Managing the Margins:

Intersections of the State and the Khawaja Sira in Lahore, Pakistan

by

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ABSTRACT

Social equity research in public administration (PA) investigates different ways in which the practices of government intersect with the lives of socially marginalized individuals. However, due to limited direct engagement with marginalized groups; a predominant focus on formal state policies and institutions; and a lack of context-specific analyses of marginalization, there remain significant limitations in the existing PA research on social equity.

To address these theoretical gaps, this dissertation focuses on the Khawaja Sira of Pakistan – a marginalized group culturally defined as neither men nor women – to empirically investigate the multiple intersections between government and life on margins of the state. Specifically, this dissertation explores research questions related to legal and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira, impact of their changed legal status, their informal institutional experiences, and their interaction with front-line government workers through an interpretive research methodology.

The research design consisted of a ten-month long person-centered ethnography in Lahore, Pakistan during which in-depth person-centered interviews were conducted with 50 Khawaja Sira. I also conducted semi-structured interviews with 19 frontline workers from National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), social welfare department, and a local NGO and a group interview with 12 frontline workers of police. I coded the data collected from the fieldwork using qualitative thematic content analysis in MAXQDA. I then analyzed the main themes from the data using multiple theoretical perspectives to develop my findings.

My analysis shows that the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, as conceived by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has limited relevance and benefits for the Khawaja Sira most of whom instead choose to register as men. The analysis of administrator-citizen interactions reveals that the Khawaja Sira are exposed to hyper-surveillance, moral policing and higher administrative burden during these interactions. These interactions are also strongly mediated by formal public policy, social discourses about gender identity and informal institutions. I discuss the implications of my analysis that can contribute to a more inclusive society for the Khawaja Sira. In doing so, my research makes important contributions to research on administrative burden, everyday citizenship, and social equity in public administration.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all those who are searching for answers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

This dissertation is about public administration (PA) – as a professional

discipline[1] - and its relation to lives at the social margins. An important research agenda

in public administration is to investigate the multiple ways in which the practices of

government intersect with the lives of marginalized groups and how this intersection

influences social equity by creating, sustaining or contesting conditions of living at

margins of the state. As noted by many researchers, limitations of the representative

political system (Catlaw 2007), the techniques of visibility used by governments (Scott

1998; Canaday 2009), problems of categorization (Yanow 2003), and the entrenched

power relations in society (Dahl and Soss 2014) result in many individuals being

relegated to margins of the state and society. It is at such margins that the socio-political

asymmetries underlying the state – often taken for granted at the center—are laid bare.

Hence, it is important to understand and analyze "[h]ow state practices run

through everyday life on the margins" and how "the practices and politics of life in these

areas shape the political, regulatory and disciplinary practices that constitute, somehow,

that thing we call the state" (Das and Poole 2004, 3) since the "forms of illegibility,

partial belonging and disorder that seem to inhabit the margins of the state constitute its

necessary condition" (6). Public administration as a boundary making and disciplinary

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[1] The primary focus of this dissertation is on public administration as a professional discipline and a part of government. The relation between public administration as a research discipline and the social margins, while interesting, is not the primary focus in this dissertation.

1

apparatus is often implicated in a variety of ways with the creation and management of social margins. For example, Catlaw (2007, 153-154) notes that PA "brings discipline to the interstices of disciplinary enclosures… It is fundamentally a boundary or rebounding practice generated by the political ontology of representation." This critical role of PA mandates a theoretical and empirical inquiry about the different ways in which PA practice intersects with lives at the social margins.

While in "classical"[2] public administration scholarship the concern for the relationship between public administration praxis and lives of marginalized social groups remained peripheral, since the Minnowbrook I conference in 1968, research on social equity has been an important part of the PA canon. Notably, George Frederickson (1971; 1990), in a series of essays, problematized an exclusive reliance on economy and efficiency as the exclusive goals of public administration research and labeled social equity as the third pillar of public administration. Fredrickson's work, accompanied by other developments in the field including the subsequent Minnowbrook conferences, established social equity as an important agenda for public administration researchers. Consequently, numerous researchers have analyzed various important dimensions of government practices and policies and their significance for marginalized social groups (e.g., Soss 2000; Lucio 2009; Broer, Nieboer, and Bal 2012; Taylor 2007; Mora 2014; Visser 2014).

Since excellent reviews of social equity research in PA already exist (Guy and McCandless 2012; Gooden 2015; Wooldridge and Gooden 2009), I briefly summarize the

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[2] Here the word "classical" is a reference to the pre-Minnowbrook conference I era.

empirical focus and primary findings of this research here. The social equity research in

public administration can broadly be classified into three main intersecting thematic

areas. First, a major focus of social equity research in PA has been on creating more

inclusive workplaces and organizations. Researchers have examined how unequal access

to organizational membership and experiences within the workplace contribute to

persistent social inequity within organizations. Notable examples include research

highlighting the systematic discrimination against women (Harrison 1964; Lepper 1976;

Kellough 1990; Kerr, Miller, and Reid 2002; Guy and Newman 2004; Stivers 2002),

African Americans (King 1999; Hunt 1974; Rose and Chia 1978), Hispanics (Sisneros

1993), and Asian Americans (Kim and Lewis 1994). Overall, this line of research shows

that contemporary organizations are unequal spaces where systematic biases mediated

through imperfect polices and organizational culture continue to limit access, experience

and promotion of minority groups.

Second, ensuring more equitable distribution of governmental resources and

programs has been another major focus of PA research on social equity. Over the years,

multiple researchers on formal public policy have noted that unequal distribution of

governmental resources is a major reason for persistent social inequity. This line of

inquiry can be further sub-divided into two sub-categories; budgeting and social policy[3]

research. Research on budgeting has highlighted how imperfect contracting (LaNoue and

Sullivan 1995; Smith and Fernandez 2010), procurement (Celect et al. 2000) and resource

allocation (Chitwood 1974; Porter and Porter 1974; Rice 1992; Moser and Rubenstein

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[3] By social policy, I am referring to governmental policies related to education, health, housing, and other social sectors.

3

2002; Rubin and Bartle 2005) contributes to persistent social inequity. Similarly, social policy researchers have highlighted implicit and explicit biases in governmental policies. Examining public policy formation and design, these researchers have highlighted how explicit or implicit limitations in welfare (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011a), transportation (Poister 1982), disability (Bishop and Jones 1993), health care (Liebert and Ameringer 2013), disaster management (Craemer 2010), and immigration (Angel 2003) policy design limit effectiveness and access of governmental programs and services for marginalized and minority groups in society.

Finally, policy implementation research highlights how even seemingly neutral public policies can contribute to social inequity through selective implementation. For example, researchers have highlighted how selective policing contributes to increased racial injustices in society (Ward 2002; Epp, Manyard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Importantly, policy implementation researchers have found that the individual and group identity of frontline workers of government plays an important role in determining how they use discretion in implementing public policy (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Oberfield 2014; Brehm and Gates 1997; Gofen 2014). For example, Schram et al. (2009) found that African American clients are more likely to be sanctioned by welfare frontline workers if they had an adverse identity marker as compared to white individuals with identical traits. Similarly, Gofen (2014) and Oberfield (2014) argue that group level norms play an important role in influencing how frontline workers use discretion in their interactions with marginalized social groups.

While these lines of inquiry have contributed a great deal to our understanding of the relationship between public administration praxis and social equity (Guy and

4

McCandless 2012), there remain significant limitations in existing research in public administration scholarship related to the intersections of governance and marginalization[4]:

First, most PA scholarship continues to remain primarily practitioner focused. For example, most PA research on public participation, red tape, and policy implementation has been based on research primarily on bureaucrats rather than the publics with which they work. Similarly, instead of analyzing the experiences of marginalized individuals, social equity related PA research has generally focused on the practices and perspectives of bureaucrats about policies related to marginalized individuals. Many PA researchers have pointed out the potential complications associated with this pattern of research (e.g., Farmer 2003, Catlaw 2006, Nisar 2015) and have called for engagement with the "ostensible beneficiaries" of various public policies since their perspectives and interpretation of these policies may be different from the practitioners (e.g., Williams 2015, Soss 2014).

Second, even when the political behavior of marginalized individuals is studied directly, "various academic pressures push students of political behavior" to prefer "decontextualized analyses of individual respondents based on nationally representative samples" (Soss 2014, 251). This pattern of research fails to situate "individuals as members of communities and [show] how their political lives are shaped by institutional rules, public policies, and relations with state authorities" (Soss 2014, 251). Therefore,

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[4] Marginalization – or relegating to margins – is an inevitable outcome of social inequity and refers to the "the process through which persons are peripheralized on the basis of their identities, associations, experiences, and environments" (Hall, Stevens and Meleis 1994, 25).

we still know little in public administration about the context-specific ways in which marginalization is produced by governing practices and the concrete ways in which marginality is experienced.

Third, broader socio-political theory has long recognized that public policies and formal institutional experiences are only one of the many ways in which the practices of government intersect with the lives of marginalized individuals; other subtler and often more effective, practices of government which operate within and through informal institutional spaces have increasingly become more influential in the neoliberal governance paradigm. These practices which encourage disciplinary self-governance of marginalized individuals have been studied less often in PA research. Indeed, apart from a relatively small but growing research stream in PA research (e.g., Catlaw 2007; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011a; Ferlie and McGivern 2013; Visser 2014), most empirical and theoretical work on self-governance, bio-politics and disciplinary practices of government has remained peripheral to the field of American public administration. This not only limits our understanding of the influence of governments on the lives of marginalized individuals but also limits the utility of PA scholarship beyond the confines of our discipline.

Fourth, while gender and racial justice related problems have been addressed, PA research on social equity issues related to the LGBT individuals continues to remain "woefully inadequate" (Candler, Johnson III and Anderson 2009, 236). Overall, as little consideration is paid to the "pink elephant" in the room, "LGBT scholars see an unwelcoming environment in public affairs, and so opt for other professional associations to write on LGBT issues" (Candler, Johnson III and Anderson 2009, 236). Since public

6

administration has had a historically important role to play in categorization (Canaday 2009) and management (Taylor 2007) of LGBT individuals, it is important to understand the intersections of PA practice and lives of marginalized LGBT individuals. Relatedly, as most research on social equity issues in general and LGBT related research in particular has been done primarily in Western developed countries, it is important to expand the PA canon to the developing world contexts to understand the different ways in which PA practice intersects with social equity and marginalization in different socio-political contexts.

Finally, most PA research on social equity has been limited to what Farmer (2003) labels the transparent layer of analysis: instrumental considerations of what ought to be done about equity related issues. Consequently, the symbolic framing of PA as a "civilizing" or "bathing" discipline (Farmer 2003) and the hierarchically lower position of the publics in the PA canon (Fox 2003; Nisar 2015) continue to remain largely unchallenged. That is why some researchers have called for a fundamental shift in the normative focus of public administration scholarship and a deeper engagement— at the level of disciplinary[5] and cloacal[6] layers (Farmer 2003)—with the idea of social marginalization and the contribution of PA to it. For example, Farmer (2003) has called for "PA theory to become more self-consciously aware of its own relationship to power" (173). Similarly, Catlaw (2007) has called for a better theorizing and empirical

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[5] The symbolic discourses within PA used to frame social equity as a problem and socially marginalized individuals as its effect.

[6] Normatively, what is considered social equity and the social role of PA in achieving that ideal. Cloacal level analyses are concerned with problematizing the taken-for-grantedness of social ideals and the positive social role of PA in achieving those ideals.

exploration of, what he called, a "politics of the subject" which "concerns the generative, situational process of subject constitution and the conduct of conduct" (194). He argues, normatively, that "[g]overning must be good for those who have been reduced to nothing and … stripped of all symbolic belonging" (Catlaw 2007, 194) in contemporary societies.

To address these gaps in our understanding, situated at the intersection of multiple research streams related to social equity, citizenship and marginalization, this dissertation focuses on the Khawaja Sira of Pakistan— a marginalized heterogeneous social group culturally defined as neither men nor women— with the research objective to empirically examine the multiple intersections between public administration and life on margins of the state. In doing so, this dissertation contributes to social equity research in PA by providing an in-depth context-specific analysis of the multiple ways in which formal and realized public policy intersects with life on the social margins. Moreover, by directly engaging with a marginalized gender queer group, this dissertation improves our understanding of the multiple ways in which individuals at the social margins perceive and respond to policies ostensibly designed for them and discriminatory frontline practice. Furthermore, this dissertation also adds valuable insights to contemporary research on administrative burden, formal and everyday citizenship, and street-level bureaucracy within the PA canon.

Key Definitions

Since this dissertation relies heavily on several key concepts that have varied and contested uses across the different disciplinary and theoretical traditions that I draw from, I will first provide working definitions of these key concepts as used throughout the

dissertation. Any definitions not accompanied by a citation are developed by me as a result of my study of the relevant literatures:

Cis-gendered

The term "cis" means "on the same side of" and the term cisgendered refers to "a person who fits conventional social expectations of gender. A female who identifies as woman and feminine would be labeled cisgendered or ciswoman" (Wood 2009, 25)

Counter-public

A term coined by Fraser (1997) to contest Habermas' notion of a singular public sphere being an unproblematic given. As Klesse (2016, 36) notes, "[t]he 'counter' in the term counterpublic derives its meaning primarily from a disadvantaged position with regard to other dominant publics." It is defined as a "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses so as to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, and needs" (Fraser 1990, 67).

Genealogy

Genealogy is a Foucauldian concept and problematizes reliance on linear conceptions of history and time. Genealogy, instead of searching for true origin or essence, considers history of ideas, individuals, and things by investigating their "contingent historical and political emergence … [and] showing possibilities excluded by the dominant logics of historical development" (Howarth 2000, 73).

Government

Gordon (1991)—based on Foucault—defines government as the "conduct of conduct: a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons" (2). A similar definition of governing provided by Catlaw (2007) is "the conduct

of conduct, the production of mechanisms that constitute and sustain subjectivities and relationships...and create the bounded context or contained spaces within which these appear" (190-191). This definition of government acknowledges that in addition to acting through formal institutions and policies, the state acts on its subjects in multiple other ways. There is precedence of using similar definitions for government in PA research (Catlaw 2007, Ferlie and McGivern 2013, Freeman 2002, Cowell, Downe and Morgan 2013, Ruggiero, Monfardini and Mussaria 2012).

Human waste

Human waste is a concept developed by Zygmunt Bauman (2004) to capture the experiences of the individuals who represent the failure of the classifying and order-building business of the state. Bauman argues that the contemporary order building enterprises of the state also entail the inevitable creation of human waste: lives which cannot be integrated easily, are excluded from and remain at the margins of the social order.

Identity

Identity is "composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically play in highly differentiated contemporary societies" (Stryker and Burke 2000, 284). However, as Hall (1996) points out, identity should be understood not as an "essentialist" but a "strategic and positional" concept which is always in "the process of construction but never complete" (4). More importantly, identity should not be taken as a signal to the stable core of the self which remains the same throughout life. Instead, it refers to the "increasingly fragmented and fractured" multiply constructed identities an individual has because of multiple roles and positions in society.

10

Performativity

Performativity is defined as the gradual development of identity by performing the norms considered appropriate for a particular role (Reinelt and Roach 1992). For example, the gender (social and self) identity of an individual is contingent on that individual performing the norms and roles considered appropriate for a particular gender in a society.

Queer

"[N]onnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time" (Halberstam 2005, 1).

Redistributive (material) vs Recognition based (symbolic) Justice

The material aspect of marginalization refers to income inequality and other aspects of life (like job opportunities) related to political economy of a society. Redistributive justice – a term popularized by Nancy Fraser – refers to the social class based arguments for a more equitable distribution of financial resources and economic opportunities. The symbolic or recognition based justice refers to elimination of identity based marginalization. In other words, it refers to the demand of marginalized groups for formal recognition of their differences (based, for example, on race, gender, sexual preference) by the state.

Social Equity

"The principle that each citizen, regardless of economic resources or personal traits, deserves and has a right to be given equal treatment by the political system" (Shafritz and Russell 2002, 395). A more comprehensive definition was provided by the National Academy of Public Administration Standing Panel on Social Equity in

Governance (2000), according to which social equity refers to, "the fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract, and the fair and equitable distribution of public services, and implementation of public policy, and the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in the formation of public policy."

Techniques of Government

Based on Foucault's exposition in his various works these include a) *sovereignty* (also known as juridical power) which manifests itself in the form of law and public policy through which the state determines access of various social roles for individuals; b) *discipline* which refers to various normalizing institutional discourses and surveillance techniques by which subjects are converted to docile bodies and are trained to behave in certain predictable manners; and c) *governmentality* (also known as bio-power and pastoral power) refers to the variety of ways in which a concern for the overall population manifests itself as an important concern for nation states in the form of practices like enumeration, vaccination, demographics and epidemiology.

Third Space

A term widely used in geography and post-colonial theory, "[t]hird space is a relational space of contestation – often in the form of a discursive struggle – and can also be one of shared understanding and meaning making. As a practice it can reveal a differential consciousness capturing the movement that joins different networks of consciousness and revealing a potential for greater understanding" (Licona 2012, 13).

Transgenderism

"[A] contested umbrella term used to describe individuals whose gender expression and behavior do not match the usual expectations associated with the male-female binary system" (Gherovici 2010, xiii).

Research Context and Terminology

Khawaja Sira of Pakistan (or Hijras as they are called in neighboring India) are a gender queer group of heterogeneous individuals with contested identities. Since there were only two legal categories for gender (male/female) at the time of last census in Pakistan (in 1998), no reliable demographic statistics exist about the total number of Khawaja Sira in Pakistan and the estimates of their population range from 80,000 to 300,000 (Baig 2012). According to Nanda (1990, 12), whose work focused on Hijras of India, they are culturally defined as "neither man nor woman." However, multiple definitions of Khawaja Sira (and Hijras) exist in academic and legal literatures. For example, Reddy (2005) argues that "[f]or the most part, Hijras are phenotypic men who wear female clothing and, ideally, renounce sexual desire and practice by undergoing a sacrificial emasculation" (2). On the other hand, according to Jami (2005), Hijras are all "those men who are transgender, eunuchs, transvestites, hermaphrodites or intersex bisexuals or homosexuals" (3). Similarly, Majeedullah (2016, 8) defines Khawaja Sira as, "intersex, transgender and transsexual individuals."

Khawaja Sira or Hijra?

There are multiple terms used to refer to the Khawaja Sira, the most common being *Hijra* and *Khusra*. Both terms have similar meaning in contemporary usage in Pakistan as suggested by the definitions used by Jami (2005) for Hijras and Majeedullah (2016) for

Khawaja Sira, and are occasionally used as synonymous terms (e.g., Sultana and Kalyani 2012; Chaudhry et al. 2014). Both are considered umbrella terms which include all individuals who don't conform to their socially given gender or sexual identity. As I discuss in section I, my fieldwork suggests that in addition to transgender, transsexual, and intersex individuals, impotent individuals and those who were raped in childhood can also be included within these umbrella terms.

While the term Hijra is most commonly used in academic literature, it is used more often in neighboring India and hardly any of my research participants (based in Pakistan) used this term to talk about themselves or their friends. While both the terms (Hijra and Khawaja Sira) have origins going back centuries, the term Khawaja Sira was popular during the Mughal era (1526 – 1857 AD) and was used for the court (castrated male) eunuchs. The Khawaja Sira were influential actors in the political realm and acted as a liaison connecting the court and harem (Reddy 2005; Faruqui 2012). Although the contemporary use of the term Khawaja Sira does not refer to the eunuchs anymore, the traditional association of respect and some degree of authority give it a more positive connotation (at least in Pakistan) as compared to the term Hijra.

The term Khusra is much more common and is primarily used in the Punjabi language. This term was used by many of my research participants. However, this term is often invoked in the comparison to the term *Zenana* within discourses of authenticity: Khusray (the plural of Khusra) being the individuals biologically born with ambiguous genitalia or having had surgical modification to their body to match the gender of their choice and the Zenanay (plural of Zenana) being the normal biological males (with no

surgical modifications) with the performative identity of women. In addition, the term

Khusra is not commonly used outside Punjab in Pakistan.

Most of my research participants used the term *Khawaja Sira* to self-identify and

that is why I will use this term in rest of this dissertation. I must note that this choice of

terminology should best be treated as an academic convenience meant to keep the

terminology consistent throughout the dissertation and to honor my interview data and

not as a prescriptive judgment on terminology for all Khawaja Sira. For example, one of

my research participants did not like the term Khawaja Sira and instead preferred another

term *Mukhanis* (someone with ambiguous genitalia). I am using the term Khawaja Sira

because it is the term that research participants and I most commonly used in our

interactions and, to the best of my judgment, is the term most of my research participants

would prefer.

Khawaja Sira as Transgender

Another important clarification needed is to respond to the potential problems

associated with engaging with transgender and queer theory developed primarily in

Western contexts. As Williams (2014) notes, the term transgender originated in the

second half of the 20th century and gradually became an umbrella term for different

gender queer groups. However, as Singer (2015) and Towle and Morgan (2006) argue,

the category of transgender has subsumed many non-Western forms of queer personhood

in processes that Singer (2015, 59) labels as "linguistic acts of colonization." Similarly,

Valentine (2000) argues against using the term transgender for individuals in non-

American contexts. According to Valentine, "if 'transgender' has a specific history and

set of meanings which implicitly mark it in terms of its difference from US American

understandings of 'gay,' then labeling *bantut* [Philippines] or *travesti* [Brazil] as 'transgender' is just as problematic" (Valentine 2000, 91).

On the other hand, Stryker (2014; 2015) argues that the primarily American origin does not mean that the term "transgender" or the insights of transgender theory should be completely de-coupled from non-Western contexts. Instead, a balanced attitude which recognizes the heterogeneous subjectivities included in the term "transgender" allows for creation of trans-national networks of queer individuals, who while cognizant of their different subjectivities can come together to resist the status-quo.

It is also important to note here that I did find some evidence of the category of transgender encroaching on local terms associated with third-gender identification in Pakistan. This was especially true for my research participants who had interacted with foreigners or were active on the internet and social media. The term transgender was used by two of my research participants to self-identify. However, one of them later mentioned that a documentary producer from neighboring India had advised her that the term transgender was inappropriate for her. So she said that she was going to stop using the term transgender and start using the term Khawaja Sira to self-identify. However, many Khawaja Sira continue to use the term transgender on social media to self-identify. I think this may be an example of the Khawaja Sira trying to connect to the trans-national network of queer individuals and to situate themselves within the global human rights discourses related to the term transgender.

Therefore, while I will not use the term transgender to identify my research participants. Where appropriate, I will draw from and engage with the literature on transgender identity and social experiences because this lets me connect the experiences

of my research participants with gender queer individuals in other contexts while retaining the influence of their local context and subjectivity.

Another important point of clarification regarding my research context is the fact that while the Khawaja Sira community is a group of individuals mostly born with masculine bodies who prefer the feminine gender, historically there hasn't been a visible group comprising of biological females who prefer the masculine gender in South Asia.[7] Given this context and my primary research focus on the Khawaja Sira community, in this dissertation, I do not engage with debates related to the identity and experiences related to individuals born as biological females who prefer the masculine gender.

Khawaja Sira as wasted bodies

In this dissertation, I extensively use the metaphor of waste as an organizing idea to discuss the multiple intersections of public administration and lives of socially marginalized individuals. There are multiple reasons for choosing this metaphor. As Jacobsen and Poder (2008, 51) note, "[w]aste is a conceptual tool of thinking sociologically with negations." There are multiple sister concepts like the *homo sacer* (Agamben 1998; Catlaw 2007), abject citizenship (Kristeva 1982; Sharkey and Shields 2008), and the inexistent (Badiou 2009; Prozorov 2014a; Prozorov 2014b) that speak to some aspects of my research participants' social conditions. However, the metaphor of waste, which combines the idea of being discarded with the emotion of disgust, communicates best not only the social situation of my research participants but also helps

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[7] In all likelihood, such individuals do exist in the Pakistani society like almost all societies in the world. However, given the discourses associated with patriarchy, invisibility of the feminine body and honor, it is unlikely that such individuals can form a counterpublic like the Khawaja Sira community.

explain the framing of Khawaja Sira presence in the public sphere as moral pollutants by the frontline workers.

In this regard, Douglas' (1966) watershed work on waste is insightful. While many researchers have noted the problems associated with categorization schemas of society, it was Douglas who most clearly articulated that things – "matter out of place" – that cannot be categorized easily given the social norms and categorization schemas, are often deemed disgusting, impure, and hence, classified as waste. In other words, "the origin of waste stems from a social bifurcation between integrated and repressed individuals" (Jacobsen and Poder 2008, 51). While Douglas' work focused on all things (and people) classified as waste, it was Bauman (2004) who enunciated the concept of *human* waste most clearly. Bauman's concept of human waste (or wasted humans) aims to capture the experiences of the others, the deviants and the minorities who represent the failure of the classifying and order-building business of the state. Bauman (2004) argues that the contemporary order building enterprises of the state also entail the inevitable creation of human waste: lives which cannot be integrated easily are excluded from the social order. Those classified as the human waste are "stripped of dignity, driven to the farthest margins of society and eradicated from public spaces while hidden in plain sight" (Hayden 2009, 43).

It is also pertinent to mention here that the theme of "waste" has also been used in previous public administration research. For example, Patterson (2001), Farmer (2003) and Catlaw and Eagan (2016) have all used the themes of waste, hygiene and disgust to characterize the relation of public administration to certain categories of citizens, such as protesters against the state, and gender and sexual minority groups.

18

Research Questions

An important way in which government intersects with the lives of marginalized groups is by adjudicating or deciding on the legal definitions for various categories of individuals (Yanow 2003). These legal identities or definitions have an important bearing on the social, legal, and political experiences of marginalized individuals. These legal definitions are also vital for the public administration professionals implementing social policies related to marginalized groups (Taylor 2007). In the present context, there is much ambiguity in the legal identities assumed for and imposed on the Khawaja Sira by the policing and legal authorities in Pakistan who have labeled them as "She-Males," "Unix", or "Eunuchs" at various points in time (Redding 2015). Similarly, in one of its judgments, the Supreme Court of Pakistan mentioned having a "gender disorder" an integral part of being a Khawaja Sira (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2009). Most of the aforementioned legal and academic definitions for the Khawaja Sira can be classified as external definitions (Jenkins 1994) which in many cases are based on entrenched power relations and social biases in society and may have no correlation with internal definitions—self-definition of nature or identity (Jenkins 1994)—preferred by the Khawaja Sira. However, the existence and extent of this critical gap between internal (or self) definition and the external definitions provided by the state for the Khawaja Sira needs to be empirically analyzed and verified.

More importantly, there is likely to be much heterogeneity based on gender, sex, and socio-economic status among the Khawaja Sira of Pakistan which is hidden by lumping all individuals not conforming to the binary categories of male-female into the legal definition of the Khawaja Sira, simply as the "third gender." As Frederickson (1990,

28) argues, "[I]t is of great convenience, both theoretically and practically, to assume that citizen A is the same as citizen B and that they both receive public services in equal measure. This assumption may be convenient, but it is obviously both illogical and empirically inaccurate." From an administrative point of view, many issues related to governance of Khawaja Sira (e.g., legal share in inheritance, access to welfare services) are contingent on being able to understand the self-identity and the internal heterogeneities of the Khawaja Sira. Therefore, my first research question is:

> Q1. *What is the self-identity of Khawaja Sira of Lahore, Pakistan? What are some of the internal heterogeneities among them?*

The aforementioned act of defining Khawaja Sira as the third gender by the state in Pakistan is a relatively recent phenomenon. Khawaja Sira were not legally recognized by the state of Pakistan until recently as no third-gender category was available in the National Identity Card before 2011. While this state recognition of the Khawaja Sira has been praised by many human rights groups, it is still unclear whether this policy change has resulted in actual changes in the social marginalization of the Khawaja Sira. The rich tradition of public policy implementation and evaluation studies warrants that it is important to not only analyze government policies but also to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of such policies (Bozeman and Massey 1982; Barrett 2004). In the present research context, this is even more important since the impact of formal recognition by the state on the lives and governance of marginalized individuals continues to remain contested in academic literature as some scholars (e.g., Fraser 1995; 2000) argue that

recognition by the state may have little to no impact on the lives of such groups. Some scholars (e.g., Prozorov 2014a; 2014b) even argue that such recognition may increase government surveillance of socially marginalized groups limiting their socio-political autonomy. That is why, my second research question focuses on assessing the impact of policy changes related to the Khawaja Sira on their living conditions.

Q2: Did formal recognition by the state result in any (material or symbolic) perceived change in the lived experiences and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira?

In addition, to formal rules and regulations, an important way in which socially marginalized individuals are governed is through multiple techniques of government permeating the formal and informal social institutions of society. The emergence of governance in public administration during the last two decade highlights that with declining sovereignty (Frederickson, Smith and Larimer 2011) as the primary *modus operandi* of "capture" by the state (Ferme 2013), alternative techniques of government like discipline and self-governance operating through social institutions are increasingly recognized as being important for the citizen-state relationship (Harvey 2005; Dean 2010). That is why, apart from formal legal definitions and policies, understanding the experiences of Khawaja Sira within social institutions is important for a context-specific comprehensive picture of their intersection with government in its many forms. In most cases, Khawaja Sira's own families abandon them soon after recognizing that they do not fit into the binary gender categories as it is considered a sign of "disgrace and stigmatization for the whole family" (Abdullah et al. 2012, 3). According to one study,

more than two-third Khawaja Sira leave their families by the age of 21, which is very unusual in a society based on joint-family system values (Baqi et al. 1999). The few Khawaja Sira who enroll in school often drop out because of "social and sexual victimization" (Abdullah et al. 2012, 3). Additionally, the Khawaja Sira have a disproportionately high prevalence rate of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS (Hawkes et al. 2009; Khan et al. 2008). In response to their social exclusion from families and the dominant public sphere, the Khawaja Sira have created a counter-public (Fraser 1990) through an elaborate kinship system founded on *Guru-Chela* relationships. A young Khawaja Sira leaving her home joins the Khawaja Sira counter-public formally by becoming Chela (a word meaning an amalgam of child and student) of a Guru (an amalgam of parent and teacher). Therefore, my third research question that focuses on these aspects of Khawaja Sira's lives is:

Q3: Which social institutions are important for the daily lives and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira? How do these institutions intersect with the identity, citizenship and agency of the Khawaja Sira?

Public administration in many ways represents the "third space" where law, social norms and personal biases of various groups intersect to create the citizen-state relationship. The formal rules intersect with the social power relations and attitudes of bureaucrats to form realized public policies. It makes bureaucracy the best place to understand the legal and social dimensions of governance of socially marginalized groups. Since Pakistan has introduced changes in the legal status of the Khawaja Sira in

the last five years, the role of front-line workers is critical in implementing these policies. A lax implementation of these policies will ensure that legal changes will have limited to no effect on the actual social status of the Khawaja Sira. Hence, analysis of the interactions between Khawaja Sira and front-line workers is important in understanding the experience of the Khawaja Sira after formal changes in law. Therefore, my fourth research questions is:

> *Q4a: What is the attitude of front-line government workers towards the Khawaja Sira?*
>
> *Q4b: How do interactions with front-line government workers influence social[8] and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira?*

Existing Research about the Khawaja Sira

Owing to the multiple social, legal and institutional biases faced by the Khawaja Sira, hardly any systematic investigation of the experiences of the Khawaja Sira in Pakistan has so far been done. With a few exceptions, almost all scientific research on Khawaja Sira has been done with a focus on their sexual practices or HIV prevalence and control (e.g., Bokhari et al. 2012; Rehan 2011). Among the notable exceptions are studies done on the ambivalence of the justice system about policing Khawaja Sira (Redding 2015), their residential patterns (Ahmad et al. 2010), and an investigation of the consequences of their systematic exclusion (Abdullah et al. 2012). While I engage with

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[8] Social identity is defined as an "that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (Tajfel 1982, 24).

this work throughout the dissertation, to the best of my knowledge, no systematic investigation of Khawaja Sira's experience of government in Pakistan has so far been conducted.

In addition, in a pattern reminiscent of their social exclusion, in what little research has been conducted on Khawaja Sira, they are mostly asked to choose from the given menu of survey options or respond to certain questions which have pre-determined themes. These questions and choices generally represent what the researcher thinks is important for their project, thus exacerbating our lack of knowledge about Khawaja Sira communities. Thus, we still do not know how the Khawaja Sira perceive the state and the society which has systematically excluded them and more importantly, how the Khawaja Sira envision a society in which there is a place for them. An intellectual aim of this research is, therefore, to minimize the power differential between the researcher and the researched to enable the respondents to express their experience without any *a priori* categorization. Another intellectual goal of my research is to inform PA practice and provide some insights to the state about how to best serve this community.

Organization of the Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: In the next chapter, I describe my research methodology and methods. This is followed by an explanation of my data analysis and translation approach. I also discuss different checks for trustworthiness I employed and that are important for judging evidentiary claims in qualitative-interpretive research.

As the extra-administrative spaces and interactions substantively contribute to the experience of social marginalization, a comprehensive "politics of the subject" (Catlaw

24

2007) must concern itself with a study the subject formation of marginalized individuals within significant social institutions like family and significant peers. Therefore, in Section 1 (chapters 3 and 4), I discuss the experiences of the Khawaja Sira in the two most influential informal social institutions of their lives: family and the Khawaja Sira counter-public. My analysis shows that these institutions play an important role in the identity formation and experiences of social marginalization for the Khawaja Sira, and also intersect with public administration praxis in various significant ways. The analysis in chapter 3, which focuses on family related experiences of the Khawaja Sira, highlights how deeply the institution of family is implicated in the categorization and disciplining of the individuals deemed to be deviating from the gender norms of society. Most Khawaja Sira who are forced to leave their families join the Khawaja Sira counter-public. As I discuss in chapter 4, the Khawaja Sira counterpublic, instead of being a place of radical freedom or agency, has its own strict sets of rules and kinship structure which play an important role in governing the performative subjectivities of its members and their ideas about social inclusion and relationships.

In Section II (chapters 5 and 6), I analyze the legal categorization and citizenship of the Khawaja Sira. In chapter 5, I analyze official and legal discourses regarding identity construction of the Khawaja Sira. My analysis shows that the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, as conceived by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has limited relevance to the phenomenological self-identity of the Khawaja Sira. The framing of the Khawaja Sira identity as being primarily biological by the Supreme Court of Pakistan makes the socially constructed distinctions between authentic and unauthentic Khawaja Sira legal. More importantly, such uncontested instrumental bestowing of rights allows the state

institutions to avoid dealing with the deep social causes of the marginalization of the Khawaja Sira and to side-step their more immediate concerns.

Chapter 6 focuses on responses of the Khawaja Sira towards their legal identity construction. Even after creation of the third gender category, most Khawaja Sira choose to register as men. There are many social stigmas attached with the third gender category which increase the psychological and social cost of choosing the third gender category for the Khawaja Sira. In addition, material opportunity costs like share in inheritance and lack of any tangible economic benefit of the non-masculine gender categories also figure prominently in the choice of legal gender for some Khawaja Sira. Perhaps more importantly, the choice of a fixed formal gender category for most Khawaja Sira doesn't hold a special meaning because of their fluid movement across various gender categories throughout their lives. Relatedly, this deliberate erasure also reinforces the social construction that most Khawaja Sira are just pretenders and do not warrant any measures for civic inclusion.

In section III (chapters 7, 8, and 9), I analyze various aspects of interactions between the Khawaja Sira and the frontline workers. In chapter 7, I analyze the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in the process of applying for legal identification. My analysis shows that the formal rules intersect with social biases against the Khawaja Sira to increase the overall administrative burden experienced by them. This chapter also contributes to a better understanding of the role administrative behavior and intersectionality play in influencing the level of administrative burden and social inequity for marginalized social groups.

Chapter 8 continues the theme of citizen-state interactions and moves beyond the formal institutional spaces to everyday public spaces. Based on an analysis of the interactions between the Khawaja Sira and the frontline workers of police and social welfare department in everyday public spaces, this chapter highlights how frontline decision making contributes to hyper-surveillance, moral policing, and public erasure of the Khawaja Sira bodies. Contributing to the citizenship literature in public administration, this chapter highlights how frontline decision making can curtail the everyday citizenship of the individuals living at the social margins.

Despite their social marginalization, the Khawaja Sira are not always passive recipients of the disciplinary normalizing discourses of the state and society. That is why, in chapter 9, I discuss the variety of strategic responses Khawaja Sira employ in their interactions with the frontline workers to frustrate the dominant disciplinary discourses of state and society. This chapter also highlights that while Khawaja Sira have to rely mostly on individual acts of contestation in their interactions with frontline government workers, the emerging leadership of the Khawaja Sira is enabling emergence of new forms of resistance based on social capital and collective protests.

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the various policy implications of my research. In the first section, which is written specifically with local policy makers in mind, I discuss instrumental policy changes that can contribute to better material and symbolic inclusion for the Khawaja Sira. I also discuss symbolic level implications of my research for the relationship between the Khawaja Sira and public administration and building on Catlaw's (2007) framing of politics of subject and role of public

administration praxis in such a project. I underscore the importance of contesting the

taken-for-grantedness of the socially productive role of public administration.

In rest of chapter 10, I discuss potential critiques of my overall analysis and also discuss

how this research project informs my future research agenda.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

According to Haverland and Yanow (2013), an important limitation of public

administration research is the lack of transparency and understanding about different

ways of conducting research. An important reason for this limitation is because

researchers often confuse research methodology and methods and also fail to make clear

the philosophical positions underlying their research approach. Methodology is the "logic

of inquiry" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013, 4) and refers to the underlying ontological

and epistemological assumptions that inform a research project. According to Haverland

and Yanow (2013), there are primarily two methodologies in social science research:

positivist and interpretive. A positivist research methodology assumes that the "data" is

"lying around in a field, just waiting for a researcher to collect them" (Scwartz-Shea and

Yanow, 79) because of an underlying belief in a fully formed world that can be studied

objectively through a researcher. On the other hand, in constructivist-interpretive

research, data are assumed to be entangled with the researcher, the framing of research

questions and the research setting because of the underlying belief in "(potentially)

multiple, *intersubjectively* constructed 'truths'" about the social world which can best be

"accessed, or co-generated, through interactions between researcher and the researched as

they seek to interpret those events and make those interpretations legible to each other"

(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013, 4).

That is why the nature of research questions is also different in these two

methodologies. While the positivist research methodology focuses on trying to

understand the underlying *causes* of a particular social phenomenon, interpretive

29

methodology instead focuses on understanding *reasons* of particular phenomenon by trying to gain "access to the conceptual world in which our subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with them" (Geertz 1973, 24).

The research design and methods – the tools through which a systematic study of the research questions can be carried out – have to be chosen according to the methodology of a researcher (Haverland and Yanow 2012). The research approach appropriate for a constructivist-interpretive research is based here on qualitative-interpretive research methods (instead of qualitative-positivist or quantitative-positivist research methods) (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013). A qualitative-interpretive research approach differs from the qualitative-positivist approach in some key areas including (but not limited to) the concept of exposure – as compared to sampling – and trustworthiness – as compared to validity.

In contrast to the concept of sampling in positivist research, which assumes systematically picking from a predicable systematic but stochastic pre-formed world, interpretive researchers instead focus on maximizing *exposure*; encountering (or trying to encounter) a wide range of "meanings made by research-relevant participants of their experiences" (Scwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2013, 84-85). Since experiences and perspectives are likely to be different based on an individual's social position and/or identities, maximizing exposure entails interacting with a comprehensive array of participants from various axes of identity.

Similarly, traditional measures to ensure validity in qualitative positivist research like reliability and triangulation are not applicable to qualitative-interpretive research (Scwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013). There are no associated assumptions of reliability or

repeatability in interpretive research; a researcher with a different personality and knowledge may generate different data or come to different results based on the same data in interpretive research (Scwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013). Hence, multiple checks for trustworthiness like *reflexivity*, *respondent validation* and *accounting for self* are preferred in qualitative-interpretive research. This difference extends to the nature of claims made by qualitative interpretive research where the nature of research questions focuses on trying to understand and co-generate the subjective experiences of the research participants. The narratives and findings generated are, therefore, partial and context-dependent. I am using a qualitative-interpretive research methodology for this research project.

In the discussion that follows, I elucidate my onto-epistemological assumptions, research design and the checks for trustworthiness appropriate for my research methodology.

Onto-Epistemological Assumptions

My primary assumptions about ontology – the nature of reality – and epistemology – the study (and the possibility of study) of this reality – are primarily based on Karan Barad's (2000; 2003: 2007) material-discursive onto-epistemology. Rather than being a purely constructive methodology, it also takes into account the agency of matter in social construction of reality.

Barad's approach is also helpful for my analysis because it not only elucidates the dynamics of boundary-making apparatuses in society but also highlights the underlying onto-epistemological arbitrariness of the exclusions that go with it. Based on Neil Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, Barad (2007) problematizes the belief in a world

31

where pre-formed objects exist with inherent properties. Instead, she argues that the "primary ontological unit is not independent objects with inherent boundaries and properties but rather phenomena" (139). For Barad (2007), the term *phenomena* does not merely represent "the epistemological inseparability of observer and observed" but also the "ontological inseparability of intra-acting 'agencies'" (308-309). Stated otherwise, it means that there are no ontological identities or boundaries that exist prior to their entangled intra-actions. The bodies, identities and the world we see all around us are a result of multiple intra-actions between different agencies and the increasing permanence of the "marks left on the bodies[9]" as a result of such intra-actions over time. Barad prefers the term *intra-action* over *interaction* because the later takes the prior existence of discrete relational units for granted. On the other hand,

> Intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action. It is important to note that the 'distinct' agencies are only distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don't exist as individual elements (Barad 2003, 33).

Apparatus – another key term in Barad's onto-epistemological approach – refers to the various conditions or ways through which some things and/or discourses are possible (and not others) in a situation. In other words, it is through the *agential cuts* enacted by different apparatuses that the intrinsic ontological indeterminacy is locally resolved giving rise to clear boundaries and the properties of resulting objects. In short, "apparatuses are boundary-making practices" (Barad 2007, 148). Hence, the term

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[9] This term refers to the important fact that there is literally a material dimension to every intra-action as well. With each intra-action the boundaries, identity and properties of each intra-acting body are sustained, re-inforced or altered as they are "sedimented into our becoming" (Barad 2007, 394).

apparatus can be used to study *boundary-making* at different levels of analysis. According to Barad, apparatuses are integral to any agential cuts enacted through them as the same matter when measured by different apparatuses can exhibit different properties. Hence, it is important to analyze the apparatuses together with the boundaries that they enact because those boundaries are inseparable from their generating apparatus.

At a macro-level, public administration is a boundary-making apparatus, which plays an important part in the categorization of social order. For example, as Correa, Petchesky, and Parker (2008) note, the idea of citizenship is "intrinsically about drawing boundaries – between citizens and others (strangers, aliens, barbarians); between public and private spaces; between categories of virtue and categories of deviance; and between 'majorities and minorities'" (157). Public administration is deeply implicated in implementing the citizenship related categorizations in society (Catlaw 2007). For example, the police stops and the Beggar's Rehabilitation program discussed in chapter 8 are classic examples of boundary marking practices of the street-level bureaucrats. They literally (re)establish the spatial and social boundaries between the Khawaja Sira and the cis-gendered public.

Moreover, the intra-actions between the frontline workers and the marginalized publics enact a resolution in the local indeterminacy of the boundaries of different subjects, discourses and identities. Hence, these intra-actions literally change the subjects because "bodies differentially materialize as particular patterns of the world as a result of the specific cuts and reconfigurings that are enacted" (Barad 2007, 176) by their respective apparatuses. Mobilizing of the same material-discursive apparatus repeatedly

and to the same effect entrenches the boundaries thus enacted between different categories of individuals in society.

It is also important to note that not all intra-actions are created equally in terms of their influence on subject formation. For example, early agential cuts matter more in creating path dependencies for the later life of the individuals. Similarly, for the state, the agential cuts of the public administrators matter significantly more than other cis-gendered individuals, just like the agential cuts of the family matter more for the phenomenology of the Khawaja Sira in their childhood and adolescence.

Furthermore, there is a strong ethical component in Barad's approach due to which she chooses to call it *ethico-onto-epistemology* to underscore the inter-relatedness and inseparability of "being, knowing and valuing" (Barad, 2007, 409). Barad argues that the inherent ontological indeterminacy is not a justification for renouncing responsibility for our actions. She notes:

> We are responsible in part for what exists not because it is an arbitrary construction of our own choosing, but because agential reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping. Which material-discursive practices are enacted matters, for ontological as well as epistemological reasons: a different material-discursive apparatus materializes a different agential reality, as opposed to simply producing a different description of a fixed observation-independent world (Barad 2000, 247).

It is important to note here that public administration is not the only boundary making apparatus in society. As I discuss in section I, the role of professional public administration as a boundary making apparatus is entangled with other institutional orders (like peer groups and family) that play a critical role in subject formation of the marginalized groups.

Finally, where appropriate, I also draw from Foucauldian analytics of subject formation. This choice is warranted for multiple reasons: First, Foucault's work problematized the given nature of identities and argued that they are formed in and through multiple social discourses emanating from historically contingent power relations in society. This enables, a thorough relational analysis of such power relations (material and symbolic), which could influence the experience of marginalization. Second, according to post-structural scholars, identities are not *a priori* givens which are biologically or ontologically pre-determined but always in a process of construction (Hall 1996). Third, a Foucauldian analytics of identity formation does not require an exclusively state-centric focus. Instead, Foucault argued for an ascending analysis of power relations from the level of the individual. This is helpful for my project since a state-centric view of identity formation or marginalization is limited as it pays little attention paid to biases, and norms in more informal social institutions and interactions.

Research Design: Methodology, Methods, and Analysis

The data for this dissertation comes from a ten month long person-centered ethnography in Lahore, Pakistan. Lahore was chosen because a number of Khawaja Sira reside in Lahore and some previous studies on disease patterns and sexuality of Khawaja Sira have already been conducted there (e.g. Bokhari et al. 2007; Rehan 2011). It is an ideal location for this project.

My methodology requires research methods that enable a meaningful study of the boundary making apparatuses related to my research questions. Therefore, I needed to focus on trying to understand how some bodies and discourses come to matter and others don't and how do the agential cuts enacted by the frontline workers influence the lives

and choices of my research participants. Therefore, I chose qualitative-interpretive

research methods (distinct from qualitative-positivist methods) for my research project

(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013).

Person-centered Ethnography

I chose person-centered ethnography as the primary research method because it is

based on the idea of an inter-subjectively constructed social world and enables the

researcher to situate an individual within multiple social, symbolic, and material

discourses (Levy and Hollan 2014). This makes it the method of choice to investigate

various aspects of identity, subjectivity, and agency. As Levy and Hollan (2014)

summarize, person-centered ethnographers are able to investigate questions like:

> How are community members constituted by their contexts? To what degree and
> in what way are they at least partially autonomous individuals, engaged in
> dynamic, sometimes coercive, sometimes enabling interplay, with a context that is
> in some way separate from and alien to them? What is the nature and location of
> such constructs as 'self', 'identity', 'agency', 'cognition', and the like, in different
> kinds communities? How are the phenomena relevant to these constructs
> differentially formed, stabilized, and located in the interplay between public and
> private spheres? (314)

Therefore, person-centered ethnography also provides an appropriate research

method to conduct an "ascending analysis" of government (Foucault 1980) beginning at

the level of the individual. In contrast to traditional ethnography which typically focuses

on the description of a community or a group, person-centered ethnography instead

focuses on trying to "tell us what it is like to live there – what features are salient to its

inhabitants" (LeVine 1982, 293). In other words, person-centered ethnography is

concerned more with presenting the (individual) subjective experiential reality of a

society and less with a supposedly objective description or observation of a group.

Hence, person-centered ethnographers primarily try to communicate the subjective experiences and embodied responses to such experiences of their research participants. That is also why in a person-centered ethnography research participants are not treated just as informants (providing information about their culture or social group) as in a traditional ethnography. Instead, they are also treated as respondents (providing information about themselves as an individual) which enables investigation of not only group level discourses but also the intersectionality and heterogeneity within this group.

In addition to direct observation and participant observation, I conducted in-depth person-centered interviews with 50 Khawaja Sira to understand their experiences of government in its various forms. While formal interviews were conducted with 50 research participants, it is also important to mention that formal interviews were just one part of my fieldwork. Informal conversations with many more Khawaja Sira, government employees and other cis-gendered individuals also inform my overall analysis. Moreover, as I discuss in the context of Guru-Chela relationship in chapter 4 and resistance related internal dynamics among the Khawaja Sira in chapter 10, observing the verbal, physical, and affective nature of interaction between the Khawaja Sira – recorded in the form of field notes – was of immense help for my overall analysis. For example, it is one thing to just talk to a Khawaja Sira about the Guru-Chela relationship and it is entirely another to see how different Guru and their Chelay meet each other (with the Chela often touching the feet of the Guru as a mark of respect), talk to each other, and sit with respect to each other in the same room (the Chela often offering the Guru a higher or more comfortable place to sit).

Gaining Access. Gaining access to the Khawaja Sira community was initially not easy. I was able to get in touch with a group of six Khawaja Sira at one of the research sites at which I had initially planned to conduct my research. While these initial encounters were very helpful in establishing a baseline understanding of the Khawaja Sira community, I found it difficult to form a closer association or to access additional Khawaja Sira through this initial group. As I discuss below, this initial struggle was partly because this initial group of Khawaja Sira was very skeptical of being interviewed because of bad experiences with a couple of journalists in the past and partly because I had little understanding of the unique vernacular of the Khawaja Sira. However, my luck changed when a frontline worker of an NGO that was working for Khawaja Sira rehabilitation recommended that I get in touch with Salma, a Khawaja Sira rights activist who had helped that NGO recruit many Khawaja Sira in their welfare program. When I contacted Salma, she was forthcoming and invited me to her home in University Town[10], Lahore.

Salma had given me rough directions about her place of residence. Since I had never been to University Town before, I had to stop when I was close to her place and ask a rickshaw driver if a Khawaja Sira by the name of Salma lived nearby. "Which Khawaja Sira's house are you looking for?" The guy from behind the rickshaw driver asked. "Salma", I replied. "Are you talking about Nadeem?", he asked. Luckily, I knew that Nadeem was the masculine given name of Salma. It is quite common for the Khawaja Sira to be known by their masculine names among the cis-gendered individuals and through their feminine name within the Khawaja Sira community. So, taking

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[10] The name of the place is fictitious to ensure anonymity.

directions from that man, I went a couple of blocks further on the road. When a couple of

turns later I needed further directions, I asked a young girl about 10-12 years old about

Salma's house. She directed her younger brother who was about 3-4 years old. "Take

them to Nadeem Khusra's home." The young boy complied accordingly and ran in front

of the car for about 50 feet where Salma's home was situated. When I rang the bell, there

was no answer for quite a while and when I was about to turn back, a young man in his

early twenties came and asked me if I was looking for Nadeem Bhai (brother)? It seemed

that this was his home. When my answer was in the affirmative, he told me that Salma

was not at home and then called Salma on his mobile phone and said, "Nadeem Bhai

there are people here to meet you." Eventually I ended up meeting Salma the next day

and came to know that the young man was her younger brother who along with his wife

lived with Salma. The purpose of narrating this incident in detail is to show that without

knowing Salma's masculine name, I wouldn't have been able to reach her home. Even

though she, like most other Khawaja Sira, prefers to be known by her feminine name,

most cis-gendered individuals still prefer to address her by her masculine name.

While Salma did face a lot of resistance from her family (especially her mother)

over her performative femininity initially, she was lucky that her parents eventually

understood that this was an important part of her identity and let her stay at home. As

both of her parents are now dead, being the eldest in the family, Salma is now head of her

household which also includes cis-gendered individuals like her younger brother and his

family. As I discuss throughout this dissertation, Salma is unique in this as most Khawaja

Sira end up leaving their homes permanently because of social and familial pressures.

The meeting with Salma proved to be a godsend. She is part the new leadership of the Khawaja Sira community, which, as I discuss in chapter 8 and 9, is emerging in response to the increasing need for the Khawaja Sira to interact with the state functionaries. As a result, she has cultivated many social contacts during her efforts to help her fellow Khawaja Sira. Due to Salma's social connections and her position in the Khawaja Sira community, many Khawaja Sira used to visit her house regularly. Because of the extremely welcoming attitude of Salma and the ease of access to other Khawaja Sira, in the coming months, her home became my primary research site where I met many of my subsequent research participants. Later on, I hired Salma as my research assistant to help with recruitment of research participants, navigation through multiple research sites, and in guidance about the everyday language of the Khawaja Sira (see below). She was extremely valuable in helping me gain access to and confidence of many Khawaja Sira. I was not only able to observe and take part in many discussions between the Khawaja Sira at her home but was also able to observe many Guru-Chela interactions at Salma's home as many Chelay used to visit her.

As I was trying to maximize exposure[11] by meeting Khawaja Sira along multiple identity and experience dimensions, I would often discuss with Salma what theoretical concern I had (for example, including participants who had undergone surgery to match their body with what is deemed socially appropriate for the feminine gender), and she would recommend Khawaja Sira who either fulfilled that criteria or had some information that I thought was important. Salma and I also visited many other Khawaja

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[11] A term used in interpretive research instead of sampling to indicate the focus on diversity of research participants along multiple axes of identity.

Sira places of residence and institutional sites during the course of my research. I can't emphasize how much help Salma was during my research in not only providing access to the Khawaja Sira community but also a safe place where the Khawaja Sira felt comfortable talking about their personal experiences. My wife and kids also met her a few times and we continue to have an excellent working relationship.

As noted by Angrostino and Rosenberg (2013), the role of an ethnographer continues to change at different points during the research process. My role in my research setting also continued to evolve during my fieldwork. The initial conversations and interviews can best be characterized as "descriptive observation" (Angrostino and Rosenberg 2013) where my primary focus was to develop a basic understanding of the norms and routines of the Khawaja Sira community. This initial phase also allowed me to gain trust of the Khawaja Sira community and to improve my interviewing skills. For example, while I had a detailed interview protocol in my mind, it took me a while to engage with my research participants properly. While I am a native speaker of Punjabi and Urdu, the primary languages spoken by the Khawaja Sira, I was unfamiliar with the vernacular used by the Khawaja Sira called "Farsi"[12]. Developed over hundreds of years, this Farsi is known only to the Khawaja Sira (and those few cis-gendered individuals who interact with them regularly) and allows them to privately discuss issues related to their everyday life in public. Many of my participants often used words like *Khoktki* (masculine dress), *Firqa* (feminine dress) and *Girya* (adult male, usually refers to a love

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[12] Different from the Farsi (Persian) used in Iran.

interest) while talking among themselves in my presence. Salma was helpful in teaching me many commonly used words of Khawaja Sira Farsi.

Once I learnt some of the Khawaja Sira Farsi and developed a basic understanding of the norms and typical narratives within the Khawaja Sira community, it was relatively easier for me to gain the confidence of the Khawaja Sira I met. Phrasing questions in their own vernacular was helpful because that was an indication that I had not only met other Khawaja Sira but that they trusted me enough to teach me some of their commonly used Farsi words. At this point in research, my focus shifted towards "focused observation" (Angrostino and Rosenberg 2013) where I was primarily interested in investigating my research questions in depth and to explore emerging themes in detail. For example, it was during this phase in research that I realized that Beggar's Rehabilitation Program (discussed in detail in chapter 9) was an important aspect of the Khawaja Sira interactions with the government frontline workers. This was also the most exciting and interesting phase of research, as I became quite comfortable in my research setting and those research participants coming frequently to Salma's place also became used to my presence. During this phase, there were some themes that clearly began to "saturate": there was much repetition with little new information. For example, questions about interactions with police started to result in typical responses.

In the last phase of research[13], during which I had also started to analyze my data in depth, I focused on "selective observation" (Angrostino and Rosenberg 2013) where I tried to get in depth information about particular aspects of research where I still needed

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[13] These three phases of research were not discrete but are broad generalizations of my evolving research focus and role in the research setting.

more information. For example, I had to explore various aspects of the gender fluid identity of the Khawaja Sira in depth to properly understand the various nuanced discourses associated with their choice of the legal gender. In this phase, my frequency of interaction with my research participants also started to decrease as I was focusing more on analysis and interpretation of my data and because there was saturation on most themes related to my research questions.

Interviews. I conducted responsive interviews (Rubin and Rubin 2011) during my research that were primarily open-ended and largely participant driven. However, in line with recommendations of Levy and Hollan (2014), I kept the following categories relevant to my research questions in mind:

1. **Identity and identification.** This category focuses on the individual as a unique person and focuses on self-identification of the participant. This includes general information like name, age and other demographic information. In addition, the researcher also tries to situate the interviewee in a "historical and social nexus" (Levy and Hollan 2014) including information about family, life history and childhood experiences.

2. **Group Level Information.** This category focuses on the individual as member of a larger social group and is helpful in understanding group identity and group level experiences of the Khawaja Sira. For example, it was helpful to understand group level discourses about origin and identity of the Khawaja Sira that I discuss in chapters 3 and 4.

3. **Relation of the Self to Group.** This category refers to the individuals' relation to the primary social group with which they identify. It helps identify

the heterogeneity among the Khawaja Sira enabling an intra-category analysis of various sub-groups of the Khawaja Sira.

4. **Relation of Self to Society.** This category is based on identifying salient social institutions and the experience of the participants within those institutions including questions related to access. This category is also focused on identifying participants' perceptions about concepts like inclusion, citizenship and participation.

5. **Relation of Self to State.** This category is based on information about the experiences of participants of their interactions with the street-level bureaucracy and their perception of laws and public policies relevant to their life.

6. **The Unsaid.** An important aspect of any interview is identifying the categories of experience, which the participants do not talk about or ignore. Silence can often be equally important to words that are actually said. Identifying these categories of experience can be useful, especially if there is a pattern of not talking about particular categories of experience by the participants. As I discuss in chapter 3, in initial interactions, my research participants' narrative about their identity and origin was remarkably similar. I gradually understood that this apparent homogeneity was because of systematic silence about the diverse origins of individuals that join the Khawaja Sira community. I take up this issue in detail in chapter 3. However, understanding that these experiences were of a deeply personal nature and were often painful to remember, I did not press my research participants to

discuss things they did not want to. I discuss this issue in detail in the section on trustworthiness below.

Another obstacle I experienced during my fieldwork was the general reluctance of the Khawaja Sira for their conversation to be recorded. This concern was mostly because of amateur journalists who often tried to sensationalize or scandalize the Khawaja Sira lives and experiences. This has made the Khawaja Sira reluctant about saying anything "on record." Fifteen of my research participants did not allow any of their interviews to be recorded. In such cases, I took notes to record the important information. Some participants changed their mind after the first interview and allowed me to record the follow-up interviews. I conducted a total of 76 interviews with 50 Khawaja Sira at 11 research sites. Out of these 46 interviews were recorded. Salma's house was the main research site where 38 interviews with 29 participants were done. Of the 11 research sites, three were Khawaja Sira *deray* (places generally owned or rented by the Guru where multiple Khawaja Sira live together), four were places of work, and the rest were houses of individual Khawaja Sira.

A summary of some critical aspects of individual identities of my research participants is given below:

Table 1 Age Group Details of Research Participants

Age Group	Number of Participants
19-30	7
31-40	9
41-50	16

50-60	12
>60	6
Notes: Many research participants reported only approximate ages, especially those who did not have IDs. Eight research participants did not report their age and I have used my best guess in such cases. A couple of my research participants also seemed to report considerably lower age.	

Table 2 Education Level of Research Participants

Education	Number of Participants
College	4
High School	2
Some schooling	15
Religious only [i]	1
Illiterate	28
i. In Pakistan, religious education is a separate system of education with its own hierarchy and levels. This participant studied in a Madrassash (religious schools) and is discussed in detail in chapter 4.	

Table 3 Jobs of Research Participants

Job	Number of Participants
Begging	22
NGO [i]	7
With Travelling Jamaat [ii]	4
Shop	3
Religious	2

Maid/Cook	2
Government	1
Jobless and presently doing nothing	12

i. One research participant left her job with the NGO during my fieldwork.
ii. Some Khawaja Sira travel with ritualistic religious processions that moves from one city to another every year. These procession are associated with death anniversary of some religious saints. The Khawaja Sira with these processions are given some alms by some local residents. In addition, they are asked to pray by locals and if some of their prayers are heard, they are given extra money later.

Notes: I have not included dancing as a job because almost all of my research participants (except those who were too old or were physically not able to do so) worked as dancers to private parties. However, this is sporadic. In some months, they find work frequently and sometimes months can go by without a formal function.

Table 4 Housing Situation of Research Participants

Housing/Room	Number of Participants
Rented with other Khawaja Sira [i]	20
Rented alone	12
At Guru's Home [ii]	5
Home Owner	2
With Family or Relatives [iii]	7 (3 rented by Khawaja Sira, 4 owned by family)
Temporary *Jhugi* (tent) [iv]	3
Mosque	1

i. Some of these arrangements were between peers, others between Guru and Chela.
ii. While there were no explicit rent arrangements, the Chelay were supposed to give some share of their income to their Guru.
iii. In 3 cases, the houses were rented by the Khawaja Sira who were the primary bread earners and responsible for paying rent (and taking care of old parent/s). In the other 4 cases, the Khawaja Sira were living at houses owned by family or relatives.

iv.	One of these shifted to a rented house towards the end of my fieldwork with another Khawaja Sira.	

Table 5 Legal Gender Preferences of Research Participants

Category	Man	Khawaja Sira
Preferred Gender on ID[14] (All participants)	40	9
Preferred Gender on ID (Participants who did not have ID = 16)	11	4
Actual Gender on ID (Participants who had ID = 34)	32	2
Notes: I have not included the option of woman as only two of my research participant specifically expressed that option. One had previously registered as a woman but chose to register as a man when she got her new ID recently. Another participant who had registered as a man for personal reasons mentioned that in an ideal world she would register as a woman. One participant who did not have ID was completely indifferent to her legal gender. Three participants who had registered as men said that they would prefer the third gender if they decided to get an ID again. I discuss this topic in detail in chapter 6.		

Auto-photography

I used auto-photography as a supplementary research method. The use of auto-

photography was warranted because of the following reasons. First, it enables acquisition

of information about aspects of the respondents' life and daily routine to which the

researcher may not have direct access or about which the participants don't talk during

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[14] In Pakistan, legal ID refers to the Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) issued by the National Data Base and Registration Authority. While the passport also qualifies as a legal ID. Most Pakistanis, except those who need to travel abroad, only have the CNIC as a legal ID. In all of this dissertation, ID means the CNIC.

the interviews. Second, in the context of the often cited power differential between the researcher and the researched, auto-photography enables the research participants to choose those aspects of their life to photograph which they find the most significant (Desai and Potter 2006; Miles and Howes 2014). This not only increases the consistency of the findings but more importantly, also enables the researcher to find out the emotions or values attached to various images (material, symbolic or social).

I recruited twelve participants for auto-photography. The main hurdle in recruiting participants was that not everyone had a mobile phone with which they could take photographs. So, extremely poor Khawaja Sira did not participate in auto-photography. I asked the participants agreeing to participate in auto-photography to take pictures of their everyday lives to communicate how they spend their routine life and to communicate any special thing they felt needed to be known about their life. After collecting photos from the participants, I discussed the pictures with each research participant individually in photo-elicitation "autodriven" interviews (Clark-Ibáñez 2004).

Overall, I struggled to execute this part of my research design. This was partly because for the predominantly poor and illiterate Khawaja Sira, taking pictures about their lives seemed tangential to their immediate interests and concerns. While there were some findings that were interesting and surprising (like the importance of local neighborhoods as sites of negotiation and contestation of social norms), there were limited findings that directly added to my public administration related research questions.

Frontline Workers

I interacted with many frontline government workers during my fieldwork, specifically from the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), police and social workers. This included informal conversations and direct observation in frontline offices. These interactions were warranted because of multiple reasons. First, as Williams (2015) notes, "administration of law and policy toward subordinate and marginalized groups varies considerably, and these variations shape peoples' understanding of their place in society" (434). Interactions with front-line workers helped me identify these variations and attitudes in implementation of public policies relevant to the Khawaja Sira. Second, front-line workers represent part of state machinery with which publics are most likely to interact. This interaction is likely to influence how marginalized groups in society experience public policies. Since I was getting information about the experience of the Khawaja Sira of their interactions with street-level bureaucracy (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Lipsky 1980; Oberfield 2014; Brehm and Gates 1997), it proved helpful to get the perspective of the front-line workers about significant aspects of those experiences. Doing so also helped me analyze street-level bureaucracy as a "third space" where policies are implemented, realized and contested at the same time. Third, attitude of front-line workers towards public policy can influence the way in which these policies actually get implemented (Keiser 2010; Williams 2015). Therefore, getting information about the bureaucrats' perception of public policies relevant to the Khawaja Sira and recent changes in those policies proved to extremely helpful in analyzing how these policies actually get implemented.

In addition to informal conversations and direct observation, I conducted formal interviews with 19 frontline workers and managers from National Database and

Registration Authority (NADRA) (10), social welfare department (3), and an NGO (6) working for the welfare of the Khawaja Sira[15]. In addition, I conducted a group interview with 12 police officers to understand their opinion about the Khawaja Sira and their experience of interacting with them.

For NADRA, I went to three of their offices and tried to recruit all accessible frontline workers[16] for interviews about their interaction with the Khawaja Sira. Most frontline workers of NADRA were extremely reluctant to talk about their interactions with the Khawaja Sira. Perhaps it was due to increasing media focus on the Khawaja Sira and the general reluctance of the frontline workers in Pakistan to open up to outsiders, but some frontline workers even said that they had never met even a single Khawaja Sira in their working life even though I knew (through my research participants) that they had interacted with a Khawaja Sira during the previous week. Eventually, my persistence and the promise of confidentiality convinced some of them (7 men, 3 women) to agree to an interview. I also called the NADRA helpline on five separate days and got in touch with five different employees to get information about the rules and requirements for getting

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[15] As Smith and Lipsky (1992) note, frontline workers in the private sector who cater to the public needs of the publics should be considered the new street-level bureaucrats. Since the people in the NGO I interviewed was catering to many such needs of the Khawaja Sira (including provision of legal IDs, health treatment, monthly stipend, interest free loans to start a business), the employees of this NGO were included as frontline workers.

[16] In a typical NADRA frontline office, there are about 7-10 frontline workers. The offices are organized like an assembly line. There is generally an information counter towards one side where 1-2 frontline workers sit. There are also typically two frontline workers who start the initial application procedure. After providing initial information, the applicants typically go to the next counter where a frontline worker takes their photograph. After that, they move to another counter where one of 2-3 frontline workers take their thumb impressions and print their final applications for review. There are also 1-2 supervisors in each branch. While they have different official designations within a branch, all frontline workers in a typical NADRA frontline office are different types of data entry operators who were continuously choosing which information to enter in the identity management system of the state.

legal IDs for the Khawaja Sira. As I discuss in chapter 7, these phone calls were helpful

in understanding some of the learning costs associated with getting legal IDs for the

Khawaja Sira.

From the social welfare department, I was able to interview an additional three

administrative professionals (2 women and 1 man) concerned with the Beggar's

Rehabilitation Program, which emerged as a major theme of citizen-state interactions

during my fieldwork. I also visited the Beggar's home (a detention center for beggars). In

addition, I was able to interview almost all the relevant managers and frontline workers

(4 men and 2 women) associated with their Khawaja Sira rehabilitation program

organized by a local NGO.

Accessing the police was also a challenge, which was eventually negotiated

through personal contacts, and I was able to conduct a group interview[17] with 12 frontline

police workers (all men). The participants belonged to a rapid response group of police

officers tasked with preventing street crimes. Only those participants were selected who

had interacted multiple times with the Khawaja Sira during their jobs. The group

interview was held at the head office of the rapid response force and lasted about 90

minutes. I took notes during the group interview which was co-moderated by a police

official and me. The co-moderator introduced me at the beginning and helped keep the

discussion focused on the Khawaja Sira. I asked all the guiding questions and was the

primary moderator of the session. Appendix-A contains the instrument containing my

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[17] Originally, I wanted to conduct individual interviews with police officers but on the day of interviews,
the police officer negotiating access and the participants expressed willingness to instead have a group
interview. Following Bernard (2011), I have chosen to call this session a group interview instead of a focus
group because of the spontaneous nature of the event.

(translated) guiding research questions for the group interview. This was probably the most information rich interaction I had with the frontline workers and elucidated the general attitude of police officers about the Khawaja Sira.

Data Analysis

The data collected during fieldwork included interview recordings, transcripts and notes; group interview notes; photographs and field notes. Interview recordings and transcripts were coded in MAXQDA. While funding constraints were initially the reason I started voice coding my interviews, even after I was able to procure funding for transcription of part of my data, I realized that I preferred voice coding over text based codes. Listening to the narratives in my respondents' voice not only brought back to my mind the complete scene of the interview but also helped me relate to the respondents' sentiments associated with the words better, something emphasized in person-centered ethnography (Levy and Hollan 2014). For the interviews that were not recorded, I coded my notes manually I did coding iteratively. After conducting the first few interviews, I coded the data from those interviews to see if I was getting the information needed to answer my research questions. I used this preliminary analysis to inform my interview approach and to focus on themes that needed to be explored in detail. Overall, I used thematic content analysis scheme (Kuckartz 2014) to identify major themes in the data.

As an example of my coding process, after listening to and reading the data multiple times, I coded the audio and text data along main categories, one of which was "ID related information." In the next phase, I listened to and read all the data in the category "ID related information" to identify major sub-categories (having an ID, gender on ID, getting an ID). I then coded the data in this main category into sub-categories.

These sub-categories were then divided into further sub-categories if needed. This also facilitated intra and inter category based analysis of data related to IDs that informs chapters 6,7 and 9. In intra-category analysis, I focused on analyzing the range of experiences within a single category. For example, for the code "getting an ID", intra-category analysis highlighted different aspects of administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira (chapter 7). This included inter-interviewee analysis – comparing the responses of different individuals and groups with each other. This helped me distinguish between the responses of the Khawaja Sira and the frontline workers of NADRA. In inter-category analysis, I focused on the intersections between different codes. For example, inter-category analysis of the codes "getting an ID" and "gender on ID" helped me distinguish the additional administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting an ID if they decide to register under the third gender category (chapter 6).

It is also important to note that some passages were coded in more than one category. In line with my interpretive methodology, my analysis is not based on the frequency of codes/themes but on the ones that were most relevant to my research questions and the qualitative nature of information within relevant codes. For example, I collected a lot of information about Khawaja Sira customs, their folklore and their work related experiences that I do not discuss in this dissertation. That is also why I coded some segments "theoretically important" to remind me to focus on those segments in subsequent analysis and writing. I found this practice to be useful for analytic purposes. After I identified major themes in the data, I analyzed the data using multiple theoretical frameworks as recommended by Ellingson's (2009) crystallization method.

Translation Protocol

  All data collection was done in Urdu and Punjabi, which are the native languages of my research participants (excepted, as noted above, the unique "Farsi" terminology used by Khawaja Sira*).* Temple and Young (2004) raise the concern that "[t]he early 'domestication' of research into written English may mean that the ties between language and identity/culture are cut to the disadvantage of non-English speakers" (174). Since I am a native speaker of both these languages, I conducted the data analysis in the native languages to minimize such problems. However, I have translated many key passages to English, which are also included in this dissertation as recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008). At some places, where I felt the exact meaning of the Urdu/Punjabi terms couldn't be translated into English, I have included the original words used by my research participants in small parentheses.

  Another important point of clarification is about the confidentiality of my research participants. Following the standard protocol in qualitative-interpretivist research, I have used pseudonyms to hide the true identity of my research participants. Grinyer (2002) recommends using pseudonyms that hide the identity of research participants but caution against using names that do not reflect the social context of research participants. That is why I have used pseudonyms that are feminine and mostly belong to film actresses of India and Pakistan, which is how most Khawaja Sira are named. In addition, following Morse (1994), I have used multiple pseudonyms for some of my research participants in the dissertation to prevent them from being identified through their multiple narratives and significant life events. The use of multiple names is also appropriate because of the fluid nature of Khawaja Sira lives. Some Khawaja Sira

change their feminine names multiple times in their life. For example, one of my research

participants has changed her feminine names six times during the last few years.

Trustworthiness

As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2013) note, concepts like validity and reliability

have limited relevance to interpretive qualitative research because of its different onto-

epistemological foundations. Therefore, they recommend using practices like reflexivity,

member-checking, and accounting for self that, instead of presenting the research as an

objective ("real") interpretation of the data and research setting, focus on making

transparent researchers' sense-making during the fieldwork and data analysis. I discuss

these sense-making checks next.

Reflexivity

Bracketing or "suspending judgment" is an important component of

phenomenological analysis. However, in recent years, bracketing has gradually emerged

as a technique to improve all interpretive qualitative research. I practiced reflexive

bracketing (Gearing 2004) during the project. According to Schwartz-Shea and Yanow

(2013, 100) reflexivity refers to the "researcher's active consideration of and engagement

with the ways in which his own sense-making and the particular circumstances that might

have affected it, throughout all phases of the research process, relate to the knowledge

claims he ultimately advances in written form." To do this, I tried to remain cognizant of

my own biases, perceptions and suppositions throughout the research project.

Bracketing was immensely helpful in my conversations with different types of

encounters during my research. I not only met Khawaja Sira and frontline workers during

my research but also had many informal conversations with the cis-gendered individuals

56

in Lahore. In all these conversations, bracketing was an important skill without which I wouldn't have been able to understand many aspects of my research. For example, as I discuss in chapter 6, I initially did not understand the choice of the Khawaja Sira to legally register and to perform religious rituals as men. To me it seemed a paradoxical choice. However, I never contested this choice of the Khawaja Sira. It was only gradually that I started to understand that for the Khawaja Sira the primary significance was of what they called their feminine soul and not of the categories like sex and gender. I don't think I would have been able to understand that without bracketing my judgment initially. However, to make transparent my own suppositions, I have clarified this point in chapter 6.

I must say that in retrospect, I am not sure that reflexive bracketing is a blanket command that should be followed mechanically by the researcher. There are instances where I think I would behave differently if put in those positions again. For me the clearest example of it was the group interview with police officials. I did practice reflexive bracketing in that session and tried to patiently listen to the narratives of police officers. I tried not to contest their opinions and experiences even though I occasionally disagreed with them. This resulted in an excellent session from the research perspective. However, to be honest, I didn't feel very good after that session. If given an opportunity to conduct that session again, I would instead try to contest some of the stereotypical interpretations of police officers and try to present them an alternative view of the Khawaja Sira based on my experience of interacting with them during last year.

This should not be taken as a claim that I was able to do reflexive bracketing perfectly. I do not claim to have had a perfect wall between my personality, suppositions,

and my conversations with my research participants. Naturally, my questions and interpretations were influenced by my experiences in the field. I understand my fieldwork as the co-production of meaning making with my research participants and I was naturally an important part of this process. An obvious example of my failure to do bracketing is in case of painful memories (e.g., being raped) of my research participants. There were many instances in which my research participants shared some deeply personal memories and experiences. While this could be of theoretical interest especially in understanding better the different origins of individuals joining the Khawaja Sira counterpublic, I found myself not exploring those painful memories in detail because I just couldn't. I also discussed this issue with my wife (a fellow researcher) because as a researcher interested in personal identity, perhaps I should have asked follow up questions during those conversations (or afterwards). However, I did not think it was worth it. To me the ethical thing seemed to just listen respectfully to whatever details about such incidents my research participants were willing to share and did not ask too many probing questions about such incidents. So, if that part of chapter 3 lacks theoretical depth, it is because of precisely this failure on my part.

Another important clarification regarding "suspending judgment" is accepting the narrative of my research participants as their valid view of the world. While there were many aspects of my participants' opinions that I couldn't verify independently, I have still included them in the dissertation because they were still influential in shaping how my research participants made sense of their lives. For example, as I mention in chapter 5 that the Khawaja Sira think that the Khawaja Sira will get legally less share in their parents' inheritance if they register as Khawaja Sira as compared to what they would get

if they register as men. However, I couldn't verify this independently because my independent research suggests that both religiously and legally the Khawaja Sira are entitled to the same share in inheritance as that of a man. However, I have reported this perception of the Khawaja Sira in the dissertation because this is an important internal discourse about their choice of legal gender. This is also in line with the idea of "constitutive causality" in interpretive research where the focus of the researcher is on understanding "how humans conceive of their worlds, the language they use to describe them, and other elements constituting that social world, which make possible or impossible the interactions they pursue" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013, 52).

Respondent validation and Inter-textuality

Respondent validation or "member checking" is another way in which the authenticity and transparency of qualitative interpretive research can be enhanced. This practice is different from "quote checking" and instead focuses more on trying to make sure that the researcher was able to understand and interpret the interactions with research participants to the best of his ability. However, as Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2013) note, this practice is also not without complications in interpretive research. For example, one important methodological debate concerns disagreements among the research participants. It is possible for some participants to agree with the interpretations of the researcher and for others to disagree with it. More importantly, in interpretive research, meaning is co-produced and it is not a straightforward claim that if some research participants disagree with the interpretation of the researcher that the researcher should remove those interpretations from his account. Instead, respondent validation, like most other aspects of interpretive qualitative research, should be made transparent so that the

readers can make their own mind and are also aware of disagreements among research participants.

I did respondent validation with the Khawaja Sira in the following manner: For the research participants who I met more than once, respondent validation was done directly by informally discussing themes in the past meeting and my interpretation of those themes. I couldn't meet all of my research participants again because some interviews, while informative, did not prove to be very relevant to my main research themes. Moreover, four of my research participants were part of a local religious ritual in which they walk across different districts and were in Lahore only for a short period of time. I also had two informal group conversations with my research participants in which I discussed my main findings with them (each group comprised of 5 research participants). In such instances, instead of airing major differences, such conversations ended up being meaning making conversations (sometimes even more than the initial formal interviews). For example, in one such session, one research participant, who was relatively reserved in her interview, opened up about her own experience of being morally policed at the workplace after I was discussing how some other Khawaja Sira (without using names) had reported being harassed at work.

In addition, the practice of inter-textuality—the rough equivalent of triangulation in interpretive research—was also a good quality check for the overall themes of my analysis. Inter-textuality refers to analysis across multiple sites, individuals, methods and groups to understand "meaning-making around a particular idea, concept or controversy" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013, 84). This practice prevents researchers from making premature conclusions and instead focuses on understanding ambiguities, contradictions

and heterogeneity in the way a group of individuals responds to a particular research theme (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2013). That is why, it is important to highlight that my research participants neither agreed on every significant issue among themselves nor agreed with my interpretation in all instances. While my narrative is based mostly on how the majority of my research participants responded to a certain theme, it doesn't mean that I have ignored minority voices and opinions. Thus, instead of presenting homogeneous narratives, I have tried to clarify in all chapters that, instead of consensus, heterogeneity in experiences and attitude should be considered the norm. I have also tried to suspend my own judgment on most issues where there was disagreement among the Khawaja Sira. For example, as I noted in chapter 6 in the context of choosing the third gender legally, in chapter 3 about experiences in family, and in chapter 9 about responses to frontline workers, there are significant differences in how the Khawaja Sira experience and respond to their social and personal world.

Another important point of clarification about respondent validation refers to the level of analysis. At the transparent (or instrumental) level of analysis (chapters 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9), there are no substantial differences between my interpretation and overall narrative with that of my research participants. However, chapters 4 and 9 operate on symbolic levels of analysis and should be considered my interpretation based on my fieldwork and subsequent analysis and critical examination of my data. The interpretation of the role of institution of Guru and the Khawaja Sira counterpublic in chapter 4 is the one substantial place in this dissertation where my interpretation differs significantly from majority of my research participants. While privately some Khawaja Sira shared their unease with the institution of the Guru because of their economic dependence and

disciplinary nature of the relationships, a majority of my research participants individually and in the sessions on respondent validation, contested this interpretation. For them, many of whom were Guru themselves, the overwhelmingly positive qualities of the institution of the Guru outweigh any potential negative aspects of the Guru-Chela relationship.

Moreover, I did not share my interpretation of the role of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic as a homogenizing institution (in terms of subject formation) with my research participants because that part of chapter 4 operates at the symbolic level of analysis and is based on my interpretation of the Khawaja Sira community and its role in subject formation of its members. A majority of my research participants consider the Khawaja Sira counterpublic to be a place of refuge for themselves and while I have stated that in chapter 4, I re-iterate it here for the purpose of clarity. While they do characterize it as a broad umbrella under which individuals of different origins and identities find refuge, they will probably not agree with my interpretation of the homogenizing influence of their community on the identity formation of its members. The dominant narrative, as I mentioned in chapters 3 and 4 about the Khawaja Sira, is that most of them were born with a preference for the feminine identity and other performative traits associated with the Khawaja Sira and that is the narrative that should be taken to represent the majority of my research participants.

My interpretation of the role of Khawaja Sira community is based on the few research participants who were kind enough to share their intimate (at times painful) childhood experiences, which contest this narrative and those that openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the institution of the Guru. It was not possible for me to validate

some of those experiences either in personal conversations or group level meetings.

Overall, my interpretation of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic as a disciplinary institution

is, in fact, quite consistent with what most researchers have argued about other social

institutions like family, workplace and educational institutions (Feder 1997: 2007:

Mitchell 2003: Anderson and Grinberg 1999): They function as disciplinary institutions

that encourage particular aspirations and behaviors and discourage others. Still, the reader

should make up their own mind whether they find my narrative about the Khawaja Sira

counterpublic convincing or not and as I mention in chapter 4, at a phenomenological

level, I do not contest the role of Khawaja Sira community as a "structure of care."

Crystallization

Crystallization – an approach similar to inter-textuality but broader in scope –

refers to the practice of using multiple research sites, methods, and theoretical

perspectives to study the research questions (Ellingson 2009). Importantly, crystallization

assumes that "the goal of doing so is not to provide researchers with a more valid singular

truth, but to open up a more complex, in-depth, but still thoroughly partial, understanding

of the issue" (Tracy 2010, 844). Overall, I followed the *integrated crystallization*

approach to create a dissertation that reflects the primary principles of crystallization "in

a single, coherent representation" (Ellingson 2013, 434).

One of the primary ways to do crystallization is by approaching the research

questions through multiple research methods. I have done this by following a mixed-

methods approach and have focused on both the Khawaja Sira as well as the frontline

workers to understand different perspectives and experiences that can help answer my

research questions. Crystallization also entails analyzing the data generated from research

through multiple theoretical lenses which is why I draw from different theoretical perspectives in this dissertation. For example, in addition to relevant PA literatures, I drew from feminist (chapters 6,7,9), queer (chapters 3-10), post-structural (chapters 3-4), post-modern (chapters 3,4,9) and social constructivist (chapters 3-10) theoretical lenses to analyze my data.[18]

Another important component of crystallization is to consider different target audiences and topics and to formulate a text that provides "not just multiple perspectives but a range of perspectives—group, societal, individual, dyadic, critical, appreciative, and so on" (Ellingson 2013, 428). In different chapters of this dissertation, I try to present precisely these range of perspectives related to my research questions. For example, chapter 3 presents societal perspective, chapter 6 a legal perspective, chapters 5,7,8,9 individual and group perspectives and chapter 4 primarily a critical perspective related to my research questions. Moreover, as I mention in Chapters 1 and 10, I consider academics, local policy makers and the Khawaja Sira leadership to be my primary target audiences. As an example, the policy implications of my research in chapter 10 are specifically focused on the local policy makers and the Khawaja Sira leadership as a target audience.

Accounting for Self

Perhaps the most important aspect in which the interpretive qualitative research differs from positivist qualitative research is in terms of the role of researcher. Interpretive research practice considers researcher "contamination" to be inevitable

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[18] The examples of the use of these chapters are meant to highlight the chapters where these approaches are used extensively and are not meant to be exhaustive list of chapters where these approaches are used.

because of different onto-epistemological assumptions about the nature of social world. Accounting for self in qualitative research goes beyond the methodological and theoretical qualifications of the author and relates to the author's multiple subjectivities, experiences, and aspirations which may influence the research process and the interaction with co-participants in research. That is why it is important for interpretive qualitative researchers to consider and discuss explicitly their own role during the research process to highlight how that he or she may have influenced the data that was collected. While I have elucidated some aspects of accounting for self in the discussion of reflexivity and respondent validation, several additional important points should be considered which are mentioned below.

My personal history and background was very helpful during the research process. First, due to my education and brief working experience in medicine, I was called "doctor sahib" by many of my research participants, partly because like many of my American colleagues, some Pakistanis also find it difficult to pronounce and/or remember my name. However, due to this label, most research participants knew about my medical background and a couple of them mentioned that due to this they felt much more comfortable discussing issues related to their gender and sex. Most of my research participants were also experiencing health problems of some sort. At least 10 of them had some sexually transmitted disease (generally Hepatitis B or C). Two of my research participants were diagnosed with hepatitis during my fieldwork. At least one of my research participants was HIV positive. There were also many other health related problems, especially problems with the gastro-intestinal tract and teeth. While I did not provide any medical advice to my research participants, my wife (also a registered

65

medical practitioner) briefed a couple of research participants about the precautions related to sexually transmitted diseases. Later, my wife also referred some of them to a nearby physician who examined them free of cost. My background as a doctor and a part of the civil service[19] was also helpful in opening some doors that might have remained closed to other researchers. For example, it might not have been easy for a researcher without past experience with the government to access the frontline workers of social welfare department and the police given the social context of Pakistan.

Another important aspect relates to my status as an adult cis-gendered male. As I discuss at different points in this dissertation, cis-gendered males generally engage in gender policing of the Khawaja Sira much more frequently as compared to cis-gendered females. Moreover, as the Khawaja Sira prefer men as sexual partners, they also attract many (wanted and unwanted) male suitors. This is where my positionality as a married individual with kids was helpful. Being an adult unmarried male has a different cultural construction in Pakistan as compared to someone who is married and has kids. I felt that this aspect was helpful in dissuading some of the apprehensions my research participants had about a male researcher initially. This is also related to my struggle with journalists during my fieldwork. Many of my research participants were apprehensive of the journalists who, according to several of my research participants, scandalize information given to them. Due to limited social science research in Pakistan, it was at times difficult to explain the difference between a journalist and a researcher apart from the written

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[19] I am a member of the Pakistan Administrative Service (PAS) which "is a general management cadre of the Pakistan's civil services. The officers of this cadre act as managers at district, provincial and finally at the policy-making levels in the highest echelons of the Federal bureaucracy" (http://csa.edu.pk/pakistan-administrative-service/).

consent form. Initially, I addressed these concerned by explaining in detail that I was a doctoral student and that my primary research interest was in understanding how lives of the Khawaja Sira intersected with the state (*hakoomat*). Explaining the written consent form was very helpful in this regard as understanding that there was a code of conduct that I could not violate (regarding ethics, confidentiality and privacy) seemed to address some concerns of my research participants. However, I felt that the concerns of some participants were addressed only during the formal interviews. The focus of my questions on government and my approach of letting them share what they want instead of probing for sensational information helped make them more comfortable during the interview. Moreover, as most journalists have a short-term engagement with the Khawaja Sira for a news article or segment, it was my long-term engagement with the community that helped my gain their trust in the long-run,

The Khawaja Sira community was more forthcoming once they knew my intentions were not to scandalize their life style and sexuality like some journalists, but rather to increase knowledge of their everyday life, citizenship and social inclusion. Despite their poverty, my hosts always offered me something to eat or drink, a custom in Pakistan. As a practice, I do not eat or drink much outside home and generally declined such offers. At one research site where six of my research participants live and where I went four times, during my last visit one of my research participants expressed that they did not like that I did not eat or drink anything at their place. I vividly remember her words, "We might be poor in terms of money, but our hearts are not poor." After that, I started taking tea and/or Coke if and when offered. I mention this incident only because it

is an example of how concerns tangential to the research can influence the engagement of the researcher with the research participants.

Relatedly, living in a research location for more than ten months also means meeting many individuals not directly associated with the research. For someone like me who has also lived in Lahore for many years before the research project, this also meant meeting some acquaintances and distant family members, and making new connections. Many of these conversations were also with government officials. During these conversations, an obvious topic of conversation was my research project. While perhaps not "data" in the familiar positivist sense of the term, these conversations—typical and expected during long-term ethnographic field work—were helpful in deepening my understanding of the cultural symbolization and position of the Khawaja Sira and influenced my overall analysis.

I also was informed, on a personal level, to my relationship to previous scholarship on the Khawaja Sira. Most previous research has been focused only on their sexual practices, internal organization, or disease incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. These themes are not the main part of this dissertation partly because some of these were not directly related to my research questions and partly because it was a methodological and analytical choice. The aim of my research was also *not* to make the Khawaja Sira community more legible in terms of its sexuality, relations of love, and other practices that the society considers "illicit" I did not want to increase the visibility of the Khawaja Sira community as desired by the bio-political power/knowledge industry (to the extent possible) but to instead focus on the themes which could enlighten me and hopefully others about the everyday citizenship and social inclusion of the Khawaja Sira.

Finally, I am a Pakistani. While this was a benefit since it enabled me to negotiate the local cultural terrain more effectively and potential language barriers, it is also possible that due to this background I might have missed some aspects of the Khawaja Sira lives that might be of interest to cultural outsiders. Moreover, my background also makes make me more liable to have some unconscious biases about social relations and I could have taken some aspects of my field setting for granted.

Overall, I have tried my best to follow the different checks for trustworthiness, which are appropriate for my research methodology. My methodological approach, the particular role of the researcher it assumes and the nature of claims it can offer should be kept in mind in rest of this dissertation.

SECTION I

KHAWAJA SIRA IDENTITY FORMATION

There is no subject, no body, sex or gender, prior to the repressive constraints and generative power of culture … If transvestites, hermaphrodites, and other transgender categories occupy a space of desire and possibility, of undecidability, then they do so no less as socially and historically constituted subjects than as those who inhabit the conventional space … they interrupt.

<div align="right">(Johnson 1997, 24-25)</div>

Social institutions play an important role in the formation of the sense of self of any individual. Reproduction of social norms and policing of any perceived deviance, enforced through a range of material-discursive practices, ensures that informal social institutions act as important sites of governing. For example, as shown by Kupchik and Catlaw (2015) enforcement of disciplinary norms in educational institutions may have long-term influence on long term civic participation of the next generation. Similarly, multiple studies have shown that conformity to the communication style and interactional pattern of middle class white individuals is prioritized in multiple public institutions including workplace and educational institutions (Moss and Tilly 1996; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1991). On the other hand, social institutions can also act as a buffer for marginalized groups, providing a safer environment to socialize and navigate different aspects of identity formation.

Among the informal social institutions, family is perhaps the most important social institution influencing one's identity formation, especially during childhood and adolescence. Families can play different roles depending upon how they perceive deviant social identities. For example, supportive families have been found to have a protective effect on various aspects of mental health and identity of gay and lesbian adolescents (Hershberger and D'Augelli 1995; Savin-Williams 1989). On the other hand, negative attitude of families has been found to be associated with increased suicidal tendencies, estrangement and overall lower levels of mental health in the same demographic (D'Augelli, Hershberger and Pilkington 1998; D'Augelli and Hershberger 1993). Similarly, in the case of transgender youth, the nature of family support (or lack thereof) has often been found to have a significant influence on their behavior (Grossman et al.

2005) with most transgender individuals receiving less social support from their families (Factor and Rothblum 2007) and many reporting falling-out from their biological families after coming out as transgender (Xavier and Simmons 2000).

While most aforementioned research on families has focused on parents' attitudes towards their transgender children, the role of siblings in the familial experiences of the young transgender children remains largely unexplored. The few studies that have focused on understanding the relationship between transgender children and their cis-gendered siblings have found that children are often contemptuous and aggressive towards their transgender siblings (Boszormenyi-Nagy and Spark 1984; Brill and Pepper, 2013) and that such behavior by the siblings is often demoralizing for the young transgender individuals (Nuttbrock et al. 2009; Reddy 2005).

Peer groups are also an important social institution for identity formation. Multiple studies have found LGBT students experience multiple types of verbal and physical harassment from their peers in schools (Kosciw et al. 2008; Greytak et al. 2009; D'Augelli et al. 2002; McGuire et al. 2010). Similarly, Safren and Heimberg (1999) found that lack of peer support was a significant factor in predicting psychological and social problems among sexual minority adolescents. On the other hand, peer relations formed among minority students can also be a significant avenue of social support for such individuals increasing their overall self-esteem and reported self-efficacy (Solberg and Villarreal 1997).

Counterpublics – "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (1990, 67) – are an important peer

72

group for their members. As Warner (2002) notes, counterpublics play an important role in fostering a group identity by influencing the subjectivity and personalities of their members. This formation of a group identity enables counterpublics to make identity based claims from the dominant publics. That is why deviation from internal norms of acceptable behavior is generally discouraged within counterpublics to make sure that members comply with the social constructed identity of their respective counterpublics.

Consequently, in this section, I discuss the social construction and categorization of the Khawaja Sira in the two most influential informal social institutions of their lives: family and the Khawaja Sira counter-public. As I discuss in detail in the next two chapters, these institutions play an important role in the identity formation and experiences of social marginalization for the Khawaja Sira.

I understand that it may be atypical to start from a discussion of extra-administrative experiences, since public administration research primarily focuses on the administrative order while limited attention is paid to the "extra" administrative order – the spaces and interactions taking place outside organizational spaces (Catlaw 2007; Rawlings and Catlaw 2011). However, this focus on the informal institutions is warranted for multiple reasons.

First, limiting the analyses of citizen-state interactions to formal political institutions like bureaucracy is problematic because as noted by researchers on civic participation (Kupchik and Catlaw 2014), administrative burden (Moyinhan, Herd and Harvey 2014) and public service motivation (Perry 1997); the formal and informal institutional orders not only overlap but are also implicated in the creation of each other (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Jenkins 2000; Stiglitz 2000). In addition, as Catlaw (2007)

73

notes, one of the most important aspects of disciplinary technologies of government in contemporary societies is that they permeate through the entire society. Therefore, it is important not to limit the analytics of government only to formal institutions. Furthermore, scholars like Althusser (1971), Bourdieu (1989), and Judith Butler (1993), argued that marginalized individuals are influenced not only by formal misrecognition but also affected by subtler forms of discipline and control exerted in formal and informal social institutions which are equally important for the social and individual identity of marginalized individuals. As the extra-administrative spaces and interactions substantively contribute to the experience of social marginalization, a comprehensive "politics of the subject" (Catlaw 2007) must concern itself with a study the subject formation of marginalized individuals within significant social institutions like the family and peer groups.

Second, marginalized communities often have internal discourses that inform how members of these groups assess social policies and programs (Dietz 2002; Northcote and Casimiro 2010). Such internal discourses and assessments, based on distinct experiences of marginalization and homogenizing influences of significant peers may, in the end, hinder understanding and, perhaps, constructive engagements with administrative systems. A study of extra-administrative experiences and these internal discourses of the marginalized individuals is especially important because, as I discuss in chapter 6 and 7, lack of a fuller understanding of these extra-administrative orders can lead to distinctive and sometimes unexpected burdens that administrative systems impose on marginalized individuals.

Finally, this section will also help readers not familiar with the particular social context and position of the Khawaja Sira by presenting a thick description (Geertz 1973) of the Khawaja Sira identity formation and the multiple origins of the disparate individuals joining the Khawaja Sira community. As Denzin and Lincoln (2005, 39) note, thick description "goes beyond the mere or bare reporting of an act (think description) but describes and probes the intentions, motives, meanings, contexts, situations, and circumstances of action." Thick description not only anchors the interpretive research findings of qualitative research within their proper context but also "enables readers to transfer information to other settings" (Creswell 1998, 203) thereby increasing the trustworthiness of qualitative interpretive research.

CHAPTER 3

DISCIPLINING THE GENDER ABERRATIONS: FAMILY AND THE KHAWAJA

SIRA BECOMING

When I began my research, it seemed that all of my research participants had the

following generic, ready-made response when I asked them how why and how they

joined the Khawaja Sira community.

> *From the beginning, I used to like playing with girls. I loved playing with dolls. I*
> *also liked putting on my mother's (or sister's) make-up, wearing feminine clothes*
> *and dancing. I also used to perform feminine roles at home. My family couldn't*
> *accept that as I grew up. That is the reason why I left home and joined the*
> *Khawaja Sira community. (Feminine Preference)*

However, it was only gradually that I began to understand that this homogenizing

narrative, in fact, hides a whole range of underlying heterogeneous origins of the

individuals who eventually become a Khawaja Sira, many of which do not have anything

to do with their desire to be performative women. As I gradually became more familiar

with the Khawaja Sira and their vernacular (*Farsi*), some of my research participants

were kind enough to open up about their childhood. Consider the following narratives by

my research participants for why and/or how they joined the Khawaja Sira community.

> *Narrative 1 (External Categorization): I was not really into dancing [in my*
> *childhood]. However, I had to do it because of my Chacha (paternal uncle). He*
> *would order me to dance for him on songs and if I refused, he would beat me or*
> *tell my father that I was dancing. Once I was dancing on my Chacha's orders,*
> *when my father came back home. He hung me upside down from the roof till my*

76

eyes became red with blood. Finally, my mother had to cut me down. My father's

cousin was also there. He also told my father that it was his brother who had

ordered me to dance but he did not believe him either. He only believed his

brother… Some Khawaja Sira used to visit our village. I became interested in

[joining and being like] them because of my Chacha. (Shama)

Narrative 2 (Rape): Only those who have been raped in youth join this [the

Khawaja Sira] community… Once you have been raped, that never leaves you

since everyone around you knows that about you. Such people, even if they leave

their homes and shift somewhere else know this in their hearts [that they were

raped]. Gradually, such people start developing feelings that they should have a

boyfriend … The Khawaja Sira always starts like that. (Chanda)

Narrative 3 (Impotence): What would we have done staying at our homes? We

were not worthy of marriage [a reference to impotence]. Why should we spoil the

life of someone's daughter? So, we came here [with the Khawaja Sira]. Only

those should come in this field, whose front is dead [a euphemism for impotence].

(Meera)

Narrative 4 (Biological and/or Operation): I am like this by birth. My parents

knew everything [that I couldn't have a normal life]. So, they handed me over to

the Khawaja Sira when I was very young. I had no penis, only balls. So, I got rid

of them when I grew up. (Sakeena)

77

These are some of the narratives that represent the heterogeneous nature of individual origin stories among the Khawaja Sira. Since these narratives are important to understand the experiences of different individuals joining the Khawaja Sira community, in the discussion that follows, I have mentioned the narrative of origin after the quotes of my research participants in this chapter. This will help clarify the particular origin of each research participant and highlight the heterogeneity in their experiences. Note that these different narratives are not always discrete. For example, narratives of some participants could be classified under more than one category (for example rape and impotence). In such cases, I have either mentioned both narratives or used my best judgment to label the origin of such participants. This use of narrative codes should be considered a cautious and potentially imperfect exercise done to provide better context to the quotes provided by my research participants. The reason these codes are mentioned only in this chapter is to underscore the fact that after joining the community, these genealogies cease to be significant for the intersections between the Khawaja Sira and the government. Overall, 32 of my research participants presented the feminine preference, 5 impotence, 7 biological, 2 external categorization, and 4 rape narrative as the predominant determinant of their identity. Four (two biological, two feminine preference) of my research participants had surgically modified their bodies and also presented it as an important determinant of their identity.

As Reddy (2005) notes, there are various historical and local discourses that cast such disparate individuals as "unmales" or "third-gender." As I discuss in this chapter, such discourses circulating through families, friends, and the extended kinship networks,

either cast these disparate individuals as wasted bodies (Bauman 2004) that have no business residing in the realm of the "normal" productive bodies of society or, if deemed remediable, are disciplined to behave as normal productive gendered bodies.

Living with the Family

Family is an important informal boundary making apparatus where individuals are classified along the normal/abnormal axis. This classification plays an important role in enforcing the social norms related to gender and sexuality (Feder 1997). More importantly, the experiences of my research participants suggest that deviation from the gender norms of society is not taken lightly within families. Indeed, family acts as the principle site where any individual deemed to be deviating from the gender norms of society is exposed to a range of disciplinary techniques aimed at correcting their socially defined deviant behavior.

As I discuss below, the disciplinary practices and violence to which the young Khawaja Sira are exposed are not solely due to a concern for them but also for the preservation of the institutions of family and the individuals within it.[20] The institution of family is exposed to disciplinary pressures mediated through the extended kinship networks, neighbors, and friends of the family who make sure that the dominant gender norms are followed within each family.

Categorization at Birth

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[20] It is pertinent to mention that some form of disciplinary corporal punishment (like spanking) by parents is common in many families in Pakistan (Crane 1996). However, as I discuss below, the nature and quantum of violence hurled towards the Khawaja Sira kids by their parents and elder siblings is of a much more extreme nature and can result in fractures and muscular injuries.

As soon as a baby is born, the agential cut effected by the intra-action between a material-discursive apparatus comprising of the entangled bodies of the parents, doctors, bureaucratic rules, social norms, academic discourses, the material surroundings and the multiple non-human material agencies leads to the declaration of "it's a girl!" or "it's a boy!" The entangled material agency of the yet undifferentiated and uncategorized body of the new born is significant in this intra-action as the child with undifferentiated genitalia leads to a different agential cut by the boundary making apparatuses of society as compared to a new born with (socially defined) normal genitalia.

When I met one of the elder Gurus of the Khawaja Sira, she had an infant in her lap (about 3 months old). She told me that the child's parents had given her to the Khawaja Sira and now she would raise her as her daughter as she had done many times before. The Guru herself had been sold by her parents when she was very young. According to her, that transaction had happened on legal documents after which her Guru had become her legal guardian. She also noted that the Khawaja Sira try to make sure that "their things" end up where they belong; with the Khawaja Sira:

> *When we come to know that there is our thing [saadi shay] born in any one's home, we go there and demand that our thing be given to us. Sometimes the cases even go to court but the courts have decided that our thing should be given to us[21](Rania - Biological)*

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[21] I couldn't verify this assertion of the Guru independently. Unless a Guru becomes the official guardian of a child, there is no legal basis on which the Khawaja Sira can claim a child as their own. This was most likely an example of the Guru narrating an internal discourse about the legality of their children adoption practice.

While for the state, the "m" or "f" written on the birth certificate is important, it has little significance to the phenomenological life of the new born. The primary socialization of the child through her parents and significant others is much more important. These children raised by the Khawaja Sira acquire the habits, norms, and roles traditionally associated with being a Khawaja Sira. As Jenkins (2000, 11) notes, it is the parents and our significant others who tell a child "who she is and what she should do." It is these initial encounters and experiences which lay the foundations of what we later term an individual.[22] These early experiences are important because the intra-actions in childhood are critical in the development of the embodied "hinterland of routine and unreflective habit … created in the course of the early verbal and non-verbal dialogue – a complex interaction of separation from and identification with – between the child and significant others" (Jenkins 1994, 204-205). Such experiences ensure that such individuals develop habits, expectations, and behaviors in line with what society considers "normal" for those it classifies as "not-normal."

Some others who are classified as imperfect men at birth live a few years at home. However, their parents raise them differently as compared to their other children. For example, two of my research participants mentioned that they were not enrolled in school by their parents even though their siblings went to school and college[23]. Several others

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[22] An important term in Foucauldian analytics of power, the term individual "is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the primary effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals" (Foucault 1980, 98).

[23] To put this in context, gross enrollment ratio (GER) (primary) in Pakistan was about 91 in 2014 with male and female GER being 97% and 83% respectively (Pakistan Education Statistics 2014-2015). The GER is likely to be much lower for children labeled as Khawaja Sira in childhood. More importantly,

who did go to school had to leave because of harassment or teasing at school by teachers or peers. While there are no educational statistics available about the Khawaja Sira of Pakistan, as an example, only 6 of the 50 Khawaja Sira I interviewed had completed high school. As I discuss in the next chapter, this educational discrimination results in very few Khawaja Sira being literate and having limited traditional job opportunities. Similarly, a few of my participants mentioned that their family members used to ask them to perform chores at home (like cleaning, washing dishes) traditionally associated with females in Pakistan. As two of my participants (biological) pointed out it, their "parents knew everything from the beginning" and treated them accordingly. When their children are a bit older (6-10 years), such parents are often happy to give up or occasionally sell their children to the Khawaja Sira. For example, Naima (biological) was sent to live with the Khawaja Sira by her (maternal) grandfather when she was very young by telling her "My child you should go with them. Now they are your family[24]."

Categorization at Adolescence

For most of my research participants, adolescence was the time when the family-child institution is most threatened. As adolescents navigate a mostly unknown terrain to make sense of the changes happening to their bodies and psyche as well as to those around them, the gender related disciplinary norms of society are felt the most. It is at this time that the boy who likes to wear feminine jewelry, clothing or make-up transforms

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primary and secondary school completion rates are likely to be very low among such children as compared to the cis-gendered children.

[24] A friend of Naghma told me later that her family had actually sold her to the Khawaja Sira but I did not ask her that directly as she had not shared that information with me and that might have been embarrassing for her to admit. There are multiple such stories of abandonment and being taken in that circulate in the Khawaja Sira world, whether or not they are factual accounts was not possible to ascertain.

from a mildly amusing inconvenience into a major problem of preserving the honor of family. As I discuss below, the initial response of all significant apparatuses including family, friends, and peers is to try to correct this apparent aberration; when "m" is considered the only valid and legitimate gender for a biological boy, any performance of "f" by such a boy is naturally treated as a mistake or an error that needs to be corrected. Hence, it is made sure that a boy's hair is cut like boys, that he wears colors appropriate for boys, plays the games that are masculine, and strictly stays away from anything remotely feminine; and this is done not only for those who have aberrant bodies, but even for those who are "normal." The fear of potential costs of transgressing gender boundaries is so great that parents enforce them with no exceptions.

In some cases, the initial response of the family is to try to find a simple reason for the "abnormal" behavior of their "son." For example, the parents of some my research participants thought that interacting with women or performing feminine chores at home leads to feminine behavior, betraying the underlying understanding of femininity as a contagion.

> *I used to read Quran from a woman. After my family came to know of my dispositions, they shifted me to a male teacher [hoping that it would help improve my situation]. (Kaaf - Feminine Preference)*

> *People used to say that I am like this because I am the only brother of five sisters. (Tahseen – Feminine Preference)*

As Winter (2006) notes in the context of gender queer individuals in Thailand, in some cases gender queer individuals also report that proximity to females or performing

83

feminine roles at home played an important role in their identity development. Consider Shahida's reply when I asked her why she joined the Khawaja Sira community.

I am like this from the beginning. We were three brothers [including me]. We had no sister. My mother used to be unwell all the time. So, to help her, I used to perform all the chores at home [usually done by women like] cooking, washing clothes, doing dishes. I did not let her do anything. I also used to play like a girl. I learnt all the [feminine] things myself as I did not have a sister. (Shahida – Feminine Preference)

It should be noted that this is not something limited to the Khawaja Sira. Even the "normal" bodied children are expected and encouraged to play with their own gender and to engage in gender appropriate activities. So while a mother will invite a girl child to play in the kitchen, learn to do cooking, make bread, she will usually push her son out of the kitchen in Pakistan. Even though taking care of parents is an important social and religious duty, if a son tries to sweep floor or goes in the kitchen to help his mother, she will not let him, since conforming to gender boundaries trumps other day to day concerns.

Once these initial measures are not taken seriously, the disciplinary apparatuses, especially the family, regress to gender policing by violence. Consider the following narratives by my research participants:

When my father came to know that I had been skipping school to go with my Khawaja Sira friends to watch movie shootings and do other stuff [like playing with dolls], he tied me up with a tree and watered the soil underneath with sweetened water. A large number of ants came out, covered my legs and started

biting my legs. As I was screaming with pain, my father kept asking me that I will set you free if you promise not to go with your friends again. But I told him that can never happen. One of my sisters who was married and lived in a house nearby ran to our home when she heard my screams and cut my ties to set me free. She removed the ants which had been stuck in my legs with a knife ... She angrily asked my father, "Do you read magazines?" He said yes. She asked him "Do you read newspapers?" to which he also replied in the affirmative. She then said, "You can't read this. This is a different world. This is a different field. He has a different social circle. His performativity (adakari) at home is different [from who she really is]. You are an educated person. Why do you argue with him daily? (Nadia – Feminine Preference)

My father was in police and my elder brothers were lecturers… They just did not accept this [my femininity]. They used to say we judge the disputes in the neighborhood [implying social prestige], how can [we let] this happen in our home? They used to try to change me both verbally and by force but I did not stop. My father was in police. He used to ask his subordinate [SHO] to detain me overnight. In the morning, he would come and ask me, "So, will you behave now?" and I would respond [in an exaggerated feminine style] "Oho! I am still exactly the same." (Saira – Feminine Preference)

I used to love dancing. When I started to meet with the Khawaja Sira and went to a function (as a dancer) with them, someone told my family about it. They beat me

so much that my ankle got fractured. I have not been able to dance properly ever since. I left my home soon after that. (Sheela – External Categorization)

I started meeting my [Khawaja Sira] sahelyan [feminine friends] and also started dancing and singing with them. My family did not like that and tried to stop me. I would stop for 3-4 days and then start doing the same things again. My father and my elder brother used to beat me so much. I belong to the Jatt clan. There wasn't anyone like me in our clan before me. (Reema – Feminine Preference)

When we come into this line, there is often violence by parents. They say, "you bring us a bad name by going to these people [the Khawaja Sira]. We are not such people." But these people [the Khawaja Sira] are also God's creations. There is nothing wrong in [being like] them. After all, they were made by God, not by people. (Laiba – Feminine Preference)

It is often in adolescence that the Khawaja Sira face the most abuse from family and friends. This violence is often the result of the classifying apparatuses of society created to label everyone as "m" or "f" trying to correct the occasional aberrations. During my field work I have come to realize that the abuse the young Khawaja Sira often face is because of the dominant social discourse in Pakistani society that the only authentic Khawaja Sira are the ones who were born that way, with ambiguous genitalia. All other individuals are considered unauthentic pretenders by their significant others. Resultantly, the family members, friends and the extended family all act as re-calibrating

86

apparatuses that try to shame, beat or humiliate the Khawaja Sira into the normal binary system of gender.

What Will the Neighbors Think?

This policing of gender norms is not always driven by a concern for the child but for the whole assemblage of the family. As Feder (2007) notes that for the circulation of disciplinary power, "the effects of panopticism[25] are marked not only in the internalization of the gaze of the 'headkeeper' (or warden or parent); they are revealed, too, in the question 'What will the neighbors think?'" (15) and the fact that "not only that the organization of the family as an institution" is based on the dictates of disciplinary power "but also that its 'anchor point,' as Foucault puts it, lies outside the institution … in, for example, the gaze of 'other families.'" (15)

Having a Khawaja Sira child exposes the whole family to a range of disciplinary techniques by the macro-level apparatuses trying to ensure that the family conforms to the dominant social norms. As one of my research participants noted,

> *The problem is not with our family but the broader society. No one lets families*
>
> *with children like us live normally. (Guria – Feminine Preference)*

Extended family members, peers, friends, and schools play an important role in making sure that the Khawaja Sira either accept their status as human waste or conform to the gender norms in society. Having a gender queer individual makes the "honor" of the whole family vulnerable. By asking the question "Is your brother a Khawaja Sira?"

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[25] A reference to panopticon, an institutional structural design recommended by Jeremy Benthem as an ideal place to monitor deviant behavior by continuous, imperious surveillance. In an ideal panopticon, one watchman in a central position can monitor the movement of all inmates/occupants of the building who can't tell whether they are being monitored or not at a particular time.

again and again, the society makes sure that every member of the family realizes that they need to play their role in ensuring that their gender queer family member either conforms to the gender assigned at their birth or leave home. Consider the following accounts of my research participants:

> *My brother used to go to the same school as me. When his friends used to tease me for the [feminine] way I walked, he used to become angry with me and used to say why don't you walk normally [like a boy]. What could I do about it? (Nargis – Biological)*

> *My parents accepted me for who I am but we can't stay at our homes whether our families accept us or not… Other children tell us from the beginning that we are different. (Guria – Feminine Preference)*

As Pascoe (2007) notes, these naming and shaming practices are not just significant for creating the constitutive outside to the normal society, but that these practices belie the continuous labor required to maintain the normalcy of the heteronormative binary gendered system. "The fag is an 'abject' position, a position outside of masculinity that actually constitutes masculinity. Thus, masculinity, in part becomes the daily interactional work of repudiating the 'threatening specter' of the fag" (342)

As I discussed at the start of this chapter, not all individuals fit this generic narrative of a biologically male child who, adopting the gender identity of a woman, is exposed to the disciplinary discourses of society. Instead, many Khawaja Sira are

exposed to discourses that are historically associated with impotence in the sub-continent (Reddy 2005). Such individuals gradually internalize the social discourse that if they were raped in the childhood, they have become permanently unfit to be the active partner (a penetrator to put it crudely) in sex. Resultantly, the only option left for them is to accept their (socially defined) imperfection. Consider for example the following narrative of Radha and Chandi,

> *My teacher asked me to come to his home for tuition and then gave me something to drink. When I woke up, I had no clothes and I was bleeding. He threatened me that if I told someone about it, he would say that it was all my idea. From then on it became a routine that I would go to my teacher's home and he would abuse me… I think that if my teacher hadn't abused me, I wouldn't have become a Khawaja Sira. (Radha – Rape)*

> *Once you have been raped, that never leaves you since everyone around you knows that about you. Such people, even if they leave their homes and shift somewhere else know this in their hearts [that they were raped]. Gradually, such people start developing feelings that they should have a boyfriend … The Khawaja Sira always starts like that. (Chandi – Rape)*

On the other hand, the Khawaja Sira who think they are impotent face a different form of agony. Due to lack of sex education and overall openness about issues related to sexual health, such individuals either do not open up about their condition to their family or, if they do, are simply not believed by their parents. The end result in both scenarios is similar; the family pushes such individuals to get married as soon as possible. Nothing is

as more of an anathema for the parents of a "man" than the fact that he will not marry. It is truer for the families of lower socioeconomic class where children of either sex are married soon after adolescence. The idea that their son will never marry and hence never reproduce is simply not entertained. One of my research participants had to run from home after her marriage to a girl was scheduled by her family. A couple of other research participants also mentioned that their families were planning to get them married.

> *Our parents say get married. How can we get married when we are not "fit"*
> *(qabil) for marriage? Why should we spoil the life of someone else's daughter?*
> *If we marry someone else even though we are not fit for it, will it be better that*
> *when we will be out [of the home], other men will enter our homes[26] [to have sex*
> *with our wives] or we get divorced? Won't it bring a bad name to our families?*
> *(Shabana – Impotence)*

Another mentioned that even now when she visits home, her parents implore her to get married (to a woman). This remedy of marriage is something that is prescribed to all Khawaja Sira by their families who think that this "phase" of deviance will disappear as soon as they are married. However, hardly any of my research participants agree to this remedy. While my research participants did mention that some individuals do submit to their parents' wishes and agree to marriage, I never met such a person.

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[26] A reference to the complex social discourses surrounding impotence, sexuality and sexual performance in Pakistan. The participant is invoking the underlying social construction of heterosexual intercourse being central to the institution of marriage. This statement has two meanings; First, recognizing the "imperfect masculinity" of the research participant, other men will approach his wife rather openly. Second, the wife not being sexually satisfied by her husband will seek satisfaction elsewhere.

In all cases, eventually the family and the child are left with only two choices; either make sure that the "not-normal" child conforms to the gender and sexuality related norms prescribed by society or the child be removed from the family. As one of my participants mentioned, "We can't stay at home. Our family says we are insulted if you stay. We can't show our face to anyone." Or consider the following account of Komal, whose experience epitomizes the reality that often the individuals who were judged to be deviating from the socially acceptable gender roles were pushed to join the Khawaja Sira through a variety of formal and informal ways,

> *People used to stalk me when I came back from the school. You know (they recognize us) because of the way we walk. You know what kind of preconceived notions people have about us. They think that we are bad people or beggars. People generally think badly about us. I used to become so sad that now I would have to live with them [the Khawaja Sira]. The Khawaja Sira in our area used to come to our home and fight with my family. They used to say "this is our thing.[27] You have to give it to us. Let her live with us" ... Finally, my mother said "If you want to live life as you want, you should go with them. Otherwise, we will lose social respect in our extended family. You know people talk. They speak badly about people like you." Then they (my parents) left me with the Khawaja Sira... I was about 11-12-year-old at the time... (Komal – Rape)*

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[27] Note the use of the term "thing" by Komal. It connects with Douglas' (1966) interpretation of "things" out of place being problematic for society and suggests how the counter publics can also reinforce proper placement of "things" social perceived to be out of place.

Occasionally, the apparatuses do succeed in removing the aberration. That is why, some of my research participants mentioned that they also knew individuals who live all their lives hiding their true selves because they are afraid to come out and live their lives as they want. That is also why the adolescence is often a time of great anxiety and guilt for the Khawaja Sira as they try to figure out what is wrong with them:

> *My family used to not even include me in the family photos. I used to never say a thing at the time but now I feel angry when I think about that… I used to think that I am doing something wrong. I loved my parents. They were always impressing upon me that I should get married [with a woman]. So, for their satisfaction, I went to a doctor for medical check-up to see if I was fit for marriage. But he said I wasn't. I also tried to commit suicide after that and faced so many psychological problems. (Teena – Rape, Impotence)*

In a society where compliance to parents' orders is idolized, people like Teena spend their youth grappling with multiple emotions like grief, shame, loneliness, and stigma. This fight with the self and others often ends in the Khawaja Sira leaving their families to live permanently as Khawaja Sira.

Leaving the Family

Eventually, almost all Khawaja Sira end up leaving or being kicked out of their homes. After that, the doors of their homes generally remain closed for the rest of their lives, especially if they insist on continuing to living as a Khawaja Sira. The social norms of normalization and categorization don't allow the deviants to share the same space as its most prized institution of normalcy, the family.

I can't go back home as my elder brother says, "This Khawaja Sira [Khusra] shouldn't come in our house. He will corrupt our children." (Razia – Feminine Preference)

Our families abandon us to preserve their honor. That is also why they don't give us any share in inheritance. If we go to visit our family and try to give some money [which is customary], they don't accept it. They say, "We don't want your begged money." (Nazia – Feminine Preference)

I went to meet my sister. Her son said about me, "Who is this small ghost [badawa]? What is he doing here?" (Shumaila – Feminine Preference, Operation)

I don't go home anymore. When someone is not respected somewhere, why would s/he go there? (Jeem – Impotence)

This act of severance was perhaps signified the best by Tahseen's father who, after she refused to "be a man" and left home, declared in a public newspaper that his son had died.

In a few cases, even after the Khawaja Sira leave their homes, the family apparatuses continue to try to force them to come back to the "normal" society by abandoning their deviant identities. For example, Jeem's family twice took her home [in another city] from Lahore by telling her that her mother was not well. When at home, they forced her to give up her life as a Khawaja Sira and even cut her long hair short

considered suitable for a man. However, once the Khawaja Sira leave their homes, they seldom return to their homes of their own accord.

There are, however, exceptions to this pattern of leaving family. Take the example of Kaaf, a well-educated Khawaja Sira who was first a school teacher and then a hospital receptionist but had to leave both jobs after it was discovered that she was a Khawaja Sira. She had to eventually go back to her family after an eye ailment affected her vision and she was not able to carve out a living. However, with a few exceptions where the parents come around and accept a Khawaja Sira as she is, going back almost always means learning to live as a man again. Kaaf had to get her hair cut short and start wearing only masculine clothing when she decided to go back home. It is only when she meets other Khawaja Sira that she can talk or behave like them.

While their families and society play an important role in making sure that the Khawaja Sira don't end up living with their families, there are also important discourses among the Khawaja Sira that can best be characterized as sense-making (Weick 1995) discourses which rationalize their *choice* to leave their homes. Many Khawaja Sira say that leaving house is the inevitable choice for them even if their family members want them to live with them.

> *Our life and the life of a whore is similar. The only difference is that we are*
>
> *Khawaja Sira and they are women otherwise life is similar. They also do fashion*
>
> *and eat. Even if they have children they can't get away from it. Consider the*
>
> *example of [a stage actress] she has two children., she has done toba [decided to*
>
> *abandon the sinful lifestyle] twice but see what happened. She has come back to*
>
> *this field… the society doesn't allow us to lead a normal life. (Chandi – Rape)*

These discourses make sure that living with family, while always a fantasy, is never a realistic goal of the Khawaja Sira who either consider themselves undeserving to live with family or rationalize their segregation from the "normal" society.

If we stay at home, our brother and his wife are going to sit together and have their own conversation. They have a solid connection with the family and tribe. Similarly, our sister gets married and starts a different life and has her own family and tribe. When we can't have family or connections like that, we feel an emptiness inside which urges us to go live among people like us… so that we can be happy and live life as we want. (Neelo – Feminine Preference)

Our families try to keep us but we don't stay. When our 'business' is different what do we have to do in our homes…The Khawaja Sira don't stay at their homes. They are only happy among their own folk (other Khawaja Sira). We will go visit our relatives for about 20 minutes and then come back. (Hameedo – Feminine Preference)

De-Constructing the Family

In this chapter, I have focused primarily on the operation of disciplinary practices within family that try to make sure that the members of the family conform to the gender norms of society. As I discussed above, family, and significant others often play an equally important role in making sure that the gender queer individuals either become "normal" by conforming to their gender assigned at birth or get relegated to the formal and informal social institutions meant to "keep them in their place" where it is "normal" for such people to end up.

95

However, so far I have explained the influence of family in the lives of Khawaja Sira mostly as if family is a homogeneous whole. On the contrary, many Khawaja Sira reported significant differences between men and women in their families when it comes to enforcing gender related norms. As I discuss in chapter 8 as well, the gender policing roles are generally reserved for men in Pakistani society. The family is no exception to this rule where, for a majority of my participants, it was often either the father or the brothers who were obsessed with making sure that their child "acts like a man" and also often resorted to violence to make sure that this command was followed. While women also occasionally participated in gender policing, their methods were generally far less violent. Mothers and sisters were generally more understanding and tolerant of crossing the gender boundaries than fathers and brothers.

> *We don't want to leave our homes but our brothers do mudslinging directed at us. They say "Oye Khusrea! Oye Zananea! Why are you standing here? Get the hell out of here. We don't stay at home due to such insults. Parents don't say a thing but our brother's honor is harmed by us. We did not get born like this out of our choice but God's. After all, our soul was given to us by God. Our brothers shouldn't hate us so much. (Kausar - Feminine Preference)*

A few of my research participants who do visit their families after leaving or being kicked out of their homes generally only mentioned their mother (and occasionally sisters) as the reason for visiting their homes. Similarly, mother was the only figure in family which most of my participants remembered fondly. For example, Gulzar, who was one of the saddest persons I met during my fieldwork, used to remember her mother very fondly:

My mother never said a bad word to me. Even when everyone used to say bad things about me, she would say, "He is my son and I am going to live with him." I don't meet anyone else [in my family]. Even if my sister won't say a thing, her husband will. He will say to my sister, "Our honor (izzat) will suffer if he comes to our home. If you have to meet him, you can visit him. He shouldn't come to our home… When my mother used to see any Khawaja Sira on street, she would ask them, "Come here! Do you know Gulzar? He is my son." When they would say, "Yes! He is our elder, our Guru!" She would become very happy and tell me all the details when she used to come back home. She would say, "They also offered me tea and offered to give the rent of my rickshaw but I refused." I would say, "It is their duty. They should do this. You are like their grandmother." She used to love all the Khawaja Sira. She used to say, "If your soul is like this, [why should I hate the other Khawaja Sira], they are also children of someone else." (Gulzar – Feminine Preference)

Similarly, Ashi's mother forced his father to find her after she had left home. When Ashi (Feminine Preference) was finally found, she told her husband and sons who were the reason Ashi left home, "All of you can live wherever you want. I am going to live with my Ashi… I can't bear to live without her anymore."

Many of my participants also mentioned the death of their mother as the moment that terminated their relationship with their family permanently.

When my mother died, my elder brother said when mom was alive, we were related. [Now that she is dead], don't ever come to this home again. (Shahida - Feminine Preference)

97

My brothers burnt my books after my mother's death. They beat me so much and said that you are lucky that we paid your school and admission fees when mother was alive. Don't expect this to happen now. (Chandi – Rape)

But not all mothers are loving, and like Saleha's mother who used to beat her for doing make up and wearing feminine clothing ever though her father never said a thing, not all fathers are patriarchal monsters.

Once there was a circus organized [in my city] where I met other Khawaja Sira who invited me to join with them. So, I joined them without telling my family as I was afraid of my father. For one year they did not know where I am and continued to search for me. After he found me, an elder Khawaja Sira advised my father that there was no use in hitting me or taking me back. "She will come back to us again. So, you should compromise so that her fear [of your punishment] can be erased", she said to my father. My father finally understood in that moment [that this was not something temporary] and gave me permission to live my life as I wanted (Saleha – Biological & Operation).

Family and Public Administration

In a society where the family and informal social networks often play a significant role in navigating the governmental bureaucracy, there are also other important consequences of leaving the family. As Singerman (2006) notes, "transgressing the familial ethos comes with costs, as individuals may not be able to find … a job … or successfully negotiate the bureaucracy because their network of kin, neighbors, or friends does not consider them honorable, mature, or dependable and excludes them from

98

networks" (14). This lack of co-operation by family has important ramifications for the Khawaja Sira.

As I discuss in the chapters on citizen-state interactions, the normalizing interests of families continue to influence the interactions between the Khawaja Sira and the state in multiple important ways. For example, the identity management rules of the state often require the Khawaja Sira to go back to their biological families and ask for various favors. Without these favors, which seldom come without a cost, the Khawaja Sira find themselves stranded in their bid to get a legal ID from the state. Similarly, as discussed in chapter 8, the everyday experiences of interacting with frontline workers of police are very different for the Khawaja Sira who remain in touch with their families and can therefore tap into their social capital, as compared to those who do not have the same luxury. As O'Neil (1986) notes, the modern bureaucracy depends to a great degree on disciplinary subject formation in the social institutions like family as it facilitates the state in ensuring compliance of its subjects through mechanisms other than direct violence. Resultantly, when it comes to individual identity management, the state and society represent a nexus at which there are similar interests. Resultantly, the individuals deviating from the family norms face higher administrative burdens by the state and those discarded by the state categorization schemas are exposed to multiple disciplinary discourses in family.

In addition to the instrumental role of family in facilitating or hindering access to administrative services of the state, an even more important implication of my analysis in this chapter is for public administrators to be cognizant of the multiple internal discourses of marginalized communities. Such communities have narratives that circulate and

99

exclude other narratives that are considered socially unacceptable. While helpful in fostering a group identity and as a coping mechanism against recounting painful memories, in the end, such discourses can hinder understanding and, perhaps, constructive engagements with administrative systems.

For example, as I will discuss in chapter 5 in detail, the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira is premised on an incomplete understanding of the multiple genealogies of individuals in the Khawaja Sira community. Without understanding that many Khawaja Sira are not born Khawaja Sira but end up joining the Khawaja Sira community due to multiple diverse discourses, policy makers cannot devise policies and goals aimed at better social inclusion of such individuals. More importantly, knowledge of such discourses can facilitate policies aimed at dispelling the social discourses that cast victims of sexual assault or patients of treatable conditions as discarded bodies unfit for society. Therefore, a comprehensive "politics of the subject" (Catlaw 2007) necessarily must be concerned with precisely these heterogeneous genealogies to ensure that, at least in future, such bodies instead of being discarded can live more socially inclusive lives.

As I discussed in this chapter, individuals with very different genealogies end up leaving their families and join the Khawaja Sira community. However, it is unclear as to why the performative identity of a Khawaja Sira is the only socially available option for all these individuals. It also makes one wonder if there is an inherent identity called Khawaja Sira and as to why, all adult Khawaja Sira despite very different phenomenological origins, happen to like dancing, dressing like women and have other markers of identity traditionally associated with being a Khawaja Sira. As I discuss in the next chapter, a good point to start answering these questions is by problematizing the role

of the Khawaja Sira's social organization, internal norms, and position within the broader

social system.

CHAPTER 4

FROM THE DISCIPLINED WITHIN TO THE DISCIPLINED OUTSIDE: SUBJECT

FORMATION IN KHAWAJA SIRA COMMUNITY

> Th[e] exclusionary matrix by which subject are formed … requires the
> simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not yet
> "subjects," but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject.
> The abject designates here precisely those unlivable and uninhabitable zones of
> social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy
> the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the "unlivable" is
> required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. (Butler 1993, 3)

The individuals categorized as imperfect men by their friends and family end up

joining the Khawaja Sira community. The reason for their socially defined imperfection

can be different; some might be perceived as imperfect men because of their performative

femininity, others because of their impotence and/or ambiguous genitalia. However,

Khawaja Sira community is the only social group that welcomes these individuals. Living

alone is seldom an option for any individual in Pakistan because the society considers

living as a family a normative ideal (Ebrahim 2013; Immigration and Refugee Board of

Canada 2007). Moreover, as Cavalcante (2016) notes in the context of transgender lives,

"[d]ue to the marginality and precariousness of gender variance, living a transgender life

requires reliable structures of care and concern; structures that help to make the

management of everyday life possible" (118). The Khawaja Sira community through its

extensive kinship system provides precisely this "structure of care" where individuals

discarded by their significant others find refuge. For the Khawaja Sira, their community

is a wide umbrella which gives shelter to individual who wants to join. For them, the

different origins of the new entrants hardly matter. Every new entrant can find someone

who can relate to their story within the Khawaja Sira community. In my observations,

everyone appeared to be accepted with open arms and I did not see any discrimination against any individual (except for those who chose to subsequently modify their bodies through surgical operations). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a normative underlying assumption among the Khawaja Sira Guru that their community is *the* place to be for individuals who come under the umbrella term Khawaja Sira. That is why, such Guru actively try to include children and/or adolescents they consider to be like them.

In many ways, the Khawaja Sira community represents what Fraser calls a subaltern counterpublic; "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (1990, 67). As scholars like Butler (1993) and Mouffe (1994) argue, the existence of some of these counterpublics is not a historical accident. Instead, these counterpublics help demarcate the distinction between the normal *Us* and the abnormal *Them* (Mouffe 1994). Hence, individuals who problematize what is deemed socially normal are often relegated to the realm of human waste (Bauman 2004) through socio-legal discourses and self-governance in order to maintain the myth of the normality and singularity of the dominant public sphere (Habermas 1984; 1989). Over the years many researchers (e.g., Badiou 2009; Prozorov 2014a; Zizek 2005; Scott 1990) have theorized the emancipatory potential of these counterpublics. This argument is premised on the idea that since the counterpublics are not perfectly inscribed in the normal social order (or at least not as the "normal" individuals), their imperfect subject formation allows them a greater degree of agency, especially in its potential to contest the status-quo.

Conversely, others challenge this idea of counterpublics as sites of radical freedom or emancipatory potential. For example, through theorization of multiple forms of power relations, Michel Foucault (1980; 1982), argued that even the groups not formally recognized or represented in political institutions were subject to various forms of power relations which influenced their subject formation. This in many ways pre-empted and contested later theorists' assertion that groups which are not recognized or represented in society were "not seen by the state" (Scott 1998) and hence, had emancipatory potential for the whole society. More importantly, as Kent (2008) argues, "claiming counterpublicity is difficult. Determining what constitutes dis-identification or a break with the values of the public sphere, as opposed to a simple imitation of them, is always subjective, tenuous, open to interpretation" (188). As Fernandes (1997) notes in the context of workplace counterpublics, occasionally the subaltern discursive arenas end up reinforcing some of the same exclusions and disciplinary techniques as the ones demanded by the dominant interests in society. Similarly, Warner (2002) notes, "that we cannot understand counterpublics very well if we fail to see that there are contradictions and perversities inherent in the organization of *all* publics, tensions that are not captured by critiques of the dominant public's exclusions or ideological limitations" (80). However, there continues to be a lot of disagreement among scholars from different lines of thought about the degree of autonomy and influence of government on subject formation of inexistent groups.

As noted by multiple researchers, every counterpublic performs a dual function (e.g., Felski 1989; Asen 2000; Warner 2002). While *externally* it problematizes and contests the dominant discourses related to normality, *internally* it constructs subjectivity,

an "Us" based on similarity and solidarity between its members. While most of this dissertation is about the external function of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic, it is also important to note the internal functions of this counterpublic and exclusions entailed in the construction of the Khawaja Sira subjectivity[28]. That is why, in this chapter, I focus on the internal organization of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic with particular emphasis on its disciplinary subject formation. Doing so not only helps me answer my research questions about Khawaja Sira self-identity and their experiences in significant social institutions but also contributes to the understanding of the important role played by the internal dynamics of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic in managing discarded individuals in society.

As I discuss below, my experience with the Khawaja Sira community suggests that their counterpublic performs a distinct function for the dominant public sphere by managing its discarded individuals in such a manner that keeps the normality of the status-quo intact. For example, the Khawaja Sira community keeps the gender queer individuals hidden from the public eye and through a variety of disciplinary subject formation mechanisms ensures that the subject classified as deviants self-govern and self-objectify themselves in such a way that does not problematize the lives of the dominant public sphere. More importantly, the strict organization and consideration of only a few roles as authentic for the Khawaja Sira ensures that all the disparate types of individuals with different histories and possibly different gender identities entering the Khawaja Sira

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[28] In this chapter, I use the terms "subjectivity" and "subject formation" multiple times. Subject formation implies the creation of a particular identity (and not others) for the Khawaja Sira by various internal and external social discourses through which they internalize what it means to be a (socially defined) Khawaja Sira.

community end up developing similar subjectivities. As one of my research participants

noted, "our nature becomes the same after joining the (Khawaja Sira) community." It is

as if the Khawaja Sira community is a counterpublic where the individuals who don't fit

in the "normal" society are cast in a similar frame.

Joining the Khawaja Sira

> The subordinate status of a counterpublic does not simply reflect identities formed elsewhere; participation in such a public is one of the ways its members' identities are formed and transformed. A hierarchy or stigma is the assumed background of practice. One enters at one's own risk. (Warner 2002)

> The entry into the Khawaja Sira community doesn't happen all of a sudden.

Instead, the decision to leave home and join the Khawaja Sira community is often taken

gradually. For some it is an inevitable choice because they are told by their significant

others that they have already "become Khawaja Sira" (because of their impotence or

performative femininity). For others it is due to affection felt towards similar others who

have the courage to express their femininity openly and unapologetically. Some of my

research participants used the word *lagan* (closest translation is affection or imprinting)

to describe why they joined the community.

> *When we see a Khawaja Sira, we are automatically attracted towards her even if*
>
> *we haven't met her before. Our heart just desires to talk to her. (Shaheena)*

> *When I saw her, I was just mesmerized. I couldn't stop looking at her. At that*
>
> *moment I decided she is going to be my Guru and she has been my Guru ever*
>
> *since [more than 15 years]. (Kaaf)*

106

This is our true gender (jins), so our affection is for these people [the Khawaja

Sira]. We meet these people. These are our family and theirs is our home.

[In my case], sixty, sixty-five percent of it [the reason for leaving home and

joining the Khawaja Sira formally] was that when this is who we are, we might as

well live like this [by formally joining the Khawaja Sira community] and forty

percent of it was because of the torture by friends and family. (Bano)

Sometimes it is a triggering event that pushes a young individual over the edge

after which she decides to leave the family and formally join the Khawaja Sira

community. For example, as I mentioned in the last chapter, for one of my research

participants, such an event was when her marriage was scheduled against her wishes. So,

she decided to run away from her home. For another it was when her father and brother

beat her a lot after coming to know of her dancing. So, she ran away and started living

with her Khawaja Sira *saheli*.

I had a friend who was a Khawaja Sira (moorat) from the beginning. After my

family beat me, I started living with her. I used to wear feminine clothing (Firqa)

and dance at her home and also went outside to collect charity. She was a great

friend (saheli). I did not know anything about Guru then. She was a very good

friend. She then sent me to Lahore where I got a Guru [and formally joined the

community]. (Reema)

The Guru-Chela Relationship

Once the Khawaja Sira leave their homes and decide to live their lives as a

Khawaja Sira, they formally join the community by getting a *Guru* (master). A Guru can

best be characterized as an amalgam of a parent-like figure and a teacher. When a

Khawaja Sira formally joins the community, it is done through choosing a Guru who publically adopts the Khawaja Sira as a Chela in a ceremony called *poghat chitai* in which a ceremonial token amount (Rs. 350 these days) is given to the Guru by the Chela. There is no Khawaja Sira who can formally join the Khawaja Sira community unless a Guru formally vouches for her.

> *If someone doesn't have a Guru, we consider her to be a charlatan who is not one of us. We will not let that person sit among us. Just like I am sitting now among my saheliyan (feminine friends), if I sit among other Khawaja Sira, they will ask me, 'Child, whose Chela are you? To whose name do you belong? 'If I tell them the name of my Guru, they will welcome me but if I tell them that I don't have any Guru and that I am alone, they will angrily force me to leave immediately by saying, "Then what business do you have sitting among us?" (Nargis)*

Just like the legal ID analyzed in chapter 7 is the password that opens the doors to governmental recognition, the name of one's Guru in a similar manner acts as a surrogate identity for the Khawaja Sira within their community. This condition ensures that the Khawaja Sira end up going from one rule-bound institution to another where their behavior continues to be disciplined and managed. The Guru-Chela (Master-student) relationship is highly regimented in nature where the Guru not only trains the new entrants in the norms and ideals of the Khawaja Sira community but can also enforce his will through strict disciplinary techniques like financial penalties (*Dand*) and complete social boycott in extreme cases.

For example, if the Guru thinks that the Chela has disrespected her, violated any norms of the community, or has done something wrong in the household (in case the

Chela lives in the Guru's house), she can fine her Chela any amount she wants. The penalties can be very harsh. For example, Salma wanted me to meet a Khawaja Sira who lived nearby but then remembered that she was being socially boycotted by her Guru and no other Khawaja Sira was allowed to even talk to her. Salma was afraid that if she tried to contact her, she would be levied a huge fine (she mentioned Rs. 50,000 as the likely fine for such an infraction[29]). So, I ended up not meeting that Khawaja Sira.

If a Chela doesn't like her Guru or develops disagreements with her, she can choose to change her Guru. Changing a Guru is a financial transaction for all practical purposes. In this transaction that takes place between the old Guru and the new Guru, the new Guru has to make sure that no financial liability on her new Chela is left standing. This includes any financial penalty the old Guru might have levied on the Chela. In addition, the new Guru has to pay the *Pesha* to the previous Guru. *Pesha* is at least Rs. 2500 the first time a Guru is changed. Afterwards, it doubles every time a Guru is changed.[30] This financial cost of changing a Guru ensures that changing a Guru is not something that can be taken lightly or done multiple times by the Chela and is usually a matter of last resort.

The purely financial nature of this transaction also hints at the complicated underlying foundations of the Guru-Chela relationship. Even though ostensibly a Guru is like a parent like figure or a teacher, in economic and financial transactions, a Chela is

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[29] To put this in context, the average per capita monthly income in Pakistan is about Rs. 15000 (Rana 2015). Most Khawaja Sira likely earn less than this amount. Therefore, a fine of Rs. 50000 is more than three-month income of an average Pakistani.

[30] So, the second time a Guru is changed, the new Guru will have to pay Rs. 5000 to the previous Guru.

more like the property of the Guru: The new Guru "buys" a Chela and pays off her outstanding debts along with the price asked by the old Guru. Like any good investor, the new Guru usually makes sure that her investment is worthwhile and will make good on the original investment and potentially result in some profit.

While the new Guru often pays all the amount required to take the Chela under her name, she knows that it is mostly a safe investment because most Guru take a part of their Chela's income which can be anywhere from occasionally mandated gifts to all the income earned by the Chela. According to some of my participants, the norm in Pakistan is that the Guru always takes half of the income of her Chela. However, others contested that. For example, Chanda noted that one of her Gurus used to take all of her income. However, meeting all her requirements like make-up, dress and food were her Guru's responsibilities. There is hardly any Guru who does not take money from her Chelay (plural of Chela). According to some Gurus, due to the changing times and increasing rate of poverty some of their Chelay don't give them anything anymore. This is only true for those Chelay who live separately from their Guru. Those living with their Guru of course don't have that luxury. The Chelay who don't give anything to their Guru are generally frowned upon by the Khawaja Sira community. Despite this continuous payment, the original debt, that is the amount that the Guru paid to the previous Guru (owner) to get the Chela under her name, continues to remain outstanding. That amount is considered paid only when the Chela decides to change a Guru and the new Guru pays that amount to the previous Guru.

The strictly financial foundation of the Guru-Chela relationship is further underscored by the fact that if a Khawaja Sira, who is a Guru in her own right, that is, has

110

her own Chelay, dies or decides to change her Guru, her Chelay are inherited by her own Guru (called *Dada Guru* literally grandfather Guru). For example, Kaaf one of Salma's Chelay proudly mentioned that when Salma changed her Guru a few years back, she had requested Salma to take her along (otherwise Salma's previous Guru – Kaaf's Dada Guru – would have become her Guru). So, Salma had to pay Kaaf's *Pesha* (the amount to be paid to change one's Guru) to her own Guru to keep Kaaf as her Chela. These strict penalties and highly controlled economic and social organization ensure that the Khawaja Sira have to follow most commands of their Guru and quickly learn the norms, mannerisms, and the language of their community.

For an outsider, it is not easy to ascertain the strictly regimented nature of the Guru Chela relationship because often the Chelay respect their Guru in their presence and try not to antagonize them. However, occasionally differences do surface and it is at that time that a rather different aspect of the relationship comes to the fore. A telling example of the dynamics between the Guru and a Chela was when I went to meet Salma's Guru with her. The Guru who was financially quite well off started teasing and saying bad things about Salma and her friends. She argued that people like them bring a bad name to the Khawaja Sira community by doing public protests and "selling" their marginality. She also accused some of Salma's friends of being "unauthentic" Khawaja Sira. All through this conversation, Salma was sitting close to her Guru's feet, clearly not liking what she was hearing but she never said a word. To me it seemed as if the Guru was trying to get back at Salma for something she had done. When we were about to leave, the Guru ordered Salma to stay back and prepare tea for her. It seemed that she had not had enough and wanted to further re-assert her dominance over Salma. Salma told the Guru that she

had to get back home because a couple of her friends were waiting for her there. However, the Guru insisted that she stay and prepare her tea. I, not understanding the situation properly, thought that Salma was saying this because of me and told her that I could find my way back (as the Guru's house was deep inside a locality I had not been to before), and that she could stay with the Guru if she wanted. In retrospect, I shouldn't have said that because Salma's face expressions (her back was to the Guru) told me everything regarding how she felt about staying back. However, the Guru still insisted that Salma make tea for her. Finally, Salma had to stay back because at that point, she would have risked being fined or penalized for her insubordination to the Guru.

While there were many of my participants who were very resentful of their Guru, especially because of the financial dependence and leeching behavior of their Guru, others were happier. A Guru often represents the first authority figure who welcomes the young Khawaja Sira among their fold and who also have no objection to their performative femininity. The Guru welcomes the young Khawaja Sira when their own families have abandoned them and for some individuals, the Guru-Chela relationship does come very close to the relationship between a parent and a child[31]. The Khawaja Sira community is like an umbrella that welcomes all the different categories of discarded

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[31] While phenomenologically, the Guru-Chela relationship is like a surrogate parent-child relationship for some Khawaja Sira, the role expectations, financial foundations and the fluid nature of the relationship is very different from the relationship between a parent and a child. For example, while a typical parent in Pakistan is supposed to take care of the child if the child doesn't have a job or money, such expectations are generally not associated with the Guru. On the other hand, like a typical child is supposed to take care of the parents financially as well as by providing personal care, a Chela is also supposed to share her earnings with her Guru and to take care of her. While many Chela don't do this anymore, the normative underlying assumption is still present and the Guru frown upon such individuals who do not conform to these normative expectations of being a Chela.

112

individuals who have been labeled imperfect men[32] by their significant others. However, after joining the Khawaja Sira community, there is generally only one performative identity that is available to these disparate individuals.

> *When we go to our Guru for the first time in masculine clothing, they would take us to their homes, do our make-up, ask us to wear female clothes, fashion us according to the requirements of our field… Later, the Chelay (plural of Chela) are taken to either a fair or a festivity where their Guru will ask them to dance and they will announce proudly, 'These are our Chelay'. People will give them money and this is basically our field. Wherever we go (to dance or get money), we will tell them (if they ask) that we are that Guru's Chelay. (Nargis)*

Relationships

In addition to the Guru-Chela relationship, the Khawaja Sira kinship structure is based on relationships that mimic the social organization of the heteronormative family. According to my research participants, such a kinship structure helps them cope with the loss of their real (biological) families.

> *We have customs like others, like you. We have also Taya Guru (Paternal-Uncle who is elder than father), Dada Guru (Paternal Grandfather), Chacha Guru (Paternal-Uncle who is younger than father), Maa (mother, distinct from biological mother), Dadi-Guru (Paternal-Grandmother). So we have similar words. We create similar relationships. When others don't accept us, we create our own relationships so that we don't feel anything (bad) … (Tahseen)*

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[32] This could be due to ambiguous genitalia, impotence, virility related discourses, and performative femininity.

113

Another example of managed expectations in the Khawaja Sira community is that of romantic relationships resulting from a combination of internal, religious and social discourses about legitimate desire. Almost all the Khawaja Sira I met during my research had had romantic relationships with men[33] at some point of their life. Sometimes these relationships lasted years. Consider for example, Rubab, who used to have a very strong romantic relationship with a young man. The relationship lasted many years during which they lived together like husband and wife. As Rubab was narrating her relationship with that man, a student of her who was sitting with us told me that she and the other students of Rubab used to call that man *abu,* a term reserved for one's father. However, like most other Khawaja Sira romantic relationships, once that person got married (in a heterosexual relationship) he gradually ended his relationship with Rubab.

However, since sexual relations outside marriage are illegal and punishable offenses in Pakistan and marriage is recognized only between a man and a woman, almost all of my research participants mentioned that they knew beforehand that their romantic relationships were temporary because the ones they loved were supposed to live normal lives and that the Khawaja Sira were not supposed to or even hope for such relationships becoming formal. Consider for example, the following narrative by Andaleep who had a long romantic relationship with a man from her village:

> *I did find love. I will not lie. He was from our village. He used to provide me everything at my home. He used to ask me not to dance because he would give me anything I wanted. Whatever thing I demanded, he would bring it for me. I had*

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[33] All my research participants mentioned being sexually attracted towards men only. It is also considered one of the identity signatures of the Khawaja Sira.

even left dancing for him. He used to ask me to get my hair cut short but I told

him that it was not going to happen. I didn't cut my hair. He is now married and

in his home and I am here… Some of us do stop [our lovers from marrying] but I

didn't. What can they get from us? [a reference to children] Why should we

encroach upon others' rights? We are who we are. Why should we make them like

us [childless]? I went to his marriage ceremony also. He gave me some money

[as a gift on his marriage]. I bought some clothes with that money and gave those

clothes as a gift from my side at his home. He was nice with me.

Sadia perhaps summarized the internal discourses about romantic relationship among Khawaja Sira the best in following words:

Our elders tell us that these [men] are only 'time pass'. They remain with us only

till they want to pass time and once they are married they abandon us and say

'We are leaving you. We shouldn't even meet people like you'. Our elders say this

because they have seen this in their own lives.

Religion is another factor which plays an important role in influencing the Khawaja Sira romantic aspirations. As I discuss in Chapter 6, when it comes to religion, most Khawaja Sira consider their primary status to be that of a male in the eyes of Allah. Since marriage is not considered legal between two males in Islamic law, even though almost all Khawaja Sira are sexually active at some stage of their life, they never demand that they be given the legal right to marry. Once in a conversation with a group of five Khawaja Sira at Saima's home I brought up this topic and was surprised by the almost unanimous response by everyone present that that this (legal right to marry) was not something they desired as, "We are Muhammad's followers. How can we do such a

thing?" One radical soul, however, mentioned, "If we were allowed, I would marry at least 10 times." These examples illustrate that the Khawaja Sira community is not a "liberated" territory where desire has free reign and recognition. Instead, even the possibility of legitimate desire is foreclosed in the strictly disciplined lives of Khawaja Sira through important religious discourses. Moreover, it is also because of religion that most Khawaja Sira don't have surgical procedures done to modify their bodies to match the gender of their desire. As Altinay (2014, 16) notes, "[i]n Islamic bioethics, persons have only limited autonomy over their own bodies, which are understood to have been given to them in trust by their creator." That is why, sex reassignment surgeries are prohibited as they are considered "self-inflicted physical injuries or unnecessary cosmetic procedures that have long-term negative effects on the patient's physical and psychological well-being" (16). Some jurists argue that such "operations amount to a repudiation of Allah's will and that they constitute a form of deceit" (Altinay 2014, 16). According to most of my research participants, very few Khawaja Sira get their bodies surgically modified in Pakistan and they are generally frowned upon by their peers.[34] As I discuss in chapter 6, this discourse about religion and body has important ramifications for the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira.

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[34] The Khawaja Sira who do surgically modify their bodies are closer to the Hijras of India in terms of their self-identity and ritualistic beliefs (for a detailed discussion of these beliefs see Reddy 2005). The internal kinship networks of individuals who surgically modify their bodies and those who don't are generally separate and the internal discourses of each group consider the other group to be either unauthentic or religiously corrupt. Four of my research participants had surgical modifications done to their body. While the practice of surgical modification is much more common among the Khawaja Sira in neighboring India, according to most of my research participants this practice continues to remain uncommon in Pakistan. There is also some evidence to support this claim of my research participants. For example, Rehan (2011) in a reproductive study of 400 Khawaja Sira found that more than 99% of them did not have surgical modification of their bodies done. According to my research participants, religion is the major reason for this pattern.

Interestingly, in a society where law, religion and cultural norms strictly prohibit homosexual relationships, the Khawaja Sira are, at least before old age, never short of suitors; men who either want to become their romantic partners or become their clients (when the Khawaja Sira are working as sex workers). While the Khawaja Sira are trained to accept their roles as "wife (*biwi*) no. 2" or "time pass" in their romantic relationships and to take most of the blame for corrupting the society as sex workers, socially there is hardly any focus on the men who have sex or develop romantic relations with them, who are generally perceived as innocent victims corrupted by the Khawaja Sira. As Asthana and Oostvogels (2001) correctly note, it would be erroneous to try to categorize such individuals along rigid identity categories like gay or bisexual which have little relevance in this cultural context.

Making a Living

The question of earning money ultimately confronts everyone in society and the Khawaja Sira are no exception. The traditional source of income for the Khawaja Sira is collection of *badhai*: money given to the poor at festivities like marriage or birth of a child. However, due to the increasing number of the Khawaja Sira in big cities and limited job opportunities most Khawaja Sira have to resort to begging to make a living. For both badhai collection as well as begging, the cities are strictly divided between the elder Gurus. These divisions, which are based on traditional residency in the area and can occasionally be hundreds of years old, are strictly enforced and guarded. Only the Guru

117

and her Chelay can earn a living in that area by going to the homes of the residents on

any celebratory event (like wedding or the birth of a child) or simply to ask for money[35].

> *We don't let anyone beg in our area. If we find someone doing that we admonish*
>
> *her but if they don't listen, we physically make it sure that it doesn't happen*
>
> *again. I tear the clothes of anyone who tries to beg in my area. (Sadia)*

This ensures that, in addition to not being welcome in the Khawaja Sira community,

those who are without a Guru can't earn any money from traditional sources of income

associated with being a Khawaja Sira.

The Guru plays an instrumental role in shaping the future personality of the young

entrants in the Khawaja Sira community by making sure that they learn the mannerisms,

norms, and skills traditionally associated with being a Khawaja Sira. For example, the

Guru generally makes sure that their Chelay are well versed in the art of dancing, another

skill traditionally associated with the Khawaja Sira identity. The Khawaja Sira not only

dance at festivities to earn *badhai* but also are invited to perform at private ceremonies.

The Guru or a dance teacher trains the new entrants in the art of dancing. The Khawaja

Sira subjectivity revolves so much around the idea of dancing that the new entrants

realize the importance of dancing pretty soon.

> *Once I joined them (the Khawaja Sira), I realized I will have to learn dance. So, I*
>
> *joined a dance academy. Gradually, I started to like dancing. (Chanda)*

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[35] Occasionally, the elder Guru allows other Khawaja Sira to beg in their area as well but in such cases they have to pay a monthly fee to that Guru. In the area where I conducted most of my research, this monthly fee was Rs.3000.

Another way in which conformity to the performative norms associated with Khawaja Sira subjectivity are enforced is through division of earnings. The Khawaja Sira go to dance ceremonies as a group. Those Khawaja Sira who dance get a higher share of the earnings as compared to those who don't dance (which is generally because of old age and/or some physical impediment like an injury or ailment). In addition to begging and dancing, sex work has become another significant source of income for many Khawaja Sira due to increasing poverty in recent years. Resultantly, some Guru encourage their Chelay to make money in any way possible.

> *The guru says go lie with them and do this and that [implying sex] with them. Guru are only interested in money. Mostly they are only interested in that their Chelay go to various places and earn money for them. (Chanda)*

Others, instead of blaming their Guru, blame their poverty for the choice to become sex workers.

> *When we can't make a living any other way, what are we supposed to do. We might as well do that [implying sex work]. (Nargis)*

Their modes of earning a living, often put the Khawaja Sira in the cross hairs of the surveilling gaze of the frontline workers of different government departments. As I discuss in detail in chapter 8, the frontline workers of social welfare department and police are entrusted with the task of implementing anti-vagrancy laws which often result in incarceration and detention of the Khawaja Sira. Similarly, while only a minority of Khawaja Sira engage in sex work, the archetype of the hypersexual Khawaja Sira polluting society, is often used as a pretext for minimizing the everyday citizenship of all the Khawaja Sira by hyper-surveillance and selective implementation of laws.

119

The frontline workers, local administration, and other influential individuals often

hold the Guru accountable for any wrongdoings of their Chelay. So, the Guru are, in

effect responsible for ensuring that no problems are created for the dominant public by

their Chelay. Many of my participants were asked to call their Guru to come and bail

them out after they were arrested by the police. If a Guru does show up in such cases, it

serves as a guarantee for the police that the Khawaja Sira, in fact, does belong to the

Khawaja Sira community and is not a troublemaker pretending to be a Khawaja Sira.[36]

Similarly, if any Khawaja Sira commits any crime in a locality the Guru, who has

jurisdictional control over the area, is generally the first person approached by the police

to inquire how such an incident could happen on his watch. That is part of the reason why

the jurisdictional boundaries are so strictly enforced by the Khawaja Sira. Although not

analogous, one is reminded of the relationship between policing and ordering functions of

organized crime[37] here. Mafias and street-gangs contain and control violence and crime

though their own regulatory apparatuses. Trouble—for society and criminals—comes

when the crime is not organized and stops observing broader social norms, when there is

no longer "honor among thieves."

I must also mention that while the Guru are critical in keeping the Khawaja Sira

behavior predictable and pliable for the status-quo, the Guru also may hold the key to

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[36] However, as I discuss in chapter 9, due to increased infringement of the state on the different modes of making a living by the Khawaja Sira, a new leadership structure is also beginning to emerge in the Khawaja Sira community. A few entrepreneurial Khawaja Sira are taking the lead in helping their fellow Khawaja Sira navigate their interactions with the state officials, especially in cases where their Guru fail to do so. However, this new leadership has had no effect on the kinship structure of the Khawaja Sira which continues to be based on the Guru-Chela relationship.

[37] This analogy should be interpreted as an example of the internal disciplinary function of various counterpublics (like the Khawaja Sira, and the mafia) and not a normative comparison between the two.

breaking the centuries old pattern of Khawaja Sira behavior. If a Guru, instead of encouraging a new entrant in the Khawaja Sira community to become a sex worker, encourages her to complete her education, it can change what is deemed "normal" for a Khawaja Sira. Consider the example of Tahseen, who when I met her was working in a local NGO for the improvement of the living conditions of other Khawaja Sira.

> *My guru gave me a very good counsel. She advised me that I should do a job … she said that those who have gone into dancing and singing can't come back from that. This is your start you should strengthen yourself. You should do a job and earn your livelihood with dignity and respect.*

However, working in jobs generally reserved for the cis-gendered population is not easy. While I met some Khawaja Sira who were educated and had tried to do "normal" jobs, almost all of them had to either leave their jobs because of discriminatory behavior by peers and superiors or had to bear the harassment and discrimination on a routine basis. Take for example, Kaaf, who was a teacher in a private school. She would pass as a man by dressing and behaving like men in the workplace. However, once her co-workers discovered that she is a Khawaja Sira, she was exposed to severe discriminatory behavior by peers, school management and students' parents alike. Everyone was concerned that she would be a bad influence on the students and eventually she had to leave her job. Similarly, Ashi who had opened a tailor's business was forced to close her shop and resort to begging after many of her customers insulted her and refused to pay her for work she had already done.

Some Khawaja Sira who do work in cis-gendered workplaces, experience micro-aggressions and hyper-surveillance on a daily basis. Questions like "why do you talk like

121

that" and "why do you walk like that" never leave such individuals and it takes all of their courage to remain in the workplace. Similarly, in a few cases where segregation between Khawaja Sira and the cis-gendered population cannot be achieved, a constant reminder that you are not "one of us" serves to re-entrench precisely those boundaries which the "working" Khawaja Sira are supposed to dismantle. For example, a Khawaja Sira who used to work in an NGO that was working for the rehabilitation of the Khawaja Sira told me that if they sat with some male workers for a long time, their manager would inquire why they were sitting together and if there was something fishy going on between them. Similarly, their manager would not shake their hands in the morning even though it was a norm that he would do that with all other employees. All these practices and behaviors ensure that very few Khawaja Sira end up in the "normal" cis-gendered workplaces and most of them have to go back to professions deemed socially appropriate for the discarded bodies in society.

Old Age and Performativity

While their reasons vary, most Khawaja Sira choose to have the performative identity of males after a certain point in their life. By performative identity, I mean becoming indifferent to the growth of facial hair (in the form of moustaches or beards), wearing masculine clothes only, cutting the hair short, stopping wearing make-up and dancing permanently. Almost all the Khawaja Sira I met who were more than 60 years of age were wearing masculine clothing and some had moustaches or facial hair, something not common in the young and adult Khawaja Sira. However, I was told by a couple of my research participants that some of their colleagues continue to have the performative identity of women in their old age.

For many Khawaja Sira, it is old age when (in their words), they think "come on! Is it appropriate for us to do such things (wear makeup and dress like women) at this age?" This definition of old age is naturally different for different people. However, for most of my participants, the threshold of old age was when they couldn't dance (like they wanted) anymore. In some cases, switching to a masculine performative identity was due to a medical problem like bone disease. For others, it is the death of a loved one – specifically a love interest – that triggers this switch in performativity of the feminine gender. One of my respondents who was otherwise quite bitter about life in general mellowed considerably when talking about the man he loved. "After his death, I decided to leave everything."

Old age is often a time of even greater isolation and marginalization for the Khawaja Sira. At this point, the nature of Khawaja Sira identity and role in their group also begins to change. When going to dance parties or other events, such Khawaja Sira either stop going completely or get different roles. For example, Boby who doesn't dance anymore is now entrusted with collecting *velein* (the money thrown on the dancers by appreciating spectators). The Khawaja Sira who don't dance are also given a lower percentage in the division of money after dance parties. Often in old age, the primary determinant of the Khawaja Sira's marginalization is health and economic concerns. A society where one has to rely on one's kinship networks, in old age, the Khawaja Sira increasingly find themselves alone and without any source of income in old age. Since traditional modes of earning money like dancing and sometimes begging dry up, the Khawaja Sira find themselves relying on their Chelay for income. However, given the changing social milieu, the older Guru often complained that "times have now changed"

123

since the Chelay now don't care for their Guru anymore. Consider the following narrative of one of my research participants who was 75 years of age.

> We get Chelay so that someone can take care of us in old age. I have many Chelay but most are only in name. Only two of them are my real Chelay who ask me about my health and if I go to their houses, offer me something. Others don't even pretend to care. If I go to their place, they would say, 'Oho! The Guru came [again]. Now we will have to serve her tea.' If I stay at their place for long, they would say, 'It seems as if Guru has set camp at our house (lagda ay Guru nay tay chaooni ee paa laee ay).' So, I don't even go to their places anymore. (Kousar)

The situation is especially dire for the Khawaja Sira who do not have any Chelay. Take for example Gul, a Khawaja Sira in her 60s who lives alone in a rented room. She doesn't shave regularly anymore, wears masculine clothing and doesn't dance anymore. She is suffering from hepatitis C. She used to be a dance teacher for the Khawaja Sira and spends most of her time alone. She never took any Chelay under her wing. Now very old, she spends most of her time reminiscing about old memories. She had a couple of very strong romantic relationships with men who later got married and cut off their ties with her. The only way she can afford the rent for her room is through the help of a monthly stipend of a local NGO and charity of some local individuals. She hadn't gone to doctor in quite a while because she can't afford the medication for hepatitis and thinks that the local *hakeem's* (practitioner of traditional medicine) *puree* (small paper packets) is the best option for her.

Old age is one point where their gender becomes less of a concern for the Khawaja Sira individually as well as a group because other more pressing concerns (like

health and money) dominate their mind. While the old Guru do remain concerned about policing the performative identity of their younger Chelay, they become much less concerned about their own performative identity. While not strictly policed like the performativity in young adult Khawaja Sira, this changing of performative identity in old is very much a norm in the life of the Khawaja Sira and is another example of their gender fluid lives (see chapter 6 for more discussion about the gender fluidity of the Khawaja Sira).

Problematizing the Khawaja Sira Identity

> The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the primary effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals (Foucault 1980, 98).

Early writings on identity of marginalized groups considered their subjectivity to be an unproblematic construct and as an *a priori* given. However, during the last quarter of the 20th century multiple scholars have argued that identity is primarily socially constructed (e.g., Burke and Stets 2009; Hall 1996). In this line of inquiry, social relations and systems are given the primary importance in subject formation. For example, according to post-structural scholars, self-identities are not *a priori* givens which are biologically or ontologically pre-determined but always in a process of construction (Hall 1996). For example, feminist and LGBT scholars (e.g., Butler 1993; Irigaray 1985) problematized rigid categorizations of sex and gender and argued that the categories of sex and gender were socially constructed "habits of mind" which did not

have any ontological existence and were results of historically contingent power relations.

As the multiple examples in this (and the previous) chapter suggest, what we call an "individual" and "subject" is a result of material-discursive practices that lead to the creation of a particular subject. One could in fact argue that human is a norm that results from the iterative citation of performances (Butler) according to disciplinary material and discursive practices (Barad 2007). The Khawaja Sira are no exception. The repeated intra-actions of their changing bodies with the bodies and discourses that surround them lead to the formation of a distinct subjectivity which is recognized by both the general public and the counterpublic as a Khawaja Sira. Granted that the Khawaja Sira serve as a constitutive outside that helps maintain the myth of the binary gender system, the Khawaja Sira identity itself is no less socially constructed than the binary gender categories. Given a set of different bodies and discourses that surround a Khawaja Sira, a different subjectivity may result, especially for the multiple individuals in the Khawaja Sira community who do not claim to be born with a preference for feminine gender.

Consider the example of Razzaque who is partially blind and identifies as a Khawaja Sira. Since early childhood, he was enrolled in a *madrassah* (religious school) and after his mother died when he was quite young, his family sent him to live at the madrassah permanently. He has been living in the madrassah ever since. His life presents an interesting counter narrative to the traditional axes of identity (like gender, sexuality, performativity and sartorial preferences) associated with the Khawaja Sira. The reason that I am using a masculine name and the masculine pronouns for him is because he uses a masculine name and talks about himself using masculine pronouns. According to him,

126

he lies on the biological end of the biology-psychology spectrum of Khawaja Sira identity; it is his (socially defined) deviant body that led his family to classify him as a Khawaja Sira since early childhood. As he lived in the madrassah, he never lived with other Khawaja Sira and resultantly never chose a Guru. He has a long beard and has never worn make up or feminine clothes in his entire life. When I asked him about his sexual preference, he replied that he "never felt anything for a man or a woman. If any thought comes to my mind, I recite some verses of the Quran and it goes away."

While he is a Mo'azin (one who calls for prayer in a mosque), he also occasionally leads other men in prayer. This was perhaps the most surprising aspect of his story as traditionally Muslims reserve the right to lead prayer for men. According to him, everyone in the mosque knows that he is a Khawaja Sira. However, no one has ever complained that he leads others in prayer. He plans on spending his entire life devoted to religion. Perhaps the only formal way in which he is connected with the other Khawaja Sira is through his enrollment in a monthly stipend program for poor Khawaja Sira by a local NGO. Razzaque was enrolled in the NGO through informal verification by other Khawaja Sira who upon getting knowledge of his poor socio-economic condition (and the fact that he is a Khawaja Sira) wanted to help him out. No one complained about the way he lives, dresses or performs his identity. Although he is not a member of the group in the same way as others, this did not stop the Khawaja Sira from helping him out.

Razzaque problematizes the way in which the subjectivity of the Khawaja Sira community is commonly envisaged in Pakistani society. Razzaque's story highlights how some of the most significant identity markers traditionally associated with being a Khawaja Sira (like feminine performativity, sartoriality, sexual preference towards men)

are also historically and socially constituted in Pakistan.[38] One could argue that it is likely that if Razzaque's parents had sent him to live with other Khawaja Sira instead of a religious seminary, he would have developed the traditional markers of Khawaja Sira subjectivity. Perhaps more importantly, his experience points out that if, instead of being led into a strictly regimented system of subject formation, the young Khawaja Sira are allowed to explore their identity in multiple ways, there is a possibility of formation of new identities. Granted that these identities will also be socially and materially constituted, but the intra-action of each body with its surrounding material-discursive practices has a unique generative potential which can't be predicted beforehand. Since no body is ever perfectly inscribed by the disciplinary discourses that surround it, we can't predict beforehand, how the Khawaja Sira identities might differ or problematize the gender-sex-body-identity spectrum if all of them don't end up in the Khawaja Sira community. However, given the distinct role of the Khawaja Sira play as discarded individuals in society and the strictly disciplined ways of their subject formation, it seems unlikely that anyone is going to heed to such a "radical" proposition.

Structure of Care or Structure of Discipline?

My analysis shows that the Khawaja Sira subject formation takes place in iterative material-discursive intra-actions after joining the Khawaja Sira community where they are trained or disciplined to have certain roles, aspirations and dreams and not others. In a way, this iterative process mirrors the process of gender identity formation for cis-

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[38] While my claim about the socially constructed subjectivity of the Khawaja Sira is local in nature, it is likely that similar dynamics influence formation of marginalized and/or group identities in other contexts as well as evidenced by multiple research studies (e.g., Thomson and Scott 2001; Fearin and Laitin 2000, Hunt, Benford and Snow1994).

gendered individuals (West and Zimmerman 1987). It is important for the management of discarded individuals in society because if there continues to be reluctance or resistance from those it relegates to the status of the human waste in society. To be clear, I am not arguing that there are no individuals that fit the typical narrative (feminine preference) of Khawaja Sira subject formation in Pakistani society (and the one generally presented by the Khawaja Sira to outsiders) or who view themselves as females since early childhood. Instead, my research shows that there are individuals with multiple other subjectivities who enter the Khawaja Sira community and these disparate individuals are trained to develop a similar performative identity.

The Khawaja Sira community, which also serves as a constitutive outside for the binary gendered system, plays another important *external* role which is to absorb all varieties of individuals that do not conform to the binary gender system in society. This is achieved *internally* by disciplining its members to have a similar set of expectations, subjectivities, and roles through multiple disciplinary discourses and practices. This impedes multiple, potentially generative, counterpublics from developing and in their place constructs and maintains a deliberately constructed and meticulously disciplined singular constitutive outside to the binary gendered system. Even though the existence of this counterpublic does problematize the normality of the binary gender system, its emancipatory potential is limited due to its strictly regimented nature. The Khawaja Sira, instead of being able to choose their own identities, are disciplined into choosing only a particular menu of choices.

For the dominant interests in society, it is convenient that multiple disciplinary social discourses ensure that individuals classified as imperfect men, imperfect males,

129

and victims of child abuse often end up with the Khawaja Sira where all of them are cast in a similar mold. This erasure of multiple forms of gender related waste from the public eye ensures that the ugly underbelly of the society remains hidden and the uneasy questions it needs to ask itself remain unasked.

This alignment of the internal and external functions of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic points out that identification with social margins as emancipatory is not a straightforward enterprise (Scott 1998; Zizek 2005; Prozorov 2014b). As my analysis shows, the individuals on the social margins are also constructed by homogenizing external and internal disciplinary discourses. So, identities on social margins shouldn't be conceived as unproblematic givens which can be treated always as expressions of radical freedom. Instead, it is important to be cognizant of the ontological violence which converts heterogeneous marginalized individuals into a few socially recognizable identities even at the social margins. It doesn't mean that there is no space of agency available to individuals on social margins. As I discuss in detail in chapter 9, the spaces of agency arise because no discourse can perfectly inscribe a human into the present social order and there is an unpredictability to the ways in which multiple subjectivities intersect with disciplinary apparatuses. That is why the only resistance that happens is on the margins and "at an angle" to the dominant discourses. Moreover, while the emancipatory potential of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic is limited due to homogenization of the subjectivities of its members, it is important to mention that the existence of the Khawaja Sira counterpublic does provide a collective avenue through which some dominant gender related norms of society (like gender appropriate

performativity) can be contested. In the absence of such a counterpublic, it would be very difficult for the individual Khawaja Sira to resist these norms alone.

I understand that my interpretation of the role of Khawaja Sira community as a manager of human waste might problematize their framing at a macro-level as an institution of radical freedom and agency, especially in its relation to the dominant public sphere and human waste management in society. However, at a micro-level, for the individuals abandoned by their friends and family, the Khawaja Sira community often acts as a safe heaven. It is a space where most of the Khawaja Sira can live their day to day life happily among those who like them have been discarded or disowned by society. While the Guru-Chela relationship can be uneasy at times, a mention of their *saheliyan* - Khawaja Sira friends – almost always brings a smile on the face of the Khawaja Sira. In their *saheliyan* the Khawaja Sira have someone with whom they can be who they want to be without the fear of judgment. Some of my research participants developed the courage to leave their violent families only due to their *saheliyan* in whom they could confide their true feelings and with whom they often escaped to another city. It is their *saheliyan* that make all the troubles, violence and isolation bearable for the Khawaja Sira.

Until Pakistani society reaches a point where a child who is raped is not told by everyone around that he is destined to lead life as a passive sexual partner, or a young adult who is impotent is told that their gender is not defined by their erection, or a child born with dysphoria is not considered an immediate threat to the artificial taken-for-grantedness of the binary gender system, the Khawaja Sira community remains the only safe haven for such individuals. I would, however, argue that if most such individuals continue to be managed by the Khawaja Sira community, what impetus would there be

131

for anyone to change the status-quo? My discussion in this section also highlights that state can play a limited direct role in influencing identity formation of the Khawaja Sira within informal social institutions (like family and the Khawaja Sira counterpublic). This raises an important question: how can the state influence the experiences and identity formation of the Khawaja Sira within informal social institutions? I discuss this important question in detail in Chapter 10.

SECTION II

LEGAL CITIZENSHIP OF THE KHAWAJA SIRA

In considering many of the challenges that we face in matters of societal diversity, our inability to have an honest dialogue about how we develop our understanding of group construction and the impact of such construction on policy development keeps us on a road that prolongs ongoing challenges. (Farmbry 2009, viii)

CHAPTER 5

FABRICATED IDENTITIES: LEGAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION OF THE

KHAWAJA SIRA OF PAKISTAN

> What kind of a thing is sex in … bureaucratic exchange? It is curiously at odds
> with gender … for no performance of gender is convincing enough, no display of
> femininity sufficient, to stand in for the designation of "sex" that is determined
> and withheld by the document. Sex is something that the documents themselves
> enact, and sex becomes performative in the sense that the *m* or the *f* on the
> document does not merely report on the sex of its bearer but becomes the truth of
> and bestows the bearer's sex (Salamon, 2010, 191).

An important way in which the state intersects with lives of marginalized

individuals is by adjudicating or deciding on the legal definitions for various categories

of individuals (Yanow, 2003). These legal identities, constructed through laws, policy

documents, and court decisions have a significant bearing on the lives of marginalized

groups and the opportunities available to them in contemporary nation states. These legal

definitions are also vital for the public administration professionals implementing social

policies related to marginalized groups (Taylor, 2007). As the epi-quote indicates,

identities once enacted through legal documents, become the (official) state-sanctioned

"truth" about their bearers. Thus, these legal identities become significantly more

important in the intersections between social groups and the state than any other "non-

legal" identities which may be phenomenologically more intimate but legally considered

illegitimate. In this chapter, I analyze the legal and governmental discourses regarding

Khawaja Sira identity construction in a Supreme Court case in Pakistan which granted

the Khawaja Sira a separate legal identity.

As I discussed in chapter 1, until recently, the *Khawaja Sira* were not legally

recognized as "persons" by the state as no third-gender category was available in the

133

National Identity Card application. In 2009, after a law and order incident in Rawalpindi in which some Khawaja Sira dancing at a function were arrested, a local jurist filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (hereinafter the Supreme Court) about the legal rights of the Khawaja Sira (Redding 2015). From 2009 to 2011, the Supreme Court gave multiple directives regarding the social position and legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, the most prominent of which was the creation of a third gender category to accommodate the Khawaja Sira. In the final decision, the Supreme Court declared that the Khawaja Sira "in their own rights are citizens of this country and subject to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, their rights, obligations including right to life and dignity are equally protected. Thus no discrimination, for any reason, is possible against them as far as their rights and obligations are concerned."[39]

While this recognition of the Khawaja Sira identity and rights by the state has been praised by many groups (see for example, Sattar 2010; Baig 2012; Bezhan and Azmi 2011), it is still unclear whether it has resulted in actual changes in the social marginalization of the Khawaja Sira. While I discuss the impact of this decision on the lives and inclusion of the Khawaja Sira in the next chapter, in this chapter I focus on the construction of Khawaja Sira identity by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In doing so, I follow the call for caution by Judith Butler who argues that "it would doubtless be a mistake to say that all forms of recognition are fugitive modes of regulation and signs of unfreedom. We have to struggle for them at the level of law and politics, though we also have to struggle against being totalized by them" (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, 85-86).

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[39] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 22.03.2011 Order.

To this end, I try "to expose and trouble the normative terms that regulate and accommodate identity-based claims" (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, 87) in the Supreme Court opinions and directives during the case. I also compare the language used by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to that used by the Supreme Court of India in a similar case. As Gee (2014) notes, language can be understood as a tool that can be used to build (formal and informal) identities. The language of legal and policy documents is unique as it is meant to allow certain identities and practices in the world, making some things normal and acceptable and others less so. The language of policy documents also reveals what Gee (2014) calls figured worlds – simplified versions of what is considered typical or normal – of their creators, and at the same time, contribute to the functioning and reproduction of those "figured worlds" (Gee 2014). An analysis of languages in policy documents within their social contexts allows us to investigate the political and social implications of implicit practices and social constructions in these discourses. Such a discourse analysis also enables us to look beyond the language to understand the (unarticulated) agendas embedded or inscribed in these documents and normative assumptions of the underlying sociopolitical order.

My analytical approach in this chapter is based on Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). Foucauldian discourse analysis, which is based on post-structural and post-modern underpinnings, "involves more than analyzing the content of texts for the ways in which they have been structured … [and] is concerned with the way in which texts themselves have been constructed in terms of their social and historical "situatedness." (Cheek 2004, 1144). Hence, this approach is distinct from (formal) policy analysis methods which treat "policy as text" (Ball 1993, 10) and instead treats "policy as

discourse" (Ball 1993, 10) where "language cannot be considered to be transparent or value free" (Cheek 2004, 1144). In FDA, the researcher (or discourse analyst) is generally assumed to play an important role in providing a contextualized analysis of the discourses. The purpose or claim of such an analysis is not to provide the only possible interpretation of the discourse being analyzed but a "partial or situated reality" (Cheek 2004, 1147) that is informed by relevant social, legal and historical context. In fact, Cheek (2004) argues that trying to provide the only possible reading of a discourse is "in conflict with the tenets of the approach employed" (1147). While there are multiple approaches of doing FDA, I follow the six stages of FDA outlined by Willig (2013). I explain these stages in the discussion section.

My analysis shows that the Supreme Court operating on the basis of dominant social constructions of the Khawaja Sira created a corresponding legal identity for them which has limited relevance to their own self-identity. Moreover, this decision legalizes socially constructed distinctions between authentic and unauthentic Khawaja Sira; distinctions which are, again, disconnected from the Khawaja Sira's own internal discourses about themselves.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: First, I briefly discuss the identity construction "business" of the state and its influence on socially marginalized identity groups. I then provide a brief historical context of the legal identity of the *Khawaja Sira* in the Indian sub-continent. This is followed by an analysis of the legal discourses in the Supreme Court case where the Khawaja Sira were granted legal identity and rights. I conclude with a discussion of main theoretical insights and some limitations of my approach.

Constructing Identities of Social Groups

The second half of 20th century saw the rise of "politics of recognition" (C. Taylor, 1994) where marginalized groups tried to improve their social status by seeking formal changes in the law based on their group identity. In contrast to the first half of 20th century, when redistributive justice was the predominant demand of marginalized groups, the primary demand of identity based movements was recognition of their separate identity based rights[40]. These movements were based on the idea that by changing formal laws and official recognition of their rights by the state, the problem of social marginalization will disappear (McNay, 2014). Resultantly, most previous research on the interaction between the state and marginalized groups has focused on analyzing formal changes in law resulting from the identity based movements. Primary examples of such include studies on African American civil rights movement (Kluger, 2011; Morris, 1984); ethnic minorities' movements for civil rights (Donato, 1997; Rosales, 1997); women rights movements (Kerber, 1980; Rhode, 1991); gender queer groups' struggle for recognition (Clendinen and Nagourney, 2001; Smith, 2008); and of the individuals diagnosed with mental illnesses (Fleischer and Zames 2001; Scotch, 1988).

However, the politics and consequences of recognition have been contested on multiple fronts in recent years because of persistent social exclusion and marginalization in society. First, researchers like Nancy Fraser (1997; 2000) and her colleagues (Fraser

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[40] The primary reason for the emergence of identity based politics was that the redistribution arguments were (and primarily still are) based on the idea of class consciousness as the primary social category of inclusion for all groups (e.g., Marx and Engels 1888, Gramsci 1992; Althusser 1971). This line of argument, gradually lost its appeal both at the macro and micro political level because of a variety of reasons which have been discussed in detail elsewhere (Chirot 1991; Keucheyan 2013). This led to the gradual emergence of identity as the primary signifier of the experience of marginalization in a society.

and Honneth 2003) problematized the exclusive focus of identity based movements on recognition by the state at the expense or neglect of redistributive demands. According to Fraser (1995; 2000), the rise of politics of recognition combined with the fall of communism, led to an increase in social injustice in certain societies since regressive economic policies were often not the main focus of attention of the identity based movements of marginalized groups. Instead, Fraser (1995; 2001) argued that redistribution and recognition were equally important and distinct aspects of marginalization and social equity can result only if both these categories of social injustice are addressed. More importantly, Fraser argues that without changes in the supra-structure of the political economy, formal recognition by the state results in limited changes in the material conditions of living for the marginalized groups.

Second, the rise of intersectionality based research – a contribution of third wave of feminism[41], especially as articulated by feminist scholars of color and from post-colonial nations – highlighted multiple internal social asymmetries inside misrecognized groups. These scholars argued that there was a lot of heterogeneity and social asymmetry within and across marginalized groups often not accounted for by identity based movements dominated by a few members of the marginalized groups (e.g., middle class white women in case of feminist theory). Resultantly, recognition by state results in minimal changes for individuals who are already marginal inside these groups. For example, post-colonial (Spivak 1988) and African-American women (Spelman 1988;

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[41] The history of feminism is commonly divided into three waves referring to the changing demands and focus of the movement. First wave of feminism was primarily focused on suffrage for women, the second wave on broader social and political equality and the third wave highlighted the different definitions and demands of women based on race, ethnicity and sexual preference.

138

Lorde 2012; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983) often benefited little from early feminist

demands at gender equality. Similarly, intersectionality based studies have highlighted

that LGBT individuals from racial and ethnic minorities experience higher degree of

marginalization than other LGBT groups (Daley, Solomon, Newman, and Mishna, 2008;

Meyer, 2012; Monro and Richardson, 2010).

Third, policy researchers like Schneider and Ingram (1993) argued that dominant

social constructions of marginalized groups – defined as "the cultural characterizations or

popular images of the persons or groups" (334) – play an important role in how the state

accommodates identity based claims of unrecognized social groups. For example,

Machado (2008), through an analysis of paternity related court cases in Portugal found

that the legal procedures enacted to determine parentage of children reproduced the

dominant patriarchal norms in society. Relatedly, the explicit and implicit heterosexual

biases in social welfare policy frameworks in the USA which negatively influence the

rights and access of LGBT individuals to social welfare services have been analyzed by

Lind (2004). Similarly, Haney-Lopez (2006) analyzed the legal construction of race in

American public policy and law and argues that the multiple intersections of law and

social norms by various policy actors and judges (re)create racial biases in society.

Research on legal group identities also highlights how law (and public policy)

creates new fabricated identity categories which influence the subjects who get classified

within these groups. Bourdieu (1994) calls it the symbolic power of the state; the ability

to create fabricated categories and associate different values to such categories. For

example, Canaday (2009) analyzed the multiple ways in which homosexuality was

categorized and made (hyper)visible through bureaucratic practices in military and

immigration. Her analysis also reveals that sometimes bureaucratic institutions create the conditions for the emergence of group consciousness among marginalized groups. Relatedly, Yanow (2003) discusses how various governmental techniques to measure racial diversity construct and create (fabricated) racial identity in the US which puts certain racial groups at a distinct disadvantage in society. Another example is Zetter's (1991) work on labeling of the refugees based on stereotypical categories assumed by the bureaucrats.

Other areas in which role of law and governmental bureaucracy in influencing (or creating) identities of marginalized groups include citizenship (Lucio, 2009), disability (Ladd, 2003), mental health (Broer, Nieboer and Bal, 2012) and ethnic identity (Mora, 2014; Visser, 2014). The overall theme and findings of this line of research can be summarized by quoting Lopez (2006) whose insights, while focused on racial identity, are also valid for most other marginalized identity categories: "law constructs race at every level: changing the physical features borne by people in this country [USA], shaping the social meanings that define races, and rendering concrete privileges and disadvantages justified by racial ideology" (xv).

In the present context, the Khawaja Sira received a separate legal identity after a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2011. While this decision seems to be a step in the right direction, as I discuss in this chapter, a closer inspection of the discourses used during this court case and its implementation status reveals a much more complicated picture. However, before I delve into the analytics of the Supreme Court decision, a brief interlude is in order to understand the relation of the Khawaja Sira identity and administrative law in the Indian sub-continent (present day India, Pakistan,

and Bangladesh). This is especially warranted because a comprehensive discourse analysis requires the researchers to situate their analyses within relevant social and historical discourses to provide readers with necessary contextual information.

British India and the Legal Construction of the Khawaja Sira

The Criminal Tribes Act (CTA) of 1871[42] represents the first instance of a law enacted specifically targeted at the legal construction of the Khawaja Sira in the Indian subcontinent. The British colonial administration introduced the idea of the Khawaja Sira identity as "deviant", "infectious" and problematic for the society (Hinchy, 2013; 2014; Reddy, 2005). Before the British rule, the Khawaja Sira had various social – though marginalized – roles in society in which they had access to public sphere and could earn a living in a variety of ways. However, the British viewed the Khawaja Sira as having essentially a deviant identity which had to be controlled and disciplined. This was driven primarily because of rigid notions about masculinity of British colonial administration and the obsession with cleanliness in the public sphere (Hinchy, 2013; 2014; Reddy, 2005). That is why administrative and legal measures were introduced to remove the Khawaja Sira from the public sphere of Colonial India.

The CTA, which represented an attempt by the British Colonial Administration to control and manage different Tribes deemed "criminal," was divided into two parts. While the first part focused on how different tribes were to be labeled criminal and legal consequences for those tribes, the second part was devoted entirely to the Khawaja Sira

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[42] *An Act for the Registration of Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs.* 12th October 1871. Act No. XXVII of 1871. Passed by the Governor General of India in Council.

(labeled eunuchs in the CTA)[43] who were also included in the category of criminal tribes. The CTA defined as eunuchs "all persons of the male sex who admit themselves, or on medical inspection clearly appear, to be impotent" (CTA 1871, 355). Hinchy (2013; 2014) has analyzed in detail how this definition, which was based on the idea of the Khawaja Sira[44] identity being based on "something" in the body which could be medically inspected, resulted in major implementation headaches for the local administrations. For example, the Zenanay who, in many cases were biologically potent men were to be excluded from the definition of the eunuchs. More importantly, in many cases medical inspection revealed little "conclusive evidence" about the impotence of the examined individuals. In fact, Hinchy argues that in many cases, submitting to medical inspection (as opposed to admitting to being impotent or eunuch) was often employed as a resistance technique by the Khawaja Sira who did not want to be legally registered.

The CTA mandated the local governments to register the "names and residences of all eunuchs" residing in their jurisdiction who were "reasonably suspected of kidnapping or castrating children" and unnatural sexual offences (a reference to sodomy under section 377 of the Indian Penal Code). The CTA also prohibited the Khawaja Sira dressing as woman in public places, dancing, playing music or participation in any public exhibition "in a public street or place or for hire in a private house" (CTA 1871, 356).

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[43] The CTA referred to the Khawaja Sira as the Eunuchs. As I discuss below, this was not the first instance of a government trying to translate the term Khawaja Sira into English using terms loaded with historical baggage and lacking the local linguistic authenticity.

[44] Hinchy uses the term Hijras in her analysis of CTA.

Any Khawaja Sira who was registered under the CTA was also prohibited from acting as a guardian to any minor, making a gift, making a will or adopting a son.

While the CTA increased the social marginalization of the Khawaja Sira, the eventual aim of eradication of the Khawaja Sira failed as very few number of the Khawaja Sira were registered by the local authorities and through multiple local techniques of resistance, the Khawaja Sira were able to frustrate the efforts of British colonial administration. Ultimately, the CTA revealed the limits of disciplinary potential of the colonial administration.

Khawaja Sira Legal Identity in Pakistan

After partition of the Indian sub-continent (in 1947), apart from a temporary ban on the Khawaja Sira activities in the early 1960s (Pamment, 2010), the only relation the Khawaja Sira had with the formal law until recently had been that of indifference. Khawaja Sira were not legally recognized as an identity category by the state of Pakistan until 2009. The few who did have IDs were forced to choose the binary gender categories of man or woman.

In 2009, a police raid caught a group of Khawaja Sira dancing at a marriage ceremony; they were subsequently allegedly "humiliated and manhandled"[45] by the police. A local jurist Muhammad Aslam Khaki petitioned the Supreme Court of Pakistan to ensure that the Khawaja Sira (the word used in the petition was She-males) be given their fundamental human rights as envisioned by the Constitution of Pakistan. The petitioner also requested that "[t]he government and Civil Society may be directed to

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[45] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 06.02.2009 Order.

come forward, analyze their situation and protect the rights of these innocent oppressed people."[46] As this case had important implications for the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, the fact that this case was not initiated by the Khawaja Sira is significant[47]. According to Mr. Khaki, the petitioner in this case, the purpose of his petition was to "save them [the Khawaja Sira] from a life of shame" (Usmani, 2009). This normative judgment of the petitioner and the fact that there was no widespread demand for legal recognition by the Khawaja Sira is significant since "[t]he nature of rights discourse is that anyone can assert a right and have it tested in court. But the ill effects of the codification of bad definitions of group culture and identity will not be limited to the litigant asserting the right: they will instead be deployed to regulate all members of the group" (Ford, 2002, 56).

In addition to arguments by the petitioner, the court appears to have primarily relied on the opinions and recommendations of various governmental institutions (including police, social welfare, and education departments) to formulate its opinion. It is also pertinent to mention here that the original petition did not contain any request for

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[46] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 06.02.2009 Order.

[47] Almas Boby, President Pakistan She Male association, joined as a petitioner in-attendance during the case and the Court also heard opinions of some other Khawaja Sira during the proceedings of the course. However, it seems that these individuals did not represent the wide range of identities present within the Khawaja Sira community and the Court paid more attention to the dominant social construction of the Khawaja Sira in society and governmental discourses. This factor of Khawaja Sira representation is also complicated by internal politics among the Khawaja Sira leadership and regional divisions among them. Different leaders have different "visions" for the Khawaja Sira community which can, occasionally, be at odds with each other. As this case took place in Islamabad, it is likely that many of the other regional leaders were not able to present their point of view in front of the court. As one of my research participants said, "She [Almas Boby] might be the leader in her own area [Islamabad] but here [in Lahore] nobody knows her. I have my own area and she has her own." During my fieldwork, I met 3 Khawaja Sira who were high in the local hierarchy of Khawaja Sira leadership in Lahore, none of whom appeared before the court in this case.

recognition of a separate identity for the Khawaja Sira which would become the most important reason for later prominence of this case.

Governmental Discourses and Khawaja Sira Legal Identity

Based on Willig's (2013) approach to FDA, in this section, I analyze the language used by the Supreme Court during the case and also try to highlight the discourses relied on by the Supreme Court to formulate the Khawaja Sira legal identity.[48] In addition, although the CTA and the Supreme Court case regarding the Khawaja Sira rights are nearly 140 years apart, a few similarities between the two stand out which I also discuss as they facilitate better understanding of the relation between the state and gender queer groups.

Stage 1: Discursive Constructions

In the first stage, the analyst clarifies the discursive object – in this case the Khawaja Sira – and presents the "different ways in which the discursive object is constructed in the text" (Willig 2013, 131).

Khawaja Sira as biological identity. An important point of similarity between the CTA and the Supreme Court decision is that both construct a biologically rooted gender identity for the Khawaja Sira. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in one of its directives on November 4, 2009 declared that the Khawaja Sira (the word used by the Court was "eunuch") had "been neglected merely on account of gender disorder in their bodies, otherwise they [were] entitled to enjoy all the rights granted to them by the Constitution

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[48] The Supreme Court decision was in English. All the terms used below like "disability", "gender disorder", and "weakness" are the actual words used by the Supreme Court and not translations by the author.

being its subject."[49] While the Supreme Court directive did not mention impotence explicitly (unlike the CTA), and it is unclear what "gender disorder in the bodies" the court had in its mind, it is significant that even after 140 years the body continues to remain the primary legal determinant of gender for the Khawaja Sira.

Khawaja Sira as a disorder. Like the CTA which considered a biological disorder (impotence) as being the essential determinant of Khawaja Sira identity, the Supreme court also used the word "disorder" to identify the Khawaja Sira, reinforcing the idea that Khawaja Sira have, by definition, "a physical or mental condition that is not normal or healthy" (Merriam-Webster 2016) as they disturb the social system based on the binary categories of man and woman. The court also used words like "weakness" and "disability" to label the Khawaja Sira identity, further pathologization their social and self-identity.

Khawaja Sira as Eunuch. Perhaps the most obvious similarity between the CTA and the recent Supreme Court case is discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira as "eunuchs." This is in contrast to neighboring India where the Supreme Court used the terms "third gender" or "transgender" in a similar case in 2014.[50] This was partly because the Supreme Court of Pakistan, like the CTA and unlike the Supreme Court of India, considered the Khawaja Sira identity as primarily biological as discussed above. However, interestingly at various points in the case, various discursive constructions like

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[49] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 Order.

[50] National Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India and others. Write Petition (Civil) No. 604 of 2013. In the Supreme Court of India.

"she-male", "transgender", "eunuchs" and "unix" were also used by the Supreme Court

to describe the Khawaja Sira. As I discussed in chapter 1, this ambiguity in terminology

by the Supreme Court could be a result of the multiple opinions within the Khawaja Sira

community about the proper label for their community. However, the labels used by the

Supreme Court are not the ones generally used by the Khawaja Sira community to self-

identify. The use of these multiple terms by the Supreme Court was likely a result of the

"inevitable (and 'innocent') fumbling" (Redding 2015, 260) that any juridical system has

to go through when encountering individuals or groups with whom it is unfamiliar or

uncomfortable.

Overall, analysis of the discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira by the

Supreme Court reveals that the Court – like the CTA – envisaged the Khawaja Sira as a

biological disorder.

Stage 2: Discourses

This stage involves situating various discursive constructions of the discursive

object within wider discourses. This enables a situated contextual understanding of the

discursive constructions in a text and helps the readers understand the relevant social and

legal discourses from which the text draws – and not others – its constructions of the

discursive object (Willig 2013). Since I have already discussed the historical discourses

about Khawaja Sira identity above, in this section, I highlight various contemporary

discourses that influenced opinion of the Court in this case.

Social Discourses. As I discussed in chapter 2, the dominant social construction of the

Khawaja Sira in Pakistani society is that most of them are biological male pretending to

be women and that only authentic Khawaja Sira – those who are biologically born as

neither men nor women – deserve social sympathy and support. The Court's discursive construction of Khawaja Sira having ambiguous genitalia or hormonal disorders repeats the broader social discourse that the only authentic third gender is biologically determined. On the other hand, the court largely ignored various internal discourses within the Khawaja Sira community which consider the Khawaja Sira identity as being determined by one's soul and not the body. As I discussed in chapters 3 and 4, for most Khawaja Sira the primary determinant of their identity is their performative femininity and not any biological disorder.

In this regard, a comparison with the Indian Supreme Court, which also recognized a legal third gender recently, is also illustrative. While the Supreme Court of Pakistan reinforced the dominant social and religious construction in Pakistani society i.e. the only normatively authentic gender is determined by one's sex, the Indian Supreme Court observed that it prefers "to follow the psyche of the person in determining sex and gender and prefer the 'Psychological Test' instead of 'Biological Test'…Gender identity … forms the core of one's personal self, based on self-identification, not on surgical or medical procedure."[51]

Governmental Discourses. Most reports submitted by government departments to the Court during the proceedings of this case reproduced the dominant social constructions in Pakistan about the Khawaja Sira identity. While a complete analysis of all reports and opinions submitted to the Court by different government departments, is beyond the scope of this chapter, as an example, I briefly discuss the report submitted by the Social

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[51] National Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India and others. Write Petition (Civil) No. 604 of 2013. In the Supreme Court of India.

Welfare Department (SWD) of Punjab to the Supreme Court of Pakistan on 13 August 2009. There are many reasons for choosing this particular report. Punjab is the most populous province in Pakistan and I also conducted my fieldwork here. Moreover, this report seems to have been quite influential in shaping the opinion of the Supreme Court. The recommendations for "special I.D. cards" for the Khawaja Sira as well as requiring medical examination of all Khawaja Sira (discussed below) as proposed in this report were later endorsed by the Supreme Court in its subsequent directives.

The first part of the report consists of recommendations submitted by the SWD for social uplift of the Khawaja Sira. Regarding gender identity, the SWD recommended that "[t]he She-Males should be registered after their proper Medical Examination and arrangements for their treatment may be worked out as a whole."[52] As discussed above, the Supreme Court also adopted a similar opinion on the gender identity of the Khawaja Sira, considering it a medicalized biological disorder. However, the SWD report mentions the (fabricated) abnormality of the Khawaja Sira even more explicitly as it recommended "grooming" of the Khawaja Sira "as normal human beings" in view of the prescriptions of the doctors or psychologists.[53]

The second part of the report was a summary of a field survey carried out by the Social Welfare Department in Punjab on directions of the Supreme Court. Some of the findings of this report were quite surprising. For example, even though only 6.8% of the

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[52] Report number DSW-P.W-DIR.(PROG)/09/8564-65, Dated 5th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare, Women Development and Bait ul Mal Department, Government of Punjab.

[53] Report number DSW-P.W-DIR.(PROG)/09/8564-65, Dated 5th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare, Women Development and Bait ul Mal Department, Government of Punjab.

Khawaja Sira surveyed by the SWD said that they became Khawaja Sira by choice through an operation or as a profession, one of the main findings reported by the SWD was that "[t]he majority of She-Males are self-made and they have adopted it as profession to earn their livelihood."[54] Similarly, while 81% surveyed Khawaja Sira reported to be born that way, the department noted that "[t]he number of actual She-Males (by birth) is less than as estimated earlier."[55] It is quite unclear what "earlier estimates" the department had in mind and how were those estimates reached. However, it is pertinent to mention that the survey form used by the SWD did not have the options "by choice/profession" or "by operation with her own will" in response to the question "how the persons became She-Males?" These categories seem to have emerged during the survey as the survey form used by the SWD only included the options "by birth", "by accident", "by disease", and "by force." Hence, one can infer that the department tried to survey only "biological" Khawaja Sira (which would also explain it could only find about 2200 Khawaja Sira in the entire province), and that is why finding that 6.8% among them were Khawaja Sira by choice, the SWD concluded that majority of the total Khawaja Sira were in fact "self-made."[56] However, the Supreme Court does not appear to have paid

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[54] Report number SO(SW) 10-5/2009 dated 13th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare, Women Development and Bait ul Mal Department, Government of Punjab.

[55] Report number SO(SW) 10-5/2009 dated 13th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare, Women Development and Bait ul Mal Department, Government of Punjab.

[56] Report number SO(SW) 10-5/2009 dated 13th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare, Women Development and Bait ul Mal Department, Government of Punjab.

much attention to this finding of the SWD in its discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira.[57]

It is also pertinent to mention that there were also reports submitted by other departments and provinces that did influence the Court to varying degrees. As an example, the report submitted by the SWD of another province (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) was much more detailed than the report of SWD of Punjab. A potentially useful step recommended in that report which was not adopted by the Court was the need to be cognizant of the various categories of Khawaja Sira and the caution against treating all Khawaja Sira as a group with identical "gender dysphoria."[58] That report, in addition to focusing on counseling and parental education about "gender dysphorics" put a lot of emphasis on imparting religious education (and improving their religiosity) to "prevent [children from] slipping into this particular community."[59] However, I am hesitant to call this report as a counter-discourse because some of the language used to characterize the various groups of gender queer individuals used normative language which had little to no relevance to the actual lives of the Khawaja Sira. For example, a Khawaja Sira was defined as a "normal man living forcibly, unwillingly full-time in the gender opposite to

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[57] The survey results also help provide more context of the social situation of the Khawaja. For example, only 16% of the surveyed Khawaja Sira had ID cards, 84% of the surveyed Khawaja Sira were labeled as poor and 18.7% percent were living with their family. Significantly, 87% of surveyed Khawaja Sira reported that they reached their Gurus by themselves (as opposed to being forced, or sold).

[58] Report number PS/SECY/SWD/8225-26 dated 15th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare and Women Dveleopment Department, Government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

[59] Report number PS/SECY/SWD/8225-26 dated 15th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare and Women Dveleopment Department, Government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

their birth sex."[60] Similarly, according to this report, "Hijra as a 'verb' represents an individual, having a social problem (failed man) who feels that he has failed miserably as a man and may seek to find an easier life by portraying as a female."[61]

These reports indicate that construction of a medicalized biological identity of the Khawaja Sira by the Supreme Court was primarily based on the dominant social and governmental discourses about the Khawaja Sira. On the other hand, the Court seems to have paid relatively little attention to identity related internal discourses among the Khawaja Sira community.

Stage 3: Action Orientation

This stage of Foucauldian discourse analysis involves an interpretation of the potential consequences of the particular discursive constructions in a text. Analysis in this stage highlights "what the various constructions of the discursive object are capable of achieving within the text" (Willig 2013, 132).

Authenticity. The biological discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira identity by the Supreme Court not only rooted the Khawaja Sira identity in the body but also medicalized the Khawaja Sira's status; a biological disorder could be verified through medical examination. Hence, the court directed that the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), entrusted with the task of registration of all citizens of Pakistan and for provision of their IDs, to decide the gender status of the Khawaja Sira

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[60] Report number PS/SECY/SWD/8225-26 dated 15th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare and Women Dveleopment Department, Government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

[61] Report number PS/SECY/SWD/8225-26 dated 15th August 2009 submitted by Social Welfare and Women Dveleopment Department, Government of NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

"after undertaking some medical tests based on hormones etc."[62] This discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira identity as being biologically determined had an important implication for the Zenanay who, for many centuries, have been problematizing the normative assumption of ontological sameness of gender and sex in Pakistan and India. The Supreme Court decision basically categorized the "thirdness" of the Zenanay as legally illegitimate and unauthentic as it is not biologically determined.

Hence, like the CTA before it, the Supreme Court decision in Pakistan foreclosed the possibility of "normal" biological males being counted as Khawaja Sira. Even after 140 years, a "normal" biological (where biology is almost synonymous with ontology) man cannot be officially contemplated as anything but a man.

Enumeration. Like the CTA, which focused on registration of the Khawaja Sira, the Supreme Court directed Social Welfare Department of each province to arrange a survey of the number, names and addresses of the Khawaja Sira.[63] This action orientation of the Court towards enumeration is significant as techniques of enumeration have historically been used by nation states "to know, manage, and make [their] subjects" (Kohrman, 2003, 8). In the present case, this focus on enumeration was significant as these surveys by the Social Welfare Department were later used as a justification for allocating limited resources for the Khawaja Sira.

As allocation of government resources is often based on the numerical strength of different groups, despite being recognized as marginalized, social groups have to show

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[62] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 Order.
[63] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 14.07.2009 Order.

themselves to be "large enough" (numerically) to deserve special treatment. This puts great premium on making oneself visible to the state (when one expects material benefits from the state) by submitting to the official identities as defined by the law. In the present context, a provincial minister in Punjab recently noted that only 2467 Khawaja Sira were officially registered with the Social Welfare Department of the Government of Punjab. The minister further argued that as the exact number of the Khawaja Sira was not known because of their general reluctance to get registered, the government was unable to fix any separate quota for them "as their number is not that much high (to deserve a quota)" (Dawn 2015).

Overall, the action orientation of the Supreme Court towards authenticity and enumeration resulted in an important consequence for the Khawaja Sira: instead of self-identification, the state was established as the arbiter of the Khawaja Sira identity.

Social Inclusion. While my primary in this chapter is on the legal identity construction of the Khawaja Sira, it is also pertinent to mention that in addition to symbolic inclusion, the Supreme Court also gave multiple directives about the material inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. For example, the Court directed the department of Police to ensure that the Khawaja Sira are not harassed by frontline workers.[64] Similarly, the Social Welfare department was directed to coordinate with other government departments to design special initiatives aimed at improving the socio-economic status of the Khawaja Sira.[65]

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[64] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 & 14.07.2009 orders.

[65] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 & 14.07.2009 orders.

Furthermore, the Court also directed the Education department to make sure that any Khawaja Sira interested in education are provided appropriate educational facilities.[66]

Stage 4: Positionings

An important dimension of this identity discourse is that it is at the time of formal visibility of previously inexistent –present yet unrepresented – groups (Prozorov 2014a) that the legal constructions of their identity is most critical. It is at this time that the politico-legal apparatus determines where does the newly created category of individuals fit in the broader scheme of things. That is why the next stage of FDA involves analyzing the *subject position* – "a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that repertoire" (Davies and Harre 1999, 35) – being offered to the discursive object within a particular discourse (Willig 2013).

In the present context, Stanley (2014, 90) cautions against seeing recognition based "biopolitical shifts" as unproblematic victories because often "the state and its interlocutors … work to translate and in turn confine the excesses of gendered life into managed categories at the very moment of radical possibility." That is why, it is noteworthy that the court in addition to using words like "weakness", and "disability" while referring to the Khawaja Sira identity also directed the government that "[o]n account of gender disorder in their bodies they [the Khawaja Sira] can be accommodated against the jobs which they can perform quite conveniently. As the Government has already ensured the jobs to the disable[d] persons, therefore, similar policy can also be

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[66] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 & 14.07.2009 orders.

adopted for them."[67] This is perhaps the most curious part of the judgment since it is quite unclear what jobs the Khawaja Sira would be unable do, as compared to a man or a woman. Perhaps more significantly, the Court did not direct the government to create special quotas for the Khawaja Sira like the various quotas created for women in various formal institutions in Pakistan (which should have been the obvious framing). Moreover, the Court directed the government to provide "security to eunuchs at the hands of miscreant persons who exploit them for taking the benefit of their *sexual weaknesses* [emphasis added]."[68] This directive indicates that the court considered the Khawaja Sira disabled individuals who need protection not because of social stigma or isolation but because of their inherent biological and sexual disability.

Overall, analysis of the Supreme Court directives during this case indicates that the social position being offered to the Khawaja Sira was that of a group of disabled individuals having a medical disorder and not that of a gender queer group.

Step 5: Practice

This stage involves analyzing the "relationship between discourse and practice" to highlight how discourses "limit what can be said and done" (Willig 2003, 132). In this section I discuss how the Supreme Court decision was subsequently implemented by the different governmental departments. Doing so also helps put the Supreme Court decision

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[67] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 Order.

[68] Khaki vs. S.S.P. (Operation), Rawalpindi. Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009 (CP 43, 2009), 20.11.2009 Order.

within broader governmental attitude towards social inclusion and legal identity of the Khawaja Sira.

As Golder (2015) recently observed "rights depend to a significant extent upon societal patterns of behavior and normative acceptance for their actual observance and enforcement" (105). Although the Supreme Court, in addition to its observations on the Khawaja Sira identity, directed the government (specifically police, social welfare, revenue, education and establishment departments) to ensure protection of legal and constitutional rights of the Khawaja Sira regarding inheritance of property, educational opportunities, and other fundamental rights for the Khawaja Sira, creation of a new gender category was the only major Supreme Court direction which was implemented to any meaningful degree in the long-run. For example, in the electoral lists prepared for national elections in 2012, only 458 Khawaja Sira in the Punjab province (out of 48,913,447 registered voters), 40 in Baluchistan (out of 3,278,164 registered voters), 99 in Sindh (out of 18,432,876 registered voters), 68 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (out of 12,064,597 registered voters) were Khawaja Sira[69]. In addition, the Khawaja Sira continue to be denied their rights in inheritance, educational, and job opportunities.

The only exception to this trend was the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). After the Supreme Court decision, NADRA soon created a third gender category known as the Khawaja Sira in its national registration system. Three further categories were created within the third gender category in the NADRA registration system: Khawaja Sira (male), Khawaja Sira (female) and *Khansa-e-Mushkil*

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[69] These statistics were taken from the website of Election Commission of Pakistan (www.ecp.gov.pk).

(true hermaphrodites). In line with the language used in the Supreme Court decision, these categories are also primarily based on biology instead of gender. So, unlike *trans-man*, a term used in many Western societies for individuals who were assigned as female at birth but prefer to live as men, the term Khawaja Sira (male) is instead reserved for individuals who are biologically close to men yet have the performative identity of women. This highlights how the discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira identity as primarily biological influences its subsequent translation into practice by NADRA: Even when legally recognized as a Khawaja Sira, their male body never ceases to be the primary determinant of their identity. Based on Supreme Court directions, NADRA also required the Khawaja Sira to produce a medical certificate if they wanted to register under these newly created categories.

Stage 6: Subjectivity

The last stage of FDA involves a discussion of the different ways in which a discourse influences the subjectivity of relevant social actors. As Willig (2013, 136) notes, "[h]aving asked questions about what can be said and done from within different discourses (Stage 5), we are now concerned with what can be felt, thought and experienced from within various subject positions." In the present case, it requires an examination of the responses of the Khawaja Sira to their legal identity construction. As I discussed in chapter 3, for most Khawaja Sira the primary determinant of their identity is their preference for the feminine gender and not their body. Importantly, for most Khawaja Sira their identity is not a disability. Therefore, the discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira identity as a biological disability has limited relevance to identity related internal discourses within the Khawaja Sira community. Moreover, limited

implementation of the Supreme Court directives about the economic inclusion of the Khawaja Sira made them weary of the value of the legal third gender. Since answering my research question about the self-identity of the Khawaja Sira requires a comprehensive investigation of their subjective interpretation and response to the third gender category created by the Supreme Court, I take up this issue in detail in the next chapter.

Discussion and Conclusion

Analysis of the legal discourse in this case reveals that the Supreme Court proceeded to construct a legal identity for the Khawaja Sira that had limited relevance to their self-identity. In doing so, the Court relied on wider discourses that consider gender and sex to by synonymous and consider only biological thirdness – of individuals with ambiguous genitalia – to be legitimate. Moreover, the action orientation of the Court towards medicalization of the Khawaja Sira identity and enumeration made governmental agencies as the official arbiters of legal thirdness. Importantly, the social position envisaged for the Khawaja Sira by the Court was that of disabled individuals and not a gender queer group. In this section, I briefly discuss the main insights from my analysis.

First, the primary discourse on which the Supreme Court based its discursive construction of the Khawaja Sira was the idea that gender and sex are synonymous and are biologically determined. Hence, any deviance to this norm is to be treated as a medicalized disorder. This assertion is supported by the fact that the Court occasionally used the words "gender" and "sex" interchangeably while referring to the Khawaja Sira. As is well known, this idea is deeply contested and the dominant perspective in Western social sciences, especially after the defining work of Butler (1993; 2002) is that sex and

gender are distinct, albeit socially constructed aspects of an individual's identity. Not only are gender and sex not synonymous but also not necessarily biologically determined. Butler, and many others after her (e.g., Fausto-Sterling 2000; West and Zimmerman 1987), have convincingly argued that gender is instead a performative identity based on the multiple intersections of an individual (in all her internal complexity) with one's heterogeneous socio-cultural ecology. Similarly, anthropological research with individuals in many cultural settings who don't fit in the binary categories of male-female also demonstrates that for hundreds of thousands of people across the globe, gender is not an attribute that originates "in the body" (Stryker, 2006). As I discuss in the next chapter, this biological construction of the Khawaja Sira identity by the Supreme Court limited the value of the legal third gender for the Khawaja Sira.

Second, my analysis in this chapter indicates that it is important to be cautious of formal law or policy based approach towards social inclusion as they can result in legalization of socially constructed identities of marginalized groups. For example, in this case the Court effectively made a socially constructed distinction between authentic (biological) and inauthentic (non-biological) Khawaja Sira legal. More importantly, Khawaja Sira is an umbrella term for individuals with many heterogeneous identities and genealogies. As I discussed in chapter 3, individuals molested in childhood or impotent or having gender dysphoria or biological males having a preference for the feminine gender can all co-exist under the label of Khawaja Sira (or Hijra) in South Asia. By legally defining, "legitimate" and "illegitimate" Khawaja Sira, the Supreme Court decision can potentially poke holes in this umbrella in the long term.

Moreover, ignoring the potential disjunction between gender and sex by the Supreme Court makes it very difficult for the Khawaja Sira not deemed authentic to make their case for legal recognition. In fact, legally, their social stigmatization has been reinforced by the Supreme Court. That is why, a comparison with the CTA is helpful. As I discussed above, the rationality and techniques employed by the Supreme Court was similar to the one used by the creators of the CTA pointing to the fact that even though the law now aims to do good for the Khawaja Sira, their fundamental alienation from a juridico-political order based on a binary gender system and biological ontology remains the same.

Third, while my primary goal in this chapter was to analyze the legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, it is important to highlight that legal identity construction of the Khawaja Sira was only one part of the Supreme Court decision. As I mentioned above, other parts of the decision focusing on redistributive justice for the Khawaja Sira were not subsequently implemented by government agencies. This was especially surprising because no governmental agency contested or made public statements against the legal rights of Khawaja Sira, making one wonder as to why the Khawaja Sira social and economic marginalization persists to the present day. Limited implementation of the Supreme Court decision and the predominantly negative attitude of frontline workers towards the Khawaja Sira (discussed in chapters 6-9), could indicate that while people and institutions might not be formally or publically against Khawaja Sira legal rights, they continue to limit Khawaja Sira social inclusion in other subtler ways (like limiting implementation). Overall, formal recognition of the Khawaja Sira resulted in minimal changes in their everyday lives because of limited implementation and the larger power

of informal social institutions that continue to exclude the Khawaja Sira even after the Supreme Court decision.

I would like to anticipate two possible critiques of my analysis and approach. First, it could be argued that most of the Supreme Court directives and decisions during this case aimed at improving their educational and economic well-being and I picked and chose those parts of the Court's directives and decisions that fit my narrative. To this critique I respond that this choice to focus only on certain parts of the Court's decisions and directives was driven by my primary research interest in the Khawaja Sira's legal identity construction. Perhaps more importantly, the instrumental directives of the Court, while a welcome initiative, proved to have limited relevance to the lives of the Khawaja Sira as almost none of the Court's directives regarding redistributive justice for the Khawaja Sira were implemented.

Another possible critique could be that my analysis is one sided i.e., it presents the Court and state machinery in primarily a negative manner and that by emphasizing the disjunction between gender and sex, I have ignored the "good" the Supreme Court decision could do for the "biological" Khawaja Sira in Pakistan. Admittedly, my analysis does operate from a primarily conflict based view of government i.e., certain sections and norms in society have a disproportionate access to state machinery which, in turn, plays an active role in policing those norms and interpellation of the relations of power in society. However, I am also cognizant of the word of caution by Foucault who mentions that discourses in addition to being instruments and effects of power "can also act as a point of resistance and a starting point for opposing strategy" (Foucault 1978, 101). The Supreme Court case and the discourse surrounding it did help in creating a dialogue

162

around Khawaja Sira identity and inclusiveness in Pakistan, which has resulted in increased awareness about their social situation. Moreover, as I discuss in chapters 6 and 9, Khawaja Sira are not always passive recipients of official discourses about their identity but contest their subjectification in a number of ways.

In addition to pointing out the potential limitations in a formal policy based approach towards social inclusion, this analysis also prompts two very important questions about the governance of gender and the politics of recognition raised in the literature: "what does it mean to insist on the preservation of the gender of 'factual record,' even when that gender has no phenomenological life at all*?*" (Salamon, 2010, 199-200) and as to "why some forms of life and relatedness are more possible, imaginable, eligible for recognition, thinkable, and livable than others" (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, 86). In the next chapter, I begin to answer these questions by analyzing the social discourses emerging around the legal third gender in Pakistan and the response of the Khawaja Sira to the creation of a separate gender category for them. Section III of the dissertation focuses on citizen-state interactions and directly engages with the later question about socio-legal hierarchies of identities and citizenship.

CHAPTER 6

BECOMING A MAN: ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND LEGAL IDENTITY OF

THE KHAWAJA SIRA

> *There is no use of the third gender when one doesn't have any resources or*
>
> *[social] support … The Supreme Court had directed the government to give us all*
>
> *our rights but their decision was not implemented. The government doesn't accept*
>
> *us… It implemented the [part of the decision about] IDs so that it could claim it*
>
> *had done something for the Khawaja Sira. The ID doesn't provide us food or*
>
> *fulfill any of our basic needs.*
>
> *Ashi – Chose to register as a Khawaja Sira*

> *The government has done nothing for us. Allowing us to have IDs [as Khawaja*
>
> *Sira] is not a big deal. We don't even want to have IDs as Khawaja Sira because*
>
> *we can't do Hajj [mandatory religious journey for Muslims] and then there are*
>
> *also other things [like share in inheritance] where we face hurdles [if we register*
>
> *as Khawaja Sira].*
>
> *Nadia – Chose to register as a Man*

"Politics of recognition" (Taylor 1994) - marginalized groups' effort to improve

their social status by seeking formal changes in the law based on their group identity –

continues to remain a normative ideal for most marginalized groups around the world

(see for example Donovan, Heaphy and Weeks 1999; Emerton 2004; Kollman and

Waites 2009) despite multiple contestations of its instrumental value (Fraser, 1995, 2000,

2001; Fraser and Honneth 2003). Resultantly, marginalized groups continue to gain legal

recognition of their unique identity and rights through popular protests, legal contestation and political struggle in different parts of the world. Such instances of legal recognition of marginalized identities mostly result in such groups embracing their legal recognition. However, legal recognition of gender queer individuals in Pakistan presents a striking contrast to this global pattern.

As I discussed in the last chapter, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a landmark decision in 2011 ordered the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) to create a third gender category in the legal ID issued to all citizens of Pakistan. While the Supreme Court decision to create a third gender category was accompanied with much fanfare, the response of the Khawaja Sira to this new third gender category has been less than overwhelming; with most Khawaja Sira choosing to register as men instead of opting for the third gender categorization. According to a recent report, only 1432 Khawaja Sira had opted for the third gender category introduced by National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) (The News, 2015). As the estimated number of Khawaja Sira in Pakistan ranges from 80,000 and 300,000 (Baig, 2012) it implies that less than 2% of the Khawaja Sira have registered under the third gender category since it became officially available to them in 2011. Most of my research participants who had IDs (as men) prior to the creation of the third gender category, elected not to get their IDs as Khawaja Sira after the Supreme Court decision. More importantly, my interactions with the Khawaja Sira and the frontline workers of NADRA suggest that considerable

number of Khawaja Sira who got their identity cards after the aforementioned decision still chose to register as men.[70]

This seems a paradoxical choice since the Khawaja Sira face social isolation and persecution due to their non-conformity with the gender assigned at their birth. That is why, in this chapter I analyze this choice of the Khawaja Sira to register as men instead of choosing the third gender legally. To this end, I analyze the different discourses that have emerged around the legal third gender category in Pakistan and also discuss the influence of these discourses on the seemingly paradoxical choice of the Khawaja Sira to register as men. In doing so, this analysis makes the following broad contributions to research on marginalized gender groups. First, while previous research has highlighted the limitations of the state categorization systems (Yanow 2003; Catlaw 2007) and the symbolic violence[71] inherent in limiting the life of gender queer individuals to the binary gendered legal system (Monro 2005; Spade 2008; Salamon 2010), there has been little research on the normative and instrumental value of the legal third gender category for gender queer individuals. My research points to limitations of symbolic value of legal recognition for gender queer groups and suggests that choosing any static gender category – including the third gender – limits the fluid movement of gender queer individuals across different gender categories.

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[70] Although I don't have a number, my participants suggested that no more than 5-15% of their peers have chosen the legal third gender.

[71] Symbolic violence refers to "the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning … upon groups and classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate. This legitimacy obscures the power relations which permit that imposition to be successful (Jenkins 1992, 66).

Second, analyses focusing on the limitations of the official categorization systems (Yanow 2003; Monro 2005) generally present the publics as passive recipients of their legal categorization and there has been little research on the responses of marginalized groups to their legal categorization. My research suggests that legal gender is a deliberate choice for many gender queer individuals who opt their legal gender after weighing the benefits of the legal third gender against its opportunity costs. Moreover, my research also shows that instead of the official definitions of different gender categories, it is their social and religious valuations that are more important for gender queer individuals.

Finally, my research also points out that selective policy implementation by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) can limit the utility of legal recognition for marginalized gender groups by increasing administrative burden – "experience of policy implementation as onerous" (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014, 3) – experienced by them.

Identity and Refusal of Subjectification

When the Supreme Court decision regarding creation of the legal third gender was announced, it seemed as an important step towards social inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. However, very few Khawaja Sira opted to register as third gendered individuals. This seemingly paradoxical choice of the Khawaja Sira who face social isolation and stigmatization to assert their thirdness problematizes the instrumental value of the Supreme Court decision. A good starting point to analyze the choice of the Khawaja Sira to register as men is to consider the social and official valuation of the gender identity being offered to them by the state.

167

Bourdieu (1994) contends that the symbolic power of the state resides in its ability to define and present the officially sanctioned identities as legitimate and objective. These legal identities, once promulgated, introduce new social discourses related to authenticity, inclusion, and citizenship. More importantly, not all identities are created equal; the socio-legal benefits and costs associated with different identities represent the legally prescribed and socially perceived position of the individuals assuming those identities. In the context of present discussion, it implies that the introduction of legal third gender also represents a position in the network of social relations being offered to the Khawaja Sira by the state.

Accepting and submitting to the official third gender category means that the Khawaja Sira accept or will be subjected to the discourses and consequences associated with this new identity. That is why the choice by the Khawaja Sira to register as men, instead of choosing the legal third gender, can be termed as the "refusal of subjectification" (Pathak and Rajan 1989) where individuals being bestowed new legal identities and rights respond "with a discontinuous and apparently contradictory subjectivity" (572). According to Pathak and Rajan (1989), this "apparent inconstancy or changeability must be interpreted as [the subaltern subject's] refusal to occupy the subject position offered to her" (572). A classic example in this regard is that of "welfare stigma" (Moffitt 1983) where many eligible individuals refuse to enroll in welfare programs of the government due to negative social construction of welfare recipients (Stubera and Schlesinger 2006). Similarly, social stigmas associated with drug users have also been found to be negatively associated with participation in drug rehabilitation programs (Semple, Grant, and Patterson 2005). Another related example is the low participation in

child vaccination programs because of social perceptions of negative effects of vaccines (Larson et al. 2011). Overall, these findings suggest that that the valuation of any program, policy or identity is driven partly by the perceptual filters of the participants and their significant others. In such circumstances, it is the perception about the program that matters and not the actual merits or de-merits of the policy.

The decision of the Khawaja Sira to register as men is also motivated by different social discourses. As I discuss below, various social and religious stigmas – "negative attribute[s] or identit[ies] that devalue a person within a particular context or culture" (Quin 2006, 83) – dissuade the Khawaja Sira from choosing the legal third gender. In addition, there are limited material and symbolic benefits that could offset the social and religious costs associated with choosing the third gender legally.

Choosing the Legal Gender

In the discussion that follows, I discuss the major factors and discourses that influence the Khawaja Sira while choosing their legal gender. I have divided these factors along three main thematic areas; stigma, utilitarian concerns and symbolic concerns.

Stigma

Familial stigma.

> *The other day three Khawaja Sira came [to my house] who even had the operation done and looked just like women. They said, "Sister we have to get the male ID!" I said, "But you even have the operation done and look just like women. Why don't you register as Khawaja Sira?" to which they replied, "No Sister! Our [paternal] uncle will kill us if we do that" … I think if there was less family pressure, more among us might register as Khawaja Sira. (Salma)*

169

The new ID introduced by the government can only be issued to those who have destroyed themselves, who have knowingly (jeetay ji) … [pause implying surgical alteration to the body] … [destroyed] their bodies, who have literally erased their name [or identity] from everywhere, from their siblings and from their relatives. The Khawaja Sira ID gets issued to only such individuals as that card is only made in the name of the Gurus. We want our name to be included with the name of our parents. Our parents gave us birth, our mother carried us in her womb for nine months, our father did hard labor (tokri chukee) to earn money. They took care of us in our childhood. How can we erase their name? (Katrina)

These two narratives point to the different ways in which families influence the Khawaja Sira choices about their legal gender. Many families, even after the Khawaja Sira have left or been thrown out of their homes, keep tabs on them and actively discourage a public display of their (primarily feminine) identity. One of the participants in my research was beaten badly by her family members after her interview aired on a local news channel about the Khawaja Sira rights since she was thought to have acted too boldly and to have brought shame to the family. This anxiety over honor of the family reaches its peak when the families know that their "son" is going to register as a Khawaja Sira, which is thought to bring further disrepute to the family. Resultantly, the threat of violence and withholding family verification (which is mandatory for getting a legal ID) are often used as strategies to dissuade the Khawaja Sira from choosing the third gender.

As noted in the context of welfare stigma, individuals often internalize the negative stereotypes associated with adopting the identity of a welfare recipient (Stuber

170

and Kronebusch 2004). This internalization, in turn, results in refusal to participate in welfare programs even if one is eligible to receive benefits (Stubera and Schlesinger 2006). In a similar vein, many of research participants had internalized the discourse among the Khawaja Sira that choosing the legal third gender meant abandoning one's parents. Even though most of my research participants had left or had been thrown out of their homes by their families, the thought of formally abandoning them remained very much a taboo. Most of my research participants wanted to hold on to the hope that at some level they were still part of their family. It was as if getting the Khawaja Sira card would make the disconnect from their families "real." Selma perhaps expressed this sentiment the best when she said, "There is no use of it (registering as Khawaja Sira). People say get it, get it. How can one forget one's own family, one's own parents?" Such individuals ended up choosing the male gender only because they thought it would keep them, at least symbolically, connected to their families.

Another important reason for this valuation of the third gender by the Khawaja Sira is that most of my research participants believe that an integral part of choosing the third gender category is to include their Guru's name in place of their father (something which is neither allowed nor encouraged by the government). That is why those who opt to register as Khawaja Sira have any hope of any material or symbolic connection with their family. That is also part of the reason why most Khawaja Sira call the ID where they opt the male gender as "the family card" and the card where they choose the third gender as "the Khawaja Sira card." Among my research participants, only those who had had especially bad breaks from their families, or whose parents had died, wanted to choose the third gender category. In fact, a couple of them wanted to be allowed to use their

Guru's name instead of their biological father to make the disconnect from their families formal.

Religious stigma. For many of my research participants, one of the most important reasons for becoming legal men is, what I call, for the lack of a better term, religious ontology. Most Khawaja Sira believe that in front of God, they are (ontologically) men and they should perform all religious rituals like men otherwise those rituals will remain imperfect. From Naghma's observation that "we are born as boys in our parents' homes" to Sheela's opinion that "we will be resurrected with men at the day of judgment" and that she wants to be "included in Prophet's row[72] (implying the row of men) on the day of judgment", it was perhaps the most consistent finding about the religious beliefs of the Khawaja Sira about their legal gender. This is somewhat surprising since most other Khawaja Sira narratives about their identity were based on the idea that they had a feminine soul inside a masculine body. I would have assumed (perhaps naively) that religion should be concerned with soul and not the body. But for some reason, when it comes to religion, the soul paradoxically takes a back seat for the Khawaja Sira and the body takes over. This is what I mean by the term religious ontology.

Many Khawaja Sira believe that when they go to Mecca for religious pilgrimage (Umrah or Hajj), if they choose the legal identity of Khawaja Sira, they will either not be allowed to enter Saudi Arabia[73] or will have to perform the religious ritual like women.

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[72] The original word used was "saf" which refers to the straight rows of Muslim during the time of prayer.

[73] While the Khawaja Sira narrated many stories about their peers being sent back from the airport or not allowed to travel to Saudi Arabia because of the third gender, I could not verify this independently. According to Saudi Law, women can't travel for religious pilgrimage without a *Mehram* (a male relative). So, it is probably the Khawaja Sira who wear women clothing or register as Khawaja Sira (women) who are not allowed to travel to Saudi Arabia.

Both of these options are unacceptable for them. Many Khawaja Sira narrated multiple

incidents where their friends couldn't travel to other countries (U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia)

because of their Khawaja Sira identity. That is why, the Khawaja Sira are apprehensive of

choosing the Khawaja Sira identity or travelling internationally dressed in feminine

clothes.

Relatedly, many Khawaja Sira also believe that only those among them opt for

this new identity who have undergone surgical modification of their bodies to become

more like women. As I discussed in chapter 4, this practice, which is relatively more

common in neighboring India (Reddy 2004), is still not the norm in Pakistan. Only a

small minority of Khawaja Sira choose to get their bodies surgically modified as this is

taken to be a sign of interfering in the domain of God. Most Muslims believe that surgical

procedures required for sex change are a sin since they are considered to alter the

ontological status of the body, something exclusively reserved for the domain of God.

Such radical alteration is tantamount to a revolt against God (Altinay 2014). To illustrate

this point, the breast enhancement procedure would not be considered a sin for a Muslim

woman as it does not change her (ontological) status as a woman, but a similar operation

would be prohibited to those considered men. As the second epi-quote to this section

indicates, such individuals are considered to have abandoned everyone including their

family and friends. Someone who revolts against God and abandons her parents might as

well become a formal Khawaja Sira.

For a variety of historical reasons, religion is perhaps the most important form of

government – defined as institutional "conduct of conduct" (Gordon 1991, 2) – for

subject formation in Pakistan. While the queer personalities of the Khawaja Sira resist the

173

normalization imperatives of other dominant informal institutions like family and friends, when it comes to religion, they follow the normative ideals communicated to them by their family members and the Guru, all of whom think that they should consider themselves as men when it comes to religion. There is a *doxa* – common beliefs assumed to be true without question (Bourdieu 1987) – for every individual and for the Khawaja Sira, their masculine religious ontology is very much an unproblematic given that continues to influence their religious and legal identity.

Utilitarian Concerns

For many Khawaja Sira, their choice of legal gender is also motivated by more utilitarian concerns. As I discuss below, a combination of comparatively more benefits of registering as a man, limited benefits of the legal third gender, and higher costs associated with registering as third gendered individuals result in many Khawaja Sira registering as men.

Benefits of Registering as a Man.

In a religious and legal system based on patriarchy, there are also tangible economic benefits associated with becoming a "legal man" which one has to forego to choose the third gender legally. The material benefit of the masculine gender, especially when it comes to property rights was noted by Khawaja Sira rights activists like Simran and Naima, both of whom had chosen the masculine legal gender in their ID cards. For example, Simran said the following about the benefits of registering as man:

> *I always say [to my Khawaja Sira peers] that we should have the ID card as a*
> *male because otherwise we get counted as women [for legal purposes] where we*
> *were going to get a bigger (12 anay) share [equal to that of a man] we are given*

174

a smaller (only 4 anay) share because they say you are Khawaja Sira so you are equal to sisters. That's why I advise everyone [among the Khawaja Sira] to get their ID card as a man. A friend came to me to get ID card as a Khawaja Sira but I said no, you should get the ID card as a man because then you can claim your complete [(and due] share in inheritance.

While I could find no evidence or statute about this claim of Simran that the legal share of Khawaja Sira and men is legally (or religiously) different, nevertheless social discourses about the denial of legal inheritance by their family because of their gender circulate widely among the Khawaja Sira and produce powerful effects. Like Simran, many other Khawaja Sira also mentioned inheritance as one of the main factors responsible for them choosing the male gender legally. In many cases, the primary concern was not *what* their share was in inheritance but whether they got *any* share at all. As noted by the Supreme Court in its decision on Khawaja Sira rights, the Khawaja Sira are mostly denied any share in their parents' inheritance. The Khawaja Sira registering as men are holding on to the hope that maybe identifying themselves as men may persuade their parents (and siblings) or the legal system to let them have their due share in inheritance.

However, in some cases adopting the legal male gender is not enough to persuade parents or relatives to let the Khawaja Sira have their due share in family inheritance. For example, Chandna, who had legally registered as a man, was not given any share by her father when he divided his property among his children recently. According to Chandna when she asked her father the reason, he said "what use would you have for the property?" This is another common theme where the economic exclusion of the Khawaja

Sira is justified on the premise that they don't need to save or care for anyone other than themselves (as they don't have any spouse or children).

The idea that those who opt to register as Khawaja Sira have no claim over inheritance of their parents is also reinforced by the few Khawaja Sira who consider the decision to choose the legal third gender to be one of the identity signatures of being an "authentic" Khawaja Sira. As Reema, who wanted to get an ID as a Khawaja Sira and also wanted to include the name of her Guru instead of her parents on the ID noted:

> *If the government insists that we get IDs in the names of our (biological) families (as compared to allowing us to have the name of our Guru on the card), it should also ensure that those Khawaja Sira who are married or claim share in their parents' inheritance as sons are differentiated from us (as being pretenders). We have left our parents' property. After leaving our homes we are forsaken (hence only we can claim authenticity).*

Similarly, Saeeda was also not interested in getting any property from her family. According to her,

> *"Why would we need any property? It is not as if we have any family (implying spouse) or children. After our deaths, our property will go back to our brothers and sisters anyways. Then what is the point of getting it now?"*

Some Khawaja Sira are more instrumental in their thinking when it comes to family and inheritance. Meera whose old ID was left at home when she was thrown out of the house after her mother's death, also said that she will not get 'that' (family) ID again and will only get the Khawaja Sira ID, "Which property do they have that I would want ID card in their name?"

Limited Benefits of the Legal Third Gender.

It is also important to note that so far there are limited official benefits associated with the third gender category. An important reason for this is the disjointed nature of gender related data collection. As Spade (2008) argues, in the Unites States various institutions and jurisdictional areas have different policies when it comes to gender reclassification. For example, 28 states allow gender reclassification on birth certificate by law or administrative statutes, in three states (Idaho, Ohio, Tennessee) gender reclassification is not allowed while the remaining 19 states do not have any officially promulgated rules about reclassification of gender, but do allow it in practice (Spade 2008). Similarly, the documentation required for assessing one's gender varies across different institutions (like Social Security Administration, Department of Motor Vehicles, and Homeless Shelters) in different states. This holds true for Pakistan as well where different institutions have different requirements for collection of gender related information, none of which associate any material benefit with the legal third gender. As one of my research participants noted:

> *What good is [adding the third gender on] the ID for us unless 'third-gender' is added to all forms, for example, related to transfer of property, divorce…, on certificates, on forms for admissions to schools. On these forms, there is never written man, woman, Khawaja Sira. We just have to write man or woman. Unless a third category is added everywhere, how will we get our place and our dignity (izzat). (Nirmal)*

Figure 1: Advertisement by NADRA for Data Entry Operator Job Reserved for Khawaja Sira. *Notes:* One of the conditions for eligibility is "a valid medical certificate verifying *Mukhanas* (Khawaja Sira) status from the Medical Superintendent of the District headquarter Hospital."

Perhaps the clearest example of this disjointedness is the fact that, as shown in figure 1, when NADRA advertised special reserved jobs for the Khawaja Sira, instead of asking for the legal ID as a proof of being a Khawaja Sira, it asked for the production of a medical certificate verifying that they were authentic (biological) Khawaja Sira. So, it was technically possible for an individual to be registered as a man and still apply for the job. Conversely, not all individuals registered legally under the third gender category could apply for these jobs if they could not produce a medical certificate showing their biological thirdness.

Similarly, local NGOs that manage most social welfare programs for the Khawaja Sira do not require the legal identity of a Khawaja Sira for recruitment in their programs. Instead, informal verification mostly in the form of referral by other Khawaja Sira or self-identification is preferred. On this point, Naima perhaps summed up the overall sentiment of the Khawaja Sira the best: "If there was any benefit in legally registering as a Khawaja Sira, every one of us would have chosen it."

In fact, considering the political culture of Pakistan, if there were benefits associated with being a Khawaja Sira, many individuals who are not Khawaja Sira may also line up to get those IDs to get that advantage. Thus, the choice of the legal gender for the Khawaja Sira is, in part, a case of circular logic; since there are few Khawaja Sira who choose the third gender, there is no incentive for the government to associate any material benefits with that category and since there are no incentives to offset the social and religious costs associated with the third gender, the Khawaja Sira have no reason to choose the third gender.

Compliance Costs.

According to Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey (2014), compliance costs refer to time and monetary costs required to comply with the paperwork and rules associated with choosing to opt in a government program or policy. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, the Khawaja Sira face high compliance costs in getting a legal ID in the form of multiple documentation requirements. However, documentation requirements disproportionately increase if a Khawaja Sira wants to choose the third gender category. The Khawaja Sira have to produce a medical certificate verifying that they (biologically) belong to the third gender category if they want to change their gender on their legal ID.

As I discussed earlier, many Khawaja Sira are biologically men but their legal identity constructed by the Supreme Court and implemented by NADRA doesn't consider such Khawaja Sira as authentic. Resultantly, such Khawaja Sira, have to choose the male gender as they cannot comply with the requirement for a medical certificate as a proof of their third-gender. Moreover, those few who do try to register as Khawaja Sira have to face higher administrative burdens in the form of time and travel costs to get the medical certificates from the designated government hospitals.

Furthermore, even though a medical certificate is not needed legally at the time of applying for a legal ID the first time, many frontline workers still require the Khawaja Sira applicants to provide one when applying. Due to illiteracy and lack of awareness about the formal policies, some Khawaja Sira face additional administrative burden at government hospitals to get a medical certificate. Consider the following account of Rani who accompanied her friend Neeli to the NADRA frontline office to apply for a legal ID.

> *We had a long argument with the [NADRA frontline] staff. But they said, 'we can't do anything. We can only follow the documents you have submitted … if you want to register as a Khawaja Sira, you should go to a doctor and get a medical certificate [indicating that you are a biologically a Khawaja Sira]. Only once we get the report will you be registered as a Khawaja Sira'. We said, 'Ok we will get it done somehow'. [Next day, we went to Jinnah Hospital]. When we reached there, they told us that we were too late and that we should come again the next day. When we went back the next day, they told us that such medical certificates are only issued at Services and Munshi Hospitals. After that, I thought enough is enough and told Neeli to go home.*

Eventually Neeli did get registered as a Khawaja Sira after her friend went to the regional headquarters of NADRA and contested the insistence of the frontline staff about the medical certificate (discussed in detail in chapter 9). This episode shows the high compliance costs in getting a medical certificate for the Khawaja Sira. This requirement also encourages some Khawaja Sira to choose the male gender. It is not only easier to register as a man but implicitly the frontline organizations encourage this choice, as it is in conformity with the dominant social construction of the Khawaja Sira as biological male pretending to be women. Consider the following narratives of two of my research participants which are representative of the way registration under the third gender category is discouraged by the frontline workers:

We have to pass through so many hurdles to register as a Khawaja Sira. [The frontline workers say that] You should grow moustaches. If you want to go to Umrah, you should get ID card as a male. Your face doesn't look like that of a woman. Your face is that of a man. (Resham)

They made me return to the office 4 times… I am from that area [and] the frontline staff knows me [and my family]. They said both your parents are alive. Why would you do this [abandon your parents by registering as a Khawaja Sira?] …We know you. How can we write your name among the Khawaja Sira? (Shahida)

Due to high compliance costs associated with third gender registration, their legal gender often – though not always – becomes a secondary concern for the Khawaja Sira.

As a research participant noted, "for most Khawaja Sira, the main concern is not whether they get legal ID as a Khawaja Sira but whether they get any ID at all."

Learning Costs.

According to Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey (2014) learning costs refer to the costs associated with learning about all the benefits and costs associated with participation in a government policy. As I discussed above, one of the reasons a low number of my research participants choose the third gender is because they think that they will be required to replace the name of their parents with their Guru on their IDs, something which is not a part of the government policy. Relatedly, very few Khawaja Sira know that they are legally required to produce a medical certificate only if they are changing gender on their IDs – i.e., if they previously have IDs as men and now want to register as Khawaja Sira. There is no requirement of a medical certificate as a proof of one's gender in the official rules of NADRA when an individual applies for a legal ID the first time. However, I met many Khawaja Sira who were unaware of this important distinction in the official rules and were resultantly not able to make an informed decision about their legal gender[74]. Perhaps more importantly, this example also points out that occasionally the Khawaja Sira are also confronted on the administrative side with lack of knowledge or unwillingness to follow the prescribed policy. Therefore, in addition to the psychological costs in the form of social and religious stigma, high learning and

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[74] To provide a personal example of how the same rules can incur different degrees of learning and compliance costs, co-incidentally my wife's ID card got stolen while I was conducting fieldwork in Lahore and we had to go through similar procedures and requirements at the NADRA offices and the local police station to get a new legal ID. Having previous experience with formal institutions in Pakistan and knowing all the requirements beforehand, it was much easier for us to navigate the official spaces and rules than most of my research participants.

compliance costs are, therefore, another important barrier responsible for the Khawaja Sira not choosing the third gender category. Moreover, these costs may be incurred at multiple governmental sites, such as NADRA offices and government hospitals.

Symbolic and Psychological Concerns

Prior to the introduction of the third gender category, very few Khawaja Sira had legal IDs and almost all of them had to register as men. So, perhaps the most obvious benefit one would expect of the third gender category for the Khawaja Sira is the symbolic psychological value associated with legal recognition of their thirdness. That is why, at the beginning of my research, the fact that most Khawaja Sira didn't attach much symbolic value to their legal categorization in general and the third gender category in particular seemed paradoxical to me. I understood that creation of this new identity category was not one of their major demands but still being legally recognized as neither men nor women seemed (perhaps naively) to be an attractive choice for the Khawaja Sira. However, I gradually came to realize that a fixed gender category is tangential to their everyday lived experiences because a static categorization system cannot take into account the gender fluid lives of many trans individuals in general (Monro 2003) and Khawaja Sira in particular. The Khawaja Sira are "gender voyagers" (Witten 2002). As Witten (2002, 185) argues, "[l]ike a fluid that can change state from gas to solid, so too the gender voyager often changes … back and forth between states of being/existence."

A Khawaja Sira typically has to respond to her masculine name around her (biological) family and to her feminine name around her Khawaja Sira friends; wear masculine clothes when living with the (biological) family or when performing religious rituals but wear feminine clothes with her friends, at parties, and at her own home. More

importantly, as I discussed in chapter 4, most Khawaja Sira adopt a masculine performative identity in old age, which is another example of their gender fluidity. Thus, performing as women, praying like men and in relations of love unlike anyone else, their lives are characterized by fluid movements within and across different gender categories. Most Khawaja Sira seamlessly take on different gender roles in different social institutions and asking them to choose one gender category permanently (whatever that category might be) limits their fluidity across different categories.

In the context of trans citizenship, Monro (2003) notes that the state is and has always been uneasy with the idea of fluidity of gender or sexual identity and one way in which to address this anxiety is the application of top down static categories over fluid lives. In the present context, it is as if the Khawaja Sira are offered legal citizenship by the state – their membership in society based on law and public policy –but this inclusion is at the price of their gender fluidity (in addition to facing social and religious stigmas); most Khawaja Sira I encountered, at least at present, are not willing to bear this psychological cost. Viewed from this perspective, the choice of Khawaja Sira not to register as third gender individuals appears to problematize the rules of the game when it comes to categorization of gender queer individuals. Theoretically, it's almost as if by legally remaining man the Khawaja Sira problematize the instrumental value of the third gender as a category to absorb the "wasted bodies" (Bauman 2011) along the gender axis.

Another subtle but significant aspect of official categorization of the Khawaja Sira is related to the choice of terminology in official policy. The word used in official registration policy of NADRA is "gender." While the distinction between gender and sex might be clear to social scientists, the same distinction is not used by most Khawaja Sira.

Instead, the distinction they use is between body and soul. Many of my research participants mentioned that they had bodies of men but their soul was feminine. It is this distinction that speaks the most to them and not the one between gender and sex. If instead of (or in addition to) gender, there was a category of soul on the legal ID, almost all Khawaja Sira would choose the feminine option. That is also why, while most of my research participants opted to register as a male, some of them ideally wanted to register as a female. However, considering the social and administrative biases, very few believed, rightly so, that they would be allowed to choose that option because of their biology. As one of my participants, when asked about what gender would she ideally choose if given an option responded:

> *Obviously, we would choose female but we will not be allowed to do so. We will be judged on the basis of our biology. It will be seen that our bodies (jisamat) are like men. So, we will have a problem. (Nirmal)*

However, I did not meet (or come to know of) any Khawaja Sira who had registered or tried to register as a female (except one) in recent years. It was as if it was something they thought was not going to be possible given the current social, legal, and administrative discourses. My interactions with the NADRA frontline workers also confirmed this apprehension of the Khawaja Sira. While most frontline workers preferred that the Khawaja Sira register as men, they could tolerate them being registered as Khawaja Sira. However, whenever I asked if the Khawaja Sira can register as females (which they technically can when they apply for their first ID), I was met with almost an incredulous remark like "how could that happen", "in that case we will have to see if

185

their appearance matches the gender of their choice" or "they could. But I don't know any Khawaja Sira who has tried to do that."

However, it is also important to mention that the third gender category is relatively recent and owing to illiteracy and lack of proper communication, some discourses surrounding the legal third gender (like authenticity) are still evolving. For example, for a few Khawaja Sira, the new third gender identity promises new potentialities which were not possible in previous binary system of gender management. For example, as discussed in detail in chapter 9, Neeli, a Khawaja Sira, wanted everyone to use her Khawaja Sira (feminine) name and to have her photograph taken in traditional female attire with jewelry and long hair. By choosing to register under the third gender category, she was able to accomplish both her wishes. It is unlikely, if not impossible, that she would have been able to do either of those things before the creation of the third gender category. The few Khawaja Sira who did (or wanted to) register under the third gender category often used the Urdu/Punjabi word *pehchan* (a hybrid of the English words, *recognition* and *identity*) to communicate the importance of the new identity category for them. For such Khawaja Sira, this new identity category meant that they now had a distinct legal *pehchan* which they considered a step in the right direction in terms of their social inclusion.

For example, some like Dildar consider the Khawaja Sira identity as being potentially helpful in distinguishing between authentic and unauthentic Khawaja Sira. However, the definition of authenticity for the Khawaja Sira is quite different from that used by the Supreme Court in its judicial discourse. While the court focused on the signature of their bodies, for the Khawaja Sira, authenticity is synonymous with

186

completely adopting their life style. They are very apprehensive of (people they label as) men who pretend to be like them by putting on makeup and female clothing to beg at traffic stops yet have wives and children at home. These men are considered as direct competition and are seen as "usurping our rights." That is the reason why, the Khawaja Sira identity card is seen as a potential way of differentiating between authentic and unauthentic Khawaja Sira.

> *That is why, we say that there should be a registration of the Khawaja Sira (Khusras) so that the 'real' Khawaja Sira can be recognized who have (ID) cards and fake Khawaja Sira who have families, who wear (female) clothes like us and beg in our place can be exposed and removed from our fold. (Dildar)*

That is also why some Khawaja Sira insist on including the name of Guru on the ID card because they think that only authentic Khawaja Sira will opt to include their Guru's names on their IDs and those pretenders "who are married and go back to their wives at night and claim inheritance from their families" will be exposed as frauds. However, as I mentioned above, this opinion is not shared by everyone and most Khawaja Sira prefer to have the names of their biological parents on their ID. As some of these discourses around authenticity are still evolving, it would be premature to pass a final judgment on the symbolic influence of this new category on the Khawaja Sira lives.

Discussion

As Korteweg (2006) notes, ethnographic research enables us to move beyond simplistic interpretation of the influence of social policies on "gendering of citizenship" (336). If one was to focus on statistics alone, it would be tempting to consider the response (or lack thereof) of the Khawaja Sira to the new third gender category as an act

187

of resistance. However, I am hesitant to call the general reluctance of the Khawaja Sira to choose the legal third gender as an act of normative resistance – "conscious and active strategies and actions for making life choices distinct from those considered most socially expected, celebrated, and sanctioned" (Pfeffer 2012, 578) – as the limited benefits and high social costs associated with the third gender category often end up being the most important determinant of the Khawaja Sira's choice about their legal identity. Instead, it is better to characterize this choice of the Khawaja Sira as an act of inventive pragmatism – "active strategies and actions that might be considered clever manipulation of an existing social structure in order to access social and material resources on behalf of oneself or one's family" (Pfeffer 2012, 578). Due to a legal and religious order which puts premium on being a man, it is often easier and more convenient for the Khawaja Sira to register as men. In this section, I briefly discuss the main implications of my analysis.

First, this analysis points out the dilemmas associated with the legal identity of the gender fluid Khawaja Sira. When their mere presence in a room or a workplace is enough for others to label and ostracize them even when they don't want to disclose their real identity, there is limited, if any, utility of any formal, legal identity for them. In fact, one could argue that asking them to choose a formal identity would limit their informal freedom to move within and across the gender boundaries in society. The Khawaja Sira don't exist within traditional gender categories and the choice of categories does not speak to their everyday problems and concerns. Although we as researchers, public administrators, and policy makers focus on legal identity categories as they are integral to the way representative governments operate (Catlaw 2007; Yanow 2003), Khawaja Sira do not live their lives within formal state categories. For many of them, their legal ID is

just another example of the multiple times they have to act as a man or a woman in a social setting. Perhaps more importantly, the choice of no single gender category captures the fluid identity of the Khawaja Sira, pointing to the inherent limitations of the way formal categories have become integral to the way our societies are governed.

Hence, symbolic violence[75] (Bourdieu 1994; Jenkins 1992) is inherent in reducing the lives of Khawaja Sira to a static categorization system. Many researchers have noted this symbolic violence resulting from the static categorization of fluid identities by the state (Grillo 2003; Turner 1993; Baumann 1999; Werbner 1997). As Candea (2010, 112) notes,

> Often, this distinction between fixity and fluidity is mapped onto a distinction between state-imposed categories and local ones, between explicit categorization definitions and the myriad implicit ways in which people "do" identity in practice… The kind of fixed and bounded ways of categorizing people which are enforced— sometimes violently— by states and bureaucracies interrupt the contextuality and revocability of people's everyday categorizations of each other.

Second, the different costs associated with the choice of legal gender for the Khawaja Sira results in their undercounting which is another example of the systematic erasure of gender queer individuals around the world. Since Namaste's (2000) ground breaking work in Canada, many researchers (e.g., Knight, Flores, and Nezhad, 2015; Singer, 2015) have highlighted the systematic undercounting of trans populations because of the limitations of classification practices. However, in case of the Khawaja Sira, the state does not seem to be the only determinant of administrative burden. Instead, for

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[75] Symbolic violence refers to "the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning … upon groups and classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate. This legitimacy obscures the power relations which permit that imposition to be successful (Jenkins 1992, 66).

many of my research participants, social and religious stigmas associated with the third gender were a more influential determinant of their choice about their legal gender. Importantly, this choice to be subsumed in the binary gender system is a result of the Khawaja Sira choices that are often (though not always) tangential to the top-down discourses about recognition of gender queer groups and are instead governed by the social values associated with the legal third gender.

More importantly, this analysis also cautions against celebrating all legal recognition based initiatives for the inclusion of socially marginalized individuals as success stories. Instead, legal recognition of marginalized identities has to be done after a meaningful analysis of the identity related discourses within such groups and has to be accompanied with redistributive measures as well. In this case, the state has created a new identity category for the Khawaja Sira while not associating tangible material benefits with it. Hence, this is a classic example of identity politics where recognition of the third gender by the state was not associated with any redistributive measures (Fraser and Honneth 2003). Formally accepting the legal third gender only decreases the chances of Khawaja Sira retaining the already tenuous connections with their families and can also have adverse financial consequences for them (such as decreased share in inheritance). Importantly, as there are no material benefits associated with choosing the third gender for the Khawaja Sira, any symbolic benefits related to authenticity that might be associated with the legal third gender, are often not enough to offset the social and religious costs associated with the third gender category. Therefore, this analysis supports Fraser's contestation of the value of legal recognition of marginalized social groups without associated redistribution as the normative first step towards their social inclusion.

Third, for better or worse, being "seen" by the representative state system (Scott 1998; Catlaw 2007) means that the choice of the Khawaja Sira regarding their legal gender comes with consequences. The Khawaja Sira opting to register as men become formally invisible for the enumeration and statistical operations of the state and can't claim any special rights based on their identity. As Farmer (2003) argues, "[w]hat-is-true and what counts-as-true co-exist, and these two may or may not overlap. What-counts as-true counts. Holders of what-counts-as-true are liable to be rewarded; those who deny what-counts-as-true are liable to be graded as wrong in their jobs and in their examinations, or even ridiculed" (175). For the business of the state, a Khawaja Sira registering as a man ceases to be a Khawaja Sira and as alluded to in the previous chapter, when it comes to allocating resources, the low number of "official" Khawaja Sira is now being used as an excuse to further their economic marginalization (Dawn 2015).

So, in reality, once a new identity category is created, there is no right choice for the Khawaja Sira. Choosing to register as Khawaja Sira means accepting social and religious stigma along with a fixed identity with all its baggage while choosing to register as man means accepting (at least for the society and for the government) that their feminine performativity is only an act. This is another example of the symbolic power of the state (Bourdieu 1994) by which the only legitimate identities available to the subjects are state sanctioned. These identities, once formulated, put into motion politico-legal dynamics that pressure individuals to self-identify within the state sanctioned categories in order to be able to claim legitimacy even if those categories don't represent their phenomenological reality. However, it is important to mention that choosing the legal

male gender does help the Khawaja Sira navigate the legal formal environment which puts a premium on the masculine identity (especially when compared to that of a Khawaja Sira). In addition, as I will discuss in the next chapter, it also makes the process of getting an ID card simpler and easier. Again, this cautions against a simplistic interpretation of legal recognition of marginalized groups without taking into account the associated social burdens.

Finally, from a practical standpoint, this discussion highlights that government can only play a limited role in increasing the acceptance of recognition based social policies. Certainly some official policies dissuading the Khawaja Sira from officially registering as third gender individuals can be changed by the government. For example, amending the decision to require a medical certificate for changing one's gender—a requirement which continues to limit the utility of the third gender category for the Khawaja Sira—can be a useful step in reducing the official burden associated with the third gender. Similarly, making sure that both the Khawaja Sira and the frontline workers are educated about the relevant official policies about different gender categories can help reduce the learning costs associated with the choice of legal gender. However, social and religious stigmas are much harder to address. For example, it is much harder to convince the Khawaja Sira to contest their families' pressure to register as men. Perhaps as a first step, the state should make sure that there are tangible material benefits associated with the third gender so that there are at least some material benefits to offset the social stigma of choosing the third gender.

It is also pertinent to mention that getting a legal ID has become a major concern during recent years. Before starting my fieldwork, it seemed to me that the most

important aspect of the Khawaja Sira interactions with NADRA would be their legal

gender selection. However, it became clear quite early during my field work that for most

of my research participants, the most immediate concern was getting the legal ID instead

of their legal gender. Getting a legal ID has become a major concern for the Khawaja Sira

because in the wake of recent wave of terrorism, the government of Pakistan is

increasingly emphasizing that all citizens have a formal identity. However, owing to the

administrative burden they have to pass through, getting a legal ID is no mean feat for the

Khawaja Sira. A separate discussion of the administrative burden experienced by the

Khawaja Sira while getting legal IDs is warranted because while some aspects of the

official administrative burden in getting legal IDs are similar to the costs experienced

during legal gender selection, there are other significant costs and discourses associated

with getting IDs that are not associated with legal gender selection. That is why, in the

next chapter, I analyze the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira when

they visit NADRA frontline offices to get their legal IDs.

SECTION III

ADMINISTRATOR-CITIZEN INTERACTIONS

It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to critique the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent, to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked so that one can fight them. (Foucault 2006, 41)

> [T]he paradigm case of administrator-citizen interaction is not, as we would like, co-production. Rather being confronted by cops and other agents of behavioral coercion is the paradigm case. (Fox, 2003, 63)

Law and written public policy are only one aspect of the administrative apparatus of the state. Realized public policy – resulting from the discretionary implementation of law and public policy on the frontlines of public organizations – is often different from the written policy documents (Lipsky 2010: Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Take for example the case of the classifying role of the public administrators, especially the street-level bureaucrats. Who gets classified as deserving and who doesn't – though partly determined by official policy – (Schneider and Ingram 1993) is influenced to a great degree by the choices of the frontline workers in different parts of the government. Therein lies the fundamental significance of bureaucracy and the inevitability of frontline discretion. As Khader and Rothenberg (2013, 185) note, "The whole mystique of bureaucracy in its most sublime hinges on this gap: you know the facts, but you can never be quite sure of how these facts will be registered by bureaucracy." While one individual is given a verbal warning, another is given the full financial penalty under the given law for committing the same transgression (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Similarly, two individuals applying for social welfare might be classified on the deserving/undeserving axis based on the discretion of the frontline workers (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011a; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). These multiple agential cuts by the public administration professionals influence individuals not just by defining who they are and what is socially acceptable but also limit and define the possibilities open to them in life.

Relatedly, as noted by many researchers, the attitude of front-line workers towards various social groups is of critical importance. For example, Taylor (2007) has shown that front-line workers can withhold services from transgender individuals considered "not normal" with occasional deadly consequences (Fernandez 1988). Relatedly, Oberfield (2014) in his analysis of socialization practices in front-line organizations found that most new entrants in these organizations take cues from the cognitive schemas of their fellow workers, especially veterans, in their assessments of various social groups. Such peer pressure and socialization processes can lead to entrenched biases towards certain social groups.

As Wen, Hudak, and Hwang (2007) argue, street-level bureaucrats can either interact with marginalized groups as "I-It" interactions in which individuals from marginalized groups are treated as a "thing or object with no personality or agency of his or her own and with no standing as an equal member of society" (Williams 2015, 3) or as the "I-you" interactions where such individuals are treated as "a person, with personality, agency and standing as an equal member of society" (Williams 2015, 3). The former type of interactions is likely to worsen the experience of marginalization while the later can significantly improve it. Empirical research has also shown that the "gatekeeping and people changing" (Soss and Moynihan 2014) activities of bureaucracy can contribute to empowerment or increased marginalization of various groups in society (Soss 2000).

Hardy (2003) notes that identity can best be understood as "fragile" and is formed as its bearer "passes through the nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe 1987) or obligatory passage point (Callon 1986)." In contemporary societies, the administrator-citizen interaction represents this critical juncture where the formal rules intersect with the social

power relations to form realized public policies. For example, frontline organizations are the major site where the classification regimes of the government come to fruition. From categorization at birth (through the birth certificate), to issuance of official identity (cards) and eligibility for various services of the state, frontline workers make most of the decisions which influence the lives of marginalized groups in many significant ways. It makes such organizations the best place to understand the legal and social dimensions of governance and citizenship of socially marginalized groups.

Frontline institutions are often the sites where bodies of marginalized citizens are disciplined and their value for society assessed in line with bio-political ideals. For example, Mitchell (2003) and Anderson and Grinberg (1999) have shown educational institutions are also another site where marginalized individuals are disciplined to act in certain predictable patterns of behavior most of which are based on the ideals informed by the dominant groups in society. Other examples of the role of frontline institutions in creating a compliant populace out of marginalized groups include analysis of immigration officers' conduct by Codó (2011), and Powell and Biggs' (2000) work on old age, governmentality and social welfare. This aspect of bureaucratic behavior can often go undetected as "it is more likely to take on a variety of subtler forms—moderating and containing conflict and defining what is to be seen as 'normal' and 'acceptable' through, for example, the workings of the law, the media and the educational system" (Ward and Mullender 1991, 23). That is why such institutions were famously labeled as ideological state apparatuses by Althusser (1971); institutions where future generations are trained in the dominant norms of society.

On the other hand, street-level bureaucracies can also be important sites which enable individuals from marginalized groups to contest their marginalization or to feel safe. For example, teacher support has been found to be associated with LGBT students feeling safer (McGuire et al. 2010) and overall fewer reports of their harassment in schools (O'Shaughnessy et al. 2004). Similarly, front-line workers acting as citizen-agents (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003) can occasionally provide more relief to marginalized groups than what a strict literal interpretation of law would entail. For example, Williams (2015) found that local front-line organizations are able to create "welcoming practices" for immigrants which can provide them relief despite constraining legal frameworks. Conversely negative experience with street-level bureaucracy can increase negative views about state and its policies (e.g., Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2009; Weaver and Lerman 2010).

Hence, in this section I analyse the significant administrator-citizen interactions in the lives of the Khawaja Sira and discuss how they can inform our understanding of social inclusion, citizenship and governance of marginalized groups in society.

CHAPTER 7

CHILDREN OF A LESSER GOD: ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN AND SOCIAL

EQUITY IN CITIZEN-STATE INTERACTIONS

Following the global trend and responding to the last decade of terrorism, there

has been an increased focus by the state agencies in Pakistan to make sure that every

citizen has a legal ID. This politico-legal environment has seen the Khawaja Sira – who

traditionally did not have legal IDs – increasingly becoming concerned about having a

legal ID. For example, in 2009 a survey by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW)

found that only 16% of the Khawaja Sira had legal IDs[76]. While there were multiple

factors due to which a very low percentage of Khawaja Sira had a legal ID, a significant

reason was that they seldom needed a formal ID in their routine lives. Shunned from

formal institutions and workplaces, getting a legal ID used to be rarely a priority for the

Khawaja Sira. Owing to the mushrooming security checkpoints in all major urban centers

of Pakistan and overall increased state surveillance, getting the legal ID is now a major

concern for the Khawaja Sira. For example, one of my research participants, who is also

an activist for Khawaja Sira rights, mentioned that she had never felt the need to have a

legal ID for anything until recently. Now, due to the (security) situation in Pakistan, she

finds having a legal ID obligatory. Similarly, another research participant whose ID had

been stolen a while back, said that she never thought of applying for a new ID until

recently as "one can't live without having a legal ID anymore." Many other Khawaja Sira

also reported increasingly being asked to prove their (legal and sexual) identity at

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[76] From the survey report SO(SW) 10-5/2009, Dated 13th August 2009 submitted to Supreme Court of
Pakistan in Constitutional Petition No. 43 of 2009.

security checkpoints by the police. Consequently, the Khawaja Sira increasingly find themselves visiting various NADRA offices to get a legal ID. However, as I discuss below, getting a legal ID is no mean feat for the Khawaja Sira who have to cross multiple obstacles and face different types of biases just to get a legal ID. In this chapter, I analyze the various problems related to provision of a legal ID for the Khawaja Sira.

My theoretical approach is based on the recent research on administrative burden (Burden et al. 2012; Herd et al. 2013; Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014; Heinrich 2016). Administrative burden is defined as "the experience of policy implementation as onerous" (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014, 4). Researchers on administrative burden have focused on understanding the way in which publics' interactions with government are often influenced by "hidden politics" through which some groups are exposed to a disproportionately higher administrative burden as compared to others (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014). Thus, rules, processes and behaviors which might seem neutral in theory, end up sustaining or increasing social inequity by reducing access to government services or public places for many social groups (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Therefore, a study of administrative burdens experienced by marginalized groups in citizen-state interactions might help us better understand how rules and practices of public administration contribute to social inequity.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, I briefly review the research on administrative burden and social equity highlighting the underlying close association between these lines of inquiry. Second, I discuss different aspects of administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in the process of getting a legal ID and the role third-parties play in influencing this administrative burden. In the final

200

section, I elaborate how this analysis can contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between administrative burden, social equity and frontline workers and what these findings mean for research and practice.

Social Equity and Administrative Burden: An Understudied Intersection

According to National Academy of Public Administration Standing Panel on Social Equity in Governance (2000), social equity is defined as, "the fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public directly or by contract, and the fair and equitable distribution of public services, and implementation of public policy, and the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in the formation of public policy." As I discussed in Chapter 1, understanding the social equity footprint of public administration has become a major research stream in public administration during the last few decades. However, as Gooden (2015, 373) notes, "[d]espite the long-standing commitment to fairness as an administrative principle, administrators must be humbled by the realization that they contributed to the discrepancy and, in many places, helped institute inequality in the past by enforcing discriminatory laws and by using their broad discretion to advance exclusionary social mores" (Gooden 2015, 373).

Often the response of policymakers to such critiques is to either recommend creation of rules, policies and laws that are "identity neutral" – they apply across all sections of society irrespective of their disparate identities – or to recommend in increase in representation of marginalized groups in bureaucracy. However, as noted by many researchers (Fraser 1995; 2000), social inequity continues to persist to the present day despite recognition based changes in laws and policies in most societies. While there are multiple reasons for the persistence of social inequity, unequal access to services of the

state is perhaps the most relevant to public administration praxis. That is why the recent

interest in study of administrative burden holds great promise in improving our

understanding of the intersections between public administration theory, practice and

social inequity. As Herd (2015) has shown, while the written rules and policies might

seem neutral, administrative burdens are not i.e., different individuals are likely to face

different administrative burdens based on their social position on different axes of

identity. More importantly, according to Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014), the

different levels of administrative burdens are not always because of neglect but deliberate

design. Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) argue that:

> [T]he level of administrative burden placed on an individual, as well as the
> distribution of burden between the state and the individual, will often be a
> function of deliberate political choice rather than simply a product of historical
> accident or neglect. The opaque nature of administrative burdens may facilitate
> their use as forms of "hidden politics," where significant policy changes occur
> without broad political consideration (43).

Consequently, administrative burden can be used as a policy instrument to

communicate implicitly or explicitly to marginalized social groups that they do not have

the same right over the public sphere and the formal institutional spaces in society. A

study of administrative burden can, therefore, highlight how marginalization is

experienced and (re)produced through the implementation of public policies during

routine citizen-state interactions. It is also important to note that as I discussed in the last

chapter, administrative burden is not always a result of deliberate design or because of

neglect in official policies. Instead, social discourses originating in informal institutions

can also intersect with official rules and policies to augment the administrative burden

experienced by the marginalized publics.

202

There are primarily two theoretical approaches to study administrative burden. The first suggested by Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) focuses on analyzing the three different types of costs that constitute administrative burden. First, *learning costs* refer to the cognitive, monetary and time requirements to make someone knowledgeable about all aspects of a policy, rule or law. A classic example in this regard is filing one's tax returns where many individuals often fail to use all relevant tax deductions because of high learning costs involved in making one familiar with the nuances of the tax code. Second, *psychological costs* arise because of the different cognitive valuation of public policies by different social groups. For example, if participation in a welfare program gets you the label of a "parasite" by the society or those close to you, naturally the psychological cost of participation in such a program will be high. Finally, *compliance costs* refer to the administrative burden associated with completing relevant requirements of a policy, rule or law. For example, getting a driving license requires one to go to a DMV office, pass an eye test, a written examination, a driving test, and some amount of time waiting in lines at the DMV office. In addition, discretionary demands by frontline workers of the state can add (or reduce) compliance costs. As noted by many researchers over the years (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, Lipsky 1980), the nature of job in most frontline officers of the government is such that their discretionary behavior can influence administrative burden of different social groups to a great degree. An example is recent work by Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) which highlights how the compliance costs for traffic violations can be disproportionately higher for African American drivers due to the higher discretionary burdens imposed by the frontline

workers of police. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of administrative burden warrants an analysis of all these types of costs.

While Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) analyze the concept of administrative burden along the lines of cognitive, temporal and monetary costs involved in getting some service from the government (or privately provided public service), Heinrich (2016) in an excellent recent analysis focused on the interactional order to analyze administrative burden. According to Heinrich, there are four types of interactions that can contribute to administrative burden; first are the interactions between organizational employees, an example of which is group level norms about behaving towards certain social groups which are learnt during socialization in frontline organizations (Oberfield 2014). Second, citizen-state interactions that are initiated by citizens to access some service of the state. The administrative burden associated with getting a driving license falls in this quadrant of interactional order. Third, citizen-state interactions initiated by government employees as part of their official jobs. The interactions between police officers and drivers at traffic stops is an example of such an interaction. As noted by Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014) such interactions can disproportionately shift administrative burden towards some social groups. Finally, citizen-citizen interactions (the applicant and any third-party not directly associated with relevant government department) can also contribute to social and psychological costs associated with various government programs. For example, it is through interaction between citizens that social stigmatization related to participation in some government programs is (re)enforced.

While both aforementioned theoretical perspectives have their own pros and cons[77], in the discussion that follows, I primarily rely on the framework suggested by Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014). However, where appropriate, I also use Heinrich's (2016) approach to inform my analysis to understand how different types of interactions influence administrative burden. While I broadly follow the theoretical framework suggested by Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) for analyzing administrative burden in this chapter, I analyze the different types of administrative burdens separately based on their etiology. Hence, official and social burdens are discussed separately. *Official burdens* include the formal and discretionary costs associated with participation in a government sanctioned program, policy or identity. The time costs required in getting a driving license from the DMV are a good example of official administrative burden. *Social burden* refers to the social, religious or political costs associated with participation in a government program, policy or identity. Welfare stigma discussed above is a classic example of social burden. The reason for this analytic choice is simple; bundling official burdens with social burdens risks losing the transformative potential of the idea of administrative burden for public administration praxis. The primary reason for the study

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[77] While Heinrich (2016) discusses the theoretical perspective of Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2016) as being applicable to only the citizen-state interactions initiated by the citizens, a better theoretical approach could be to analyze the different types of costs associated with administrative burden in each of Heinrich's four quadrants. Take for example, the social psychological costs associated with administrative burden. While such costs are associated with citizen-state interactions initiated by the publics, they can also arise from citizen-citizen interactions through social stigmatization of participating in certain programs. Similarly, psychological costs also arise because of disempowering experiences in citizen-state interactions initiated by the police with the marginalized groups. Finally, intra-organizational interactions between frontline workers can give rise to red-tape which increases the overall negative perception of government and hence indirectly increases the psychological costs of interacting with the state. Thus, whether the three types of costs mentioned by Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2015) are present in the different types of interactions mentioned by Heinrich remains an empirical question, the answer of which is likely to be different depending upon the research context.

of administrative burden is to find its origins and to remedy them where necessary and possible. De-coupling official and social burdens helps achieve that.[78]

Navigating the Administrative Burden

In this section, I discuss the different types of administrative burdens experienced by the Khawaja Sira. It is important to note that the different types of costs are not discrete, rather they are interrelated and feed into each other. For example, the prospect of waiting in lines may increase psychological costs, as well as monetary costs if someone has to miss work because of a time conflict.

Official Burden

Official burden refers to the different costs associated with getting a legal ID resulting from formal or realized public policy.

Learning Costs.

You know NADRA staff doesn't listen to us easily. If one knows some influential person, only then they pay some attention. Otherwise, they listen to us only superficially and tell us to do this and that and bring our birth certificate. We are completely illiterate (chittay unparh), and don't understand the intricacies of the system. (Nargis)

How will we go there [to the NADRA offices]? We don't know what we will have to do there. [At the office] they give us so many commands; Go here and go there,

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[78] I understand that this neat de-coupling might not always be possible and official and social burdens intersect and mutually reinforce each other also.

get token etc. We don't know where to go. If there was a one-window office, we

could go there. (Raina)

A consistent theme in my fieldwork was that most Khawaja Sira knew very little

about the official requirements to apply for a legal ID. One of the reasons for this lack of

knowledge is the high learning costs for the Khawaja Sira in making themselves familiar

with relevant rules and policies. Most Khawaja Sira rely on information from their peers

to understand the rules related to ID provision which is seldom complete or reliable. The

other option of going to the NADRA frontline offices and asking for information is not

much better for the Khawaja Sira either. As the epi-quotes to this section indicate, the

Khawaja Sira seldom receive complete attention or information from the frontline

workers who have a dismissive attitude towards them. This dismissive attitude of some

frontline workers not only prevents the Khawaja Sira from getting complete information

about relevant policies related to ID provision but also increase the psychological costs

associated with getting an ID.

For example, one day when I was visiting a NADRA frontline office, I went to

the help desk and asked the frontline worker about the policy regarding provision of legal

IDs for the Khawaja Sira. She mentioned that she did not know the relevant rules and

went to ask one of her colleagues. Both of them discussed something for about a minute

and finally said, "This is an executive branch. The Khawaja Sira IDs are not made here.

So, we have no information. You should go to some other branch." The only distinction

between an executive branch and a normal branch of NADRA is that one has to pay a

higher fee for quicker processing of IDs at the executive branch. The flat refusal of the

frontline workers was even more surprising because I knew for a fact that some of my

research participants had gotten their IDs from that branch, which was located in an area where a large number of Khawaja Sira reside. While the frontline workers at the other branches were more forthcoming about the policy related to the Khawaja Sira, I did learn from this episode how difficult it can be for an individual to learn about the relevant rules for getting a legal ID.

The third option – that of calling the NADRA telephonic helpline – is seldom used by the Khawaja Sira, most of whom do not even know that such a helpline exists. To check the quality of information, I called the NADRA helpline five times on five different days and inquired about the process of getting a legal ID for the Khawaja Sira. I was surprised that I got a different response from the frontline workers four out of five times. One of the frontline workers correctly mentioned that there was no need for a medical certificate for the Khawaja Sira. Another mentioned that the medical certificate was mandatory while the third one told me that it was the discretionary authority of the manager of a NADRA frontline office to ask for a medical certificate or not. Similarly, there was much confusion among the helpline workers about the process of identity verification for a Khawaja Sira if they could not find any blood relative to verify their legal identity. One frontline worker was not even aware of that a separate third gender category existed in their registration system!

> *NADRA frontline worker: They [the Khawaja Sira] have the option to choose*
> *male or female. In the NADRA centers, the data entry operator interviews them*
> *and decides based on their visibility…We only have two options (male and*
> *female) and no third option is available.*

Me: But based on the Supreme Court decision a third gender is available and I

know individuals who have gotten ID cards in the third gender category.

NADRA frontline worker: Let me check. (After about a minute). I have checked

from my senior and there is indeed a third gender category available. I have in

front of me old forms which only show two categories… If you need detailed

information, you should go to the Lahore regional head office and get

information. They should be able to provide you with detailed information.

Psychological Costs.

As I discussed in the previous section, many frontline workers have a dismissive and careless attitude towards the Khawaja Sira. In my observation, such a dismissive attitude by frontline workers is often a result of very high workload. Whenever I visited the NADRA frontline offices, they were packed with individuals with queues of applicants occasionally extending to outside the office boundaries. Pressed for time and faced by demanding clients, frontline workers often use coping mechanisms like stereotyping and routinization (Lipsky 1980). While frontline workers might behave similarly towards all clients, the citizens at the receiving end of such attitude are not similar. The journey to and the experience within the NADRA offices is not an easy one for the Khawaja Sira. When an individual is being teased or laughed at by other applicants in an office, a dismissive attitude by the officials is likely to disproportionately influence such individuals. Resultantly, such encounters with frontline workers often left my research participants feeling powerless and vulnerable.

However, a few frontline workers go even further and have a disproportionately hostile attitude towards the Khawaja Sira. Such frontline workers, instead of

209

implementing public policy, act as enforcers of dominant gender norms and biases in society. Some of my research participants reported that the frontline workers also had the same mocking smile characteristic of so many people in Pakistani society whenever they see a Khawaja Sira in a public place.

> *The other day two staff members at … [a NADRA] Branch, started teasing us by saying [sarcastically] so, how can we serve you? We went to the other workers who were much better and treated us seriously…Unlike many others, I [also occasionally] confront them [the frontline staff which teases or mocks the Khawaja Sira] and say you should be ashamed of yourself. The government has not hired you to laugh at us but to serve us. Some of them are better [in the sense that they change their attitude after such confrontation] but others when they hear two sentences [of protest] from our side, say four [insulting sentences] in return… If someone is without a sense of shame, what can we do? (Shazia)*

Moreover, as Heinrich (2016) argues, interactions outside organizational spaces can also contribute to higher administration burden. Similarly, in addition to the interactions that take place within the confines of the NADRA frontline offices, the interactions between government employees and the Khawaja Sira that take place in every day public places of Pakistan play an important part in increasing the psychological costs of getting a legal ID. As I discuss in the next chapter, most of my research participants reported having disempowering experiences with frontline workers of police and social welfare department in urban public places where they were humiliated, harassed or detained after seemingly arbitrary stops. These encounters communicate to the Khawaja Sira that they are not welcome in the formal public sphere dominated by the

concerns of the cis-gendered majority (individuals who identify with gender ascribed at their birth).

More importantly, the administrative behavior within various governmental institutions is not completely independent for the publics. A frontline worker represents the visual interface of the state for the applicant at the time of their interaction and all the previous interactions with the state inform how the applicant perceives the behavior of a frontline worker. If a Khawaja Sira has experienced multiple incidents of marginalization at the hands of police, her perception of a government worker might be very different from that of a person who has had no such experience. This raises the psychological cost of going to a government office and having to interact with government employees. Moreover, this also makes the Khawaja Sira much less likely to contest the dismissive behavior of some of the frontline workers.

Compliance Costs.

> *They [NADRA frontline workers] ask for so many things. Bring the birth certificate, bring the death certificate [if your parents are dead], bring this, and bring that. Look at Najma. It took her seven years to get the ID card. (Ashi)*

> *NADRA people ask me to bring my birth certificate. How can I bring my birth certificate? Both my parents are dead. My brothers' don't meet me. From where do I bring it? [They say] 'We don't know just bring it'. They give us a flat refusal. (Radha)*

One of the most consistent reasons mentioned by the Khawaja Sira for not getting legal IDs was the burdensome requirements they have to comply with to get a legal ID.

The seemingly neutral documentation requirements for getting a legal ID proves to be disproportionately difficult hurdles for the Khawaja Sira.

For example, at first glance, provision of birth certificate to apply for a legal ID appears to be a simple unproblematic requirement and for most people in Pakistan that is indeed the case. However, for the Khawaja Sira the compliance cost of this simple requirement is quite high. Since proper documentation of birth in general, and issuance of computerized birth certificates in particular, are relatively recent developments in Pakistan, most Khawaja Sira do not have access to their birth certificates. The birth certificates are issued by the local Union Council where an individual was born. As most Khawaja Sira have left their native cities because of harassment and normalizing family pressures, the birth certificate requirement often forces them to go back to those areas to try to get their birth certificate. The Secretary Union Council (who issues the birth certificate) often requires verification by one's family members for issuance of a birth certificate. Families often refuse to cooperate in such instances, especially if one's parents are dead. If someone's parents are dead, they are supposed to produce the death certificate of their father as a proof, which can be even more difficult to obtain than a birth certificate.

Often the easiest way to get something done in public offices in Pakistan is to bribe the frontline staff (Banuri and Eckel 2012). However, even that option turns out to be a difficult one for the predominantly poor Khawaja Sira. When an individual doesn't have money to eat food, buy a mattress, or go to a doctor, spending money on a piece of paper can become a secondary concern. Consider the case of Salma whose parents had died when she decided to apply for a legal ID. It took her more than a year to get her

father's death certificate issued and get a legal ID. Others are not as persistent as Salma. That is why some Khawaja Sira who I met during my fieldwork had abandoned the pursuit of a legal ID after trying in vain to get a birth certificate.

Social Burden

Social burden refers to the different types of costs associated with getting a legal ID that result from the particular social identity and context of the Khawaja Sira.

Psychological Costs

I don't go to the NADRA office now. I went once. There was a long line. I got into the line but some guys started teasing and harassing me. So I came back [and haven't gone back since then]. (Rekha)

There is no separate line for us. When we are wearing women's clothes (firqa), we stand in the female line and when wearing men's clothes (khotki), we stand with men. The women start laughing at us while the men start teasing us. (Salma)

An important part of becoming a subject of the state in Pakistan is to come to expect that waiting in long lines is an integral part of going to almost every government office in Pakistan. However, these long lines prove to be a disproportionately higher hurdle for the Khawaja Sira because of the attitude of other applicants at government offices. For many of my research participants, other applicants at the NADRA offices prove to be a significant nuisance. While the government has created a new identity category, no separate lines or counters exist for the Khawaja Sira to register for an ID. So, they have to stand with the other men or women to wait for their turn. While they can try to ignore them in streets, in the confined spaces of NADRA frontline offices, that is

213

not always possible. Resultantly, standing in line for the ID can be a painfully long waiting experience as the Khawaja Sira can't escape the glaring eyes, the mocking laughter, the sarcastic smiles, and the occasional physical gestures by other applicants.

Compliance Costs. As I discussed above, the documentation requirements for getting a legal ID often require the Khawaja Sira to request their families to help them get their birth certificates which comes at a significant personal psychological cost. Another rule associated with high compliance costs is the requirement to have a family member (blood relative) verify the identity of applicants for legal IDs. This verification requirement is probably the biggest hurdle for the Khawaja Sira in the process of getting an ID. The government policy for legal IDs requires that the verifying blood relative must accompany the applicant, have a legal ID himself, and also submit his or her fingerprints as a proof of identity. Considering the fact that most Khawaja Sira do not have any connection left with their families, it is a difficult requirement to meet. Considering the long lines and the waiting period required at governmental offices, even those Khawaja Sira who have some connection with their families, often find it difficult to meet this requirement: The family members often refuse to wait for a long time, an inevitable reality when applying for a legal ID in Pakistan.

During my fieldwork, when a special NADRA team was invited by an NGO to help more Khawaja Sira get their legal IDs, many Khawaja Sira reported that the primary reason they were not able to get their IDs was the official requirement for a blood relative to verify the identity of the applicant. There were many Khawaja Sira who were waiting for their family members, some of whom never showed up. One Khawaja Sira mentioned that her mother had to lie to her other family members to just show up at the NADRA

office for her to apply for the ID. Her mother said that she couldn't stay for more than half an hour as the other family members might get suspicious and if they found out that she was helping her get a legal ID; all hell would break loose.

Sometimes these favors by blood relatives come at a cost. For example, a frontline worker mentioned that

> *Only those few [Khawaja Sira] have been able to get their [ID] cards who are relatively [financially] 'set'. Because without greed no one is going to help them. If I come to you, you will say without any personal benefit, why I should involve myself with this mess?*

Basically, he was implying that some family members verified identity of the applicant in return of some monetary favor.

Interestingly, this focus on situating every citizen of Pakistan as a member of a family is counter to the contemporary trend of what Bennett and Lyon (2008) call "individuation" where the state, instead of treating individuals as members of families, focuses on having a unique ID for every individual. While the unique ID continues to remain an important concern, the primary thrust of identification documents in Pakistan is for the state to be able to trace every individual to a family. This is being done in order to ensure that those who have no blood relatives cannot get a legal ID.

This governmental anxiety with verification by blood relatives has a close connection with the recent wave of terrorism in Pakistan. In the last decade, many

Afghan refugees[79] (including the Taliban chief) who have also been involved in terrorist activities managed to get their IDs as Pakistani citizens. Resultantly, recent years have seen a crackdown against such incidents with NADRA being at the forefront of such efforts. As such, NADRA frontline workers try to ensure that the biological origin of every individual can be traced to a Pakistani family. A NADRA frontline worker mentioned that one of his colleagues was recently fired after it was revealed that he did not insist on completing the identity verification of an applicant who later turned out to be an Afghan refugee. In such a legal environment, those Khawaja Sira, who for obvious personal reasons do not want to disclose the identity of their biological families, often find themselves treated like terrorists in front of the law. As a frontline worker noted about the Khawaja Sira:

> *Their IDs don't get made because they don't want to disclose their real background...We only ask them to bring some proof of residence and lineage, for example a bill, [or] property documents. The real reason that their ID cards don't get made is because of the Terrorist Act [1997] because they [terrorists] also don't want to disclose their true identity. If Khawaja Sira are allowed to get their ID cards like this [without disclosing their 'true' identity], terrorists will also be able get their ID cards and will be able to exploit this loophole. That is why, only those few have gotten their IDs who have disclosed their real identity and who have been verified by some 'authentic' people that they are in fact their relatives.*

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[79] Pakistan hosts about 1.5 million Afghan refugees; one of the largest refugee populations in the world. Most of the Afghan refugees who migrated from Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of the 1980s have resided in Pakistan for more than 30 years.

Third Parties and Administrative Burden

Many researchers have noted the important role played by third-parties in augmenting (Soss, Fording and Schram 2011b) or reducing administrative burden (Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches 2007; Budd and McCall 1997) faced by the publics in their interaction with the state. For example, Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches (2007) show the reduction in learning costs in filing taxes facilitated by private tax-preparing agencies. Similarly, Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) note the role played by advocacy and community groups in lowering the compliance costs associated with Medicaid enrollment in the state of Wisconsin. Third-parties often influence the level of administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in important ways. As I discussed above, families often increase the compliance costs associated with application for a legal ID by withholding cooperation or asking for favors in return for verification. On the other hand, the cis-gendered applicants at the NADRA frontline offices often increase the social and psychological costs for the Khawaja Sira through harassment, and teasing. Conversely, taking a Khawaja Sira colleague familiar with relevant rules and formal institutional spaces reduces the administrative burden for the Khawaja Sira. In this section, I briefly how institutionalized third parties can influence the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira.

A local NGO in Lahore launched a Khawaja Sira Support Program (KSP) in 2011 with the aim of improving their economic and social marginalization. The program focuses primarily on older individuals or the Khawaja Sira experiencing health issues as they are more likely to face problems economic marginalization. At present, about 400 Khawaja Sira are enrolled in this program. The KSP provides a monthly stipend to the

enrolled Khawaja Sira in addition to providing basic health services. In addition, to interest free loans are also provided to the interested Khawaja Sira to start their own small businesses.

According to the NGO frontline staff associated with the KSP, they soon realized that very few Khawaja Sira had legal IDs. So, they tried to help the Khawaja Sira in provision of their legal IDs by helping them understand all the rules and regulations related to ID provision. In effect, this reduced the learning costs associated with legal IDs for the Khawaja Sira. This helped some Khawaja Sira get their legal IDs. However, understanding that they needed to do more for provision of legal ID for the Khawaja Sira, the program manager of KSP contacted the NADRA authorities and requested that a special team of NADRA frontline staff is needed for the provision of legal IDs of the Khawaja Sira. Eventually, NADRA send a team of three frontline workers to the monthly meeting of the KSP in which all the enrolled Khawaja Sira participate. I attended the meetings which took place in a reserved hall space large enough to accommodate all the Khawaja Sira.

The program staff had already asked key figures in the Khawaja Sira community to brief everyone that if they wanted to get their IDs made, they should bring the relevant documents and a family member for verification to the meeting. Since it was the first time KSP was doing it, many Khawaja Sira could not be informed in time about the initiative. However, about 20 Khawaja Sira did apply for the ID. The difference in the citizen-state interactions at this meeting and the NADRA frontline offices was striking. There were no lines at the meeting since no one was in a rush. Everyone knew they would be accommodated and waiting in an air-conditioned hall with friends did not seem

to be as much of an inconvenience as compared to braving an alien space where they are unwanted objects under continuous hyper-surveillance of the cis-gender majority.

In addition, the nature of physical space was much different when the special team of NADRA's frontline workers visited the Khawaja Sira. It was a space with which the Khawaja Sira were very comfortable since their monthly meetings with the project staff were carried out in that hall. Most Khawaja Sira were also dressed up for the monthly meeting as compared to their presence in NADRA offices where they are generally dressed in routine clothes. Resultantly, they were more familiar with that space than the NADRA officials and were visibly more comfortable in interacting with them as compared to NADRA offices.

That is why, in such a space, mutual understanding and enhanced knowledge sharing were also possible for the Khawaja Sira. For example, one of my research participants developed an acquaintance at that gathering with one of the NADRA frontline workers; a contact which was to prove of great use later when she was able to use this acquaintance to contest arbitrary requirements incurred on one of her friends by another frontline worker. The Khawaja Sira were also able to ask questions from the frontline workers which they wouldn't have been able to ask otherwise.

While this initiative by the NGO reduced some of the socio-psychological costs associated with getting a legal ID, the compliance costs were still an important barrier for the Khawaja Sira. Many Khawaja Sira at the meeting had requested their family members for verification but they never showed up. In the first meeting, the documentation of 12 Khawaja Sira was completed for provision of legal IDs. This number might seem low but as many NADRA frontline workers told me, generally they receive less than ten Khawaja

Sira applicants at their branches in a month. Moreover, the NADRA team was requested to come to the monthly meeting by the NGO for the next two months also and the documentation of more than 20 Khawaja Sira was completed each time.

Discussion

While the formal requirements for a legal ID are the same for the Khawaja Sira and the cis-gendered individuals, due to illiteracy, lack of co-operation by the families and bureaucratic attitudes, the same rules take a disproportionately higher toll on the Khawaja Sira. In this section, I elaborate some key insights of my analysis and their implications for important matters in public administration praxis and research using some guiding questions raised by Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey (2014). I also draw from some insights from the previous chapter in which I discussed administrative burden associated with the choice of legal gender for the Khawaja Sira.

What is the relationship between administrative burdens and social inequality? Perhaps the most important insight from the Khawaja Sira experiences at frontline office of NADRA is that informal practices and process (social burdens) often end up being more important for marginalized publics than formal policies and laws (official burdens). While legally there is no special provision that prohibits the Khawaja Sira from getting a legal ID, they are perhaps the only section of society for whom getting an ID is not just a challenging experience but one that leaves them feeling powerless and helpless. As Herd (2015) notes, even seemingly neutral rules can result in some sections of society being exposed to disproportionately more costs of doing business with the state. In the case of Khawaja Sira, the high administrative burden often results in them failing to get legal IDs which limits their job opportunities and makes the frequent stops by the police in their

220

everyday lives an even bigger nuisance. However, my research shows, it would be incorrect to attribute the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira exclusively on "hidden politics." While deliberate design does inform the creation of official administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira, in the present case, administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira is often a consequence of their social identity and isolation. For example, the administrative burden associated with choice of legal gender for the Khawaja Sira is primarily due to social and religious stigma associated with the legal third gender. It is also important to keep in mind that the official and social burdens can also augment each other. For example, the requirement of a birth certificate requires high compliance costs for the poor individuals in Pakistan but this official burden ends up being disproportionately onerous for the Khawaja Sira because of their social isolation from their families. Similarly, the choice to move the poor from "welfare to work" in the USA was surely politically motivated but the consequences are amplified by changes in the contemporary low wage labor market in which employers seek to minimize labor costs and hours and require on-call workers that work against meeting workfare requirements (Matthews 2016). Therefore, it is important to be cautious about the "agentifcation" of administrative burdens and the resulting social inequity. The broader social milieu serves as an important contextual factor that can increase the administrative burden manifold for some social groups.

Apart from hidden and social politics, intersectionality – defined as the intersection of multiple aspects of identity, usually related to marginalization, to form a unique experience of oppression, discrimination, and/or marginalization (Walker 2008, 340) – is another major reason the Khawaja Sira find themselves disproportionately

exposed to administrative burden while getting IDs. The social marginalization of the Khawaja Sira is not just a result of their marginalization related to their nonconformity to the gender norms in society. Instead, the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira is a factor of their illiteracy, poor socio-economic status, gender queer behavior, and isolation from their families. These multiple axes of identity are entangled with each other and augment the overall marginality experienced by the Khawaja Sira.

What is the relationship between bureaucratic discretion and administrative burden? My analysis also points to the need to situate the frontline workers' behavior within the broader social milieu to understand the pattern of their interaction with marginalized publics better. For many of my research participants, the frontline workers acted as obstructive agents whose actions were not only at odds with the stated policies and the desires of their clients but actively prevented them from exercising their options (regarding their legal gender) in an informed manner. Some of my research participants ended up not having any ID because of their interactions with such frontline workers. Therefore, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that frontline workers are also socially constructed and situated cis-gendered subjects who can also act as gender policing agents on behalf of the cis-gendered majority. As Bomba (2014) notes, "the state-machine backs the cis-gendered group insofar as they constitute the process that reproduces gender conformity and the repression of nonconformity" (36). Resultantly, "the cis-gendered subjects embody the process of gender policing, exerting Force in the direction of gender conformity" (41).

As compared to the frontline workers of NADRA, the frontline workers of the NGO contributed to a reduction in the level of administrative burden. One reason for this

difference in behavior might be that as noted by previous researchers (e.g., Lipsky 1980; Halliday et al. 2009) frontline workers use techniques like stereotyping and routinization to limit their cognitive load in view of time constraints and higher caseloads. For the NADRA frontline workers, the Khawaja Sira represent one of the many types of clients they are going to interact with in their jobs and hence they are less likely to make special concessions for them unless specifically ordered by their superiors. On the other hand, even though the distinction between eligible and ineligible clients also exists in the KSP, for their frontline workers, the Khawaja Sira represent their only clients and the experience of the Khawaja Sira is a reflection of their overall performance. Resultantly, they are more likely to take special measures to reduce administrative burdens for their clients as exemplified by arranging a special team of NADRA frontline workers for provision of legal IDs for the Khawaja Sira.

How can administrative burdens be reduced for marginalized groups? My research shows that seemingly neutral rules and policies can incur very different degrees of compliance burden on the citizens depending upon their social identities and the broader social milieu within which those identities operate. That is why, it is important that rules and policies should have special consideration for the less privileged sections of society if there is empirical evidence that they are experiencing disproportionate administrative burden due to them. Perhaps more importantly, it is critical to echo Frederickson's call for a "compensatory ethic" in public administrator's behavior as a first step towards reducing administrative burden for the less privileged sections of society.

A full commitment to social equity might well result in the development of a kind of compensatory ethic, that is a norm which tells the administrator that public services must be especially well developed in those areas of his community which have the most critical need. Such a compensatory ethic would have the effect of balancing the inherited disadvantage of the poor. (Frederickson as cited in Hart 1974, 9)

Furthermore, it is important to consider the gender policing role of citizen-citizen interactions in frontline organizations. In many developing countries, long waiting lines at public organizations mean that applicants spend a lot of time interacting with their fellow citizens. For the marginalized publics, it represents another instance where they are exposed to the normalizing pressures of dominant social groups. Resultantly, public offices, which should be a safe place for such publics, can end up being exactly the opposite. One way to address this issue is to either introduce special measures (like special days allocated for marginalized groups like the Khawaja Sira at frontline offices of the government) or to create special initiatives by coordinating with private civil society organizations to cater to the special needs of the marginalized groups. I take up these issues in detail in the last chapter where I discuss specific policy recommendations to reduce the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting a legal ID and choosing their legal gender.

My analysis also supports the importance of going beyond the study of the presence of rules and perceptions of those rules to a study of associated administrative behaviors, socio-psychological context, and third-parties (Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014). An analysis focused only on rules and their compliance burden would underestimate the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting a legal ID. More importantly, almost all the rules regarding legal ID provision serve

224

important objectives for the state related to legibility and reliable identification of its citizens. Unfortunately, viewed from the perspective of the Khawaja Sira many of these rules are burdensome distractions as their intersection with social discrimination and imperfect implementation results in the Khawaja Sira experiencing disproportionate delays in getting IDs.

An important limitation of my analysis is that since I was primarily focused on administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira, my analysis could have presented the Khawaja Sira as primarily passive recipients of administrative burden. As I discuss in chapter 8, while the balance of power is tilted in the favor of frontline workers and the cis-gendered majority, frontline offices are also occasional sites of resistances where employing strategic tactics, the Khawaja Sira can contest the disproportionate administrative burden directed towards them.

Finally, my analysis of administrator-Khawaja Sira interactions has been focused on formal institutional spaces so far. Administrator-citizen interactions outside formal institutions like the everyday urban spaces represent a more significant way in which frontline workers intersect with the lives of the Khawaja Sira. The Khawaja Sira typically have limited access to formal institutional places in Pakistan because of poverty and joblessness. However, accessing the everyday urban spaces (like public roads and bazars) represents a much more immediate and recurring concern. As I discuss in the next chapter, frontline workers intersect with the access of Khawaja Sira to such urban public places in multiple ways which have important ramifications for the citizenship and social inclusion of the Khawaja Sira.

CHAPTER 8

WHAT ARE YOU DOING HERE? STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY AND

EVERYDAY CITIZENSHIP OF THE KHAWAJA SIRA

> [I]f citizenship is to mean anything in an everyday sense it should mean the ability
> of individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their
> self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially. If
> people cannot be present in public spaces … without feeling uncomfortable,
> victimized and basically 'out of place', then it must be questionable whether or
> not these people can be regarded as citizens at all (Painter and Philo, 1995, 115).

Research on citizenship represents one of the fundamental research agendas

where the debate over the legitimacy of public administration and its proper relationship

with the public has unfolded over the last four decades (Frederickson 1982; Cooper and

Gulick 1984; Lowi 1981; Salisbury 1981; Gawthrop 1984). Initially, the research on

citizenship was primarily focused on the analysis of legal versus ethical citizenship (Lowi

1981) and high – all citizens to be considered equal – versus low – based on socio-legal

hierarchy – citizenship (Flathman 1981). While legal citizenship – the status and

categorization of individuals in a polity according to law – continues to remain an active

research agenda, most research on citizenship in public administration in recent years

falls under the broad category of ethical citizenship – status of individuals based on

norms, social values and traditions. These lines of inquiry have, and continue to, yield

important insights about public administration theory and praxis. However, with some

notable exceptions (e.g., Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014), most empirical

research on ethical citizenship in public administration, has primarily focused on public

participation and/or bureaucratic behavior in formal enclosed institutional spaces. The

last two chapters were examples of such an analysis. Little attention has been paid so far

to citizenship within everyday urban public spaces[80] and its relation to public

administration praxis. In this chapter I focus on the administrator-Khawaja Sira

interactions in the everyday urban public spaces to highlight how these interactions

influence their citizenship.

As noted in the epi-quote, one of the most fundamental rights of citizenship is the

ability to be present, visible and mobile in the public places[81] of a given society.

However, as I showed in the previous chapter, public places are not neutral spaces that

equally accommodate all bodies (Casper and Moore 2009), identities and/or behaviors

(Hubbard 2001; Fraser 1990). Instead, while some modes of expression, identities and

bodies are treated as normal – even ideal – others deemed deviant are marked for

surveillance and subsequent marginalization and invisibility. The subjects who embody

these deviant identities exemplify the *hypervisibility paradox[82]*; the state of "being

everywhere and nowhere simultaneously" (Krainitzki 2014, 14). Understanding the

experiences of such individuals in everyday urban public spaces, especially in their

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[80] I use the term everyday urban public space to refer to the external spaces like roads, markets, and bazars in contrast to internal public spaces like the government offices etc.

[81] As Goodsell (2003) notes in his excellent review that public place can mean anything from the Arendtian sphere of public (inter)action to the Habermasian "realm of conversation and discussion by private individuals on public interest" (362) and the urban planners' idea of public space which implies the physical, open places which are sites of public use and interaction. In this chapter, the word 'public space' should be treated as a combination of Arendtian, Habermasian and Urban planners' vision of a public space. It is important to mention that Goodsell (2003) also notes the importance of minimizing state authority, encouraging public access, and reducing barriers between the public officials and the publics as some of the normative requirements for an ideal democratic public space.

[82] The simultaneous hypervisibility and invisibility of the marginalized individuals results when the stereotypes about such groups are propagated throughout society making them hypervisible but the actual voices and perspectives of the marginalized remain largely invisible. In another sense, the hypervisibility paradox refers to the "ocular violence of racism [that] splits its object in two, rending and rendering it simultaneously hypervisible and invisible" (Mitchell 2005, 34) Hypervisible as the presence of the marginalized is always subject to the surveilling gaze of the normal majority and invisible as the actual suffering of the abject individuals continues to remain hidden in plain sight.

relation to the frontline public practitioners is an important, yet understudied, aspect of citizenship research in public administration. This everyday citizenship – defined here as the inalienable, equal right of every citizen to be present, visible, and mobile in the public spaces in a given territory – focuses not on equality based on legal rights but on contesting geographies of exclusion in everyday spaces (Phadke, Khan and Ranade 2011). Although a relatively recent addition to citizenship research, the concept of everyday citizenship has been used in different contexts to understand the daily experiences of different sections of society in the urban public space of different territories. From Muslim experiences in British public places (Hopkins and Blackwood 2014) to youth's citizenship in everyday life (Biesta, Lawy and Kelly 2009; Wood 2010) and challenges faced by disabled women in the public sphere of Eastern Europe (Zavirsek 2010), the idea of space plays an important role in research on everyday citizenship (Dickinson et al. 2014).

Gordon (1997, 15) notes that "[v]isibility is a complex system of permission and prohibitions, of presence and absence, punctuated alternately by apparitions and hysterical blindness." Public administration plays a very important role in sustaining this system of permissions and prohibitions that sustain the particular socially constructed nature of the urban public space in a society. For example, the frontline workers of police acting on behalf of the dominant interests in society are often responsible for extra surveillance and selective implementation of the law on different minorities hindering their presence in the public sphere (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014; Daum 2015; Buist and Lenning 2015). That is why, to understand the intersections of everyday citizenship of marginalized subjects and frontline workers' behavior, it is

228

important to understand which identities and bodies are kept invisible from us and "what are the consequences of such selective blindness … How is visibility possible? For whom, by whom, and of whom? What remains invisible, to whom, and why?" (Haraway 1997, 202).

To contribute to this line of research, in this chapter, I analyze the phenomenology of interactions between the Khawaja Sira and street-level bureaucrats in external urban spaces of Lahore, Pakistan. My approach in this chapter is loosely based on Ahmad's (2006) queer phenomenology of "being stopped" which requires an analysis of questions like "Who are you? Why are you here? What are you doing?" as "stopping devices" (Ahmad 2006). Ahmad (2006, 133) notes that a "phenomenology of 'being stopped' might take us in a different direction than one that begins with motility, with a body that 'can do' by flowing into space." With a few exceptions (e.g., Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Merkel 2014), we often take this flow of bodies across physical space for granted in public administration research and pay limited attention to how public administration praxis contributes to curtailing the flow of bodies in the everyday urban public spaces of a polity and the ramifications of such stopping devices for everyday citizenship of the marginalized groups.

In doing so, this chapter makes the following contributions: First, the concept of everyday citizenship contributes to citizenship research (e.g., Racine 1995) in public administration by underscoring the intersections of mobility, everyday urban spaces, and administrator-citizen interactions. Second, it contributes to the literature on street-level bureaucracy by highlighting how hyper-surveillance and archetypes of marginalized groups constructed by frontline workers contributes to increased social inequity in urban

public space. Finally, it contributes to the limited research on gender queer groups in developing countries through a theoretically informed empirical analysis of the interactions between a gender queer group and the frontline workers of government in Pakistan.

Citizenship and Public Administration

There has been a close relationship between legal citizenship, civic participation and public administration praxis since the inception of public administration as an academic discipline. As noted by Frederickson (1982), two of the earliest public affairs schools in USA (at Syracuse and University of Southern California) were initially known as schools of Citizenship and Public Affairs. However, citizenship as an active research agenda in public administration started in the early 1980s with multiple researchers calling for increased focus on analyzing the relationship of public administration with citizenship related roles and obligations. These early discussions can primarily be divided into two lines of inquiry. First, research on "citizenship as a legal status" (Kalu 2003) which is the aspect of citizenship "formally codified in terms of qualifications, rights, and obligations by constitutions, charters, and laws" (Cooper 1984, 144). In this line of inquiry, PA researchers have focused on analyzing the ramifications of legal categorization and status to highlight the multiple ways in which social inequity is sustained or influenced by law and public policy. The section on legal identity construction of the Khawaja Sira in this dissertation falls under this category of research. Other notable examples of such research include work by Yanow (2003), Taylor (2007) and Visser (2014) on the intersections between legal categorization, public administration and legal citizenship of marginalized groups.

A second line of inquiry focuses on "[t]he qualifications, rights, and obligations of citizenship … defined and prescribed by the values, norms, traditions, and culture of any given community or by consensus among members of the community in specific instances" (Cooper and Gulick 1984, 144). This line of inquiry has been broadly called "ethical citizenship" since the idea of an active and committed citizen generally acts as the normative ideal in this line of inquiry (Dimock 1990; Zanetti and Carr 1999). The increasing literature on public participation in public administration decision making is also an example of this line of inquiry. Finally, in recent years, the idea of organizational citizenship has also become a major research agenda in public administration. In this research stream, the primary focus is on understanding the status, obligations and desirable activities of various categories of individuals exclusively within (mostly public) organizations (e.g., Sembor 1993; Green 1994; Cooper, Bryer and Meek 2006).

Interestingly, both major lines of inquiry on citizenship recognize that public administrators have an important role to play in creating, sustaining and nurturing various forms of citizenship (see for example Cooper and Gulick 1984; Campbell 2005; Bryer and Cooper 2012). Citizenship researchers have also noted the importance of public administration professionals, especially the frontline workers, in enhancing or limiting the degree of citizenship of various groups (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014; Zetter 1991; Williams 2015; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011b). As Cook (1998, 226) argues,

> In carrying out the law, administrative agencies often create particular categories or classes of citizenship and define the proper relationships among those classes… In doing all this, [a public administration department] also shapes behavior, the perceptions that citizens hold of one another, and the experiences they have in particular contexts (for in- stance, between employer and employee).

Relatedly, the idea of high versus low citizenship has also been there since the start of modern citizenship research (Flathman 1981; Cooper and Gulick 1984). While most researchers advocate high citizenship – where "citizens are free, equal, and engaged with one another in pursuing matters of high and distinctively human import" (Flathman 1981, 503) – as a normative ideal, it is recognized that low citizenship – characterized by hierarchical distribution of authority based on laws, customs, and consensus (Cooper and Gulick 1984) – is still the norm in many cases. In other words, not all legally equal citizens are able to be active and committed citizens based on social norms which may also limit their participation in the public sphere.

Citizenship research has been influential in highlighting the importance of being cognizant of the close association between public policy (design and implementation) and the overall situation of legal and ethical citizenship in society. However, with a few notable exceptions, studies on citizenship in public administration have either been theoretical explorations about instrumental and normative dimensions of citizenship or limited to empirical analysis within formal institutional spaces of public organizations. Limited attention is given to geographies of everyday exclusion that characterize contemporary societies (Phadke, Khan, and Ranade 2011) and are responsible for the perpetuation of a low degree of everyday citizenship for marginalized communities in society.

A notable exception in this regard is the excellent recent work by Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2015) which analyzes the lived experiences of African Americans at police stops in United States and the influence of these experiences on their

citizenship and social inclusion. Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2015) also move beyond the analysis of formal policies and statistical analyses of discriminatory behavior of frontline workers towards analysis of the lived experiences of marginalized communities. More importantly, their analysis problematizes the two common assumptions associated with the discriminatory behavior of frontline police workers; that it is only the behavior of police officers that is troublesome for the minorities and not the disparate frequency of traffic stops and that discriminatory behavior is primarily because of a few discriminating officers and not because of biased institutional norms and practices. Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2015) instead argue that police officers' behavior is only part of the larger institutional dynamics responsible for increased racial profiling in police behavior.

While not much work in public administration or elsewhere has focused on street-level governance of gender queer individuals, recently researchers in other disciplines have started focusing on this important, yet understudied, aspect of citizenship research. They have highlighted how urban space plays an integral part in the everyday citizenship of individuals with different genders and sexualities. For example, Massey (2003, 179) notes, "[f[rom the symbolic meaning of spaces/places and the clearly gendered messages which they transmit, to straightforward exclusion by violence, spaces and places are not only themselves gendered but, in their being so, they both reflect and affect the ways in which gender is constructed and understood."

Similarly, Elder (1998) argues that heterosexuality as the apparent social norm is created and sustained through institutionalized regulatory apparatuses which manage publics access and experiences of urban public space in society. Perhaps more

pertinently, Dwyer (2010, 417) notes that "policing is about policing heterosexual spaces." In other words, the public sphere can be envisaged as a heterosexual (as well as patriarchal and racist) social construction (Hubbard 2000; 2008) which is policed and managed in a way that makes entry into the public spaces very difficult for marginalized identities and bodies which are deemed as deviant, immoral, and/or criminalized. Researchers in many contexts have shown how bodies and identities considered deviant along the axes such as gender (Massey 2003; Phadke, Khan and Ranade,2011), sexuality (Adler and Brenner 1992; Namaste 1996; Valentine 1993), race (Feagin 1991; Epp et. al 2015), and mental health (Parr 1994) experience the everyday urban spaces as hostile and unwelcoming limiting their presence and visibility in the everyday life of a society as an equal citizen.

In the context of present discussion researchers focusing on interactions between trans individuals and law enforcement agencies in Western contexts have found that such individuals often experience discriminatory behavior by law enforcement agencies (Woods et al. 2013; Grant, Mottet and Tanis 2011; Irvine 2014). As Daum (2015) and Buist and Lenning (2015) note, like "driving while black", the term "walking while trans" (Edelman 2014) captures the everyday excessive surveillance trans individuals have to experience on a daily basis by the criminal justice system.

Phenomenology of The Stop

In the discussion that follows, I analyze the interactions between frontline workers of government (police and social welfare department) and the Khawaja Sira in urban public spaces (mostly public roads) of Lahore. As discussed below, many times the Khawaja Sira are stopped by the frontline officials during the (foot or car) patrol by the

police as they are simply walking about in the urban public places. As noted in the

previous chapter, due to the local ramifications of global war on terror, routine urban

surveillance by police, in the form of mandatory security checkpoints and patrolling, has

increased manifold in Pakistan in recent years. As noted by others in the context of global

immigration related concerns (Gehi 2012, Jeanty and Tobin 2013) and war on terror

(Beauchamp 2009; Spade 2008), marginalized groups are often disproportionately

influenced by the security related concerns. The experience of the Khawaja Sira is similar

as the increased police presence in the urban public places translates into higher

likelihood of them being stopped by the police to justify their presence in public.

As I discuss in detail below, the stops by frontline officials of the state often act as

important technique of disciplining and surveilling the deviant bodies in a society since

> to stop involves many meanings; to cease, to end, and also to cut off, to arrest, to
> check, to prevent, to block, to obstruct, or to close…The 'hey you' is not here
> addressed to the body that can inherit the ego ideal of an organization, or who can
> be recruited to follow a given line, but to the body that cannot be recruited, to the
> body that is 'out of place' in this place. In other words, the 'unrecruitable' body
> must still be 'recruited' into this place, in part through the very repetition of the
> action of 'being stopped' as a mode of address. (Ahmad, 2006, 140)

What are you doing here?

I have had multiple encounters with the police. They misbehave a lot. They never

talk in a respectable manner. First, they curse us and then ask, "Who are you?

What are you doing here?" (Neelam)

Most of the Khawaja Sira with whom I talked during my research reported being

arbitrarily stopped by police in urban public spaces as a significant aspect of their

everyday life. These stops epitomize the hyper-visibility paradox for the Khawaja Sira.

As soon as they enter the urban public spaces, their deviant bodies are marked for the

surveilling patriarchal gaze by the cis-gendered majority. As Neelam's experience with police indicates, often the first question asked by the police at these stops is, "what are you doing here?" as if betraying the command that the deviant bodies of the Khawaja Sira should remain invisible unless they have a good reason to be present in the cis-gendered public spaces. As Bacchi and Beasley (2002) note, citizenship often involves constructing and maintaining boundaries between individuals along various axes. That is why, the "stopping device" (Ahmad 2006) of "what are you doing here?" should be interpreted as a boundary sustaining mechanism by the police. Here, the concern is not just to know the actual reason for the Khawaja Sira's presence in the urban public space but also to remind them that they are now present in the cis-gendered public sphere where, like an alien's presence in a foreign land, their permission to use that alien space has to be not only justified but can be rescinded at any point. However, this justification is only required from some social groups. For example, in an analysis of routine experiences of middle-class women in urban public spaces of Mumbai, India, Phadke, Khan, and Ranade (2011) argue that while middle class, upper-caste men would have "open, legitimate, and unquestioned access to public space," under the guise of notions of safety, protectionism, and surveillance, women are denied the simple right to loiter – to simply be present without purpose – in the public sphere.

As many of my research participants noted, occasionally the permission to use the cis-gendered urban public spaces in everyday life comes at a literal financial cost as the Khawaja Sira have to often pay the *Jagga tax*[83] – a colloquial term signifying financial

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[83] Literally translated, it means the tax of power.

extortion based on threat of violence by the powerful groups in society – to frontline

police officials to not only be present in the public sphere but also to retain their nominal

freedom. Consider the following statement by Shama who mentions the perils of the stop

for the Khawaja Sira:

> *We were returning from a function when we were stopped by four policemen.*
>
> *They said, "As you can see we are four individuals. What good will 500 rupees*
>
> *do? At least [give us] 2000 rupees so that each of us gets at least 500 rupees…We*
>
> *could get rid of them only after we gave them 2000 rupees.*

Like Shama, many other research participants also noted there is often not even a

made up reason provided for the demand for money made by police officials at the stops.

In fact, many times the stop is enacted just because the police officials find the Khawaja

Sira easy victims to make some easy money due to their low socio-economic standing

and social support. Due to the lack of accountability, advocacy groups (such as the

nonprofit assisting with legal IDs discussed in chapter 7), and external checks on the

working of street-level police officials, this practice of police is often an inevitable – yet

unpleasant – aspect of the lives of the Khawaja Sira. This *Jagga Tax* is often a perpetual

threat for the Khawaja Sira, but is more painful for those few who are unfortunate enough

to encounter the police at the end of a payday at a local dance party or a full day of

begging. Like Shama, Shazia, who has to resort to begging at urban public spaces such as

major traffic signals, had precisely such an experience:

> *Sometimes we earn a thousand rupees [by begging] during the whole day and*
>
> *when it is evening, the police takes that away from us. In these circumstances,*
>
> *how will we be able to afford anything to eat or wear or any place to live?*

A similar tendency of street-level police officers to prey upon sex workers by extorting money or arresting them on flimsy grounds has also been noted by Biradavolu et al. (2009). It is important to mention here that this extortion of money is not unique to the Khawaja Sira. Instead, other individuals of lower socio-economic status are also – though not nearly with the same frequency – at the receiving end of police harassment and extortion as well (Verma 1999). However, such stops are often initiated on some ruse, however flimsy that might be. One the other hand, the same courtesy is often not extended to the Khawaja Sira.

Sometimes, even when any money is not exchanged, the threat of detention serves as a constant reminder for the Khawaja Sira that if not now, next time the police could take their money away. This perpetual threat, perhaps more than anything, exemplifies their experience in the everyday spaces when out of nowhere, the police can simply stop and detain the Khawaja Sira. Rakhi, who works at a local NGO and was briefly detained by police for precisely this crime of "walking while trans" noted the following:

> *One day I got off at the bus stop while going to work [in an NGO], the Police detained me [without providing any reason] and took me away. When I told them I don't have any money at all [to bribe them], they let me go.*

What is he paying you?

> *Even if we are going somewhere with a family member such as a brother, they [policemen] will ask us, "Who is he? What is he paying you [allegedly for sexual favors]?" They believe that the only thing we can do is sex and nothing else. That is completely wrong. (Nirmal)*

Once, I was begging near the Wapda Town Roundabout and a motorcycle rider stopped at the signal. I asked them to give me something in the name of Allah. The policemen quickly stopped both the rider and I. They asked me, 'Who is he? Has he come to take you [for a sexual encounter]? He will violate you. Do you know that?' I told them that I did not know the rider and I was simply asking for money. Then they tried to detain me and directed me to get in the [police] car. But I refused. They insisted again but I let them know that there was no way that I was going to get in the car. Then they said, "Give us whatever money you have on you. I had 200 rupees that I had collected by begging." I gave it to them and got rid of them. (Fozia)

Experienced policemen [in our area] know us and don't disturb us … but whenever there is new staff … they are very strict and are always stopping us... They say, "You are destroying the society. You make [sexual] deals with men. (Shazia)

As the epi-quotes indicate, being spotted in the company of an adult male is often the reason for the Khawaja Sira being stopped by the police. Many of my research participants said that the police often accused them of being sex workers, especially when accompanied by an adult male companion. As Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock (2011) note in their classic study of the interaction of LGBT individuals with the legal system, archetypes – like "deceptive gender benders" and "disease spreaders" – based on dominant social constructions of marginalized individuals influence the way in which they are classified and treated by the police personnel and the legal system. In a similar

vein, the social construction of the Khawaja Sira as hyper-sexual workers often acts as the presumed norm by the police and other cis-gendered individuals. As I discussed in chapter 4, a few Khawaja Sira have to resort to sex work to make their ends meet. While their clients are generally perceived as innocent men who couldn't resist temptation, the few Khawaja Sira who engage in sex work are held to be representative of all Khawaja Sira by some police officers who accuse all of them to be hyper-sexual moral pollutants.

Consider the following narratives of frontline workers of police which highlight the simultaneous "abomination and adoration" that according to Fanon (1952, 8) characterizes the objects of racial violence.

Once I was on duty at night and was having tea at a stall near Jail road. Those days I did not use to have a beard. A Khawaja Sira (Khusra) came to me and asked me if I was interested (in having sex). When I refused, he said, "I will kiss every part of your body from head to toe." I asked him (hath jorray) [in a sarcastic manner] to spare me and left that place.

Have you ever seen their clothes when they are begging on traffic stops? They wear such sexy clothes that people find it hard to resist them.

There should be severe punishments for them [the Khawaja Sira]. There should be some legislation to this effect. They start doing their antics even in court. Judges become scared that they might curse them[84] and let them go.

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[84] The prayers and curses of the Khawaja Sira are thought to be really potent according to the folklore of sub-continent.

Resultantly, at police stops many interactions begin with this assumption and the onus of proving that nothing "fishy" is going on often falls on the side of the Khawaja Sira. In addition, as the epi-quotes show these stops are also often the sites of moral policing by the police officials who, while enacting their patronizing patriarchal gaze, consider it their God (and state) given duty to protect and advise the Khawaja Sira without the later seeking or requiring their help. It is important to note that this increased surveillance of the Khawaja Sira is not necessarily a result of anti-solicitation laws. As Daum (2015) argues, it is often not the official policies that criminalize presence of transgender individuals in the urban public spaces. Instead, it is the discretionary authority of the juridical apparatus of the state intersecting with "modes of power such as capital and wealth, racial privilege, citizenship, and heteronormativity that work to criminalize the trans community via the selective application of solicitation laws" (568). In other words, it is often not the law which determines which bodies look "reasonably suspicious" to warrant a stop by the police on the pretext of solicitation charges. Instead, it is the police officers acting as representatives of the cis-gendered majority with the obvious consequence being the hypervisibility of the Khawaja Sira bodies as sex workers.

While most police stops often do not result in detention, legal charges or removal of the Khawaja Sira from the public spaces, they often act as sites where the police offices try to humiliate the Khawaja Sira by trying to expose them as moral pollutants This is akin to the subjection practices noted by Daum (2015) where police officers deface transgender women by "forcibly removing their breasts and wigs in public places" (566). Perhaps more important than such physical transgressions are the verbal assaults

241

meant to de-humanize and humiliate the Khawaja Sira. Seemi, a well-educated Khawaja Sira who works in a government department, noted about her experience at the stop.

> *I was stopped at the police security post (Nakka) for a security check. When I told them that I was employed and worked at [a government department]. They said sarcastically, "O really! So, people like you can get jobs?" I was dressed as a man [to not be spotted as a Khawaja Sira] but they still recognize us.*

The remarks of the police official not only capture the humiliating nature of many police stops but in Seemi's case are a reminder that for the surveilling apparatus of the state, her deviant body overshadows her education and employment.

Occasionally, this patronizing patriarchal gaze converts to the shameless masculine gaze where the Khawaja Sira become a part of the voyeuristic urban spectacle – even objects of attraction – for the cis-gendered representatives of the state. In this position, the police officers re-assert the socially constructed exclusive right of the men to engage in *Flânerie* – "the process by which urban space is consumed as a visual spectacle by voyeuristic and self-assured male observers" (Hubbard 2004, 680) – which implies an active "looking" man and the passively "seen" bodies of women or any other gender queer individuals. These instances often reinforce the taken for granted assumption that the city space belongs to the man, for whom the others act as a passive visual spectacle. Consider the following interaction between Madhuri, a young educated Khawaja Sira who works at a local NGO, and a police official:

> *Today before I came to office, I took some money out of the bank. A police man stopped me and asked me 'Where did the money come from?' I said, 'Sir! I just withdrew from the bank'. He then asked me who had sent the money and where*

did I live. I told him my address and asked him to please let me know since I was

getting late from office. But he insisted that I first tell him about the money. I lost

my cool and said, 'Don't you know the manners to talk to someone?' Why should

I be afraid of such people? We do not fear anyone anymore. He said, "Sorry! You

have become angry ... I just wanted to complement your eyes. They are beautiful.

Can I get your number?"

While far from being a violent interaction, it is important not to see this

interaction as an example of two equal sexual peers interacting because the voyeuristic

pleasure in this stop was the exclusive right of the police officer. It is not possible for this

conversation to happen in the opposite direction with the Khawaja Sira acting as the

flaneur and the police officer the passive recipient of the voyeuristic gaze since that

would create the impulsive urge in the police officer to put the Khawaja Sira back into

her position (Hubbard 2008).

Occasionally these indiscretions move beyond subtle invitations to forced sexual

encounters as the archetype of the hyper-sexual Khawaja Sira is used for personal

advantage. The idea that all the Khawaja Sira are sex workers is used as a pretext not

only to invite the Khawaja Sira for sex but for forced illicit sexual encounters.

There are some policemen who are very cunning. They are generally the ones

who have been around for a while. They will generally ask us to meet them

somewhere [private], come to their flats [for sex]. Some misbehave a lot. We

dance at the fairs [or other private functions]. Police often raids these places

[especially when they run late]. If they find a [dancing] girl or a Khawaja Sira

243

there, they will forcibly put them in their car. They use them [sexually] and only

then let them go… Policemen can never behave… (Chanda)

I was coming back from Wahga Border on the canal, when I was stopped by a

police officer [who was in his car]. He offered me a lift back to the city… He took

me to his apartment.... He also invited four of his friends to his apartment. They

raped me throughout the night... I kept asking them to leave me but they did not

listen. They were very violent. (Seemi)

If we don't beg, what should we do?

The governments are so arbitrary. They are creating strange laws. They may

create a new strange law any day…Allah will hold them accountable one day.

(Farzana)

Police is not the only group of street-level bureaucrats that limit the mobility and

presence of the Khawaja Sira in the urban public spaces. The social welfare department

of the Government of Punjab launched a Beggar's Rehabilitation Program (BRP) in 2014

to minimize begging at urban public spaces in Lahore. Under this program, which is

similar in its ambitions to the recent anti-panhandling and anti-homeless laws in the USA,

the individuals caught begging at urban public places are brought to the Beggar's home; a

facility where the beggars are detained for a few days[85]. According to the official website

of the SWD, the Khawaja Sira are provided free medical treatment, vocational, and

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[85] The period of detention varies from a single day to more than a month. However, most individuals
reported being released anywhere between 3-14 days.

religious[86] treatment. In addition, "Those inmates who [have] completed their vocational and technical training successfully during their stay in the Beggar Home are provided tool kits so that they may work on self –employment basis etc.[87]" However, in practice no vocational or technical training is provided. Instead, as the word "inmate" indicates, the Beggar's works primarily as a detention center where the beggars are kept hidden from the public eye under the guise of rehabilitation.

Since begging is the most common way the Khawaja Sira are able to carve out a living, they have been disproportionately affected by this program. Consider the following statements of two of my research participants:

They stop us from begging. What do we do if we don't beg? Look at our clothes, our shoes. The winter is coming. If we don't beg what do we do? (Nargis)

You tell us what we should do if we don't beg. Should we do burglaries? We have to beg to stay alive. They have created this new rule out of nowhere [that we can't beg]. They don't listen to anyone. One can't appeal to their decision. The people [begging] on the roads [at traffic signals] men women and us, we have to carve out a living by begging. We can't do daily wages labor; we don't have any family to support us. Should we just jump in water in die? (Sakeena)

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[86] Religious treatment refers to the idea that being away from religion is part of the reason why the beggars do not engage in traditional work and instead prefer to beg. Islam frowns upon begging in general. So, religious treatment entails asking the beggars to offer regular prayers and follow the religious rituals with the hope that that will inspire them to leave begging.

[87] http://swd.punjab.gov.pk/beggar_rehabilitation

Many other Khawaja Sira also echoed these sentiments. As noted in the chapter on legal identity of the Khawaja Sira, they were not always beggars. However, the Criminal Tribes Act and the increasingly changing urban social structure limits other possibilities for work. Another important reason why the Khawaja Sira have to rely on begging is the rapid decline in local and street fairs in the last decade in all major urban centers of Pakistan. These local fairs often presented the Khawaja Sira with multiple economic opportunities. Many of the older Khawaja Sira I met had started their career dancing at the local fairs. These local fairs, in addition to wedding ceremonies, were considered a traditionally accepted avenue for the Khawaja Sira to earn a living. However, because of the local effects of global discourses related to security and surveillance resulting from war on terror, these local fairs have quickly disappeared from the urban public sphere in Pakistan that has minimized these traditional economic opportunities for the Khawaja Sira.

Resultantly, most Khawaja Sira find themselves reduced to begging to eke out a living. As one of my research participants noted:

> *I know my Khawaja Sira colleagues who never begged (kisi kay agay haath nahee phailayay thay) even ten rupees from anyone. Now, I see them tapping on the windows of cars on traffic signals begging for money. (Chanda)*

Indeed, many consider begging to be one of their most fundamental rights in society Consider the following statement of Saeeda:

This is so unfair that people from other cities can come to Lahore and earn a living but the Khawaja Sira (khusras) who are descendants[88] (Jaddi) of the area are not allowed to beg.

A senior official of the social welfare department told me, "Khawaja Sira were not included in the program scope when it was initially conceived but once the program started, we discovered that a lot of them engage in begging, [so many of them were detained]. However, it is very difficult to keep them contained. They even cut the [protective] wires [of the fences of the Beggar's home] to escape." Similarly, the supervisor of the program (often referred to as "Madam" by the Khawaja Sira), also mentioned that their primary focus was not to detain the Khawaja Sira. However, because many Khawaja Sira do engage in begging at traffic signals, many of them end up in the beggar's rehabilitation center. At the Beggar's home, the Khawaja Sira are detained with male beggars. However, according to the supervisor of Beggar's home, due to the sexual advances of the Khawaja Sira and complaints by other male beggars, the Khawaja Sira are now detained in a separate room from both the male and female beggars. Like almost all the government officers I talked to, she made a point to mention that most of them were in fact "not really Khawaja Sira." According to her, "only about 10% of the detained individuals were real Khawaja Sira and many of them even had families who came for their acquittal."

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[88] Since begging areas are handed down from the Gurus to their Chelay like inheritance, one's begging jurisdiction is jealously protected. One of the Gurus I met had documents going back more than a century showing the detailed lineage through which the areas in her jurisdiction had reached her.

Since the beggar's rehabilitation program is relatively recent and was in full swing when I started my fieldwork, the Khawaja Sira often mentioned it as the most important hindrance to their everyday citizenship. Consider the following account by Katrina, one of the Khawaja Sira who was sent to the Beggar's home.

Now the society [in terms of our mobility]) has become very strict. There has come this 'madam' [a reference to the supervisor of beggar's rehabilitation program]. She arrests us. The other day, I was arrested [by her team] but they did not beat me… I was returning home after buying milk… I also had some clothes that a family had given for my mother… when their car suddenly appeared… I told the madam [that I was not begging but just returning home]. She asked me my mobile number. I told her that I did not have any mobile. I did have the mobile but when I saw their car, I quickly gave it to a nearby shop owner. I also gave him whatever money was in my pockets and told him that they were going to take me away… They took me [to the beggar's rehabilitation center]. There were other Khawaja Sira (mooratan) sitting there, some of whom were from Raiwind [where she lives] … The employees there are scoundrels. They misbehave a lot. When Madam is not present, they take money from the beggars… I was there for about one and a half hour when our local Nazim [political administrator] reached the center. He is very rude. He can be very nice too [if he wants to]. He said to the Madam, "First, you tell me under what law have you brought him here? Was he [even] begging?" He argued with the Madam for quite a while. We were listening to it all since we were sitting in front of them… The Nazim is very well connected … He told the madam, "I can take this uniform away from you and send you

home within five minutes if I want. He [a reference to Katrin]) is a Sain log [minds his own business]. He is our son (puttar ay sada). He is the [male] child of a poor family… He is not able to do hard labor and has to resort to begging to make his ends meet, yet you stop him from doing that." He shamed the madam a lot… The madam even asked him to sit in her chair but he refused. There were ten other Khawaja Sira (mooratan) there. I was the eleventh. I said that if I am going, I am also taking them along. Eventually, they let all of us go." Afterwards, the Nazim advised that we should move about in the city more discretely.

Some aspects of Katrina's stop by the frontline workers of the SWD and her subsequent experience at the Beggar's home stand out. First, the arbitrary nature of the stop where she was neither given the opportunity of hearing nor provided any reason for why she was being detained. Second, while it might seem that the Nazim intervened on behalf of Katrina to protect her citizenship rights, it was actually her relatives who voted for the Nazim that brought him to the Beggar's home to free Katrina. The Nazim was acting to protect his votes and not Katrina's citizenship rights. Had she not been directly connected to the Nazim or if her relatives had voted for someone else, it is unlikely that this courtesy would have been extended to her. Finally, Katrina had to rely on a cis-gendered individual associated with the state to get out of detention by the SWD. Interestingly, and perhaps expectedly, the local Nazim also talked about Katrina as "our son." Even at the time of getting her released from the Beggar's home, she was referred as a son and not as a Khawaja Sira. In addition, the unequal degree of citizenship of various groups in Pakistani society as also evident in this episode. While Katrina was picked up without being provided any reason, the attitude of the frontline workers was

very different with the local politician who legally had no mandate to interfere in the official business of the Beggar's home. Most importantly, the camaraderie between the Khawaja Sira was also noteworthy as Katrina insisted that all other Khawaja Sira be released by the SWD.

Overall, the BRP influences the everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira in two significant ways. First, as Rosiers (2003, xi) notes in the context of anti-panhandling laws in North America, the "relationships between the very poor and the rest of society are marked with claims of ownership of space: public space is middle class and should remain so." In the present context, the BRP also reasserts the ownership of the cis-gendered middle class majority on the public sphere. In addition, as Collins and Blomley (2003) argue in the context of anti-panhandling laws in Canada, laws against begging in urban public space are based on the disruption it causes in the imperceptible flow of money in capitalist societies. That is why, anti-panhandling and anti-homeless laws often aim to "purify" the public spaces of the commercial core of big cities as the "presence of the homeless and destitute begging for alms on the street is a stark and very public reminder of social marginalization and economic polarization, which potentially undermines carefully crafted urban images" (Collins and Blomley 2003, 42).

Second, the BRP is another example of the idea that some individuals can carve out a living without work, as it is socially defined, is an anathema to most contemporary capitalist societies. That is why such individuals are presented as passive poor (who do not work by choice) in vagrancy laws. Such laws (like the vagrancy ordinance of Pakistan) often provide for creation of rehabilitation centers where such individuals are trained to join the labor force of society again. However, as in the case of the Khawaja

Sira, the reality is often rather different. Instead of being passive poor, individuals like Khawaja Sira represent the "human waste" (Bauman 2004) created as an inevitable byproduct of contemporary socio-economic organization where identities and bodies that are not considered socially acceptable are denied access to work (as it is socially defined). Rosiers (2003, xiv) notes, "[t]o be in the public domain requires a recognition of the other as well as a discussion regarding the allocation of power and the making of choices." That is why, a Khawaja Sira beggar demanding her share from an unequal society in a public place causes social unease as it exposes the ugly underbelly of the socio-economic inequality in society. The practical goal and consequence of programs like BRP is not rehabilitation but to curtail the everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira and to make this human waste invisible. As Bauman notes, we "dispose of leftovers in the most radical and effective way: we make them invisible by not looking and unthinkable by not thinking. They worry us only when the routine elementary defenses are broken and the precautions fail" (Bauman 2004, 27).

If you have ever stopped at a busy intersection or gone shopping at a busy mall in Lahore, you understand the discomfort felt by all the so-called normal individuals because of all the beggars and the solicitors. The standard responses to such individuals like *"Please forgive me (Muaf karo)"; "you look perfectly fine. Why don't you do some work?";* and *"Please don't do this. Go somewhere else"* reflect the unease felt by those classified as normal over being forced to encounter the human waste in their routine lives. As Dean (1999, 3-4) argues, "at its simplest the dilemma any of us face when confronted by a beggar is whether to give money or not, yet beneath this dilemma lies the necessity for the kind of classificatory judgments that had supposedly been colonized by

social administrators: is the supplicant deserving or undeserving, genuine or fraudulent?"

Granted some of these individuals could be habitual beggars – another fantasy narrated

multiple times in Pakistan to self and others to comfort oneself that everything is actually

fine with the world and these are only tricksters since it is highly unlikely that that many

individuals would habitually beg by choice.

This is where public administration frontline workers come to our rescue. By

picking up the human waste that disgusts us and depositing it (albeit temporarily) in the

garbage disposal places (like the Beggars home, rehabilitation centers and occasionally

prison), the street-level bureaucrats keep the city clean and serene for the rest of us. They

save us the agony of encountering the human waste demand a small pie from our share in

the world to carve out their living. In this regard, a comparison with the response of

public administrators to the Occupy movements is insightful. As noted recently by

Catlaw and Eagan (2016) the sit-ins by the Occupy protesters were mostly "framed as

problems of public safety, sanitation, and waste removal." Such a framing reduced the

occupiers trying to re-assert their rights in the urban public space "to giant leaps of waste

by police and city officials" and also reinforced the fabrication of public administrators as

agents of "cleaning and civilizing urban space" (Catlaw and Eagan 2016).

Discussion

As Butler notes, "[t]he public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and

the regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as

reality, and what will not" (Butler, 2004, xx). As I discussed in this chapter, in the

context of everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira, this regulation of appearances

happens in multiple ways by street-level bureaucrats that limit their mobility and access

to everyday urban public space. Perhaps more importantly, whenever they come into the urban public places, their hyper-visible bodies are marked by a gaze of surveillance and mockery that stays with them till the retreat to their private abodes. Combined with the micro-aggressions enacted by the cis-gendered majority which are meant to dissuade them from being present in the everyday spaces of society, the Khawaja Sira can never truly "be" in the public sphere.

Street-level public administration officials are critical actors in-charge of managing this system of appearances in everyday spaces. While the cis-gendered publics also play an important role in minimizing the access and participation of the Khawaja Sira in the everyday life of society, the frontline workers are different. One can try to ignore the insults, passing remarks or visual surveillance of the cis-gendered publics, but one can't escape the same gestures and authority of the frontline workers. That is why "the stop" and its phenomenology is so important. When a Khawaja Sira is stopped by the frontline workers, especially by police, they can't ignore it by keeping their head down, moving faster or covering their body with *dupatta*. When you are called by the state to stop, you have to stop. These stops, even the ones not resulting in extortions or detentions, are a constant reminder for the Khawaja Sira of their socially perceived deviance and suspicion. The taken-for-granted nature of their hyper-sexuality implies that any adult male in conversation with them in everyday spaces is deemed a potential sex partner and as noted above, and this assumption is often communicated loud and clear by the frontline officials. An important consequence of the negative attitude of frontline workers of police is that most Khawaja Sira don't report most transgressions of the cis-gendered majority to the police. Only some incidents like theft are reported. I don't have

253

statistics to support this claim but it is likely that the Khawaja Sira report a very low percentage of their legitimate legal complaints, especially the ones related to sexual transgressions, to the police. For example, some of my research participants reported being sexually harassed or raped but they never mentioned going to the police. Similarly, Ashi, an employee of a local NGO, mentioned the following:

Others [a reference to the cis-gendered individual] have the police. If they have some problem, they can go to police where their problems are heard and investigated. If there is a big case, there are courts which can solve their problems. We should also have some protection [from the police] so that we can also speak up. Only then will the society will have some fear that if we cross them, they can go to court against us.

Another point of theoretical significance is that while it is true that the hyper-visibility of the Khawaja Sira bodies results because of their perceived deviance on the axes of gender and sexuality, their intersectional marginality on other axes like economic status, educational and social class augments the curtailment of their everyday citizenship rights. When a police officer stops a Khawaja Sira in an urban public place, it is not just a stop by a representative of the cis-gendered state questioning a trans-gendered individual, it is also a male talking to a non-male; a middle class individual talking to an individual of lower socio-economic status; an educated individual talking to an illiterate; an individual nurtured by the state and society as one of its own talking to the human waste generated as a necessary byproduct of this nurturing business of the state. In other words, the frontline workers influence the everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira not just on

254

the bases of being representatives of the state but also because of their patriarchal and cis-gendered privilege.

An important limitation in the scope of this chapter was the deliberate focus on only the formal governmental actions and rationalities influencing the access of the Khawaja Sira to the urban public space. Cis-gendered individuals not formally related to the government also play an important part in influencing the mobility and visibility of the Khawaja Sira in urban public space. An important area in this regard is the public transport. For example, Phadke, Khan and Ranade (2011) in their study of women's experience in urban public spaces of Mumbai, note that when it comes to governing cis-gendered norms, women also play an important role. According to them in the local public trains, "Hijras [trying to travel in women compartments] are met with annoyance mixed with anxiety. Transgender people and lesbian women who dress ambiguously face reactions ranging from confusion to hostility. Women who do not look indisputably feminine and therefore directly or indirectly excluded from these spaces" (75-76). Most of the Khawaja Sira I talked to also mentioned that they avoid public transportation because of harassment and teasing by other passengers.

It is also pertinent to mention that all police officials are not the same. While many of them do act on behalf of the cis-gendered majority to limit the everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira, a few are more understanding and caring. I end this chapter with the following two police stops where the phenomenology was quite different. While it is important to critique the conduct of police officials limiting the citizenship conditions for the Khawaja Sira, perhaps it is equally important to appreciate those few who stop to understand and not judge:

255

Some of them are so good. Once we were returning from a function and waiting for a rickshaw when a police car stopped near us… After we told them we were returning home from a function, they asked us to get in the police car. We were so afraid but they were so good. One of them said that drop them where they want to go. They changed their route just to drop us at the appropriate spot, arranged a rickshaw for us. (Chandni)

Some experienced policemen are quite nice. They know that we don't cause any trouble. Some of them even ask us to sit down and have a cup of tea and ask if there is a problem that they can help us with. We tell them that this [begging] has become an unavoidable reality for us otherwise who would want to beg on purpose. (Kousar)

In the epi-quote by which I started section-III, Fox (2003) argued that public administration researchers are often guilty of trying to "legitimize the administrative state" by discussing those administrator-citizen interactions that re-affirm our affinity to the role of public administration as a productive discipline while "downplaying abhorrent ones" (Fox 2003, 63). As the discussion in this chapter shows, the paradigm case of administrator-citizen encounter (at least in this research context) is indeed that of an agent of behavioral coercion trying to ensure implementation to the dominant social norms by the marginalized individuals. However, as the last two narratives indicate, that is not always the case meaning-making administrator-citizen interactions do happen, albeit infrequently. As I discuss in the next chapter, this heterogeneity in the attitude of frontline workers does open up new possibilities for the Khawaja Sira. Moreover, the

Khawaja Sira are not always passive actors when interacting with frontline workers who act as agents of behavioral coercion. Instead, as I discuss in the next chapter, the Khawaja Sira have devised multiple individual, and collective resistance strategies that help them occasionally contest the frontline workers' commands.

CHAPTER 9

NEGOTIATING WITH POWER: KHAWAJA SIRA STRATEGIES IN

ADMINISTRATOR-CITIZEN INTERACTIONS

> The intertwined bodily and territorial forces of dispossession play out in the
> exposure of bodies-in-place, which can become the occasion of subjugation,
> surveillance, and interpellation. It can also become the occasion of situated acts
> of resistance, resilience, and confrontation with the matrices of dispossession,
> through appropriating the ownership of one's body from these oppressive
> matrices. Acted upon, and yet acting, bodies-in-place and bodies-out-of-place at
> once embody and displace the conditions of intelligible embodiment and agency
> (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013, 22).

As the last three chapters indicate, the Khawaja Sira often find themselves on the

receiving end of disproportionate administrative burden, hyper-surveillance, and moral

policing by frontline workers of government. An important consequence of these

administrator-citizen interactions is the curtailment of everyday citizenship and social

inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. Although one can romanticize the idea of resistance and

"speaking truth to power" (Farmer 2003), and academics are perhaps guiltier of it than

anyone else, the harsh reality of the lives of most marginalized individuals is that they

have to enact "cost reduction" strategies (Emerson 1962) when confronted by the threat

of power by the state officials. As Scott (1992) argues, "[w]ith rare, but significant,

exceptions the public performance of the subordinate will, out of prudence, fear and the

desire to curry favor, be shaped to appeal to the expectations of the powerful (55). That is

why, various performative and verbal "gestures of submission" (Held 1999) are often the

typical response of the Khawaja Sira when they encounter frontline workers with the

power to detain, or arrest them. These gestures of submission, often a combination of

bodily and speech acts (like falling to the feet or imploring loudly), are quite common

among the individuals of the lower socio-economic status when confronted by those in authority in Pakistan. Consider the following statements of two of my research participants when asked about their interaction with police in everyday life:

> *The police stops us at the traffic signals. I beg them and beseech them to let me go. (Nazia)*

> *When I go to beg somewhere [and any police officer sees me], they say, 'What are you doing? Don't beg here, go there [out of our jurisdiction].' If they try to detain me, I throw myself at their feet and implore them to leave me [which usually works]. Whatever money I have on me; they take that away. (Meera)*

These gestures of submission are meant to re-affirm the status and self-image of the police officials. For the Khawaja Sira, these acts as short-term rational cost strategies which minimize the cost of compliance to the "powerful other" (Emerson 1962, 35), in this case the cis-gendered police officers acting on behalf of the state. However, as Emerson (1962) notes, cost reduction strategies seldom act as balancing operations in asymmetric power relations. Instead, as they often also involve change of expectations and attitudes about what is deemed possible in particular relations of power, they serve to fortify the existing relative state of power relations along multiple identity axes: of the cis-gendered individuals against the Khawaja Sira; the bourgeois policemen against the poor Khawaja Sira; and the bureaucrat against his clients. It is as if the Khawaja Sira literally need to willfully belittle themselves by falling at the feet of the cis-gendered state to prevent it from taking away the already limited everyday citizenship to which they are afforded access.

259

However, as McEwen (2000) notes, citizenship is also a site of "ongoing contestation" (102) because everyday encounters, while often reproducing the existing state of power relations, occasionally also provide the opportunity for subversion, resistance and contestation (Dickinson et al. 2008). Scott (2008) argues that while we focus more on overtly political and open strategies of resistance and rebellion, *everyday forms of resistance* tend to be overlooked. While the dominant identities and norms hold sway for most of the time, marginalized identities are able to eke out an existence by using atypical form of resistance "which directly opposes nothing, but which nevertheless exploits the ambiguities and opportunities of an actual third space, rather than directly oppositional, forms of resistance: those which are directed at an angle to specific exercises of power" (Butz 2002, 24). While these strategies might not seem heroic or emancipatory, they are "an integral part of the small arsenal of relatively powerless groups" (Scott 2008, 34), especially in contexts where open insubordination is not possible. That is why, it is important to understand how marginalized groups respond to various forms of discrimination in their everyday life.

The Khawaja Sira are not always passive recipients of the discriminatory and disciplinary practices of the government. Instead, they have devised strategies, gestures, and practices through which they try to frustrate the normalizing discourses and practices of frontline workers about their appearance and personality. In this context, resistance following Prior (2009) is defined as, actions (or lack thereof) "by citizens to develop alternative strategies or technologies in response to specific situations, in order to achieve outcomes other than those prescribed in official policies" (30). As Foucault (1980) noted, such resistance strategies are multiple in nature and are "formed right at the point where

relations of power are exercised" (142). In the discussion that follows, I use examples and narratives from my fieldwork to highlight the wide range of responses of Khawaja Sira to the disproportionate administrative burden and hyper-surveillance faced by them.

Individual Contestation

I quickly take off my clothes

Disciplining the bodies of citizens is one of the central concerns of the bio-political state (Foucault 1978; 1980), leading Sacco (2002, 205) to call the body as "the persistent yet unacknowledged underbelly of citizenship." For example, Rawlins (2008) has shown how various institutional spaces (like schools) act as the sites where the body is at the center of disciplinary practices related to citizenship. Similarly, the socially deviant body of the Khawaja Sira is at the center of their legal, ethical and everyday citizenship. Body shaming is often used by frontline police officers as a way to harass the Khawaja Sira and expose them as "men pretending to be women." Consider the following narrative of a police officer:

> *Once we had detained one of them [a Khawaja Sira]. One of my constables said, "Sir! Be careful. There curses are really potent." I ordered him to take the clothes off of the Khawaja Sira. When he [my constable] took off his clothes, he started laughing loudly [because the Khawaja Sira was a biological man and was not only a pretender but also did not have any supernatural powers of cursing]*

Resultantly, one could in fact argue that any Khawaja Sira who dares to take her body in the cis-gendered public sphere with her atypical sartorial preferences, inflection of voice and the feminine gait, is performing an act of resistance. Under the perpetual threat of insults, detention, and physical violence not just by the representatives of the

261

state but also other cis-gendered individuals, it takes real courage simply to go out in the urban public space and re-assert one's right to everyday citizenship. Some, like Seemi, however, wear masculine clothing, cut their hair short, keep their head down and walk quickly to give others little opportunity to inspect and insult them.

> *To save myself from the persistent hooting, I generally wear hoodies [as they also hide my long hair], keep my head down and walk quickly so that others don't recognize me. But they often still do…*

Her statement is a reminder that "for those who are consigned to public invisibility, what is seen and how it is seen, often takes on a phantasmal form. The sources of their misery are not immediately present or transparent but seem to haunt them as half-conscious suspicions that things are 'not quite right'." (Mooers 2003, 14)

A few Khawaja Sira, however, deploy atypical resistance strategies when stopped and confronted by the police. Consider the following two statements by my research participants:

> *Whenever the police stops me, I quickly take off my clothes [in retaliation]. Those among them who have any modesty, don't look and say "For God's sake! Don't do this. You can go. Others are shameless. It's better to not discuss this topic in detail [you will be surprised at what you hear] (ay gullan bus tusee chud ee deyo) (Bilo)*

> *When the police official was threatening me and not listening to me, I said loudly, "Do what you want but if you don't listen to me, I will bring a hundred Khusras*

(Punjabi term for the Khawaja Sira) outside the police station tomorrow who will protest naked." It worked and the police official backed down. (Salma)

As Eileraas (2014) notes in the analysis of the Egyptian female nude blogger Elmahdy's influence in the politics and public sphere of Egyptian protests, the appeal of such atypical protests lies in "[m]aking visible what had no business being seen" (Rainciere 1989, 674 as cited in Eileraas 2014). This strategy, which may seem like an act of madness to the frontline workers and society, also reminiscent of what Callen (2012, 123) labels as a resistance tactic against dominant discourses in public administration:

> madness is resistance not against the Other but along the border of what constitutes the Other. It is a transgression in the in-between space that destabilizes, deterritorializes, the privileged position and, in turn, 'revalues all values.' Madness is when one dwells in the in-between space of self and other, a space haunted by specters of liberation, where one forgets what is impossible. It is in this space that one may be called mad, if viewed from the dominant discourse, but it is the same space from which resistance to that discourse can emerge.

The urban space, like most other institutionalized spaces of society, is a highly structured and regimented field of appearances where visibility, invisibility, and hyper-visibility are all meant to reproduce the existing state of power relations in society (Fraser 1990). The nude – and deviant – body, therefore, often enacts as a sudden disturbance and occasional reconfiguration of the local relations of power by disrupting how power flows through different bodies. The Khawaja Sira by taking off their clothes defiantly in front of the police take away their most potent weapon – body shaming – and re-deploy it in their own favor. This strategy which relies on the officials having some sense of decency is seldom deployed but often – not always – succeeds in temporarily shifting the relations of power in the opposite direction.

One Can't Tell It's you

Perhaps the most significant recurring theme characterizing the Khawaja Sira-frontline interactions in NADRA offices is the obsession of the frontline workers with the authentic masculine appearance. This concern of the Khawaja Sira especially comes to the fore when a Khawaja Sira wants to register as a man while dressed as a woman. As a frontline worker noted,

> *One of them [a Khawaja Sira] came to our branch the other day to get an ID (as a man). He was wearing make-up like an actress or a movie star and had long [feminine] hair. If he had chosen to get his hair cut [shorter] and washed his face [to take off the make-up], his picture would have come out better (as a man) but he did not do that. While we did not say anything, such people should show some courtesy [and look more like men].*

The frustration of the frontline worker who narrated this event is quite apparent. This frustration arises out of the discomfort of the frontline workers with Khawaja Sira whose appearance and attire doesn't match the masculine gender. While this frontline worker approved of the choice of Khawaja Sira to register as men as "almost all of them [were] in fact men" according to him, his discomfort with their refusal to take off their makeup was obvious. This practice of the Khawaja Sira to register as men while "looking like women" is something that I also observed myself. This choice of the Khawaja Sira to which the frontline workers can't legally complain because there is nothing "illegal" about this choice and as the choice to register as men is often approved since it reinforces the dominant social construction.

Even though many times this choice of Khawaja Sira to dress as women while applying for IDs is not even a conscious choice but a natural continuation of how they spend their daily lives, it shouldn't take anything away from the disruptive potential it brings to the gender management system. As Getsy (2014) notes in the context of what she labels "transgender capacity", "a capacity need not be purposefully planted or embedded (though of course it may be), and it does not just result from the intentions of sympathetic or self-identified transgendered subjects. It may emerge at any site where dimorphic and static understandings of gender are revealed as arbitrary and inadequate" (47). By consciously or unconsciously choosing not to look like proper men, the Khawaja Sira highlight the sheer absurdity of the gender management system. Some frontline workers end up accepting that some men do choose to look like women even when they want to register as men.

However, others like Naghma are not so lucky. Naghma has spent all her life living as a woman. Now retired, she spent most of her adult life as a street theatre actress and used to perform the role of a female lead or her mother. Since being sent to live with the Khawaja Sira at a very young age by her (maternal) grandfather, she never wore masculine clothes in her life. Due to her remarkably feminine appearance and voice, she has had no problem "passing" as a woman throughout her life. Now when she is old and lives with a couple of her family members, no one in her street knows that she is a Khawaja Sira. She is just known as the *bari behan* (elder sister) of the family. Naghma is what the Khawaja Sira call a Khusree; Khawaja Sira who are the most (in external and/or physical characteristics) feminine among them. Naghma faced no problem getting her ID as a woman a few years back.

However, a few months earlier she started thinking about going to Saudi Arabia for *Hajj* or *Umrah* (ritualistic religious pilgrimage for Muslims). That is when she decided to register as a man. As I mentioned in chapter 4, many Khawaja Sira believe that they have to perform the religious rituals as men otherwise their rituals will remain imperfect[89]. She says, "I want to wear *Ahram* (a dress worn by men during *Hajj* and *Umrah*) and get my head shaved (like men) when I go for *Hajj* or *Umrah* [to Mecca]." When she went to a NADRA office to register as a man, the frontline workers at the NADRA office were initially very reluctant to do so. However, she persisted in her stance and finally succeeded in registering as a man. Following is her narration of her visit to the NADRA office when she was finally able to register as a man:

> *The woman officer who took my photograph was very nice. She said do you have any such [masculine] shirt? I said that I didn't have one but that I will bring it somehow. Then a [Khawaja Sira] friend got me a masculine dress shirt from somewhere. I had not worn any masculine clothes since my childhood. I don't even know what masculine clothes are [i.e., how to wear them] … I just wore the masculine shirt there [at the NADRA office]. I did not even wear it before entering the office. I only wore it at the time they took my photograph [over my feminine clothes so that they could take my photograph]. The same thing*

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[89] It might be of interest to note here that many Islamic religious rituals are performed differently by men and women, but in *Hajj* and *Umrah* this difference is perhaps the most obvious: men wear a special ritual garment that bares their chest partially (called *ahram*), that is not worn by women (who wear their ordinary clothes); men have to shave their head at the conclusion of their pilgrimage, while women cut only a small section; and finally, and most importantly from the perspective of the Khawaja Sira, men are allowed to travel alone to Saudi Arabia while women need to be accompanied by a chaperone that is usually a close male relative (*mahram*), a requirement that is understandably difficult for the Khawaja Sira to fulfil.

happened when I went to get a passport [I had to wear a masculine shirt when my

photograph was taken].

When I went to the NADRA office to inquire about getting the ID card as a man

earlier, the officer there said, "I understand your request [that you are a

Khawaja Sira and want to get an ID as a man] but your photo won't come out as

a man since your face is that of a woman and your voice is very feminine." I said,

"it is God's will that he gave me a feminine face and voice, please just let me get

the ID card [as a man] I will be very thankful." That's why I wore the masculine

shirt [so that my photograph comes out as a man]. Another [probably

supervisory] woman officer saw me and said that I should register as a Khawaja

Sira and [asked me] to show her all my application documents after they were

completed so that she could check that I registered as a Khawaja Sira. But when

the time came [to choose my gender on the ID application], I told the relevant

officer to just write man and that I don't want to write any such thing as a

Khawaja Sira on my [ID] card. The officer said "ok" and did as I requested.

When [I went back to the supervisory woman officer and] she saw [that I had

registered as a man instead of a Khawaja Sira], she said, "Oho! Auntie what

have you done? Why did you not register as a Khawaja Sira?" I asked her to look

at it carefully. When she looked at my photograph closely, she said, "Wow! Your

face has changed completely [because of the masculine shirt]. One can't tell you!

Your face does not look feminine anymore" … It took about 3 months for this

issue to get resolved [but I eventually got the ID card as a man].

This incident reveals how the Khawaja Sira can occasionally exercise choices about their legal identities which are tangential to the official discourses and their dominant social constructions. Perhaps the most import aspect of Naghma's journey from a legal woman to a man is the irrelevance of the third gender category for her. Even though the woman frontline worker at the NADRA office tried to convince her to register as a Khawaja Sira, Naghma never really considered it as an option for her. Naghma's case is an example of Khawaja Sira tactically using the gender categories of the state, conversely, her choice to register as a man conforms to the dominant religious discourses about identity among the Khawaja Sira; another example of contestation at one point and compliance at another in the social network of power. Indeed, one could argue that another form of resistance for Naghma would be to resist the religious discourse among Khawaja Sira that all of them need to perform religious rituals as men. This incident points out how while resisting to some forms of government, the Khawaja Sira continue to conform to other more immediate forms of government.

I don't wait in lines

"I don't stand in the lines [at the NADRA offices]. I start making a scene (mein to khap daal deti hun). I ask them you have lines for men and women, where is our line? I am not going to stand with men or women. They say, 'ok, ok, please just be silent'. This [tactic] mostly works" (Sheila)

Another common strategy used by the Khawaja Sira as they try to frustrate the efforts of frontline police officials to extort money or detain them is that of public shaming by complaining and lamenting loudly. Deploying this strategy, also used by Hijras in neighboring India as noted by Hall (1997), Khawaja Sira often employ sexually

268

explicit insults if they feel disrespected. Although employed commonly against cis-gendered individuals in everyday life and as an aggressive begging strategy, some participants reported using this strategy of "creating a fuss" against frontline workers also. As one of them proudly proclaimed, "Let them [the police] stop me! I have a sharp tongue too (*itni lambi zumban hai meri*)."

As discussed in chapter 5, most applicants in NADRA frontline offices have to wait a long time for their turn. According to Sheila, instead of waiting in line, she often contends that if there is a separate gender category for the Khawaja Sira, a separate line should also be created for the Khawaja Sira. Sheila uses the characteristic clap – a classic identity signature of the Khawaja Sira (Reddy 2005) – and her loud voice to "make a scene." This strategy which often, though not always, succeeds is perhaps the best example of the nature of contestation that takes place "at an angle" to official discourses yet brings immediate relief to the marginalized groups.

Note that this contestation does not change much in the larger scheme of things; the official (written) discourses of categorization remain unaffected because that is not what concerns Sheila, she is only concerned about getting things done quickly at the NADRA office. Interestingly, Sheila didn't register as a Khawaja Sira but chose to register as a man. However, that didn't stop her from strategically employing the newly created gender category for her advantage.

Contestation Based on Social Capital

If they don't listen to us, we just call her

An important consequence of the new forms of government surveillance, emergence of some NGOs as advocates of Khawaja Sira rights, and failure of old guard

of the Khawaja Sira to safeguard the new generation from the arbitrary decision making of frontline officials, is the emergence of new leadership among the Khawaja Sira. While the internal day to day social organization of the Khawaja Sira continues to be based on the old system of Guru-Chela relationship, increasingly younger Khawaja Sira are leading the charge of contesting the abysmal state of their legal and everyday citizenship. Part of the reason for the rise of these new leaders is their ability to contest the everyday disciplinary acts of the frontline workers. An example of this new vanguard of leadership is Salma Butt[90] who has, over the years, cultivated relations with many influential human rights activists, social figures, and government officials in police and other government departments. Resultantly, she often helps other Khawaja Sira navigate the treacherous bureaucracy. For example, one of Salma's Chelay Faiza when asked about her experience with police mentioned:

> *Yes, they do occasionally stop us but we know how to deal with them. If they don't listen to us, we just call her [Salma]. She is so well connected and everyone knows her so well that no one bothers us after hearing her name. They say, "O so you are connected to Butt Sahib. You can go."*

Similarly, Ashi, another of my research participants helps out other Khawaja Sira who are detained by the Beggar's Rehabilitation program. Getting out of the Beggar's home requires completion of legal paper work (by someone on the outside), visits to various offices of the government (located on opposite ends of the city), and acquaintances at these offices to facilitate the finalization of orders of release. For the

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[90] Butt is a caste in Pakistan and India.

Khawaja Sira, who have mostly no connections left to their families, this represents a huge problem. However, Ashi, one of my research participants, has emerged as a solution to such Khawaja Sira. She charges them a facilitation fee and in return completes all the paper work required for their release from the Beggar's home. This helps the detained Khawaja Sira get out quickly and Ashi not only gains monetary benefit but also valuable social capital as she continues to rise in the Khawaja Sira community.

While the older Gurus used to be well connected with the local elite, because of the increased requirements of dealing with bureaucratic rules and urban surveillance by the police, they often find themselves needing to ask the much younger leadership of the Khawaja Sira for favors (e.g., to get their own Chelay out of police custody). During the course of my research, I met many Khawaja Sira who, although senior to Salma in the internal hierarchy of the Khawaja Sira, owed many favors to her and referred to her as "Madam" or other titles reserved for respect of the seniors during routine conversation. Because of the way bureaucratic rules and policies (like ID requirements, police detention) are increasingly becoming important, in a few years from now this new generation of leaders may replace the old institution of Guru-Chela, at least in relation to the business of the state.

How did you reach that office!

When Neeli went to a NADRA office, her main concern was that she got an ID and not what gender was written on it. However, since the default option for most Khawaja Sira is to register as a man, she was leaning towards that option. Being unfamiliar with how the government offices work, she took a Khawaja Sira friend along. When the time came to have her photograph taken, she took off her *dopata* (head cover

worn by women) and opened her long hair. In her friends' words, "she was getting ready for the photograph as if it was a model's photoshoot." Combined with the fact that she was wearing a nose pin, the frontline workers said that if she wanted to register as a man, she had to look like a man. However, she refused to change her appearance and demanded that she be registered as a Khawaja Sira (woman) and that her feminine Khawaja Sira name be used on the ID. However, the supervisory officer at the NADRA office told her that if she wanted to register as a Khawaja Sira, she needed to bring a medical certificate to prove that she was in fact a Khawaja Sira. She was also told that since her birth certificate had her (masculine) birth name, she couldn't get her feminine name written on the ID. The rest of the incident is narrated in her friend's words below:

> We had a long argument with the [NADRA frontline] staff. But they said, 'we can't do anything. We can only follow the documents you have submitted … if you want to register as a Khawaja Sira, you should go to a doctor and get a medical certificate [indicating that you are a biologically a Khawaja Sira and biologically closer to women]. Only once we get the report will you be registered as a Khawaja Sira'. We said, 'Ok we will get it done somehow'. [Next day, we went to Jinnah Hospital]. When we reached there, they told us that we were too late and that we should come again the next day. When we went back the next day, they told us that such medical certificates are only issued at Services and Munshi Hospitals. After that, I thought enough is enough and told Neeli to go home. I told her I'll figure something out and that now it's my job to get her the ID card. Afterwards, I went to the head office of NADRA. I dialed [a NADRA official's] number [who I had met a week earlier as he was a member of a special team of

frontline workers that visited an NGO to make the IDs for the Khawaja Sira] but his phone was not responding. I got confused since there were (security) cameras everywhere and I didn't know where to go. However, he probably saw my phone call and soon came to receive me. Everyone was so welcoming... They took me to the cafeteria for a cup of tea and then took me to [a senior official's] office. I asked him, 'If you don't ask men or women for any proof of their gender, why do you require such proof from us? When we admit who we are then why do you require proof from us?' He [agreed with me and] quickly called the concerned branch manager and directed him to register Neeli as a Khawaja Sira [woman] and also to write her feminine name on the ID card. When we went back to the office, the branch manager was very surprised. He asked me incredulously, 'How did you go to that office?!' After that Neeli's card was quickly made as she wanted.

As this episode reveals, Neeli's friend, who represents the new leadership of the Khawaja Sira I mentioned above, and her social connection with the NADRA officials were of critical importance in making this contestation successful. Another interesting aspect of this episode is the direct contestation by the Khawaja Sira of the requirement for a medical certificate to prove their identity. This contestation was successful because in all likelihood the NADRA officer at the head office was aware of the official policy about gender categorization. Like Naghma, this episode indicates the heterogeneity within the frontline workers when it comes to interacting with the Khawaja Sira. While the frontline workers at the NADRA office were not very helpful, the ones at the head office went beyond their normal routine to help her, hence facilitating the Khawaja Sira

contestation of arbitrary demands by the frontline staff. If they had agreed with the position taken by their colleagues in another branch, it would have been difficult for Neeli's friend to be successful in contesting this requirement. Hence, these frontline workers acted as citizen-agents (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003) who used their discretion to facilitate their clients.

Finally, like Naghma's case, this episode also indicates how the Khawaja Sira can strategically use the gender categories to problematize the dominant discourses of physical appearance, dress and gender identity. While Naghma decided to dress as a man to frustrate the frontline workers' effort to register her as a Khawaja Sira, Neeli did not take that option and instead decided to register as a Khawaja Sira (woman) and managed to not only do that but also to have her feminine name written on the ID card which considering the legal environment in Pakistan was quite an achievement.

My relatives are in police

For the few Khawaja Sira who can tap into their familial social networks, police stops are not sites of great panic. For example, Neelo, one of my research participants, mentioned that she seldom has a problem with police because:

> *If I am stopped by police, I talk loudly in an arrogant manner, they become silent. They don't misbehave with me because my relatives [sister's sons] are in police. They know that if they do [misbehave with me], my nephews will say why you did that? You know he is our maternal uncle.*

Since she was still in touch with her sister (who had also saved her from her father's violence in her childhood), she was able to tap into the social capital that comes with family members being in positions of power in Pakistan. The way Neelo mentioned

her interactions with police, it seemed as if she wanted the police to stop her so that she could re-assert her social standing.

Similarly, as I discussed in Chapter 6, another research participant (Katrina) not only managed to get out of the Beggar's home through her connection to a local politician, she also got release all other Khawaja Sira detained at the Beggar's home at the time. As Abu-Lughod (1990) and Riessmen (2000) have noted, occasionally as marginalized individuals contest the boundaries at one node in the web of power relations in society, they reinforce other sites of existing network of power. While relying on cis-gendered members of the state is a resistance strategy that almost always works in Pakistan, it is important to keep in mind that both Neelo and Katrina have to rely for these subversions on their cis-gendered relatives who are also members of the state. This not only reinforces dependence of Khawaja Sira on the cis-gendered majority but also legitimizes the same politico-administrative system they seek to subvert. Perhaps, more importantly, like Katrina, Neelo continues to remain the "maternal uncle" in her imagined conversation between her nephews and their peers in police. The protection, even in Neelo's imagination, is provided to the "maternal uncle" and not the "maternal aunt" or Khawaja Sira.

Collective Resistance

Although most resistance strategies operate at the individual (or small group) level because that is how the Khawaja Sira interact with frontline workers in everyday spaces, occasionally group level protests do happen. As Fraser (1990) argues, in response to a public sphere dominated by the concerns of a few social (racial and gender) groups, some sections of society have traditionally responded by creating subaltern counter-

publics: "parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (67). Occasionally, these counter-publics actively re-assert their right to exist and be visible in the cis-gendered bourgeois public sphere. These protests are not always successful and are not done against any routine micro-aggressions – "commonplace, interpersonally communicated, 'othering' messages related to a person's perceived marginalized status" (Nordmarken 2014, 129) – by the state officials. Instead, they are generally reserved for those occasions where the governmental machinery (in its broader conception), starts to encroach on the limited conditions of living the Khawaja Sira have carved out for themselves.

When many Khawaja Sira were being detained because of the Beggar's rehabilitation program of the Social Welfare Department (SWD), the new leadership of the Khawaja Sira coordinated and took out a protest rally in front of the offices of the SWD in which hundreds of Khawaja Sira participated. According to Saima, who played a key part in organizing the protest, when they refused to end their protest, eventually the SWD had to send out a representative to hold talks with them who was confronted by a barrage of questions. As Saima recalled:

> *We asked him, 'Where are our other rights? What about our quotas in jobs [as declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan]? What happens to the money that you take from us? … If we don't beg what do we do?'*

Eventually, the government acceded to the demands of the Khawaja Sira and according to the supervisor of the Beggar's Home, she was directed not to detain the Khawaja Sira on the pretext of begging anymore.

Such protests also provide Khawaja Sira the opportunity to show their large number and group solidarity. Consider the following conversation between Saima and Farzana:

Saima: They don't arrest us anymore. We took out a [protest] rally. So they don't arrest us anymore.

Farzana: No no madam! they are very strict in our area at Raiwind [and are still arresting the Khawaja Sira for begging].

Saima: If they detain any of you, just call me immediately. But [when you do], they [other Khawaja Sira activists] will complain that you didn't come to the rally [so you don't deserve our support] … [uneasy pause] … [if any other Khawaja Sira asks] just say we came to the rally. Do call me if you are in trouble.

The conversation between Saima and Farzana, who had been recently captured by the Beggar's rehabilitation program, also shows how group identity can be synonymous with active membership when it comes to issues related to mobility and access to public spaces. It is so because the rising new leadership of the Khawaja Sira community behave less like the traditional Gurus and more like activist leaders for whom active participation is mandatory to ensure group membership and the protection it offers.

Discussion

In this chapter, I discussed the different strategies used by the Khawaja Sira in their interaction with the frontline workers. Figure 2 provides a summary of these strategies. At the individual level, Khawaja Sira most resort to compliance or atypical strategies. By employing tangential subversions and acts of resistance, the Khawaja Sira live "to fight another day" (Butz 2002) against the hyper-surveilling normalizing social

277

order. As I discussed above, most acts of resistance are individual and only result in a temporary reconfiguration of local relations of power enabling the Khawaja Sira to frustrate the dominant social order. While beneficial to the Khawaja Sira in the short-term, such strategies result in minimal changes in the larger socio-political order. Social capital based strategies often enable the Khawaja Sira to negotiate with the frontline workers to avoid excessive surveillance or to accomplish their short-term tasks related to the state. However, social capital based strategies require the Khawaja Sira to be "connected" to the social network of cis-gendered state actors in one form or another continuing their dependence of on their cis-gendered families or friends. Collective resistance, while being the most uncommon form of resistance, generally takes the form of direct confrontation and is important not just for highlighting discriminatory policies against the Khawaja Sira but also for fostering a collective group identity.

UNIT OF RESISTANCE

Individual   Social Capital based   Collective

Submission/   At an angle: Negotiate   Direct
Compliance   Frustrate & live to   Confrontation
                     fight another day

RESISTANTCE STRATEGIES

Figure 2: Strategies Adopted by the Khawaja Sira in their Interactions with Frontline Workers. *Notes:* The width of the arrow indicates the likely frequency of adoption of different strategies. The darker shade of the arrow reflects instances where the personal and/or group level goals of the Khawaja Sira are likely to be achieved.

However, it is important to mention again that these examples of resistance and subversion shouldn't discount the Khawaja Sira's asymmetrical relations of power vis-à-vis the frontline workers of government and their overall social marginalization; such encounters are not always the norm and contestations are not always successful. Overall, the key insights from individual strategies of contestation can be summarized as following:

> The idea of emphasizing the oppositional power and agency of the relatively powerless highlights how survival, making do, invisibility, secrecy, passive resistance, and so on, function tactically as ways of making space within this imposed order. Whereas strategies are able to take and hold ground, and define their own place, tactics are opportunistic and momentary, and isolated actions or events. (Dudgeon and Fielder 2006, 399).

That is why, the emerging new leadership of the Khawaja Sira holds much promise in changing this pattern of local contestation. The new leadership of the Khawaja Sira is playing an instrumental role in enabling emergence of new forms of resistance based on social capital and collective protests. The social capital based contestation enables the Khawaja Sira to tap into the relational networks of the new Khawaja Sira leadership thereby providing new modes of resistance to the individual Khawaja Sira who do not have any social connections with family, politicians or frontline workers. It is, however, collective forms of resistance that hold the most potential in enabling broader more long-term changes in the socio-political marginalization of the Khawaja Sira. It is too early to assess the degree to which such collective contestations will be successful, but the experience with the Beggar's rehabilitation program suggests that such contestations can be more effective than individual contestations in the long-term.

Related to PA praxis, the multiple discourses and positions of frontline workers discussed in this chapter are also significant as they indicate various ways in which the gender management policies are interpreted and managed by the frontline workers. This heterogeneity in frontline practice opens up new possibilities for the Khawaja Sira highlighting the significance of frontline discretion in enabling or constraining opportunities for resistance for marginalized groups. For example, in Naghma and Neeli's cases, frontline workers acting as citizen agents (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003) played an important role in frustrating the gender policing by their peers and helped create spaces of flexibility for the Khawaja Sira. Here I find the metaphor of "third-space" helpful as it enables a movement away from the binary of resigned submission and direct confrontation (Carroll 2012). As in Naghma and Neeli's cases, if the frontline workers are willing to listen to the personal history and perspective of the marginalized individuals (McSwite 2003), they can work together with the citizens to move away from the strict compliance-disobedience binary.

Moreover, it is also important to note the heterogeneity across different frontline organizations in terms of the nature of administrator-Khawaja Sira interactions. The historic contingencies, path dependencies and socio-political context play an important role in determining the nature of administrator-citizen interactions within various frontline organizations. For example, when it comes to their interaction with police, most Khawaja Sira narratives present a relationship of fear and avoidance. Hence, the interactions with frontline workers of police often offer little opportunities for negotiation or contestation as the threat of detention, fine or harassment always looms large. On the other hand, in case of NADRA which is a recently established institution, even though

the asymmetric relations of power are still the norm, there is much less degree of fear associated with administrator-Khawaja Sira interactions because the threat of violence or detention is not present. Resultantly, such encounters occasionally provide the Khawaja Sira the opportunity to contest the gender related norms in a less confrontational manner.

CHAPTER 10

IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NEW DIRECTIONS

> Governing must be good for those who have been reduced to nothing and hominis
> sacres, stripped of all symbolic belonging. (Catlaw 2007, 198)

The problem statement with which I started this dissertation (and this research

project in general) was to investigate the multiple ways in which practices of government

intersect with the lives of marginalized groups to influence social inequity. The different

chapters of this dissertation, were explorations of this main theme based on my field

research: Section 1 focused on the role of disciplinary discourses on subject formation in

informal institutions, section 2 on legal citizenship of the Khawaja Sira and section 3 on

administrator-citizen interactions. On the central theme of understanding the relationship

between equity for marginalized groups and public administration practice, my research

provides the following insights. First, my research shows that the actions of courts and

frontline workers in public agencies can reinforce social marginalization by acting on the

dominant social constructions of marginalized groups. Moreover, my work highlights that

discriminatory frontline practice – in being informed by long term social biases against

socially marginalized groups – can limit the positive influences of changes in the legal

status of such groups, at least in the short term. For my research participants, the

discrimination faced during the course of everyday lives in their interactions with

frontline workers was much more important in terms of their perception of inclusion in

society as compared to any changes in their legal status. These findings not only highlight

the limitations of law based approaches towards social equity but also point to the central

role public administration plays in achieving social equity related ideals. Without

introducing meaningful changes in frontline practice to complement legally inclusive

measures, social equity cannot be achieved.

Second, my research shows that public administration must concern itself with a

meaningful engagement with the marginalized groups it seeks to include in the larger

society. Without a comprehensive understanding of the heterogeneity in the genealogy

and experiences of marginalized groups, it is difficult to understand the consequences of

their marginalization or to design meaningful policies to ameliorate such consequences.

Finally, my research highlights that an important way in which government

intersects with the lives of marginalized groups is through various forms of disciplinary

discourses and practices within informal institutions. For the Khawaja Sira, their families

and the Khawaja Sira community play an important role in the way they think about

themselves as members of society. By limiting their expectations, influencing their

subjectivity and encouraging self-governance, these informal institutions are important

sites of governance. Without a theoretical and empirical focus within PA research on

understanding government through informal institutions, social equity related agendas

cannot be achieved.

While I have discussed some important theoretical implications of my research in

the individual chapters of the dissertation, in this chapter, I return to my problem

statement to summarize important theoretical contributions of my research and discuss

important practical implications about the overall role of government and public

administration in the lives of the Khawaja Sira. Such a discussion is warranted because

there are some underlying themes (like bureaucratic behavior and PA framing of

marginalized groups) that cut across the difference sections of my dissertation and require

an integrative discussion to highlight the overall relationship between government and the Khawaja Sira. However, before I discuss the theoretical contributions of my research, I provide a brief summary of key insights on my research questions below:

Q1. *What is the self-identity of Khawaja Sira of Lahore, Pakistan? What are some of the internal heterogeneities among them?*

My research highlights that individuals with heterogeneous origins self-identify as Khawaja Sira. As I discussed in chapter 2 and 3, biological males with a preference for the feminine gender, individuals with ambiguous genitalia, children who were raped, impotent individuals, and others can all self-identify as a Khawaja Sira. Moreover, the Khawaja Sira live gender fluid lives taking different gender roles in different situations and at different points of their lives. Instead, of defining or categorizing them as having a particular self-identity, the best way to understand them is to acknowledge their gender fluidity.

Q2: Did formal recognition by the state result in any (material or symbolic) perceived change in the lived experiences and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira?

A static gender categorization system cannot take into account the gender fluid lives of the Khawaja Sira. There is limited symbolic benefit of the creation of third gender category for the Khawaja Sira who do not need a legal identity for the social recognition of their unique gender identity. More importantly, the creation of this gender category was not associated with any redistributive measures to improve social and economic inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. So, there are limited material benefits of registering as third gendered individuals. On the other hand, there are comparatively more material benefits of registering as a man in the socio-legal system of Pakistan.

284

Moreover, socio-religious stigma and high compliance costs dissuade the Khawaja Sira from registering under the third-gender category. Overall, there has been limited change in the lives of the Khawaja Sira due to their legal recognition which is exemplified by the decision of most Khawaja Sira to forego the legal third gender and continuing to register as men.

Q3: Which social institutions are important for the daily lives and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira? How do these institutions intersect with the identity, citizenship and agency of the Khawaja Sira?

In childhood, family and peers generally represent the most significant social institution for the Khawaja Sira. The Khawaja Sira are exposed to a variety of normalizing disciplinary measures within these institutions. Eventually, most Khawaja Sira end up leaving their families and join the Khawaja Sira counterpublic. The Khawaja Sira counterpublic acts as a structure of care for the individuals joining the community. However, homogenizing discourses within the Khawaja Sira community ensure that most of its members conform to the norms and roles traditionally associated with the Khawaja Sira. Due to limited job opportunities, illiteracy and social isolation most Khawaja Sira do not vote, have a formal job or participate in the dominant public sphere like the cis-gendered individuals. The Khawaja Sira also experience higher administrative burden in getting a legal ID due to limited cooperation from their family.

Q4a: What is the attitude of front-line government workers towards the Khawaja Sira?

Q4b: How do interactions with front-line government workers influence social[91] and self-identity of the Khawaja Sira?

The Khawaja Sira-frontline worker interaction represents an important aspect of their intersection with the government. By engaging in hyper-surveillance, moral policing and selective implementation of laws, some frontline workers limit the everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira. Some frontline workers of police have developed the archetype of the hypersexual Khawaja Sira who is a moral pollutant that governs their interactions with the Khawaja Sira in urban public places. The frontline workers of NADRA also contribute to the high administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting a legal ID. However, most administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting IDs is of a social nature; resulting from limited cooperation and normalizing pressures from family members. The social welfare department through its recent Beggar's Rehabilitation Program – where the Khawaja Sira begging in urban public space are detained in a Beggar's Home – also limits the opportunity to make a living for the Khawaja Sira. The Khawaja Sira are not always passive actors in Khawaja Sira-frontline worker interactions. Instead, they have devised various individual and group level tactics through which they try to frustrate the normalizing pressures of government in their interactions with frontline workers.

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[91] Social identity is defined as an "that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership" (Tajfel 1982, 24).

Theoretical Contributions

First, my research makes multiple contributions to the emerging scholarship on administrative burden (Heinrich 2016; Herd 2015; Moynihan, Herd and Harvey 2014). My research highlights the critical importance of differentiating between official and social administrative burdens. Doing so not only limits the tendency to ascribe administrative burden primarily to state and government officials but can also help design better rules and policies to rectify the different types of burdens based on their origin. Moreover, my analysis also highlights that marginalized communities can experience a higher official administrative burden even in the presence of seemingly neutral rules and policies due to the discriminatory behavior of some frontline workers and other clients in frontline offices of the government. Furthermore, responding to the call by Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2014) and Heinrich (2016) for better understanding of the role of third-parties play in influencing administrative burden, my research shows highlights different ways in which third-parties affect administrative burden experienced by marginalized groups. My analysis also points to the importance of analyzing citizen-citizen interactions in frontline organizations, something often ignored in previous research on frontline organizations. As I discuss in chapter 7, the behavior of other applicants in frontline organizations often contributes to higher degree of social marginalization experienced by some individuals in frontline organizations. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations can reduce administrative burden by reducing the psychological and learning costs experienced by the marginalized publics in their interaction with the state. This is also the first research study to empirically examine the administrative burden experienced by gender queer individuals within developing countries and highlights that

such individuals experience moral policing by some frontline workers which increases the psychological costs associated with accessing state services. My research also contributes to the limited scholarship (Heinrich 2016) on administrative burden within non-western developing world context.

Second, limited access to urban public space for marginalized groups continues to remain an understudied theme in citizenship research in public administration. My research contributes to this line of research by introducing and empirically analyzing the concept of everyday citizenship which is conceptualized as the inalienable, equal right of every citizen to be present, visible, and mobile in the public spaces in a given territory. My discussion highlights that through selective implementation of law, hyper-surveillance and moral policing, some frontline workers can contribute to curtailing the everyday citizenship of marginalized social groups. Furthermore, my research shows that the intersectional marginality of the Khawaja Sira along identity axes of gender, capital and literacy play an important role in augmenting their limited access to public sphere.

Third, my research extends the limited empirical PA scholarship (e.g., Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014; Soss 2000) that specifically focuses on experiences of the marginalized publics in citizen-state interactions. More specifically, while there is considerable literature on the coping strategies used by PA practitioners in response to administrative burden associated with administrator-citizen interactions (e.g., Lipsky 1980; Kelly 1994; Nielson 2006; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003), there has been little research on the different strategies employed by the publics to reduce the administrative burden experienced by them. My research addresses this important research gap in PA research by providing a context specific empirical analysis of the

different strategies employed by the Khawaja Sira to contest the hyper-surveillance and moral policing by some frontline workers. Moreover, my discussion highlights that some frontline organizations can also act as third-spaces where meaning making interactions between frontline workers and the marginalized individuals can take place.

Relatedly, a comprehensive inquiry of administrator-citizen interactions and their influence on social inequity requires in-depth qualitative inquiry because some of the socio-psychological aspects of the experience of marginalization associated with such interactions will likely remain unexplored otherwise. Using person-centered ethnography, my research contributes to a better understanding of the way social context and intersection of multiple social markers such as class and gender influence administrator-citizen interactions.

Fourth, Catlaw (2007) called for a comprehensive "politics of the subject" in PA research that is not limited to analyses within formal administrative spaces and institutions but also takes into account experiences of marginalized publics within informal spaces and institutions as they significantly contribute to the overall experience of government for marginalized individuals. My research underscores the importance of analyzing the subject formation and unique experiences of marginalized individuals within extra-administrative spaces for social equity ideals. As the discussion in chapter 6 and 7 highlights, it is important for public administrators to be cognizant of the multiple internal discourses of marginalized communities. Lack of such an understanding can limit participation in government programs and also inadvertently augment the administrative burden experienced by such individuals. For example, without understanding gender fluidity and religious subjectivity of the Khawaja Sira, it is not possible to understand the

Khawaja Sira's decision to register as men. Similarly, without understanding their uneasy relationship with family, the disproportionate compliance costs experienced by the Khawaja Sira in getting legal IDs can neither be understood nor rectified.

Fifth, in the context of social equity scholarship in PA and legal citizenship research on gender queer groups (Monro 2005; Spade 2008, 2015), my research highlights multiple potential problems associated with recognition base initiatives for social inclusion of marginalized groups. For example, my discussion in chapter 6 shows that the static gender categorization schemas of the government cannot take into account the gender fluid lives of the Khawaja Sira. Moreover, my discussion in chapter 4 also highlights that the state institutions can inadvertently legalize the division between authentic and unauthentic marginalized groups which has important implications for the individuals whose marginalized is deemed to be unauthentic. As I discussed in chapter 4, the biological framing of the Khawaja Sira identity by the Supreme Court of Pakistan resulted in the Zenanay being deemed unauthentic Khawaja Sira.

Finally, Catlaw (2007) argues that professional public administration as a boundary making apparatus has an important role in the management of individuals who fall between the lines of disciplinary categorization schemas of society. This observation is echoed by Patterson (2001) who argues that it is often left to the public administrators to deal with the individuals discarded or thrown away by the society. Extending the primarily discursive approach of these authors, in this dissertation I have shown, through a context-specific empirical analysis, that public administration as a boundary making and sustaining apparatus, is deeply implicated in the bio-political processes running through margins of the state by which some bodies are moved towards "emergent

possibilities" while others are consigned to decreased life opportunities (Stryker 2014, 41). These findings have important implications for public administration praxis which I discuss in the next section.

Practical Implications

Following Farmer (2003) and Berger and Luckmann (1967), I divide the practical implications and recommendations from my research into different levels of analysis. The first set of recommendations is at the transparent level of analysis and highlights the instrumental ways in which the social inclusion and citizenship of the Khawaja Sira can be improved. The second set of implications operates at the symbolic level of analysis (Farmer 2003; Berger and Luckmann 1967). The symbolic level of analysis concerns a discussion of the underlying "interrelated, powerful, and implicit beliefs or attitudes" on which the transparent level practices and policies are based. The symbolic level implications include a discussion of both the *disciplinary symbolic* – concerning disciplinary discourses like hyper-sexuality, deviance and biological masculinity associated with Khawaja Sira identity – and *cloacal symbolic* – the role of PA in sanitizing, civilizing or "bathing" the public sphere (Farmer 2003). The inclusion of symbolic level implications is warranted because as McSwite (2003, 186) note,

> The mistake of seeking social change through protest or direct action is that when such activities are directed against the (easy) targets available at the level of categories …, folk theories …, or institutional theories, the effect is inevitably to activate the symbolic universe all the more and thereby fuel a conserving response. Given this, even when "real" change, such as new law, is created, it frequently functions in a conservative fashion. If racial prejudice is traditional to a society and has gained a place in the symbolic universe, it is not going to be rooted out simply through the device of changing law or other institutional norms.

It is also important to mention that in line with my interpretive approach, these implications and recommendations are primarily local in nature and are informed by my research context.

Transparent Level Implications

In this section, I discuss the instrumental policy and behavioral changes that can improve the social inclusion and everyday citizenship of the Khawaja Sira. These recommendations are written with local policy makers in mind as I hope to share some of these with the relevant organizational leadership. This list of policy recommendations is by no means exhaustive and should be considered as a list of initial steps towards a long journey towards social equity for the Khawaja Sira.

Administrative Burden

First, in the NADRA frontline offices, Friday is designated as "woman applicants only" day; only women can apply for legal IDs on that day. It not only enables women to avoid the long waiting lines during normal days but also enable them to feel more comfortable in the otherwise cramped spaces of the NADRA frontline offices. As things stand now, the Khawaja Sira cannot go to the NADRA frontline offices on the days designated for women for the obvious reason that they either register as men or as third gender individuals. A simple, yet effective, way to reduce many aspects of the administrative burden experienced by the Khawaja Sira in the frontline offices of NADRA is to either allocate a separate day when only Khawaja Sira applicants can come to the NADRA frontline offices. However, if that is not possible, considering that not many Khawaja Sira go to NADRA frontline offices on a given day, another strategy could be to designate particular time slots for Khawaja Sira applicants only. This would

reduce the administrative burden arising from citizen-citizen interactions and the long lines at frontline offices. In addition, it will likely help the family members of the Khawaja Sira co-operate more frequently in terms of verification requirements as they will not be "exposed" in front of other cis-gendered individuals. Yet another strategy could be to designate special branches for Khawaja Sira clients where the frontline workers are better trained or selected to handle the specific needs of the Khawaja Sira.

Second, lack of clarity and myths about various aspects of ID provision and legal gender continue to increase the administrative burden for the Khawaja Sira in getting legal IDs and their legal gender selection. There needs to be a concerted effort from NADRA to communicate the details of relevant policies related to ID provision and gender selection to the Khawaja Sira community. An effective way to do that is to engage with the leadership of the Khawaja Sira community and organize focused sessions with them to brief them about the various aspects of policies related to ID provision in general and legal gender in particular. There should be a particular focus on dispelling the myth that choosing the third gender category also requires the Khawaja Sira to have the name of their Guru on the ID in place of their parents. Relatedly, it is important to educate the frontline workers at the help desks of frontline offices (and the telephonic helpline) of NADRA about the policies specific to the Khawaja Sira.

Third, there needs to have increased transparency about the official rules related to ID provision and gender selection in general. For me, a surprising finding during my fieldwork was that NADRA does not share its standing operating procedures (SOPs) related to ID provision with the general public. I also asked this question from four frontline workers of NADRA, all of whom mentioned that while they had access to

293

SOPs, they couldn't share them with me. While I was later able to procure a copy of part of the SOPs through other personal contacts, it represents the degree of opacity regarding rules related to ID provisions. Making these SOPs publically available will not only reduce administrative burden associated with ID provision but will also make it easier for the applicants to contest any arbitrary demands from the frontline staff.

Fourth, NADRA amending the decision to require a medical certificate for changing one's gender, a requirement which continues to limit the utility of the third gender category for the Khawaja Sira, can be a useful step in reducing the official burden associated with the third gender.

Finally, local NGOs can play a significant role in reducing the administrative burden associated with getting a legal ID. Increasing collaborative sessions with NGOs for ID provision (as discussed in chapter 7) is another effective strategy to limit the administrative burden associated with ID provision. Such initiatives should be expanded to other cities as there is a lot of potential in limiting the administrative burden associated with getting a legal ID this way. The NGOs an also help in reducing the learning costs associated with the provision of a ID by disseminating the relevant information to their Khawaja Sira clients.

Citizenship and Inclusion

First, there is a need to differentiate between different forms of begging. As I mentioned in chapter 8, most Khawaja Sira still do not beg on traffic signals and claim that most individuals begging on the traffic signals are charlatans pretending to be Khawaja Sira. The Khawaja Sira instead go from house to house and ask for money which is one of their traditional sources of income. They have been doing this for

centuries. This activity, which represents the last source of income for most Khawaja Sira, should not be outlawed. A possible objection to this recommendation would be that those individuals pretending begging like the Khawaja Sira on traffic signals can also start going from home to home if they know the government is not stopping the Khawaja Sira from doing that. However, as I mentioned in chapter 4, the Khawaja Sira are very protective of the jurisdictional boundaries of the areas in which they can collect money and can likely make sure that such a thing doesn't happen. Moreover, residents of an area generally know the Khawaja Sira who collect money from their area because they have been coming regularly to their places for many years. This will minimize the number of individuals other than the Khawaja Sira taking advantage of this relaxation.

At a more macro-level, perhaps there is a need to reconsider the social attitude towards begging in public places and the sanitized nature of the public sphere. When there are broader socio-economic biases preventing certain sections of society from earning a living through traditional modes of income, a case can be made for such individuals to be allowed to collect money from their more affluent fellow citizens, especially when such individuals are not enrolled in any income welfare programs of the government.

Second, as Monro (2005) argues in the context of queer citizenship, a better way to conceptualize the legibility demands of the state is to have alternative ways of identity verification like biometric identification instead of focusing on gender and/or sex. While that is presently not possible in Pakistan considering the segregated nature of society and the special quotas in place for individuals of different gender for jobs and admission in educational institutions, it is a good ideal to ultimately strive towards.

295

Third, in addition to symbolic inclusion, there needs to be a meaningful focus on reducing the economic marginalization of the Khawaja Sira. Many Khawaja Sira want the government to help them make their ends meet by providing either a monthly sustenance allowance of some sort or by providing some jobs. While the government has some social welfare programs for the very poor sections of society (like the Benazir Income Support Program which provides a monthly stipend to the very poor), the Khawaja Sira are seldom included in such initiatives. None of my research participants was enrolled in such a program despite extreme poverty in some cases. Since enrollment in such programs is often dependent upon political affiliations in Pakistan, this is partly due to the limited political capital of the Khawaja Sira who owing to limited civic participation and lack of IDs often do not vote in the local elections. Inclusion in such programs is an easy and effective first step towards material inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. NGOs working with the Khawaja Sira can be helpful in identifying the very poor and/or old Khawaja Sira in this regard.

However, the issue of jobs is not straightforward. As I mentioned at different points in dissertation, the traditional sources of income for the Khawaja Sira are drying up because of neoliberalism and security related developments. Most of the Khawaja Sira are illiterate and, it is not clear how the state can provide them jobs that would be appropriate for them. More importantly, even the Khawaja Sira that are literate end up leaving their jobs because of harassment, micro-aggressions and hyper-surveillance at their jobs. Another important factor is what I would call for the lack of a better word "imperfect subject formation"; the contemporary workplace considers subject formation in the ideological state apparatuses for granted. It is in within these institutions that the

future generations are socialized into the habits, rules, and norms of the workplace. Most Khawaja Sira don't experience that. That is why, some of them find it difficult to follow the seemingly arbitrary time constraints of a daily job. As one manager who had experience of supervising Khawaja Sira employees noted:

They [the Khawaja Sira] initially find it difficult to adjust to the workplace because they have no experience in institutions. They have lived their lives without rules and regulations and are used to following their heart. That is why, they don't stay in a job for long. However, [in my experience] those who end up staying are excellent employees.

Similarly, one of my research participants who is also a Khawaja Sira rights advocate mentioned the following:

The Khawaja Sira don't follow time. Even if they are being given a stipend, they don't come on time. I have to arrange transportation for them and then ask them again and again to make sure that they turn up to receive their stipend. They are used to living as they want. The night time is their morning.

I spent quite some time during my fieldwork thinking about the issue of material inclusion of the Khawaja Sira. I informally discussed this issue with many individuals from different walks of life and also met some individuals who work for the welfare of the marginalized sections of society to discuss with them ways to improve the socio-economic status of the Khawaja Sira. The most common denominator in such meetings was that every social rights entrepreneur has his or her own "vision" about the socio-economic inclusion of the Khawaja Sira which almost always requires the Khawaja Sira to leave singing and dancing to pursue something more "respectable"; an option which is

297

mostly not acceptable to the Khawaja Sira who often leave their families for precisely the same reason[92]. Perhaps more importantly, there is a lack of long-term focus in such "visions." That is also why, the Khawaja Sira have an ambivalent attitude of the Khawaja Sira towards NGOs with special programs for the Khawaja Sira welfare. While some of my research participants were appreciative of the efforts of a local NGO that was giving them monthly stipends, there was a lot of distrust among others. For example, some of my research participants were of the opinion that the NGOs take money in the name of Khawaja Sira from the foreign donors and spend only a small share on the Khawaja Sira.

Another concern was related to the short-term focus of most NGO projects. For example, a couple of my research participants had participated in a short term vocational training program funded by an NGO. However, due to the short term focus and limited work related opportunities, there proved to be limited utility of that training. They see those trainings as lost time that could have been spent on earning some money through other ways. Therefore, initiatives aimed towards material inclusion of the Khawaja Sira should be carefully planned and have a long term focus.

Finally, housing was a major concern for many of my research participants. A combination of poverty and lack of availability of cheap housing in Lahore results in most Khawaja Sira living in one room rented places where 2-4 Khawaja Sira reside. Some Khawaja Sira don't have even that luxury and live in temporary huts. One of my research participants used to live with no roof over her head. She had a bed (charpai) next

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[92] There was one activist who arranged a meeting with Salma and asked her about the different ways in which the Khawaja Sira community can be included in the society. However, even that meeting resulted in little progress as the rights activist seemed more interested in political capital than material progress in the long run.

to a railway line and some plastic hanging over head between two trees that provided some help in case of rain. She used to spend her entire day at that bed because she had recently become partially blind and that was the only place her relatives could find for her (her relative's home was nearby). Considering their housing predicament, having their own house is a big dream for the Khawaja Sira:

> *We only want the government to give us a room to live in. They can even keep the ownership but we should have a room where we can live and die and peace. Or give us some room rent allowance so that we can live separately in a room. They can even ask us to do some job for a few hours in return. We will try our best to do that despite any age or health related weakness. But we should be allowed to live free. We should be allowed to live the way we want in our places. We don't ask anyone to care for us. After all, one has to spend whatever life we are given somehow.*

> *The government should create a separate housing scheme for us where we have small houses (marla derh marla) ... where our living is separate from everyone else where either we disturb everyone else nor they disturb us.*

Bureaucratic behavior

The moral policing and hyper-surveillance of the Khawaja Sira are constructions of the frontline workers not inscribed in law. While law plays a part in the marginalization of the Khawaja Sira, ultimately it is the realized public policy and the attitude of the frontline workers that often ends up being more important for the Khawaja Sira than their formal legal marginalization. That is why it is important that the frontline

workers of various departments be educated about the unique identity and requirements of the Khawaja Sira and other marginalized sections of society.

The conceptualization of public administration as primarily a boundary making apparatus in society warrants an increasingly self-reflexive approach by the frontline workers. Self-reflexivity implies, first and foremost, recognition of the multiple ways in which public administration influences the lives and choices of marginalized publics. This is similar in spirit to the Frederickson's compensatory ethic I discussed in chapter 8. Moreover, a reflexive consciousness has to be cognizant not just of the transparent but also the disciplinary and cloacal levels of administrative discourses and their consequences for persistent social and economic inequity. As Barad (2007, 178) notes:

> We are responsible for the cuts that we help enact not because we do the choosing (neither do we escape responsibility because "we" are "chosen" by them), but because we are an agential part of the material becoming of the universe. Cuts are agentially enacted not by willful individuals but by the larger material arrangement of which "we" are a "part." The cuts that we participate in enacting matter. Indeed, ethics cannot be about responding to the other as if the other is the radical outside to the self. Ethics is not a geometrical calculation; "others" are never very far from "us"; "they" and "we" are co-constituted and entangled through the very cuts "we" help to enact.

Before this project started, I had limited idea of the extent to which the Khawaja Sira lives are influenced by aspects of public administration praxis like administrative burden, selective implementation of law, and hyper-surveillance. My informal conversations with public officials and the cis-gendered publics suggest that I was not alone in having a limited understanding of the Khawaja Sira. As a cis-gendered individual is unlikely to interact with a Khawaja Sira (except as a beggar or dancer), there is hardly any conversation that happens between such individuals. Combined with the

limited visibility and access to the public sphere for the mostly illiterate Khawaja Sira, the stereotypical narratives about them continue to dominate the public imagination. While I hesitate to generalize, frequent meaningful interactions are one way to start developing the kind of compensatory ethic Frederickson and Barad have in mind. A simple yet effective way to achieve that is to have interactions with Khawaja Sira and other marginalized groups as a part of the training of different levels of public administration professionals. Reading about someone and actually meeting that person in person are two completely different things and the focus should be on actual interaction rather than simplistic focus on "teaching" or reading about something.

From the perspective of the Khawaja Sira, it is also imperative to recognize that given this view of the entangled nature of intra-actions, the process of contestation, and resistance to the status quo has to start in local-intra-actions. Instead of a great refusal, strategic micro-contestations that enact changes in the local configuration of power relations can perhaps achieve a better outcome in the long run. For example, resisting a particular technique of power (like the Beggar's rehabilitation program) instead of opening multiple fronts at the same time against different governmental departments is likely to be a more successful strategy for the Khawaja Sira. While these changes might seem insignificant in the short-term, due to the entangled nature of different apparatuses in society, such marginal changes have the potential to effect long term changes in the whole assemblage we call the state.

Informal Institutions

As I discussed in section 1, extra-administrative spaces continue to influence the administrative behaviors and experiences and it would be naïve to expect a complete

disconnect between the two. So, institutional measures should be accompanied with steps aimed at improving the overall social attitude towards the Khawaja Sira. For example, teaching the future generation through media and schools that the Khawaja Sira are also humans like all of us might be a useful step in the right direction. Such educational material should be designed after consultation with the Khawaja Sira to minimize stereotypical presentation of their identity and performativity. Moreover, there is a need for public awareness campaigns through print and electronic media, like the ones launched in recent years about family planning, polio eradication and AIDS prevention in Pakistan, about the social stigmatization of the Khawaja Sira and to communicate that gender identity is very much a personal choice for every individual who should be able to exercise it without fear of victimization. Moreover, there is a need to develop openness and freedom to talk about issues related to rape, genital dysphoria, and impotence so no individual gets socially defined as imperfect man due to treatable conditions or social myths.

There is also a need to train medical professionals, especially mid-wives, lady health workers and gynecologists in proper counselling for children born with ambiguous genitalia or children who have problems related to development of secondary sex characteristics around adolescence. Long-term engagement with parents of such children should be established through the lady health workers program[93] or the local medical professionals who should keep guiding the parents regularly. According to my informal conversations with some colleagues in the medical profession, many such problems are

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[93] Lady health workers in Pakistan go from house to house to communicate and implement public helath programs (e.g., related to family planning).

treatable with advances in medical science and stigmatization of such individuals can be eliminated through proper counselling and treatment. Relatedly, there is a need to provide psychological counselling services to adolescent individuals grappling with issues related to their gender and/or sexual identity. Such counsellors should be properly trained and should provide guidance that is not based on social or religious stigma associated with such individuals. Such training should also be provided to school teachers to make sure that they do not contribute to the marginalization of Khawaja Sira children in schools.

I understand that some of these recommendations might seem more like a wish-list given the present socio-religious milieu of Pakistan and perhaps at some level that is indeed the case. Ultimately, this is a long-term endeavor with no simplistic short-term solutions. Deep seated historical, social and religious biases are responsible for the stigmatization of the Khawaja Sira. It is only with long-term concerted efforts that their social stigmatization and isolation can be addressed.

Disciplinary Symbolic Implications

As Berger and Luckman (1967) argue, the transparent level of society is held together by an underlying "symbolic universe." This symbolic universe consists of explicit and implicit taken for granted attitudes or perspectives towards different institutions and sections of society. These symbols "function as commonsense, axiomatic descriptors of reality" (McSwite 2003, 186) and maintain the status quo at the transparent level of society. That is why, along with transparent level changes, it is also important that changes in the social and academic framing of professional public administration and the Khawaja Sira also takes place.

It is important to be cognizant of the potential pitfalls of a simplistic thinking about the relationship between a self-reflexive public administration and the marginalized publics that I mentioned above. Self-reflexivity without fundamental re-thinking of the foundations of administrator-state relationship will not achieve much as the "commonly accepted practices and institutions continue to believe" (Catlaw 2007, 98) in the status quo for the self-reflexive public administrator. As the discussion in this dissertation highlights, the Khawaja Sira are considered to occupy a lower moral, legal, and social hierarchical position by the different sections of society including some frontline workers. Such a symbolic framing presents a paternalistic view of the state where the (public and private) administrators and frontline workers know what is best for the Khawaja Sira and aim to include them in the status quo as they deem appropriate. Unless this symbolic framing of the Khawaja Sira is changed, transparent level initiatives aimed at better inclusion of the publics are likely to yield limited results.

Following Fox (2003), I am hesitant of a symbolic framing of co-production (as conceptualized in PA at present) to characterize the administrator-Khawaja Sira relationship. The ideal in such a framing is generally to include marginalized individuals in the governing order, as it exists today; and such a project, for a variety of ontological reasons is bound to fail (Catlaw 2007). More importantly, as I have noted in my work on public participation (Nisar 2015), the larger symbolic disciplinary framing of publics in public administration is premised on an assumption that publics occupy a "lower" position in the hierarchical administrative order. Such framing risks losing any transformational potential the marginalized publics might enjoy because it requires the counterpublics to "adapt themselves to the performatives of rational-critical discourse"

304

and "cede the original hope of transforming, not just policy, but the space of public life itself" (Warner 2002, 89).

That is why instead of the symbolic framing of co-production or participation, perhaps a better symbolic framing for the role of public administration in the lives of the Khawaja Sira is that of a "mid-wife" (Catlaw 2007). As Catlaw (2007) argues, this symbolic framing implies the attitude of public administrators as facilitators who help bring to fruition, ideas conceived by the publics. Perhaps more importantly, such a symbolic framing recognizes that public administrators do not have access to any perfect solutions to the various policy problems. In the present research context, such a symbolic framing would imply that the local administrators or NGO officials, instead of devising their own plans for the welfare of the Khawaja Sira engage with them and implement their solutions faithfully. If failures are inevitable in the path to better socio-economic inclusion for the Khawaja Sira, why not let the Khawaja Sira make those mistakes (and learn from them) instead of the administrators? This will not only address the problem of lack of long-term focus but also will likely result in better ownership and result of initiatives planned or recommended by the Khawaja Sira. Since the symbolic framing of public administration as a mid-wife also implies prevention of "false-births" (Catlaw 2007), it means that public administrators explain potential failures and the painful process of gradual learning to the Khawaja Sira. Furthermore, such a symbolic framing also requires a commitment to local solutions instead of broad generalizations. So while some broad instrumental efforts such as the ones outlined could be cautiously explored, the focus should be on implementing local pilot projects aimed at social inclusion of the Khawaja Sira, learning from them and moving on from there.

Finally, such a different symbolic framing of public administration may also require a fundamental re-orientation of the thing we call public administration. The thing we call public administration or, at a more macro-level, the state is being (re)produced on a daily basis by the entangled intra-actions between citizens and the state. A different symbolic orientation of public administration, as the one suggested here, will not only result in altered "others" but also a different public administration. That is also why, it is important not to foreclose, in advance, the possibilities or modalities of what such reconceptualization might mean for the citizen-state relationship. As Warner (2002, 123-124) notes,

> A queer public might be one that throws shade, prances, disses, acts up, carries on, longs, fantasizes, throws fits, mourns, "reads." To take such attributions of public agency seriously, however, we would need to inhabit a culture with a different language ideology, a different social imaginary. It is difficult to say what such a world would be like. It might need to be one with a different role for state-based thinking; as things stand now, it might be that the only way a public is able to act is through its imaginary coupling with the state.

Cloacal Level Implications

Another important symbolic implication of my work is to be cognizant of the negative role that public administration plays in the lives of marginalized individuals. Here, I echo Farmer (2003) who argues that it is important to contest the predominant framing of public administration as inherently positive, civilizing and sanitizing. There are multiple ways in which this underlying symbolic framing of public administration is sustained. For example, Fox (2003) argues that public administration researchers downplay the negative aspects of public administration and focus on the ones that are more positive. Similarly, the disproportionate street-level administrative burden experienced by the marginalized communities is often interpreted as being a result of few

306

isolated individuals and not the systematic biases in frontline organizations (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014)

However, as argued by multiple researchers (Fraser 1990; Catlaw 2007; Catlaw and Eagan 2016) and shown in chapter 8 of this dissertation, some frontline workers of government play an important role in sustaining the fantasy of a unified and sanitized public sphere by maintaining the boundaries between the visible and the invisible in society. The dominance over the public sphere was hard fought and the classes that have control over the public sphere don't want to let go of that control easily (Fraser 1990). One of the primary way to achieve this goal is by controlling access to public spaces and designating "onto groups who can serve as, so to speak, the surrogate dirt of a community, enabling the dominant group to feel clean and heavenly" (Nussbaum 2010, 7). Public administration plays an important role in carrying out this compulsion of the dominant interests in society to segregate themselves from those considered the Others (marginalized groups) (Morris 2015). This observation is echoed by Patterson (2001) who argues that it is often left to the public administrators to deal with the individuals discarded or thrown away by the society.

> When it comes to encounters with disgust, suffering, and other negative emotions, we pay and oblige" administrators to "take care of it." In some instances, we ask them to avert their eyes, and in others, to palliate, confront, or invent particular types of disgust. We want them to grapple with and regulate a plethora of disgusting people, acts, and situations, and to do so in particular ways. In turn, perhaps we have a responsibility to understand something of these complex emotions (Patterson 2001, 206).

The Beggars Rehabilitation Program, the hyper-surveillance by the police, the disproportionate administrative burden to get legal IDs, and the limits on legal citizenship are, to an extent, aspects of public administration praxis that are socially productive from

307

the perspective of dominant interests in society. These boundary-(re)creating practices ensure that the Khawaja Sira continue to live their lives as "wasted humans" (Bauman 2004) and that the normal publics don't have to see or hear about their misery most of the time. This ensures that that the "true horror of the situation" (Zizek 1997, 6) as it relates to social inequity and human waste remains hidden from the "normal" public and myth of a unified public sphere can be perpetuated.

As Catlaw (2007, 203) argues, "Public administration could be the site of the coming politics of the subject . . . But it must make the first move." Perhaps the first rectifying step in contesting the taken for grantedness of the civilizing nature of public administration would be to realize that "nothing is ever neutral" (Catlaw 2007). The façade of neutrality which hides the clear sides public administrators often take towards the status quo needs to be dismantled if public administration is to assume a different social position.

It is also important to note that the implications at instrumental level are also influenced by the symbolic level implications. For example, Catlaw and Eagan's (2016) observation about the framing of Occupy as primarily a problem of urban hygiene also points to the significance of another critical function of public administration; public administrators not only manage legibility and social ordering but also play an important role in framing problems and solutions related to social equity issues. As the example of Occupy suggests, framing a protest as primarily a public health or hygienic problem as compared to an ideological one, has important ramifications for how the protest will be socially perceived and its possible solutions. In the present context, as I discussed in chapter 8, some frontline workers portray and perceive the Khawaja Sira not as victims of

308

social categorization schemas but as moral pollutants and hyper-sexual deviants for the dominant public sphere. Resultantly, their solution to this problem focuses on moral cleansing and hyper-surveillance of the Khawaja Sira.

Limitations

While I have noted some limitations of my analysis in the different chapters of this dissertation and specifically detailed the limitations to my research design and methodology in chapter 2, in this section, I briefly discuss some limitations and possible critiques of my overall approach.

A possible critique to my analysis could be that due to its primary focus on the social margins, it isn't representative of the role of public administration at the proverbial center. I don't make any claims to the generalizability or representativeness of my research regarding the role of public administration vis-à-vis all sections of society because my methodology and research design was focused on a specific social margin in a specific context. However, I must say that, as Das and Poole (2004) argue, it is often at the margins that the dynamics taken for granted at the center are laid bare. While my discussion has focused on the citizen-state intersections at the margins, many underlying dynamics, especially the role of public administration as a boundary making apparatus, are likely to be the same at the so-called centers of the state and society. While there is some research to suggest that this is indeed the case (e.g., Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003; Hardy 2003; Yanow 2003), this is an empirical and context specific question which cannot be answered without further research.

Relatedly, in interpreting the various instrumental and symbolic implications and recommendations of this dissertation, the historical context of public administration in

Pakistan must be kept in mind. It is important because local social, historical, and legal discourses play a critical role in mediating how the symbolic and transparent role of public administration evolves in a society. As Catlaw (2007) has shown, there is a distinct genealogy of American public administration as an apparatus to manage the failures of the socio-political organization based on representation. In the case of Pakistan, my research setting, the colonial origin of public administration has to be kept in mind to understand in its relation to managing the marginalized publics. As noted by Alavi (1972) and Svensson (2013), the social position and power of public administrators remained largely unchanged from its colonial origins after formation of Pakistan in 1947. Before partition, public administration formed a critical part of the colonial government and comprised of mostly British citizens. For a variety of historical reasons, the locals joining the bureaucracy saw themselves as becoming part of the ruling elite and not representatives of their people (Svensson 2013). Those joining the ranks of their masters wanted to make sure that the other sections of society remained the proverbial slaves; how could becoming a master be worthwhile if there was not someone to rule? Resultantly, such emerging elites fashioned themselves in the same mold as their colonial masters; from education to mannerisms and routine lives, everything British was mimicked with great diligence. While these new elites tried to secure more rights for themselves, others who were not part of the bureaucracy were denied any privileged status. The civil-military bureaucracy continued its peculiar relation to the publics after formation of Pakistan; since the foreign colonial masters had gone, someone had to make sure that the civilizing and disciplinary business of the state continued (Alavi 1972). So, while the civilizing or bathing function of public administration, at least in the context

310

Pakistan, should also be interpreted in its literal connotation. While the Khawaja Sira represent a classic case of this civilizing nature of administration because of associated discourses of impurity, moral pollution, and debauchery, they are by no means the only example of groups exposed to the disciplinary imperatives of the human waste management system in Pakistan. However, I must also mention that many observations of Catlaw and Eagan (2016), Patterson (2001), Fox (2003) and Farmer (2003) about the civilizing nature of American public administration, also hold true for my research context; perhaps pointing to something fundamental about its role as a disciplining state science.

Another important point of clarification is to address an important critique of my interpretation of the role of public administration in the lives of the Khawaja Sira. Should public administration, as a profession, be judged by the acts of a few errant souls? Not all police officers engage in hyper-surveillance of the Khawaja Sira and not all teachers morally police the Khawaja Sira in educational institutions. Relatedly, another factor to consider in this regard is that of intentionality. How much intentionality can one ascribe to public administrators in their role as human waste managers? Is it done deliberately by them or is it an extension of the social discourses about the socially defined otherness of the Khawaja Sira? In the present context, while it is certainly true that an important reason for the moral policing of Khawaja Sira by some frontline workers is that they are cis-gendered individuals who carry their personal views about them to their workplace and have the power of the state behind them to implement those biases. As Oberfield (2014) and Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) note, there are group level discourses within frontline organizations that determine how the frontline workers interact with

311

clients from specific sections of society. What is deemed possible and normal versus what is frowned upon and discouraged in frontline organizations depends to a large degree on the valuation by one's peers (Brehm and Gate 1997; Sandfort 2000; Gofen 2014).

Moreover, while the social discourses play a part in influencing the frontline workers' behavior towards their clients, there are many social discourses that frontline workers learn to not follow while they are at work. A classic and mundane example is wearing Western clothes in Pakistan. While some individuals don't like wearing Western clothes due to associated social and religious stigma, all the officers of police and military wear western clothes as uniform in Pakistan because that is the norm and no deviance is accepted to such norms. Stated otherwise, it is the institutional norms that play a significant role in determining which social discourses the frontline workers can follow in their workplace. As Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Merkel (2014) show in their analysis of experiences of African American at police stops, the argument that the acts of a few police officers shouldn't be held against the whole police force or, at a more macro-level, the state, is flawed because it is often deep rooted institutionally biased material-discursive practices that are responsible for giving the public administration professionals the license to act on their flawed priorities. In addition, the reported and the acted out biased actions hide a much higher frequency of unreported and self-governed incidences of marginality (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Merkel 2014). Ultimately, my fieldwork and analysis lead me to agree with McSwite's (2003, 193) following interpretation of the relationship between individuals and the institutions they inhabit:

312

the authoritative actions of institutions are deeds done by people, but they are people who are "alienated into" institutions or constituted by them. This is why we refuse Eichmann's defense of himself as "just carrying out orders," but at the same time have difficulty generalizing our easy judgment of him into a universal rule. Institutions are like Ouija boards, given life by those who inhabit them and yet autonomously taking over the minds and bodies of those who follow their instructions.

Finally, I am also suggesting policy recommendations cautiously. While most of these recommendations are based on my fieldwork, they are limited and can potentially result in unwanted effects. They should, therefore, be followed with caution and authentic hesitation (Farmer 1999). For example, the legitimization of begging for Khawaja Sira will, in turn, also legitimize the jurisdictional divisions and the economic dependence of the Khawaja Sira on their Guru will continue. The other solution of the government assigning areas to Khawaja Sira is not better either as it will introduce unwanted government interference in the lives of the Khawaja Sira. Finding solutions to policy problems of such complex nature which involve an intersection of many social, religious, political, and administrative discourses is a gradual process that involves stumbling across inevitable failures to achieve an acceptable final solution.

I also do not claim to have represented all aspects of the lives of the Khawaja Sira. My fieldwork and discussion was informed by my particular problem statement and research questions. This was partly due to the fact that while previous researchers have highlighted many aspects of the Khawaja Sira lives, like their romantic relationships and inner organization (at least in India), there has been hardly any focused research on the intersections of the Khawaja Sira, public administration, and government. That is why, even in section-1, my discussion primarily focused on the theme of subject formation and its relation to the governing order in general and public administration in particular.

313

New Directions

My research also highlights important areas of future research to understand issues at the intersection of PA and marginalized groups. I briefly mention a few lines of inquiry that can carry on the work done in this research and contribute to better understanding of social equity footprint of PA practice.

First, my research highlights the significance of taking into account the social discourses and personal histories of marginalized individuals for meaningful engagement with such groups by PA professionals. Future research can explore this theme further to explore how these factors contribute to limited access to governmental services or increased administrative burden for marginalized groups in other socio-political contexts.

Second, research is also needed to empirically study and evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives which try to address the disproportionate administrative burden experienced by marginalized groups in accessing governmental services. For example, it would be interesting to see a comparison of women's experiences in the frontline offices of NADRA on women only Fridays versus other days to see whether they face less administrative burden on Fridays.

Third, there has been limited research on resistance strategies employed by marginalized groups in their interactions with frontline workers. Empirical work engaging with other groups facing selective implementation or hyper-surveillance by frontline workers can highlight how other social groups or movements (like Black Lives Matter) contest this aspect of frontline practice. Such cross-cultural work can help develop a theoretical framework of resistance strategies and/or coping mechanisms available to marginalized groups against discriminatory frontline practice.

314

Finally, everyday citizenship offers an interesting conceptual framework to explore questions related to access to urban public space that are relevant to PA practice. For example, future research can investigate how unequal access to public transport influences the everyday citizenship of marginalized public groups. More importantly, cross-cultural research can refine the conceptual and theoretical understanding of everyday citizenship developed here. Such cross-cultural work can also highlight whether there is a possibility of developing a more universal conceptualization of everyday citizenship as compared to a more context-specific conceptualization in this dissertation.

Related to my personal future research goals related to present research, I would like to continue my research on frontline workers and administrative burden by empirically analyzing how frontline workers' decision making intersects with the identity markers of their clients (like socio-economic status, gender, race and ethnicity) to influence administrative burden. As an example, in my fieldwork, I was surprised how influential seemingly mundane things, like the dress one wears, can be in one's experience within frontline offices in Pakistan. If you are wearing a clean western dress, you are likely to be called "sir" by the frontline workers and offered a chair. In contrast if you are wearing relatively unclean *shalwar qameez* (loose fitting shirt and trousers, national dress of Pakistan), you will likely be addressed as "oye" (Informal word of address, considered derogatory). I want to conduct an experimental study where research participants go to the same frontline office with different external identity markers (like dress, beard, make-up etc.) on different days to investigate how changing these identity markers influences the administrative burden experienced by them.

315

Space and mobility emerged as another major theme during my fieldwork. In reviewing relevant literature on the topic in PA, I realized that apart from a few exceptions (e.g., Goodsell 2003; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014) this aspect of PA practice has not been investigated in depth. There are important research questions related to these themes that I would like to explore in future research. For example, how unequal distribution of capital in urban spaces produce sharp social margins (for example, where extreme poverty and extreme wealth exist side by side) and how PA practice contributes to the formation and sustenance of these sharp social margins. In my fieldwork, I was struck by how often individuals with extremely high (economic/social/political) capital had to co-exist with individuals with extremely low capital in the same confined spaces of the frontline offices of the government. Similarly, some of my research participants lived in slums which have been systemically created over the past years in Lahore (and in all major urban cities of Pakistan) by rapid expansion of middle and upper class gated housing communities and the resulting dispossession of farmers due to acquisition of agrarian land for housing. These slums are islands of extreme poverty surrounded by communities where class and wealth are often expressed through conspicuous consumption. To me the most iconic image of this sharp margin is the sight of Nishat Emporium, Pakistan's largest shopping mall that houses some of the most expensive and fashion forward local and international brands. Inside, it is all about elegant lighting and sharp angles of ultrachic architecture. But outside, it is surrounded by makeshift shacks and huts that are little more than thatched roofs propped up on bamboo sticks. Some semblance of privacy is created by hanging sheets around the structure. After the last rainy season, the whole area was submerged under five feet of

316

water, and women and kids were sitting on cots along the road. Ironically, many of them are labors who built the structure that they cannot afford to visit now. In my future research, I want to explore how individuals situated at these sharp margins experience space, government and the "Other"? And what role government officials play at such sharp margins?

Relatedly, I would also like to focus on finding out how spatial design and material architecture within frontline offices influences administrative burden? In my fieldwork, I found out that in addition to congestion, long queues and teasing applicants, simple things like familiarity with space can contribute to the psychological costs for marginalized publics. In my future research I would like to explore the intersection genders, social-capital, and ethnicity in the experience of these "frontline spaces."

Related to the present research project, I also intend to focus on queer groups in Pakistan belonging to the higher socio-economic status. None of my research participants belonged to affluent families. The few research participants who came from middle class families were generally abandoned by their parents forcing them into a life of poverty. On the other hand, based on my limited informal research among other queer groups in Pakistan, especially lesbians and gays, there are individuals who belong to elite families. While I couldn't access them during my present project, I plan to do that in near future. Understanding the social experiences of such individuals might help me understand better how class intersects with the experience of other axis of marginalization in society.

Finally, a commitment to new directions also warrants an optimistic attitude towards issues like social inequity despite the present gloomy situation. As Foucault famously noted:

317

> My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints. (Foucault 1988, 156)

While the life for the Khawaja Sira at social margins of Pakistani society might be becoming increasingly unlivable, it is important to remember that every new intra-action is an avenue of opportunity where boundaries, identities, and accompanying exclusions can be renegotiated. As boundaries are enacted, spaces of opportunity do emerge where the human waste can contest their social marginalization (Barad 2007). That is why past negative experiences should not dissuade us from the radical possibility of (re)negotiation and contestation offered by the future intra-actions between the frontline workers and the marginalized publics.

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APPENDIX-A

GUIDING QUESTIONS: GROUP INTERVIEW WITH POLICE OFFICIALS

1. How often do you typically interact with the Khawaja Sira during your job? How has your experience been in interacting with the Khawaja Sira during job related activities?

2. What is your opinion about the gender identity of the Khawaja Sira? Why are some people different? Do you think there are "authentic" and "unauthentic" Khawaja Sira?

3. What is your general opinion of the Khawaja Sira? What kind of people do you think they are? What is their social role?

4. Do Khawaja Sira create law and order related problems? Can you give any examples? If they do, how do you respond to such problems?

5. I have been told that police officials stop the Khawaja Sira on roads and traffic signals more than other people. Is that a fair observation (*kya yay baat sahih hai*)? If it is, why do you think that is the case?

6. What is your view of the Khawaja Sira's practice of begging?

7. How do you think the Khawaja Sira and police officials can have a better relationship?

8. How do you think the Khawaja Sira's problems [or problems caused by the Khawaja Sira] can be resolved?