Differential Perceptions of LGBT Individuals:

The Intersectionality of Sexual Orientation and Gender

by

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ABSTRACT

Current research on anti-gay attitudes has focused heavily on heterosexuals versus non-heterosexuals, with very little research delving into the differences within these "non-heterosexual" groups. The author conducted an exploratory analysis of how the intersectional effect of gender and sexual orientation affect perceptions of target groups' gender and sexuality, which in turn might explain different levels of prejudice toward LGBT subgroups. Based on previous studies, the author hypothesized that participants would believe that a gay male has a more fixed sexuality than a lesbian, leading in turn to higher levels of moral outrage. This study further aims to extend the literature to perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals by testing competing hypotheses. Participants might feel less moral outrage toward these groups than other LGBT subgroups because they believe their sexuality is even less fixed than lesbians'. Alternatively, participants might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender targets (versus other LGBT groups) because of the uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty about these groups' sexuality and/or gender. Overall, participants demonstrated an interactive effect of gender and sexuality on factors including perceived sexual orientation, perceived biological sex, perceived gender identity, perceived sexual fixedness, and moral outrage rather than gender having a main effect on perceptions of gender and sexual orientation having a main effect on perceptions of sexuality. Furthermore, perceptions of sexual fixedness mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for heterosexual target groups, but not gay targets. Gender certainty mediated the effect of gender on moral outrage for pre-op transgender target groups, but not heterosexuals. This work is important to inform future research on the topics of the

intersection of sexuality and gender, especially to extend the limited literature on perceptions of bisexual and transgender individuals.

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Introduction

Gender and sexual orientation play an important role in our everyday lives. Although the legal system has made a lot of progress toward equality for women and LGBT individuals, there is much anecdotal and empirical evidence demonstrating that implicit biases and negative attitudes toward women and the LGBT community might still exist. Several instances of businesses discriminating against gay and lesbian couples have been reported in the past few years, from pizzerias and bakeries to photographers refusing to cater to gay and lesbian weddings (Weingus, 2015; McGough, 2015; Barnes, 2014). Further, there are still several states that do not have laws prohibiting discrimination against LGBT individuals, meaning many places are still able to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation for employment and housing (Brown, 2015). The current project was designed to investigate what perceptions and opinions concerning gender and sexuality might underlie prejudicial attitudes and discrimination toward LGBT groups. For example, the continued debate over whether people are born gay or actively decide to be gay has implications for anti-gay prejudicial attitudes (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2010; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; Sakalli, 2002). Specifically, people who believe that homosexuality is a controllable factor exhibit more negative perceptions of gays and lesbians, and conversely people who believe that sexual orientation is determined biologically exhibit more positive perceptions of gays and lesbians. Investigating the roots of anti-LGBT attitudes is an important first step to combatting the anti-gay discrimination that stems from these attitudes.

However, the literature on anti-gay attitudes is lacking when it comes to the interaction of sexual orientation and gender. Attitudes toward, for example, gay males

often do not generalize to lesbians, despite their shared LGBT status. Furthermore, most research into anti-gay attitudes has focused on the L and G of LGBT, with very little focus on bisexual and transgender individuals. That is, it is likely that people hold different attitudes toward bisexual and transgender individuals when compared to gay men and lesbians, but we do not know how exactly are they perceived differently. Anecdotally speaking, we know that bisexuals and transgender individuals experience discrimination and hate crimes (such as transgender individuals being attacked and even killed; Frosch, 2008), but what kinds of perceptions might underlie the intense negative prejudice that might underlie these hate crimes?

More specifically, I conducted an empirical analysis of how the intersectionality of sexual orientation and gender leads to differential perceptions of gender and sexuality and, in turn, prejudice. I also specifically aimed to get a clearer picture of how people perceive bisexual and transgender individuals, given the lack of extant research on these groups. To accomplish these goals, I will first discuss the existing literature on sexual prejudice. Next I will discuss the differences between perceptions of and attitudes toward gay men versus lesbians, and further expand this into a review of how perceptions of gender and sexual orientation are interconnected. I will then explain how these factors might predict prejudice. Finally, I will present a study that extends the reviewed research to compare a host of different perceptions and reactions to different target groups based on the intersection of gender and sexual orientation.

Sexual Prejudice

Although, colloquially, people use the term *homophobia* to refer to prejudice against sexual minorities, Herek (2000a) argues that this term is incorrect because it

implies that the prejudice is based on irrational fears (because of the term *phobia*). Heterosexism, on the other hand, generally refers to prejudice and discrimination toward non-heterosexual groups at a societal level. Heterosexist beliefs and behaviors can be influenced by many factors, such as participant gender, age, religion, etc. (for a review, see Hebl, Law, & King, 2010). At the individual level, Herek (2000a) suggests that sexual prejudice refers to negative attitudes toward non-heterosexuals. Some use these terms interchangeably, however, meaning that heterosexism might refer to the individual level, and homophobia might actually be referring to sexual prejudice, and so on. Regardless of which term is used, it is clear from both anecdotal and empirical evidence that prejudice exists toward non-heterosexuals (Herek, 2000a). Although on one level "non-heterosexual" is a helpful umbrella category that captures the heterosexist nature of sexual prejudice, it refers to multiple subgroups of sexual minorities who might experience different levels and types of prejudice. Often called the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, these subgroups created by the intersection of sexual orientation and gender minorities are lumped together despite being unique, distinct groups. Failing to investigate the differences in prejudice toward subgroups might obscure the psychological underpinnings of this prejudice and prevent us from understanding the roots of sexual prejudice. Thus, one goal of the current research is to investigate each of these groups independently. How do people perceive gay individuals, bisexuals, and transgender individuals—and even further, do these perceptions differ depending on the target's gender?

Gay Men vs. Lesbians

Originally, research on anti-gay attitudes lumped gay men and lesbians into one category of "homosexuals" (Brady & Busse, 1994; Cass, 1984; Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008) effectively ignoring possible target gender differences. More recently, though, researchers have investigated how perceptions of gay men differ from those of lesbians. This research indicates that gay men are generally perceived more negatively than lesbians (Blashill & Powlishta, 2010; Kerns & Fine, 1994). People also make different specific assumptions about gay men versus lesbians. Taylor (1983) found that participants drew distinctions between gay men and lesbians on multiple variables, such as believing gay men needed the approval of others and were more expressive of their feelings than lesbians. Herek (2002) found that heterosexuals rated gay men as more mentally ill and less fit to adopt children than lesbians. Furthermore, Herek (2000b) found that, although heterosexual women perceived gay men and lesbian similarly, heterosexual men indicated that they felt significantly less warm toward gay men than lesbians. Generally speaking, people seem to believe that gay men and lesbians have more similar character traits to the opposite sex than to their own (e.g., gay men have more similar characteristics to women than to men). Kite and Deaux (1980), in support, described how people tend to apply implicit inversion theory to gays and lesbians. That is, participants perceive gay men as more similar to heterosexual women (compared to heterosexual men and lesbians), and perceive lesbians as more similar to heterosexual men than heterosexual women or gay men.

The Intersectionality of Sexual Orientation and Gender

Some characteristics are perceived to be interconnected with each other, even if they do not necessarily impact each other in reality. For example, racial and gender stereotypes often overlap (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013). Specifically, Galinsky and colleagues found interactions such that, when compared to White women, Asian women were seen as more feminine, but Black women were actually seen as more masculine. Furthermore, White men reported being more attracted to Asian women over Black women, but women reported the opposite pattern (i.e., more attracted to Black men over Asian men). This phenomenon of two different group memberships being intertwined might also be the case for sexual orientation and gender—perhaps even more so considering that there are groups that are specifically defined by the mix of their gender and sexuality (e.g., a lesbian is specifically a homosexual female). Inferences people draw about a target's sexuality might be different based on the target's. Similarly, the inferences people draw about a target's gender might depend on their sexual orientation. In other words, the assumption that reactions to different LGBT groups will generalize across genders might be flawed—it might be the intersection of gender and sexual orientation that is important. For example, past research indicates that people's perceptions depend on the combination of sexual orientation and gender. For example, Herek (2002) reported that heterosexual women felt more negatively toward bisexual men and women than gay men and lesbians, while heterosexual men felt more negatively toward bisexual and gay men when compared to both bisexual women and lesbians. Eliason (1997) found that bisexual men were perceived more negatively than both gay men and lesbians, who were themselves seen more negatively than bisexual women.

These studies indicate that it not a matter of simple differences in sexual orientation, but an interaction of sexual orientation and gender that might determine prejudicial reactions. Further, transgender individuals are often lumped in with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals (i.e., "LGBT" community; Worthen, 2013), even though being transgender is defined by gender, not sexual orientation; transgender individuals can be of any sexual orientation.

It is possible that all groups that stray from sexual and gender norms are generally lumped together because they are all counter-normative. Indeed, research indicates that people do not like others who violate sexual orientation and gender norms, and are even less fond of "double offenders" (those who violate both sexual orientation *and* gender norms; Lehavot & Lambert, 2007). This trend is evident in research on perceptions of masculine versus feminine gays and lesbians (Cohen, Hall, & Tuttle, 2009; Glick, 2007; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Laner & Laner, 1980; Walker, 2012). Feminine lesbians are perceived more positively than masculine lesbians (Cohen et al., 2009; Laner & Laner, 1980), while feminine gay men are perceived more *negatively* than masculine gay men (Glick, 2007). Because men are expected to be masculine and women feminine, these groups that do not follow these norms (i.e., feminine men and masculine women) are violating gender norms. Coupled with the violation of sexual norms that comes with identifying as gay or lesbian, feminine gay men and masculine lesbians are thus "double offenders," and are perceived particularly negatively as a result.

Gays and lesbians might face less prejudice than bisexual and transgender individuals given that they are at least clearly defined by their gender and sexual orientation. Bisexuals and transgender individuals, on the other hand, are less easily defined. These groups are not clearly defined by a single sexual orientation or gender,

and thus are much more ambiguous. In fact, these groups are *defined* by their ambiguity: bisexuals are sometimes attracted to men and sometimes women, thus exhibiting sexual orientation ambiguity. Transgender are ambiguous in terms of gender: They either identify as a different gender than their biological sex or have taken measures to change their sex.

This ambiguity and intermingling of perceptions of sexuality and gender might mean that people make inferences about gender based on sexuality and people might make inferences about sexuality based on gender. In other words, rather than a gender label having a main effect on perceptions of gender, or a sexual orientation label having a main effect on perceptions of sexuality, the two labels might interact to predict these perceptions. More specifically, how people perceive different LGBT groups' sexuality might depend on gender, and how people perceive different gender groups' gender might depend on their sexual orientation. People might particularly struggle with perceptions of sexual orientation and gender for these more ambiguous groups, such as bisexual and transgender individuals.

There is not a lot of research investigating perceptions of bisexuals. This small body of research has demonstrated that although people tend to place gay men (Glick, 2007; Kite & Deaux, 1987; Madon, 1997) and lesbians (Brambilla, Carnaghi, & Ravenna, 2011; Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006; Walker, 2012) into masculine and feminine subgroups, they are less likely to be able to identify bisexuals based on appearance (Hayfield, 2013). Herek (2002) found that female participants felt significantly less warmth toward bisexual women and men than gay men and lesbians. However, male participants felt less warmth toward both heterosexual and bisexual male

targets as compared to female targets. In other words, women were more focused on the sexual orientation – preferring gay men and lesbians to bisexuals; whereas men were more focused on gender – preferring women to men. Thus, the present research on perceptions of bisexuals is minimal and unclear, and needs to be extended to more fully understand perceptions of bisexuals and how they might differ from other LGBT subgroups.

Transgender individuals are unique in the LGBT community because, as previously mentioned, they are not defined by their sexuality. Anecdotally, transgender individuals face discrimination. North Carolina, for instance, recently passed a bill that mandates that people use bathrooms only matching the gender on their birth certificate (Miller, 2016). Supporters claim this will make women and children safer, indicating a belief that transgender individuals are inherently sexually deviant, if not dangerous. Transgender individuals are rarely visible in the media, except in these negative scenarios, which might feed into these negative perceptions of transgender individuals. However, there has been very little empirical research on perceptions of transgender individuals; that is, almost all of the current research investigating transgender individuals focuses on the clinical or personal experience of transgender individuals rather than how they are perceived (Clarke, Hayfield, & Huxley 2012; McKinney, 2005; Toomey, Ryan, Diaz, Card, & Russell, 2010). Norton and Herek (2013) asked participants how warm they felt toward sexual minority groups (gay men, lesbians, bisexual men, and bisexual women) and transgender individuals (without specifying gender). They found that participants' ratings of transgender individuals positively correlated with the ratings of the sexual minority groups, but rated transgender

significantly more negatively than the other groups. That is, participants felt the least warm toward transgender individuals when compared to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals. Thus, the only study specifically comparing transgender targets to other LGBT subgroups suggests prejudice might be particularly high. However, not only did this not give an idea about perceptions of transgender individuals by gender, but it also did not indicate whether there were differences in pre-op versus post-op transgender individuals. It is possible that people have different perceptions of these subgroups as well. In support, Gerhardstein and Anderson (2010) found that participants rated transgender targets whose facial features were gender-incongruent (i.e., a transgender male with feminine features or a transgender female with masculine features) to be less attractive than those whose features were congruent (i.e., a transgender male with masculine features or a transgender female with feminine features), leading to higher levels of transphobia. Because post-op transgender individuals physically change, perhaps they become more gender-congruent (compared to pre-op transgender individuals). I extended this limited research by (a) testing whether this prejudice was equally high for male and female transgender individuals (b) testing whether there was a difference for pre-op versus post-op transgender individuals, and (c) investigating what perceptions might explain this higher level of prejudice.

Prejudice and Discrimination

These differences in perceptions of gender and sexuality would be particularly problematic if they resulted in differential levelf os prejudice and discrimination toward these groups. Although the Supreme Court recently legalized gay and lesbian marriage nationwide (de Vogue & Diamond, 2015), some states still allow for explicit

discrimination against the LGBT community in other ways. For example, Mississippi is currently voting on a bill that would explicitly allow for discrimination against LGBT individuals in employment, housing, providing services for same-sex weddings, and even allowing parents to force their LGBT children to go to conversion therapy (Allen, 2016). Several states have Romeo and Juliet laws that explicitly only apply to opposite-gender sex (Higdon, 2008). These laws offer protections for similarly-aged juveniles who engage in non-forced sexual acts that would otherwise result in criminal prosecution for statutory rape and the requirement to register as a sex offender. Some states explicitly state that these protections do not apply to same-sex teenagers.

Likewise, differential perceptions of gays and lesbians might impact their experiences with the legal system. For example, Kaitlyn Hunt had sex with her 14-year-old girlfriend when she was 18 (Harrison, 2013). Though the sex was not forced, her girlfriend could not legally consent and Kaitlyn accepted a plea deal to avoid being placed on the sex offender registry, leading to a sentence of 4 months in jail, 2 years of house arrest, and 3 years of probation (Corcoran & Lanee, 2013). Matthew Limon, on the other hand, was also charged at the age of 18 for having non-forced oral sex with a 14-year-old boy (Stout, 2003). However, he was sentenced to serve 17 years in prison (this has since been overturned, but he had to serve nearly 4 years in prison before then, while Kaitlyn was able to get a plea deal before spending any time in prison).

There is a small body of literature providing empirical evidence consistent with this anecdotal example that suggests implicit anti-gay bias might lead to differential application of these laws. Salerno, Murphy, and Bottoms (2014) assessed public support for registering sex offenders based on sexual orientation and gender. Participants rated

their support for registering a juvenile sex offender for having non-forced (but technically illegal) sex with a similarly-aged peer. Participants were significantly more punitive toward gay males than heterosexual boys, but were actually marginally less punitive toward lesbians than heterosexual girls. Thus, it is clear that discrimination plays out very differently for males and females in this context: people want to punish gay boys more than heterosexual boys, but lesbians less than heterosexual girls. Thus, although most states no longer explicitly allow discrimination in sex offender registration, implicit biases against gay males might lead to differential application by law enforcement. This is just one of many examples of LGBT discrimination in legal judgments (e.g., Quas, Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Stawiski, Dykema- Engblade, & Tindale, 2012; Walsh, 1994; Wiley & Bottoms, 2009, 2013)

Although the differential laws that explicitly allowed for discrimination based on sexual orientation have been eradicated, these implicit biases affecting gay and lesbian individuals in the law are also evident outside of the legal system. Hebl, Foster, Mannix, and Dovidio (2002) had confederates pose as job applicants who wore hats printed with either stigmatizing ("Gay and Proud") or non-stigmatizing ("Texan and Proud") phrases. These confederates went to six different stores inquiring about available job opportunities, and subsequently rated the store employees on formal discrimination and how they treated them interpersonally. Potential employers did not formally discriminate against these participants in that they treated stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals equally in terms of the extent to which they were honest with all participants about job availability, allowed them to complete a job application, called them back with job offers, and gave them permission to use their restroom. However, interpersonal discrimination

was apparent in that the potential employers spoke more negatively toward the stigmatized participants, and shortened the interaction time for these participants when compared to the non-stigmatized participants. Similarly, Hendren and Blank (2009) found that store clerks were not as willing to help customers wearing pro-gay shirts as compared to a control group of customers, further supporting the idea that this kind of interpersonal discrimination can negatively impact gay men and lesbians.

So evidence indicates that there is prejudice against gay men and lesbians and that the degree of prejudice and discrimination might be different between gay men and lesbians, but why? One potential theoretical explanation, as mentioned previously, is implicit inversion theory (Kite & Deaux, 1980). To reiterate, people tend to believe that gay men are similar to heterosexual women, and lesbians are similar to heterosexual men. This assumed violation of gender norms might lead to prejudicial reactions. Another potential explanation offered by Pirlott and Neuberg (2014) is the idea that certain groups direct unwanted sexual attention more than others (i.e., heterosexuals might believe certain target groups are more likely to hit on them than others). Specifically, heterosexual women believed that bisexual men and women and lesbians all directed unwanted sexual interest toward them, while heterosexual men believed that it was bisexual and gay men who directed sexual interest toward them. Importantly, a follow-up study indicated that heterosexual men and women felt more negatively toward these same groups. Thus, this belief that certain groups might direct unwanted sexual interest to the perceiver might be what elicits the prejudicial reactions. Other potential explanations offered by Pirlott and Neuberg (2014) include in-group-out-group heterosexism (i.e., heterosexuals have prejudicial reactions based on sexual orientation alone), gender-norm

violation (i.e., heterosexuals experience prejudice toward gay men because they do not follow gender norms), and sexual identity threat (i.e., prejudice is a result of insecurities about one's own sexual orientation). Pirlott and Neuberg's data ultimately fit their explanation better than the alternatives.

Perceptions of Sexuality and Gender

One goal of the current research is to investigate how people's perceptions of individuals' gender and sexuality are affected by the *intersection* of their sexual orientation and gender. A second goal is to identify which perceptions might explain potentially different levels of prejudice toward these subgroups. In other words, I tested whether the intersection of a target's gender and sexual orientation would predict perceptions that, in turn, might influence prejudice toward subgroups of the LGBT community. Below, I review the potential perceptions that could be affected by the intersection of gender and sexual orientation.

Perceived sexual orientation. The combination of sexual orientation and gender might lead people to draw different assumptions about a target group's sexual orientation. People might not make the same assumptions about, for example, a gay male that they would for a lesbian in terms of their sexuality. In support, people are likely to perceive a girl kissing another girl in a college setting as heterosexual rather than bisexual or lesbian (Lannutti & Denes, 2012), whereas they might assume a boy kissing another boy in the same setting is gay. Identical same-gender sexual activity might lead to different perceptions of sexual orientation for men versus women.

Perceived gender. Similarly, the combination of gender and sexual orientation might also affect belief about gender. People might, for instance, believe that gay men are

less male than straight men, as they are often perceived to be more feminine (Kite & Deaux, 1980). But when considering lesbians, people might consider them to be just as feminine as heterosexual women, considering the "lipstick lesbian" stereotype (e.g., a feminine lesbian; Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006). Further, gender roles are less strict for women, and thus lesbians might get a break in this sense (Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014). It is also important to note the difference between perceptions of biological sex and gender identity. Here, I refer to biological sex as the physical characteristics (including genitalia, body shape, body hair, hormones, etc.) an individual is born with, whereas gender identity is how an individual personally defines their own gender. These two factors do not always align with each other, which might cause confusion about an individual's gender.

Gender and sexual orientation certainty. Why might a lack of certainty about an individual's gender or sexual orientation impact prejudice? According to Hogg (2007), uncertainty is a very powerful motivator. Hogg's Uncertainty-Identity Theory asserts that it is impossible to be completely certain of anything, so people are consistently driven to reduce high levels of uncertainty. Although people might feel some level of uncertainty about some LGBT groups' gender and sexual orientation, it might only spark prejudice in certain contexts or for certain groups. That is, though gay men and lesbians might be disliked for violating sexual orientation norms, they are at least easily categorized. So people might be more prejudiced against bisexual and transgender (versus gay and lesbian) targets because they elicit greater uncertainty in terms of gender and sexual orientation.

Sexual fixedness. People might have different levels of prejudice toward LGBT individuals who they perceive as sexually deviant depending the degree to which they think their sexuality is fixed and unchangeable. Dweck's Fixed versus Incremental Learning Theory (2000) proposed that intelligence is a factor that people might believe is either stable throughout time (fixed theory) or an ability that can be developed throughout the lifespan (incremental theory). People tend to perceive homosexuality more negatively overall if they believe it is a chosen trait than if they believe it is biological (Sakalli, 2002; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2010), indicating that people might differ in their belief that sexuality is a fixed versus flexible trait as well. This belief might vary based on the interaction of a target's sexual orientation and gender. For instance, people perceive female sexuality as more flexible than male sexuality overall (Diamond, 2003; Peplau, 2003), so it is likely that people will perceive lesbians as having a less fixed sexuality than gay males. Indeed, my past research indicates that people perceive lesbians to have significantly more malleable sexuality than gay men (Salerno, Malik, & Stevenson, in preparation). Thus, perceived sexual fixedness is likely to differ based on the combination of a target's gender and sexual orientation. Furthermore, sexual fixedness might increase prejudicial reactions because participants believe the sexually deviant behavior is more likely to continue if the individual's sexuality is fixed, rather than just a "phase" they will get over if the individual's sexuality is more malleable.

Moral Outrage

To assess prejudice toward targets, I assessed participants' level of moral outrage toward each group. Moral outrage is a constellation of cognitive, affective, and behavioral negative reactions to a group or situation (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004),

and thus might represent a particularly extreme form of prejudice. Research focusing on punishment motives links moral outrage to retributive motives (Carlsmith, Darly, & Robinson, 2002), and I have found that moral outrage is indeed a mediator that explains greater punitiveness toward gay male versus lesbian sex offenders (Salerno et al., in preparation). Furthermore, I found that overall, participants felt less moral outrage toward lesbians than gay men. Thus, I would expect to find this pattern here as well. I will extend this research to assess moral outrage toward bisexuals and transgender individuals.

I will also investigate which perceptions (reviewed above) will affect moral outrage. My past studies indicate that sexual fixedness predicts moral outrage for gay men and lesbians (Malik & Salerno, 2016). Specifically, we found that lesbian juvenile sex offenders, when portrayed as feminine, are perceived as having a less fixed sexuality than when portrayed as masculine, leading to less moral outrage, and less punitiveness. Conversely, perceived sexual fixedness, moral outrage, and punitiveness were equally high for masculine and feminine (as well as straight girls and boys). However, participants believed lesbians (regardless of appearance) had lower sexual fixedness than gay boys overall, which lead to less moral outrage and less punitiveness. Thus, I expected sexual fixedness to again explain moral outrage.

It is also likely that levels of certainty regarding gender and sexual orientation will impact moral outrage. Because people are uncomfortable with ambiguity, they might feel more moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender individuals (as compared to other LGBT groups) because they feel less certain about their gender or sexual orientation.

The Present Study

The present study aims to extend the research in the area of perceptions toward LGBT individuals. Research, thus far, has focused on lesbians and gay men, with very little information about how bisexuals and transgender individuals are perceived. I hypothesized that there would be a significant interaction between a target's sexual orientation and gender on perceptions of target groups' gender and sexuality. In other words, gender and sexual orientation will be intertwined—people will judge (a) sexuality of the different LGBT groups differently based on gender and (b) gender of the different gender groups differently based on their LGBT status. Because this is the first study that I am aware of to directly compare perceptions of sexuality and gender for all of these groups, I took a very exploratory approach to my hypotheses. I did not have specific a *priori* hypotheses about the pattern of this interaction for all groups, but based on my previous research I did have predictions about gay men and lesbians. As previously stated, my past research has shown that participants feel less moral outrage toward lesbians as compared to gay men because they perceive their sexuality as less fixed. That is, people believe lesbians (as compared to gay men) are less fixed in their sexuality, and are thus less morally outraged toward them (Malik & Salerno, 2016). Drawing from this evidence, I predicted that the same would hold true here: specifically, that participants would believe gay men to have higher sexual fixedness, resulting in more moral outrage as compared to lesbians. Similarly, I would expect the same for heterosexual men and women, since participants would likely believe that heterosexual men are more fixed in their sexuality than heterosexual women.

Regarding bisexual and transgender groups, I had competing hypotheses. Because having a less fixed sexuality lead to less moral outrage for lesbians (vs. gay men), participants might perceive bisexual and transgender individuals to have an even less fixed sexuality and gender, respectively, leading to even *less* moral outrage toward these groups. On the other hand, participants might feel *more* moral outrage toward bisexual and transgender individuals when compared to other groups because of the uncertainty about their gender and sexual orientation.

Method

Participants

One hundred and seventy five undergraduate students were recruited via the online SONA system (70% female, 29% male, 1% other; $M_{age} = 23$, $SD_{age} = 4.64$). Fifty-five percent of participants were White, 26% were Hispanic, 7% were Asian, 6% were Black, and 5% described their ethnicity as "other." Eighty-eight percent of participants reported that they were heterosexual, while 7% were bisexual, 3% were gay or lesbian, and 2% reported their sexual orientation as "other." I chose to include non-heterosexual participants because LGBT individuals might still have negative opinions of others within the LGBT community (Mohr & Rochlen, 1999).

Procedure

Participants were recruited via SONA to participate in this study in exchange for one research credit for class. They were first informed that all information would be confidential and that they could skip questions or stop participating at any time without being penalized. Participants were randomly assigned to give their opinions about one of ten groups: lesbians, heterosexual women, gay men, heterosexual men, bisexual women,

bisexual men, pre-op transgender women, pre-op transgender men, post-op transgender women, or post-op transgender men. To reduce social desirability concerns, participants were instructed to answer questions based on what stereotypes they believe to exist, rather than their personal beliefs using previous methodology (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Participants answered items about their perceptions of the group's gender and sexuality and the level of moral outrage they felt about the group.

Materials and Measures

Perceived sexual orientation. Participants were asked, "If you had to guess how the average American would assume that a *lesbian woman* is attracted to, who would it be?" Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing attracted to "nobody" and 100 representing "attracted to completely men." Thus, higher numbers indicate a higher attraction to men. This question was repeated with the option of 0 representing "nobody" and 100 representing "attracted to completely women," where higher numbers indicate a higher attraction to women.

Perceived biological sex. Participants were told, "Biological sex is the physical sex characteristics an individual is born with and develops including genitalia, body shape, voice pitch, body hair, hormones, chromosomes, etc." and then asked, "If you had to guess how the average American would classify a *lesbian woman's* biological sex, what would it be?" Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing "asexual" and 100 representing "completely male." Thus, higher numbers indicate a stronger belief that the group in question is biologically male. Again, this

¹ Participants were asked to respond about only one of the ten groups; *lesbian woman* in the measures thus holds the place of the target group was specific to the condition to which the participant was assigned.

question was repeated with the option of 0 representing "asexual" and 100 representing "completely female," with higher numbers indicating a stronger belief that the group is biologically female.

Perceived gender identity. Participants were told, "Gender identity is how an individual, in their own head, defines their gender based on how much they align (or don't align) with what they understand to be the options for gender." and then asked, "If you had to guess how the average American would classify a *lesbian woman's* gender identity, what would it be?" Participants answered on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, with 0 representing "non-gendered" and 100 representing "complete man-ness." Thus, higher numbers indicated a stronger belief that the group identifies as male. This question was again repeated with 0 representing "non-gendered" and 100 representing "complete woman-ness," with higher numbers indicating a stronger belief that the group identifies as female.

Sexual fixedness scale. Participants completed 7-items assessing their belief that the group's sexual orientation is fixed (e.g., "They have clear gender preferences for sexual partners," "Their gender preferences for sexual partners are fixed and unchangeable," "They are likely to exhibit change in whether they prefer men or women in the future," "Their gender preferences for sexual partners is fluid and changeable," "They have a certain sexual orientation and they cannot really do much to change it," "Their sexual orientation is something about them that they cannot change much.," and "They can try new things, but they cannot really change their basic sexual orientation") on 7-point Likert scales ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree". Higher

scores indicated a stronger belief that the target group's sexual orientation is fixed and unchangeable (Cronbach's $\alpha = .83$).

Gender certainty. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were certain of a *lesbian woman's* gender on an 11-point scale from 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain). Thus, higher numbers indicate more certainty in the target group's gender.

Sexual orientation certainty. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were certain of a *lesbian woman's* sexual orientation on an 11-point scale from 0% (not at all certain) to 100% (completely certain). Thus, higher numbers indicate more certainty in the target group's sexual orientation.

Moral outrage scale. Participants answered 4 items assessing their moral outrage toward the target group (e.g., "I feel a desire to hurt them," "I believe they are evil to the core," "I feel morally outraged by them," and "I feel a compelling desire to punish them;" Skitka et al., 2004) on 6-point Likert scales ranging from "*Strongly Disagree*" to "*Strongly Agree*". Higher numbers indicate more moral outrage toward the group (Cronbach's $\alpha = .91$).

RESULTS

All dependent measures were analyzed with 2 (gender) X 5 (LGBT status: heterosexual, gay, bisexual, pre-op trans, post-op trans) between-subjects ANOVAs.

Perceived sexual orientation². There was a significant main effect of LGBT status on the belief that the group is attracted to men, F(4, 165) = 3.21, p = .014. However, post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that no differences reached significance, all $ps \ge .24$.

This main effect was qualified by a significant gender by LGBT status interaction, F(4, 165) = 44.79, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed that—as one would expect—for heterosexuals, participants predictably believed women (M = 83.33, SD = 24.87) were significantly more attracted to men than were men (M = 10.00, SD = 13.10), F(1, 22) = 66.45, p < .001. For gay groups, participants believed men (M = 91.65, SD = 8.34) were significantly more attracted to men than women (M = 25.00, SD = 24.48), F(1, 38) = 148.43, p < .001. Interestingly, for bisexuals, participants believed men (M = 65.00, SD = 16.82) were significantly more attracted to men than women (M = 42.28, SD = 16.56), F(1, 39) = 18.68, p < .001. For both pre- and post-op trangender targets, participants perceived men and women as equally attracted to men; all other effects were nonsignificant, all $Fs \le .55$, $ps \ge .46$.

⁻

² Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of results on perceptions of attraction to men. When I analyzed the perceptions of attraction to women the pattern of results was the same, but reversed.




Figure 1. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived sexual orientation.

Biological sex³. Participants saw men as significantly more biologically male (M = 64.88, SD = 3.31) than women (M = 43.27, SD = 3.28), F(1, 152) = 21.51, p < .001. There was also a significant main effect of LGBT status on the belief that the group is biologically male, F(4, 152) = 4.23, p = .003. Post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that heterosexual groups (M = 40.78) were seen as significantly less biologically male than pre-op transgender groups (M = 69.96), p = .001 and post-op transgender groups (M = 61.83), p = .015. There were no other significant differences between groups, all $ps \ge .10$.

These main effects were qualified by the predicted significant gender by LGBT status interaction, F(4, 152) = 10.08, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed that for heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 68.22, SD = 35.36) were biologically more male than were women (M = 13.33, SD = 16.08), F(1, 19) = 22.92, p < .001. Similarly,

³ Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of results on perceptions of biological "male-ness." When I analyzed the perceptions of biological "female-ness" the pattern of results was the same, but reversed.

for gay groups, participants believed men (M = 69.14, SD = 24.23) were biologically more male than women (M = 31.27, SD = 32.64), F(1, 34) = 16.01, p < .001. For bisexuals, participants again believed men (M = 70.05, SD = 30.18) were biologically more male than women (M = 28.88, SD = 21.99), F(1, 36) = 21.43, p < .001. For pre-op transgender groups, participants perceived men (M = 68.13) and women (M = 71.80) to be equally biologically male, F(1, 29) = .09, p = .76. For post-op transgender groups, participants believed men (M = 48.87, SD = 28.78) were biologically less male than were women (M = 71.10, SD = 26.98), F(1, 34) = 5.62, p = .024.




Figure 2. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived biological sex.

Gender identity⁴. Participants saw male target groups as having greater male gender identity (M = 54.08, SD = 2.93) than did women (M = 40.12, SD = 2.95), F(1, 158) = 11.27, p = .001. This main effect was qualified by the predicted significant gender by LGBT status interaction, F(4, 158) = 6.20, p < .001. Simple effects analyses revealed

⁴ Because the two scales were conversely redundant, I am reporting only one set of results on perceptions of male gender identity. When I analyzed the perceptions of female gender identity, the pattern of results was the same, but reversed.

that for heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 81.70, SD = 23.90) had greater male gender identity than women (M = 24.42, SD = 29.89), F(1, 20) = 23.91, p<.001. For bisexuals, participants believed men (M = 53.83, SD = 20.25) had greater male gender identity than women (M = 35.81, SD = 23.39), F(1, 37) = 6.58, p = .015. For gay, pre-op transgender, and post-op transgender groups, participants perceived men and women as having similar levels of male gender identity; all other effects were nonsignificant, all $Fs \le .65$, $ps \ge .42$.




Figure 3. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived gender identity.

Sexual fixedness scale. As predicted, participants perceived men has having a significantly more fixed sexuality (M = 4.66, SD = .13) compared to women (M = 4.16, SD = .13), F(1, 165) = 7.77, p = .006. There was also a significant main effect of LGBT status on perceived sexual fixedness, F(4, 165) = 3.51, p = .009. Post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that gay groups (M = 4.92) were perceived as having significantly higher sexual fixedness than bisexuals (M = 3.93), p = .002. There were no other significant differences between groups, all $ps \ge .17$.

These main effects were qualified by the predicted significant gender by LGBT status interaction, F(4, 165) = 3.03, p = .019. Simple effects analyses revealed that for heterosexuals, participants believed men (M = 5.38, SD = 1.03) were significantly more fixed in their sexuality than women (M = 3.64, SD = 1.26), F(1, 21) = 11.96, p = .002. For gay target groups, participants believed men (M = 5.22, SD = 1.07) were marginally more fixed in their sexuality than women (M = 4.56, SD = 1.09), F(1, 38) = 3.71, p = .062. For bisexual, pre-op transgender, and post-op transgender groups, participants believed men and women were similar in their sexual fixedness; all other effects were nonsignificant, all $Fs \le .98$, $ps \ge .33$.




Figure 4. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on perceived sexual fixedness.

Gender certainty. There were no significant main effects nor interaction on gender certainty, all $Fs \le 1.60$, $ps \ge .21$.




Figure 5. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on gender certainty.

Sexual orientation certainty. There was a significant main effect of LGBT status on the level of certainty about the group's sexual orientation, F(4, 166) = 5.44, p < .001. Post-hoc tests using the Tukey HSD correction revealed that participants felt significantly less certain about pre-op transgender groups' sexual orientation (M = 3.76) than heterosexual (M = 7.29, p = .002), gay (M = 6.27, p = .014), and bisexual (M = 5.95, p = .045) groups' sexual orientations. Participants also felt significantly less certain about post-op transgender groups' sexual orientation (M = 4.33) than heterosexual groups' sexual orientations (p = .013) and marginally less certain when compared to gay groups (p = .081). All other comparisons were nonsignificant, all $ps \ge .21$.




Figure 6. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on sexual orientation certainty.

Moral outrage scale. The predicted gender by LGBT status interaction was significant, F(4, 165) = 2.45, p = .048. Simple effects analyses revealed that for pre-op transgender groups, participants felt more moral outrage toward men (M = 1.60, SD = .90) than women (M = 1.08, SD = .26), F(1, 31) = 4.55, p = .041. Though nonsignificant, it is interesting to note that the pattern was the same for all groups except for bisexuals. That is, for bisexuals, participants felt *less* moral outrage toward men (M = 1.11) than woman (M = 1.46), F(1, 39) = 2.52, p = .121. All other effects were nonsignificant, all $Fs \le 2.78$, $ps \ge .10$.




Figure 7. The effect of gender and sexual orientation on moral outrage.

Correlations

To determine which of my variables related to each other, I ran bivariate correlations between all variables (see Table 1). Specifically, I was interested in which perceptions were correlated with my outcome prejudice variable of moral outrage, which I subsequently used to inform my mediation analyses. I found that only sexual fixedness, r = -.16, p = .036, and gender certainty, r = -.20, p = .008, significantly (and negatively) correlated with moral outrage. Thus, the more fixed the sexuality and the more certain they were about gender, the less morally outraged participants felt toward the target group. All other correlations with moral outrage were non-significant (all $ps \ge .06$). However, I chose to only include sexual fixedness as a mediator for my models because gender and sexuality did not have any main effects or interactions on gender certainty.

Table 1

Bivariate Correlations

	- 7.0						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Attracted to men	-						
2. Bio male	.128	-					
3. Identify as male	177*	.245**	-				
4. Sexual fixedness	.116	.138	.133	_			
5. Gender certainty	.022	.178*	.053	.120	-		
6. SO certainty	.060	.006	.043	.236**	.521***	-	
7. Moral outrage	039	052	087	159*	201**	144	-

^{*}*p*<.05

Mediation analyses

Next, I tested whether the indirect gender effect on moral outrage through sexual fixedness would depend on target sexual orientation. I tested these moderated mediation models using Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro. I tested only sexual fixedness as my mediator because it was the only variable that was affected by gender and sexual orientation *and* related to moral outrage. I ran four models comparing heterosexual groups against each of the other LGBT subgroups (i.e., heterosexual vs. gay/lesbian, heterosexual vs. bisexual, heterosexual vs. pre-op transgender, and heterosexual vs. post-op transgender; see Table 2 for all conditional indirect effects). Because only two were significant, I will discuss them in more detail.

Heterosexual versus gay as moderator. The indirect effect of gender on moral outrage through sexual fixedness was significant for heterosexual target groups, indirect effect = -.26, 95% CIs = -.53, -.13, and gay target groups, indirect effect = -.10, 95% CIs = -.25, -.003. Thus, participants thought that heterosexual and gay men had more fixed

^{**}*p*<.01

^{***}p<.001

sexuality and, in turn, felt more moral outrage toward them when compared to heterosexual and lesbians women, respectively.

Heterosexual versus post-op transgender as moderator. The indirect effect of gender on moral outrage through sexual fixedness was significant for heterosexual target groups, indirect effect = .16, 95% CIs = -.10, -.02, but not for post-op transgender target groups, indirect effect = -.04, 95% CIs = -.25, .01. Thus, this model again revealed that participants thought that heterosexual men had a more fixed sexuality and, in turn, felt more moral outrage toward them when compared to heterosexual women.

Table 2

Moderated Mediation Analyses: The Effect of Target Gender on Moral Outrage Through Sexual Fixedness as a Function of Target LGBT Status (Versus Heterosexuals).

	Indirect Effect	SE	95% <i>CI</i> s
Model 1:			
Heterosexual	26	.09	53,13*
Gay	10	.06	25,003*
Model 2:			
Heterosexual	03	.09	23, .13
Bisexual	.0003	.01	03, .03
Model 3:			
Heterosexual	11	.09	34, .03
Pre-Op Transgender	.02	.04	03, .13
Model 4:			
Heterosexual	16	.10	44,02*
Post-Op Transgender	04	.05	25, .01

^{*}Denotes a significant conditional indirect effect because the confidence interval does not include zero.

Discussion

It would be reasonable to predict that a target's gender category would determine other people's perceptions of the target's biological sex and gender identity, and that a target's sexual orientation category would determine other people's perceptions of the target's sexuality (i.e., assumptions about who they are attracted to and the fixed nature of their sexuality). In other words, to predict that there would be a main effect of gender on perceptions of gender and a main effect of sexual orientation on perceptions of sexuality. Yet, I predicted and found that it is important to take into account the intersection of gender and sexual orientation. Gender and sexual orientation consistently interacted to drive perceptions of gender and sexuality. The effect of gender on perceptions of gender and sexuality depended on sexual orientation; the effect of sexual orientation on perceptions of gender and sexuality depended on gender. Further, gender and sexual orientation interacted to determine the level of prejudice directed toward the groups, as measured by moral outrage. Thus, I found the predicted result insomuch as the concepts of gender and sexuality are highly intertwined in determining how people perceive these LGBT subgroups and the extent to which they exhibit a prejudicial reaction. Next, I will describe the pattern of these interactions on perceptions and prejudice.

Perceptions of gender. Logically, participants should have expected men of all LGBT groups to be more biologically male than women except for post-op transgender targets, as they change their gender by definition. As expected, participants believed straight, gay, and bisexual men to be more biologically male than their female counterparts. For post-op transgender targets, on the other hand, females were seen as

more biologically male than post-op transgender males. This makes sense, as they changed their genitalia surgically. Surprisingly, when considering pre-op transgender targets, participants believed male and female pre-op transgender targets to be equally male, biologically speaking. So it did not matter what gender a pre-op transgender identified as when it comes to biological sex – participants still saw them as more male than female. Perhaps this is a stereotype about transgender individuals? It might be the case that because male-to-female transgender individuals are more visible in the media (e.g., Laverne Cox, Caitlyn Jenner), people are more inclined to picture a male-to-female transgender whether they are described as male or female.

Gender identity seems to be a little less clear than biological sex. Again, we would expect all males to be perceived as having a male gender identity, including transgender targets (as transgender males would likely consider themselves male, as that is how they are labeling themselves). One potential difference between gender identity and biological sex might manifest for gay and lesbian targets. Specifically, lesbians might be seen as having more male gender identity than gay men, given that gay men and lesbians are often stereotyped as being similar to the opposite gender (Kite & Deaux, 1980). However, the expected results held only for heterosexual and bisexual participants. For gay, lesbian, pre-op, and post-op transgender targets, there were no gender differences—meaning people saw all of these groups as having a similar gender identity, despite being labeled male or female. For example, gay men and lesbians were both seen as similarly identifying as male to a similar degree (right around the midpoint of the maleness scale). Perhaps inversion theory could explain this, as believing that gay individuals are more similar to the opposite sex could cause some confusion as to what

gender they identify as. Both pre-op and post-op transgender targets' gender identity did not differ based on gender. Perhaps participants were confused as to which gender the target identified as (i.e., was a transgender male a female-to-male or a male-to-female?). In contrast to biological gender, participants saw pre-op transgender targets to be more female than male, which, if they are indeed picturing a male-to-female transgender individual, makes sense (since they would, by definition, identify as female).

Perceptions of sexual orientation. Naturally, it would make sense for participants to perceive heterosexual women (versus heterosexual men) and gay men (versus lesbians) to be more attracted to men, while bisexuals should have no gender differences. While this was the case for heterosexual and gay targets, bisexual males were also perceived to be significantly more attracted to men than bisexual females. Perhaps this is because people believe that men's sexuality is more fixed than women's (Diamond, 2003; Peplau, 2003), and thus once a man has one same-sex encounter, he is gay. However, this does not explain why bisexual women are considered to be less attracted to men, as women are likely to be considered straight even if they have samesex encounters (Lannutti & Denes, 2012). It is possible that a stereotype exist that asserts that bisexuals are just gay or lesbian individuals that are afraid to "commit" to being completely non-heterosexual. Furthermore, there were no gender differences in the transgender target groups. This should not be the case given that transgender does not impact sexual orientation in reality, but overall, participants believed all transgender targets were more attracted to men than women. There might be a stereotype that all transgender males are gay and all transgender females are straight. Maybe this has to do again with the more common image of a male-to-female transgender individual; but this

raises the question: Would it also hold true for post-op transgender targets, considering participants believed female targets in this group to be more biologically male than their male counterparts? Perhaps participants are relying more on gender identity, as there was no gender difference there for post-op transgender targets, either.

Furthermore, as expected, participants believed heterosexual men were more fixed in their sexuality than heterosexual women. There was also a marginal effect such that participants believed gay men were somewhat more fixed in their sexuality than lesbians. Participants perceived bisexual men and women to be equally fixed in their sexuality. This logically makes sense given that bisexuals are, by definition, more fluid in their sexuality than other groups. Similarly, there were no gender differences for pre-op transgender and post-op transgender. Perceptions of sexual fixedness should not be affected for transgender groups since, again, transgender is about changing *gender*, not sexual orientation. That being said, perhaps participants believe that if these groups are fluid in one aspect (i.e., gender) they are likely to be fluid in the other aspect (i.e., sexuality), regardless of gender.

Certainty. Participants did not differ in their certainty of target gender for any of the groups. I would expect participants to be less certain of transgender targets' gender, as they are changing their gender or identifying as a different gender than was biologically determined at birth, but this did not play out. Maybe participants are just reluctant to admit their uncertainty. As previously mentioned, people are constantly trying to reduce uncertainty (Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014). If they *admit* that they feel uncertain, perhaps it becomes too hard to avoid, and thus participants convince

themselves that they feel more confident about their assessment of a transgender target's gender than they actually do.

Similarly, there was no interaction of gender and sexuality on sexual orientation certainty. However, there was a main effect such that participants were more certain of heterosexuals' sexual orientation than pre-op transgender targets'. It is not surprising that participants felt relatively certain about heterosexual's sexual orientation, but it is surprising that the only significant comparison was to pre-op transgender targets. If anything, I would expect comparatively less certainty for bisexuals, because they are less defined in their sexuality. Being transgender does not have anything to do with sexuality. And why might this comparison only be significant for pre-op, but not post-op, transgender targets? Perhaps people think that, because pre-op transgender individuals might still be in a transitioning phase (as compared to post-op transgender individuals who have *already* transitioned), they are more likely to be questioning other aspects of their lives – such as their sexuality.

Moral Outrage. There was an interaction of sexual orientation and gender on moral outrage such that participants felt more moral outrage toward male pre-op transgender individuals than female pre-op transgender individual. Although one might expect more differences among the groups, given that we were asking people to explicitly express intense negative reactions about a group with no other information (e.g., the extent to which they thought bisexual men were evil to the core), in hindsight it is actually somewhat surprising that I found any effects here at all. In my past research where we did find differing levels of moral outrage toward gay men (versus lesbians) in particular, I assessed moral outrage toward someone who committed a crime, so that

participants have something at which to direct their prejudice. Further, it was not clear that we were investigating the effect of the target's sexual orientation like I did in this study. In this context, participants were willing to state that they "feel a desire to hurt" pre-op transgender males, "believe they are evil to the core," "feel morally outraged by them," and "feel a compelling desire to punish them." Because of social desirability bias (Devine & Elliott, 1995), it makes sense that participants did not to agree to such drastic statements. Admittedly, the numbers were all still very low on the scale, and yet a significant difference emerged between pre-op transgender men and women. Why are people comparatively more willing to admit prejudicial reactions to pre-op transgender men? Perhaps people believe there is not a stigma for discriminating against this group. When participants picture a pre-op transgender man, perhaps they are envisioning a cross-dresser, rather than an individual with a true transgender identity. With media representations such as the contestants on Ru Paul's Drag Race and Tim Curry's fan favorite Dr. Frank-N-Furter in *The Rocky Horror Picture Show*, maybe people think that a pre-op transgender man is, in reality, just a man dressing up as a woman, with no real intention of being a woman. With this in mind, perhaps we do not see this same pattern in post-op transgender targets because people perceive them as being more serious about their gender identity (i.e., if they were willing to go through surgery, they must truly want to change).

Explaining prejudice. Only two variables correlated with moral outrage – gender certainty and sexual fixedness. However, because the manipulations did not affect gender certainty, I tested only sexual fixedness as a potential mediator. Specifically, the more sexually fixed participants perceived a group to be, the less moral outrage they felt. This

is surprising because it contradicts the past research I have conducted. Thus far, my previous findings indicate that the more fixed a group's sexuality, the more moral outrage participants report (Salerno et al., in preparation). What is different about these results that is causing this effect to flip?

Furthermore, sexual fixedness mediated the relationship between gender and moral outrage for some LGBT groups. Specifically, participants believed that heterosexual men (versus heterosexual women) and gay men (versus lesbians) had a more fixed sexuality, and the more they thought their sexuality was fixed, the less moral outrage they felt toward these men. It is surprising that we only found these effects for heterosexual and gay groups. It might be the case that people are more comfortable saying negative things about heterosexuals, as compared to the other target groups. However, this does not explain why this effect worked for gay men (versus lesbians) as well. Furthermore, the ANOVAs indicated that participants felt more moral outrage toward pre-op transgender male targets than female, indicating that people might be more comfortable expressing negative opinions about pre-op transgender males as well. Additionally, it is surprising that I only found an effect for heterosexual targets in two of my four models. This suggests that perhaps the significance was affected by the other variables in the model.

Limitations

This was a preliminary exploratory study with the purpose of informing future research on the topic of bisexual and transgender individuals. Though I did make some predictions driven by the current literature and my previous research on gay men versus lesbians, I was unable to make specific *a priori* hypotheses about most of my variables

because of this exploratory nature. As a result, my choice of variables to test in my models, analyses, and conclusions were mostly data-driven rather than theory-driven. Furthermore, my relatively small sample size left me with somewhat low power. In fact, the power was too low to be confident in the results from the complex moderated mediation analyses. This may have contributed to the small number of significant pathways; perhaps with a larger sample, I might find more significance in these models.

Additionally, participants' responses might have been influenced by social desirability concerns. In my past research, I have asked about perceptions of gays and lesbians in the context of an ambiguous sex crime. Thus, participants were likely to answer more honestly in those studies because their prejudice could be hidden by the ambiguity of the situation (and they were also less likely to guess that the study was about discrimination). Here, rather than trying to tap into implicit bias playing out in case judgments, I asked them to explicitly label and express prejudice toward a group based on only the target's gender and LGBT subgroup. I tried to avoid bias by asking participants to respond with how the average American perceives the target group as opposed to their own personal opinions, but that was likely not enough to eliminate social desirability concerns. Furthermore, I told participants directly that I was interested in perceptions of different groups, so they were likely aware that I was analyzing prejudice and discrimination, activating social desirability. Similarly, simply asking about perceptions in the absence of an ambiguous scenario might have caused further problems. For example, asking about moral outrage might not be as valid in this scenario as in a study including a crime vignette simply because I did not give them anything to be morally outraged about. However, the fact that I found a gender effect on moral outrage

for pre-op transgender individuals means that either prejudice toward this group is unusually high, or that people just believe that it is relatively acceptable to express open outrage toward this group.

Furthermore, my sample was entirely made up of students, rather than community members. Thus, my participants might be more educated, younger, more liberal and, in turn, less prejudiced (or at least more concerned about social desirability) than the general population. Perhaps with a community sample, I might find more prejudicial responses—either because they are more prejudiced coming from an older generation or because they are more willing to admit prejudicial responses.

Because I wanted to learn how participants perceived each target group with as little influence as possible, I might have caused some confusion in the four transgender conditions. I simply asked about a "pre-op transgender male," "pre-op transgender female," "post-op transgender male," or "post-op transgender female." I did not specify if I meant male-to-female or female-to-male in any of these conditions, but it is likely that some participants might have perceived a male transgender target group to be male-to-female, while some might have pictured a female-to-male in this circumstance. However, this was a strategic, intentional first step. Because I did not know what people would think about these groups, I did not want to be too specific so that I could get an accurate representation of participants' perceptions of their target without any sort of direction. Had I been more specific, I might not have been able to pick up on certain nuances between transgender groups (such as the belief that all pre-op transgender individuals are biologically male).

Future Directions

I plan to apply for funding to follow up this study with a replication using Amazon's *Mechanical Turk*. This will allow me to obtain a much larger sample size and thus be able to make more definitive conclusions. Importantly, this will also allow me to test whether my effects depend on participant characteristics, such as gender. Because of the small sample size in the present study, I could not look at male versus female participants' differences in perceptions of target groups. This is important to test given that several studies indicate that there are differences in the way men and women view non-heterosexuality (Herek, 1998; Herek, 2000b; Pirlott & Neuberg, 2014). It would also be interesting to see how other factors such as religiosity, political orientation, and personal sexual and gender identity affect perceptions as well.

The next step will be to apply this information to the legal context. I plan to extend my previous findings about punitiveness toward gay and lesbian sex offenders to bisexual and transgender offenders as well, to see how the interaction of sexual orientation and gender further might be different for these groups. My past studies indicated that people were more punitive toward gay men (versus lesbians) because they believed their sexuality to be more fixed, and thus felt more moral outrage (Salerno et al., in preparation). The present results reflect a *negative* correlation between sexual fixedness and moral outrage. If this pattern holds true after the *Mechanical Turk* replication, perhaps putting this into a legal context will produce a more consistent result. If not, I will at least be able to make more definitive conclusions about how the intersection of gender and sexuality affect prejudice.

Conclusion

Though the exploratory nature of this study calls for follow-up studies to be able to make any definitive conclusions, it is clear that the intertwined nature of gender and sexual orientation impacts perceptions of gender and sexuality and, in turn, prejudice. It is not enough to focus on prejudice and discrimination toward non-heterosexuals, or even just toward gay men and lesbians; each LGBT subgroup is unique and needs to be treated and researched as such. If we ever hope to understand the differences in prejudice, and as a result the possible reasons *why* prejudice exists, toward these groups, we as researchers must understand the importance of gender *and* sexual orientation and how perceptions of each impact each other.

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APPENDIX A IRB APPROVAL



EXEMPTION GRANTED

Jessica Salerno Social and Behavioral Sciences, School of

Jessica.Salerno@asu.edu

Dear Jessica Salerno:

On 10/27/2015 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Modification
Title:	Juvenile Sex Offender Punishment Decisions
Investigator:	Jessica Salerno
IRB ID:	1302008820
Funding:	None
Grant Title:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	• Juveniles Crimes Study - online - recruitment 2- 13.pdf,
	Category: Recruitment Materials;
	• Juvenile Crimes Study - undergrads - recruitment 2-
	13.pdf, Category: Recruitment Materials;
	• Juvenile Crimes Study - online - consent 2-13.pdf,
	Category: Consent Form;
	• Experimental Measures.pdf, Category: Measures (Survey
	questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus
	group questions);
	• Juvenile Crimes Study - undergrads - consent 2- 13.pdf,
	Category: Consent Form;
	• Juvenile Crimes Study - attorneys - recruitment.pdf,
	Category: Recruitment Materials;
	Attitudes Study - undergrads.pdf, Category: Consent
	Form;
	• Juvenile Sex Offenders Protocol v3, Category: IRB
	Protocol;
	• Juvenile Crimes Study - attorneys - mailing, Category:
	Recruitment Materials;
	Attitudes Study - online.pdf, Category: Consent
	Form;

The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 10/27/2015.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).	he
Sincerely,	

IRB Administrator

cc:

Sarah Malik

APPENDIX B QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

We have some questions about how you think about other people and groups.

For this portion of this survey please think about whether there is a cultural stereotype about <u>LESBIAN WOMEN</u>. Please answer the following questions about what stereotypes you think exist, even if you do not believe they are true. Later, you will be asked about what stereotypes you personally believe are true.

What are the first 3 stereotypes that you think **the average American** has about **lesbian women's** sexual behavior?

If you had to guess how **the average American** would classify a **lesbian woman's** gender, what would it be?

- Male
- Female
- Other

If you had to guess how the average American would classify a lesbian woman's gender, what would it be? Please indicate the point on the scale that represents this group *OR* choose to click the box to indicate a belief that they are neither male nor female.

- 0 (Exclusively female)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50 (Equal parts male and female)
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Exclusively male)
- Neither

If you had to guess how **the average American** would classify a **lesbian woman's** sexual orientation, what would it be?

- Heterosexual
- Gay
- Bisexual
- Other

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify a <u>lesbian</u> <u>woman's</u> sexual orientation, what would it be? Please indicate the point on the scale that

represents this group *OR* choose to click the box to indicate a belief that they are **asexual** (they do not experience sexual attraction).

- 0 (Exclusively heterosexual)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50 (Completely bisexual)
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Exclusively gay)
- Neither

To which gender would <u>the average American</u> say a <u>lesbian woman</u> is attracted? Please indicate the point on the scale that represents this group *OR* choose to click the box to indicate a belief that they are **not attracted to either gender**.

- 0 (Exclusively opposite gender)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50 (Equal attraction to both genders)
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Exclusively same gender)
- Neither

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify a <u>lesbian</u> <u>woman's</u> sexual orientation, what would it be?

- Exclusively heterosexual
- Predominantly heterosexual/only incidentally homosexual
- Predominantly heterosexual but more than incidentally homosexual
- Equally heterosexual and homosexual
- Predominantly homosexual but more than incidentally heterosexual
- Predominantly homosexual/only incidentally heterosexual
- Exclusively homosexual

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify a <u>lesbian</u> woman's gender identity, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. **0**

represents non-gendered, and 10 represents complete "woman-ness" or "manness".

Woman-ness

- 0 (Non-gendered)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete woman-ness)

Man-ness

- 0 (Non-gendered)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete man-ness)

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify a <u>lesbian</u> <u>woman's</u> gender expression, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 represents agender, and 10 represents complete masculinity or femininity.

Masculine

- 0 (Agender)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete masculinity)

Feminine

- 0 (Agender)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete femininity)

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify a <u>lesbian</u> <u>woman's</u> biological sex, what would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. 0 represents asex, and 10 represents complete "female-ness" or "male-ness".

Female-ness

- 0 (Asex)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete female-ness)

Male-ness

- 0 (Asex)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Complete male-ness)

If you had to guess how <u>the average American</u> would classify who a <u>lesbian woman</u> is attracted to, who would it be? Please indicate the point on both scales. **0 represents** attracted to nobody, and 10 represents completely attracted to men/males/masculinity or women/females/femininity.

Men/Males/Masculinity

- 0 (Nobody)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Completely men/males/masculinity)

Women/Females/Femininity

- 0 (Nobody)
- 10
- 20
- 30
- 40
- 50
- 60
- 70
- 80
- 90
- 100 (Completely women/females/femininity)


Please use this grid to indicate where <u>the average American</u> believes <u>lesbian</u> women would fall in regards to gender and sexual orientation.

The <u>horizontal</u> line represents <u>gender</u>, with points left of center representing men and points right of center representing women. The further away from center, the higher the degree to which they are exclusively associated with that gender.

The <u>vertical</u> line represents <u>sexual orientation</u>, with points higher than center representing gay and points lower than center representing heterosexual. The further away from center, the higher the degree to which they are exclusively associated with that sexual orientation.

For example, a point directly in the middle of the grid indicates that the average American would say a lesbian woman is approximately in the middle of being male and female and of being gay and straight.

Your point does *not* need to fall on the bold center lines. It can fall anywhere within the grid.



How certain are you about a lesbian women's gender?

- 0% (Not at all certain)
- 10%
- 20%
- 30%
- 40%
- 50%
- 60%
- 70%
- 80%
- 90%
- 100% (Completely certain)

To what extent does your level of uncertainty about a lesbian woman's gender make you feel uncomfortable?

- 0% (Not at all uncomfortable)
- 10%
- 20%
- 30%
- 40%
- 50%
- 60%
- 70%
- 80%
- 90%
- 100% (Extremely uncomfortable)

How certain are you about a lesbian women's sexual orientation?

- 0% (Not at all certain)
- 10%
- 20%
- 30%
- 40%
- 50%
- 60%
- 70%
- 80%
- 90%
- 100% (Completely certain)

To what extent does your level of uncertainty about a lesbian woman's sexual orientation make you feel uncomfortable?

- 0% (Not at all uncomfortable)
- 10%
- 20%
- 30%
- 40%
- 50%
- 60%
- 70%
- 80%
- 90%
- 100% (Extremely uncomfortable)

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items about **LESBIAN WOMEN**.

	Strongl y Disagre e	Disagre e	Disagre e Slightly	Neither Disagree or Agree/Unsur e	Agree Slightl y	Agre e	Strongl y Agree
They prefer women (rather than men)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
sexually. Their sexual preference for women is fixed and unchangeabl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
e. They are likely to exhibit change in whether they prefer men or women in the future.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Their sexual preference for women is fluid and	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
changeable. They have a certain sexual orientation and they cannot really do much to change it.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Their sexual orientation is something about them that they cannot change much.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

They can try new things, but they cannot really change their basic sexual	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
orientation. Their behavior violates norms in our society.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items about <u>LESBIAN WOMEN</u>.

	Strongly	Disagree	Somewhat	Somewhat	Agree	Strongly
	Disagree		Disagree	Agree		Agree
They are kind.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are perverted.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are sexually	0	0	0	0	0	0
promiscuous.						
They have bad	0	0	0	0	0	0
character.						
They are immoral.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are insincere.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are untruthful.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are normal.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are deviant.	0	0	0	0	0	0
There is something	0	0	0	0	0	0
wrong with them.	_	_	_	_	_	_
They are likely to	0	0	0	0	0	0
cheat within a						
committed						
relationship.		_	_	_		_
They are desperate.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They will have sex	0	0	0	0	0	0
with anyone.		_	_	_		_
They have trouble	0	0	0	0	0	0
with monogamy.		_	_	_		_
I feel a compelling	0	0	0	0	0	0
desire to punish them.						
I feel a desire to hurt	0	0	0	0	0	0
them.						
I believe they are evil	0	0	0	0	0	0
to the core.						
I feel morally	0	0	0	0	0	0
outraged by them.						

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items about <u>LESBIAN WOMEN</u>

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree
They are likely to prey on others who are interested in experimenting with their sexuality.	O	0	Ó	0	0	0
They are likely to recruit others into sexual activity that they otherwise would not have engaged in.	0	0	0	0	0	0
They are likely to lure others down the path to deviant sexual activity.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Please use this grid to indicate how angry and disgusted you feel by <u>lesbian women</u>. Lesbian women can make you feel high in both, low in both, or high in one and not the other.

Along the **bottom** of the grid is how **disgusted** you feel about lesbian women, with low disgust on the left through high disgust on the right.

Along the <u>left side</u> of the grid represents how <u>angry</u> you feel about lesbian women, from low anger on the bottom to high anger at the top.

Please click the box that best matches with your level of disgust and anger about lesbian women.

_						
Î	Extremely angry	5-1	5-2	5-3	5-4	5-5
ı	Very angry	4-1	4-2	4-3	4-4	4-5
ANGER	Angry	3-1	3-2	3-3	3-4	3-5
₹∎	Somewhat Angry	2-1	2-2	2-3	2-4	2-5
	Not at all angry	1-1	1-2	1-3	1-4	1-5
		Not at all	Somewhat	Disgusted	Very	Extremely
		disgusted	disgusted		disgusted	disgusted
				DISGUST		

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following items about **LESBIAN WOMEN**.

	Strongly	Disagree	Somewhat	Somewhat	Agree	Strongly
	Disagree		Disagree	Agree		Agree
Their behavior makes	0	0	0	0	0	0
me feel anxious. Their behavior makes	0	0	0	0	0	0
me feel fear. Their behavior makes me feel pity.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each according to your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. It is important for you to realize that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. People are different, and we are interested in how you feel.

	Strongly	Moderately	Slightly	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly
	Disagree	Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Agree	Agree
It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I enjoy being spontaneous.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I don't like situations that are uncertain.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I hate to be with people who are	0	0	0	0	0	0
unpredictable. I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations.	0	0	0	0	0	0
I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Your gender:

- Male
- Female
- Other

Your age (in years)

What ethnicity are you?

• White

- Black
- Hispanic
- Asian
- Other

What is your current religion? That is, what is your current denominational preference? PLEASE CHOOSE ALL THAT APPLY:

- Fundamentalist
- Christian
- Catholic
- Jewish
- Muslim
- Hindu
- Buddhist
- Non-denominational
- Agnostic
- Atheist

How often do you attend religious services?

- Less than once a year
- About once a year
- A few times a year
- About once a month
- A few times a month
- About once a week
- A few times a week
- Once a day

How religious do you consider yourself to be?

- Strongly not religious
- Not religious
- Neither religious nor not religious
- Religious
- Strongly religious

When it comes to politics, how liberal or conservative are you?

- Extremely liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely conservative

What city and state do you live in?

What is your profession?

Which of the following degrees do you have? SELECT ALL THAT APPLY:

- Some high school
- High school diploma
- Some college
- Associates Degree
- Bachelors
- Masters
- J.D.
- Doctorate
- Other

To whom are you most sexually attracted?

- Men
- Women
- Both
- Neither

Which of the following best describes you these days?

- Heterosexual or Straight
- Homosexual, Gay, or Lesbian
- Bisexual
- Other

Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is homosexual?

- Yes
- No

Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is bisexual?

- Yes
- No

Has any friend, family member, or close acquaintance revealed to you that he or she is transgender?

- Yes
- No

Are there any other thoughts or comments you would like to share with us?