Here Be Dragons:

A Primer for Tropology and the Philosophical Cartography Thereof

by

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ABSTRACT

My job in this thesis is to explore a supposedly dragon-filled area of philosophy, tropology. By 'tropology,' I only mean the study of figurative speech, or, more particularly, metaphors. It seems clear to most people that metaphors have meaning. But this fact flies in the face of several different theories of meaning. For example, the meaning of a metaphor can't be properly conveyed by Possible Worlds Semantics or Truth-Conditional Semantics. Tropology is also an area of philosophy with very few commonly accepted theories. It is not like the study of reference, where there are two theories, each having a large following. The various theories in tropology are so radically different, with each having relatively few followers, that the it is widely unexplored in philosophy. Some theories claim that metaphors are the exact same as another use of speech (namely, similes). Another claims that metaphors lack “meaning.” And a third claims that metaphors do 'mean' but getting at that meaning requires some special mental operations. By the end of this thesis, you will not only have my map of tropology, my theory of metaphors, but also some experimental philosophy about them to help put to rest some theories.

DEDICATION

There are four people I would especially like to thank for their help over the process of writing this thesis and completing my degree at Arizona State University. I would first like to thank Tom and Sandie Smith for their support and for, on occasion, providing more 'down to earth' outlooks on the various errant topics that pass through my skull. Secondly, I would like to thank my parents, Dave and Tami Smith for assisting me in innumerable ways over the past 24 years of my life.

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Second, I would like to thank the many other graduate students at ASU for putting up with my obsession with metaphors, coding the data, dealing with my nigh on incessant posts on Facebook about whatever area of philosophy struck my interest at that time, and for providing some valuable insights into some of the stranger phenomena that came up in my study.

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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Tropology

There are many ways of drawing a map. Cartographers of antiquity in areas which are unknown and dangerous would sometimes write "Hic Sunt Dracones" or, in English, "Here Are Dragons."[1] This was to warn wayward adventurers, sailors, and merchants that these areas are uncharted and thereby dangerous. It is reasonable to assume that users of such maps would avoid such areas; sticking instead to known, safe shores and not venturing far into the wild blue yonder. Some armchair cartographers may seek to map these partially undiscovered countries through reports from survivors from lost voyages, induction, and, perhaps deduction. The maps produced by these cartographers may be more accurate than others. Some may represent a placid island where there is none; have two landmasses connected, when there is, in fact, a great sea separating them; or, perhaps just as erroneous, have a great sea between two connected masses.

The metaphor tying this passage above to the topic of this paper is that philosophy is cartography. I find this metaphor to be extremely rich in many different regards. First, built into this metaphor is the further that philosophic theories are maps. If a map charts something as there which is not, or fails to chart something which is there, that map is not as good as one which does not have these failings. Philosophical theories which claim something as true which is not, claims that something is false which is true, or simply does not account for something; then that theory would be just as good as a faulty map. It is sort of hard to picture this, but a map which posits something both there and not there would be a bad map for that region. In the same way, a philosophical theory which brings with it a contradiction would be an equally bad theory for the area in question. Built into

1 Sometimes translated as "Here Be Dragons."

that is the idea that there are many ways of drawing a map. Two philosophers, trying to explain the same phenomenon, may come up with radically different theories. Second, we have the notion of 'Hic Sunt Dracones.' People using an incomplete map, as I mentioned not moments before, would avoid the unknown, remain in the safe areas. Philosophers are much the same way. We each have our own map, composed of the various theories that we endorse. These maps, I am willing to wager for many philosophers, will have areas which are marked as dangerous, the unknown. It is reasonable as well, to assume that many philosophers stick with the known, familiar shores on their maps. Philosophers of some field (or fields) rarely venture into the area of dragons. We are insular in that regard. The criticism of a map from a person who does not inhabit the area, who has not explored it, is far less powerful than such from a person who does or has.

My job in this thesis is to give a map of an area in which dragons are said to reside, tropology. By 'tropology,' I do not mean the sometimes commonplace meaning 'a metaphoric interpretation of the bible or some other sacred text' but rather I mean the study of figurative speech, or figurative speech (more particularly, metaphors) simpliciter. The notion of metaphors for many philosophers, flies in the face of their theories of meaning.[2] Tropology is also an area of philosophy with very few commonly accepted maps, and these maps are radically different from each other; some claim that the area of metaphors is just another name for another area,[3] another claims that the region lacks the feature of meaning,[4] another group claims that the region has the meaning-feature and has special mental operations to understand.[5]

2 For example, Donald Davidson, who we will see later.
3 The Similes Account
4 Non-Cognativist Account
5 My Account and The Interaction Account

After this chapter, I have three more. The first (chapter 2) gives a brief overview of some of the more common maps used for tropology as well as my own. The first (1), concerns the theory of metaphors expounded by Aristotle and Quintilian. This, stated briefly, is that metaphors are abbreviated similes. The second (2) concerns the Interaction Account of Metaphors which is that metaphors involve the interaction of two concepts, with one emphasizing features of the other. The third (3) concerns the Non-cognitivist accounts of metaphors. These are, stated simply, that metaphors don't mean, but rather do something else. The fourth and final theory we will discuss is my own. I do not want to give many spoilers, but I will also be covering what my theory of metaphors can do and explain, such as why some might find others offensive and how a person could learn something from a metaphor. The third chapter of this thesis concerns my metaphoric traveling to the land of metaphors and an experimental philosophy study that I conducted (making me less of an armchair cartographer). The first section is a basic introduction, where I state that this was to test whether Aristotle's theory was in fact correct. The second is an outlining of my two hypotheses. These were that metaphors are not abbreviated similes and that metaphors will receive responses concerning appearance more oft than similes. In the third section, I will cover the procedure that I used to collect the data. In the fourth, I give the results of the study. The final section is a discussion of the results and some interesting finds, showing the need for further testing or recoding (only in the case of some of the results). The final chapter is relatively short just as a conclusion to this thesis.

Chapter 2: Different Theories of Metaphor

1. Comparison (Simile) Theories of metaphors

There is a theory about metaphors which claims that they are nothing more than abbreviated similes. As we will see later on, I performed an experimental philosophy study testing whether this was the case; but first, it would be good to go over the different philosophers who have claimed something along these lines.

1.1 Aristotle

First on the docket is Aristotle. In The Rhetoric, Aristotle starts off by claiming that metaphors are in bad taste, as can be seen in the following quote:[6]

> There remains the fourth region in which bad taste may be shown, metaphor. Metaphors like other things may be inappropriate. Some are so because they are ridiculous; they are indeed used by comic as well as tragic poets. Others are too grand and theatrical; and these, if they are far-fetched, may also be obscure. For instance, Gorgias talks of 'events that are green and full of sap', and says 'foul was the deed you sowed and evil the harvest you reaped'. That is too much like poetry. Alcidamas, again, called philosophy 'a fortress that threatens the power of law', and the Odyssey 'a goodly looking-glass of human life',' talked about 'offering no such toy to poetry': all these expressions fail, for the reasons given, to carry the hearer with them. The address of Gorgias to the swallow, when she had let her droppings fall on him as she flew overhead, is in the best tragic manner. He said, 'Nay, shame, O Philomela'. Considering her as a bird, you could not call her act shameful; considering her as a girl, you could; and so it was a good gibe to

6 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3 iii

address her as what she was once and not as what she is.

It is ironic, therefore, that the translators chose to use the term “bad taste” in this section, because it seems clear that that is used metaphorically. This passage does have some gold to it, we see that one can easily make out of it a system of degrees between good and bad metaphors. We have the latter when, to follow Aristotle, the metaphors are too much akin to poetry; they are too obscure for the listener to follow. Good metaphors, on the other hand, may be those which the listener has no trouble following. Good metaphors are those which are not too obscure or akin to poetry.

Tying this back to the notion that metaphors are abbreviated similes, we need to look at the next section of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Aristotle's main thrust is made with the following quote:

> The Simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles that he "[l]eapt on the foe as a lion," this is a simile; when he says of him 'the lion leapt', it is a metaphor-here, since both are courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of 'lion'. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but not often, since they are of the nature of poetry. They are to be employed just as metaphors are employed, since they are really the same thing except for the difference mentioned. [7]

The difference that Aristotle seems to have mentioned is the use of the word “as” or “like.” “He leapt as a lion” is a metaphor because of the comparison of the action of Achilles and that which a lion may do; whereas “the lion leapt” is a metaphor because it lacks the comparison indicators.

7 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3 vi

I found it interesting, and thereby found a little more gold, in Aristotle claiming that it was the name (maybe solely) which was transferred to Achilles. When I give my account of metaphors, the Cicero-Austinian Account, the notion of 'transferal' will play a central role, but I don't think it was the name which was transferred alone, nor do I think that referring to a thing by a different name is the sole way metaphors are used; as are in Aristotle's examples.

Aristotle also states, in chapter 2 of Rhetoric, that metaphors, for prose-writers, are very important. He says:

> In the *Art of Poetry*, as we have already said, will be found definitions of these kinds of words; a classification of Metaphors; and mention of the fact that metaphor is of great value both in poetry and in prose. Prose-writers must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side.[8]

This makes metaphors seem more important than similes, but the core notion that, on the whole, they are the same. He warns that a prose-writer must be careful when it comes to metaphors because they are, he thinks, overly poetic in comparison to similes. It is worth noting that Aristotle thinks that metaphors must be fitting to the object. For

8 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3, ii

example, just as we can't say “the sun is like an automobile,” it is equally unfitting to say “the sun is an automobile.”

1.2 Quintilian

Next up is Quintilian. In *Institutio Oritoria*, he writes that metaphors are merely shortened similes (or merely shorter similes), as can be seen in the following passage:

> It is even possible to express facts of a somewhat unseemly character by a judicious use of metaphor, as in the following passage:
>
> > “This do they lest too much indulgence make
> > The field of generation slothful grow
> > And choke its idle furrows.”
>
> On the whole *metaphor* is a shorter form of *simile,* while there is this further difference, that in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to describe, whereas in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing.[9]

The main difference between this view and Aristotle's is that, while Aristotle took similes to be a form of metaphor, Quintilian takes it to be the case that metaphors are a form of similes. Aside from this, which could simply be seen as a difference in name for the same categories, the views on metaphors are basically the same. Both are claiming that they are abbreviated similes, with one making a comparison by referring to an object by a different name, while the other is explicitly making a comparison.

Other comparison (simile) theories of metaphors follow a very similar idea to the one found in these two philosophers. My main objection to the theory will be covered later on in my analysis of an experimental philosophy study that I conducted.

9 Quint. Inst. 8 6.8

2. Interaction Theories of Metaphors

The Interaction Theory of Metaphors comes from Max Black and others. We will start our look into this view of metaphors by looking at this quote from I.A. Richards:

> In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is resultant from their interaction.[10]

From this quote, Black in his book "Models and Metaphors" builds a rather robust theory of how metaphors function and work (some of which will be implemented in my own theory later on).

The core feature which Black need to make this idea work is that words have a system of associated commonplaces.[11] The system of associated commonplaces for some thing, according to Black, is approximately the set of statements resulting from asking a layman about what he or she held to be true about the thing in question. These responses are not necessarily actually the case; one could easily imagine that a person whose culture has it that rainbows are a sign of good fortune from the gods would give that as one of their responses. Also, using the same example, the system of commonplaces will, probably, be different from culture to culture. A member of this rainbow-culture would have a different system for rainbows than would a member of my own (whatever culture that may be). The idea that these commonplaces are different from culture to culture can be supported by the almost obvious observation that metaphors rarely can be translated from one language to another. For example, take the Latin metaphor "relinquare nuces,"

10 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, pg. 93
11 Black, pg. 40

which translates as “to relinquish/give-up the nuts.” The vast majority of people, including the readers of this thesis, would not understand the meaning of this metaphor; or, if they tried to give a meaning, it would more than likely be way off base. The meaning of the phrase in Latin is “to grow up” and the reasoning for this, to follow Black, is that in Roman culture, nuts were used as childhood playthings (like dice). So, in the system of commonplaces for nut, the Romans had “is a childhood plaything,” which is not included in most other systems for these objects in other cultures.

The way metaphors work, then, for Black, can be seen in the following passage, where he is talking about the metaphor “man is a wolf” (which he uses often as an example here):

> The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling a man a "wolf " is to evoke the wolf-system of related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf, he preys upon other animals, is fierce, hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a scavenger, and so on. Each of these implied assertions has now to be made to fit the principal subject (the man) either in normal or in abnormal senses. If the metaphor is at all appropriate, this can be done-up to a point at least. A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of implications to construct a corresponding system of implications about the principal subject. But these implications will not be those comprised in the commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of “man”. The new implications must be determined by the pattern of implications associated with literal uses of the word "wolf". Any human traits that can without undue strain be talked about in "wolf-language" will be rendered prominent, and any that

cannot will be pushed into the background. The wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man.

Let us apply this general idea to a simple case. Say the metaphor is "she is a rainbow;" what would be the system of commonplaces for rainbow in our culture? I can see certain things like "is colorful," "comes after rain," "is homosexual,"[12] "is arched," "is flamboyant," and so on. For Black, then, the hearer of the metaphor would have this system in place and make the implications fit the primary subject, "she" in this case. The traits of the person in question which can be stated using the rainbow-system will become more pronounced, whereas the others will be quenched down.

The main issue that I have with this account, taken at face value, is that it would have a very hard time accounting for how a person could learn something from a metaphor. As Black explicitly states in the passage cited above "[t]he wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes others-in short, organizes our view of man;" This means that all of the information about man is already within the system of associated commonplaces, and the framing or presenting of man as a wolf only increases or makes more prominent the relevant parts of the commonplaces. Features are not added to the system, but rather are emphasized.

If we say that learning amounts to (or, at least, sometimes is) the addition of information to a system like Black's associated commonplaces, then it would not be possible to learn from a metaphor; because no information is added to the system. Suppose that I and another person we talking about a person who I had not met

12 This would be there because of the common use of the rainbow color scheme for homosexual rights purposes.

previously. My cohort may very well seek to enlighten me to some of the person's personality by describing her as a rainbow. It seems clear to me that if I had the appropriate system of commonplaces for rainbows in mind, I would have learned something from the metaphor (because I added some information about the person). Since I had very little information about this person before hand, it is hard to say that any features were emphasized or subdued. Rather, it seems more appropriate to say that features were transferred or carried over from the vehicle (the object of the metaphor) to the primary subject.

3. Non-cognitivist Theories

A non-cognitivist about metaphors would say that metaphors are devoid of meaning outside of the literal content of the words. They deny the seemingly plausible view held by myself and many others that metaphors have meaning in a substantive sense. Despite this, they do claim that metaphors are effective in what they do, but they don't do it by meaning anything. Donald Davidson being the primary promoter of this view, holds, rather counter-intuitively, that metaphors mean nothing over and above the literal meaning of the sentence. On his view, metaphors make "us attend to some likeness, often a novel or surprising likeness, between two or more things."[13] This is done, according to Davidson, by "making us see one thing as another."[14]

A fantastic objection to this account, and one that I had not previously thought of (the one I had in mind was far longer and subtle), is outlined by Marga Reimer and Elisabeth Camp in their overview of metaphors, who cite others as the originators.[15] The

13 Davidson, 33
14 *Ibid* 47
15 Reimer, pg. 858

objection requires us to understand what 'dead metaphors' are, as opposed to 'novel metaphors.' Dead metaphors are those such that they have been so frequently used that they have some new *literal* meaning. Think of the metaphor "kicked the bucket." In that case, it seems clear that it means 'died' or 'is dead' in a more veiled way. This does not require any special mental operations to understand whereas novel metaphors more than likely will.[16] The core notion behind the non-cognitivist account of metaphors is that they do not mean, but that they do something other. Since in order to have dead metaphors, like 'kicked the bucket', we needed to have used the metaphor to mean something enough to have that meaning engrained as literal, metaphors must mean something, which rejects non-cognitivism.

4. Cicero-Austinian Account of Metaphors (My Account)

After much build up, this is my account of metaphors. As its name, Cicero-Austinian, suggests, this idea comes primarily from the works of the Roman orator and philosopher Cicero and the philosopher J.L. Austin. But I am also incorporating some contemporary works in philosophy of language and mind, more particularly, the idea of mental files. I will be treating this section a little different than I have the previous explanations of theories of metaphors, mostly because it is my own baby; but also because, rather than merely explaining the view of another, I am culminating several other views into one cohesive whole. I will start by going over the relevant parts of Cicero, then move on to Austin, and then to Recanati (for the mental files work). After this, I will move on to show how these various parts link up.

16 This is a claim that they make and I am of a mind to argue against it, but it does not hurt nor help the objection.

4.1 Cicero

The following passage comes from Cicero's work "*De Oratore*." In full honesty, there are a few similarities between his view and Aristotle's, but the markable differences make his view more pleasing to my eyes:[17]

> Thus, in a simple word, there are three qualities which an orator can bring in to illustrate and beautify his speech: these are either an unusual word, new word, or carried over word. [...] The third way, that of carrying words over, extends widely. Necessity gave birth to this third way, forced by how limited and narrow language was. But, after that, pleasure and delight make it frequently used. For it is like how we first started wearing clothes to repel the cold, but we later made them ornaments of the body and a sign of dignity; thus, the carrying-over of words had been made a custom, with need being the cause and frequency being the pleasure. [...] For when a statement scarcely can be said truly with a proper word, it is said with a carried over word. The statement, which we want to be understood, with similarity, brings light to its thing, which we put with a foreign word. Thus, these 'carrying-overs' are like 'borrowings,' when that which you don't have you can get is from somewhere else. Those things are a little more bold and don't indicate need, but bring something of brilliance to a speech; what should I put to you of their kinds and reasons from invention?

Normally when this passage is translated, people will translate "verba translata" as "metaphors." I chose to go with a more literal translation (translating the phrase as

17 This is my translation. I am working form Cicero, 152

"carried over words"[18]) because I feel that it better grasps how Cicero thought about these things.

According to Cicero (breaking down the passage), early on in a language's development, it was limited in what it could express and the contexts in which it could be used properly. But there was a need to express oneself in new contexts. So, people began to borrow words from different contexts and apply them in these new scenarios. As time went on, however, new words were added to the lexicon, making the need to borrow words in this way less and less. But we kept the habit of carrying words over because they either add beauty to one's statements or they express something which would be difficult or impossible to say with the words appropriate for the context. This is similar to why we started wearing clothes. Initially, it was to keep us warm and to make sure that we stayed dry. But, as we, as a society developed, the need for clothes became less and less. We have kept clothes around mostly to show dignity and custom.

In this passage also, we see the similarity to Aristotle's account. Both involve a notion of transferal, which has, uncoincidentally, a similar etymology to the word "metaphor." For Aristotle, it was a word carried over to a thing other than its proper referent. But for Cicero, it is a word carried over from one context to another.

4.2 Austin

The next portion of my theory of metaphors comes, as I noted above, from the works of J.L. Austin; more particularly, it comes from his paper "On the Meaning of a Word." The part relevant to this project concerns the primary, or nuclear, sense of a word:

18 The term 'verba translata' literally translates as 'carried over words,' The perfect participle of 'transfero' (I carry over) is 'translatus, a, um,' with 'verba' being the plural of the word 'verbum'

> A very simple case indeed is one often mentioned by Aristotle: the adjective 'healthy': when I talk of a healthy body and again of a healthy complexion, of healthy exercise: the word is not being used just 'equivocally'. Aristotle would say that it is being used 'paronymously'. In this case there is what we may call a primary nuclear sense of 'healthy': the sense in which 'healthy' is used of a healthy body: I call this nuclear because it is 'contained as a part' in the other two senses, which may be set out as 'productive of healthy bodies' and 'resulting from healthy bodies'.[19]

To illustrate how one could learn the primary, or nuclear, sense of a word, let's try it with another word (aside from 'healthy'), 'soft.' Take a look at these three statements:

1. The grass is soft
2. He is a soft grader
3. The lighting is soft.

These are all fairly common phrases which people use to describe the world around them. According to Austin, these three uses of the word should have some feature in common.

I think that the meaning of (1) is that the grass is not firm or is easily malleable to your body shape.[20] Some examples of this way of thinking about it are 'a soft bed,' 'a soft pillow,' and 'a soft breeze.' The other two have similar connotations to them about this. For (2), I would say that the grader is not firm about his expectation, is malleable to different standards. With just these first two examples we can sort of see a trend; thus far, the meaning of 'soft' is (easily) malleable. This holds true for the third statement. (3)

19 Austin, 55-75
20 Think of lying in a meadow.

means that the lighting bends around objects, that it does not cast hard shadows behind them.[21]

In all three of these cases, the meaning of 'soft' is malleable. Another, probably more robust, example can be seen when we look at our use of the word 'hard.' Take a look at these three statement uses of the word:

4. A hard rock
5. A hard problem
6. A hard line

It would seem that the meanings of each have something in common.

For (4), it is quick and easy to say that they meaning is that the rock in question is 4+) not easily broken, firm, or solid. This same type of meaning can be seen in the phrases “a hard wall of snow,” “a hard bed,” and “a hard block of wood.” Each of these don't deviate much from that core meaning. All three of them are firm, solid, or not easily broken.

With my second case, we can say that the meaning of (5) is that the problem in question is 5+) not easily solved.[22] This general sense of “not easily X-ed” can be seen in the phrases “a hard book[23],” “a hard project[24],” and “a hard speech.[25]” In each of these, the X is in some way related to break. One breaks down a book in order to read it.[26] One breaks down a project into steps in order to complete it. And one breaks down a speech

21 Like what one would see in a surrealist painting.
22 One may also see similarities between 'solving' and 'breaking.'
23 Not easily read.
24 Not easily completed.
25 Not easily memorized/given.
26 This is clearer when regarding a sentence, one breaks down a sentence in order to read it.

into parts in order to memorize and give it.

With the final example, I am quick to say that the meaning of (6) would seem to be that it is a line between two things is 6+) not easily crossed or we would say that is is firm in how it divides the two things. We commonly say that we break a line when it is we cross it. This idea of being firm in how it does something can be seen in the phrases "a hard word," "a hard sailor," and "a hard law."

All of these, (4+)-(6+), have one or more things in common. Each of them involve something not easily done, and many of them involve firmness or solidity. Thus, the primary sense of the word 'hard,' for Austin, would be the sense which we mean when we say the phrase 'a hard rock.' The different senses of the word 'hard' are derived from this primary sense because each of them have some aspect of the sense. So, the primary sense of a word, for Austin, is the aspect of the sense of a word in all of its various uses.[27]

4.3 Mental Files

As I said in the onset of this project, the next feature of my theory of metaphors comes from contemporary works in philosophy of mind and language. These works concern the notion of mental files, which is explained by Recanati as follows:

> The role of the files is to store information about the objects we bear these acquaintance relations to. So mental files are 'about objects' : like singular terms in the language, they refer, or are supposed to refer. They are, indeed, the mental counterparts of singular terms. What they refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (i.e. by information — or

27 The idea of a 'primary sense' will be amended after I have mental files (more particularly, generic files) in my toolbox (in section 4.1). But this is how Austin thought about it, it is workable for now, and it sets us on the right track.

> misinformation — in the file), but through the relations on which the files are based. The reference is the entity we are acquainted with (in the appropriate way), not the entity which best 'fits' information in the file. [28]

I have the mental file about the computer screen before me, call it 'Old and Busted.' The file about Old and Busted exists in virtue of the epistemically rewarding relation (the relation allows me to gain information about it) I have with it (I can see it) and contained in that file are the predicates 'is missing two bolts,' 'has twelve cracks in the glass covering,' 'has a back panel which is falling off,' 'is falling apart (quite literally),' and 'was once a touch screen but is no longer.'

These files, like words, refer to the objects which they are about. The deal is, though, that built into the picture is an anti-descriptivist backdrop. It should be clear that the mental files refer to objects, not in virtue of their content but rather in virtue of their ER relation (the epistemically rewarding relation that they have with the object in question). This avoids many of the purported problems with descriptivism and its variations; such as the Twin Earth Case.[29]

With the Twin Earth Case, the conclusion from Putnam was that "meaning just ain't in the head."[30] But if mental files are mind-dependent, and they refer to some object(s), then we can say that the meaning of the words is not wholly in the head, but rather is partially in the head and partially not. Mental files, as I have mentioned, refer to objects in virtue of the ER relation. Relations between objects aren't wholly in one place or another. If we were forced to pinpoint where the relation is, people would be totally

28 *Ibid* pg, 35
29 *Ibid* pg. 121
30 Putnam,227

lost. For example, take the “x is a brother of y” relation. It seems to me that the relation is not only where x is located, nor is it only where y is. For this relation to hold, both of the objects need to exist.[31] This is because relations exist where the related things are; they are bi-, tri-, or even quadrilocated.[32] Playing off of Putnam's statement, we can say that “meaning ain't just in the head.”

One could go with a Meinongian account of the existence of relations, to which I am sympathetic, and state that relations do not exist, but rather they subsist.[33] Subsisting things do not have a location, definite or otherwise, so asking where a relation is located is close to a category error. This is amicable to the relation between mental files and their objects because we can say that the relation holds in virtue of both the object and the mental file existing,[34] though the relation itself does not exist.

Now that we have a base level understanding of mental files, I would like to move now to a suppler and more nuanced version, which I call 'Generic Files.'

4.3.1 Generic Files

In order to really have my account of metaphors flourish, I need a more general

31 In the case where one of the relata ceases to exist, we specify a time for, or temporally index the relation, such as “x was the brother of y” or, if we do not specify y, we say “x had a brother.”

32 An example of that last one could be the *give* relation when the giver, w, is giving a present to three others. “w gives a television to x, y, and z.”

33 Meinong writes in The Theory of Objects “the totality of what exists,including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. This fact easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeration which finds the non-real a mere nothing--or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be something for which science has no application at all or at least no application of any worth. How little truth there is in such a view is most easily shown by ideal Objects which do indeed subsist (bestehen), but which do not by any means exist (existieren), and consequently cannot in any sense be real (wirklich). Similarity and difference are examples of objects of this type: perhaps, under certain circumstances, they subsist between realities; but they are not a part of reality themselves.” (pg. 79) This explicitly states that relations between objects are not parts of reality (existing) but rather that they subsist. Despite this, Meinong contends that we can still make true statements about these objects.

34 If it is appropriate to say that mind-dependent objects exist. We could say that the relation holds in virtue of the object existing and the person in question has the mental file.

version of mental files. You can have a mental file for a particular cat, but you cannot have one for cats in general. As cited by Recanati, Kenneth Taylor in his book “Reference and the Rational Mind” writes that:

> A conception... is a kind of mental particular, a labeled, perhaps highly structured, and updateable database of information about the extension of an associated concept. For example, each thinker who can deploy the concept <cat> in thought episodes is likely to have stored in his head a database of information (and misinformation) about cats.[35]

Though Recanati states that Taylor seems to be talking about mental files, he still claims that Taylor's 'conception' corresponds with the content of a file (the predicates, information, or misinformation in the file).[36] My question here is “why can't we have it both ways?” Why can't we have a sort of generic file which contains information about a class of objects?

Well, it seems that we can. The mental files framework is perfectly amicable with the idea that we can have files for classes of objects. I would call such files 'generic files,' but Recanati calls them 'recognitional files.'[37] Recanati writes that:

> It is tempting — though not mandatory — to construe natural-kind concepts as recognitional files, distinguished from the above by the fact that their content is not an individual object. We use the superficial or 'stereotypical' properties of water to detect water in the environment. What we detect is that substance (H20) multiple exposure to which has created and maintained in us the disposition to

35 Taylor, 181
36 Recanati, 38
37 Recanati, 72

> recognize it. In a different environment a different substance would possibly play the same role: it would have the same superficial characteristics and multiple exposure to it would have created and maintained in us the same disposition to recognize it via those characteristics. In such a context we would have a concept very similar to our WATER-concept and internally indistinguishable from it, but it would not be a concept of water. It would be a concept of twater or XYZ (however we call the substance which plays the role of water on Twin-Earth). On this familiar, Putnamian picture, the reference of our WATER-concept depends upon the context, even if the context at issue is much broader than the context relevant to determining the reference of HERE.[38]

These generic files would be much like what Taylor calls 'conceptions' in the passage above. The ER relation for this type of file is not connected to a singular entity, like my mental file for my grandmother Smith, but rather it is connected to a class of objects through my ability to recognize the thing. For example, as I was pulling into my driveway, a gray furry creature bolted across my front lights. I was able to recognize that creature as a bunny. My BUNNY file is based upon my disposition to recognize or my ability to label objects correctly of this general type.

In these generic files is the stereotypical information about some thing. Such as, in the WATER file is 'H_2O' and in the CAT file is 'mammal.' A claim which I would like to make, though nothing really hinges on it for this thesis, is that the information (or misinformation) contained in mental files makes reference to generic files. So, using more symbolic language, if mental file X contains the predicate 'is Y' where Y is a

38 *Ibid,* pg.72

generic, then X refers to Y in the same sort of way as the mental file X refers to its object. When we make the statement 'X is Y,' it is not the case that all of the (mis)information contained in the Y file is called to mind, but it does contain all of such information.

Having this referring relation between mental files lessens the amount of space required to contain all of the information I have about a subject. Suppose that I have a SNOW file[39] for my pet cat. Contained in the SNOW file would be the predicate 'is a cat.' Without these relations, in addition to that predicate, there would be the predicates "is a mammal," "is warm-blooded," "is four-legged," "has pointy ears," and so on. And these bits of information (or misinformation) would be had in all files about individual cats, which seems remarkably redundant.

With this relation between mental files, the predicate 'is a cat' would make reference to the generic file CAT. All of the seemingly redundant predicates are in the CAT file, and this is true for all mental files about individual cats. From this reference or through this link, if a person were to ask me "is Snow a mammal?" I could easily make the assertions that Snow is a mammal, because she is a cat. I could also assert that she has any other predicate contained in the CAT file; such as that Snow is fluffy, that Snow likes to knock over stacks of paper etc. But calling up all of that information is not necessary to assert that Snow is a cat.[40] In much the same way as how calling a mental file to mind does not force the thinker to think about every bit of information (or misinformation) contained therein, calling to mind a generic file does not force the thinker to think about every bit of information contained in it.

39 'Snow' being the name of my cat.

40 Just like how, according to the mental files picture, reference is not determined by the content of the file. I could be totally wrong about cats, but I could still refer to them an assert that Snow is one.

Another example of how my idea of the relation between predicates and these generic files works is in the way we make judgments about things. It is a perfectly real possibility that I could have been unsure about whether the gray furry startled creature zooming in front of my headlamps was a bunny. But after getting a good long look at it, I noticed certain salient properties. In the case of bunnies, these salient properties are a general shape and a general color. In virtue of seeing those features arranged as they were, I automatically asserted, to myself, at the very least, that the creature before me was a bunny. Now, what predicates are contained in the generic file BUNNY? Some of these predicates would be the color or the general shape.[41] Others would be clearly referring to other files. Such as the MAMMAL file. The MAMMAL file would contain further information, such as 'is warm blooded.' I am not a biologist so the WARM BLOODED file does not contain all that much information but other files, like FURRY, would contain even more references to other files..

The various predicates in the generic file, one can easily see, are basically what Black had as the elements in his system of associated commonplaces and what Austin had in mind for his senses. From this, I think that the elements in the generic file for some thing(s) are the same as the elements in the purported system of associated commonplaces.

One potential worry for this picture is that many, but not all (most), predicates would be relational. I have no problem with this and, in fact, I have been mulling this idea around in my mind for a long time. The core of this idea can be found in Logic, though I think it is backwards. The basic idea is that predication is a relation between an

41 Maybe we could describe the general shape of the rabbit.

object and a set. The nature of this relation would be slightly different, as it is the relation between two mental files but the idea that predication, at its heart, is (most of the time) relational is still there.

There is another potential worry that claiming that the contents of mental files make reference to generic files and they too have contents (and are themselves mental files), that it would be mental files all the way down.[42] Or, in more literal language, we have an infinite-regress problem; file A refers to file B which refers to file C and so on. To avoid this issue, we should claim that there are certain base level, or bedrock generic files which cannot be explained in terms of other files, where all of the information in them does not have any further explanation. The files for some colors could be an example of this.[43] This is not to say that mental files define; they just contain information about the subject. But just to reiterate, this is not necessary for my claims here, all I need are the first level generic files (like WATER or CAT) to get my connections to metaphors off the ground. But, as we will see later on, having even more connections makes the explanation of offensive metaphors even clearer than otherwise.

4.4 The Way My Theory Works

Thus far, we have three different concepts. One, Austin's, concerned the meaning

42 This is a variation on the common metaphor in philosophy "it is turtles all the way down."

43 Though we can use color files metaphorically, but only when there is further information contained in the file beyond the phenomenological experience of the shade. For example, I was listening to a purported heavy metal cover of Mr. Sandman originally by The Chordettes; a friend of mine said that "the vocals are a bit white." The WHITE file contains more than just the phenomenological experience of white, or a memory thereof, but also that it is the opposite of black, and the BLACK file in turn has a strong connection to heavy metal music. These can be used metaphorically, but only because there is more to them than the most bedrock aspects. Think of what metaphoric meaning there could be for the statement "she is chartreuse." I can't think of one, because there is nothing else to that file other than the color.

of a word. This was that it is the primary sense; such as the primary sense of the word 'soft' is easily malleable. The second, Cicero's, was concerning how metaphors function. This was that words are carried over from some context to another. Our third concept is that of mental files. Bringing these three ideas together, we can say that a Cicero-Austinian account of what metaphors are is:

> Metaphors are statements where one or more of the words have some aspects (or a single aspect) of their primary senses are carried over.

The notion of carrying-over is where I need to apply more advanced philosophical jargon and use the notion of mental files:

> Carrying-over is the process by which some predicates are copied, borrowed, or moved, from one mental file and added to another (typically from a generic file to a particular)

As I mentioned previously, the primary sense of a word, I take it, is the content of the generic file and I also take it that the content of the generic file is the system of associated commonplaces. For me, these are all the same thing, just discovered by different philosophers and given different names.

I am going to illustrate how this definition can classify statements by going over three different kinds of metaphors. One where some aspect of the primary sense of a verb is carried over, another where some aspect of the primary sense of a noun is so carried, and a third, where the metaphor is seen after a preposition. Having this distinction is not only natural (well, as natural as the distinction between nouns and verbs), and it seems to cover most, if not all, possible metaphors.

4.4.1 Verb-Metaphors

Take a look at these two different metaphors:

7. The girl floated onto the stage
8. The politician slithered to the podium

This statement, (7), is a metaphor. It would almost be absurd to assert the contrary. By my account, it is a metaphor because some aspect(s) of the primary sense of the word 'float' has been brought over to the statement. The first step in figuring out the meaning of the metaphor would be to understand what the content of the FLOAT file is. Notice that this would be a mental file about an action. I think that we can and do have those. In much the same way as I can recognize a bird or a person or a bunny, I can recognize actions such as running. The primary sense of the word 'float,' I think, is 'moving lightly' or 'drifting.' The proper use of the word 'float' concerns boats and other aquatic things; thus we have applied the concept of this kind of movement to the way she moved onto the stage.

Metaphors where some aspect of the verb's primary sense is borrowed do not always concern the movement or actions of the subject. Sometimes they concern the subject herself. Take 8) 'the politician slithered to the podium.' The primary sense of the word 'slither' is the way a snake moves across the ground. But no one would say that the politician moved snake-like, rather they would say that the statement has the added meaning, beyond that the politician moved to the podium, that the politician is a snake (which is itself a metaphor).

4.4.2 Noun-Metaphors

Now let's look at these two metaphors, which are slightly different in form from the ones we saw not moments ago.

9. He is an onion.

10. She is a big red bouncy ball.

With metaphors where it's a noun which is carried over, we can look at the example (9). There are several different aspects of the primary sense of 'onion' which could be borrowed and applied to the subject; such as smelling bad or layered.[44] But I assert that whatever interpretation is correct, it will have its roots in some aspect of the primary sense of the word 'onion.'

(9) brings to mind an interesting point about these two types of metaphors. Metaphors where the sense is carried over from a verb, such as (7) and (8), have very few ways that they could be applied to the subject/action. This is probably because the primary senses for these types of words is relatively small. Metaphors where the sense is carried over from a noun, however, seem to have more possible interpretations. For example, we could go with (10) The primary sense of 'big red bouncy ball' has many aspects to it; some of them are behavioral and others are iconic.

This account has some exceptions. These are when a metaphor has become so common that the very meaning of the phrase or word has changed to match the interpretation (we call such metaphors “dead”). (7)-(10) are all novel metaphors, they are new or uncommon. Dead metaphors are those like 'she kicked the bucket,' 'time is running out,' or 'she fell in love.' The senses of these phrases no longer need to be carried

44 You have to peel back the layers to get to know him.

over. Their senses are within the file already.

4.4.3 Preposition-Metaphors

Let's take the following two metaphors as examples of preposition-metaphors:

11. He ran into the fire.

12. She is on a cloud.

In these cases and others like it, we seem to require more knowledge about the situation than in the other cases. The object of the preposition is being referred to by a different name, much like how we can, and sometimes do, metaphorically refer to a person or a thing by the name of another. This is seen in Aristotle's examples of metaphors when Achilles is referred to with “the lion.” For (11) we need to know what the man was doing, such as, maybe, he was running into a boardroom to give a presentation about the need to spend more money in some department. The metaphor implied by (11), were that the case, would be that 11+) “the boardroom is a fire.” The same holds for (12). We need to know what the woman is doing to make further claims about the meaning of the metaphor. It may be the case that she is mattress shopping with her wife and she is currently laying on a mattress to test it out briefly . Were that the case, then we would get the metaphor 12+) “the mattress is a cloud.” Both of these implied metaphors reduce to the sorts of metaphors that were examined in 4.4.2. Whether or not the subjects of the implied metaphors were in fact the boardroom or the mattress doesn't really matter for the purpose of general analysis. But what does matter is that in cases where the metaphoric expression is after a preposition, there is an implied noun-metaphor, which adds to the meaning of the expression as a whole.

4.5 How Metaphors Function

How metaphors function should be quite easy to see from the definition I gave. We understand metaphors by taking certain aspects of the primary sense of the alien or foreign word (determined by context) and applying them to the relevant part of the circumstance (be it the subject or the way the subject does/did something). The relevant part of the circumstance is determined by which aspect is carried. As we saw with (7), the aspect carried over was the nature of the movement; so it was applied to the way the subject moved. With (8), the aspect was being a snake; so it was applied to the subject.

4.6 Some Interesting Explanations

In this section, I will be giving some explanations for interesting phenomena, as I mentioned in chapter 1. The first is how certain, seemingly bland, metaphors can be found offensive. The second is actually my complaint against the Interaction account of metaphors. This was that it seems possible that we can learn things from metaphors, and this is not accounted for in the other theory. Due to the similarities between the two theories, mine and Black's, it seems best to show how mine overcomes the obstacle that trips the other theory. The third and final is to make explicit the fact that my theory entails a difference between metaphors and similes.

4.6.1 Offensive Metaphors

For this sub-subsection, I am going to be looking closely at two possibility offensive metaphors.[45] For my purposes, it does not matter whether people actually find these offensive (though I have it on good authority that some do); I am merely showing

45 I would like to thank Rachel Ades for these examples.

how a person could find these offensive in some way. The first metaphor is:

13. He is blind to the truth

This metaphor is actually deeper than it seems. There are two possible ways that I can go about illustrating why a person might find this offensive. These two different ways illustrate two different possible routes of offense. For the first, if you would recall my discussion of generic files in this chapter, 4.3.1, I stated that this is seems reasonable and, in some cases necessary for metaphors, that the mental files make reference to generic files. I think, in this case, a rather enlightening way of thinking about it is that here a generic file is making reference to another generic file. It seems clear that the BLIND file contains the predicate "is unable to see." The relevant predicate or property carried over from this file to the subject emphasizes an inability. A person who is blind probably does not want to be associated so clearly with an inability simpliciter. The second method follows a similar route as the previous, but we will go further into the predicate "is unable to see." This predicate makes reference, or so it would seem, to the SEE file. That file is probably more robust than the BLIND file. And, due to the very common metaphor associating seeing with understanding (such as "I see what you mean" or "I see the solution to the problem"), it is a very real possibility that people have in the SEE file some reference to UNDERSTAND. Thus, (13) would mean that he, the subject is unable to understand the truth. Having SEE so closely associated with UNDERSTAND would make members of the blind community offended because it is not the case that they are unable to understand a concept despite the fact that they lack the ability to see.

The second metaphor which a person may find offensive follows a very similar

process in understanding to the latter method seen above.

14. Black is evil

This metaphor is, as before, deeper than it seems. This is a very common metaphor in our culture, with the opposite, 'white is good' equally as common. Since the African-American (Black) community commonly is called 'black,'[46] having that color so closely associated with evil would almost make that a derogatory moniker. Calling a person 'black' can, quite easily, carry with it the implication that they are evil; which, without much need for explanation, is quite offensive.

Let's here look at how the Interaction account of metaphors would handle these sorts of metaphors. For (13), it could claim that the statement frames the subject in such a way that the inability is emphasized, which may be offensive. But, since the system of commonplaces for blindness does not, at least to me, contain anything to do with understanding, there would be the missing chunk of meaning making it that they are unable to understand the truth. (So far as I have found, Black makes no claim about the relations between systems of associated commonplaces other than those used in his account of metaphor, which are remarkably different than the ones necessary to the understanding of this metaphor. Namely, there is no emphasizing of features in the relation between the blindness-system and the seeing-system).

For (14), a similarly wrong reason for the offense would be given by Black's account. Like I mentioned before, the features would need to already be in the system to be emphasized. This means that calling people of a dark skin-tone “black” and in the

46 As I just did.

system of commonplaces for “black” is “evil” would only be offensive, if contained in the system of commonplaces for that community was “evil” (which would thereby be able to be emphasized). A simpler way to solve this problem would not be to remove (14) from common practice, but rather to disassociate the community from the notion of evilness. This would also serve to help the community in more ways than I could count.

4.6.2 Learning From Metaphors

As you may recall, my objection to the Interaction Account of Metaphor was that it could not account for the fact that people can learn something new from a metaphor. For example, a person could tell me that a girl I am about to meet is an owl. Since I know very little about this person, it seems natural to say that some owl features are carried over, such as, big eyes or wise (in this case, probably big eyes and weird hair). In this case and others like it, it seems that, because my theory does not need many properties in the subject's file, only in the vehicle's file, we can learn things from metaphors.

4.6.3 Metaphors V. Similes

Previously, I have spoken about how I do not think that metaphors are the same as similes, and later on, the next chapter, I will be giving evidence to support that conclusion. As I have stated many different ways and times, metaphors have one particularly relevant property/predicate copy-pasted from the vehicle to the subject; similes, on the other hand, to me, involve comparing the properties one the two files in questions in their entirety. Comparing the files in their entirety could and, I think, will make other properties/predicates become more salient and thereby result in differing interpretations of the words.

4.6.4 A Potential Worry

Metaphors, it can be said, are always (or almost always) literally false. Some may claim that I have missed some phenomenological aspects of how we understand metaphors; namely that we first reject the semantic meaning of the statement and then we try and figure out the speaker meaning. This distinction is found in *Semantic Reference and Speaker Reference* by Saul Kripke. Kripke writes, for example, that the distinction "between what *the speaker's words meant* on a given occasion, and what *he meant*, in saying those words."[47] The game does save Kripke and others from some worries, saying that their theories are talking about the meaning of the words, not what the speaker meant. I could see a person, who I think is John, raking leafs, and then say to a friend "John is racking leafs." But, as a matter of fact, that person is not John, but Bill. According to those who hold that there is such a thing as a semantic meaning/reference, I am referring to Bill, but my words are referring to John, and semantically my statement is false.

A quick point against the notion that metaphors are always literally false can be seen with the following example. Take the statements 'love is love' and 'it is what it is.' Both of these are literally, semantically, and necessarily true, but there is more meaning to them than just some uninformative statement of fact. Applying my theory of metaphors to them gives us that the vehicle and subject of the metaphors are the same, so when some relevant feature of the vehicle is carried over to the subject, it only serves to emphasize that feature, nothing is learned about it.[48] 'It is what it is' is commonly used to express the

47 Kripke, pg. 13
48 This is much like the Interaction Account of Metaphors seen earlier.

fact that whatever 'it' refers to can't be changed in the relevant context. So, if a person is trying to repair a car and failing to do so because the car is too far gone, another person may say 'it is what it is' to emphasize the fact that the alternator is broken. With 'love is love,' were it said by a daughter trying to convince her father to let her date some other person, it serves to emphasize the fact that love is worth striving for, or something like that.

The worry here, I think, has little bearing on the way we use words. In everyday conversation, the semantic meaning and the pragmatic meaning may align a lot of the time, but what really matters is the pragmatic, or speaker, meaning. The meaning of a statement is its use, to quote Wittgenstein.[49] In conversation, there may be two different ways of interpreting any given statement made by one of the parties therein, but the one taken away, the one understood by the hearer is the one which matters. The fact that both parties in a conversation understand each other and can proceed with the activity in which they are engaged makes it less likely that the semantic meaning plays a very large role. In my two counter examples to the claim about the semantic truth-value of metaphors, we have cases where the semantic meaning plays almost no role at all in the understanding or the meaning of the statements, which supports my following point.

When it comes to metaphors, the pragmatic meaning is all that matters and having an additional mental process to distinguish between the two does not fit with my phenomenological experience, nor does it fit with the brain scans of people given

49 Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, 43

statements which require either semantic knowledge[50] or world knowledge.[5152] This objection to the point that I failed to account for a difference between metaphors and literal speech is, well, short but it is so because I only want to say that the distinction really does not matter in everyday conversational life.

50 Statements relying solely on the semantic meaning of the words therein.
51 Statements relying on what the person knows or believes about the world, these are statements which rely on pragmatic meaning.
52 Hagoort, pg. 440

Chapter 3: An Experimental Philosophy Study

1. Introduction

As we saw previously, some philosophers have thought that metaphors are merely abbreviated similes. This study is to test whether there is, in fact, a difference in how people understand the two (namely, whether people will give different interpretation when prompted with a metaphor vs a simile).

The Interpretation of Novel Metaphors by Bruce Fraser, published in 1979, had a structure very similar to this study. That study, however, was testing on how context determined the interpretations. The author did note that the subjects tended to give more responses concerning behavior when prompted with a simile than when prompted with a metaphor.[53]

2. Hypothesis

Building on the note made by Fraser, the preliminary hypothesis of the present study is that similes and metaphors will tend to get different responses when participants are asked to interpret them. For example, the metaphor "he is a puppy" (not used in this study) will get responses like "he is cute" while the simile "he is like a puppy" will get responses like "he is playful." Our secondary hypothesis is that similes will tend to get behavioral responses (i.e. responses concerning the behavior of the subject (how the subject acts)) while metaphors will tend to get iconic responses (i.e. responses concerning the appearance of the subject (how the subject looks/smells)). Following the examples just given, a response of the form "he is cute" would count as iconic, whereas a response of the form "he is playful" would count as behavioral.

53 Fraser, pg. 40

As I stated previously in chapter 2 4.6.3, my account of metaphors does imply a difference between metaphors and similes. This is that when it comes to metaphors, we are looking for one, or very few, particularly salient features/predicates in one mental file and carrying it over to another mental file; whereas, with similes, we are engaged in a more comparative process taking the files as a whole to make our judgments about the meaning. I expect that when one is searching for one, or very few, features in a file, the salient features will different than the salient features when one is comparing the files as a whole. For me, using the puppy-example, when I look for one, or very few, features in the file, iconic features are far more prominent; while when I look at the file as a whole, behavioral features become more prominent.

3. Procedure

The participants included in this study were 179 undergraduates between the ages of 18 and 40. There were 107 men and 72 women. All of the participants included in the study were self-described native English speakers. 15 participants not included in the study because they either described themselves as non-native English speakers (8), answered the same for all interpretations (5), answered incoherently (1), or described themselves as 16 years old (1). Each participant was given a survey form consisting of 15 metaphors or similes. Of these, 5 had animals as the object (e.g. “she is like a rhino”), 5 had food items (e.g. “he is an onion”), and 5 had inanimate objects (e.g. “she is like a book”) (The metaphors and similes were procedurally generated from a data-bank of 60 different objects (which will be further described in the results section)). The participants were given one of 16 possible forms. Each of these forms consisted of either only

metaphors with a male as the subject (e.g. “he is an octopus”), only similes with a male as the subject (e.g. “he is like an artichoke”), only metaphors with a female as the subject (e.g. “she is a star”), or only similes with a female as the subject (e.g. “she is like the sun”). Since all of the metaphors and the similes were generated from the same pool, there are four versions for each object/vehicle.[54]

The participants were given metaphors and similes with different gendered subjects to test whether this would make a difference in the interpretations of the statements. If there is such a difference, it could be used to make the claim that the difference in metaphors and similes depends greatly on the subject to which they are applied, which may be intuitive to some people.

4. Results

After the data was collected, I had the sentences coded by 4 graduate philosophy students. The coders were sent the following email instructing them on how to code the data:

> Hey, guys,
>
> You each said that you would be my coders for the study. For the study, I had the participants interpret a set of sentences. Your job is to go through the interpretations and judge whether they concern the behavior of the subject ("she" or "he") or the their appearance. Behavioral responses will be like "she is playful," "he is jumpy," or "she is stoic." Iconic responses (responses concerning appearance) will be like "she smells bad," "he is fat," or "she is beautiful." If the participant just rephrased the prompt, left it blank, or wrote something like "no

54 This makes 240 distinct sentences.

meaning;" count that as a null response. All you need to do is put a 'B' next to the behavioral responses, an 'I' next to the iconic, and a 0 or 'N' next to the null responses.

Some tricky ones will be responses like "she is tasty." 'Tasty' has two meanings, the first concerns having a pleasant taste while the other concerns being beautiful (appealing to the eye). "He is bright" has a similar issue. 'Bright' can mean "luminescent" or "smart." Since all of the sentences concern people, use your better judgement on responses with 2 or more possible meanings (such as, in my two examples, the latter make more sense). Responses concerning noises made by the subject (e.g. "she is loud") are behavioral and responses concerning the hardness of the subject (e.g. "he is soft") are iconic (these were hard for me to decide on).

I will be around, if you want to talk about it or have any questions.

The coders only ever received one of the four types of forms and they did not know my hypothesis. I will first present the raw numbers and then present the graphs derived from the data. In each of the subsections below, I will present also, side by side, the results from the he-statements (metaphors and similes with a male subject) and those from the she-statements (metaphors and similes with a female-subject). I will also give 6 different P-values through the use of a chi-square test. The P1-value is the value for he-statements treating the results from the metaphors as the expected and the results from the similes as the observed. The P2-value is the value for the he-statements where the roles of the results are reversed. The P3-value is the same as the P1-value, only where it is the results

from the she-statements; the same holds for the relation between the P4-values and the P2-value. The P5-value follows the same formulation as the P1-value, only taking the results of both the he-statements and she-statements. The P6-value also takes all of the results into account for the set of responses in question, but has the same formulation as the P2-value. I am taking a P-value to be statistical significant whenever it is below 0.05.

4.1 The Data and Graphs: Set 1

For the first set of data I will present, I will give, side by side, the metaphors and similes with male ('he') subjects. Graph 1, seen below, shows the metaphors and similes with the following vehicles (the object of the sentence):

Set of Vehicles 1 (SoV1): Cake, onion, artichoke, carrot, banana, ball, gazelle, spider, octopus, cat, dog, sign, mirror, wall, and book.

The metaphors were interpreted by 11 participants, 6 male and 5 female. The similes were interpreted by 12 participants, 5 male and 7 female. The interpretations were coded by 2 male graduates students in philosophy. For the metaphors from this set, iconic responses appeared 14.5% of the time, behavioral showed up 73.4% of the time, and null responses came up 12.1% of the time. For the similes from this set, iconic responses showed up 20.43% of the time, behavioral came up 63.44% of the time, and null appeared 16.13% of the time. Comparatively, iconic responses were approximately 6% more common for similes than for metaphors, behavioral were 10% more common for metaphors than similes, and null responses were 4% more common for similes than metaphors. The P1-value for this set is 0.0394, which is statistically significant. The P2-value for this set is 0.0001, which is significant. Both of these values support my primary

hypothesis (that metaphors and similes will be statistically different), but the percentages do not support my secondary hypothesis (that iconic will be more common for metaphors).

Now turning to the she-statements made from this set. The data from this set of vehicles were all coded by a male and a female philosophy graduate students. The metaphors were interpreted by 11 participants, 9 male and 2 female; while the similes were interpreted by the same number, but 5 male and 6 female. For the metaphors, behavioral came up 60% of the time, null was at 22%, and iconic was at 18%. Similes had behavioral at 70%, null was at 11%, and iconic came in at 19%. This means that behavioral came up 10% more for similes, null came up 11% more for metaphors, and iconic came up 1% more for similes. The P3-value of for this set is 0.0270, which is statistically significant. The P4-value for this set is 0.0019, which is significant. The values support my primary hypothesis, but do not support my secondary. They do support the notion that metaphors will tend to get more null responses than similes.

When we take the data from this set as a whole, the P5-value is 0.4620, which is not significant. The P6-value is equally bad with a value of 0.4823. If we remove the null responses from the equation, we get that metaphors got behavioral 81% of the time and iconic 19%; similes got behavioral 77% of the time and iconic 23% of the time. This means that metaphors got behavioral 4% of the time more than similes and similes got iconic 4% more of the time than metaphors; which goes against my secondary hypothesis and generates an insignificant P-value. Comparing the results from the two, we get support for the notion that there is a difference in how people interpret statements with a

male subject and a female subject. This is because not only is there a difference in how statistically significant the results are, but also that the differences cancel each other out. This can be seen in how the sum of them does not make a significant result.



1: SoV1 He-Metaphors



2: SoV1: She-Similes



3: SoV1: She-Metaphors



4: SoV1: He-Similes

4.2 The Data and Graphs: Set 2

Continuing with the 'he-metaphors' vs 'he-similes', graph 2, seen below consisted of the following vehicles:

SoV2: tall glass of water, potato, radish, hamburger, PB&J sandwich, raven, parrot, aardvark, elephant, rat, chair, table, star, sun, and moon.

The similes from this set were interpreted by 8 participants, 3 male and 5 female; while the metaphors were interpreted by 13 participants, 8 male and 5 female. These were coded by the same coders as the last set. For the metaphors, behavioral responses were 62.1% of the time, null were 21.2%, and iconic were 16.7%. For the similes, behavioral

responses were 69.6% of the time, null were 5.6%, and iconic were 24.8%. Behavioral responses were 7.5% more common for similes, null responses were 15.6% more common for metaphors, and iconic responses were 8.1% more common for similes. Running a chi-square test, as I did before, gives us a P1-value of 0.0002, which is significant; the P2-value is 0.0001, which is also significant. These values also support my primary hypothesis, but they do not support either that metaphors tend to get more iconic responses or that similes will tend to get more iconic. It did support, however, that metaphors would get more null responses. This may be because when a person is looking for a singular feature in the files associated with these vehicles, they tend to fail; but when they are looking at the file as a whole, they tend to succeed.

The she-metaphors were interpreted by 10 participants, 5 male and 5 female; the she-similes were interpreted by 11 participants, 5 male and 6 female. For the similes, behavioral responses were at 57%, null responses were at 12%, and iconic responses were at 31%. Metaphors had behavioral at 65%, null at 7%, and iconic at 28%. This means that behavioral responses were 8% more for metaphors, null responses were 5% more for similes, and iconic responses were 3% more for similes. The P3-value for this set is 0.0873, which is close, but not quite statistically significant. The P4-value for this set is 0.1193, which is far from significant. The values and percentages do not support either my primary hypothesis or my secondary, though, the difference in percentages, however small, does support the notion that similes will tend to receive iconic responses over metaphors.

Taking them all together, we get that metaphors got behavioral 63% of the time,

null 15% of the time, and iconic 22% of the time. Similes had behavioral at 62%, null at 9%, and iconic at 29%. This means that metaphors got behavioral 1% more, null 6% more, and iconic 7% less. The P5-value is 0.0981, which is not significant, and the P6-value is 0.0576, which is, also, not significant. These values do not support my primary hypothesis, though they do weakly support the notion that similes will tend to receive more iconic responses than metaphors.



5: SoV2: He-Metaphors



6: SoV2: She-Metaphors



7: SoV2: He-Similes



8: SoV2: She-Similes

4.3 The Data and Graphs: Set 3

The next set of data is from the same strain, seen in graph 3, it consisted of the following vehicles:

SoV3: chicken soup, glass of wine, beer, Thai curry, pizza, worm, turkey, chicken, rooster, lamb, lamp, encyclopedia, rug, trash bin, and statue

These were coded by the same coders as before. The similes were interpreted by 11 participants, 6 male and 5 female; while the metaphors were interpreted by 10 participants, 9 male and 1 female. For the metaphors, I had behavioral at 62%, null at 21%, and iconic at 17%. In the case of similes, I had behavioral at 75%, null at 3%, and iconic at 22%. This means that similes had 13% more behavioral responses, metaphors

had 18% more null responses, and similes had 5% more iconic responses. Doing the same process as before, we get a P1-value of 0.0001, which is statistically significant; the P2-value is 0.0001. Again, these values support my primary hypothesis; but also the percentages fail to support the secondary. Again, we see that metaphors tended to get more null responses, which is in line with the potential explanation I gave in the previous section.

The she-metaphors here were interpreted by 12 participants, 6 male and 6 female; with the she-similes interpreted by 13 participants, 7 male and 6 female. For metaphors, behavioral responses came up 67% of the time, null came up 22%, and iconic was at 11%. Similes had behavioral at 75%, null at 12%, and iconic at 13%. This means that similes had 8% more behavioral, metaphors had 10% more null, and similes had 2% more iconic. The P3-value for this is 0.0533, which is close to being statistically significant, but not quite. The P4-value for this set is 0.0278, which is significant. The P4-value does support my primary hypothesis, while the P3-value, on its own, does not. The percentages do not support my secondary hypothesis, as is becoming the trend with the she-statements, but they do support the notion that metaphors will tend to get more null responses than similes.

Taking this set all together, we get that metaphors have 61% behavioral, 22% null, and 17% iconic. Similes have 75% behavioral, 8% null, and 17% iconic. This means that metaphors got 14% less behavioral responses and 14% more null responses. The P5-value for this set is 0.0023, which is significant and the P6-value for this set is 0.0001, which is also significant. These P-values support my primary hypothesis, but the secondary hypothesis is not supported. We do have even further support for the notion that metaphors will tend to receive more null responses than similes, however.



9: SoV3: He-Metaphors



10: SoV3: He-Similes



11: SoV3: She-Metaphors



12: SoV3: She-Similes

4.4 The Data and Graphs: Set 4

The next set of data, seen in graph 4, was coded by the same coders as before. The similes were interpreted by 11 participants, 7 male 4 female; while the metaphors were interpreted by the same number but consisting of 9 males and 2 females. The set of vehicles used are seen below:

SoV4: whiskey, candy, fennel, pho, hot wings, rhino, meerkat, marmot, lion, cheetah, violin, trombone, piano, theater, fountain.

For the metaphors, behavioral responses were 81% of the time, null were 8%, and iconic were 11%. For the similes, behavioral responses were 59% of the time, null were

25%, and iconic were 16%. Behavioral responses were 22% more common for metaphors, null responses were 17% more common for similes, and iconic responses were 5% more common for similes. Running a chi-square test, as I did before, gives us a P-value of 0.0001, which is extremely significant, the P2-value is 0.0001. These values, yet again, support the conclusion that there is a difference between metaphors and similes. These numbers do not fall in line the idea that when one is searching for a particular feature, rather than looking at the file as a whole, they tend to fail. More nulls were for similes in this case. But what we did get is support for the idea that similes tend to get iconic responses more often than metaphors, which the opposite of my secondary hypothesis.

The she-metaphors were interpreted by 12 participants, 8 male and 4 female. The she-similes were done by the same number of participants, but with 9 male and 3 female. The results were, for metaphors, 67% of the responses were behavioral, 14% were null, and 19% were iconic. With similes, 66% of the responses were behavioral, 18% were null, and 16% were iconic. This means that metaphors had 1% more behavioral, similes had 4% more null, and metaphors had 3% more iconic. The P3-value for this was 0.4423, which is not statistically significant. The P4-value for this set is 0.4203, which is not significant. These values do not support my primary hypothesis, but they do not line up with any of the previous sets of data. These percentages support a previously unsupported claim that similes will receive more null responses than metaphors. Maybe, in prompting the participants with a female-subject, for these vehicles, all of the features in their files were equally salient (similes), or there were many competing for 'first place', making the

participants chose not to answer. While with metaphors, in looking for one, or very few, salient features, the participants were readily able to respond intelligibly.

For this set, overall, metaphors were 74% behavioral, 11% null, and 15% iconic; similes were 63% behavioral, 21% null, and 16% iconic. Thus, metaphors had 11% more behavioral, 10% less null, and 1% less iconic. The P5-value for this is 0.0045 (significant) and the P6-value is 0.0343 (significant). The values support my primary hypothesis, but the percentages do not support my secondary hypothesis. They support the notion that similes will tend to receive more iconic responses, and that metaphors will tend to receive more behavioral responses.



13: SoV4: She-Metaphors



14: SoV4: He-Metaphors



15: SoV4: He-Similes



16: SoV4: She-Similes

4.5 The Data and Graphs: Set 5

Now, comparing them overall, I had a total of 45 participants interpreting the he-metaphors, with 32 male and 13 female; and I had 42 participants interpreting the he-similes, with 21 male and 21 female. For the metaphors, behavioral responses came up 74% of the time, null response appeared 13% of the time, and iconic responses came up 13% of the time. For similes, behavioral response showed up 67% of the time, null responses came up 13% of the time, and iconic was at 20% of the time. This means that behavioral responses came up 7% of the time more often for metaphors, null was at the same occurrence level, and iconic appeared 7% more often for similes. Running the chi-square test as before, we get a P1-value of 0.1091, which is not considered to be

statistically significant, and a P2-value of 0.2038, which is also not significant. This is despite the fact that over all, thus far, metaphors had behavioral responses 7% more than similes and similes had iconic 7% more than metaphors. Taking this into account, if we do not include the null responses, we get that for metaphors, behavioral came up 85% of the time and iconic came up 15% of the time; while with similes, we get that behavioral appeared 76% of the time and iconic was at 24%. This does give us a statistically relevant P1-value of 0.0117. The P2-value for this, including null responses, is 0.2038, without the null responses, we get a P2-value of 0.0351.

These values, if we do not include the null responses, support my primary hypothesis, but the percentages, just like when we looked at the sets individually, do not support my secondary hypothesis. They also do not support the idea that metaphors will tend to receive more null responses, as both metaphors and similes got the same percentage of those. The percentages do support the idea that similes will tend to receive more iconic responses than metaphors. This can be explained by saying that when a person is looking for one, or very few, (metaphors) salient features in a file, the behavioral features are more readily available; while when a person is looking at all of the content of a file (similes), the most noticeable features are iconic: or, at least, tend to be.

Now it is time to compare all of the sets of she-metaphors and she-similes together. The metaphors were interpreted by 45 participants, 28 male and 17 female. The similes were interpreted by 47 participants, 26 male and 21 female. The response for the metaphors were 65% behavioral, 17% null and 18% iconic. The similes had 67%

behavioral, 13% null, and 20% iconic. This means that similes got 2% more behavioral, metaphors got 4% more null, and similes got 2% more iconic. The P3-value is 0.5420 which is not statistically significant. The P4-value for the overall she-statements is 0.4746, which is not significant. As before, if we remove the null responses, we get that metaphors has behavioral responses 78% of the time and iconic 22% of the time; while with similes, we get the same. Which is not going to be a statistically relevant difference (value of 1). The values do not support my primary hypothesis, but the very small difference in values lend a very small amount of support to the notion that metaphors will tend to get more null responses, as seen in some of the sets of responses. Since these results differ from the he-statements, we could point to either that prompting with a female-subject results in the participants searching for relevant features which differ from those they search for with he-metaphors and failing; while they succeed when they take the files as a whole.

Now, if we take the total over all, combining the responses from he-metaphors with she-metaphors and the responses from he-similes with those from she-similes we get what is seen in the graph below. The metaphors were interpreted by 90 participants, 60 male and 30 female, and the similes were interpreted by 89 participants, 47 male and 42 female. The metaphors got 69% behavioral, 15% null, and 16% iconic. The similes got 67% behavioral, 13% null, and 20% iconic. Breaking this down, we got behavioral 2% more often for metaphors, null 2% more often for metaphors and iconic 4% more for similes. The P5-value for this over all is 0.5157, which is not statistically significant. The P6-value is 0.6260, which is not significant.

If we remove the null values, we get that metaphors got behavioral responses 81% of the time and iconic responses 19% of the time; similes got behavioral responses 77% of the time and iconic 23% of the time. Meaning that metaphors got behavioral 4% more often and similes for iconic more often by the same percent. This gives us a P5-value of 0.3079 and a P6-value of 0.3418, neither of which are significant. These values do not support my primary hypothesis, mostly because of the strong difference between the responses for he-statements and she-statements; the latter basically cancels out the difference in interpretation seen in for the he-statements. The percentages, however, support the notion that similes tend to receive iconic responses over metaphors; which, as I have mentioned before, is the opposite of my hypothesis.



17: He-Statements Overall



18: She-Statements Overall



19: The Statements Overall



20: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Iconicity



21: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Behavioral Responses



22: Comparing Metaphors and Similes for Null Responses

5 Discussion

In this section, I plan to give my interpretation of the data presented in the last section. As you may recall, I started this project with two hypotheses. The first was that there will be a statistically relevant difference between the interpretations of metaphors and similes; thereby concluding that metaphors are not abbreviated similes, as Aristotle's theory, and others like it, would claim. The second hypothesis was that metaphors will tend to receive iconic responses more often than similes. This claim is based on my own way of thinking, which is highly pictorial when it comes to metaphors.

In the case of the he-statements, I certainly have support for the primary hypothesis. In the overall analysis, as well as the individual analyses, I consistently got statistically relevant differences. These differences give support, thereby, for the

conclusion that metaphors are not abbreviated similes. For the she-statements, however, there was the interesting result that there was only a statistically relevant difference between metaphors and similes once. Overall, when we remove the null responses actually resulted in a P-value of 1, this the least statistical difference possible. Having a P-value of 1 for the she-statements basically canceled out the relevant differences in the he-statements, making the overall difference not statistically significant.

When it comes to my secondary hypothesis. I did not see that metaphors received iconic responses more often than similes for the he-statements. But rather, the opposite came out as supported. It would seem that given the results from this survey, similes tend to receive more iconic responses than metaphors. These results fall in line with another study, by Ravid A. Aisenman published in 1999. In that study, the participants were given sets of words and ask to choose whether it was more natural to have “is” or “is like” in between them. The author's results there supported the claim that metaphors and similes are not the same thing (what is called there the “nonequivalence view”).[55] These results, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, despite aligning with my view that they are not the same thing. This is because another study, published that same year, concerning the recall of metaphors and similes cross-culturally (Spanish monolinguals and English monolinguals) showed that there is some production bias within a linguistic community (some cultures will prefer metaphors over similes, even for the same set of objects).[56] For the she-statements, it can only be said, rather tenuously, that metaphors receive null responses more often than similes, and similes receive both iconic and behavioral

55 Aisenman, pg. 50
56 Harris, pg. 7

responses more often. But this difference is not statistically significant.

In the following subsection, I will go over way in which my study may have gone wrong. These include the lack of context and the possible variance in context. After that, I will move on to an explanation of why I think there was such a great difference in the interpretations of the he-statements vs. the she-statements. One way of handling the difference is to say that in English, 'he' is commonly used as a generic singular person, rather than a pronoun for a particular male. Another reason that there may be difference could be that people use different cognitive processes for interpreting statements with male-subjects and female-subjects. Finally, I will move on to how my theory of metaphors allows for the difference seen in the he-statements.

5.1 Ways the Study may have Gone Wrong

As I mentioned above, I can think of two ways that the study may have gone wrong. The first is that there was a lack of context. Some may, rightly, claim that the meaning of a metaphor, or any speech is highly dependent on the context of the utterance. To reuse an example I gave previously, take the statement 'love is love.' If we take that statement without any context whatsoever, we would get that it is necessarily true and very uninformative. But if the statement is made in a context where a person is hopelessly infatuated with a person who is dead-wrong for them, the statement 'love is love' would have some meaning would be informative in some sense (namely, 'love is irrational' or something like that). If, however, the statement is seen on a protest sign in favor of homosexual marriage, then the statement would have a radically different meaning (such as 'love is irrespective of gender' or 'love is good'). The core issue with my study which

some may claim is that the wild differences and similarities between metaphors and similes can't be taken at face value, because without context, there aren't reliable results.

The other issue that some may claim against my study is that I did not control for a context. The participants may have, easily, thought of a person that they knew and applied the metaphors to them, or they treated it as a generic, as we will see below. If the participants applied the metaphors or similes to a person that they knew, the results may be different because what they take to be possible of that subject is different. We can easily imagine that a participant took 'he' to be referring to an ex-lover, and in that case, how they take the metaphors or similes would be different than how they would take them were 'he' in reference to their father.

5.2 Reasons for Difference

As I mentioned above, I think that one of the reasons that the metaphors and similes in the she-statements do not seem to have a statistical difference is in virtue of the fact that 'he' is commonly used as a generic. For example, although there has been a trend to change this, when a philosopher is setting up a thought experiment, she may not have specified the gender the subject therein, but the default is to use 'he.'[57] If the participants in the study have a similar habit, then what we are looking at is what the participants take to be relevant to build up information about some generic person, not a particular. With the she-statements, 'she' is not treated as some generic for a person, but as a particular pronoun referring to a person. In that case, what the participants look for as relevant to the person would be rather different.

57 When writing that sentence, I noticed that I needed to pay special attention not to use 'he' and go with 'she.' Seeing 'she' in a thought experiment where the gender of the subject is unspecified catches many off guard.

Another possible reason, saying that 'he' as a generic pronoun is not relevant here, is that people think about women differently than they think about men. This is akin to the explanations seen in several of the sub-subsections concerning the she-statements. It may be the case that the prompting with the gender resulted in a different way of interpreting the statements. The features which are salient when a person is looking for one, or very few, feature(s) for a male-subject are different than the salient feature(s) one would find when looking for a female-subject. This different way of thinking about the statement will elicit different sorts of responses; which, just by coincidence, metaphors and similes are interpreted similarly. This way of explaining the difference does not help the similes account of metaphors because the examples used by the supporters involve male-subjects; which does not illicit similar responses.

5.3 How My Theory Handles The Difference

Just merely looking at the he-statements, I have a strong difference. As I mentioned in chapter 2 4.6.3 of this thesis, my theory can handle and my even imply a difference between the two. My explanation for the difference is that with similes, since the mental files are compared in their entirety, the salient features tend to be more iconic, whereas since with metaphors, the hearer is only looking for one, or very few, particularly relevant feature(s), the salient features tend to be behavioral. This explanation would work either way. We can suppose that were my secondary hypothesis correct, I would claim that the salient features elicited by the statements are flipped. This does not, however, make my theory unfalsifiable. The falsifying condition for the theory would be that there is no difference between the two.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

I started this thesis with a rather robust metaphor that philosophy is cartography. Different theories are different maps used to represent the world, or different aspects of it. Maps which fail to represent the world in the right way are bad maps; philosophical theories which do the same are equally bad. I ventured into an area seldom mapped; hic sunt dracones. First, I compared different maps of tropology to see which one made the most sense given my knowledge of the region. These maps failed in different respects, but some of the core notions were accurate, at least in the case of the Interaction Account of Metaphors. Noticing this, I took it upon myself to draw out a new map of the region, first from the armchair, taking the claims of Cicero, Austin, and Ricanati; and then venturing forth into the region through the use of experimental philosophy. My map can account for the phenomena seen in the study and for phenomena found elsewhere in the realm of tropology.

An open question is the relation between metaphors and literal speech given my theory. Since, for reasons outside of the scope of this thesis, I hold that there is no hard-line between metaphors and literal speech (there is no great ocean or river dividing these regions), my theory needs to explain why, in a vagueness-friendly way, there is a seeming difference. One possible way of accounting for this is that the amount of salient features which may be carried over from the vehicle (or object of the sentence) to the subject in literal speech is very high, if not all of the features, whereas with metaphors, the number of salient features which may be carried over are not quite as high. With 'philosophy is cartography' while the number of salient features is low, the number of possibly correct

features that one may carry over is quite high, but since the set of these features does not encompass all of the features in the CARTOGRAPHY file, we still call this a metaphor. In the same way, if we were to analyze the statement “geometry is math,” people would assent to this being literal because all of the features in the MATH file are applicable to the GEOMETRY file, but not necessarily the other way around. Further testing and exploration in tropology is needed to get a truly accurate map. It is accurate to say that the region is beautiful and dragon-less.

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