermogenes in particular, noting that the Anglo-Saxon poem *The Dream of the Rood* bears remarkable resemblance to discussions of impersonation from Priscian and other *progymnasmata* texts (Knappe 1999, 31). Her advocacy for Priscian's adaptation is based in the grammatical and literary evidence from the period. She notes, "Although there is no definite evidence this textbook [Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes] was known to the Anglo-Saxons, the potential value of these basic exercises with their intermediate position between rhetoric and grammar cannot be doubted" (Knappe, 1998, 26). I proceed from the premise that some elements of the *progymnasmata* tradition were in fact available in the Anglo-Saxon period, if not Priscian's entire adaptation. While this is an assumption on my part, I believe sufficient evidence exists to warrant this assumption. In light of Ælfrīc's own acknowledgments and the manuscript work of scholars such as Manfred Kraus and Knappe (2013), it appears the most likely sources of the *progymnasmata* in Anglo-Saxon England are therefore Priscian (who translated the Greek

educational program of Hermogenes into Latin) and Isidore of Seville (Knappe 1998). These two sources of the *progymnasmata* tradition will be the object of my study and comparison with the *Colloquy.*

What was transmitted to Ælfrīc and others of the period was likely incomplete: rather than the full, 14-step educational process the Greeks and Romans would have recognized, Ælfrīc and others would likely have known only a more limited program of those exercises mentioned in Isidore's *Etymologies* or from fragments of Priscian's translations (Kraus 2013). Isidore's *Etymologies* offer short explanations of maxims and *chreia*; a fairly complete explanation of confirmation and refutation, particularly in regards to fable; a short treatment of *ethopoeia*; and a summary of various topics. Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes covers fable, *chreia*, *ethopoeia*, maxim, refutation and confirmation, commonplace, *encomia*, *ekphrasis*, thesis, and laws, all relatively completely (Murphy 2001). However, Priscian's adaptation was not always transmitted in its full form. Manfred Kraus has noted that the fragmentation of the *progymnasmata* resulted in only scattered or individual exercises becoming integrated into medieval educational programs; however, while the complete program was indeed fragmented, with some exercises such as attacks on laws having little practical use in Anglo-Saxon England, and others presumably lost due to the destruction of manuscripts, the exercises that were transmitted were adapted and deployed in unique and interesting ways.

Priscian was one of the most popularly copied authors in the Middle Ages, though the most popular of his works were grammatical. As such, the availability of some of Priscian's grammatical works to Ælfrīc is near certain: Luke Reinsma has found ample evidence in Ælfrīc's *Grammar* of this intellectual debt, at least in terms of Priscian's

grammatical texts. He concludes: "There is no question that Ælfrīc and his contemporaries knew the grammars of Aelius Donatus" and of Priscian (Reinsma 1977, 401). Indeed, Priscian was one of the most commonly available authors throughout the Middle Ages, with nearly one thousand manuscripts attributed to him surviving across Europe (Kraus 2013; Reinsma 1977). At least 24 of these manuscripts contain Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes, and many of these are contemporary with Ælfrīc in time if not geographic proximity (Lanham 2001, 85; Kraus 2013). Note that this does not necessarily mean Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes was available to Ælfrīc: I mean only to highlight the relative availability of Priscian's work, which was no doubt even greater in Ælfrīc's time than in our own. Contemporary scholarship, however, has ascribed early medieval interest in Priscian's texts as primarily grammatical, without acknowledging the rhetorical aspects of this form of education. Yet, we must question such an assessment in the context of an intellectual culture that largely assimilated grammar, rhetoric and hermeneutics. As Gabriele Knappe notes, "the rhetorical prescriptions in Priscian's *Praeexercitamina* are not unlikely to have been part of the rhetorical aspect of Anglo-Saxon grammar teaching, thus complementing the teaching of techniques of text production based on literary models" (1998, 26).

The *Colloquy* was likely meant to be utilized in tandem with Ælfrīc's grammatical texts as a rhetorical supplement to classroom education in similar ways. The use of the *Colloquy* as rhetorical exercise likely depended upon aspects of classroom instruction that are not recoverable via manuscript evidence—exercises such as reading aloud,

offering critique, and penning short compositions.[24] As such, my argument is not primarily concerned with demonstrating an unbroken manuscript transmission of the complete classical *progymnasmata* tradition, but rather with how what *was* transmitted was adapted, repurposed, and deployed in a uniquely Anglo-Saxon educational and rhetorical context. Regardless of the ultimate source of inspiration for the text, it is my argument that, as a model for students of rhetoric, Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* demonstrates processes of invention, argumentation, and style through three main exercises: fable, *ethopoeia*, and theoretical thesis/comparison. The *Colloquy* models these exercises not only to teach rhetoric as an art of speaking, argument or persuasion, but also to demonstrate the ideal role of rhetoric and the rhetorician in Anglo-Saxon society.

Progymnasmata and Moral Education

In addition to the *progymnasmata's* grammatical and rhetorical roles, the *Colloquy* retains the Greco-Roman *progymnasmata*'s moral and civic emphasis as well. As Craig Gibson states regarding the classical exercises, "good citizenship was taught [through the *progymnasmata*], not as a vague ideal, but as a moral and religious duty" that would have been familiar to Anglo-Saxon Christians (2014, 5). However, the role of these exercises in Anglo-Saxon society shifts from training elite, landed men who would speak and debate in public forums, to educating men from many tiers of society who must interact in far more communal yet simultaneously less democratic settings, be they educational, religious or secular. Since educated men in the Anglo-Saxon period would likely have

24. Student compositions were often written on wax tablets, and are thus not generally maintained in the archaeological record.

been Christian monks (who were drawn from various class backgrounds), court advisers and nobility, or traveling religious figures, Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* takes on an overtly Christian focus centered on public spaces such as the village and the monastery. The result is a rhetorical educational program that is less agonistic, but retains central pedagogical and thematic elements of the ancient Greek *progymnasmata.*

That education, particularly rhetorical education, can influence moral character and civic participation is perhaps an accepted commonplace. Arthur Walzer notes that "it is not an exaggeration to characterize the history of rhetoric as a twenty-four-hundred-year reflection on citizen education" (2005, 113). Cicero and Quintilian both assert a prominent role for rhetorical education in civil society—training the "*vir bonus*" speaking well. Craig Gibson too has argued that in a progymnasmatic program along with "instruction in form and technique necessarily came instruction in content, as teachers transmitted the values of elite culture to their young students" who would then engage in practice that cemented their place in an upper-class, male, and landed civic society (2014, 4). In Gibson's view, the *progymnasmata* assert something about what it means to be an ancient Greek citizen—that is, how should behavior be judged in the Greek public sphere, and upon what criteria? Ideally, through the course of instruction and engagement with the *progymnasmata*, the ancient Greek rhetor should learn to answer these questions. The *Colloquy* deigns to answer similar questions: an orientation that will become clear through a reading of the text attentive to the indirect influence of rhetorical exercises.

The *Colloquy* as Fable

At its core, the progymnasmatic tradition is based in the idea that simpler exercises should proceed the more complex. The exercises were explicitly ordered to scaffold the development of the student as a writer, thinker and speaker. Fables were one of the earliest exercises assigned, often ordered after anecdote, or as the very first exercise. Priscian notes that fables are "what orators first offer to children, because they can easily introduce impressionable young minds to the better things"[25] (Priscian 1974, 53). Aside from delivering a moral or lesson, the fable was an extremely flexible format for composition, as fables were open to expansion, compression, and explanation—exercises that asked students to alter earlier compositions or the compositions of others to improve their own skills. As Francisco R. Adrados has argued, medieval "fables were devoted to teaching . . . [offering] the customary exempla of the *Progymnasmata* of the rhetoricians" (2000, 395). However, those same stories were also subject to refutation on the basis of believability, presence of the unfamiliar, inconsistency, falseness, and other criteria, which would further test the students and their development as learners. Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* is interesting in its utterly simple, familiar, and believable characters and settings. Rather than dealing with historical or mythological examples, as is often common in Greek or Latin *progymnasmata* programs, Ælfrīc bases his examples in familiar professions and the village as a social space. As a model document produced by an established educator, this is perhaps expected; Ælfrīc was composing effective

25. Translations of Priscian are from Joseph Miller, "Fundamentals Adapted from Hermogenes." Fabula est oratio ficta uerisimili dispositione imaginem exhibens ueritatis. ideo autem hanc primam tradere pueris solent oratores, quia animas eorum adhuc molles ad meliores facile uias instituunt . . .

examples for his students. The need for good models and imitation is foundational to both the sophistic and *progymnasmata* traditions.

However, despite Ælfrīc's changes in character and setting, the fable crafted within the *Colloquy* is not divorced from the classical tradition. The *Colloquy* shares its structure and moral with an Aesopic fable, "The Belly and the Members." As Edward Wheatley notes, both Priscian and Quintilian "cite Aesop as the originary name associated with fable," though most fables available in the Middle Ages, though based on the original fables of Aesop, were in fact composed later by Avianus (2000, 37). While the original tales of Aesop were unlikely to be in circulation, there is much evidence to support a continued tradition of fable production and adaptation in the Middle Ages, particularly within the realm of grammatical education (Wheatley 2000; Adrados 2000). Adaptation of fables was thus an accepted component of grammatical pedagogy. Through expansion, and a variety of speeches in character, Ælfrīc's model document seeks to establish a synthesis of a variety of *progymnasmata* exercises, altering the original fable considerably. In doing so, the model document fits *progymnasmata* criteria of believability and familiarity. The tale, which is quite short in the original, is as follows:

> One fine day it occurred to the Members of the Body that they were doing all the work and the Belly was having all the food. So they held a meeting, and after a long discussion, decided to strike work till the Belly consented to take its proper share of the work. So for a day or two, the Hands refused to take the food, the Mouth refused to receive it, and the Teeth had no work to do. But after a day or two the Members began to find that they themselves were not in a very active condition: the Hands could hardly move, and the Mouth was all parched and dry, while the Legs were unable to support the rest. So thus they found that even the Belly in its dull quiet way was doing necessary work for the Body, and that all must work together or the Body will go to pieces. (Aesop 1909)

The dialogue of the *Colloquy* is an extended example of this fable. By engaging in expansion, one of the typical progymnasmatic exercises, the *Colloquy* offers an abundance of sample speeches and therefore model texts for his students to work with. In the expanded fable, the students with their various professions take the place of the members of the body; the plowman from the beginning of the *Colloquy* takes the place of the belly. Ælfrīc's document is interesting in that it adapts a perhaps unfamiliar story for a young audience. Rather than drawing from an unknown Greek tradition, Ælfrīc uses the Anglo-Saxon village as the basis for his morality tale. Familiar village workers stand in for the personified members, creating a more relatable tale for the document's young audience. In this version of the story, "each member of the fraternity helps the others by his craft" (Anderson 2002, 211).

Despite the difference in setting and character, the ultimate moral of the fable is the same: the lawyer concludes that food is most important for the village (the body) and thus the plowman is deserving of the village's respect; as the lawyer notes in the *Colloquy,* "the plow feeds us all" (Ælfrīc 1966, 39). However, the lawyer also notes that all the other professions have their own important functions as well, just as the Aesopic fable suggests each member serves its own important function to the body. The fable expressed in the *Colloquy* serves to idealize a form of communal life that would have been important to encourage in children who may very well have entered monasteries in their later years. The need to normalize relationships between social classes in pursuit of communal consensus is most visible in The Rule of Saint Benedict and in a more visual artifact, the monastery plan of Saint Gall. The Rule of Saint Benedict, for instance, recommends that if a matter must be decided in a monastery "all should be called for

counsel [because] the Lord often reveals to the younger what is best. Let the brethren give their advice with all the deference required by humility, and not presume stubbornly to defend their opinions" (Chapter 3). Children, then, would be expected to learn early on the standards of decorum that would accompany opportunities for public speaking, and these standards were informed by Benedictine rule.

Manuscript evidence also suggests these two texts—the *Colloquy* and the glossed copy of Benedict's Rule—were meant to be read and considered together; an interlinear gloss of the *Rule of Saint Benedict* accompanies the *Colloquy* in the Cotton Tiberius manuscript. As Earl Anderson notes, "it is possible for us to see the unifying theme of the *Colloquy* as an expression of the Benedictine monastic ideal, derived from the Rule" and offering opportunities for the young learners to see such regulations applied practically in various social contexts (Anderson 210).

In contrast to the highly competitive cultures of Greece and Rome, the students of Anglo-Saxon England are encouraged to aim for acceptance and concession. Hence we see the lawyer offer not so much an answer to his master's original question, but rather a statement that recognizes the work of all parties: "If you be priest, or monk, or layman, or solider, exercise yourself in this, and be what you are; because it is a great damage and shame for a person to be unwilling to be what they ought to be" (Ælfrīc 1966, 41). Their rhetoric is not one of agonism but instead of accord. As Anderson notes regarding the debate between the workers:

> The dispute is resolved, probably not without influence from the commonplaces of the 'gifts of men' and the 'three estates' but more especially as an expression of the Benedictine ideal, by an affirmation of the need for a harmoniously unified society which is devoted to the service of God and in which each craftsman works in his own way for the benefit of the whole. (Anderson 2002, 212).

Rather than emphasizing the debate between the various professions, the *Colloquy* instead focuses on the peaceful resolution of the conflict in a way that honors all involved, while simultaneously reinforcing an existing theory of social order known as the three estates. The estates—the clergy, soldiers, and laborers—each have distinct responsibilities to their society, and the fulfillment of these responsibilities is to be valued, regardless of social position or class.

The relationship among the estates was directly pertinent to monastic communities, a fact made apparent by a surviving manuscript known as the monastery plan of Saint Gall. Completed around the time of Ælfrēd's educational reforms by the abbot of Reichenau, the monastery plan depicts a general, and idealized, monastic community. Created by attaching five different manuscript pages together, the plan depicts a community complete with agricultural fields, orchards, apiaries, forges, mills, bakeries, and numerous other buildings directly related to various professions. Since the plan was never used to build a real monastery, it stands to reason it was created to represent an ideal monastic community—a community that was not cut off from the world, but rather worked closely with many members of the medieval third estate. Taken together, the *Colloquy* and the plan of Saint Gall suggest that mediating the interactions between vernacular and monastic groups was an important focus of early grammatical and rhetorical education. These exercises helped young students to internalize values and practices of public behavior that conformed with Benedictine values.

The *Colloquy* as *Ethopoeia*

Thus far, I have focused on how Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* uses *progymnasmata* exercises such as fable in order to create a more familiar rhetorical education program for Anglo-Saxon students in the Middle Ages, as well as how that fable could serve to reaffirm aspects of Anglo-Saxon society. The *Colloquy* also utilizes the rhetorical exercise speech in character, or as it is called by Priscian, impersonation (in Greek *ethopoeia).* Priscian distinguishes between impersonation of particular or indefinite subjects, among other categories. The primary use of impersonation in the *Colloquy* is the indefinite; that is, it is concerned with speeches composed in response to a general scenario rather than with the particulars of a specific historical situation. The students in the *Colloquy* thus do not speak as a particular lawyer or blacksmith, but rather as members of those professions in general. Such speeches in character serve as a mode of expansion for fables, a tactic apparent in the *Colloquy.* These speeches have the goal of providing a variety of sample texts for students to critique according to various *progymnasmata* exercises of confirmation and refutation.

Fable and impersonation are closely related in that speeches delivered in character are often recommended as a method for expanding fables, speeches and other narratives. Priscian advocates for this approach: specifically, Priscian uses the example of fable in which apes wish to found a city. In the original fable only the most important details are recounted, such as the initial desire to build a city and the reminder by the older ape that walls would make them all easier to catch. To expand the fable, Priscian notes that, "you may draw out the oration in this way by lingering over details, telling how the vote was

taken, and developing in the same way the speech of the old ape"[26] (Priscian 1974, 54). In the expanded form of the example fable, Priscian's tale of apes and cities is expanded to include a speech in defense of city-founding with its own reasoning and justification. Ælfrīc seems to be following this format in his adaptation and expansion of the Aesopic fable previously discussed. By assigning each of the workers (who each stand in for the various members of the body) their own speeches, Ælfrīc builds from the advice offered in *progymnasmata* texts and composes a thoroughly expanded model fable on which his students might base their own compositions or practice the more advanced skills of attacking or defending a fable. Whereas the original Aesopic tale has no speakers, only a narrator, the *Colloquy* relies on a series of individual speakers. The *Colloquy* demonstrates both the goal of fable as an exercise, as well as how that exercise might be adapted for new formats and stories. Furthermore, it adds additional criteria to the fable on which it might be judged, such as the effectiveness of the expansion and the believability of the various speeches, giving Ælfrīc's students more opportunities to critique and learn from the piece.

A common *progymnasmata* exercise is the confirmation or refutation of a composition. As such, Ælfrīc's students may have also found themselves critiquing the believability of the impersonations offered within the text. Priscian notes that one must "be careful to preserve the character and the times being imagined: some words are

26. Et sic proferes orationem morando dicens, quod et plebiscitum scriptum est, et finges etiam orationem ueteris simiae . . .

appropriate to the young, some to the old, some to the joyful, some to the sad"[27] (Priscian 1974, 64). Since Ælfrīc's educational documents show as much concern for vocabulary as they do for grammar, crafting distinct speech for each character could have been emphasized, perhaps serving a dual purpose in conjunction with language training (Law 1987). For Priscian, appropriate impersonation requires knowledge of both the speaker's passions and manners. Passions refers to the speaker's emotional state; manners refers to the speaker's upbringing. For instance, Priscian provides the example of the first time a person from the country sees a sailing ship as an instance in which manners would prevail in impersonation: that is, one would expect the country dweller to be surprised by such a thing, and an effective impersonation would reflect that emotion. Ælfrīc has presented a relatively simple task for his students' impersonations. While the students certainly must consider character, Priscian's first category, they would not have had to consider period (another factor addressed by Priscian) as the implied period appears to be Ælfrīc's present. Moreover, the students would not have to consider passions as much as manners: by asking students to evaluate impersonation based on the highly variable criteria of social class and profession, the students are forced to think more about the latter than the former. As we will see in the coming sections, the differentiation of each character through manners is quite distinct.

The striking characterization of the *Colloquy* has been noted by scholars such as Earl Anderson, who compare the bold hunter, bolstered by his king's support, with the timid fisherman, who must always provide for himself. Thus, further criteria of

27. Ubique autem seruanda est proprietas personarum et temporum. alia sunt enim uerba iuuenis, alia senis, alia gaudentis, alia dolentis . . .

believability are introduced through the behavior and manners of each individual speaker, with the quality of each distinct impersonation subject to review by Ælfrīc's students. In short, the main purpose of the individualized speeches of each character is to provide students with many small sample texts to refute or confirm according to the varied criteria offered by the *progymnasmata*. Both the plowman and the merchant's impersonations help to illuminate the differences in power within society; as such, the accuracy of their presentation as workers would be a relatively simple category on which to base a confirmation or refutation.

Isidore suggests that an effective *ethopoeia* is achieved when the text or oration fits a "man's character, age, interests, rank, pleasures, sex, habits, [and] courage" (*Etymologies* 2.14). Pirates should give speeches that are "bold, abrupt, and daring" while women should give speeches "consistent with the sex" (*Etymologies* 2.14). Regrettably, how Isidore might handle the speech of a female pirate is a neglected topic within the text. Priscian notes that speeches "dealing with manners are speeches in which the speaker's way of life takes hold"[28] (Priscian 65). In short, determining the effectiveness of a given impersonation depends largely on *doxa*, as the consistency of the impersonation depends on how that character fits into common opinion. In the case of Ælfrīc's plowman, the character consistently projects a persona of oppression and misery.

The plowman has no freedoms; he occupies the lowest rung of society and owes everything to his lord. When the school master asks the plowman to describe his work, he responds by stating: "I labor quite hard. . .By no means is it such a rough winter that I

28. Morales uero, in quibus obtinent more . . .

dare lay hidden in my home, out of fear of my lord. . .indeed, it is a great work, for I am not free"[29] (Ælfrīc 1966, 20-21). Confirmation and refutation exercises ask students to present evidence for or against the effectiveness of a composition. Ælfrīc's students, then, would be expected to determine if this portrayal fit common opinion regarding plowmen and laborers; is this character believable and appropriate? This determination would be the basis for any refutations or confirmations made by the student. However, the plowman does present a consistent class-based personality, and thus attempts to fit into Priscian's injunctions regarding the importance of manners to impersonation.

The plowman is also quite distinct in his speech from the many professions of other social classes presented in the *Colloquy*. For example, the merchant exhibits a far more independent and confident personality, perhaps appropriate to his greater wealth and freedoms. When asked by the master about his value to society, the merchant responds "I say I am useful to the king, and to the leaders, and to the rich men, and to all people."[30] (Ælfrīc 1966, 33) The merchant, in contrast to the plowman, is sure of his value. When asked if he sells his goods for the price at which he purchased them, he nearly scoffs at the master, stating "What then would my labor profit me? I wish to sell here dearer than I buy in that place"[31] (Ælfrīc 1966, 34). Unlike the plowman, the merchant travels extensively in search of his goods in order complete his work. The manners this character presents are quite distinct, as the merchant has seen far more of the world than the

29. Nimium laboro. . .non est tam aspera hiems ut audeam latere domi pro timore domini mei . . . etiam, magnus labor est, quia non sum liber.

30. Ego dico quad utilis sum et regi et ducibus et diuitibus et omni populo.

31. Quid tunc mihi proficit labor meus? Sed uolo uendere hic carius quam emi illic.

plowman and presumably also possesses more wealth. In part, this passage seems to indicate the merchant's lack of social obligation to a noble or lord as well. Unlike the plowman, he does not owe allegiance directly to a master. Ælfrīc's students would be asked to assess to believability of this impersonation based on the criteria of manners and others; in short, how does this portrayal conform to Anglo-Saxon *doxa*?

Reading, confirming, refuting, and even composing such impersonations would have allowed Ælfrīc's students to practice a variety of skills, rhetorical and otherwise, such as invention, style, tone, vocabulary and grammar. However, beyond practice in writing, grammar, and rhetoric, impersonation can be said to have a distinct moral and social purpose that encouraged identification with the experience of others. Identification through imitation is common in many rhetorical traditions, especially the sophistic (Hawhee 2004). However, rhetorical imitation became increasingly concerned with the modeling and acquisition of virtue, especially within the realm of civic life. Quintilian suggests that "imitation. . .not be confined to words. We ought to contemplate what propriety was observed by those great men, with regards to persons and things" (*Institutio Oratoria* 10.2.27). As Kathleen Lamp has argued, "Early imperial [Roman] rhetoric . . . was based largely on the practice of imitation" with the goal of modeling "ideal practices of citizenship" (2013b, 47). Medieval pedagogy expanded both the goals and models of rhetorical imitation. As Marjorie Curry Woods notes in her essay, "Weeping for Dido: Epilogue on a Premodern Rhetorical Exercise in a Postmodern Classroom," male students were often assigned impersonations of (particularly female) characters who are "in a state of severe emotional agitation" in order "to examine the psychological as well as the technical aspects of rhetorical techniques" (Woods 2001, 284).

Using an example shared by Augustine in the *Confessions,* Woods notes that medieval students might even participate in contests to compose the most appropriate *ethopoeia* for a given character in a given situation (Woods 2001, 285). However, the main focus of *ethopoeia* is not on competition but on the ability of the composing student to identify psychologically and emotionally with a given character, and to reflect that identification through the use of language and rhetoric (Woods 2002). Woods notes that Augustine was assigned as a child to deliver speeches as if he were the goddess Juno. Later descriptions of *ethopoeia* offered by Augustine in his *Confessions* frequently refer to his identification with Dido (founder and first queen of Carthage, and character in Virgil's *Aeneid*, known for slaying herself upon a funeral pyre) and her pain and loss, seemingly relating more closely to her experience through the creative process of representing her through his compositions. That Anglo-Saxon students might have completed similar exercises is not hard to believe: indeed, it could be easy to see the value in a noble or young monk learning to identify more closely with the plowman and his suffering due to his work through the long winters. Monasteries were not sealed off from the world; they engaged in trade and their members came from a variety of backgrounds. In completing such exercises, Anglo-Saxon students might be encouraged to recognize the value of the work undertaken by the members of the other estates, reaffirming both a social hierarchy and set of religious ideals. While the students were certainly learning grammar and rhetoric, it seems they may also have been practicing empathy as well.

The Colloquy as Thesis and Comparison

Thus far, this chapter has focused on the *Colloquy* as an example of a fable expanded through the inclusion of speeches in character; it has also explored the importance of those individual impersonations for the progymnasmatic exercises of confirmation and refutation on the basis of manners and common opinion. I will conclude by examining the text as an example of theoretical thesis and comparison, exploring the distinct model of rhetorical and moral education Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* offers. Priscian refers to thesis as *positio,* noting that it deals with "the consideration of some general question which relates to no particular person or other circumstantial consideration, like a debate over whether sailing or getting married or studying philosophy is good, without asking for whom"[32] (Priscian 1974, 66). Aelius Theon also uses considerations of marriage as an example of thesis, noting "there is no difference if someone discusses (the practical question) whether one should marry. . .and (the theoretical question) whether marriage should be chosen or avoided" (2003, 56). Since the debates included within the *Colloquy* are not directed toward any particular audience (i.e. which profession would be best for Wulfstan) the text thus addresses a theoretical thesis: which of the professions is most valuable in general? This issue is made clear when the master asks the lawyer, "What have you to tell us, wise man? Which craft among these seems superior to you?" (Ælfrīc 1966, 39).

32. Positio est deliberatio alicuius rei generalis ad nullam personam certam pertinens uel aliam partem circumstantiae, ut si tractemus an nauigandum, an ducendum uxorem, an philosophandum, non addentes cui.

The consideration of theses often depends on the exercise of comparison. In Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes, he explains the role of comparison within the *progymnasmata*, noting that "comparison is the bringing together of similar things or different things, or a cross reference of greater things to lesser things or lesser things to greater,"[33] which orators learn to deploy as a basic technique in all manners of discourse (Priscian 1974, 63). Priscian notes that comparison is useful for a variety of topics, including comparing "one race to another, or food to food, or professions to professions"[34] (63). The *Colloquy*, as is perhaps clear, is a comparison of various professions with the goal of determining which craft is the best for Anglo-Saxon society. This type of comparison Priscian calls *duplex,* or "double," as it directly compares two or more items within a category. As Priscian notes, "if we debate whether wrestling should be practiced, our consideration is simple; but if we ask whether wrestling should be preferred over farming, it is twofold"[35] (1974, 67). A double comparison, then, is direct and compares known items within categories, like professions. The answer to this double comparison is relatively clear and provided through the lawyer's extended speech on the value of the plowman: every profession is important, but if one must choose, food is most important for life and therefore 'plowman' is the most important profession. Indeed, the moral of the lawyer's fable is that all workers should accept their lots in life and strive to

33. Comparatio est uel similium uel diuersarum uel minorum ad maiora uel maiorum ad minora collatio et ea usi sumus.

34. Et genus generi et uictum uictui et professiones professionibus.

35. Si enim dicamus an luctatione exercendum, simplex positio, sin autem luctatione exercendum an agricultura, duplex.

be their best within that profession—his conclusion is that such an argument is unnecessary and that peace and concord must be reached. The resolution of the question comes about by denying the question's validity.

However, in addition to comparisons of professions, the students in the *Colloquy* are also asked to compare more abstract concepts, such as types of wisdom. Indeed, how and what the students wish to learn is a central theme of the text. These considerations—the means and ends of learning—are more akin to what Priscian terms "civil questions" or "those which relate to the common good"[36] (Priscian 1974, 66). The questions raised by the dialogue are just as related to morality and norms of public participation as they are to grammar and language acquisition. Such a focus speaks, I believe, to the *Colloquy's* role in what might be more recognizable as a form of moral and rhetorical education, a traditional role of the classical *progymnasmata*. The students in the *Colloquy* are asked to consider the role of rhetoric within society, a question directly echoing one of Priscian's examples of a "civil question:" that is, "whether rhetoric should be taught" (Priscian 1974, 66). The monk in the dialogue of the *Colloquy* asks the students not only to debate the merits of professions, but also to define the role of trained speaking in the development of wisdom in a Christian society; in doing so, he articulates the traditional anxieties that have been associated with rhetorical training since the ancient sophists. The students are presented with one of the most timeless debates within the history of rhetoric: do they wish to be, in their master's words, manipulative "shape-changers, clever in speaking, sly, full of cunning, good speakers and poor thinkers" (Ælfrīc 1966, 43)? Or

36. Ciuiles quidem, quae communibus et ad ciuitatem pertinentibus subiacent opinionibus.

rather, do they wish to use their training in grammar and rhetoric for "good," speaking truth to others?

The *Colloquy's* use of the term "shape-changers" (*uersipelles*) in this context is interesting to note. The Old English used is in this context is *prættige* (the root of the Modern English *pretty*) which has only the senses of "sly, cunning, tricky, wily" and not the sense of physical change and metamorphoses offered by *uersipelles*. Yet this sense of physical transformation in response to various situations conveyed by the Latin text is reminiscent of discussions of Greek sophistic training practices. As Debra Hawhee notes in her discussion of the octopus as a representation of sophistic *metis,* the animal is "a figure of cunning polymorphousness, [representing] a modality of response constantly bound up in its flexible, adaptive movement between things . . . an affinity for tricks and disguises" (Hawhee 2004, 56-7). Such an orientation toward language and rhetoric clashes with the typically medieval Augustinian conception of rhetoric, bound as it is in the expression and dissemination of Christian truth. The students are thus presented with a choice; do they accept the form of (sophistic) rhetoric and wisdom presented to them by the master? Or rather, do they posit their own definition of trained speaking and writing?

In their piety, the students of course choose the latter. In contrast to the *uersipelles* rhetor proposed by the master, the students wish to be *simplices sine hipochrisi,* simple and without hypocrisy (Ælfrīc 1966, 43). Their identity as rhetors is defined in opposition to the sophistic definition forwarded by their master. The master's questioning serves to set up a more complex consideration of theoretical thesis than the comparison of professions. Rather than changing and multi-formed, the students wish to be constant and straightforward, a point reinforced by their choice of vocabulary and diction. In contrast

to the master's long list of qualities possessed by the shape-changing speaker, the students define for themselves a relatively simple role and identity: they state, "We wish to be simple and without hypocrisy (*simplices sine hipochrisi*), and wise in order to avoid evil and accomplish good" (Ælfrīc 1966, 43). The stakes of language learning in the *Colloquy* are higher than the acquisition of another language; rhetorical and grammatical training shape broader practices of citizenship and public engagement, idealizing certain forms of participation and expression. As Craig Gibson has suggested, *progymnasmata* exercises ask students to consider "what shared principles may human actions and attitudes" be evaluated upon (5). While these principles—sophistic *metis,* agonistic deliberation, communal consensus— may change in accordance with political and cultural shifts, the methods by which these principles were taught were remarkably consistent. The *Colloquy* clearly suggests an idealized public identity which Ælfrīc's students would be asked to internalize.

Thus, a variety of the topics addressed through comparison and thesis in the *Colloquy* are related to suggested topics from Priscian's *progymnasmata* program; that is, the double comparison of types of professions, and the "civil question" of if and how rhetoric should be taught. The idealized responses of the students in the *Colloquy* help to model appropriate forms of public behavior and opinion in relation to education. These similarities to the *progymnasmata* programs of antiquity suggest an intellectual debt that offers support for the continuity of basic rhetorical instruction through early grammatical education. The *Colloquy* may have been composed as model text meant to be utilized in a basic *progymnasmata* program informed by elements of the classical tradition. As in

antiquity, these exercises served a greater purpose than simply grammatical or rhetorical education; they sought also to cultivate and reinforce social norms.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued for the continued influence of the *progymnasmata* of antiquity within the teaching of rhetoric and the language arts in Anglo-Saxon England. Through a comparison of the *Colloquy* to two likely sources of inspiration—Priscian's adaptation of Hermogenes and Isidore's *Etymologies*—I have drawn attention to the similarities in use of fable, *ethopoeia,* and considerations of theoretical thesis. These similarities speak to the need to seriously consider the *progymnasmata* as a potential influence on the *Colloquy,* as well as on Anglo-Saxon grammatical and rhetorical education more broadly.

Beyond these connections to the classical *progymnasamta* programs and texts, the *Colloquy* also seeks to both idealize a form of communal life dependent on consensus and cooperation and encourage identification with others though the *progymnasmata* exercises of fable and *ethopoeia*. These exercises speak to the continued practice of utilizing early rhetorical education as a site of civic identity formation in service of communal goals. Ælfrīc's students thus would have learned not only how to invent and compose texts and speeches, but also to internalize the moral and civic messages communicated through such genres—messages supporting the ideal of communal monastic life and the existing social order of the three estates. The exercises and goals of student engagement with Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* could very well have resembled the goals of Greco-Roman rhetorical education through childhood engagement with the

progymnasmata, though the lessons are of course applied to different religious and practical ends.

CHAPTER 6

TRANSLATION, TECHNE, AND CIVIC IDENTITY

Beginning in the 13th century, rhetoric's disciplinary status underwent enormous change, particularly in England. As philosopher and rhetorician Richard McKeon has argued, the theories and practices of rhetoric in the Middle Ages "had long wandered from field to field" as rhetoric's disciplinary identity shifted (1942, 1). Drawing from his studies of the Middle Ages, McKeon argued that medieval rhetoric was an architectonic productive art that had "no special subject matter . . . [but] nonetheless must be discussed in application to some subject," with that subject varying from diverse disciplines, including theology and ethics (1942, 3). His observations have been extended and refined by other scholars such as Rita Copeland, who suggests that rhetoric in the Middle Ages "is always valued as an instrument of reasoning; but its value is always defined and delimited by its subordination to a governing inquiry" (Copeland 1992, 63).

These views are the product of the diverse historical applications of medieval rhetorical theory, particularly as they intersect with Aristotle's theories of knowledge, which became increasingly important to medieval thought in the 13th century. The concepts and vocabulary of rhetoric seeped into otherwise foreign realms due to rhetoric's wide applicability as a system of structuring thought. While previous chapters of this study have considered the relationship between civic identity and pedagogy, in this chapter, I would like to propose an additional realm which was influenced by rhetoric and served a role in constituting vernacular civic identity: Middle English vernacular treatises focusing on technical subject matter.

Specifically, I wish to suggest that changing conceptions of Aristotelian models of knowledge in the 13th and 14th centuries led to an understanding of rhetoric as (perhaps paradoxically) both architectonic practical art and *techne,* and that this collapse of distinct categories within Aristotelian influenced thought helped not only to authorize vernacular production of learned texts—both related and unrelated to rhetoric as a discipline—but also helped to authorize vernacular readership of those same texts in service of the common good. Rhetoric in these cases serves as a *techne* governed by practical wisdom, and is thus utilized as part of a larger "architectonic art . . . [which] order[s] the ends of subordinate arts" and "produces subject-matters and organizes them in relation to each other and to the problems to be solved" (McKeon 1987, 2, 6). English authors such as Trevisa, Gower, and Chaucer drew from the vernacular rhetoric treatises of medieval continental Europe, specifically those of Brunetto Latini, to authorize their own rhetorical production, often in service of subversive political goals.

Taken together, the writings of Latini, Trevisa, Gower, and Chaucer suggest an evolving understanding of rhetorical *techne* beginning in the 13th century and extending to the end of the14th. To clarify, my argument is not that Middle English authors wrote a preceptive rhetorical *techne* in the style of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* or some similar treatise, but rather that the production of other Middle English technical treatises was itself rhetorical and informed by a purposeful appropriation of Latini's view of rhetoric as *techne* subordinated to (and nearly itself becoming) practical knowledge and politics. The collapsing distinctions between practical and productive knowledge in these centuries led to novel approaches to securing the common good through speech and writing. Indeed, I suggest that rhetoric's changing relationship to ideas of common, civic goods—as

expressed chiefly by Latini—helps to enable vernacular translation and composition under the auspices of increased educational access. That is, changing theories of rhetoric and rhetorical production fundamentally changed what counted as a common good in relation to education.

These changing conceptions of the common good required accompanying shifts in theories of civic identity—the logical and affective responses of everyday citizens to public relationships and activities sanctioned by their political culture—as well. As ideas of educational access evolved, the relationship of everyday people to legal and historical records traditionally recorded only in Latin texts changed, as Latin literacy was no longer a prerequisite for reading texts such as historical chronicles. Moreover, while England had a long tradition of vernacular literary production before this period, movements associating Middle English composition with civic goods intensified during the 13th and 14th centuries. As David Rollison has argued, "Vernacularization is the key to the evolution of English 'civic consciousness'" in the later Middle Ages (2005, 146). This civic consciousness extended beyond traditional learned circles of academics; as Rollison further elaborates, "we are dealing not only with the circles of poets and scribes, but with an extended information community, and with the desire of certain authors to create, by their efforts, another kind of community in which the information would be understood" (2005, 150). The development of this type of civic awareness is closely tied to changing views of rhetoric and its disciplinary functions. Rhetoric becomes in the Late Middle Ages "the scientific category that best represents the aims of localism" as its theories were newly applied to pressing and practical political issues (Copeland 1992, 63). Specifically, this shift can be seen in the ways Latini, Trevisa, and Chaucer position the

vernacular reader as in need of certain forms of social and civic knowledge and the intervention of art.

Identifying and tracing these shifts in civic identity requires a reassessment of historiographical approaches in the history of rhetoric. Specifically, following Susan Jarratt, as well as theorists of vernacular rhetoric discussed in earlier chapters, I employ a syncretic approach that draws evidence from texts that do not explicitly identify themselves as "rhetorics." I then use a probability-driven method of analysis that employs rhetorical reasoning to draw inferences about the influence of specific texts, such as Latini's works, and the evolution of rhetoric's relation to civic identity more broadly. I will first discuss the medieval understanding of *techne* and offer a very brief overview of the historical contexts of rhetoric in both Italy and England (the homes of these authors). I will then trace Brunetto Latini's adaptation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* in which Latini collapses traditional Aristotelian distinctions between types of knowledge. Then, I will illustrate Latini's role in shaping rhetoric's civic evolution by drawing examples from two late 14th century Middle English texts which explicitly discuss the rationale behind producing vernacular learned discourse: John Trevisa's *Dialogue Between the Lord and the Clerk on Translation* and Geoffrey Chaucer's *Treatise on the Astrolabe.* These texts, I argue, share both a common goal in authorizing vernacular readership and production of text, and a common strategy of employing rhetorical precepts to convey clarity, plainness, and widespread social and civic value in service of a (new) common good. Implicit in the approaches of these two texts is a desire to reassess the relationship between academic and scientific knowledge and vernacular civic identity. Trevisa and Chaucer's treatises address the thorny and political questions of who has access to—and the authority to

produce and interpret—learned discourse. The reassessment of civic identity which these texts suggest is primarily constituted through their proposed relationship between academic knowledge and a wider readership. Moreover, each of these texts show features of an evolving understanding of rhetoric that can be traced to the encyclopedic writings of Brunetto Latini's *Li Livres dou Tresor*. However, before analyzing any of these works, I will first discuss several important contextual matters, namely the idea of a medieval rhetorical *techne* and the changing disciplinary status of rhetoric in late medieval England, both of which are necessary to understand rhetoric's changing function as an architectonic art (that is, a "master" art that subsumes other arts within its practices) and its relationship to vernacular civic identity and the idea of the common good.

Rhetoric and *Techne*

The Greek term *techne* is often associated with tools, or artifice; it can be defined variously as either "art" or "craft," and is the subject of a substantial portion of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.*[37] Aristotle speaks of *techne* as a distinct category of knowledge, namely the productive arts, which include things like bridle-making and other artisanal activities. To Aristotle, these categories of knowledge have to do with a product to be produced which is intended to be used in service of a larger goal—for instance, bridles are made in service of the larger art of horsemanship. Since productive arts are only carried out in service of larger goals, Aristotle suggests that the master, or architectonic arts, should be preferred to the productive. Such arts typically belong to Aristotle's

37. Namely, Book VI and its discussion of the intellectual virtues.

category of practical knowledge (represented by *phronesis*), as they offer guides as to what one should and should not do (examples include politics and ethics). However, in rhetorical theory the term *techne* sometimes takes on a particular meaning as a preceptive (that, offering rules to inform future discourse) text intended to guide the composition of speeches or other texts, a sort of rhetorical handbook (for example, the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*).

Medieval authors and commentators preferred to employ the Latin term *ars* in place of the term *techne.* For instance, the 13th century Latin translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* completed by William of Moerbeke employs the Latin term *ars* where Aristotle employs *techne.* Like *techne, ars* shares a focus on the human capacity to alter or to move beyond nature. Common medieval interpretations of *ars* include: "skill," "craft," "art," "science," "method," "knowledge," or "way." In its varying definitions, *ars* also shares some similarity with the Greek *organon*—a term which medieval authors readily integrated into their vocabularies. As Janet Atwill has suggested, *organon* can be thought of as "an instrument 'manipulated by man' and an 'extension of his own organs'" (Atwill 1998, 54). Unlike the term *techne,* the term *organon* was commonly used throughout the Latin Middle Ages, particularly to refer to Aristotle's core works on logic. The adoption of the Greek term *organon* seems to suggest that Aristotle's core works on logic were themselves understood as mental and conceptual tools—as instruments to be manipulated as extensions or accessories to one's mind.

To put it a different way, Aristotle's *Organon* is viewed in the period as a technology, something that, when one is equipped and properly trained in its use, allows one to augment one's modes of thought beyond what is normally (without training/art) possible.

Scholars such as Walter Ong have made similar claims about the status of writing: while learning to write may seem to us a basic need, Ong contends it is a sophisticated technology requiring immense training and practice that can influence mental processes. The very idea of writing-as-technology can change one's modes of thought. Aristotle's *Organon* occupies a similar place in medieval society as a system of thought requiring training and experience employed to alter forms of reasoning. To learn to write or to learn the rules of logic or rhetoric is to fundamentally change how one thinks. Both writing and logic are conceptual tools which can be marshaled to a variety of other ends, even as they are subordinated to the broader categories of practical and speculative knowledge, respectively.

In this way, the term *organon* approaches a similarity with both *ars* and *techne*, because, as Janet Atwill writes, art "intervenes when a boundary or limitation is recognized, and it creates a path that both transgresses and redefines that boundary" (1998, 48). Both *techne* and *organon* share a common goal and purpose: they serve as an intervention that ″"transmits and amplifies the force of man'[38]" (Atwill 54). Beginning in the 13th century, as rhetoric became more intwined with logic and dialectic it took on additional features one might associate with the logical works of the *Organon* (*Organon* in the Middle Ages served as a shorthand for Aristotle's core books on logic, such as the *Posterior* and *Prior Analytics*) and their application. In short, rhetoric came closer to

38. I want to note and recognize my choice to preserve instances of non-inclusive gender terms such as "man." In the case of modern scholarship, preserving these instances is part of a commitment to accurately attributing words and thoughts to their authors. In the case of historical works, preserving gendered terms is necessary to understand the cultural and intellectual context historical thinkers operated within. I attempt to use inclusive terms whenever possible, except when quoting others.

what Richard McKeon termed an "architectonic productive art" that establishes "structures, forms, and procedures that transcend the unique languages of specialized sciences" (Backman 1987, xxviii).

While the category McKeon identifies does not exist in Aristotle's writings (it is a kind of hybrid of Aristotelian knowledge types) the term comes closest to late medieval understandings of rhetoric's functions and roles. Perhaps the biggest difficulty in understanding this shift is that medieval authors such as Latini often speak of rhetoric as *techne,* not as an architectonic art, even when they describe rhetoric as having architectonic functions. Yet, it is precisely rhetoric's history of blurring disciplinary boundaries that made it most useful to Middle English writers seeking to challenge the relationships between vernacular groups and academic knowledge, and to recast the relationship between these groups as one dependent on a common good tied to accessibility of information. To understand how Trevisa and Chaucer use rhetoric to subvert an established sense of civic identity and its relationship to technical subject matter, it is necessary to first consider rhetoric's changing status in comparison to related disciplines—those which were either influenced by rhetoric, or from which rhetoric itself borrowed.

Rhetoric's Evolving Roles: Italy and England

As Rita Copeland has astutely commented, "The history of rhetoric in the Middle Ages is in large part the history of its configuration within systems of knowledge" (Copeland 1992, 57). From Late Antiquity onward, rhetoric was understood as much through its position within systems of thought, such as the Trivium, as it was by its own

features as a discipline. Moreover, rhetoric's position within these systems was very unstable in comparison to other disciplines: it had been defined variously as the core of civil science, as an aspect of eloquence alongside grammar and dialectic, or as an element of virtuous conduct (Copeland 1992, 58).

However, beginning in the 13th century, two important developments for the history of rhetoric occurred. First, rhetoric was increasingly associated with the on-the-ground, practical elements of civil science, politics, and governance—a trend best exemplified by Brunetto Latini's *Li Livres dou Tresor* and his vernacular commentary on Cicero's *De Inventione, La rettorica.* While rhetoric had been consistently invoked as civil since at least Cassiodorus's and Isidore's writings, these earlier treatments were more concerned with the theoretical relations between members of civil society, rather than the day-to-day applications of rhetoric to the business of civil affairs. These earlier treatments of rhetoric represented more of an idealized philosophical approach between those living in civic communities, while still positioning rhetoric as necessary to harmonious community life. This is not to discount the importance of this sort of theorization, but rather only to observe a distinct difference that occurs within some key texts between these earlier and later periods. Second, rhetorical treatises become increasingly focused on authorizing vernacular distribution of rhetorical precepts, in particular when those precepts are intended to guide practical civic action, not simply the production of official civil texts or discourse (the rather uncontested territory and focus of the *ars dictaminis;* see Cox 1999). Both trends have implications for the later composition of Middle English technical treatises.

While many of the well-known histories of rhetoric associate the desire for widespread vernacular dissemination of rhetorical knowledge with later Renaissance writers such as Baldassare Castiglione and Christine de Pizan, writings by authors such as Brunetto Latini, Dante Alighieri, and John Gower show similar concerns far earlier, and these writings helped to authorize the politically subversive positions adopted by authors such as Trevisa and Chaucer (who themselves make similar arguments in favor of vernacular composition and educational access). It is this union between the role of rhetoric in the civil administration of largely independent Italian cities and the increasingly widespread need for vernacular training in rhetoric and civil speech that ultimately influence the Middle English resurgence of vernacular academic texts; given the popularity of both Latini's texts, it is perhaps not surprising that Middle English compositions would show some influence from these documents. Moreover, it is the framing of these vernacular rhetorics as tools, arts, or *techne*—methods by which to succeed at a goal and contribute to the common good—that helps to insulate their adaptations and translations from more widespread criticisms. *Techne* functions as a kind of *topos* that provides justification for translation and the sharing of knowledge. This is as true for Latini as it is for Trevisa or Chaucer. However, before discussing rhetoric's increasingly political nature and its association with vernacular literary production in more depth, it remains to argue for the possibility of Latini's influence on Chaucer's England. The clearest way to trace this influence is through Chaucer's friend John Gower. By attending to the ideas, theories, and texts that influenced a notable figure within the same social circles as Chaucer, we can draw inferences about the relative availability of texts and ideas within the period.

In Italy, the production of vernacular rhetorical treatises began far earlier than in England; as Virginia Cox has suggested, "Ciceronian rhetorical theory was adopted in Italy from the mid-Duecento as a supplement to the *ars dictaminis* in response to the expanding rhetorical needs of an increasingly complex society, governed by an increasingly sophisticated machinery of government, and affected by exasperated social and political tensions" (1999, 283). Similar conditions would not arise in England for some time. While John Gower's *Confessio Amantis,* ca. 1390, is often held up as the first vernacular Middle English discussion of rhetoric (and it is little more than a discussion; Thomas Wilson is the first to write a complete English rhetoric, and this would not come until the mid-1500s), Brunetto Latini translated and commented on Cicero's *De Inventione* in/to Italian and completed his encyclopedic *Li Livres dou Tresor*—one of the most popular encyclopedias of the Middle Ages—in French around 1260 (Murphy 1965, 6). Latini himself stands out for his direct connection of rhetoric and politics, which has led Virginia Cox to state that he was "the most politically aware of the Ciceronian rhetoricians of this period, and the writer who manifests the most authentically Ciceronian understanding of the nexus between rhetoric and politics" (1999, 249). Similarly, Stefania D'Agata D'Ottavi, in her recent edition of Latini's *La rettorica,* notes that Latini translated "Cicero not only to make his writings accessible to a wider audience but also to stress that Cicero's civic passion, which had induced him to put rhetoric at the service of politics, was also his own" (2016, 3).

However, Latini's texts are of special interest not only for their clear and (for the time) rather unique and explicit discussion of rhetoric's civic applications, but also for their influence in late medieval England. Indeed, as James J. Murphy has argued, Gower's

discussion of rhetoric from the *Confessio Amantis* is little more than a repackaging of Latini's divisions of knowledge in the *Li Livres dou Tresor* into categories of the theoretical, practical, and logical—with the second category holding rhetoric as the most important of the sub-divisions (1962, 402). Yet, while Murphy confidently, and I believe rightly, connects Gower and Latini through Book VII of the *Confessio,* Murphy does not seem to allow for the possibility that Chaucer also may have read Latini, and that this reading may have influenced his works. Rather, Murphy seems to suggest in another of his articles that Chaucer gained what knowledge he had of Ciceronian rhetoric through "abstracts in some *florilegium,*" or a compilation of short excerpts of important authors or poets (Murphy 1964, 9 footnote 4).

This seems to me an unsatisfactory explanation, for several reasons. If we are to accept that Gower based his discussions of rhetoric on Latini's *Tresor* we must also accept the possibility that Chaucer drew from this source as well. Gower was a friend of Chaucer and a contemporary of Trevisa; Chaucer and Gower dedicated poems to one another and all three lived through momentous English political events, including the peasant revolt of 1381, the subject of Gower's *Vox Clamantis.* Moreover, Julia Bolton Holloway has observed that "[s]everal manuscripts of works and letters by Brunetto Latini came to England at different times" and that "Some of the works could have been known by John Gower and Geoffrey Chaucer" (1987, 14). Holloway further argues that we "can safely assume that they [Chaucer and Gower] shared books" on the basis of their close friendship and other connections (1987, 20). She further suggests that at least four manuscripts contemporary with Chaucer and Gower are still in England; another two are no longer in England, but were during Chaucer and Gower's time (Holloway 1987, 16).

It is also known that Chaucer spent time in France and "it is generally agreed that Chaucer's French was as good and perhaps better than was his English," raising the possibility that Chaucer may have acquired his own knowledge of Latini's text independently of Gower (Crafton 1989-90, 26; Holloway 1987, 20). This would not be surprising, as Latini's *Tresor* was one of the most popular, and commonly copied, texts in the later Middle Ages. Moreover, John M. Crafton has convincingly argued for Latini's influence on Chaucer's style on the basis of the discussion of the schemas for prologues in the *Tresor* (1989-90. 33-4). In short, both manuscript and literary evidence suggest that Chaucer may have had access to Latini's works, either through his dealings with Gower or through his own travels in mainland Europe.

Noting the availability of these texts to Chaucer is important because Latini's text repositions rhetoric as the pinnacle of an entire category of knowledge, rather than one aspect of trained speaking and writing; the role Latini imagines for rhetoric is one of the most expansive of the Middle Ages, and this view collapses the typical distinction between Aristotelian categories of knowledge. This collapse is important for understanding the relationship between rhetoric and the seemingly distant subjects discussed in some Middle English vernacular treatises. Latini's expansive view of rhetoric allows for rhetoric's role not only in poetic composition but also in political, practical, and prose works. While Aristotle's divisions certainly would have allowed for rhetoric to take on many of these roles as well, the important distinction is that Latini does not envision rhetoric as in anyway subordinate to another art. In fact, it frequently seems to be the case the Latini considers rhetoric to be equal in its disciplinary status.

Latini's View of Rhetoric

In his *Li Livres dou Tresor,* Brunetto Latini refigures rhetoric as an architectonic art useful in structuring thought regarding political matters, even as he continually asserts rhetoric is a *techne*. While his introduction ostensibly organizes the *Tresor* into categories of theoretical, practical, and logical sciences, Latini sometimes has difficulty determining the exact category to which rhetoric ought to belong (whether it is practical or logical), and he does not follow the schema he presents at the beginning of his book; his discussion of the "logical sciences" is dedicated almost entirely to rhetoric, with politics filling in the rest of the discussion. Latini's task was likely further complicated by his association with other medieval authors interested in rhetoric, particularly Hermannus Alemannus. The translator and commentator on an important Arabic discussion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (Al-Farabi's *Didascalia*), Alemannus positioned rhetoric as a form of logic concerned with reasoning about specifics (D'Agata D'Ottavi 2016, 12). This view was one shared by Latini, but the Scholastic tendency to understand rhetoric within a logical framework surely must have complicated Latini's efforts to position rhetoric as an art. However, I would ultimately suggest that this is not due to a lack of knowledge of rhetoric's disciplinary character or status within the Trivium, but rather to Latini's desire to demonstrate that rhetoric contains logical, technical, and practical elements.

Since Latini sees rhetoric as a skill necessary to successful governance, it is perhaps unsurprising that he should understand it as multivalent. For instance, in the introduction to the *Tresor,* Latini states that:

> The third part of the treasure is like fine gold, that is to say that it teaches how one should speak according to proper rhetoric, and how a lord should govern the people who are under his jurisdiction . . .. all this belongs to the second branch of

> philosophy, that is, the practical. For just as gold surpasses all metals, so also is the science of speaking well and governing a people more noble than any other in the world. (1993, 1.1.4)[39]

In this section, Latini seems to align rhetoric with Aristotle's conception of practical knowledge; these are the arts that Aristotle claims are associated with prudent judgement (*phronesis*), and in Aristotle's discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* include politics and ethics. While this alone is not a particularly novel way in which to categorize rhetoric, the divisions Latini draws between the various sub-categories of knowledge *are* novel. Latini essentially agrees with Aristotle's basic definition of the practical sciences: the practical "teaches us what to do and what not to do" and includes such disciplines as ethics, economics, and politics (Latini 1993, 4). These domains of knowledge are practical inasmuch as they inform our future actions and decision making.

However, at this point Latini conflates Aristotle's distinctions between practical and productive forms of knowledge. During his discussion of politics, which he holds to be "without a doubt . . . the highest wisdom and most noble profession there is among men," Latini asserts the necessity of using this knowledge to govern others according to reason and a sense of justice (1993, 4). At this point, he states:

> Thus it [politics] teaches us all of the arts and trades necessary to the life of men, and this occurs in two ways, for the one is in deed and the other in word. The one way, that is, in deed, consists of the daily trades involving hand or foot, that is, metalsmiths, weavers and shoemakers and the other trades necessary for the life of men, and which are called mechanical; those which are in word are those

39. La tierce partie du tresor est de fin or, c'est a dire k'ele ensegne a home parler selonc la doctrine de retorike, et coment li sires doit gouverner ses gens ki souz li sont. . . . et tout ce apertient a la seconde sience de philosophie, c'est pratike. Car si comme li ors sormonte toutes manieres de metal, autresi est la sience de bien parler et de gouverner gens plus noble de nul art du monde.

> which involve mouth and tongue, and these consist of three disciplines: grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. (1993, 1.4.6)[40]

Latini also makes this division in his *La rettorica.* First, he notes that practical arts show "what has to be done and what should be avoided" and that only after understanding the practical might we understand "glorious rhetoric" (2016, 17.14). Politics is a sub-division of the practical, and can itself be divided into "Deeds" and "Words" (2016, 17.18). "Deeds" includes "all the arts and crafts that are practiced in cities" such as smithing (17.18). "Words" further is subdivided into the arts of the Trivium: grammar, dialectic, rhetoric. Given that these same ideas appear in both the politically motivated *Tresor* as well as his adaptation of Cicero's *De Inventione,* it seems likely that Latini understands both manual labor and rhetorical, mental labor as key to successful civic life. Word and deed each contributes to the life of the city in its own way.

To Aristotle, modes of practical knowledge (for example, economics and strategy) are distinct from the mechanical arts which Latini categorizes as a part of politics; in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* they belong to *techne,* rather than to *phronesis,* even if those two terms are at times related in other elements of Aristotle's philosophy. As Cary Nederman has suggested, ″Aristotle includes among the mechanical arts agricultural, artisanal, and commercial activities," but not the language-based arts of the Trivium (2014, 31). Rather, Aristotle assigns such disciplines as economics, strategy, and rhetoric the status of

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40. Et si nous ensegne tous les arts et toz les messires ki a vie d'ome sont besonable. Ce est en .ii. manières, car l'une est en ouvre sont li messire ke l'en ouvre tousjors de mains et des piès, ce sont sueurs, drapiers, cordewaniers, et ces autres messires ki sont besoignable a la vie des homes, et sont apielès mecaniques. Cele ki est en paroles sont celles ke l'en ouvre de sa bouche et de sa langue, et sont en .iii. manières, sors qui sont establies .iii. sciences, dramatique, dialectique, et rettorique.

subordinate arts to the "master art," or architectonic art, of politics.[41] This is because even though "production shares with practice the feature of aiming at some end other than knowledge for its own sake, Aristotle asserts that 'production and action are different in kind'" (Nederman 2014, 31). For example, children, as Aristotle points out in the *Politics*, should not be taught skills that will make them "mechanics" but instead those arts and skills that will make them free men.[42]

In Aristotle's view, there is thus a clear (and clearly gendered and classed) value judgement separating the spheres of the free and unfree which is identified in part by the types of labor each engages in. The mechanical arts are the purview of non-citizens, and represent an entirely separate sphere of knowledge from the practical arts of judgement (including rhetoric, ethics, etc). However, it is worth noting that Aristotle's entire division is fundamentally incompatible with medieval estate theory, which held a working group of people—mechanics—as a valuable and foundational element of civil society. In John of Salisbury's famous "body politic" metaphor, the mechanics are the feet on which the rest of society stands; without the feet, the body must crawl about shamefully or cease to function at all. Though tasked with mechanical labor, such workers maintained a civic role in later medieval political thought.

Thomas Aquinas, too, sought to connect civic and political engagement more fully to *techne* and productive knowledge. While discussing the nature of civic prudence, Aquinas writes:

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41. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a28-b7.

42. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1337b3–6.

> Because this executive prudence of positive law retains for itself the general name of civic prudence, it follows that only those who see to the execution of the enacted laws are said to be engaged in civil affairs since they alone are active among the people like *chirotechnae*, i.e., manual workers in things to be built; and legislators bear the same relation to them as do architects to those who execute their plans. (*Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* 6.7.1198)[43]

In effect, Aquinas positions civil administrators tasked with the implementation of laws as *chirotechnae,* or manual laborers engaged in the direct production of civic order or social goods. Their political—or as Aristotle would say, practical—skill is recast as a form of work. These administrators labor in much the same way as a smith. They are responsible for the manifestation of government decrees and legislation, whose authors are more akin to Aristotle's practitioners of practical knowledge. Thus, while Aquinas preserves the distinction between Aristotle's divisions of knowledge in name, he also blurs and muddies the distinctions between those same categories. It seems that "Aristotle's notion of citizenship in the *Politics* required revision, at least for some authors, because of a very prominent predilection in favor of the mechanical arts" (Nederman 2002, 77). The impulse to integrate productive knowledge into civic thought, I argue, is important for understanding changing conceptions of rhetoric as well. A similar evolution can be seen in Latini's work.

My intention here, however, is not to engage in a long and on-going debate about Aristotle's original intentions within his division of knowledge; rather, I wish only to contextualize the source material which seems to have informed Latini's own theorization

43. Et quia ista executiva legis positae retinet sibi commune nomen politicae, inde est quod isti soli qui exequuntur leges positas dicuntur conversari civiliter, quia isti soli operantur in civilibus, sicut chiroteginae, id est manuales artifices, in artificialibus; et comparantur ad legis positores, sicut ad architectores.

of rhetoric as he wrote his *Tresor*. Latini would likely be aware of contemporary interpretations of Aristotle's text, and these figures may have played a role in Latini's own adaptation. Understanding Aristotle's divisions of knowledge and the relationships of these divisions to rhetoric is important because Latini seems to collapse many of the distinctions Aristotle draws in his own divisions, even as Latini purports to hold to Aristotle's schema within his encyclopedic work. Yet his own interpretations more closely resemble those of Aquinas and John of Salisbury. While Aristotle defines the practical and productive as distinct, Latini subordinates the productive to the practical. However, it seems to me unlikely that this is an error of interpretation on Latini's part, as his explanation in the second book of the *Tresor* of Aristotelian virtue ethics is relatively consistent with Aristotle's discussions in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indeed, it seems far more likely that Latini is attempting to work through Aristotle's own vague delineation between various modes of knowledge. As Janet Atwill writes, "There are no concise summaries of the constituents of productive knowledge comparable to that of theoretical knowledge" in Aristotle's available works (1998, 165). Indeed, in some sections of his writings Aristotle seems to associate rhetoric with *phronesis*, and in others with *techne* (Self 1979).

Latini's thinking was likely further complicated by the fact that he was grappling with Cicero's views and definitions of rhetoric as well; given the strong political role Cicero imagined for rhetoric, and Latini's own Ciceronianism, it is perhaps unsurprising that he imagined a deep political role for the art, and thus attempted to reconcile this role with an Aristotelian schema of knowledge. We can see this ambivalence in other areas of

Latini's treatise as well, such as when he identifies politics as the highest and finest of arts (a statement with which Aristotle would certainly not agree).

Yet, for Latini, the mechanical arts of metalworking and shoemaking are also nothing but a consequence of the practical judgment associated with politics; that is, the practical knowledge of one skilled in politics is what guides the application of mechanical knowledge, such as skill in metalworking or shoemaking in the first place. Indeed, "citizenship comes to be defined by Latini as an extension of the performance of mechanical functions" in service of the community (Nederman 2002, 88). The productive or mechanical arts are hence governed by a form of practical wisdom. Moreover, the disciplines of the Trivium are discussed as simply another category of practical knowledge, just as the mechanical/technical arts have been. In Latini's view, *phronesis* governs *techne* and the arts of the Trivium are simply non-mechanical, verbal subdivisions of *techne.* In forwarding this division of knowledge, Latini advances a relationship between rhetoric and other categories of knowledge that blurs Aristotelian categories, positioning rhetoric and the other arts of the Trivium as mechanical processes akin to skilled artisanal occupations. For Latini, each is informed by art, governed by prudence, and applied to civic matters, yet ultimately subordinated to a wider political end. In creating this association, Latini is not devaluing either category of knowledge (that is, the practical—e.g. *phronesis*—or the productive—e.g. *techne*).

To understand his position, one must attempt to avoid casting Latini's position in terms of binaries between Aristotle's types of knowledge, because this does not seem to be how Latini (or many of his contemporaries) understand Aristotle's divisions. Rather than as ranked categories, Latini and others seem to understand them as sub-divisions of

one another. Latini is perfectly comfortable discussing both forms of knowledge as important divisions of *phronesis.* Both the mechanical occupations and the verbal arts of the Trivium thus have claim to practical judgment. Latini is not the first author of the Middle Ages to imagine new roles for Aristotle's distinctions. Cary Nederman, for instance, has noted several authors, including John of Salisbury, who argue for "a larger and more inclusive role to mechanical occupations that validates the worthiness of the productive sciences in a way that Aristotle himself did not" (2014, 29). Latini, however, stands out in comparison to other authors in his close association of the arts of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric with other, more quotidian mechanical arts. While Latini is part of a larger intellectual tradition which "refused the conclusion that the exercise of the mechanical arts is incompatible with the possession of practical intelligence and virtue, and consequently with political engagement," he stands alone in his development of a novel categorization of knowledge which uniquely privileges rhetoric over the other aspects of the Trivium and fully integrates the arts of the Trivium into a theory of civil life (Nederman 2008, 19).

In this way, rhetoric's association with the mechanical by no means reduces its value, nor the value of the other disciplines of the Trivium. These disciplines are simply divided into the 'verbal' sciences, a counterpart to the mechanical: grammar teaches correct reading, writing, and speaking; dialectic teaches reasoning and argumentation. Rhetoric, however, receives a much more detailed treatment, and many of Latini's descriptions of rhetoric are cast in mechanical terms related to medieval discussions of nature and art. For instance, after relating the oft-repeated story of Cicero's wise and eloquent man uniting humanity, Latini states the following:

> Rhetoric is a science which teaches us fully and perfectly to express ourselves in public and private matters, and its whole purpose is to say words in such a way that those who hear the words will believe them. You should know that rhetoric comes under the science of governing a city, according to what Aristotle says in his book, which is translated above into romance [that is, in this case, Picard French], *just as the art of making bridles and saddles is under the art of chivalry*. (Latini 1993, 3.2.1-2,[44] emphasis my own)[45]

Beyond conflating Aristotle's categories of practical and productive knowledge in the early sections of his book, Latini also uses the skilled production of a material object as his main comparison for defining rhetoric's nature and role in society, just as Aristotle uses horsemanship to discuss a type of architectonic, or master art.[46]

Rhetoric, like bridle and saddle-making, is a specific and highly trained skill subordinated to a broader category of knowledge concerned with practical judgement. Rhetoric is subordinated to politics, the "science of governing a city" mentioned above; meanwhile, saddle-making is subordinated to chivalry (a more specific and distinctly medieval body of knowledge than the general 'horsemanship' Aristotle mentions in the *Nicomachean Ethics*), which is itself clearly a category of practical knowledge, that is, a

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44. Rectrice est une science ki nous enseigne bien pleinement et parfaitement dire es choses communes et es privees, et toute sa intention est a dire paroles en tel maniere que l'en face croire ses dis a ceauski les oient. Et sachiès que rectorique est dosez la science de citè gouverner, selonc ce q'Aristotles dit en son livre, ki est translatè en romans ca en arrière, autres com art de frains faire et de selles est sous l'art de chevalerie.

45. Aristotle too uses the example of a bridle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This is clearly an instance of Latini nearly quoting Aristotle.

46. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1094a: "Now in cases where several such pursuits are subordinate to some single faculty--as bridle-making and the other trades concerned with horses' harness are subordinate to horsemanship, and this and every other military pursuit to the science of strategy, and similarly other arts to different arts again--in all these cases, I say, the ends of the master arts are things more to be desired than all those of the arts subordinate to them; since the latter ends are only pursued for the sake of the former."

system of rules or thought which "teaches us what to do and what not to do" (Latini 1993, 1.4.1)[47]. Aristotle describes these types of arts—politics, horsemanship—as master arts, or architectonic arts, though Latini does not use this same language. However, since "chivalry" (Latini, writing in Picard French, uses *chevalerie*) represents a moral, ethical, social, and religious code, it is safe to assume that Latini believes *chevalerie* represents a system of thought which tells one what they ought to do and not to do, in the same way politics does.[48] After all, an exceedingly literal definition of chivalry might be rendered as "rules for owning a horse." While this subordination may be a result of Latini misreading Aristotle's philosophy, he does seem to conceive of the broad categories in similar ways. By connecting the arts of the Trivium more closely with the mechanical arts associated with *techne,* Latini effectively positions rhetoric as a tool or process, one that is subordinated to politics as a mode of practical knowledge; combining this association with "the ideologically and emotionally compelling Ciceronian myth of the civilizing power of eloquence in union with wisdom . . . must have veiled to a significant extent the potentially morally unsettling aspects"[49] of rhetorical theory and its applications to civic life (Cox 1999, 277).

47. ki nos enseigne ke l'en doit faire et qui non.

48. "chivalry, n." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, September 2015. Web. 5 November 2015.

49. That is, the capacity of skilled but unscrupulous rhetors to misrepresent the truth or to lead others into undesirable courses of action through lies, etc.

Authorizing the Vernacular

In addition to associating the mechanical arts with aspects of the Trivium, Latini authorizes the use of traditional Ciceronian rhetorical theory not only for political matters, but also to justify his own composition in French. For the utility and value of rhetoric as both composition aide and hermeneutic process, as well as the need for rhetorical instruction, allow Latini to defend his vernacular composition as a method for increasing educational access. In doing so, Latini positions rhetorical invention and translation as a "hermeneutical performance on a traditional textual source" (Copeland 1991, 179). As Rita Copeland has argued, Latini identifies "the production of knowledge with the interests of a particular time, place, and political community" that is primarily facilitated by composition in the local vernacular: a stance that would be adopted by Chaucer, Gower, Trevisa, and others (1992, 63). Vernacular composition in this sense, however, is not limited to strict word-for-word translation, but rather seeks to create a new vernacular substitute that may revalue the original text in distinct ways. While Copeland's readings of Chaucer and Gower are concerned with how their texts "define themselves expressly in terms of difference [,]" my own reading of Chaucer, Trevisa, and especially Latini is concerned with how their texts make claims that they are similar and ultimately derivative to Latini's (Copeland 1991, 180). Lack of originality rather than a break with tradition characterizes these appeals.

Through this process, rhetoric is presented as another tool that ought to be shared (like the logical tools of the *Organon,* or the tools associated with bridle-making) in order to strive for the good of many. Access to rhetoric and the knowledge it can create is thus a worthy enough end to justify composition in the vernacular, rather than in the traditional

Latin. While this position is perhaps an easier one to adopt for Latini, writing in politically important French, it is worth noting that technical and academic "writing in English was not an inevitable choice" for authors such as Chaucer and Trevisa, as their vernacular carried with it relatively less political and social prestige (Wogan-Browne, Watson, Taylor, and Evans 1999, 3). Yet these authors make similar appeals to localism for the good of specific communities.

The appeals to usefulness and the common good are taken up by both Trevisa and Chaucer as justification of composition in their own less prestigious languages. Similar, yet less direct, tactics can be seen in the *Tresor.* As Latini states in his introduction to the *Tresor,* he wishes to write his book in such a way that his patron might "amass things of great value" (amasser come de grandisme valliance) and use them to better himself socially and politically (1993, 1.1.1). To do so, his patron will need knowledge of worldly things, of virtues and vices, and of rhetoric (which are conveniently the subjects of the three sections of Latini's book). All three are necessary for the patron's civic and political success. More so than other subject matter, Latini consistently emphasizes that rhetoric is an art which requires instruction; without the intervention of art, one cannot be said to be engaged in rhetoric. This distinction helps Latini to define the boundaries of rhetoric:

> But everything which one does not say artfully, that is, by noble words, serious and full of meaning, or which does not deal with any of the above-mentioned matters, is outside of this science and far from its rules. For this reason Aristotle says that the material of this art is concerned with three things alone, that is, demonstration, counsel, and judgment. (Latini 1993, 3.2.8)[50]

50. Mais tout ce que l'on ne dist artificielement, c'est a dire par nobles paroles, griès et replaines de bonnes sentences, ou par aucunes choses davant dites, est hors de ceste science et loins de ses riules. Pour ce dist Aristotles qua la matire de cestui art est sour .iii. choses seulement, c'est demoustrement, conseil, et jugement.

This section extends on Brunetto's earlier definition of rhetoric in his introduction, in which he states that:

> Therefore everyone should strive to know it [rhetoric], even though naturally and without instruction no man can master it. Without doubt we need it every day, and many things we can achieve merely by saying well the proper words, things we could not do through force of arms or any other means. (Latini 1993, 1.4.10)[51]

According to Latini, rhetoric is useful, necessary to all, and must be mastered through instruction and practice—he positions the art as one with both broad appeal and with great civic and social utility. Moreover, rhetoric is not solely an overtly political art intended for use in civic institutions, but rather one that any can make use of in their day to day lives.

Latini, like Chaucer and Trevisa, employs these perceptions of utility—and the need for guidance and instruction—to defend his own vernacular composition. Natural eloquence exists, but without the intervention of art, one cannot be said to understand rhetoric and therefore cannot achieve as much. Vernacular composition, then, is a mode of increasing access to the intervention of art. Indeed, Latini's justifications for writing are generally expressed in terms of their broad applicability and utility, and language is one way in which he signals this value. Early in his treatise, Latini makes seemingly little effort to defend his composition in French; all he offers the reader is the following:

> If anyone should ask why this book is written in Romance according to the usage of the French, even though we are Italian, I would say that there are two reasons:

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51. Por ce devroit cascuns pener de savoir le, se sa nature il suefre et li aide, car sans natureet sans ensegnement ne la puet nus conquerre. Et a veritè dire de li avons nous mestier en toutes besoignes tousjours, et maintes choses grans et petites poons nous faire par solement bien dire cou ki covient, ke nous ne le poriens faire par force d'armes ne par autre engin.

> one, that we are in France; the other, that French is more pleasant and has more in common with all other languages. (Latini 1993, 1.1.7)[52]

At this point, Latini seems to expect that the reader will require very little justification to accept his composition; that he is in France is enough to justify his composition in French. However, later in the text, Latini offers a fuller description of his rationale.

First, Latini relates that there are four types of speakers, each characterized by their levels of eloquence and wisdom. Some are both wise and eloquent, and these are the best speakers and people in general; others have neither, and these people are most dangerous. Others still are skilled speakers, but not wise, and as Cicero relates, such speakers cause more harm than good. Finally, there are those who are quite wise but have no skill in speaking; "they remain silent because of the poverty of their speech, and so they need help" (Latini 1993, 3.1.2)[53]. These wise but unskilled speakers, Latini tells us, are those who benefit most from learning rhetoric. Latini then positions rhetoric as a civilizing force for humanity, following Cicero's famous passage on the origins of rhetoric; however, Latini alters this standard tale by connecting it to the Biblical tale of Babel:

> To tell the truth, before the tower of Babel was built, all men had one language naturally, which was Hebrew; but after a diversity of languages had arisen among men, three were more sacred than others: Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. We see through nature that those who speak in the Orient speaking in their throats, as the Hebrews do; those who are in the middle of the earth speak with their palates, as

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52. Et se aucuns demandoit pour quoi cis livres est ecris en romanc, selonc le raison de France, puis ke nous somes italien, je diroie que c'est pour .ii. raisons, l'une ke nous somes en France, l'autre por cou que la parleure est plus delitable et plus commune a tous langages.

53. li autre sont plain de sens, mais il se taisent por la povertè de lor parleure et ce requiret aide.

> the Greeks do; and those who live in the western parts speak with their teeth, as the Italians do. (Latini 1993, 3.1.3)[54]

This seemingly unrelated passage about the splintering of languages after Babel and the elocutionary manners of different languages and cultures is immediately, and without transition, followed by a discussion of whether or not rhetoric is natural. Latini states:

> Plato says that it [rhetoric] exists through nature, not through art, because we find many who speak well naturally, without any instruction. Aristotle says that it is an art, but an evil one, because through speaking more harm than good had come to people. Cicero is in full agreement that speaking exists through nature; but in good speaking, three things are necessary: nature and usage and art; usage and art are highly instructional, and instruction is nothing other than wisdom, and wisdom consists in understanding things as they are; for this it is called the mediator of things, for it provides them all ahead of time, and then gives them a certain purpose and measure. When wisdom is then added to speech, who would say that anything but good would be produced? (Latini 1993, 3.1.4-6)[55]

For Latini, rhetoric is a conceptual and artistic system that brings wisdom to our natural speech; the only way to achieve this wisdom is through instruction. Intervention through instruction defines rhetoric as a discipline—it is no mere knack or natural talent. The application of wisdom requires the intervention of *techne*. Latini refines and makes this

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54. Et a la veritè dire, devant ce que la tour Babel fust faite tout home avoient une meisme parleure naturelement, c'est ebreu; mais puis que la diversitès des langues vint entre les homes, sor les autres en furent .iii. sacrees, ebrieu, grieu, latin. Et nous veons par nature que ciaus ki abitenten orient parolent en la gorge si comme li ebreu font; li autre ki sont ou milieu de la terre parolent ou palais si comme font li grezois; et cil ki abitent es parties d'occidant parolent es dens si comme font les ytaliiens.

55. Platons dit k'ele est par nature non pas par art, a ce ke l'on trueve mains bons parliers naturelement, sans nul ensegnement. Aristotles dist k'ele est art, amis mauvaise, por ce que por parleure estoient avenu as gens plus de mal que de bien. Tulle s'accorde bien que la seule parleure est par nature; mais en la bonne parleure covient .iii. choses, nature, us, art, car us et art sont plain de grant ensegnement, et ensegnement n'est autre chose que sapience. Et sapience est a comprendre les choses selonc ce qu'eles sont, pour ce est ele apelee amoieneresses des choses, car ele les porvoit toutes devant et lor met certaine fin et certaine mesure. Et la u sapience est jointe a parleure, ki dira k'il en puisse naistre se biens non?

opinion even more explicit when he states, "Now it has been proven that the science of rhetoric is not acquired by nature or by usage at all, but by instruction or by art" (1993, 3.1.10)[56]. Further, while some languages are more sacred than others, all languages other than Hebrew are the product of the tower of Babel—they are natural inasmuch as the linguistic differences are the product of the intervention of the divine. While the argument is unstated, Latini appears to offer this story as further justification for his composition in French. The goal to bring wisdom to speech is advantageous and necessary regardless of the language in which instruction occurs, because all languages other than Hebrew are products of the same event, even if some languages have more often been utilized to communicate divine text.

Moreover, all languages face the same limits of nature, that is, that speaking through natural talent alone will never be informed by true wisdom. Rhetoric serves as a *techne* in the sense that it intervenes at the limits of nature, refining and altering these limits through the application of conceptual technology. As Chad Wickman has argued, "Technê in this sense involves more than an instrumental capacity simply to reveal forms that exist in nature; indeed, it involves a capacity to design and produce forms that (to some extent) can be imposed on our understanding of nature" (2012, 26). Taken this way, Latini's stated divisions of knowledge seem in many ways reversed; it is the intervention of *techne* that results in the union of wisdom and eloquence, rather than the practical knowledge associated with the broader category of politics. This *topos* of rhetoric

56. Or est il dont provè que la science de rectorique n'est pas dou tout aquise par nature ou par us mais par ensegnement et par art

intervening at the limits of nature and language can be found in both Trevisa and Chaucer's texts, and is vital to both defenses of vernacular composition.

Trevisa and Chaucer's Appeals to the Vernacular

Like Latini, Trevisa utilizes the Babel myth to explain his current task as an author composing in the vernacular—in this case, Middle English. Written as a disputation conducted between himself and his lord and patron, Trevisa's *Dialogue Between the Lord and the Clerk on Translation* "comes down firmly on the side of open access to learning," with Trevisa's Lord as the eventual victor in the dispute (Evans, Taylor, Watson and Wogan-Browne 1999, 323). As Evans et al. suggest, "The lord wins not only because his argument is formally superior to his opponent's, but because he is better at harnessing the rhetorical resources of the language in which the argument is cast" (1999, 324). The Lord's intervention of rhetoric as art—as *techne*—allows for his eventual victory. As Trevisa's Lord begins the debate, he identifies the fall of Babel as the major barrier to free human communication, much as Latini does:

> Siththe [since] that Babel was ybuld, men spekith diverse tonges so that diverse men beth [are] straunge to other and knoweth nought of her [their] speche. Speche is not iknowe [known] but if hit be lerned. . .. So men of fer [far] countrayes and londes that haveth diverse speches, yet neither of hem hath lerned otheres langage, neither of hem wote [know] what other meneth, though thei mete and have grete nede of informacioun and of lore, of talking and of speche. (Trevisa 1999, 131-2)

Trevisa's Lord utilizes the need to communicate across linguistic barriers imposed by the fall of Babel as one of the main justifications for composition in the vernacular; he advances the claim that valuable and instructive speech and rhetoric "empowers the vernacular as a voice of cultural authority . . .. [T]he vernacular is the medium of public

enlightenment, which is constructed as the highest good" (Copeland 1991, 183-4). In part, Trevisa's Lord illustrates this point through precedent, noting that if translation cannot be accepted as a public good, than the works of previous scriptural translators, such as Saint Jerome, must also be seen as ultimately harmful, or at the very least, without worth (Trevisa 1999,133).

The Lord reminds the Clerk (and by extension, the reader) that since the fall of Babel prevents people from communicating freely with many other groups of people, various remedies have been found, namely employing translators and the common use of Latin for religious and scholarly discourse. However, he ultimately concludes that these remedies are insufficient for communicating social and civic knowledge; too many are left unable to access this important information. While some people learn many languages, and can thus be useful to others through their interpretation, others are not able to learn multiple languages; Trevisa's Lord recognizes that the acquisition of Latin literacy is politically and economically charged, and that the translation of relevant works can help alleviate this difficulty. Trevisa's opinion in this regard was common in Italy as well. Dante makes similar claims in his *Convivio.* As Copeland explains, "to know Latin and to participate in this [academic] discourse of learning is as much a product of the historical accidents or material conditions of birth, station, place, and opportunity" (1991, 182).

Trevisa's Lord makes similar arguments in defense of his own position. For instance, when pressed on this issue, Trevisa's Lord notes that "Nought alle [may learn Latin], for somme may nought for other maner bisynes, somme for elde, somme for defaute of witte" (Trevia 1999, 132). Moreover, while Trevisa's Lord notes that the use of

Latin as universal European *lingua franca* is itself a divine gift in that it encourages cross-cultural understanding, he emphasizes that even in its widespread usage across cultures, Latin is understood only by a small number in comparison with the various vernacular languages. As such, the Lord argues that it is necessary that translation of important Latin texts occur, "for the moo [more] men shuld hem understonde and have thereof kunnyng, informacioun and lore" (Trevisa 1999, 132). Trevisa's Lord's use of the *topos* of the greater and lesser provides the foundational claim in support of widespread translation of civic and technical (academic but not theological) information.

Trevisa's Lord's appeals are attentive not only to the number of people capable of being informed by a translated text, but also to the qualities of translation that allow for more successful readerly interpretation—differences of both quantity and quality. For instance, after the Lord asserts the need of an English translation of the "cronicles," the Clerk (Trevisa) responds that only the English speak and read English, so a translation is less likely to communicate with a larger audience. Trevisa's Lord disagrees, noting that "if this cronicles were translated out of Latyn into Englisshe, than by so meny the moo men shuld understonde hem as al thoe that understonde Englisshe and no Latyn" (Trevisa 1999, 132). In short, Trevisa's Lord recognizes that both versions of the text can exist together, each communicating with a different public, thus informing a larger audience overall. To restrict the text to only one (Latin) version is to knowingly restrict the readership of that text, and thus reduce the overall good which that text can offer.

However, the true advantage of the vernacular translation is in its plainness and clarity. When the Clerk responds that the Lord himself knows Latin, and therefore should not need a translation at all, the Lord responds with two main counter-arguments:

> I denye this argument; for though I can speke and rede and understonde Latyn, there is myche Latyn in thes bokes of cronicles that I can nought understonde, neither thou, without studiyng and avisement and loking of other bokes. Also, though it were not nedeful for me, it is nedeful for other men that understondeth no Latyn. (Trevisa 1999, 132)

The understanding that both the Clerk and the Lord attain through the Latin text may itself be imperfect, as each is working in a second language that is not widely spoken; while Latin was certainly the language of religion and learning, French was more important politically and English was still regularly used for record keeping and land deeds (Justice 1994; Rollison 2005, 156). Moreover, the Lord reminds the Clerk that his own ability to read Latin does not mitigate the need for a valuable translation. The Lord readily appeals to a wider public to portray translation as a common good.

Similar appeals to clarity, plainness, and common benefit can be found in Chaucer's *Treatise on the Astrolabe.* Unlike Trevisa's *Dialogue,* which serves as the preface to a chronicle filled with general information, Chaucer's *Treatise* directly addresses a highly specialized scientific topic—the use of astrolabes for astronomical calculation and navigation. In Chaucer's text, the difficulty and obscurity of the material—as Chaucer states, how to use an astrolabe is "unknowe parfitly [perfectly] to eny mortal man in this regioun"—combined with the framing of the *Treatise's* audience, help to authorize vernacular composition (Chaucer 2002, 105 [15-16 2r]). As in Latini and Trevisa's works, the need to defend vernacular composition is informed by appeals to rhetoric as a mechanical process facilitating access and clarity. Again, that rhetoric is discussed in terms of mechanism is not mean to indicate that rhetoric is therefore devalued; rather, it indicates that rhetoric is understood as complex and skilled process that requires the intervention of art. Moreover, and quite importantly, Chaucer's *Treatise*

is reportedly composed for a boy aged 10; as such, Chaucer strives to educate "under full light reules and naked wordes in Englisshe" (Chaucer 2002, 105-6 [21-22 2r-2v]). As in Trevisa's dialogue, the need to facilitate clear communication in service of a complex and valuable topic obviates the use of Latin; the vernacular, as linguistic expression of plainness and simplicity, must be used instead.

In further defense of his vernacular composition, Chaucer offers a discussion of the history of translation from other common languages, much as Latini mentions Greek, Latin, and Hebrew and as Trevisa mentions Babel. He states:

> But natheles [nevertheless] suffise to the these trewe conclusions in Englisshe, as wel as sufficith to these noble clerkes Grekes these same conclusions in Greke. And [to] Arabiens in Arabike. And [to] Jewes in Ebrewe and to the Latyn folke in Latyn, which Latyn fole had hem in her oune [their own] tunge, that is to seyn in Latyn. And God woot [knows] that in alle these langages, and in many moo, han these conclusions ben suffisantly lerned and taught. And yit by diverse reules, right as diverse pathes leden diverse folke the right way to Rome. (Chaucer 2002, 106-107 [25-33 2v-3r])

Like Latini and Trevisa, Chaucer sees linguistic diversity as a natural phenomenon ultimately stemming from a divine act.

The story of Babel serves as a productive commonplace allowing authors to question dominant approaches to textual production. While other writers, such as Dante, position the vernacular (understood as a consequence of Babel's fall) as a necessary but ultimately ineffective means for solving the linguistic diversity brought about by the fall of Babel, the above-mentioned writers embrace the vernacular as both signifier of "clarity and open access" and utilitarian necessity for coping with a linguistically diverse world (Evans, Taylor, Watson and Wogan-Browne 1999, 323). They invert common perception of the vernacular as a sort of fallen linguistic state, repositioning it instead as plain and

simple expression. Moreover, in Chaucer's text truth is not dependent on the use of a divinely sanctioned language; just as multiple paths lead to Rome, multiple languages are capable of expressing truth. The multiplicity of opinion these authors allude to places the questions they address fully within the realm of rhetoric; as Aquinas notes, these authors are engaging in

> rhetorical arguments, in which persuasion is produced through an enthymeme or example but not through a syllogism or complete induction because of the uncertainty attending the matters discussed, namely, the individual acts of men in which universal propositions cannot be truthfully assumed. (*Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* 1.1.1)[57]

At this point, Chaucer more directly addresses the needs of his young audience, while simultaneously grappling with the fact that others will undoubtedly read the *Treatise* as well. Chaucer states:

> Now wol I preie mekeley every discret persone that redith or herith this litel tretis to have my rude endityng for excusid, and my superfluite of wordes, for two causes. The first cause is for that curiouse endityng and harde sentence is ful hevy at onys for suche a child to lerne. The second cause is this, that sothly me semith better to writen un[to] a childe twyes a gode sentence than he forgete it onys. (Chaucer 2002, 107 [34-40 3r])

While Chaucer anticipates a wider audience for the *Treatise* ("every discret persone"), his stated and primary audience serves to justify both composition in the vernacular as well as his repetition and simple sentence structure.

This justification is coupled with Chaucer's insistence that he is acting only as a translator and compiler of information: "considre wel that I ne usurpe not to have

57. rhetoricis, in quibus persuasio fit per enthymema aut per exemplum; non autem per syllogismum vel inductionem completam, propter incertitudinem materiae circa quam versatur, scilicet circa actus singulares hominum, in quibus universales propositiones non possunt assumi vere.

foundenn this werke of my labour or myn engyn. I am but a lewde compilator of the labour of old astrolegiens" (108 [48-50 3v]). That Chaucer's claim to being nothing but a "lewde compilator" is demonstrably false—Carol Lipson estimates, through comparison with Chaucer's probable sources, that only about one fifth of a single section is a true translation—is essentially irrelevant (1983, 200). Rather, it is important to note how Chaucer uses this stock humility *topos* as one of many rhetorical resources that help to defend his vernacular composition in service of a greater good. Compare the prologue section quoted above with Latini's own in his *Tresor*:

> I do not say that the book is based on my own wisdom, which is indeed meager, but rather it is like a honeycomb collected from different flowers, for this book is compiled exclusively from the marvellous sayings of the authors who before our time have dealt with philosophy, each one in accordance with his own particular knowledge, for no earthly man can know everything. (1993, 1.1.5)[58]

Though Chaucer expresses this *topos* through mechanical imagery (e.g. "This werke of my labour or my engyn") rather than Latini's more naturalistic imagery, there seems to be a clear desire on Chaucer's part to use the traditional humility *topos* in service of vernacular composition.

Rather than identifying his work as primarily original, Chaucer positions it as a simple translation, hence avoiding potential disagreement stemming from beliefs surrounding the dissemination of technical knowledge in Middle English and other vernacular languages. Positioning the work as derivative helps to insulate the text from some degree of criticism. As Rita Copeland has suggested, translation in the Middle Ages

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58. Et si ne di je pas que le livre soit estrais de mon povre sens ne de ma nue science; mais il ert ausi comme une bresche de miel coillie de diverses flours, car cist livres est compilès seulement des mervilleus dis des autours ki devant nostre tans ont traitiè de philosophie, cascuns selong cou k'il en savoit partie

was as much a rhetorical process as a linguistic one, meaning that rhetorical invention and changes to the text were all but expected, even in something termed a translation (1991).

Conclusions

The authors and texts considered here, though dispersed in both time and space, speak to several important developments in medieval rhetorical theory and practice. First, I would suggest that the role of Latini's works in influencing later rhetorical and political thought has perhaps been underestimated. Given his popularity, as well as his unique synthesis of Ciceronian and Aristotelian thought, historians of rhetoric would do well to more closely investigate his text in relation to other contemporary authors, particularly in regard to civic matters. Second, Latini and the Middle English authors considered here speak to a continued revision of Aristotle's theories of knowledge throughout the later Middle Ages. As Cary Nederman has argued, there seems to be a strong desire by later medieval thinkers to refine Aristotle's forms of knowledge within a political system that did not seek to actively exclude mechanical laborers from its theoretical explanations and justifications, but instead integrated them within a discursive theory of civic life as full participants.

Finally, the implications of this revision—in the form of a newly valued theory of *techne,* especially as it relates to rhetorical practice—warrants a greater consideration of Aristotle's texts on logic and ethics in relation to rhetoric as a discipline, particularly as rhetoric intersects with vernacular composition. From the scholastic period on, texts and commentaries seems to suggest a view of rhetoric as a conceptual and mental process

meant to provide a framework for contingent political thought—a socially engaged form of dialectic. Rather than a discipline tasked solely with the composition of specific epistolary or civic documents, this view of rhetoric redefines rhetorical *techne* as a method by which wisdom is brought to bear in complex civic and political situations. This view aligns rhetoric with the common civic good, positioning it as a social tool that seeks the benefit of many. One of the main consequences of this view, I argue, is increased acceptance of vernacular composition.

The changes I contend occurred within England during this time have consequences for shifting theories of civic identity as well. Since composition in the vernacular allows for multiple publics to be reached through the same text, as Trevisa's Lord points out, more are ultimately able to access important civic information contained within that text. Vernacular composition removes structural barriers to literacy, and becomes another way in which text and discourse are altered in service of broader audience understanding. This change is important, as access to texts communicating social and civic values becomes an important feature of the civic identity of local communities. Writers begin to position historical and philosophical knowledge as important elements of citizenship, and in doing so advocate for greater translation efforts in order to facilitate the fulfillment of their idealized civic identity.

CHAPTER 7

IMAGE AND PHANTASIA: CIVIC IDENTITY IN CHARTRES

Medieval stained glass windows, some of which have been held in place for hundreds of years within their original context of monasteries and cathedrals, represent a wealth of information about medieval rhetoric and visual communication. However, these unique artifacts have often been overlooked by historians of rhetoric, who have maintained a strong interest in exploring the medieval manuscript tradition of rhetorical theory at the expense of material and visual forms of communication intended for broader audiences. Indeed, thus far this dissertation has primarily considered such traditional forms of evidence. However, in this chapter, I hope to productively complicate rhetorical studies' tendency toward textual- oriented scholarship, to offer a historically grounded description of medieval attitudes toward vernacular visual communication, and finally to demonstrate that stained glass windows—particularly those within Chartres cathedral—played a unique role in building and maintaining a coherent civic identity for a largely illiterate, everyday audience in medieval France.

Specifically, I wish to suggest that stained glass windows helped mass audiences to closely identify with religious ideals and communicated interpretations of historical events such as the fourth crusade. In doing so, I aim to show that even audiences lacking in traditional print literacy were regarded as "rhetorical;" that is, these groups were seen both as responsive to rhetorical practice and in need of persuasion and guidance from elite cultural groups. In advancing this argument, I aim to contribute to this dissertation's broader goal of demonstrating that rhetoric maintained a distinct civic role throughout the

Middle Ages—one that sought to cultivate specific political subjectivities among popular groups.

Visual Rhetoric and Rhetoric of Space and Place

The field of classical rhetorical studies has seen much interest in the topics of visual rhetoric and the rhetorical aspects of place and space, with a variety of works addressing Roman architectural and spatial rhetoric in particular. Ann Vasaly, for instance, has argued that references to space and place pervade Ciceronian oratory, and that to understand Cicero's works more fully, scholars would need to adopt a viewpoint similar to that of Cicero's own audiences (1993). Vasaly's suggestion was to construct a "metaphysical topography" in which we might more precisely understand Ciceronian oratory, and her analysis frequently focuses on the role of public space within Cicero's speeches, particularly how public spaces would have invoked Roman founding myths for his audiences (1993, 40-41).

More recent scholarship has considered the rhetorical basis and impact of specific buildings and monuments such as the *Ara Pacis Augustae*, which was employed to connect the Emperor Augustus to the mythological Aeneas (Lamp 2009), material expressions of literacy and power in the Celsus library at Ephesus (Edison 2013), and the disruptive potential of the visual rhetoric of Diocletian's victory column in Alexandria (Calzotti and Crosby 2014). This more recent strand of scholarship has focused particularly on how material and visual rhetoric intersect with state power. While much of the aforementioned scholarship builds upon and extends work in rhetorical studies that began with analysis of American monuments and public spaces (Dickinson, Blair, and Ott

2010) scholarship in classical rhetoric has benefited from a stronger (perceived) connection between public space, oratory, rhetoric, and public life in general.

These studies have focused not only on the rhetorical impact of monuments but also on the daily lives of ordinary Greek and Roman citizens. For instance, more recent scholarship has figured the vernacular audience as key to understanding rhetorical production within its historical context. Kathleen Lamp, for example, has studied rhetoric's influence beyond state-sponsored monuments through a focus on coins and vernacular artistic expression, often created in opposition to state-sponsored messages (2013). Similarly, James Fredal's *Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes,* suggests that an understanding of ancient Athenian rhetoric must be achieved through the analysis of place, space, sight lines, and elements of vernacular culture such as art and ritual practices (2006). In short, scholars in classical rhetoric are increasingly calling for what Richard Leo Enos termed an "archaeological rhetoric" which seeks to broaden "the range of 'evidence' in order to gain new insights to the mentalities creating rhetoric, the context of the environments within which that rhetoric was produced, and the cultural consequences of their historical interpretations" (Enos 2013, 22-3). Such developments in the field suggest a growing concern not only with public space and visuality, but also the reception and production of rhetoric by anonymous vernacular groups.

As Dave Tell writes in his introduction to a recent special issue of *Advances in the History of Rhetoric*, "we have never escaped our habit of defining rhetoric in relation to large, anonymous groups of people" (2014, 1). However, scholarly attention is increasingly directed not only those who may have produced rhetoric for such

anonymous groups, but also the ways in which the audience of rhetorical practice viewed and experienced such production, accepted or rejected it, and potentially reinvented it to their own ends. In short, greater attention is being paid to rhetoric's anonymous masses, rather than named authors of theoretical and oratorical texts. However, while rhetorical studies in general has become more interested in such topics, such a focus has not extended to all historical periods or sub-fields within the discipline. Scholarship within the field of medieval rhetoric has not yet began to consider similar issues of vernacular reception and production, largely retaining a focus on preceptive documents intended to inform future oral or written compositions, and often ignoring visual and material forms of rhetoric. Yet medieval culture was arguably just as concerned with visual communication as classical Greek and Roman culture: as Mary Carruthers has noted regarding the medieval period, "the visual was regarded as the primary instrument of cognition for most people," and without widespread traditional literacy, the need for a defined and rhetorically sound system of visual expression in service of state and religious goals is clear (2009, 68).

When scholars of the medieval period have addressed the intersections of rhetoric, memory, and visuality, they have generally remained focused on the experience of the literate within monastic and clerical settings (Carruthers 1998). Mary Carruthers, for instance, discusses a variety of architectural, Ciceronian, and distinctly medieval forms of trained memory, drawing on the writings of Albertus Magnus, Hugh of Saint Victor, and Thomas Aquinas (Carruthers 1998, 2002, 2009). However, her analyses tend to focus on how rhetoric and memory theories aided the individual in service of intellectual/religious contemplation and composition, and thus she primarily draws her examples from

diagrams and marginalia from a variety of religious manuscripts and from architectural monastic spaces (Carruthers 1998, 2009). Her analysis is thus focused on only one small aspect of medieval society: the section most acquainted with classical learning and medieval philosophy and theology. She does not attempt to investigate the potential influence of these same theories on media intended for wider audiences.

Such a focus privileges the experience of a narrow portion of intellectual elites (monks and other educated clergy). This is not a criticism of Carruthers' work, but rather a suggestion that extending her argument to a wider variety of visual artifacts intended primarily for the medieval laity might further aid our understanding of memory, rhetoric, and the role of these concepts in medieval culture and public life. An understanding of the culture of literate elites is still necessary, since such elites would presumably have assisted in the design and managed the production of religious artifacts and texts. However, it is also necessary to understand how those texts were intended to be seen and experienced. Such a focus has not, to my knowledge, been outlined in the study of medieval rhetoric or the history of rhetoric. To that end, I first offer an overview of medieval attitudes toward images intended for large anonymous groups. I then consider the role of rhetorical theory in understanding medieval images, particularly as rhetoric related to theories of memory and sensation. In doing so, I wish to suggest that medieval rhetoric and memory theories had the potential to inform the construction of visual artifacts intended for vernacular audiences, structuring their engagement with these artifacts through theories of memory and *phantasia*.

Medieval Visions and Images

Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, one of the key figures of the Cistercian monastic order in the Middle Ages, may not have appreciated the art and general ostentatious aesthetic of medieval cathedrals, but he certainly saw them as value laden and suasive. Describing the lavishly decorated monasteries of the Cluniac monks in his *Apology*, Bernard states, "What sort of respect is shown for the images on the floor to be trampled underfoot? People spit on the angels, and the saints' faces are pummelled by the feet of passers-by" (1970, 66). For Bernard, the great work and investment required to create such images was antithetical to the goals of the church: monks should not require images to spur their devotion in the first place, and the money involved in the images' creation would be better spent caring for the poor.

Bernard saw things a bit differently, however, for the uneducated laity that might visit the average church or cathedral. Indeed, throughout his writings he readily makes the distinction between images intended for ordained clergy or monks, and those intended for the wider laity. Earlier in his *Apology,* for instance, Bernard seems quite open to visual forms of communication in cathedrals if they are intended for broad vernacular audiences, rather than narrow monastic ones. He states regarding this distinction, "It is not the same for monks and bishops. Bishops have a duty toward both wise and foolish. They have to make use of material ornamentation to rouse devotion in a carnal people, incapable of spiritual things" (Bernard 1970, 64).

While Bernard's attitude toward vernacular audiences may seem a bit flippant to our minds, his opinion here is not much different than that of Gregory the Great, who notes in his letter to Serenus, Bishop of Marseille, that:

> with regard to the pictorial representations which had been made for the edification of an unlearned people in order that, though ignorant of letters, they might by turning their eyes to the story itself learn what had been done, it must be added that, because thou hadst seen these come to be adored, thou hadst been so moved as to order them to be broken. And it must be said to them, If for this instruction for which images were anciently made you wish to have them in the church, I permit them by all means both to be made and to be had. And explain to them that it was not the sight itself of the story which the picture was hanging to attest that displeased thee, but the adoration which had been improperly paid to the pictures. And with such words appease thou their minds; recall them to agreement with thee And if any one should wish to make images, by no means prohibit him, but by all means forbid the adoration of images. (Book 11, Letter 13)

Similarly, in another letter to Serenus, Gregory states "we commend you indeed for your zeal against anything made with hands being an object of adoration; but we signify to you that you ought not to have broken these images. For pictorial representation is made use of in Churches for this reason; that such as are ignorant of letters may at least read by looking at the walls what they cannot read in books. Your Fraternity therefore should have both preserved the images and prohibited the people from adoration of them, to the end that both those who are ignorant of letters might have wherewith to gather a knowledge of the history, and that the people might by no means sin by adoration of a pictorial representation (Book 9, Letter 105). While Celia Chazelle also notes that the images Gregory refers to would likely be augmented by the simultaneous delivery of an oral narrative, she notes a clear rhetorical role for the images themselves as well (1990, 141). Indeed, images are understood by authors such as Gregory and his contemporaries as holding unique sway over the viewer. For example, Basil the Great notes, "What the telling of a story reveals to the hearing . . . the silent picture places through imitation before the eyes" (quoted in Duggan 1989, n. 7). Here, Basil closely echoes the

vocabulary of rhetorical theory, most notably that employed in Aristotle's discussions of rhetoric and especially style.

As Sara Newman notes, *pro ommaton poiein* (bringing before the eyes), *phantasia,* and *energia* are closely related terms in Aristotle's discussions of style and metaphor (2002, 20). *Phantasia* is most closely tied with a creative and imaginative quality that allows one to assemble pieces of information into coherent narratives, and as such perhaps best maps onto the type of sensory persuasion Basil and Gregory refer to in their discussions. Images in this sense are understood by Bernard, Gregory, Basil, and others to both possess affective and suasive qualities, and those same qualities are understood as varying depending on the education and class of the viewer.

Moreover, images have a unique capacity to instruct, because they put before the eyes an imitation of an act or deed itself. Indeed, these authors discussions of images mirror the vocabulary of rhetorical theory closely, a trend Mary Carruthers has also observed regarding rhetorical theory and medieval discussions of aesthetic beauty (Carruthers 2013). Medieval poetics, for instance, sought to cultivate not only technical skill or aesthetic qualities traditionally associated with beauty, but also a sense of believability, probability, and truthfulness. Matthew of Vendôme, for instance, in his *Ars Versificatoria,* notes that "A collection of utterances, measured feet, the knowledge of quantities do not constitute a verse, but the elegant joining of utterances does, the expression of distinctive features and respect for the designation of each and every thing" (1981, 19). Matthew is not primarily concerned with the technical aspects of poetics [measured feet and knowledge of quantities] but rather with the accurate and respectful designation of the subject matter as conveyed through poetry. Following Carruthers, we

can assume a general applicability of this attitude to other art forms. Understood in this way, medieval stained glass windows offer one of the clearest possible methods by which to understand the rhetorical messages thought important to communicate to illiterate audiences. It thus seems to me that it is not an anachronistic conception to view medieval material objects as governed by a form of visual rhetorical theory; however, to further defend this thesis, I will first offer a discussion of medieval rhetorical theory's connection to images and the memory.

Memoria in the Middle Ages

The importance of memory and visuality to medieval culture has been addressed at some length in the past: however, scholars have typically done so within a relatively narrow religious and monastic focus. Surprisingly few historians of rhetoric have attempted to articulate connections between classical and medieval rhetorical theory and physical objects intended for vernacular and lay audiences. Those authors who have discussed rhetoric and material objects have focused primarily on written texts as objects (manuscripts themselves) or the images and marginalia within those texts. As such, medieval rhetorical scholarship has remained intensely text-centric, largely reserving the study of architectural spaces and other visual art forms encountered by a variety of classes to disciplines such as art history. This is perhaps the effect of a general sentiment in the field of the history of rhetoric: that is, that "there is nothing after the Late [Roman] Republic worthy of consideration by scholars of rhetoric predominantly because our disciplinary narrative tells us there were no rhetorical audiences, that is, audiences capable of effecting change" (Lamp 2009, 5). Medieval audiences in particular are

typically thought of as lacking any substantial civic potential or responsibility. However, the opinions of Bernard, Gregory, and Basil seem to suggest that medieval audiences were both quite capable of change, and in need of instruction delivered through visual and material means.

Medieval material artifacts suggest influence of both classical and medieval rhetorical theory on their composition. As such, I will begin by considering the classical antecedents of medieval visual and material rhetoric. Many sources of the classical memory and visual traditions, such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Aristotle's *On Memory and Reminiscence* and *De Anima*, were readily available to and widely read by 12th and 13th century scholars. Drawing evidence from the rich commentary tradition of the Scholastics philosophers and others, I propose that these rhetorical and memory theories in turn influenced medieval thinkers who began to consider the impact of visual texts and the rhetorical dimensions of memory objects, particularly as they were directed toward vernacular audiences. Classical rhetorical treatises, especially those concerning memory, provided the foundation for medieval visual rhetoric and communication.

Pseudo-Ciceronian Memory

Classical memory theories can be (very roughly) divided into two main strands. The first includes those theories similar to the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, which focus on "backgrounds and images" which "are naturally or artificially set off on a small scale, complete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and embrace them easily" and which are typically represented architecturally (3.16.30). The second strand is represented by the Aristotelian theories of sense and sensation, which themselves often interact with theories

of memory. These two strands were productively combined during the Middle Ages in unique ways that influenced the creation of visual artifacts. In Book III of the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*, Pseudo-Cicero first suggests that we construct backgrounds in the form of a "house, an intercolumnar space, a recess, an arch, or the like" (3.16.30). Upon these backgrounds, he suggests that we place images of the things we would like to recall. This is the essence of the Pseudo-Ciceronian architectural memory system: backgrounds and images.

Ideally, images should be unique and striking to assist their retention. They are best when developed individually, rather than proscribed by others. Pseudo-Cicero explains his reasoning thusly: "When we see in everyday life things that are petty, ordinary, and banal, we generally fail to remember them, because the mind is not being stirred by anything novel or marvellous. But if we see or hear something exceptionally base, dishonourable, extraordinary, great, unbelievable, or laughable, that we are likely to remember a long time" (3.22.36). The images should be placed in serial within architectural spaces: this allows the rememberer to proceed in an orderly fashion through the things remembered. Beyond this logical organization, Pseudo-Cicero suggests that one should cultivate the memory through metaphorical associations, as he suggests when he states "each fifth background should be marked. For example, if in the fifth we should set a golden hand, and in the tenth some acquaintance whose first name is Decimus" (3.18.31). The goal in this case is to create mental images, visuals which provide a strong connection both to the ordering of backgrounds and the things to be remembered. This system's architectural schema and attention to metaphorical associations would continue to find expression in the medieval period (Yates 1966, Carruthers 2009).

Backgrounds are typically separated within the mind via architectural features, such as columns or the rooms of a house, a practice that was both continued and adapted to new ends in the medieval period. Augustine, for instance, draws upon architectural imagery when he describes "the spacious palaces of my memory, where the treasures of innumerable forms. . .perceived by the senses be hoarded up" (*Confessions* 10.8). Indeed, a common metaphor throughout the later middle ages is that of building a mental architecture of moral thought by considering the allegorical, moral, and mystical senses of an image or text, especially Biblical passages or images (Carruthers 2009, 53). Hugh of Saint Victor, for instance, models this process in *De Archa Noe*, describing it as "a model of spiritual building, which your eye may see outwardly so that your soul may be built inwardly in its likeness" (Carruthers 2009, 53). As in the example described by Hugh of Saint Victor, Pseudo-Cicero makes an important distinction between the system he describes and the process of rote memorization; he instead provides "an exercise whereby to strengthen that other kind of memory, the memory of matter, which is of practical use" (3.24.39). The goal is not necessarily to recall information without error, but to internalize the sense and message of something to be remembered, meditated upon, and communicated to others. The importance of thing remembered is in its central message or meaning, and not in its specific phrasing.

The anonymous author of the *Ad Herennium* relates this more general form of memory not only to the recall of the content of speeches, but also to the cultivation of wisdom and memory, emphasizing the need for experience in good judgment (Carruthers 2009, 81). Medieval mnemonics too would emphasize this more general memory *ad res,* refiguring the traditional rhetorical canon as an ethical imperative aligned with ideals of

practical wisdom, rather than solely as an aspect of oratory. This shift in large part depends on the medieval assumption that the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* was the work of "Tullius." Medieval writers and commentators would draw on the *Ad Herennium's* association of memory and prudence to connect the memory system described in this anonymous work to the discussions of the virtues in Cicero's *De Inventione*. In this way, both rhetoric and memory became more focused on the process of cultivating personal virtue and ethical behavior, as opposed to remembering the general parts and order of a speech. Medieval readers, having little access to what is typically considered Cicero's more mature *De Oratore*, but nevertheless greatly respecting *De Inventione* and Cicero himself, assumed that the *Ad Herennium* was Cicero making good on his promise to write a more complete text on the art of rhetoric.

Thus, medieval readers connected the memory system of the *Ad Herennium* with the discussions of memory in Cicero's early work. For instance, in *De Inventione*, Cicero defines memory as an aspect of prudence. He states:

> Prudence is the knowledge of things which are good, or bad, or neither good nor bad. Its parts are memory, intelligence, and foresight. Memory is that faculty by which the mind recovers the knowledge of things which have been. Intelligence is that by which it perceives what exists at present. Foresight is that by which anything is seen to be about to happen, before it does happen. (2.53.160).

Prudence is typically defined as the ability to govern one's conduct through reason, a sense that is reasonably clear in Cicero's definition. Augustine too associates memory and right action, because through memories one can "infer actions to come, events and hopes" (*Confessions* 10.7). If one's memory is stocked with images and these are meditated upon, then one will have a greater understanding of the present, and thus be more prepared to act correctly. Memory, in short, became a key to virtuous behavior, and

rhetoric itself became aligned with prudence. This belief was reinforced through the writings of Aristotle, who was reintroduced into medieval intellectual circles by Arabic translators and the Scholastic philosophers. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle defines prudence as one of the intellectual virtues, specifically as the form of wisdom that allows for decisions to be made about particular instances (6.7). These multiple associations, running through a variety of classical texts, perhaps explain why medieval writers, particularly the Scholastics, generally viewed Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a work of moral philosophy, not of oratory or oral communication (Murphy 1974; Carruthers 2009).

The association of memory and prudence can be seen also in the commentaries and original works of the Scholastic philosophers, which perhaps provide the best examples of the continuation of these concepts in medieval European culture. Thomas Aquinas's discussion of cardinal virtues in his *Summa Theologica*, for instance, is heavily influenced by Cicero's discussion of virtue in *De Inventione,* as has already been persuasively argued by Yates (1966, 84-85). Aquinas defines prudence, following Aristotle, as "right reason applied to action" but contends that "the knowledge of those means [of reason] cannot be in man naturally" (*Summa Theologica* 2a2ae.47.2; 2a2ae.47.15). Rather, one must be appropriately educated (through rhetoric and other disciplines) in order to internalize virtue. Albertus Magnus connects prudence and memory in his *De Bono*, noting that it is "a characteristic of ethical judgment" which he states is discussed by both Aristotle and Cicero (Carruthers 2009, 346; Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.53.160).

By tracing these concepts through classical rhetorical theory and into their various medieval interpretations, a clear tendency to conflate memory (and its associated theories

of backgrounds and images), wisdom, and prudence is made apparent. This is generally done in service of cultivating moral and ethical behavior in the reader or writer (and we will see momentarily, potentially also the viewer). Many medieval writers thus saw rhetoric and trained memory as a path to virtue and right conduct, and less as an art of oratory or persuasion. The tendency to subsume rhetoric to discussions of ethics, moral philosophy, and the virtues will be important for understanding the role of rhetoric in visual and material communication directed toward vernacular audiences.

Aristotle, Memory, and Sensation

Aristotle's newly translated works on memory and vision also had a profound impact on understandings of memory and images. The translations of commentaries by Avicenna and Averroes helped to bring Aristotle back into intellectual consideration in the 13th century, particularly among the Scholastic circles associated with Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle's writings, particularly *De Anima*, which as Ned O'Gorman states, "addresses topics intimately connected to rhetoric: perception, cognition, deliberation, visualization, imagination, and the image," helped the Scholastics to further refine their attitudes toward memory and their theories regarding its purpose and function (2005, 16).

Albertus and his student Thomas Aquinas were well acquainted with Ciceronian memory theories (they both reference Tullius frequently), and both authors draw connections between memory, prudence, and the other cardinal virtues in their own works, including their commentaries (see also Albertus Magnus' *De Bono* in Carruthers 2009 and Thomas Aquinas', *Summa Theologica*). They also each produced their own

commentaries on some of Aristotle's works; these commentaries can help illuminate the connections between rhetoric, visuality, and vernacular audiences. These writers view memory as having several aspects and processes. The typical divisions drawn between the parts and purposes of memory by the Scholastic authors is between forming images within the memory, reacting to those same images, and finally the process of recalling images from the memory (Carruthers 2009, 64). These commentaries help to suggest the importance of vision, perception, and memory to communication. Key to the process of memory and recollection, for both Albertus and Aquinas, was the experience of sensation. Aristotle connected sensation to both the memory and knowledge: as he states in the *Metaphysics*:

> All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions. Now animals are by nature born with the power of sensation, and from this some acquire the faculty of memory. (1.1.1-2)

As Ruth Webb argues, "For Aristotle, thought itself (*noein*) is inseparable from the mental images, the phantasmata, which stock our minds, and cannot take place without them" (2009, 114). Aquinas summarizes this position in what is sometimes referred to as the "peripatetic axiom," where he states "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*" or, "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses" (*De veritate* 2.3.19).

For the Scholastics, heavily influenced as they were by Aristotle's works, sensation is thus prior to intellection. Moreover, Aristotle describes prudence as dependent on past experiences, and historian of rhetoric Ned O'Gorman has argued that "The images phantasia provides to the mind for deliberation have their origin in sense

perception" (2005, 20). Sensation is responsible for our internalization of experiences and is directly connected to memory: it provides the means for impressing images on the 'wax tablet' of memory (Coleman 1992, Carruthers 2009). John of Salisbury, bishop of Chartres, would note that "Sense perception is a prerequisite for memory; the memory of frequently repeated sense perceptions results in experimental proof . . . [which] provide the materials for a science or an art" (4.8).

Since "Sensation" as John of Salisbury notes, "is 'a bodily state of being affected by action,' a state which is induced by things that are extrinsic and that make an impression on the body in various ways" (4.9), external sense objects such as the Chartres windows would have functioned as important ways to cultivate the memory for popular audiences. The windows bring before the eyes representations of good deeds, important historical moments, and abstractions of the theological concepts through the imagination. As John notes, "Imagination is the offspring of sensation. And it is nourished and fostered by memory . . .. It beholds not only things that are present, but also those that are absent in place or time" (4.10). For something to be stored in the memory and thus become the object of meditation and intellection, it must first be sensed.

Such attitudes toward the visual imbue it with significant rhetorical potential. As Ned O'Gorman states, rhetoric's affective "power is derived from opinion's external grounding—we form opinions about the world about us, and the world about us forms our opinions" (2005, 25). Creating and experiencing visual spaces that conform to or inform social belief and opinion, then, truly does become an ethical imperative, particularly in medieval society. Our sensory and particularly visual experiences are hence suasive and value-laden: they help to structure our perceptions, and it thus stands

to reason that a carefully planned and implemented environment might help to direct a viewer's thoughts. It is perhaps no wonder why Bernard of Clairvaux was so concerned about the decoration of churches.

Bernard's concerns were in many ways both the concerns of his predecessors and contemporaries. For instance, Janet Coleman has argued that Augustine's theory of memory and epistemology is similarly tied up in the idea of sensation. She states, "Augustine's epistemology, then, requires the active participation of memory, a memory whose treasures are revealed through the transient sensory medium of language" (1992, 100). Yet Augustine seems also to suggest that memory can move beyond the aural. For instance, he writes in the *Confessions* that memory receives "images of the things perceived by the senses" without limiting the phrase only to speech or sound (10.8).

Other Scholastics such as Albertus Magnus seem to shift the focus toward even more explicit visual metaphors. For instance, Albertus notes in his commentaries on Aristotle's *On Memory and Reminiscence* that "it is necessary to reduce all things to set quantity and shapes" because when something "relates matters to be grasped by the intellect to real things, it puts before the eyes a quantity" (2004, 129). Reducing objects thusly is necessary because as humans, we must understand all things in finite terms. For Albertus, this is true even of divine understanding: he states, quoting Dionysius the Areopagite, "when someone understands something of divine matters, he accommodates it to the quantity and shape in which it is made apparent through its activity" (2004, 129). However, the constant uniting these varied thinkers is the connections between vision, memory, and ethical conduct.

Medieval Rhetoric and Vision

The act of seeing, forming mental images, and later remembering might be thought of as a multi-stage process. There are a few key moments, then, in the sensory process of effectively internalizing medieval visual rhetoric, if we are to base our speculation on medieval writings and commentaries. A given image must first be viewed, seen, or otherwise experienced. This is where the peripatetic axiom perhaps fits most clearly: one must be provided with appropriate visual and sensory experiences in the service of cultivating prudent thought and action. The viewer must sense prudence before they may know prudence and become prudent. Second, one must take care to impress the image upon the memory. Since vernacular audiences were not likely to have read about the Pseudo-Ciceronian or any other available mnemotechnic, and thus would not have internalized the rules necessary for what medieval thinkers deemed a trained memory, physical objects were created with those rules expressly in mind.

Everyday audiences did not need to know of Pseudo-Ciceronian images and backgrounds, or Aristotle's theory of memory and vision, or Augustine's sensory-driven epistemology, because visual memory objects would have been created in a manner informed by those theories. Such an orientation toward persuasive texts is consistent with medieval understanding of textual agency. As Mary Carruthers notes:

> interpretation [of a text] is not attributed to any intention of the man [the author] . . . but rather to something understood to reside in the text itself. . .. [T]he important "intention" is within the work itself, as its *res*, a cluster of meanings which are only partially revealed in its original statement . . .. the text has a sense within it which is independent of the reader, and which must be amplified, dilated, and broken-out from its words. (Carruthers 2009, 236-7)

The viewer in this scenario is not a passive consumer of information; rather, they must actively interpret and internalize specific events within their memory to extract the varied moral and ethical messages contained within the visual artifact. Visual works such as the stained glass of Chartres can be described as memory objects governed by the aforementioned theories of rhetoric, memory, and visuality; their very design would attempt to ensure that vernacular audiences have a greater chance of effectively impressing images within their memory, and presumably utilizing them to model thought and behavior in service of articular religious and civic goals. Medieval memory objects, then, strive to represent memorable images, contained within ordered backgrounds, enclosed within architectural space, and emphasizing active sensory experience for the viewer. Through a process similar to Aristotleian *phantasia,* the viewer would experience sense objects in order to internalize and recall the messages those objects sought to communicate.

Design choices informed by rhetorical and mnemonic theory would be made to assist the viewer in the third moment of memory, which occurs most likely away from the object itself when the viewer experiences a moment in which judgment is necessary. At this point in time, the viewer must utilize their stored memory to make decisions about proper conduct and behavior based on their prior experience with these sense objects. We might think of this temporally dispersed process of vision and memory as related to Aristotle's deliberative imagination, or *phantasia logistike*, the faculty that allows a viewer to join distinct images together to form a coherent whole (Carruthers 2009, 65). However, beyond the simple ability to join images together, it is also "the ability to construct a composite image involving images of the past, present, and future events"

(Hawhee 2011, 148). The term represents more than ordering of information, but rather an act of wisdom and generalization allowing for described or depicted past instances of events to be applied productively to present or future scenarios. Cathedrals and their stained-glass windows were thus one way of cultivating *phantasia logistike* in service of civic virtue. As Hawhee notes, *phantasia* "traffics between the immaterial and the material;" the concept allows for the building of connections needed to associate the visual texts of cathedrals, the mytho-historical events they represent, and the social realities of audiences (2011, 142). At this point, then, we might more closely examine the stained glass of Chartres Cathedral itself.

Chartres Cathedral

With construction of Chartres beginning around 1194, the cathedral was uniquely positioned in terms of intellectual influence from rhetoric, memory theories, and Scholasticism. Among European cathedrals, Chartres is unique in its design that privileges stained glass as an art form, a design choice that is often attributed to the light-based theology of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and the influence of Abbot Suger's earlier cathedral design of Saint Denis. Chartres exceeds Saint Denis in its focus on stained glass, however: nearly all the Chartres windows are filled with surprisingly uniform quality stained glass windows. Most these windows were installed within the decades after the cathedral's construction, placing their installation slightly later than the cathedral's actual construction, potentially as late as 1240 CE, but likely around 1220 CE (Williams 1993, 16).

Chartres was also home to one of the premier cathedral schools of medieval Europe, with the school being established by Bishop Fulbert around the beginning of the 11th century (MacKinney 1957). Prominent medieval scholars such as John of Salisbury would be educated there, and would later produce rhetorical treatises themselves. Scholarship describing the connections between Chartres and Scholasticism dates back at least to the late nineteenth century work of art historian Emile Male. Male saw Chartres as "a *summa* in stone, a beautiful catechism of Christian doctrine" that served to communicate Christian theology to illiterate audiences (Crossley 2010, 214). Such has been the prevailing view among many scholars; beginning with Male and extending well into the 20th century, Chartres has traditionally been seen as a sort of visual and pictorial Bible, a text intended to communicate spiritual messages to the vernacular masses.

This view is perhaps supported by the large number of depictions of Biblical scenes seemingly haphazardly combined with representations of workers and tradespeople within the cathedral windows. However, more is at work here than a desire to communicate theological points, and Male's view is not sufficient to explain the rhetorical function of the windows. Of the nearly 200 windows in the Chartres Cathedral, 42 exhibit images of workers; within these windows, there are 125 individual images, or panels, depicting 25 different professions (Williams 1993, 2).

The large proportion of images of workers have led many to see everyday people as contributing to the construction of the cathedral, generally through donations offered on behalf of a patron saint representing a group or trade guild. Similar trade windows can be found in several other Gothic cathedrals, including Amiens and Tours (Williams 1993, 8). However, it is unlikely that members of the third estate—the medieval workers class—

would have contributed substantial donations toward any of the Chartres windows. Jane Welch Williams notes that the economic conditions of the area were far from prosperous, and little to no export is attested to in the historical records of the area; nearly all goods produced were intended for local consumption (1993, 17). Given the exorbitant cost of stained glass windows, it is highly unlikely these groups could have financed their creation, even in part. In short, the depictions of vernacular groups and tradespeople are unlikely to reflect donation; this explanation does not sufficiently explain the images or their presence in the lower sections of many windows.

While the windows almost certainly were funded through religious groups of some sort, this is not to say that the windows must therefore be viewed as purely official religious messages. Rather, the windows represent a nuanced rhetorical appeal that bridges official, religious, and vernacular culture in service of both religious and state goals. In her analysis of the windows, Williams suggests that it is naive to view the windows as material representations of a "simpler past when faith in God ordered everyone's life," and I very much tend to agree. Rather, Williams notes that the windows might be understood as a response to class antagonism rising from local power structures or from competitions between various groups (1993, 19). This seems a more satisfactory explanation of the windows and their rhetorical purpose. Cathedral construction was a way to gain and express social and political power, and as such, appeals to the masses could have been one way of gaining influence at a local level.

Seen in this light, the windows of Chartres cathedral can be said to have a clearly rhetorical audience: one that needed to see itself as valued within a local system of power, one that could be best appealed to through a system of visual communication

informed by the rhetorical canon of memory and sensation, and one that the designers of the Chartres windows possibly believed needed concrete modeling of civic and religious virtues that could support the church. For these reasons, the Chartres windows can be thought of as rhetorical texts—persuasive objects informed by rhetorical theory and Scholastic thought in the service of cataloguing cultural knowledge and belief, building metaphorical associations in the service of a trained memory, and modeling virtuous behavior for the benefit of popular audiences. To explore how the windows might fulfill these functions, I examine several stained-glass windows depicting vernacular audiences and speculate as to the messages they might have conveyed within the historical context of their creation and early installation.

Chartres Windows and Memory Theory

In their simplest manifestations, the Chartres windows can be viewed as representing common cultural knowledge and assumptions in material form, a form of visual epideictic (Walker 2000, 6). The windows portray a surprising diversity of material, including saints' lives, Old and New Testament narratives, the deeds of kings, hierarchies of celestial beings, the labors of workers, donor information, and even the signs of the Zodiac. This diversity is only supplemented by Chartres' various sculptures, which, while outside the realm of my present concerns, include representations of classical figures and personifications of the liberal arts, including rhetoric. Depending on how one approaches the cathedral, they may be required to literally pass beneath Lady Rhetorica (an allegorized representation of the art of rhetoric, generally portrayed as a heavily armed woman or goddess) to view the Chartres windows themselves. These

windows provide perhaps the clearest connections to medieval theories of rhetoric and memory.

In many of the Chartres windows, dense metaphorical associations are developed to aid in memory and retention; since the rules of mnemonics such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* would be applicable to the creation of such objects, it is interesting to consider possible connections between memory theory and the windows themselves.

Take, for example, the full window representing the labors of the month and the Zodiac (see figure 1). Each panel in the window represents a specific scene. The labors of the months are depicted on the left-hand side of the window, though occasionally a labor might share a center panel with a representation of the Zodiac (as in the case of October/Scorpio). The right-hand panels depict the signs of the Zodiac. The bottom of the window shows winemakers and a count met by his grateful subjects. The top panel depicts Christ holding an Alpha and Omega, emphasizing the endless and circular nature of the Zodiac and the seasons. In this window, memorable images (in their oddity or uniqueness, as recommended by Pseudo-Cicero) are combined with more familiar images of the tasks common people might be engaged in during any given month. Moreover, the images are overlaid on a geometric and visually unique series of backgrounds: the colored panels of the windows. These create an orderly progression from January in the lower right hand corner to December in the top left.

Figure 1: Zodiac/Labors of the Months: (Dr. Stuart Whatling)

Beyond the imposition of unique images upon ordered backgrounds, the images within the windows cultivate similar metaphorical associations as recommended in

memory texts such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. The pairings of the Zodiac and monthly labors helps to create memorable relationships by combining the well-known with the less known: vernacular knowledge is contrasted with both academic and theological knowledge. Hence Aries, the Ram, is placed opposite the labor for March, which is the pruning of grape vines. Beyond these memorable images, each panel is also labeled in Latin, indicating the given month or sign of the Zodiac.

While other labors, such as threshing wheat, or even relaxing by a fire (for the colder months) are portrayed, the varied tasks of wine making are portrayed in several panels throughout. The labor for September is crushing grapes with one's feet; for October, it is the storage of wine. Even the lower 'signature panels,' which were sometimes used to represent donors, contain two representations of wine makers and sellers. This visual continuity throughout the panels takes advantage of the already seasonal aspects of winemaking: the process itself depends on a sophisticated understanding of the seasons, which the window seeks to depict. But, as Jane Welch Williams has noted, wine makers and sellers were also prominent influences in the region, and the window may serve to do more than catalogue knowledge of the seasons and Zodiac: it could potentially represent an attempt to garner influence with merchants and other workers, while also affirming the social position of the third estate, the medieval worker's class. The Zodiac window, then, has both a clearly defined audience, a rhetorical purpose, and many of the markings of medieval memory theory.

Imitation and *Phantasia*

Similar influences can be seen in the Chartres window detailing the story of Noah and the flood. The Noah window seeks to integrate vernacular groups within mytho-historical events by drawing comparisons between the labor of those groups and Noah's own labor: as Basil the Great notes, images are uniquely suited to encourage imitation. Moreover, the image of Noah's ark was also frequently deployed in the medieval period as a metaphor for trained memory. Hugh of St. Victor, for instance, utilizes the ark as a complex, architectonic system to structure moral and allegorical thought (Carruthers 2009). However, in Hugh's case, the ark is purely mental: visuality is important, as he asks the reader to assemble the ark in their mind through an ekphrastic description, so that the reader's "eye may see outwardly so that your soul may be built inwardly in its likeness" but he offers no physical sketch or model (Carruthers 2009, 53). While the Noah figures in the Chartres windows function differently, the connection of the ark to memory theory is a telling one.

Figure 2: Wheelwright Making Wheel, Dr. Stuart Whatling

In the case of the Chartres Noah window, the ark is used to build connections between the signature panels near the bottom of the window and the larger narrative communicated throughout the panels. The bottom panels depict the labors of carpenters, coopers, and wheelwrights (figure 2; all professions that rely on the working of wood) going about their work. These images provide a thematic foundation for the later wood work performed by Noah and his sons further on (in the case of the Chartres windows, higher up) in the narrative (figure 3, below). For instance, the panel depicting

Noah and his son working to build the ark together closely resembles the bottom signature panels. The figures are depicted in similar poses, using similar tools, and are engaged in similar work. Like the Zodiac windows mentioned above, images of labor are used to provide continuity between the seemingly disconnected main panels and the lower "donor" panels. These similarities and associations between these panels would likely have been apparent to vernacular audiences, who, by connecting their own life experiences to Biblical narratives, would be more likely to internalize their messages and morals. As Ruth Webb notes, "images derived from sense perception were also thought to be the basis of natural memory. . .. These memory images resulted from impressions received on the mind or soul through the senses" (2009, 111).

Figure 3: Noah and Sons Build Ark, Dr. Stuart Whatling

By placing both Noah and the workers in closely proximity to one another and engaging in similar activities, audiences would be more likely to associate their own labor with that of Noah's. The Chartres windows thus serve also as vernacular models for imitation. The placement of these figures at the base of the window, the starting point for nearly all of the Chartres windows, emphasizes the workers' importance to the church and the wider medieval social order. The workers are foundational to the narratives in the windows; they imitate Noah, just as Noah imitates the workers.

Visual models for imitation were not confined to representations of saints or biblical figures, however. One of the most striking Chartres windows depicts the legends of historical king Charlemagne. Once again, the window fulfills a variety of rhetorical

functions. In its simplest form, the window preserves in a visual medium elements of the king's rule and tales of his deeds. The importance of vernacular audiences is reaffirmed through the presence of a clothier selling a robe in the bottom signature panel. But unlike the more narrative biblical windows, the Charlemagne window focuses on representing significant yet sometimes distant moments in the king's life: events that would be worthy of widespread imitation in the medieval world. These panels help not only to model appropriate behavior for kings and rulers, but also to offer general models of behavior for wider audiences. A consistent message is the glorification of the Christian church (as immaterial ideal as well as situated material location) through donation and charitable deeds. Charlemagne's generosity is portrayed to exhort the window's viewers to similar behavior. However, these images may also serve as rhetorical arguments regarding the movement and acquisition of relics from Byzantium during the fourth Crusade, a delicate political matter especially following Pope Innocent III's vocal condemnations of the sack of Constantinople.

Consider two panels from the life of Charlemagne window. In the first panel (figure 4), Charlemagne has just returned from an apocryphal crusade in the Middle East. After defeating the Saracens on behalf of the emperor of Constantinople, Charlemagne is offered a reward from the emperor for his services (these earlier events are depicted on various other panels on the window; interestingly, this scene also parallels the contents of a forged



Figure 4: Charlemagne Asks for Relics, Dr. Stuart Whatling

letter, *The Donation of Constantine,* circa 1106-7 which invited Latin Christendom to take control of Constantinople to protect it and its relics from invading Turks; see Perry 2015).

After his victory, Charlemagne (helpfully labeled for the viewer as 'CAROLVS') gestures to a series of reliquaries, indicating that he wishes not for money but for holy items in return for his campaign—a scene that mirrors elements of the 11th century text *Descriptio qualitier Karolus Magnus clavum et coronam Domini a Constantinopoli Aquisgrani detulerit*, which records his legendary crusade (Maines 1977, 807). This panel models behavior that emphasizes the holy over the secular, placing the good of the church above personal wealth or even the state. At the same time, it suggests a level of humility on the part of the king, a virtue that subsequent panels in the window seek to reinforce. In the next panel (figure 5), the king offers the same relics to the (Roman Catholic) church. The tonsured hair of the figured on the right, as well as the style of the bishop's staff, all indicate Charlemagne has procured these relics from the 'Holy Land' to glorify the Western Catholic faith, transferring relics from the Eastern church to the Western.



Figure 5: Charlemagne Donates Relics, Dr. Stuart Whatling

In each of these cases, Charlemagne has declined immediate and more personal glory to better serve the (Western) Christian faith. The panels model prudent behavior by emphasizing the promised (yet delayed) rewards for aiding the church through both material donations and prudent behavior. However, this is only the most simplistic

possible interpretation. Devoid of their historical context, these images suggest a relatively uncomplicated fable illustrating the value of aiding allies and engaging in charitable acts. However, when understood within the context of the fourth Crusade, the Charlemagne windows also suggest other, more complex motives as they relate to their vernacular viewership. They serve as both instances of rhetorical amplification and modes of justification for the acquisition of relics from Byzantium, each of which seeks in influence public memory surrounding the events of the fourth Crusade and the sack of Constantinople.

Amplification and Justification

In March of 1204, an invading European army comprised primarily of Frankish and Venetian soldiers created documents dictating how any wealth gained from a successful sack of the city of Constantinople was to be divided by the conquering army (Perry 2015). While the document did not explicitly address what was to be done with holy relics, such items nevertheless were looted and brought back to the Latin West in the aftermath of the fourth Crusade. The actions of the invading army were criticized by Pope Innocent III, who issued an official reprimand and widely circulated it. Innocent wrote:

> How, indeed, is the Greek church to be brought back into ecclesiastical union and to a devotion for the Apostolic See when she has been beset with so many afflictions and persecutions that she sees in the Latins only an example of perdition and the works of darkness, so that she now, and with reason, detests the Latins more than dogs? As for those who were supposed to be seeking the ends of Jesus Christ, not their own ends, whose swords, which they were supposed to use against the pagans, are now dripping with Christian blood . . . Not satisfied with breaking open the imperial treasury and plundering the goods of princes and lesser men, they also laid their hands on the treasures of the churches and, what is more serious, on their very possessions. They have even ripped silver plates from

> the altars and have hacked them to pieces among themselves. They violated the holy places and have carried off crosses and relics. (1962, 208-9)

The looting of some relics from the city was in fact authorized by Latin religious authorities, but for the most part holy relics were acquired without permission through the efforts of individual soldiers (Perry 2015, 17). However, even when the acquisition of relics was initially sanctioned by the church, the entire relic enterprise following the crusade had been tainted by the sack of Constantinople and Innocent's subsequent denunciation. Yet, despite the problematic relationship between sacred relics and the fourth Crusade, items supposedly of Byzantine origin also served as a powerful point of rhetorical amplification for monasteries, cathedrals, and those who administered them. Yet, at the same time, the possession of these relics required justification in order to distance them from the sting of Innocent's condemnation. The Charlemagne window, then, might be thought of as an alternative narrative presented to popular audiences in order to explain the transfer of Byzantine relics to the Latin West.

To understand the rhetorical goals of the Charlemagne windows, one must first understand the importance that Constantinople held in the medieval imagination. Comparisons between the art and architecture of Western cathedrals and those of Constantinople are extant in many writings from the period. Often, the image of Constantinople is used as a point of rhetorical amplification, generally achieved through direct comparison with another city or specific architectural space, such as a cathedral.

Abbot Suger of St. Denis, for instance, frequently compares the renovations made in his cathedral to the works of similar religious spaces in Constantinople. He states, "I implored Divine mercy. . .that he [God] might not repel from the building of the temple a

bloody man who desired this very thing, with his whole heart, more than to obtain the treasures of Constantinople" (Suger 1979, 45, emphasis original). Suger, in short, is stating here that he desired to improve his home cathedral more than he desires the riches of the entire city of Constantinople. Given that Robert of Clari, speaking on behalf of his soldiers in the aftermath of the fourth crusade, noted that Constantinople "had been filled with 'two-thirds of the wealth of the world,'" Suger's point should not be taken lightly (Perry 2015, 22).

The city effectively becomes a point of amplification for Suger, and he uses it again to highlight his own works at St. Denis. He notes: "I used to converse with travelers . . . those to whom the treasures of Constantinople and the ornaments of Hagia Sophia had been accessible, whether the things here could claim some value in comparison with those there" (Suger 1979, 65). Suger then reports that the travelers told him the works of his church were superior, but he acknowledges that this might be the case only because the churches of Constantinople are fearful of being looted, and thus forced to hide their best relics and riches (Suger 1979). While Suger ends with a typical humility *topos*, the city and its marvelous architecture and relics nevertheless serve as points of comparison that help Suger to emphasize his own renovations and the magnificent quality of his own cathedral.

The Charlemagne panels within the stained-glass windows of Chartres are informed by this understanding of the city, and operate in a similar way, though the comparison is not as explicit as in Suger's writings. The stories (including the events portrayed in the windows of Chartres) surrounding the city would have influenced audience perception of the wealth Charlemagne stood to gain. Rhetoric, whatever its form, always draws on the

preexisting thoughts, ideas, and beliefs of the audience. Preexisting images and ideals of the city conditioned audience response to the Chartres windows' messages. Given the wealth associated with Constantinople, Charlemagne's refusal of wealth in exchange for relics for Western churches becomes an even more noble act. Even if a speaker or audience member has never seen Constantinople, they can form a mental image of the city based on other sensory experiences. As Ruth Webb argues:

> the speaker's visualization of the scene he wants to place before his audience's eyes draws on elements already residing in his memory and, unless it is a scene he has witnessed himself, is a composite of existing images. The fact that memory images do not remain inert but are subject to manipulation means phantasiai or phantasmata are not to be understood as limited to the quasi-photographic reproduction of things seen. By various processes, images that derive from experience can form the raw material of new composites. (2009, 119).

To the audience's mind, the emperor of the city of Constantinople, one of the richest known at the time, could have offered Charlemagne nearly any price. Yet in his piety Charlemagne of course takes holy relics, only to donate them to the Roman Catholic church. The images thus glorify not only Charlemagne for his virtuous and prudent behavior, but also the church itself for serving as host of relics that can no longer be found even in the great city of Constantinople; the message of these panels is that the West has surpassed the East. These panels help to model virtues of piety and charity in service of the Roman Catholic church through a visual medium for illiterate, vernacular audiences.

However, at the same time, the windows also offer justification for the sack of Constantinople and the subsequent movement of relics from Byzantium to the Latin West, paralleling the literary genre of *translatsio,* which also sought to construct narratives around the movement of holy relics to distance churches and monasteries from

the behavior being condemned by the Pope (Perry 2015). Indeed, the primary motive of the Charlemagne window may in fact be a justification for the presence of looted relics in the aftermath of Innocent's condemnation—the windows provide an alternate narrative of that justifies the presence of Eastern relics in Chartres cathedral, hence distancing those relics from the abhorrent slaughter and looting carried out by Western crusaders. The political expediency of such a narrative is clear, but also reveals that crafting persuasive visual arguments around current events was an important goal of an artistic medium such as stained glass.

Conclusions

Much of the scholarship addressing the application of rhetorical memory or sensory theories in the medieval period has focused on the experience of the highly educated and literate, particularly those in monastic circles. However, this chapter has argued that the Chartres windows, particularly those depicting workers and other vernacular themes, sought to communicate with audiences outside of these typical circles, yet that this communication was nevertheless informed by many of the same rhetorical theories that have spurred recent scholarly discussions of memory, place, space, and sensation in the classical period. This reading is supported by various Scholastic sources, which show a remarkable level of concern for cultivating trained memory and exposing the viewer to explicitly designed visual experiences to model the acquisition of virtue. This evidence indicates that viewing both architecture and art as related to rhetorical theory is not necessarily anachronistic. Many writers from the period focus on the connections between material objects, memory theories, and virtues such as prudence, and the

connections they perceive can be seen through careful analysis of a variety of visual artifacts. Specifically, Ciceronian memory theories and Aristotelian theories of *phantasia* both seem likely to have informed visual rhetorical production. Moreover, these theories are focused on imparting specific civic identities to viewers: on-lookers at Chartres cathedral saw themselves represented as part of a social order, as connected to religious and historical events, and as rhetorical audiences sensitive to contemporary events.

A common rhetorical strategy within the Chartres windows is to represent vernacular experience within or alongside mytho-historical narratives, which is at its heart an issue of rhetorical arrangement and comparison. As such, the windows serve as material and visual texts cataloging cultural knowledge, representing historical narratives, and modeling desirable civic and religious behavior. The Chartres windows help to place the vernacular viewer within the narratives portrayed within the panels, often as starting points that provide a known quantity from which to begin interpreting the window panels. These understandable starting points (in the form of the workers' signature panels) are created to assist in establishing the metaphorical relationships between the various images and narrative plot points, in similar fashion as Pseudo-Ciceronian memory. These strategies are perhaps most apparent in the Zodiac/Labors of the Months window. To return to the words of Thomas Aquinas, the axiom of medieval visual rhetoric might be "Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses" (*De veritate* 2.3.19).

Material objects carried moral and ethical weight and could help to influence a wide variety of audiences. However, the Chartres windows are only one aspect of the sensory experience cultivated within Gothic cathedrals and other medieval public spaces. As Paul Crossley has noted, Chartres integrated a variety of art forms, which would have

been experienced in a particular and planned order by any visiting pilgrim (2010). This chapter has addressed only one aspect of this multi-media rhetorical and sensory experience; the role of other elements, such as liturgy, chant, and sculpture could also be considered alongside discussions of sensation. Yet doing so will require viewing medieval rhetorical practice as a broader phenomenon than it has commonly been theorized, and necessitate conceiving of medieval audiences as rhetorical. One productive line of inquiry could be considering various arts of preaching from the period considering their likely location of oratory. In doing so, greater attention might be paid to how forms of medieval rhetoric may have impacted its intended audience, moving focus away from the development of theoretical precepts and toward a situated interpretation of rhetorical practice within its historical, political, and social context.

CHAPTER 8

UNDERSTANDING VERNACULAR CIVIC IDENTITY

Thus far, this study has remained focused on some of the traditional questions that have often occupied historians of rhetoric; questions such as how was rhetorical education structured, and to what ends? How did rhetoric intersect with other fields of study and approaches to knowledge? It has also considered some less traditional questions, such as how did visual media contribute to a sense of civic identity for popular audiences? However, while I have attempted to integrate a wide variety of media into my observations regarding the intersections of rhetoric and civic identity, I have nonetheless remained focused on relatively elite discourses that simply speak of, about, or around aspects of vernacular culture. I have not, to this point, attempted to analyze the rhetorical production of everyday groups themselves, or attempted to analyze the civic identity such groups may have claimed as their own.

To some extent, I have avoided doing so because of the difficulty of such a task. Despite this project's commitment to utilizing visual, contextual, and architectural evidence to understand medieval rhetorical theory and practice, medieval rhetorical practice is still largely available to modern historians and rhetoricians through written records passed down through manuscripts and printed editions, usually attributed to individual and known authors. However, in this chapter, I attempt to move beyond the traditional paradigm for studies in the history of rhetoric: "the single, named, public figure who composes (or is composed through) speeches and texts" by considering the mass rhetorical acts of anonymous and marginalized groups of people (Fredal 2002, 591). In doing so, I contribute to understandings of specific instances of medieval rhetoric and

civic identity. By avoiding the textualization of non-literate rhetorical activity to better understand a mode of persuasion focused on performance, emotion, and the body, I intend to suggest that rhetorical theory offers a valuable heuristic for understanding the mass rhetorical acts of anonymous medieval rhetors, and furthermore that understanding these rhetorical actions allows for a better conception of medieval civic identity more broadly.

To forward this argument, I analyze the activity associated with popular groups at a medieval shrine, with the goal of relating the available evidence of rhetorical activity in terms of the "symbolic acts, rituals, practices, events [that] might help us understand the persuasive practices of a largely oral and performative people" (Fredal 2002, 593). Specifically, I suggest that vernacular rhetoric, as theorized by scholars in rhetoric and communication studies, offers a productive means for understanding the rhetorical production of everyday groups of historical people. By examining an instance of medieval vernacular discourse in its original context, focusing not on the prevailing approaches to rhetorical theory common within the period, but rather on creating an (always tentative and provisional) descriptions of the actual rhetorical practices of a marginalized group of people, it is possible to gain an understanding of identity as claimed by such groups. However, this understanding is necessarily distorted as represented through the available sources—in this case, the practices attributed to visitors to a monastic shrine to Saint Leonard, the patron saint of the imprisoned. Since these documents straddle official and vernacular culture, it is necessary to theorize the ways in which both appropriate one another.

In doing so, I argue that popular ritual practices in the Middle Ages functioned as performative claims to citizenship, and that those claims speak to an internalized civic identity that was actively claimed by vernacular groups. These claims position the suffering of the body as a marker of virtuous public and civic behavior, offering an implicit critique of elite behavior and abuses of power that caused this suffering in the first place. However, I also suggest that this vernacular rhetorical practice was enabled by elite literate practices that accommodated vernacular rhetorical production within an existing system of circulation, and that one marker of the effectiveness of anonymous, mass discourse is its ability to repurpose this official form of discourse to its own ends. In this way, I also hope to contribute to scholarship focused on more modern instances of protest, especially when those instances utilize official channels of communication for their own ends (Hayes 2017).

Mass Rhetoric and Vernacular Discourse

Vernacular discourse, as theorized within rhetorical studies, faces some distinct problems as an object of study, particularly in comparison to traditional forms of rhetoric and public address. For one, vernacular discourse is often difficult to access, either because it has not been recorded, or because the records associated with vernacular groups have been destroyed or minimized. Methodologically, then, understanding vernacular discourse is dependent upon close attention to context and reconstruction based on available evidence. As Kent Ono and John Sloop note, vernacular discourse is "articulated through a creative combination of cultural artifacts" that speak to a range of issues (1995, 24). Rather than considering texts in isolation, a historian of vernacular

rhetoric must consider "culture: the music, art, criticism, dance, and architecture of local communities" holistically (Ono and Sloop 1995, 20). Vernacular rhetorics are therefore to be understood not on the terms of rhetorical theories taught and transmitted by elite educational and cultural institutions, but rather as distinct forms of cultural expression and argument informed by the daily lives of the people who participate in that discourse. As Gerard Hauser notes, vernacular rhetoric "depends on local knowledge, concerns, meanings, modes of argument, value schemes, logics, traditions, and the like share among ordinary people who neither act in any official civic capacity nor have an elite status" (2013, 41). These forms of meaning making are not always immediately clear or accessible, and thus often require probabilistic reasoning and judgment in order to draw meaningful conclusions; even then, these conclusions are necessarily tentative and provisional.

Vernacular rhetoric, then, refers to the "rhetorics of everyday, common folk: how they speak, how they interact, what discourse informs their daily routines in the communities and places they live and work, and how these communities and places likewise inform their discourse" (Ingraham 2013, 2). It is, as Ono and Sloop suggest, both the speech and cultural practices that "resonate within local communities" (1995, 20). However, at the same time, vernacularity is also often constructed as a binary opposite to 'elite' forms of rhetoric and discourse, and generally positioned as a stand-in for the related term 'mass,' particularly when discussed in regard to rhetoric and citizenship. For instance, Hauser asserts that vernacular rhetoric is in part defined by its distinction from those with elite status who might deploy that social position as a method of gaining or exercising power (2013, 41).

The tendency in rhetorical studies to sharply divide the rhetorical production of elites and masses of ordinary people is important inasmuch as it allows scholars to form useful and valuable distinctions between the discourses of very different groups of people. However, to better understand medieval and other historical instances of mass vernacular rhetoric, it is often necessary to begin with the discourse of cultural elites, as such forms of discourse are more likely to be recorded and transmitted and thus survive as an object of study.

This distinction—between the rhetoric of elites and the discourse of the ordinary masses—traces back to Athenian rhetoric and oratory and more particularly to Aristotle's political writings. As Chris Ingraham notes:

> In the *Politics*, Aristotle observes that the free population of a *polis* can be divided into two groups: the mass of ordinary citizens (*demos*) and the elite (*gnorimoi*). In this division, most people belong to the mass; they are "ordinary" and differentiated from the elite precisely for that reason, that is, for their nondistinction, for their ordinariness. (2013, 4).

While Athenian elites were distinguished from their 'mass' vernacular counterparts through either wealth, birth, or status, these same cultural elites were nonetheless concerned with appealing to the masses through their formal oratory, as Athenian deliberative policy was often conducted through direct votes after speeches were delivered in front of wide and varied audiences. Ancient Athenian rhetoric in particular thus negotiated the divide between mass and elite specifically, as Josiah Ober has suggested in his important study on the subject (1991). However, a similar concern for the divide between elite (speaker) and mass (audience) can be seen in other historical rhetorics as well, meaning the rhetorical practices of cultural elites can often inform our understanding of vernacular culture and its relationship to official forms of discourse. As

Dave Tell has argued, rhetoric has frequently been associated with the binary of mass and elite: "the theory of rhetoric has been associated with large, anonymous groups of people" and their relationship to a speaker or rhetor throughout its disciplinary history (2014, 1). Formal rhetorical theory, then, while ostensibly the practice of elite individuals trained in politics and public speaking, often takes the vernacular, mass audience's values as its subject. As a simple example of this tendency, consider Book II of Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* in which Aristotle analyzes emotional appeal with reference to various classes of people (e.g. young, old, etc). The examples here are not always based in class, and are clearly intended to provide general touchstones for common behavior across social groups. Book II is thus an excellent example of the ways in which elite rhetorical theory often finds itself theorizing the common *demos*.

The consequence of doing so is that while elite may be frequently defined against mass in a number of other social situations, the elite must also often seek to represent vernacular values through their own rhetorical production. As Josiah Ober suggests:

> [Athenian orators] wrote most of their speeches for oral delivery to a mass audience, generally either a large jury or an Assembly. Furthermore, the overt purpose of most orations was to persuade the mass audience to act— specifically, to vote— in a particular way. As Aristotle clearly recognized, an orator who wishes to persuade a mass audience must accommodate himself to the ethos— the ideology—of his audience. He must therefore in general speak well of what the audience thinks is good and ill of what the audience thinks is evil. He will present his own behavior and character as conforming to the values of his audience, his opponent's as failing to conform. (1991, 43)

In this way, seemingly elite discourses can provide valuable information about vernacular rhetorical practices, even if those practices are dispersed and anonymous. By reading the discourse of elites with an eye toward vernacular rhetorical expression, we can gain additional insights into the rhetorical practices of marginalized groups. While doing so

may require a degree of "reading against the grain" of the text, the difference is more one of emphasis than quality.

Official discourse can often therefore provide a window, though at times a distorted one, into mass values and belief. Similarly, vernacular discourse often represents or alters elements of official discourse in rhetoric through a process Ono and Sloop identify as being dependent on syncretism and pastiche (1995). Gerard Hauser similarly argued for a "reticulate public sphere" where information is interpreted and rearticulated within publics among distinct groups of people, complicating the simple division between vernacular and official forms of rhetoric and discourse (1999). In short, vernacular rhetorical theory has increasingly suggested that official and vernacular discourse constantly draw from and represent one another, creating a self-sustaining loop of representation that each group responds to anew as rhetorical conditions change.

Vernacular discourse is not merely a derivative form of official culture, but rather a substantive process that alters communication and discourse in order for it to resonate with local communities. Likewise, official discourse is certainly capable of drawing from vernacular culture in an effort (sincere or otherwise) to represent or affirm mass belief, often in the service of its own ends. The result of this borrowing is that neither elite nor vernacular culture may lay exclusive claims to any given element of common belief, nor can either forward meaningful claims to accurately representing the truth of a matter—rather, both vernacular and elite rhetors draw equally from a social storehouse of commonly held belief, from *doxa*, to make their own claims in their own ways. This sense of *doxa* is constantly evolving, altering the rhetorical strategies by which vernacular and elite rhetors engage with one another. Ultimately, both forms of discourse

are therefore indebted to a rhetorical *ecology* created and sustained by the other. As Jenny Edbauer Rice notes:

> we are speaking about the ways in which rhetorical processes operate within a viral economy. The intensity, force, and circulatory range of a rhetoric are always expanding through the mutations and new exposures attached to that given rhetoric, much like a virus. An ecological, or affective, rhetorical model is one that reads rhetoric both as a process of distributed emergence and as an ongoing circulation process . . .. Rather than a hierarchical transmission of genetic information, evolution involves a kind of sharing and an emergence that happens in the in-between of species. (2005, 13)

In quoting Rice, I wish not to suggest that 'mass' and 'elite' are two completely different species and therefore unrelated, but rather to indicate that the changing storehouse of *doxa* available to both groups is best described as evolving through the participation of both parties. It is this evolutionary relationship between official and vernacular rhetoric that best describes the material and ritual practices associated with the shrine to Saint Leonard at Inchenhofen. By coopting the official literate practices associated with monastic record keeping and pilgrimage promotion, vernacular groups were able to utilize existing systems of public circulation for their own ends, creating socially sanctioned arguments that critiqued existing social relations.

History and Rhetorical Context

As previously mentioned, this chapter focuses on the ritualistic activity associated with a shrine to Saint Leonard, the Catholic patron saint of the imprisoned, located in Inchenhofen, Bavaria. Active in the 13th and 14th centuries, this shrine was an important pilgrimage site, drawing visitors from throughout Europe to participate in ritualistic testimony and votive offering (Cassidy-Welch 2011, 41-42). Like many pilgrimage

shrines in the later Middle Ages, Inchenhofen was home to a monastery as well as a shrine, specifically the monastery of Fürstenfeld, established in 1259 (Cassidy-Welch 2011, 42). At some point after the founding of the monastery, the Cistercian monks living there began to record important events in the community based on public testimony, and eventually began to record the statements of visitors to the shrine to Saint Leonard as well.

These statements frequently reported the miraculous works that visitors attributed to Saint Leonard. Specifically, many of these stories recount tales of people being imprisoned, either with cause or unjustly, and then being saved through the intervention of the saint. Given the monastery's status as an important pilgrimage site, as well as the consistent promotion of the monastery by the local monks, Inchenhofen and Fürstenfeld soon became known throughout the area for this public testimony to Saint Leonard's works that was sanctioned and supported by the monastery. The main draw for pilgrims seems to have been the chance to recount miraculous deeds publicly and have these stories entered into official written record: as Cassidy-Welch notes, "the Fürstenfeld monks recorded the pilgrims' stories in a miracle book which was kept in the Inchenhofen church to provide materials for sermons and to bear textual witness to the wondrous workings of St Leonard" (2003, 48). These statements were almost solely related to miracles thought to be the work of St. Leonard, and in total these collections record some 637 miracles reported between 1346 and 1447 alone (Cassidy-Welch 2011, 43).

At Inchenhofen, the stories of miraculous rescue and other events recounted by peasants and visitors to the shrine were recorded by Bishop Eberhard and the other Cistercian monks of the monastery. Though this record keeping began as a local effort,

some of the Latin records written by these monks were then transferred to the *Acta Sanctorum*, a collection of saint's lives that enjoyed wide circulation. Local miracle collections assembled by monasteries were often included as supplemental material to the saints' lives recorded in the *Acta*, and were meant to serve as a record of the saint's good works on behalf of his local cult and following.

These collections were instrumental in the official canonization process for saints as well, as a reliable record of miraculous deeds remains a required element of the canonization process to this day within the Catholic Church, thought the development itself is medieval and antedates the practice of recording miracles at the shrine. As Steven Sargent notes, "as canonization proceedings became increasingly rigorous, the supporters of a potential saint found it necessary to compile well-attested accounts of their candidate's posthumous wonders" (1986, 456). While it is impossible to determine if these records accurately represent the statements of medieval vernacular audiences, we do know that monasteries collecting stories of miracles supposedly affected by saints was both a relatively common practice across Europe and popular with many groups, even across class barriers (Koopmans 2011). Hence, we see similar practices of miracle collection in England as in Inchenhofen and other continental monasteries (Koopmans 2011, Goodich 1995). Moreover, in late medieval and Renaissance Italy, similar practices of miracle collection and record keeping, as well as votive offering, developed among private individuals as well as part of their individual religious practices (Maniuera 2009, 632-633).

Since collecting miracles was a popular form of literate activity that also supported the official legal proceedings of canonization (a rhetorical process in its own right), the

records related to the performative and ritualistic activity at Inchenhofen are relatively well-preserved. The primary manuscripts containing these original records, some of which are reproduced in the *Acta Sanctorum*, are Munich BSB Clm 7685, Clm 27332, which contains the later records written in German, Munich BSB Clm 4322, Clm 26509, and Cgm 1722. However, despite the availability of these texts and records, I am less concerned about the texts as *texts* than I am with the performative, collaborative, ritualistic, and anonymous rhetorical activity these texts provide us the opportunity to understand. Specifically, the importance these records held to canonization proceedings mean that statements made by popular audiences, many of whom would likely never have the chance to record their experiences, were recorded and preserved in such a way that they are now available for study. The documents represent a unique confluence of official and vernacular discourse. However, these texts are also both anonymous and highly formulaic, meaning they are best analyzed as genre with regard to the public activities they describe. The texts are useful inasmuch as they shed light on the performative, anonymous, and mass practices I argue constituted a vernacular critique of abusive practices and as a claim to a distinct civic identity.

Miracle Collection as Public Performance

Saint Leonard was known as the patron saint of prisoners: he is often depicted in both stories and devotional art as carrying the shattered chains of those he has freed. The most common stories in the saints' lives associated with him depict him traveling the Frankish countryside to free the imprisoned after saving the life of a queen who was in labor. The *Acta Sanctorum* (*AASS*) quotes Bernard Gui, a well-known French inquisitor,

as stating that Leonard is the one who "wears down iron gates, breaks bolts into pieces, shatters chains, opens prisons, reveals the dens of thieves, and restores to their families those who have been imprisoned" (*AASS* 6 November III, qtd. Goodich 138). While Leonard is a Frankish saint and his popularity began in that region, over the years Bavaria became the center of his cult, in no small part due to the promotion of his shrine by the monks at Inchenhofen.

The miracle collections at Inchenhofen reflect Leonard's Frankish image and persona as a liberator of the imprisoned, however: a large percentage of the miracles attributed to Leonard in the Inchenhofen collections deal with the teller escaping captivity, somehow freed through the intervention of the saint. Some pilgrims testifying at the shrine reported being held by petty dukes and nobles, generally described as tyrants because they have transgressed the law by imprisoning their victims. One notable example is that of a duke Ludwig, referred to in the miracle records as "*destructor monasteriorum et oppressor [sic] pauperum*" (destroyer of monasteries and oppressor of the poor).[59] Such claims were relatively common in the Inchenhofen collections, as Cassidy-Welch notes: "Imprisonment was also the product of injustice, according to the miracle books. In particular, those described as *honestus* are distinguished from convicted criminals. These men and women are frequently imprisoned by a tyrant (*tyrannus*) or noble (*graf* or *nobilista*)" (2011, 54).

Other visitors to the shrine recount that they were imprisoned in accordance with the law, as can be seen from one miracle that recounts two murderers being freed from a

59. Munich, BSB Clm 7685, fol. 85r.

tower through Saint Leonard's intercession. Others were imprisoned by husbands or tied to trees in the wilderness by bandits or strangers. Such tales form a near majority of the events recorded in the Fürstenfeld records. As Cassidy-Welch notes, "Almost 40 percent of the reports in the two Munich Latin miracle collections deal with liberations from imprisonment and escapes from captivity of various sorts" (2003, 49).

The people recounting these events nearly always frame their discussion of release and escape in terms of Leonard's assistance, which comes after (often repeated) formulaic requests for his intercession. These requests often involved promising to visit the shrine at Inchenhofen or promising to deliver offerings such as iron or wax votives (these offerings had more than ritualistic values: monasteries could sell iron and use wax for church candles). For example, one man reported that he was to be sentenced to death for his crimes, but was saved through Leonard's intercession just before being hung above a river. The man reported swimming downstream from the site of his would-be execution and arrived at Inchenhofen to share his story and offer his thanks. Another man was imprisoned in a tower, for what the local monks determined to be a petty crime, and supposedly escaped through a portal Leonard created in the prison walls after the man asked his intercession. This pilgrim too reported promising to offer thanks at the Inchenhofen shrine.

Once freed from their imprisonment, the recipient of miraculous intervention was expected to travel to an appropriate shrine and make a votive offering (from the Latin *ex voto,* "in accordance with a vow") to the saint in exchange for the miraculous intercession. Many of the recorded miracles report that the person asking for intercession

explicitly promised to make a pilgrimage and offering in Saint Leonard's honor should they be released while still imprisoned.

The miracle itself, then, was not considered completed until the recipient of Leonard's intercession traveled, made their offering, and related their tale in public to others. As Megan Cassidy-Welch has observed:

> the culmination of the liberation miracle was the arrival of the prisoner at the shrine at Inchenhofen. The miracle reports often indicate that the pilgrim's tale was told in public (*public ennarravit*), and the testimony was given credence by the statement of an honest witness who confirmed the truth of the pilgrim's tale. (2011, 47)

Visitors were expected to testify to their experiences publicly in a ritualistic setting. There is evidence from the Inchenhofen records that a bell was rung to let nearby citizens know a pilgrim would relate a miraculous event. Moreover, the pilgrim would often symbolically make a donation of a votive offering in honor of the saint. Often this would take the form of fetters or chains—either replicas made of wax, or the actual bindings used to imprison the pilgrim. Eberhard Aeletzhofer, for instance, arrived at Inchenhofen still bound in the iron chains used to imprison him, and the local monks were forced to cut his bindings in order to free him (Cassidy-Welch 2011, 55). Steven Sargent's exhaustive catalogue of the mentioned items in the Inchenhofen collections notes that 93 iron chains or manacles, 13 iron bars, 10 stocks, and 3 towers were recorded as being delivered as votive offerings by pilgrims claiming to have been released through the aide of Saint Leonard (1982, 348). Of the wax offerings, however, only 13 items are listed that relate to captivity, with representations of the saint or other images predominating (Sargent 1982, 345). From this we can conclude that iron offerings were far more popular than wax when testifying about captivity and release.

Given the public nature of these activities, it seems likely that they were conducted for a broader social purpose rather than solely for private devotional reasons (though of course devotion would certainly be a major factor in participating in such a form of discourse). As such, it is perhaps appropriate to understand these ritualistic testimonies as a form of public rhetorical activity. Though this form of vernacular discourse is not focused on a concrete deliberative or judicial issue, there is clear appeal to underlying values and norms regarding the relations between the individual and the state, the goals of secular justice versus divine justice, and the limits of the exercise of power to be placed on nobles and other individuals who might operate outside of the law or of community norms. The pilgrims to Inchenhofen offer valuable information on the persuasive strategies of historical and contemporary vernacular rhetors, specifically in regard to the individual's place in relation to the larger "mass" within an instance of anonymous rhetoric.

Saints and Embodied Topoi

Topoi, discussed by Aristotle and others as pre-existing lines of argumentation based in common opinion, offer one potential lens through which to view the vernacular rhetorical activity at Inchenhofen. Aristotle notes that "rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state topoi, and these are applicable in common to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species [of knowledge]; for example the topos of the more and the less" (1358a). Since topoi are held to be in common by many different people and to many different disciplines, the topoi also have a strained and conflicted relationship with novelty and tradition. The genre of miracle testimony exploits the

tension between tradition (the topoi ridden accounts of imprisonment and liberation) and novelty (the implicit critique of unjust imprisonment) to legitimate mass public rhetorical action.

Conforming to certain topoi would have allowed vernacular rhetors the chance to speak publicly in an official forum such as the monastery and its shrine. Yet, these topoi also allowed for the possibility of new rhetorical goals, such as implicit critique of imprisonment. As philosopher Richard McKeon notes, "invention, discovery, and insight are creative modes of departure from accustomed circumstances . . . to transform the customary or the unnoticed into novelties" (1973, 199). For this reason, topoi are related not only to memory, nor solely to invention, but to both simultaneously (McKeon 1973). As Carolyn Miller notes, the topoi therefore are both generative and managerial: "they can effect both novelty and decorum" (2000, 132). In order to reach this point of duality, topoi must "occupy the border between the known and the unknown" (Miller 2000, 141). In McKeon and Miller's view, the topoi thus allow newness and familiarity to interact in complex ways, forming novel discourse and ideas. While a point of reference must produce a sense of familiarity, newness skirts the edges of established practice. By creating a public space for critique, miracle collections preserved injustices within a socially acceptable and traditional story format, embodying the productive tension between decorum and generativity (Miller 2000). At the same time, the embodied topos of freed-prisoner-turned-penitent-pilgrim allowed anonymous vernacular rhetors to utilize existing systems of public discourse circulation to make their own potentially subversive public arguments.

To do so, visitors to the Inchenhofen shrine were expected to adopt a particular identity. Christa Olson notes that "The association of topoi with motion, life, and bringing before the eyes lends itself well to the claim that commonplaces can be activated within bodies and that such embodiable topoi are particularly useful for establishing legitimacy" (2010, 303). In Olson's view, some topoi can be inhabited and embodied by rhetors who purposefully adopt such positions for their own rhetorical ends. In doing so, they attempt to utilize these topoi in pursuit of their own legitimacy as rhetors in various settings. The embodied position and identity itself acts as a commonplace that indexes particular cultural assumptions for the speaker and listener. As Olson notes: "The idea of commonplaces as repeated motifs, forms of pattern recognition, or storehouses of social energy thus allows us to see embodiable topoi as gaining their force by indexing and incorporating available assumptions about the bodies they reference" (2010, 303).

In the case of the Inchenhofen shrine, the visiting pilgrims frequently and repeatedly adopt the embodied topos of freed prisoner, diligently sojourning that they might publicly attest to the miraculous deeds of Saint Leonard and record them in an official history. This identity allows the Inchenhofen pilgrims to adopt "an assumable commonplace" that indexes particular assumptions about the speaker (Olson 2010, 302). For instance, we know from the monastery records that even criminals and murders who admitted to their guilt were allowed to testify that Leonard had facilitated their release; their status as "criminal" was viewed as less important than their status of "witness and recipient of miracle." They had effectively assumed the identity and miracle recipient over any other potential embodied topos. Indeed, there seems to have been a strong social assumption that the criminals would not have been released and favored by the saint if

they were not truly repentant of their crimes. This view seems to have been specific to Leonard's cult. As Megan Cassidy-Welch notes:

> More specific to this cult, however, are its links between imprisonment and liberation as they were expressed in both the miracles and the act of pilgrimage. These connections were more than discursive. They were deeply active and experiential. My suggestion here is that St Leonard's cult reveals a relationship between confinement and liberation that reflected more general principles of inclusion and participation in the Christian community. (2011, 52)

The statuses of free and imprisoned are used discursively within the public space of miracle testimony to reflect statuses of inclusion or exclusion from a religiously inflected civic community. By visiting the shrine and attesting to their release, vernacular rhetors could claim a pre-existing, commonplace identity that reflected their desire for civic inclusion. In doing so, they were also able to claim a particular civic identity that allowed them greater access to public discourse and rhetorical legitimacy. Moreover, this same identity allowed them to move beyond the social stigma associated with their past crimes to regain their place in both religious and secular society.

While visitors to the Inchenhofen shrine who had actually committed crimes could certainly benefit by claiming a new civic identity in this way, other visitors (indeed, the majority of visitors) reported that they were held or imprisoned against their will for no legitimate reason. The majority of visitors to the shrine were not themselves criminals. Often they were captured by enemy forces as prisoners of war, or held by abusive nobles. These visitors are generally specifically mentioned by the local monks to be "*honestus*" or are verified to be by other trustworthy people (the honest matron is a recurring figure) who speak publicly on their behalf. In these cases, the embodied topos of imprisoned pilgrim functions not to reclaim a lost civic status, but rather as a method by which to

legitimate an indirect critique of the abusive practices that led to their unjust imprisonment in the first place. In such cases, vernacular rhetors assumed an identity that allowed their favored status as recipient of miracle to aide in a public critique of an abusive practice of imprisonment.

Rhetoric and Indirection

The critiques I mention above are never delivered as direct arguments against specific nobles or even specific practices. Rather, the vernacular discourse most prevalent at Inchenhofen is one of rhetorical indirection. In his recent *Prisoners of Conscience: Moral Vernaculars of Political Agency*, Gerard Hauser lists one of the subheadings to his chapter on rhetoric and indirection as "who you talk to is not who you hope to reach" (2012, 101). As Hauser notes, indirect rhetoric is a "mechanism that takes the audience to the heart of the rhetor's antagonist, exposes its fraudulence, and in its expression of defiance speaks for the whole community" (2012, 101). This form of rhetoric is indirect inasmuch as it is discourse ostensibly addressed to others: however, in such cases the greatest rhetorical impact is reserved for a certain set of onlookers. As Hauser states, "sometimes reaching onlookers is the point" (2012, 101). In such a situation, frank speech is employed to influence the onlooker even as the stated audience is directly addressed. Indirection serves as an effective mode of address primarily when there are extreme differences of power or status between the speaker and the intended onlooker.

At Inchenhofen, the audience is certainly to some extent the monks recording the miraculous deeds of the saint. However, at the same time, we know that miracle testimony was public and drew observers from a variety of class backgrounds. The mixed

audience that public miracle testimony would have offered creates a scenario in which "*the person of the rhetor serves as a metonymic embodiment of the body politic*" (Hauser 2012, 103 emphasis original). In the case of the Inchenhofen pilgrims, we see the repeated testimony of very different people, often divided by class, gender, and civic status, directed toward a common goal and often assuming a common embodied topos. The repeated stories of unjust imprisonment, coupled with the sometimes graphic descriptions of the imprisoned rhetor's conditions of captivity, help to offer a unified critique of unjust imprisonment that spanned the rhetorical production of many visitors to the shrine. Onlookers, particularly repeated ones, would have thus heard many similar stories of suffering and injustice told by multiple speakers. As Hauser notes, the goal of such forms of "*indirection* [is to] *confront onlookers with a scene that involves them as witnesses to the pain of others*" (2012, 104 emphasis original).

The performative testimonies of injustice and descriptions of suffering offer instantiations of the moral claims critiquing the practice of unjust imprisonment. Moreover, such claims need not be purely written or discursive, as in the verbal testimonies or the written records associated with that testimony: "bodily performances are no less exhortative and no less instantiations of symbolic realities with which we can identify. Without question, a great deal of our response to tortured bodies as metonyms for the body politic is triggered by the pathos they elicit" (Hauser 2012, 105). In this way, both the testimony delivered and the very act of appearing in public, chains in hand, serve as indirect critiques of an abusive power relation. In this case, the visual, material, and embodied elements of the ritual practice would have been most striking, not the textual

account recorded by the monks. To fully appreciate the activity and rhetorical practice at Inchenhofen, we must imagine this experience.

While the Inchenhofen collections may strike us more as religious testimonies of experience and faith than as subversive critiques of power, I would argue that this is in itself evidence of their effectiveness as a form of indirect discourse. That these stories commonly register in this way in extant scholarship confirms their ability to utilize an existing genre and mode of circulation subversively and to new ends, thus exploiting the tension between novelty and decorum. Indeed, while a variety of historical studies (Sargent 1982, 1986; Goodich 1995; Cassidy-Welch 2003, 2011) have analyzed the activities of the shrine and the pilgrims who visited it, none to my knowledge have viewed the activity as rhetorical, subversive, or as a form of protest or dissent. To my mind, this has little to do with the character of the writings or the descriptions of the public activities which apparently took place in Inchenhofen, and more to do with the ways we imagine everyday medieval people and their relationship to systems of power and government. As I have argued in the introduction to this study, everyday medieval people are often imagined by scholars in the history of rhetoric as lacking rhetorical agency, the capacity for reasoned civic decision making, or the ability to critique oppressive social structures.

The consequences of such assumptions are that we view medieval citizens as limited in their possible ranges of expression. As Daniel Gross notes, our assumptions regarding rhetoric and emotion shape our interpretation of phenomena such as the Inchenhofen miracles collections:

> The contours of our emotional world have been shaped by institutions such as slavery and poverty that simply afford some people greater emotional range than others, as they are shaped by publicity that has nothing to do with the inherent value of each human life and everything to do with technologies of social recognition and blindness. (2007, 5)

In short, our relationship to the emotional appeals and rhetorical production of the poor, the everyday, the anonymous, and the masses colors our interpretations of those forms of discourse. Confronting these assumptions directly allows for a more in depth understanding of the rhetorical practices of such groups. For example, in the case of the Inchenhofen collections, we must be willing to believe that even marginalized and disenfranchised medieval groups were capable of complex and indirect subversion; doing so requires confronting a common scholarly bias that positions medieval rhetors as lacking the agency to engage in acts of public persuasion about the common good, as well as classed assumptions about rhetorical production.

Material Epimone

Thus far I have primarily examined how individual rhetors used discursive and embodied forms of rhetoric in order to assume particular topoi and to engage in an indirect critique of abusive practices. At this point, however, I would like to turn my attention to the rhetorical appeals enacted not through one speaker or visitor's individual agency, but rather to how the Inchenhofen shrine facilitated an asynchronous form of mass vernacular discourse. By codifying the practice of leaving *ex voto* offerings in the form of symbols associated with Saint Leonard—towers, stocks, and chains—the official modes of discourse associated with the Inchenhofen shrine supported and enabled a form of mass vernacular rhetoric that utilized *epimone*, or persistent repetition of similar

claims, to allow rhetors separated temporally and spatially to work in concert with one another across time and space in pursuit of a common rhetorical goal. In doing so, these rhetors engaged in a mass vernacular rhetoric defined by the repeated but indirect testimony to suffering. Indeed, the continued presence of these votives could "act persuasively without the mediation of a rhetor," an important goal given the necessarily transient status of the pilgrim (Lamp 2011, 183).

Isidore of Seville notes that *epimone* "occurs whenever we linger for a rather long time on the same thought" (*Etymologies* 2.21.40). While vernacular critique was repeatedly enacted through an oral discourse that was recorded in the monastery's records, it was also enacted through more immediate material means that sustained interest in the indirect discourse produced by the visitors to the Inchenhofen shrine. Exploring these material and non-textual elements of rhetorical expression adds unique dimensions to our understanding of rhetorical history. The primary method by which the effect of *epimone* was achieved was through the repeated offering of iron and wax votives representing captivity and imprisonment, as has been mentioned above. The most common of these offerings were chains.

It is at times unclear whether the chains offered at the shrine are the literal chains of the prisoners' bondage or simply substitutes. Moreover, not all votives were chains; other offerings included iron towers, or images of the saint himself. An even greater number of pilgrims left wax replicas of similar objects. These offerings formed visual representations of the traditional narrative structure of a Leonard rescue miracle. The tower served as symbol of imprisonment and confinement; the saint served as symbol of escape; finally, the chains served as a symbol of the saint's intercession, visual proof that

the pilgrim had been released. The presence of these visuals alone would have served as powerful arguments, particularly when displayed prominently within public space. As Megan Cassidy-Welch notes:

> Visual or material evidence of the saint's efficacy also took the form of various objects which the pilgrims brought with them to the Inchenhofen church. The miracle books themselves tell us of a range of offerings brought by prisoners in particular to Leonard's shrine. One ministeriale, for instance, who had been captured by the Venetians in the early fifteenth century, brought the chains which had held his arms to the wall of his prison tower. Another 'honest man' from Nürnberg arrived at Inchenhofen with two chains which had bound him for 13 weeks. Leonard himself was said to have consoled one Prussian merchant whose neck and hands were chained, telling the prisoner that once he was released he should take his chains to Inchenhofen, while one Andreas Violfalt brought his leg irons to the shrine after Leonard released him. (2011, 50)

The material objects associated with an individual's captivity contributed to one's *ethos* and helped the visitor to assume the appropriate embodied topos associated with the shrine. They were visual markers of the topos itself. However, the miracle collections are also quite clear that the visitors would leave their chains, iron or wax, so that other might see them after they had testified publically. This also seems to have been the reason the monks at Inchenhofen kept track of how many offerings had been left by visitors: the items were physical manifestations of Saint Leonard's efficacy, and could be used as evidence in canonization proceedings. They were visual memory objects related to the saint's deeds.

The chains and other objects left as votive offerings would have contributed to the mass rhetorical action at the Inchenhofen shrine, as they would shape the site of rhetorical production and act on both speakers and visitors. Lamp has observed the varied ways public spaces and monuments might function rhetorically. She notes that "both Cicero and Quintilian argue that repeated exposure to visual media . . . shapes memory"

(2011, 183). Moreover, she suggests that visuals could be used to influence the process of invention, with public space having the "potential . . . to shape or even control the oratorical act" (Lamp 2011, 183). While the wax chains and towers would most likely have been melted down for use in the monastery after a period of display, the iron chains would have likely remained a fixed feature on or near the shrine. Indeed, that the monastery counted the number of chains at all speaks to some level of investment in the offerings. Visually, these offerings would have influenced vernacular discourse in a few distinct ways. First, they would have marked the space as one defined by Saint Leonard and his associated topoi, helping to sanction public speech related to imprisonment and liberation and encouraging potential rhetors to adopt this embodied topos. Second, together with the oral discourse of the shrine and the written records, the votives would have served as effective symbols of captivity and the suffering of bodies, serving as a visual and material reminder of the suffering discussed in the oral discourse and the written records of the monks.

The chains and other votives would also have helped to sustain a rhetorical practice based in *epimone* across time and space. Since most who visited the shrine were pilgrims, and thus did not reside in the immediate area, it was important that their discourse be recorded in a public, non-textual form. Doing so allowed evidence of their stories to remain within the specified site of public memory, and for that evidence to be meaningful to the mostly illiterate pilgrims visiting the shrine. The chains—at one point, potentially 192 of them according to monastery records—served as potent visual reminders of the suffering of others.

Moreover, the iron and wax chains would have persisted long after the oral speech of the visitor ended. They served as continued reminders of the suffering recounted by others in their speech. As Lamp has noted in her analysis of Quintilian's discussions of persuasion, bodily harm can have potent rhetorical force. Quintilian argues:

> even some sight unsupported by language [can persuade], when for instance the place of words is supplied by the memory of some individual's great deeds, by his lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person. Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence [sic] of Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honorable scars which he had acquired while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer on the power of speech, but appealed directly to the eyes of the Roman people. (*Institutes of Oratory* 2.15.7)

While chains are not equivalent to scars—they are not actual wounds inflicted and visible on another person—they are excellent reminders of bodily harm, discomfort and captivity. They are not of the body but they refer to the body, and in the absence of the actual rhetor, the chains stand in metonymically for that person's story of suffering. They are visual reminders of another's time in captivity, memory objects that, as Lamp argues regarding material artifacts, could potentially influence how future visitors interpret that space and form arguments within its confines (2011). The chains made implicit arguments about the suffering of pilgrims, but also helped to define the experience of those who later visited the shrine. This effect was amplified through visual *epimone*: rather than the persistent repetition of an oral or written theme, votive offerings left *en masse* made persistent visual and material arguments, constructed explicitly to appeal to emotion through reminders of confinement and suffering.

Understanding Mass Medieval Rhetoric

As James Fredal notes, "Mass action can press its agenda upon an audience through factors of scale, unanimity, and time unavailable to individual agents" (2006, 135). The rhetorical activity of the Inchenhofen pilgrims, I believe, has confirmed the observation above, as the spatially and temporally dispersed tactics of the visitors to the shrine of Saint Leonard clearly exhibit many of the features Fredal observes in his discussions of the "herm choppers" of ancient Greece, among other scenarios. Moreover, mass actions, by virtue of the differences that set them apart from traditional forms of rhetoric such as oratory, provide excellent windows into medieval civic identity. Rather than view rhetorical production as the product of a single named individual, such mass acts allow us to "draw our attention back from the verbal content of a speech toward the body and its manner of action, away from the single text toward the actions and character of a performative model" (Fredal 2006, 135). Dispersed mass actions therefore present significant patterns of culture, of typological ways of making meaning and conceiving of one's identity in relation to others. By investigating instances of mass rhetorical action, we better understand common civic identities that would have been appealing across time, space, and class. Moreover, in doing so we move closer to the imaginative reconstruction suggested by Susan Jarratt as a key element of a sophistic form of historiography, focusing not solely on prescriptive rhetorics that take the production of discourse as their subject, but rather broader elements of culture as they relate to meaning-making and persuasion (1991).

Examining the rhetorical activity of the shrine to Saint Leonard also allows historians of rhetoric to investigate systems of circulation available to everyday medieval

rhetors, thus moving beyond theoretical texts and other typical objects of study and inviting an approach informed by contemporary studies of vernacular rhetorics. By operating within a socially and religiously sanctioned system of textual record-keeping and public testimony, the visitors to the Inchenhofen shrine could employ a form of elite communication for their own ends, subverting the original goals of the sponsors of this activity. Ostensibly a practice of religious devotion, the system of miracle collection and public testimony and votive offering at Inchenhofen allowed the pilgrims there to highlight their own mistreatment at the hands of local and foreign power structures, thus making indirect arguments intended for other social and cultural elites. In doing so, the visitors to this shrine engaged in their own form of public rhetorical activity, which itself relied on established forms of discourse circulation.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

In a recent book chapter, scholar of medieval rhetoric Martin Camargo quipped that, for many scholars in both medieval and rhetorical studies, the history of medieval rhetoric is much the same as the American Mid-West: "flyover country" (2013, 21). His conclusion is at present a reasonable one, as few scholars in fields such as rhetorical studies have given the medieval period its due in the wider landscape of rhetoric's disciplinary history. This is regrettable, as the Middle Ages represent a vast and still under-explored period, spanning a millennium and entire continents (especially if one includes the even less studied field of Byzantine rhetoric).

In this dissertation, I have argued that the medieval period has primarily been overlooked due to historiographical biases that deny medieval rhetoric a civic function due to its lack of association with democratic political institutions, and by extension, that scholarship in medieval rhetoric has largely not been responsive to developments in other periods of rhetorical history and associated advances in approaches to historiography. I further argued that a certain strand of medieval rhetoric has been misidentified in large part due to preconceived notions about medieval people and their relationship to political and civic institutions: namely, that medieval people were not rhetorical citizens capable of reasoned public discourse aimed at solving common problems because such forms of discourse were not supported politically.

I have sought to dispel this myth by carefully attending to rhetoric's broader, culture-shaping role, suggesting that medieval rhetorical theory and practice sought to idealize civic identities, particularly those related to manual laborers. These discourses, I

suggest, operated within the realm of the contingent, thus occupying the disciplinary space medieval thinkers and rhetoricians tended to assign to rhetoric. Thus, my argument is that medieval rhetoric continued to function as an important element of civic life not because it trained orators and politicians, but rather because it sought to model diverse forms of public participation for a variety of audiences. Medieval rhetorical practice idealized certain relationships between classes, between forms of knowledge, and between social and civic institutions to advocate for practices of citizenship that varied between time and cultures. In doing so, medieval rhetoric continued to serve a civic role, attempting to find solutions to shared problems of civic life, decision making, and governance. Everyday people were not removed from such issues: they were represented in rhetorical education in pedagogy, in popular art, in debates about translation, and through their own civic activities. At every turn they found themselves represented, appealed to, reasoned with, coerced, and persuaded.

The individual chapters of this study have examined a seemingly odd collection of sites. My inquiry has not focused on a single period, or a set of authors, or a common theoretical development. This choice, however, has been a deliberate one. By examining diverse forms of rhetoric in various times, places, and settings, I have attempted to show that the civic ideals of classical authors such as Cicero and Aristotle persisted well into the Middle Ages, altered and expanded upon by a new intellectual culture and its own distinct values. The expression of these values varied, yet some features remained relatively constant. Specifically, I have argued that the embodied *topos* of labor was a common theme that surfaces throughout the medieval period, with different interpretations predominating in different cultures and time periods. Consistently,

however, these diverse sites of inquiry return to the Ciceronian ideal expressed in *De Inventione:* rhetoric is the art which forms, maintains, and brings together orderly civic communities, as well as the identities those communities value. Rhetoric helps to model the ways in which one is authorized to interact with their community and its civic and social institutions. In forwarding this interpretation, I suggest that rhetoric is not solely a discipline that provides instruction in verbal or written discourse; it also serves to locate individuals within cultural systems tied to ideals of public participation. This as more or less been rhetoric's orientation throughout its long history: rhetoric has never been a neutral *dunamis,* but rather is always sensitive to wider social and political trends.

This study began by considering the aims of medieval rhetoric from a distance, examining a variety of rhetorical treatises and commentaries to define larger trends in medieval civic rhetorics. By considering texts such as Thomas Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *Politics,* John of Salisbury's *Policraticus,* Brunetto Latini's *La Rettorica,* and Thierry of Chartres's commentaries on Cicero, a clear view of rhetoric emerges: rhetoric brings reason to our speech, be it overtly political or day-to-day. As such, rhetoric was an art that entered all spheres of life, and thus concerned itself not only with overtly political ends but with the bonds of friendship, citizenship, family, and civic identity that allow people to live in orderly communities. Rhetoric was thus not a limited technical art confined to a few genres, but rather a discipline that informed communication at a variety of levels. At the same time, it is important to remember that medieval rhetorical traditions were varied, encompassing preceptive and theoretical approaches tied to specific genres as well. However, through its educational and epideictic functions, rhetoric also articulated common cultural values and reinforced standards of civic behavior to a variety

of groups. By considering Aquinas and John of Salisbury in particular, I suggest that the maintenance of a vernacular identity tied to manual labor was an important goal and a common trope throughout the medieval period.

The next chapter more directly considered how idealized forms of civic identity tied to labor manifested in rhetorical education and pedagogy. By connecting the Anglo-Saxon pedagogical text Ælfrīc's *Colloquy* to the Greco-Roman *progymnasmata,* I suggested that rhetorical education continued to function as a site of moral education tied to specific civic identities, especially those that sought to value manual labor alongside a monastic life. Such a goal was especially important for the Benedictine order, whose motto *ora et labora,* means "pray and work."

By assigning students rhetorical exercises inspired by *progymnasmata* exercises such as fable, thesis and comparison, and especially impersonation, young Benedictines would have been taught to idealize manual labor as part of their identity as monastics. Such identity cultivation, I suggest, holds an important place in civic life, connecting both rhetorical education and practice directly to civic ideals, if not to formal deliberative oratory. Benedictine monks developed a code of public participation, contained within the Rule of Benedict, that provided clear guides for engaging in deliberative acts with their fellow monastics. These rules were tied not just to theories of speech or writing but to ideals of moral behavior and defined relationships between individuals. Such forms of education are reminiscent of the goals of classical *paideia*, which sought to position the student within a broader culture and its moral, ethical, and civic values.

In the sixth chapter, I examined the writings of the Florentine Ciceronian, Brunetto Latini, and his relationship to the vernacular translation movement in medieval England.

Latini, who wrote a text claiming to paraphrase Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* is representative of a wider medieval movement to reassess the place of manual laborers within theories of civic life. This reassessment was closely tied to Aristotle's division of knowledge between *episteme, phronesis,* and *techne.* While Aristotle expressed a clear preference for practical arts, or those governed by *phronesis* (noting that practitioners of *techne* were not fit for civic life), Latini reinterprets Aristotle's categories of *phronesis* and *techne* in ways that place greater value and emphasis on manual labor. Indeed, Latini describes rhetoric as both a valuable civic and academic discipline while also categorizing it as a *techne*. Moreover, Latini makes this case within what he claims is a paraphrase of Aristotle's own writings based on his own translations. At the same time, Latini also connects rhetoric with translation, describing both as processes that bring wisdom to one's speech.

I then turned to the reception of Latini's texts in England by examining works by both Chaucer and John Trevisa. Both authors follow Latini's lead in positioning rhetoric, translation, and labor as connected means of securing broad civic goods. Similarly, both Chaucer and Trevisa utilize similar rhetorical appeals as Latini to argue for the extension of academic and civic knowledge to vernacular speakers. In doing so, they contributed to a changing sense of civic identity that positioned vernacular speakers as in need of knowledge traditionally transmitted through Latin texts. Knowledge of laws, history, and philosophy effectively becomes a necessity for a healthy civic life for these authors, which led them to advocate for increased educational access through Middle English translation. In doing so, they argue for alternate vernacular civic identities tied to academic works. These Middle English authors offer a unique contribution and

continuation to the medieval tendency to reassess the place of productive knowledge within Aristotle's works, as well as a window into how such changes led to broader social and political change.

The final two chapters investigated the relationships between vernacular civic identity and forms of material and visual rhetoric. Chapter 7 showed that the stained-glass windows of Chartres Cathedral were both potentially influenced by the growing interest in rhetorical theory at the cathedral school, as well as in modeling forms of vernacular civic identity to illiterate audiences. By considering two sets of windows—those portraying labor, such as the Zodiac and Noah windows, and those portraying mytho-historical events (e.g. The Charlemagne window), this chapter demonstrated that medieval rhetoric would have been adaptable to visual forms of communication intended for mass audiences. It further suggested that such a concern with visual communication challenges the assumption that medieval audiences were not viewed as rhetorical. The windows portraying labor sought to idealize and reinforce a social order that valued manual labor as an essential component of civic and political life, offering a visual counterpoint to the observations developed in earlier chapters. Similarly, the reinterpretation of the Charlemagne legend in the Chartres windows speaks to the need for the messages of religious and social institutions to consider vernacular interpretations of contemporary events. Understanding mass audiences and their relationship to rhetoric in this way allows for a reinterpretation of the writings of Bernard of Caliravux and others who allegedly denied the importance of visual communication.

In the final chapter, I turned attention away from civic identities presented and defined by cultural elites and instead attempted to reconstruct the vernacular civic

identity of a diverse group of pilgrims to the shrine of Saint Leonard, the patron saint of the imprisoned, in Inchenhofen, Bavaria. By considering the monastery records and material artifacts left as offerings, I attempted to theorize a form of public dissent based in the performative practice of assuming an embodied *topos:* that of the innocent yet suffering prisoner. Vernacular groups adopted this identity, I argue, to make public arguments within a sanctioned cultural space, effectively addressing the intended audience through misdirection. In these situations, the honest labor of the suffering pilgrim is hampered by the abusive imprisonment of elites and nobles, thus contrasting the pious vernacular groups with the wicked on-lookers who might witness their public testimony. I thus suggest that vernacular groups had a strong sense of civic identity, one that can be tentatively reconstructed through the recovery of vernacular forms of rhetoric. However, at the same time, I argued that such forms of vernacular discourse are only available for study because they have been filtered and preserved through the practices of cultural elites.

It is my hope, however, that these case studies have more to offer than interpretations of the times, places, and events they examine. Rather, each represents a potential avenue into understanding not only the place of rhetoric and civic life in the Middle Ages, but also a method by which to better understand how rhetoric functions within historical societies that did not connect rhetoric directly to republicanism or democracy. For instance, scholars in the history of rhetoric have much to gain by closely examining the role of rhetoric in educational spheres, art, and within forms of vernacular cultural expression, especially within non-democratic societies. Building from the work of scholars such as Jeffrey Walker, Laurent Pernot, Kathleen Lamp, and Alex Novikoff

(among others), these case studies and the approaches they represent offer new directions for the history of medieval rhetoric and other time periods. In the final sections of this conclusion, I want to offer some guiding principles for better understanding both medieval rhetoric and civic life, as well as the role of rhetoric in other societies that did not connect rhetoric with state sponsored deliberative or forensic institutions.

Redefine Civic Life

Rhetoric's medieval traditions have been interpreted in ways that minimize the social and cultural roles of a variety of groups. These interpretations stem directly from the historiographical preconceptions of the historians who began the study of medieval rhetoric proper in the early twentieth century. Many of these historians envisioned rhetoric as a narrow art, one that pertained only to speech delivered in state-sanctioned forums; still others confined rhetoric purely to deliberative or forensic issues, neglecting the cultural role of epideictic altogether. Others have defined rhetoric as the theory that might inform the composition of writing or speech. While each of these approaches has some legitimacy (in that each approach responds to observable trends in rhetoric's disciplinary history), these approaches ultimately too narrowly define and thus constrain the possibilities for scholarship in medieval rhetoric. Rhetoric has always been an art that cultivated adaptive response to specific scenarios; to judge the rhetorical production of one period by the standards of another is ultimately insufficient for understanding a culture's attitudes toward speech, rhetoric, and persuasion. However, by redefining the definitions of civic life our discipline applies in its historic and contemporary work, historians of rhetoric gain the ability to better understand situated acts of rhetoric.

The Middle Ages, perhaps more than any other commonly studied period in rhetoric's history, requires such a revised conception of civic life. It is insufficient to maintain that rhetoric has a civic role only when connected to democratic or republican political institutions; rhetoric plays a role in the creation and maintenance of civic communities even when disconnected from democratic practices. Given rhetoric's long association with democratic and republican principles, and the relatively common tendency to connect rhetorical education with personal capacitation in service of a healthy civic life, this is perhaps the most difficult obstacle to overcome when approaching the civic role of rhetoric in non-democratic societies.

Yet, as Candice Rai has observed, the uncritical association of rhetoric and democracy does neither the discipline nor its practitioners any favors; rather, it should be the role of rhetoricians to critically interrogate the intersections of rhetoric, democracy, and other forms of governance (2010). In doing so, our field not only better understands how rhetoric might interact with other social and political systems, but may also better understand rhetoric's place in our own contemporary society. What civic identities, for instance, does American political culture model, produce, and sanction? How do these ideals facilitate or delimit forms of public engagement? How are our own societies manual laborers portrayed—and in what ways does our culture suggest they ought to participate in American political institutions? How do our own contemporary pedagogies represent workers and laborers, and how do those representations condition our students' engagement with our teaching? While it is beyond the scope of my work here, these questions are important ones that deserve further inquiry. Revising our definitions of civic life is the first necessary step in considering such questions.

Rhetoric and the Manifestation of Identity

A governing belief throughout this study is that all cultures produce idealized citizen subjectivities, and thus all cultures produce explicitly or tacitly sanctioned civic identities. Rhetoric, as one means of communicating and influencing cultural values and beliefs, necessarily plays a part in the process of representing and questioning these identities. By understanding civic life in this way, the role of medieval political and social institutions, as well as their connection to contemporary rhetorical theories, become more apparent. At the same time, this study has also shown how those identities might be rejected by vernacular groups, who claim for themselves their own unique position; it has also shown that, in contrast, official forms of rhetoric might attempt to use idealized civic identities as a form of social control. In either case, the point remains that rhetoric plays a part in both situations—it can be used to both affirm and subvert visions of civic identity.

The tension between the rhetorical production of cultural elites and the acceptance or rejection of that production by vernacular groups, however, serves only to reinforce an important point: medieval groups of all classes were seen as rhetorical audiences. They were thought to have the capacity to make decisions, change their behavior, and participate in civic life in ways that were responsive to various forms of rhetorical production, be they educational, visual, academic, or performative. For this reason, it is insufficient that historians of rhetoric study only the transmission and influence of texts of theory or the rhetorical production of elites. Rather, historians of rhetoric should seek out sights of rhetorical production that illustrate the ways that theory might have been enacted for a variety of practitioners and audiences. It should be the goal of rhetorical

histories not only to discover new texts, to trace their evolution and influence, but also to reconstruct how theories of rhetoric interacted with civic and social institutions.

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