

Why Don't Women Ask?

A Mixed Method Analysis of Gender and the Propensity to Initiate a Negation

by

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ABSTRACT

Scholars have contemplated gender differences in negotiations for a number of years. Recently, attention has been directed to the early stages of a negotiation, particularly the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Indeed, there is evidence that men are significantly more likely than women to initiate a negotiation (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). In an effort to unpack these findings, the present mixed method study partially replicates the quantitative lab study by Small and her colleagues (2007) to explore gender differences and then extends this work with qualitative interviews to examine the rationales underlying the propensity to negotiate. In the quantitative phase of this study, undergraduate students were invited to complete a task in which they could earn between \$3 and \$10 in addition to course extra credit. All participants were offered \$3 and could earn up to \$10 if they initiated a negotiation for more money. The qualitative phase of this study included follow-up qualitative interviews to explore the reasons women and men chose to initiate or avoid a negotiation. Quantitative results demonstrate no significant gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. However, qualitative findings reveal trends suggesting that women maintained higher evaluations of money but lower probabilities of attaining more money during the negotiation. Findings support that clear gender differences exist with regard to perceived risks and the value in the decision to negotiate. Thus, findings suggest that gender differences in the propensity to negotiate are more complex than which can be quantitatively measured using a simple ask-no ask dichotomy.

DEDICATION

For my sisters and brothers ~ Ashley, Seth, Jerad, Jordan, Rachel, and Dalton.

You are my inspiration, my confidants, my accomplices.

This has always been for you.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Women make less money than men in nearly all occupations. Moreover, women are paid less than men in male-dominated occupations as well as female-dominated occupations. For example, the median income for male secretaries is \$803 per week while their female colleagues earn \$665 per week (Hegewisch, Liepmann, Hayes, & Hartmann, 2010; Hegewisch, Williams, & Zhang, 2012). In recent years the wage gap between women and men has narrowed, but continues to persist. Reports from the United States Census indicate that women earn an average of 82.1% of the wages of men (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Economists suggest that many factors collectively contribute to the wage disparities between women and men. For example, factors such as demographics, professional expertise, job characteristics (Bredtmann & Otten, 2012), years of experience, occupational choice, and educational attainment (Blau & Kahn, 1997; Joy, 2003; Turner & Bowen, 1999) all have been empirically demonstrated to account for some of the variance between the wages of women and men. Other researchers have suggested the wage gap is partially caused by gender-specific factors such as career interruptions as a function of child rearing (Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010). Indeed, there are many known factors that help explain why women lag behind men in financial earnings.

While sophisticated statistical modeling has been useful in identifying observable factors that contribute to the wage gap (e.g., demographics, occupational choice, family commitments, etc.), a substantial percentage of variance remains unexplained (Blau & Kahn, 1997, 2007; GAO, 2003). Statements regarding the size of the unexplained

variance differ among studies, with some estimates suggesting that 7% (Bredtmann & Otten, 2012), 11.8% (Blau & Kahn, 2000), and up to 13% (Wood, Corcoran & Courant, 1993) is yet to be accounted for. One influential study of the gender wage gap targeted starting salary as a key determinant of current salary differences. Gerhart (1990) investigated the salaries of 4,617 managers and professionals and his analysis revealed a significant gender pay gap for both starting and current salaries. The data were then more closely examined by controlling for individual-level factors, such as education, job title, performance evaluations, year of hire, and previous work experiences that might explain the wage gaps. The study demonstrated that differences in the wages of women compared to men could be traced to lower pay at the time of first hire. Gerhart (1990) explains that, “the current salary disadvantage was largely a result of a one-time salary shortfall for women occurring at the time of hire” (p. 427). In light of the evidence that starting salary is an important factor in wage disparities, some researchers have given much closer attention to women's reluctance to negotiate higher pay (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; O'Shea & Bush, 2002).

Scholars have increasingly directed their attention to examining the initiation of negotiation as an important contributor to the gender wage gap. Babcock and Laschever (2003) sparked strong interest in the topic with the publication of their book “Women Don't Ask” which contends that women have fared worse than men financially and professionally, in large part due to their reluctance to ‘ask.’ In their book, Babcock and Laschever (2003) published findings from Babcock and her colleagues' research of graduate students demonstrating that their female students were less likely than male students to negotiate starting salary. Their study demonstrated that 57% of the male

students reported negotiating their starting salary while only 7% of the female students said they did so. According to Babcock and Laschever (2003), failure to negotiate resulted in pronounced differences in starting salary; those who negotiated earned roughly \$4,000 more per year than those who did not. The authors explain that negotiating starting salary is important because even small differences can accumulate over time and result in tremendous differences in one's lifetime income (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991).

While scholars have come to understand that the rate of negotiating amongst women is deserving of attention, there are some who underestimate this importance. The CEO of Microsoft, Satya Nadella, was interviewed at the Grace Hopper Celebration of Women in Computing and was asked how women should advance their careers when they are uncomfortable putting themselves up for promotion opportunities. Nadealla described that human resource systems are rewarding in the long-term. "It's not really about asking for the raise but knowing and having faith that the system will actually give you the right raises as you go along." He went on to say that women who don't ask for raises have "superpowers" and will experience "good karma" (Caprino, 2014). Put simply, the Microsoft CEO believes that women should trust that the system will eventually reward them. While Nadella later recanted his statement, many communication scholars argue that mundane or everyday talk can reveal broad societal discourses that have the potential to guide action and organizational practices (Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004; Tracy & Rivera, 2010). Clearly, there is a need for increased understanding of gender issues at the organizational level, particularly if the aim is to

advance our understanding of the complexities of the gender wage gap. While gender issues in negotiation are not altogether straightforward, scholars have a more cohesive understanding of the stages of the negotiation process. Indeed, the stages of the negotiation process are a useful foundation with which to begin to understand gender and the propensity to initiate a negotiation.

The Negotiation Process

By definition, 'negotiating' is an exchange process in which parties interact to explore issues and interests to reach an agreement (Lewicki, Barry, Saunders, & Minton, 2003; Wall, 1985). Shell (2001) describes the sequential stages of negotiation as one that includes preparation, information exchange, bargaining, and commitment. Other scholars have detailed the dynamic social processes that underlie negotiations (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Mnookin, Peppett, & Tulemello, 2000; Ury, 1993). Negotiations have more recently been described as hazy situations: "The fog of negotiation- it's inherent uncertainty- makes it hard to know how much room there is to negotiate or if there's any room at all" (Wheeler, 2013, p. 23). While preparation is important, there remains a significant amount of information that is only revealed through human interaction at the negotiation table. Negotiation, by definition, is an interpersonal exchange of information and is therefore dynamic, nonlinear, and unpredictable. Therefore, to optimally create value it is necessary to develop skills in agility and improvisation. Wheeler (2013) suggests that negotiators should enter negotiations under the assumption that there is something they do not know. However, these negotiation skills are worthless if one does not initiate the negotiation.

Initiating a negotiation or 'asking' is more of a one-sided proposal aimed at kindling the discussion of whether a negotiation is possible. 'Asking' can be viewed as the beginning of a conversation and addresses who “gets to the bargaining table in the first place” (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006, p. 3). An ‘ask’ only becomes a negotiation once the counterpart accepts the invitation to engage. While some scholars argue the propensity to negotiate is a singular act of either initiating or not (Bowles et al., 2005; Small et al., 2007), other scholars detail the stages of initiating a negotiation. Specifically, initiating a negotiation is posited to contain sequential stages of recognizing the opportunity, initiating the request, and subsequently optimizing that request (Volkema, 2012; Volkema, Kapoutsis, & Nikolopoulos, 2013). Hence, recognizing the opportunity is an essential first step for a negotiation to ensue.

While some situations are generally perceived as negotiable, others are not. For example, activities such as buying a home and choosing where to go for dinner are frequently identified as negotiable. However, activities such as marriage proposals and department store purchases are situations that are less frequently perceived as negotiable activities (Spears & Parker, 2009). Indeed, evidence suggests that women and men commonly fail to recognize negotiable opportunities. This literature on recognizing opportunities is particularly important given that many negotiations in everyday life are not entirely obvious (Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007).

The Propensity to Negotiate

Factors that influence the propensity to negotiate can be viewed from a broad negotiation perspective, and then more specifically from a gender perspective. Broadly, negotiation scholars (Volkema, 2009; Volkema & Fleck, 2012) have outlined two types

of barriers affecting the propensity to initiate negotiations: personal characteristics and situational factors. First, stable *personal characteristics* include the perceived appropriateness of negotiating (i.e., culture and gender) and one's perceived ability to negotiate (self-efficacy). Second, the propensity to initiate a negotiation can be moderated by episodic *situational factors* (i.e., perceived counterpart, role definition, time constraints, clarity of purpose, perceived alternatives, venue or setting, and salience of outcome). While personal factors are considered to be chronic and situational factors more episodic, both factors are useful for understanding the propensity to initiate a negotiation.

More specifically, gender scholars have also cataloged the personal and situational factors that trigger gender effects in the propensity to initiate a negotiation (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Babcock, et al., 2006; Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small, et al., 2007). Personal characteristics that may occur differentially in women and men include: relational orientation, locus of control, risk-taking, negotiation experience, and recognizing opportunities. To elaborate, women more often perceive themselves as strongly interconnected to other people (relational orientation), women are more likely to perceive that others maintain control over their lives (locus of control), women are more averse to risk (risk-taking), and women are less likely to recognize negotiable opportunities and to have fewer negotiating experiences. Situational factors that can affect the female negotiator include: an incongruent gender role (Bear & Babcock, 2012; Bowles, et al., 2007), the implicit or explicit activation of gender stereotypes (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002), ambiguity regarding *what* is negotiable and *how* one should negotiate (Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al.,

2007; Bowles et al., 2005), and lastly the amount of psychological power the negotiator perceives she or he has (Small et al., 2007). Notably, these gender differences are perceived as byproducts of processes of gender socialization (Babcock & Lashever, 2003).

Investigating the separate list of gender-specific factors that influence the propensity to initiate a negotiation is particularly necessary when considering a variable as notoriously dynamic as gender (Bear & Babcock, 2012; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Kolb, 2009, 2013). Gender is no longer solely viewed as a fixed and stagnant dichotomous variable (Kray & Thompson, 2004); increasingly, gender is viewed as a cultural phenomenon that is complex and can shift depending on the situation or circumstance (Lengel & Martin, 2002). Volkema (2009) argues that the role of gender in the propensity to negotiate is best understood as a cultural phenomenon, meaning that personal understandings about negotiation are socially constructed and are thus localized to particular times, places, and situations. Not only are personal orientations toward negotiation dynamic (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Eisenkraft, 2010), but negotiation situations themselves are dynamic. For instance, a given negotiation can involve multiple issues, multiple interests, and any number of shifts in individual acts of cooperativeness and competitiveness (Kray & Thompson, 2004; Olekalns, Brett, & Weingart, 2003). Therefore, the capricious nature of both gender and negotiation make it appropriate to expand theory beyond the stagnant and quantifiable to theory that is incorporates dynamic human processes that are both interpersonal and situational (Bowles & Kray, 2013).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this mixed method study is to replicate a laboratory study of gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation (Small et al., 2007), and then to extend this work by adding follow-up qualitative interviews to more comprehensively explore the reasons for the enacted behavior. Specifically, this study involves two phases. In the quantitative phase, a laboratory study was conducted to replicate previous work (e.g., Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007) and to examine the rate of gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. In the qualitative phase, follow-up interviews were conducted with all consenting study participants. These interviews were used to examine the reasons women and men offer for why they chose to engage or refrain from initiating a negotiation. Additionally, these interviews explored the extent to which sensemaking and problematic integration were implicated by women and men in the decision to engage and avoid negotiations. Taken together, the two phases of this study investigated a) if there were indeed gender differences in the propensity to negotiate, and b) why individuals refrained from and engaged in negotiations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Women and men have been compared and contrasted for quite some time, and countless theories have emerged to inform our understanding of gender. To this point, it has been posited that gender differences and similarities can be understood as a function of biological (Buss, 1989; Hines, 1982), psychological (Freud, 1927), and sociological mechanisms (Bandura, 1977; Bem, 1974). Renowned scholars acknowledge that gender is likely best understood as a complex amalgamation of both nature and nurture.

Undeniably, there are biological differences between women and men that can affect behavior. For example, gender differences in levels of oxytocin and testosterone can influence a negotiator's assertiveness and concern for others (Zhong, Monakhov, Mok, Tong, Lai, Chew, & Ebstein, 2012). However, in the last twenty-five years socialization and norms have been offered as a popular explanation for gender effects in both psychology (Eagly & Wood, 2013) and negotiation (Babcock & Lashever, 2004). Strong evidence exists to support the belief that male dominance in negotiation is far from ubiquitous and can be eradicated with only minor alterations to psychological or situational factors. For example, there are no discernible gender differences in the propensity to negotiate when women are primed to imagine feeling powerful, but gender differences are pronounced in the absence of psychological priming (Small et al., 2007). Hence, gender effects in negotiation are likely more complex than biological wiring since the situation has a profound effect on whether these gender effects are present. As such, gender effects are optimally understood by carefully considering gender norms and stereotypes (Bowles & Kray, 2013; Bowles et al., 2005; Kray & Thompson, 2004).

Negotiating Like a Lady

Gender norms encompass the broad societal beliefs for what is typical for each gender. Women are expected to display traits such as warmth, complacency, and emotionality, while men are expected to exert dominance, assertiveness, and persistence (Eagly, 1987, 1995; Deaux & Major, 1987). Accordingly, these normative beliefs result in expectations for the roles women and men should enact in society. Women are expected to maintain roles that are communal and nurturing while men are expected to maintain roles that are agentic and self-interested (Eagly, 1987). Further, women and men often internalize these expectations and they come to view themselves in terms of these stereotypical gender-specific qualities (Spence & Helmreich, 1978).

Individuals typically are motivated to align with these accepted gender roles and are rewarded for doing so. As role congruity theory explains, prejudice can arise when one's gender contrasts with the stereotypical qualities of a particular role (Eagly & Karau, 2002). The theory of role congruity, for example, is supported by research demonstrating that female managers encounter more negative feedback than male managers, even when both managers are described as successful (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995). The negative pushback directed at successful female managers is explained as resulting from the difference between her sex and the stereotypical (male) qualities associated with leadership positions (Schein, 1973). In this same way, stay-at-home fathers can encounter social stigma because this role is at odds with the traditional male stereotypes (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2005).

Role congruity theory enlivens our understanding of the propensity to negotiate. Just as expectations exist for the qualities of women and men in society, there are

expectations of the qualities that typify specific roles, such as a negotiator. Negotiations are commonly viewed as masculine endeavors that involve moves of rationality and assertiveness. As such, men are viewed as congruent with the role of a negotiator and women are viewed as incongruent (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 2004). It is this role incongruity for women that leaves men with either a perceived or actual advantage in negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles, et al., 2005; Miles & LaSalle, 2009) that can heavily influence the decision to initiate a negotiation.

Interestingly, researchers have demonstrated that women negotiate differently in online environments as virtual interactions often provide users with few visual and social cues about the characteristics of the individual (Walther, 1996), including characteristics such as gender. Stuhlmacher, Citera, and Willis (2007) conducted a meta-analysis in which they examined gender differences in virtual negotiations then compared this with face-to-face negotiations. Results demonstrated that women were significantly more hostile in online negotiations in comparison to face-to-face negotiations, while men were equally hostile online as they were face-to-face. While the studies varied in their degree of anonymity, it seems that any minimization of gender cues allows for women to behave in ways that are atypical of traditional gender norms. The authors suggest that in online environments women are less inhibited by prescribed social roles and thus can focus on task demands rather than tending to relationship demands. Similarly, other researchers have demonstrated that as anonymity increases, both male and female negotiators correspondingly increase their hostility (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005). Taken together, gender norms and social roles present women with a complex dilemma when deciding whether or not to negotiate, while men encounter few points of contention. It is then no

surprise that women often conform to the widely held expectation that “nice girls don't ask” (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p. 62).

Styles of Conflict Management

Individuals commonly adopt diverse strategies for coping with conflict, and these styles can significantly vary from one person to the next. One widely used taxonomy for measuring conflict style is the Thomas-Kilmann scale (1974), which outlines five styles of interpersonal conflict management. According to the scale, the five conflict styles include competing, compromising, avoiding, accommodating, and collaborating. These conflict styles range in their degree of concern for oneself and concern for the other party. A competitive style exudes the most concern for oneself and the least concern for others. A compromising style is both assertive and cooperative and aims to find a solution that meets “in the middle” to satisfy the needs of both parties. An avoidance style of conflict is one, which the individual deflects, withdraws, or postpones engaging in conflict; thus an avoidance style is neither an assertive nor competitive. An accommodating style is one in which the individual neglects one's personal needs and interests to satiate the needs of one's counterpart. A collaborating style is both assertive and cooperative, but utilizes superior communication skills to work with the other party in order to completely and creatively meet the needs of all.

Most contemporary literatures suggest that a collaborative style is the most effective strategy for building a trusting relationship with your negotiation counterpart. That said, most scholars agree that there is no single best conflict style, but competent negotiators are those who can effectively select the most appropriate style for the given

situation. In other words, each style of negotiation style is effective in a particular situation (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974).

Some research suggests that conflict style is different for women and men, and these differences tend to align with stereotypical gender roles. Specifically, women are more likely to adopt an accommodating style while men are more likely to adopt a competitive or avoidance style (Greeff & de Bruyne, 2000). Rubin and Brown (1975) were among the first to propose that women and men have different goals when faced with conflict: women are concerned with interpersonal relationships while men are concerned with maximizing their earnings. However, research findings that followed have posited that gender and conflict style is more complex than the generalization that women accommodate and men compete.

Research with managerial samples has demonstrated that there are no gender differences in conflict style. That is, female managers have been shown to adopt conflict styles similar to male managers (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Watson & Hoffman, 1996), likely because female managers experience significant power and are encouraged and expected to adopt styles similar to men (Brewer, Mitchell, & Weber, 2002). These findings suggest that gender differences in conflict styles are inconstant and wax and wane depending on the specific situation.

Indeed, meta-analyses have demonstrated that gender differences in negotiation are either minimal or altogether absent (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). These findings, combined with the contrasting evidence that perceived psychological power is influential for women but not for men, led scholars to more closely examine how research is being conducted and how variables are being

operationalized. Kolb (2012) has urged gender researchers to more clearly label their methodological approach and theoretical perspective so that meaningful comparisons can be made between results and conclusions. It is only through clearly describing the parameters of our research investigations that we can come closer to agreement about the effects of gender in negotiation (Deaux & Major, 1987). Indeed, the diversity of the negotiation literature has made it difficult to formulate sound conclusions (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Methodologically, research studies vary with regard to a) the type of negotiation, b) the composition of the dyad, and c) the outcome measure of interest. First, the type of negotiation largely influences gender differences in research findings. For example, prisoner dilemma negotiations (a negotiation in which individual gains are maximize through minimizing the gains of one's opponent) are exceedingly different interactions than integrative negotiations (gains are maximized by cooperatively exploring joint interests), and will involve different types of social strategies (Morgan & Tindale, 2002). Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) demonstrated that men are more successful in distributive negotiations, though only slightly better in integrative negotiations. Other research has demonstrated that in integrative negotiations women are better able to identify integrative potential (Halpern & McLean Parks, 1996). Second, the composition of the negotiation dyad is a key factor in understanding gender effects, and is particularly complex. For example, in some studies female-female dyads have been demonstrated to be more competitive than all other group compositions (Hottes & Kahn, 1974) and to be more exploitative (Instone, Major & Bunker, 1983). In other instances, men have also been shown to be competitive with other men but then decrease their competitiveness when negotiating with other females, likely to demonstrate admirable

qualities of chivalry (Burford, Foley, Rollins, & Rosario, 1996). Hence, the gender composition of the dyad is another complex but misunderstood factor that influences gender effects in a negotiation. Lastly, the outcome measures vary widely from one study to the next, with some studies measuring individual gains (Barron, 2003; Bowles et al., 2004), others measuring joint gains (Miles & LaSalle, 2009), and yet others measuring relational factors (Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996; King & Hinson, 1994). It has been suggested that researchers most commonly investigate economic outcomes of negotiations, largely overlooking relational outcomes, thus privileging a masculine negotiation paradigm (Putnam & Kolb, 2000). In addition, an array of methodological approaches have been used from one study to the next, making it extraordinarily difficult to compare and contrast research findings and formulate sound conclusions. Thus, women and men are oriented towards conflict rather distinctly and comparing the two is a complex endeavor.

Gender and the Propensity to Negotiate

Despite the diversity of the negotiation research, the source of gender differences are consistently conceptualized as relating to individual-level and situational-level factors (Kolb, 2012; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Individual-level factors position gender effects as a consequence of factors related to the negotiator. Situational-level factors explain gender-effects as a consequence of factors external to the negotiator. Given the conceptual merit of these factors, individual and situational factors will be used in the literature review to explore the relevant theory and empirical evidence surrounding the propensity to negotiate.

Individual-Level Factors

Gender differences have been long been considered at the individual-level (e.g., Rubin & Brown, 1975) and considered to be a fixed trait. This approach views these individual traits as mostly stable and constant, meaning that most women will act similarly to other women while most men will act similarly to other men. Further, it is believed that these gender differences cause differences in the propensity to negotiate. The individual-level traits most frequently proposed to cause gender effects in the propensity to negotiate include relational orientation, locus of control, risk-aversion, and the recognition of opportunities (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Babcock et al., 2006; Rubin & Brown, 1975).

Relational orientation. One assumed individual-level difference between women in men is their degree of relational orientation. Relational orientation or relational self-construal is described as the degree to which individuals perceive themselves to be interconnected with other people. Those with a high relational orientation perceive themselves as interconnected with other people and understand themselves in relation to others. On the other hand, those with a low relational orientation perceive themselves as disjointed or independent from others (Cross & Madson, 1997).

It has been argued that women and men develop somewhat different relational orientations as part of their role identities. Relational orientation is tied to gender norms that outline a male standard of dominance over others and a female standard of concern for others (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Curhan, Neale, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Gardner, Gabriel, & Dean, 2004). This schema includes a basic understanding or prescription of how women and men should behave in relation to others (Bem, 1981).

Indeed, evidence suggests that women are more likely to perceive their identities and actions as more closely intertwined with the people around them (Cross & Madson, 1997; Rubin & Brown, 1975) and are also more concerned with social relationships (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Gender differences in relational orientation have been found to occur at the negotiation table as well. A study by Halpern and McClean Parks (1996) demonstrated that women and men had different relational concerns while negotiating. In the study, participants were asked to negotiate over the funding arrangements of a children's playground project. The researchers then conducted a content analysis of the audio transcripts of negotiation interactions; findings demonstrated that men were more likely to assert their self-interests, make demands, and mention money much sooner than women. Women, on the other hand, were more likely to ask questions about the other's feelings and were concerned how the joint decision would affect other people. In this instance, relational concerns were a prominent consideration for women while economic concerns were at the forefront of concerns for men.

Relational concerns for women could hamper their likelihood of pursuing economic interests. Broadly, those with a high relational orientation may adopt behaviors of 'relational accommodation,' meaning they minimize or forgo economic gains in order to pursue relational goals (Curhan et al., 2008). If it is accepted that women have a higher relational orientation (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997; Rubin & Brown, 1975), then women might then have a particularly difficult time at the negotiation table, which typically involves both economic and relational elements (Mnookin et al., 2000). Women might be more willing to undervalue their economic interests in an effort to 'accommodate' to others and preserve their relationships (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988). In other words, female

negotiators may consider both relational and economic concerns while men are focally concerned with economic issues. Consequently, the multiple, often conflicting, interests of women could hinder their economic pursuits (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Indeed, there is such evidence to support the occurrence of gender differences in relational concerns when distributing pay. For instance, one study asked individuals if they felt comfortable being paid more than others in the group. Male participants in this study had no qualms with being paid more, while female participants reported a high level of discomfort with receiving higher pay than others (Barron, 2003). In other words, while men have a focal interest in their own personal gains, women are more likely to consider how their personal gains affect the relative gains of others.

In brief, a variety of research supports the belief that there are gender differences in relational orientations. Women often take interest in both relational and economic outcomes, while men often fixate their attention on economic interests. Therefore, the decision to negotiate may be somewhat trickier for women, which could lead them to either undervalue or ignore their own interests. Consequently, gender differences in the propensity to negotiate could be the result of differences in relational orientation and consideration of other people.

Locus of control. Locus of control has long been studied and has been implicated as a factor that influences the propensity to negotiate (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Locus of control is described as the extent to which individuals perceive they are personally in control of their circumstances (Rotter, 1966). Those with a high external locus of control generally believe that external factors, such as luck, chance, or other people, control their life circumstances and future. Those with a high internal locus

believe that they are personally in control of their lives and futures. It is no surprise, then, that individuals with a high internal locus of control are more likely to be assertive (Hartwig, Dickson, & Anderson, 1980) since they believe that they have the ability to attain the things they desire.

Notable gender differences have been found between women and men with regard to locus of control. Researchers consistently find that, on average, women maintain a higher external locus of control than do men (Kunhikrishnan & Manikandan, 1995; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1997), and this gender difference extends to many countries beyond the United States (Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1997). For example, a study by Barron (2003) demonstrated that men perceived themselves as largely in control of determining their financial value and were also more certain of their personal value. Conversely, women believed their employer should determine their economic value and were also more uncertain of their personal worth.

These gender differences in locus of control have important implications for negotiations, particularly in wage negotiations. Individuals with a high external locus of control, who believe they exert less control over their life and circumstances, may be less likely to exert effort towards initiating a negotiation. If a negotiator believes her or his efforts will not influence the outcome, then there is little motivation to act. Indeed, negotiators with a higher internal locus of control are more likely to be competitive and more likely to decline poor first offers in wage negotiations (Ford, 1983). Therefore, women might be less likely to initiate a negotiation because they believe others should and can determine their worth (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).

Risk-taking and risk-aversion. Gender differences in propensity could also be the result of variances in risk-taking behavior, with men more likely to engage in risky behaviors in comparison to women. These gender differences in risk-taking behavior might help explain why women are more averse to the thought of 'negotiating' in comparison to men (Small et al., 2007). Some have explained that the male proclivity for risk-taking behavior is an attribute of male psychology and they are driven to attain social and economic rewards (Wilson & Daly, 1985). Others have suggested that male risk-taking is partly a function of sensation-seeking and is fostered by supportive gender norms in the given culture (Arnett, 1992). While there is not yet a definitive explanation for why there are gender differences in risk-taking, there is evidence to suggest that these gender differences exist.

Indeed, evidence supports that men are more comfortable with risk than women (Arch, 1993). A meta-analysis conducted by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafner (1999) demonstrated that men are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviors across 14 out of 16 tasks including driving, sexual activities, gambling, and intellectual risk endeavors. This same study also demonstrated that gender differences in risk-taking are nuanced; the degree of difference varies depending on age and context. For example, gender differences in risky sexual behavior are wide in younger age groups but these gender differences narrow as age increases. In comparison, gender differences in risky drinking and drug use are narrow among younger age groups and are quite large with older age groups. Interestingly, males were likely to engage in risk-taking behaviors even when it was discernible that the risky behavior is a poor idea. Conversely, females were unlikely to engage in risk-taking behaviors even when it was a good idea to engage in the risk.

Thus, risk-taking is either adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the benefits or consequences that are attained in these various endeavors.

Gender differences in risk-taking have also been identified in negotiations. While Craver and Barnes (1999) reported no gender differences in the negotiation performances of their law students, their research also reported that the women in eight out of the 11 negotiation courses opted to enroll in the elective class for no credit to avoid the potential risk of earning a bad grade for subpar performance. It seems women, but not men, preferred to avoid risk in the negotiation course and this factor might explain the findings by Craver and Barnes (1999) as to why women negotiated at a rate comparable to men.

Recognizing opportunities and experience. Recognizing the opportunity to negotiate is an essential step if a negotiation is to occur (Volkema & Fleck, 2012). The way an individual understands negotiation will influence her/his propensity to negotiate. If one does not perceive him/herself to be amidst an interaction that is negotiable, then one is far less likely to make efforts to initiate a negotiation. Research suggests that men are more likely than women to recognize opportunities to negotiate. In an online survey, Babcock and her colleagues (2006) asked over 200 women and men to describe their last two negotiations and their next two negotiations. The study found gender differences in both arenas: estimated time until the respondents' next negotiation as well as time since their last negotiation. In predicting the time until their next negotiation, male participants reported they would negotiate much sooner than female participants predicted they would negotiate. On average, men indicated their next negotiation would take place in seven days while women reported their next negotiation would take place in thirty days.

Overwhelmingly, men expected to be negotiating much sooner than women expected to be negotiating.

Recognizing negotiation opportunities was also strongly related to the frequency of actual negotiation experiences. In the second part of their study, Babcock et al. (2006) demonstrated that men reported negotiating more recently than did women. On average, men stated they had negotiated in the last two weeks, while women said they had negotiated in the last month. There were also vast gender differences in the second-most-recent negotiation. The second-most recent negotiation took place seven weeks prior for men, and six months prior for women. The researchers suggest that these gender differences in experience could have devastating consequences for women. Without recognizing negotiation opportunities or having extensive negotiating experience, women might struggle to gain the skills or self-efficacy (Bandura, 1984, 1986) that are necessary requisites to becoming an effective negotiator.

Taken together, gender differences in the propensity to negotiate can be considered a function of a number of individual-level differences. The prominent individual differences that have been examined include relational orientation, locus of control, risk-taking, and recognizing opportunities to negotiate and experience doing so. Indeed, these individual differences have been successful in predicting behaviors related to the propensity to negotiate (Babcock & Lashever, 2003; Babcock et al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2008; Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996). That said, evidence exists to support the belief that the gender story is slightly more complex than individual-level differences. While individual-level factors are important in the propensity to negotiate (Volkema & Fleck, 2012), human behavior is at minimum a function of both individual variables and

situational constraints on that behavior (McCroskey, 1997). In fact, many scholars have suggested that individual differences can only account for a small amount of the gender differences in negotiation behavior, and situational factors are paramount to accounting for much of the variance between women and men (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Watson (1994) argues that “It appears that even small variations in experimental conditions can eliminate these [gender] differences entirely, or more surprisingly, cause them to change direction” (p. 23). Thus, gender differences can be triggered or changed by alterations to the situation. Consequently, the propensity to negotiate is optimally understood by considering both individual-level variables as well as situational factors that might influence these individual differences. The next section will discuss the situational factors in negotiations that influence gender effects in the propensity to negotiate.

Situational-Level Factors

The situational approach assumes that women and men are similar and behave similarly in negotiations; however situational factors can cause sex differences to emerge. The situational factors known to trigger gender differences in the propensity to negotiate include role congruence, stereotype activation, perceived power, and structural ambiguity.

Role congruence. One situational factor related to gender effects is role congruity. As previously described, a role is congruent when it is consistent with traditional norms for a particular gender, while the role is incongruent when the role is inconsistent with the norms for one's gender (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Both women and men are more liked when they behave in ways that are gender-consistent (Rudman,

1998). Indeed, there can be negative social consequences when gender norms are violated (Bem, 1981; Cherry & Deaux, 1978; Cross & Madson, 1997; Rubin & Brown, 1975). For example, women in particular can incur social backlash when they are “not nice” (Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001; Wade, 2001) or when they exert behaviors such as assertiveness or self-promotion (Rudman, 1998).

The congruity between the role and the sex of the negotiator can affect the propensity to negotiate in two ways. First, role incongruity in a negotiation can cause negative social responses or backlash from others. Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) found women often incur a higher social cost for negotiating in comparison to men. In their study, they asked a sample of college students to adopt the role of manager and then evaluate the profiles of internal job candidates; some of these candidates were attempting to negotiate their starting salary while others were not. Results demonstrated that women were consistently punished for negotiating their starting wage. Specifically, women who negotiated were rated as competent, but they were also rated as demanding, less likable, and less hireable. In comparison, men did not experience negative consequences for negotiating. Men who negotiated were rated as equally likable, similarly demanding, and were perceived as equally hireable in comparison to men who did not negotiate. Second, women seem to understand they are behaving in ways incongruent with gender norms when they negotiate and anticipate that they will encounter backlash. The aforementioned study by Bowles et al. (2007) also asked participants to reverse their role and adopt the role of the negotiator. The female participants correctly anticipated that there would be social consequences for negotiating, were more apprehensive about the idea of negotiating, and consequently were less likely to initiate negotiations (Bowles, et al.,

2007). In other words, women knew quite well that their requests would be met with pushback from others and therefore they chose to avoid negotiating.

On the other hand, women are unlikely to encounter backlash when the negotiation scenario is more congruent with female norms. For example, women fare much better when negotiating for others rather than negotiating for themselves. Negotiating for oneself is viewed as pursuing self-interests, a behavior inconsistent with traditional feminine norms of selflessness. Negotiating for others, however, is consistent with female stereotypes as it is considered an expression of care for others (Wade, 2001). Further, women expect less backlash when negotiating on behalf of a friend than when negotiating for themselves (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Not only do women avoid backlash during gender-appropriate negotiations, but they also perform better. For example, women are generally more assertive and achieve higher outcomes when they are negotiating on the behalf of others. Bowles et al. (2005) found that when women advocate for others they set higher goals and make higher initial offers in comparison to when negotiating on their own behalf. Interestingly, men set similar goals and opening offers regardless of whether they are negotiating for themselves or others. Together these studies suggest that female negotiators have to consider the perceived and actual social consequences of negotiating when deciding whether to initiate a negotiation. As such, for women, the risks of negotiating need to be carefully calculated and the rewards might not always outweigh the costs. However, male negotiators face few social risks and have everything to gain.

Negotiation frame. Another negotiation situation that affects the propensity to negotiate is the way the interaction is framed. Deborah Small and her colleagues (2007) used an experimental design in which they informed half their participants they could 'negotiate' for more money while the other half were told they could 'ask' for more money. Drawing from politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987), the researchers contend that 'asking' is more appropriate than 'negotiating' for those with low social power and that women more often hold low power positions. Therefore, a negotiation frame of 'asking' is more gender-congruent than 'negotiating'. Indeed, their study demonstrated that female participants perceived 'negotiating' as significantly more intimidating than 'asking'. However, men perceived 'negotiating' and 'asking' as similarly unthreatening. A subsequent experiment demonstrated that these negative perceptions indeed translated into gender differences in behavior. That is, women were more likely to negotiate when they were told they could 'ask' for more money in comparison to being told they could 'negotiate' for more money. Conversely, for men, there were no differences in the propensity to 'ask' and the propensity to 'negotiate'. In sum, the way the interaction was framed had an effect on women's perceptions and behaviors but did not affect men.

Stereotype activation. While it is well-known that a 'successful' negotiator uses an array of stylistic approaches (Mnookin et al., 2000; Shell, 2001), negotiators are more commonly perceived as possessing masculine traits. The stereotype of a negotiator more commonly includes traits that are masculine; negotiators are expected to be strong, assertive, and rational (Raiffa, 1982). Therefore, by default, men often experience an advantage because they align with the characteristics of a typical negotiator (Kray et al.,

2002). However, when gender is cued in the negotiation, implicitly or explicitly, it can significantly influence the way the negotiation unfolds.

Implicit stereotypes are not overtly stated but are simply implied and occur below immediate consciousness. These implicit stereotypes cause individuals to fulfill the gender stereotype, thus causing men to increase their behavior while women will decrease their behavior. For example, an implicit or subtle cue that men are more effective negotiators has been shown to result in improved outcomes for men decreased outcomes for women (Kray, et al., 2001). On the other hand, cuing a female advantage benefits women and penalizes men. When a successful negotiator is described as possessing stereotypically feminine traits, verbal adeptness and listening skills, the performance of women increases and the performance of men decreases (Kray, et al., 2002). Essentially, when a context implies that a certain gender will have an advantage, that gender indeed negotiates better outcomes.

Explicit cues are signals about gender difference that are openly or overtly stated, and they trigger a psychological reaction in which the individual rejects or counter the stereotype. The negative reaction to the stereotype can actually cause women to increase their performance and attain better outcomes. Explicitly or overtly cueing women to the masculine traits associated with negotiation has been shown to increase negotiation performance for women. One study demonstrated that when women were explicitly cued of a male advantage, the women reacted by behaving inconsistent with the feminine stereotype (Kray et al., 2001). In sum, subtle cues cause individuals to behave consistent with norms and explicit cues cause to reject and defy these norms.

Stereotype activation might explain why some researchers have found minimal gender differences in negotiations. Law Professor Charles Craver has been tracking his students' performance on in-class negotiation activities, with a particular interest in comparing negotiated outcomes of women and men. The first half of the semester Craver's students learn about various aspects of negotiation including topics such as communication, the various phases, relational issues, techniques, as well as gender role expectations. The second half of the semester involves five scored/graded negotiation exercises. Over the course of 16 semesters, there was only one year that gender correlated with negotiation performance. Therefore, for most of the years, gender had no relationship with performance. Craver suggests that gender differences might not relate to negotiation outcomes amongst a sample of law students that are both intelligent and competitive (Craver, 2002). Craver's work, however, might not demonstrate gender equality but instead might demonstrate the immense value of education for triggering gender reactance to explicit gender cues.

The perception of power. Gender and power dynamics can influence the negotiation experience in a number of ways as well (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010), including whether one initiates a negotiation (Small et al., 2007). Power is central to negotiation and is a function of who has control over the desired resource(s) or the ability to leave the table altogether (Volkema, 2009). Further, power can provide an individual with the leverage and bravado to competitively pursue higher outcomes (Kanter, 1977). However, gender stereotypes assume that women maintain lower positions of status and power than men (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagly & Wood, 1982; Kanter, 1977). In addition, women typically do have less societal power (Henley & LaFrance,

1984) and are more sparsely represented in most positions of power, whereas men are often perceived as powerful and have long dominated leadership positions (Fireman, 1990). That said, much of power is perceptual and therefore is far from fixed or finite (Coleman, 2006). Situational manipulations can alter the amount of perceived power that a negotiator experiences and, consequently, their propensity to initiate a negotiation.

One study by Small et al. (2007) demonstrates that perceived power strongly relates to the propensity to negotiate, especially for women. This lab study involved 149 participants, half of whom were primed to think and write about a time they perceived themselves as powerful, while the other half received no such power cue. When women were primed to feel powerful, they negotiated at a rate that was comparable to men. The rate of negotiating for men, however, did not change between the power condition and non-power condition. Thus, it is likely that women need to be reminded to experience power while men inherently experience feelings of power by nature of simply being a man. Given that women experience lower feelings of power relative to men, it seems this perception hampers their propensity to negotiate. Similar to other research (i.e., Watson, 1994), this study implies that when female negotiators experience a reasonable amount of perceived power they are more likely to initiate negotiations and will do so at a rate comparable to men.

Ambiguity. Clarity in negotiation conditions can have a profound influence on behavior and the propensity to negotiate (Kray & Gelfand, 2009; Volkema, 2009). Clarity in a situation can be understood as ranging from “strong” to “weak” (Mischel, 1977). Strong situations provide the same clear message to all participants on the type of behavior that is appropriate. These strong situations heavily influence the individual to

behave consistently with the expected and normative behavior. In comparison, weak situations provide little information regarding how one should behave. Negotiation situations often range in clarity regarding factors such as whether pay is negotiable or how pay is determined (Volkema, 2009).

Individual differences, such as gender differences, are more likely to emerge in weak situations. Weak situations often trigger individual differences because behavior will need to be improvised using internal cues such as traits and beliefs (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Gender norms provide a rich source of information regarding what behaviors are socially acceptable (Eagly, 1987) in an ambiguous negotiation (Bowles, 2012; Bowles et al., 2005). For example, women have been demonstrated to have lower pay expectations than do men, but gender differences in expectations are eradicated when the procedures of pay determination are made available (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984). Thus, clarity in regards to acceptable and normative behavior strongly influences the extent that gender effects are triggered.

Structural ambiguity is the extent to which the parameters of the negotiation are clear to the negotiators. The structure of the negotiation refers to the specific economic structure of the negotiation and involves factors such as what is specifically negotiable, the bargaining range, and what constitutes a fair agreement. Indeed, ambiguity in the environment has been suggested as an important predictor of the propensity to negotiate (Volkema & Fleck, 2012), particularly for women.

One compelling study by Bowles et al. (2005) surveyed graduating MBA students and asked them to report a series of details on their work experience and salary information. Findings suggest there were no gender differences in pay within professions

of low ambiguity regarding pay, professions such as consulting, investment banking, and venture capital. However, men earned \$10,000 more per year than women in highly ambiguous industries, industries such as telecommunications, manufacturing, and health/human services. Upon further investigation, the researchers determined that the wage differences in ambiguous industries were tied to the avoidance of negotiating starting salaries. In sum, ambiguous situations leave room for individual differences to be elicited -- individual differences such as gender or the traits that accompany gender (i.e., relational orientation, locus of control, risk-taking, recognizing opportunities). Further, these differences are typically more financially harmful to women, who often do not negotiate, than men, who often do negotiate. It has been suggested that organizations could minimize the wage gap by creating transparency surrounding what is negotiable and how pay decisions are made. With transparency, differences in pay are more likely to be the result of merit rather than individual differences such as gender (Konnikova, 2014; Pradel, Bowles, & McGinn, 2005).

Negotiation counterpart. One of the initial examinations of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate targeted apprehension as a main factor contributing to gender differences in the propensity to negotiate (Babcock et al., 2006). Indeed, apprehension or nervousness has been identified as an important factor in the propensity to negotiate, both broadly (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Volkema & Fleck, 2009) and for women specifically (Babcock et al., 2006). Recent support has been found that women experience high levels of nervousness surrounding negotiating. For example, a study by Kray and Gelfand (2009) found that women expressed greater relief when they had a first offer accepted in a negotiation, while men expressed more regret that they were not able

to negotiate for more. However, other researchers have suggested that gender differences in apprehension are marginal (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). These inconclusive findings have led scholars to more closely evaluate the situations in which apprehension differs between women and men. One factor that has been linked to apprehension is the negotiation counterpart, in large part due to the real or imagined social consequences of negotiating.

The composition of the gender dyad has been demonstrated to have a profound effect on nervousness and the propensity to negotiate. Bowles et al. (2007) demonstrated that females were more hesitant to negotiate with a male counterpart, and nervousness explained this hesitation. Indeed, in this same study it was demonstrated that women who negotiated experienced consistent backlash from male evaluators, whereas the backlash from female evaluators only occurred under certain conditions. Specifically, women punished women when they negotiated in writing, but there was no punishment for negotiations proposed in a video recording. While the researchers are unclear why the communication medium has an effect on the evaluations that are made, it is suggested that females consistently experience more pushback from males. In fact, female negotiators consistently predict there will be consequences for negotiating, and indeed are correct in their predictions. Thus, female negotiators who encounter male counterparts often experience nervousness and are then hesitant to initiate a negotiation, and their perceptions and behaviors are somewhat justified given that they are likely to experience negative social consequences. In sum, nervousness is minimally a byproduct and potentially a demotivating factor in the propensity to negotiate.

Interestingly, other researchers have demonstrated that the influence of one's counterpart is more complex than 'men make women nervous, so they don't negotiate'. A study by Eriksson and Sanders (2012) demonstrated that the opposite effect can occur. In their study, female participants were more reluctant to negotiate with other women, likely for fear of damaging the relationship. This study differed from the Bowles' study in that the interactions were face-to-face and the exchange was framed as an ongoing relationship in which the parties were likely to interact again in the future.

Eriksson and Sanders (2012) suggest that women may have been more likely to negotiate with men in their study because there were no indicators or signals of status between the participants and the applicants. Without a cue regarding status, women negotiated at a rate comparable to men. The influence of status in negotiating is consistent with other scholarship suggesting that negotiation counterparts who are perceived as unapproachable or extremely powerful are viewed as threatening and are therefore avoided (Volkema, 2009). In sum, when exploring gender differences in the propensity to negotiate, it is important to consider the gender composition of the dyad as well as power and relational dynamics.

Summary of the Literature Review

The preceding section described the literature related to gender differences in the propensity to negotiate and did so within the framework of individual-level differences and situational-level factors. Both individual-level factors and situational factors may account for gender effects in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Individual-level factors are viewed as relatively stable and relate to whether one perceives the initiation of a negotiation to be an appropriate or effective course of action. Specific individual-level

factors related to gender include relational orientation, locus of control, and the recognition of opportunities. Situational factors are episodic factors that affect one's perception of whether one should negotiate (Volkema & Fleck, 2012). Role congruence, perceived power, and structural ambiguity are situational factors that have been deemed relevant for understanding gender effects in the propensity to negotiate. While individual and situational approaches have been valuable in describing some of the factors that relate to gender effects in negotiation, the previous work really has yet to provide a coherent framework that allows room for both individual and situational factors to be explored.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study is comprised of two main elements; sensemaking and problematic integration theory. The first phase, the quantitative phase, is not driven by a particular theory, per se, but instead replicates a laboratory study developed by Small et al. (2007) to explore the relationship between gender and the propensity to negotiate. The second phase of this study, the qualitative phase, is broadly guided by Weick's articulation of sensemaking (Weick, 1977, 1995) and more closely guided by Babrow's theory of Problematic Integration (1992, 1995, 2001). Sensemaking and PI are appropriate theoretical frameworks because they both address unclear situations and consider how individuals choose to address or cope with that lack of clarity. Sensemaking proposes that uncertainty (absence of meaning) and ambiguity (confusion of meaning) are resolved by drawing from ongoing flows of co-constructed information (Weick, 1995). That is, sense is made with others and is never complete. Problematic integration proposes that when faced with uncertainty, individuals formulate

probabilistic and *evaluative* judgments of that object, and then either choose action or inertia. Together, sensemaking and PI share many similar positions. Sensemaking and PI both maintain that decision-making is more complex than accuracy and choosing the best option; instead, actions are often taken because they are feasible, accessible, and socially acceptable. Additionally, both sensemaking and PI rest upon the notion that the construction of meaning is a communicative, social process and is, therefore, dynamic and ever-changing (McPhee & Zaugg, 2001).

While sensemaking and PI share many of the same foundational assumptions, PI provides a more nuanced view of uncertainty. Specifically, sensemaking presupposes that the goal is to reduce uncertainty (or equivocality) and it is through social processes that individuals maintain or increase access to information (Feldman, 1989). PI, however, supposes that coping with uncertainty is more complex than merely reducing uncertainty. At times, according to PI, the reduction of uncertainty is not always possible or desirable. Moreover, increasing uncertainty can allow room for hope and optimism. For example, an individual diagnosed with late-stage terminal cancer might cling to sparse notions of hope to transform their PI of death, an event that likely has a high probability and a negative evaluation (Babrow, 2001).

These theoretical delineations of uncertainty fit well within the context of a negotiation. For example, individuals avoid negotiations when they expect rejection but confidently approach interactions when they expect success (Bowles et al., 2005; Volkema, 2009). Depending on the negotiation, either uncertainty reduction or uncertainty augmentation could be the foremost objective. Therefore, both of these two theoretical approaches are potentially useful in examining how individuals explain their

propensity to negotiate. The theoretical foundation for this study binds the ideas of ambiguity and communication as foundational to the negotiation process, and the relevance of each of these concepts merit consideration.

Sensemaking and PI are useful for investigating the propensity to negotiate, given that negotiation is a process that is rife with ambiguity and substantiated with communication. Foremost, negotiations present the negotiator with many instances of ambiguity. Negotiation has oft been described as an art that involves both mathematical and human elements (Raiffa, 1982). That is, in addition to economic issues of allocating resources, negotiations are fundamentally social endeavors with one or more parties that have vested interest in those particular resources. With both parties expectedly interested in claiming sufficient value, negotiations have the potential to become more competitive than cooperative, thereby leading to deception, threats, or secrecy (Strudler, 1995). As a result, the negotiation process is intensely uncertain. Uncertainty can surround the other parties interests, bargaining ranges, and alternatives to reaching an agreement. To overcome issues of uncertainty and ensure a fair deal, negotiators are trained to use forethought to understand the dynamics of the negotiation table, build trust to encourage information exchange between parties, then reflection to understand the negotiation in novel ways (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Mnookin, et al., 2000; Putnam & Kolb, 2000; Schoop, et al., 2010; Shell, 2006; Ury, 1993). Thus, ambiguity is commonly encountered in a negotiation but can be reduced through communicative processes.

Communication is the constitutive material of negotiation as, “Negotiation cannot occur without some means of communication” (Putnam & Roloff, 1992, p. 1). Negotiators communicate using verbal and nonverbal messages to make offers,

counteroffers, demands, threats, and promises (Putnam, 2010). Through communication, negotiators are able to engage in collaborative problem-solving to mutually craft a beneficial agreement (Putnam & Roloff, 1992). A communicative approach to negotiation acknowledges that multiple systems of meaning underlie bargaining. Individual negotiators maintain personal understandings and expectations of the exchange, the negotiators co-create meaning throughout their exchange, and negotiation situations are imbued with meaning surrounding what constitutes normative behavior for a given situation. Further, societal meanings of power and politics provide scripts surrounding a given negotiation context. Therefore, communication can both reveal and constrain various types of information in the negotiation exchange. Due to the centrality of language and communication to negotiation, it has been argued that communication has a central role in the bargaining process (Putnam, 2010). Communication theory, such as sensemaking and PI, provide an opportunity to consider how communication fosters or inhibits the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The following section will more specifically describe sensemaking and PI and then detail the relevance of each of these theories for the present study.

Sensemaking

Sensemaking occurs when there is an absence of meaning (uncertainty) or multiple meanings are available (equivocality). Ultimately, a situation is presented that necessitates meaning to be made, and sensemaking is the process of understanding. Importantly, sensemaking can occur at the individual or organizational level. At an individual-level, people construct an understanding of the situation or their environment (Weick, 1995). At a group or organizational level, individuals make sense socially, which

involves making sense together and formulating mutual understanding of a given situation (Weick & Roberts, 1993). As a theoretical lens, sensemaking is useful for considering the ways meaning is constructed at these levels of understanding; the individual, the group, and/or the organization (Weick, 1995). For example, Wrzesniewski (2003) argued that individuals often assign meaning to their work through multiple levels of relational sensemaking processes. Specifically, the value and meaning of one's work is constructed through interactions with others at work. Meaning or sense is made relationally and through conversations and observations of others such as customers, subordinates, colleagues, and supervisors. To describe sensemaking simply, it is the process of 'making sense' of events or situations through a collective social process in order to determine what should be done next (Weick, 1977).

The foundation of organizational sensemaking is composed of seven core properties (Weick, 1995). First, sensemaking is bound to identity; meaning that the way we make sense of the world is largely tied to our own self-conceptualization. Weick states “Once I know who I am, then I know what is out there.” (1995, p. 20). Further, one's identity influences and potentially the scripts, or recipes for action, that are available to enact (Golden, Kirby, & Jorgenson. 2006). Second, sensemaking is a retrospective process. This retrospective process contrasts with many cognitive theories that argue thoughts lead to action; instead, sensemaking posits we often take action first and then compose thoughts (Weick, 1977). In other words, making sense retrospectively involves reflection on previous actions to more fully grasp the present. This retrospective quality of sensemaking is represented in Weick's maxim “how can I know what I think until I see what I say?” (1989, p. 247). Third, experiences are organized through a

process of enactment. Enactment involves taking a particular action, and that action organizes the available interpretations of that action and producing and organizing meaning. Fourth, sensemaking is embedded within social processes, thus communication is a central conduit for sharing information vis-a`-vis language, non-verbal messages, or textual artifacts. Fifth, sensemaking is an ongoing, circular process that involves stages of enactment, selection, and retention (Weick, 2001). This involves selecting the issue (enactment), formulating interpretations (selection), and then retaining certain interpretations (retention). Sixth, cues are extracted from the environment and these cues then become input for the sensemaking process. Thus, cues involve what is noticed in one's surroundings. Lastly, plausibility over accuracy details that humans are often satisfied with explanations that are reasonable and good enough, more than they are concerned with finding the most optimal and accurate explanation (Weick, 1995).

Sensemaking and negotiation. Sensemaking is a one suitable lens with which to examine gender differences in the propensity to negotiate, in part because both gender and negotiation have been described as sensemaking processes. Foremost, understanding one's gender has been framed as a life-long sensemaking process. Individuals continuously construct and reconstruct schemas of what it means to be a woman or man (Bem, 1981). Further, these schemas of gender are always in progress and can even be contradictory (Foldy, 2006; Tracy & Rivera, 2010). Additionally, the process of negotiating has also been described as a sensemaking process. Negotiations are notoriously rife with ambiguity. Negotiations are commonly void of clarity on the content of the exchange, that is; what is to be exchanged, who holds the “upper hand,” and the degree of investment the parties have in achieving and outcome (Bowles et al., 2005). In

addition, negotiators often have little guidance on exactly how they should behave or maneuver communicatively (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). Finally, negotiations are largely social and therefore involve parties that together co-construct a reality that is continually and dynamically unfolding (Putnam & Kolb, 2000).

The last property of sensemaking, plausibility over accuracy, is particularly germane to the propensity to negotiate. Plausibility over accuracy explicates that “to deal with ambiguity, interdependent people look for meaning, settle for plausibility, then move on” (Weick, 2005, p. 419). In other words, individuals often encounter situations that are ambiguous or do not make sense, and will then develop a plausible explanation to assuage this confusion or dissonance. The explanations are often developed without rigorous reasoning since humans are often satisfied with acceptable answers that quickly come to mind. Thus, sensemaking need not be perfect, because sensemaking is “not about truth and getting it right” (p. 415), instead sensemaking is developing a plausible story that is reasonable and socially accessible. The sensemaking principle of plausibility over accuracy also enlightens our understanding of gender effects in negotiation. For example, researchers have demonstrated the potential gains that can result from wage negotiations are vast (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991), yet many women opt for a conservative course of behavior or even purposeful inaction (Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007). The plausible, reasonable, and accessible course of action that women seem to be adopting is one of politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987), largely consistent with traditional gender norms (Deaux & Major, 1987; Eagly, 1987, 1995).

To summarize, sensemaking entails resolving uncertainty or ambiguity with knowledge that is communicative and drawn from our social interactions. Therefore,

sensemaking fits quite well with the processes of negotiations, which inextricably tie the communicative process of meaning-making with deal-making (Putnam, 2010). As such, sensemaking serves as a useful theoretical lens with which to examine the propensity to negotiate. From this lens, one might evaluate how women and men make sense of negotiable situations and what interpretations are available to them during negotiation interactions based on their communicative and social experiences. To explore the rate of gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation in phase one, and to examine sensemaking in phase two, the following hypothesis and research questions are posed:

H1: There will be significant gender differences in the propensity to negotiate.

Specifically, men will be more likely to initiate a negotiation than will women.

RQ1: How do participants make sense of their choices to initiate or avoid negotiations?

Problematic Integration Theory

The communication theory of PI relates to the tension between desires and expectations, or what Babrow (1992, 1995, 2001) refers to as probabilistic and evaluative orientations. The term 'probabilistic' refers to one's overall understanding of an object; this includes the characteristics of the object, how it came to be, and how it will behave. 'Evaluative' refers to the relative value of the object, either positive or negative. For example, in wage negotiations, probabilistic orientations could be tied to the likelihood of attaining the payment, whether their counterpart is willing or able to provide the payment, and so forth. Evaluative orientations could be tied to the desirability of the payment, how it would affect the relationship, and so forth. Importantly, PI is guided by three main tenets: probabilistic and evaluative orientations are interconnected, can

become problematic, and are continuously developing through communication and lived experience.

The first main principle underlying the theory of PI (Bradac, 2001) is that probabilistic and evaluative orientations are interrelated and are integrated with little effort or conscious thought. For example, if one believes they have a low probability of receiving an annual holiday bonus, then the evaluation of that bonus might also be negative. On the other hand, if the probability of a holiday bonus is exceedingly high, then the evaluation of that event might be positive. In addition, evaluations can effect probabilities and probabilities can effect evaluations, either positively or negatively. If the likelihood of a raise becomes increasingly high, then an individual might view the value of the raise more positively. Conversely, if it becomes apparent that obtaining a raise is unlikely, then an individual might begin to devalue that raise and view it more negatively. Thus, probabilities and evaluations are interrelated, dynamic, and can shift in unison.

A second tenet of PI is that probabilities and evaluations are not always integrated seamlessly, but are potentially problematic. PI theory focuses on problematic situations in which our desires and expectations diverge. Specifically, the combination of probabilistic and evaluative orientations can take four 'problematic' forms: divergence (sadness when a positive outcome is not likely or sadness when a negative outcome is very likely), ambiguity (the odds of an event are unclear), ambivalence (multiple exclusive options are equally desirable or equally undesirable), and impossibility (a desirable outcome is not attainable). In other words, PI is useful for understanding “when expectations and desires diverge, when we are uncertain about something valuable, when we experience

ambivalence, and when we face impossible desires” (Matthias & Babrow, 2007, p. 788). It is under these problematic circumstances that people might opt to increase uncertainty, for problematic dilemmas have the potential to instigate negative feelings (Babrow, 2001). Uncertainties are fundamentally unknowable and individuals need to evaluate whether they want to discover the unknowable (Babrow et al., 1998). For example, a negotiator might avoid inquiring about a wage promotion if they fear their boss has not been happy with their work performance. PI theory acknowledges that decision-making rationales are complex and individuals might not always seek to minimize uncertainty.

A final tenet of PI is that communication plays a central role. Communication with others is central to human life and the way we come to understand the world. As such, communication is the very material that constructs and demolishes probabilistic and evaluative orientations (Babrow, 2001; Matthias & Babrow, 2007). Therefore, communication is the central means through which PI is created, maintained, and transformed (Babrow, 1995, 2001, 2007).

The theory of PI, which details probabilities and evaluations, aligns well with the propensity to negotiate. Specifically, negotiations perceived to have a high probability of success are more likely to be pursued than negotiations with a low probability of success (Huppertz, 2003). That is, when individuals believe they can attain specific outcomes, they will be more likely to exert effort toward that end (Volkema, 2009; Volkema & Fleck, 2012), thus a high probabilistic orientation toward a negotiation is likely to be pursued. Next, evaluative concerns are focal motivators and demotivators for those deciding whether to negotiate. Negotiators maintain numerous evaluative concerns; they value or devalue any number of items at the negotiating table including monetary gains

and interpersonal relationships (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996). Negotiations are more likely to take place when the expected outcome is highly valued (Huppertz, 2003; Volkema, 2009). Therefore, while PI has yet to be considered in the context of negotiations, the tenets of PI are highly applicable to understanding negotiation interactions.

It has been proposed that the theory of PI has utility in a wide range of scenarios with an “almost unbounded domain of application” (Bradac, 2001, p. 466). PI is particularly useful in understanding the role of communication in producing and coping with feelings of uncertainty. Through the lens of PI, the decision to negotiate can be viewed as a process driven by probabilistic and evaluative understandings of negotiating, and the potential problematic integration of the two. Hence, this study aims to examine the role of gender in the formulation of probabilistic and evaluative judgments when deciding whether to negotiate.

RQ2a: To what extent do women and men construct outcome *probabilities* for their negotiations?

RQ2b: To what extent do women's and men's constructed outcome *probabilities* influence their propensity to negotiate?

RQ2c: To what extent do women and men assign *value* to the outcome of the negotiation?

RQ2d: To what extent do women's and men's assigned *value* influence their propensity to negotiate?

RQ2e: To what extent do participants indicate that the following problematic dilemmas are their reason they avoid negotiations: divergence, ambiguity, ambivalence, and impossibility.

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

Data were collected from participants in three ways: 1) laboratory observations, 2) semi-structured follow-up interviews, and 3) a quantitative survey. The laboratory study aimed to examine the rate of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. The follow-up interviews were conducted immediately after the laboratory study and aimed to explore the reasons participants did or did not negotiate. These interviews were also used to explore the way individuals made sense of negotiating and indicated probabilistic and evaluative orientations. Lastly, a quantitative survey was administered that included demographic questions and the negotiation apprehension scale (Babcock et al., 2006). Taken together, these three data sources resulted in both qualitative and quantitative data which were used to investigate the proposed hypothesis and research questions.

Participants

Participants were recruited from several undergraduate communication courses at a large public university in the southwestern United States. Participants were mainly recruited from lower division communication classes, to minimize the number of students who had taken an undergraduate course in conflict and negotiation offered through the university's communication department. Two students had taken the conflict and negotiation course, which provides students with the opportunity to learn about recognizing negotiable opportunities, the process of initiating requests, and gender effects in the propensity to negotiate. The two participants who had taken the course did not attempt to initiate a negotiation.

The ‘task performance study’ was advertised to students as an opportunity to earn course extra credit and \$3 to \$10. Participant incentives were funded by the Conflict Transformation Project (CTP). Those who were interested in participating signed up for a time to come to the lab. Reminder e-mails were sent to participants one day prior to their appointment, which included detailed information such as the time, date, and location, along with a reminder that they would be earning between \$3 and \$10 and course extra credit.

All individuals from the laboratory study were invited to complete a follow-up interview. All participants agreed to complete the interview. While certainly there is a richness of information that comes with interviewing a small sample of participants, interviewing a large number of participants is useful for attaining a range of responses and for generating theory (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Thus, interviewing all participants was an appropriate strategy to gain a variety of perceptions and most comprehensively understand the phenomenon of interest: the propensity to negotiate.

A total of 86 individuals (49 women and 37 men) participated in all phases of the study. The average age of participants was 20 years old ($M = 19.98$, $mode = 19$), and ranged from 18 to 36 years. Participants described themselves as White/Caucasian (45.8%), Asian (41%), Hispanic/Latin American (10.8%), and “Other” (1.2%). At the time of this study there were numerous extra credit opportunities circulating; however, many of these studies were not open to international students. Consequently, a hefty portion of the sample in this study consists of international students, though the exact number is unknown since the resident status of participants was not assessed via the quantitative or qualitative survey. The financial status of our participants was a relevant

consideration, given our interest in the participants' propensity to ask for more money. The majority of participants were working part-time (32.1%), followed by looking for work (21%), not looking for work (17.3%), working full-time (14.8%), unable to work (8.6%), self-employed (3.7%), and retired (2.5%). Participants reported the annual income of their parents and the averages were moderately high. Many participants (42.2%) reported that their parent's combined income was \$80,000 while approximately half that number reported their parent income was below \$79,999 (21.7%). Some participants did not know or did not report parental income (36.1%).

Mixed Method Approach

This mixed method study involves the 'mixing' of both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2002). The quantitative data proved to be useful for replicating past research and testing the prediction that there would be gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. The qualitative data elaborated on the quantitative data and allowed participants to explain the reasons for their behavior and share their personal perspectives on the topic of negotiation. These qualitative accounts provide researchers with information that is not directly observable (Tracy, 2013) and thus facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of negotiation engagement and avoidance.

Concurrent Embedded Design

Numerous mixed method designs exist, and most scholars agree that the appropriate design for a given study is dependent upon the proposed research questions (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Myers, 2014). Specifically, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) argue that the researcher should consider the quantitative and qualitative strands being collected, and then determine 1) the priority

of each strand, 2) the timing of the strands, and 3) the degree of interaction between the strands. Following these guidelines for design determination, an explanatory mixed method design (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) was deemed most appropriate for answering the research questions in this study. Explanatory sequential designs begin with a first phase of quantitative data collection, subsequently followed by a second phase of qualitative data collection. The qualitative data from the second phase are used to explain findings from the first phase. Each of the decisions for determining design was carefully considered for the present study, and each merit discussion. First, priority in this study was given to the qualitative strand of the study. The qualitative phase addresses the main research question, 'why women and men don't negotiate' and will therefore be the heart of the study. Second, *implementation* of data strands was timed sequentially, meaning that the quantitative strand was collected first and then followed by the qualitative strand. The data from the second phase rely upon the data from the first strand (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2006); therefore, sequential timing was necessary. Lastly, *integration* of the two strands of data occurred during the results section.

Advantages of Mixing Methods

Mixed methods are an increasingly popular approach for conducting social science research, largely in an effort to overcome the perceived incommensurability of qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative and quantitative are often dichotomized into separate philosophical paradigms, but increasingly scholars are recognizing that these two approaches need not be separated and can be particularly advantageous when used in tandem (Pearce, 2012). Instead of adhering to philosophical assumptions of

positivism or interpretivism, mixed methods projects often embrace a position of 'pragmatism' (Creswell, 2009). Pragmatism does not commit to either induction or deduction, but instead embraces 'abduction' which involves moving back and forth between extant theory and the evidence in the data. Additionally, pragmatism does not maintain an axiological position of objectivity nor subjectivity, but embraces intersubjectivity and moving between these two poles (Hanson, 2008).

A mixed method approach is useful for replicating and then expanding current knowledge (Myers, 2014) and for obtaining “different but complementary data on the same topic” (Morse, 1991, p. 122). The quantitative phase of this study aligns with prior work (e.g., Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007), and then extends and elaborates on this prior work with follow-up qualitative interviews. This replication and extension of research is certainly a contribution to organizational scholarship for a few reasons. Not only does a mixed method perspective broaden knowledge for all those who study propensity, it also promotes the durability of social science research. Myers (2014) states that “Selecting mixed methods designs aids in probing issues and developing a complex view of organizational phenomena. For these reasons, mixed methods research can increase the value, usefulness, and visibility of organizational communication scholarship in organizational studies and the social sciences generally” (p. 315).

Quantitative Data

The laboratory study was a replication of the work Small and her colleagues (2007) conducted to investigate “Who goes to the Negotiation Table.” The original study examined whether participants would initiate a negotiation when offered the minimum amount possible for completing an arbitrary task, a word game called Boggle. Results of

this study demonstrated that men were more likely than women to initiate a negotiation for more money. This finding has also been substantiated amongst a sample of college students in Sweden (Eriksson & Sanders, 2012).

Procedures

Participants were recruited to take part in a study in which they could earn between \$3 and \$10 and course extra credit. Students were informed about the study during their class time and were subsequently e-mailed the recruitment script and a link to sign up for a time slot to visit the lab. Participants were emailed reminder notices one to two days before their appointment. The e-mails detailed reiterated information in the recruitment script; the time, location, and that \$3 to \$10 could be earned for participation. After the first day of interviewing, it became clear that many of the participants were solely interested in extra credit. As such, starting the second day of the study, the \$3 to \$10 was increasingly emphasized to participants as soon as they entered the lab: a '\$3 to \$10' sign was posted on the door of the lab, the informed consent had the pay range highlighted in yellow, and the lab assistants reiterated payment to participants in their initial interaction.

Upon arrival, participants were seated in a private cubicle where they were instructed how to complete the "Boggle" word game. The confederates then read the Boggle instructions to the participant and then provided them with a typed copy they could use as a reference. Game instructions asked participants to "Shake the game cube, then stop, allowing the lettered dice to fall into the grid at the bottom of the cube. Once the letters fall into the grid, you should search through the lettered grid and identify as many words as possible. Words can be formed from letters that are adjoined horizontally,

vertically, or diagonally to the left, right, upwards, or downwards. No letter can be used more than once within the same word.” Each of the four rounds of Boggle were played identically, and each round lasted a total of three minutes. The instructions also informed participants, “Once you have completed the four rounds, please indicate to the experimenter that you are finished so that she or he can score your rounds. Then you will be paid and proceed to the final phase of the study.”

Confederates guided participants through each of the rounds and largely controlled the timer that was used to monitor the time as it elapsed through the rounds. After the participant indicated they had completed the game, the confederate took the scorecard and asked the participant to wait while the score was calculated. The confederate exited the room and entered an adjacent room where they calculated the Boggle score. After the Boggle score was calculated, approximately three minutes, the experimenter returned to the participant. From here, the experimenters did not provide participants with feedback, but simply provided the participant with \$3 in cash and asked “Here is \$3, is that OK?” All participants were given the minimum \$3 and were only given up to \$10 if they 'asked for it', or attempted to negotiate. The participants who negotiated or asked for more money were coded as a 'negotiate.' The participants who did not initiate a negotiation were coded as a 'no negotiation.' If the participant complained about the payment, then the participant was coded as a 'complaint', but was only given more money if the complaint included a request for more money. That is, complaints that naturally escalated to a request for money were consummated. Participants that asked for further explanation of pay determination were told that a full report would be made

available to them once the study was complete. These individuals who ‘asked for an explanation of pay determination’ were coded as such.

Participants were not given any external cue informing them how well they performed. For one, the arrangement of Boggle letters is completely random. In addition, there is no feedback or gauge of performance. The isolated nature of this task is absent from social comparison data of performance which fundamental to the conventional “Boggle” game. In other words, participants would not have a social reference with which to gauge their performance.

Confederates. Four confederates were used for this study: two females and two males. These confederates were responsible for leading participants into the lab, providing participants with instructions, paying participants, and taking observational notes throughout the process. Each of the confederates was provided with standardized scripts for how to interact with and respond to the participants, including how to respond to requests for more money. Further, the study used a double-blind approach, meaning that neither the confederates nor the participants were aware of the objective of this study. Throughout the study, I met with the confederates and asked them what they had been observing. To my surprise, the confederates rarely mentioned explicit gender effects within the study. The confederates often hypothesized that those with a high language and vocabulary skills would be more likely to negotiate; similar comments about the influence of language skills were noted many times throughout their observational notes.

Measures

Gender. Gender of the participant was observed at the time of the interview, and recorded in the field note data. Females were coded with an arbitrary numerical value of '1' and males were coded with the arbitrary number '2'.

Behavioral choice. In the laboratory study, the outcome measure was the behavioral choice made by the participant; negotiating versus not negotiating. Participants that initiated a negotiation were coded with a '1' and those who did not negotiate were coded with a '2'. It was also noted when participants behaved in ways that varied from the simple ask-no ask dichotomy. Participants who complained upon payment were coded as a '3' and those who asked how payment was calculated were coded as a '4'.

Boggle performance. Following the Boggle game, the researcher scored the performance using the Boggle scoring rubric. The rubric details that one point is awarded for three-letter words, two points for four-letter words, three points for five-letter words, four points for six-letter words, five points for seven-letter words, and six points for words with eight or more letters. See table 1 for the Boggle scoring key. The actual task score was used for the descriptive analyses. Task performance scores were used to examine whether there were gender differences in actual task performance.

Table 1

Scoring Key for Boggle Performance Task

Number of Letters	3	4	5	6	7	8 or more
Points	1	2	3	4	5	6

Negotiation apprehension. The apprehension scale is a subscale from the Propensity to Initiate Negotiation (PIN) scale (Babcock et al., 2006). Sample items include “I feel anxious when I have to ask for something I want,” and “It always feels so unpleasant to have to ask for things myself.” Negotiation apprehension has been demonstrated to correlate with the propensity to negotiate (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011), and research demonstrates that women experience this apprehension more frequently than do men (Babcock et al., 2006). Given that negotiation apprehension is a valuable predictor of the propensity to negotiate, this scale was included to evaluate how apprehension relates to the propensity to negotiate. The alpha coefficient for the apprehension scale was high ($\alpha = .92$). See Appendix B for the Negotiation Apprehension scale.

Qualitative Data

Data Collection

The qualitative portion of this study was principally comprised of data from semi-structured interviews. The interviews were conducted directly after the quantitative phase and included all of the 86 participants from the laboratory study. The interviews lasted an average of 10 minutes in length and ranged from four minutes to 35 minutes. Interview questions explored reasons for initiating a negotiation or failing to do so, how individuals make sense of negotiation, and probabilistic and evaluative orientations related to negotiating. These interviews served as an extension of the Small et al. (2007) study that relied solely on experimental manipulation and quantitative data to explore the reasons individuals chose to engage and avoid negotiations. Thus, the interviews provided a novel methodological extension of the present literature because participants had not yet had

the opportunity to share their personal and unique experience in the context of this experiment. All participants were asked for their consent to have the interview audio-recorded. The interview protocol was developed from a review of the relevant gender and negotiation literature. There were slight wording changes to the interview protocol throughout the study; however, the majority of the questions remained the same. See Appendix C for the interview protocol.

Data Analysis

First, each interview was transcribed verbatim. Second, the entire set of interviews, confederate notes, and field notes, were read closely. The goal was to become familiarized with the data. Next, a primary cycle of coding was conducted by crafting and assigning words or brief phrases to the concepts being described in the transcripts. This primary cycle of coding was less devoted to interpretation and analysis, but instead was aimed at simplifying complex thoughts and actions into simple words or phrases. It was at this time that a codebook was created and then maintained to organize themes with their corresponding codes and definitions (Tracy, 2013).

Data were analyzed using content analysis. After the first level of coding, there was an additional level of coding to specifically identify concepts related to problematic integration and sensemaking processes. First, the data were coded to identify specific sensemaking processes such as uncertainty and retrospection. Instances of uncertainty were also noted, given that sensemaking and PI rest upon the premise of uncertainty in the scene. Themes were reviewed and defined, and then renamed when necessary (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Additionally, axial coding (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) was conducted to identify connections between categories.

Next, the interview data were coded to identify processes of PI in the decision to negotiate. Specifically, the data were coded to identify all probabilistic (i.e., positive, negative, uncertain, etc.) and evaluative (i.e., positive, negative, indifferent, etc.) statements made by participants. Positive probabilities included statements such as “I was expecting \$10,” and “just assumed I was gonna get more.” Negative probabilities included statements such as “low chances” and “slim chance.” Positive evaluations about the money included statements such as “I’m happy with \$3” and “everyone needs more money.” Negative evaluations included statements such as “kinda upset” and “wish I had more.” Several of the interviews included multiple probabilistic and evaluative orientations. While every reference to probability or value was coded, each orientation was only counted once per participant. For example, one participant made three separate positive evaluations about \$10. While each of the positive evaluations was coded, only one was included in the total number of positive evaluations made by the participants. This way, an interview with multiple positive evaluations, such as excitement about money, would not weigh more heavily in the overall analysis. To conclude, problematic integrations (divergence, ambiguity, ambivalence, impossibility) were examined by comparing each participants probabilistic orientation to their evaluative orientation.

Chi-square tests were used to determine whether there were gender differences for each of the qualitative categories. For this study, our interest was in whether women and men equally explained why they did not negotiate, formed probabilities, and formed evaluations. Chi-square tests aid the researcher in determining whether proportions are statistically significant between comparative groups, as opposed to relying simply on personal judgment. That said, while statistical significance is important to examine, the

trends and practical significance in the data have also been examined (Barnes & Conley, 1986).

Data Reliability and Credibility

To ensure the credibility of the data, colleagues and advisors were consulted throughout the data collection process to discuss emergent findings. This “peer debriefing” or external audit process has been deemed an effective strategy for increasing the credibility and validity of qualitative research (Creswell, 2009), and this was certainly true for the present study. Peer guidance was sought on a number of procedural issues including gaining participant trust and increasing participant awareness of the financial incentive. Lastly, I also had a colleague sporadically monitor the lab for quality assurance.

Additionally, a journal was maintained throughout all phases of the research process. This journal was used to document all the steps in the research process. Taylor and Bogdan (1998) describe that taking notes is a useful approach for “emerging themes, interpretations, hunches, and striking gestures” (p. 115). Indeed, journaling proved to be a useful tool for recording observations and reflections for multiple reasons. First, journaling proved useful for identifying early trends. For example, early in this study it was observed that participants were unaware and apathetic to the money; therefore efforts were made to increase the salience of the monetary payment. While increasing the salience of money could have bolstered the rate of negotiating, there is little evidence to support that these efforts had a significant effect since participants negotiated at a similar rate before and after the manipulation. Journaling also provided a record of events that facilitated the data analysis process.

To determine intercoder reliability, two undergraduate students were trained on the coding schemes and independently analyzed 25% of the data. To calculate reliability, the number of coded texts in agreement were divided the total number of codes. This method is a common method for determining reliability of qualitative data (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman, & Pedersen, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Tracy, Myers, & Scott, 2006). For example, the first coder analyzed 73 texts and there was agreement on 66 of those texts. Thus, the resulting intercoder reliability for the first coder was 90% ($66/73 = .90$). The second coder analyzed the same 73 texts and there was agreement on 64 of those texts, resulting in an intercoder reliability of 87% ($64/73 = .87$). The overall average was calculated and was determined to be 89% ($130/146$) which met the predetermined reliability goal of 80% (Hodson, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994). I worked with the coders to discuss the categorization of codes, and none of the categories or codes was in need of modification.

My Role as a Researcher

Gender is “complex, multifarious, and changing” (Lengel & Martin, 2002, p. 337). In a highly globalized, postmodern world, it is nearly impossible to obtain a simple understanding of gender. As a woman, I find myself continuously discovering what it means to be a woman, and I am often intrigued by the various conceptualizations that other women have constructed for themselves. Therefore, I approach gender as a type of culture in which the shades of femininity and masculinity are contextually situated. As such, I support the argument that the values and ideals surrounding gender need to be professed with sensitivity to a broad range of cultures (Hedge, 2006). Sensitivity is also needed in with regard to gender and negotiation. The research devoted to gender and

negotiation has yet to fully understand the degree to which social consequences occur. Consequently, blanket statements of what women should and should not do in a negotiation are problematic. Indeed, research has yet to demonstrate that women should persistently and intensely negotiate. That said, feminist scholarship in the pursuit of justice and democracy is essential to the accomplishment of pay equity for women and men (Lengel & Martin, 2002). It is important for both women and men to have a full understanding of the reasons they are negotiating and the consequences of their chosen strategy. In sum, goal is for women and men to achieve self-awareness rather than a personal transformation.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of data analyzed using observations, surveys, and interviews. These data sources then resulted in qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data was used to examine preliminary questions regarding the Boggle performance scores and the self-reported apprehension level of the participants in this study. The quantitative data was also used to examine the first hypothesis related to gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The qualitative interviews were used to examine the remainder of the research questions. Content analysis was used to examine the extent to which sensemaking and PI theory were indicated as influential in the decision to initiate a negotiation. Intercoder reliability is also established in this chapter.

Quantitative Results

Quantitative analyses were used to determine if there were gender differences in Boggle game performance, negotiation apprehension, and the rate of initiating a negotiation. The first quantitative analysis was used to examine gender differences in actual Boggle performance using an independent samples t-test. In addition, ethnic differences in Boggle performance were examined using ANOVA (analysis of variance). Next, gender differences in negotiation apprehension were examined using an independent sample t-test. Lastly, gender differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation were examined using a Fisher's exact test. Prior to the quantitative data analysis the data were screened for missing and out-of-range values, and none were revealed. All quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS (Statistical Package of the Social Sciences).

Boggle Performance Scores

Boggle scores were calculated by following the traditional Boggle scoring rubric, which was also the rubric used by Small et al. (2007). One point was awarded for three-letter words, two points for four-letter words, three points for five-letter words, four points for six-letter words, five points for seven-letter words, and six points for words with eight or more letters. An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine whether gender differences existed in Boggle performance. Results indicated no significant differences between women and men in round one [$t(84) = 1.39, p = .46$], round two ($t(84) = 1.27, p = .24$), round three [$t(84) = 1.03, p = .84$], or the total score [$t(84) = 1.3, p = .42$]. However, significant gender differences were found in round four Boggle scores with women scoring significantly higher ($M = 33.08, SD = 23.92$) than men ($M = 28.89, SD = 16.67$), $t(84) = .91, p = .01$.

Throughout the interviews, numerous Asian participants suggested their language barrier contributed to their poor performance in the Boggle game. Consequently, an ANOVA was conducted to examine whether there were ethnic differences in Boggle performance. Indeed, total score for the Boggle game was significantly predicted by the ethnicity of the participant [$F(2, 81) = 15.48, p < .001$]. Tukey post hoc tests demonstrate that Asians scored significantly lower than both Caucasians ($p < .001$) and Hispanics ($p = .02$). There were no significant differences between Caucasians and Hispanics in Boggle scores ($p = .89$).

Negotiation Apprehension

To gauge negotiation apprehension level, participants completed the Negotiation Apprehension scale (Babcock et al., 2006). Results of an independent sample t-test suggest that women experience greater negotiation apprehension ($M = 4.16, SD = 1.27$) than men ($M = 3.67, SD = 1.72$), $t(84)=1.48, p = .02$. Results of a one-way ANOVA suggest no ethnic differences in negotiation apprehension ($F(2, 80) = 2.44, p = .09$). Specifically, negotiation apprehension scores were similar for Caucasians ($M = 3.61, SD = 1.57$), Asians ($M = 4.14, SD = 1.18$), and Hispanics ($M = 4.69, SD = 1.98$).

Gender and the Propensity to Negotiate

Hypothesis 1 predicted there would be significant gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation, with men more likely to initiate negotiations than women. Only four of the 86 participants initiated a negotiation for higher pay, which is roughly 4.6 percent of the total sample. Of the four participants who negotiated, there were an equal number of women ($n=2$) and men ($n=2$). To put it another way, 4.1% of women and 5.4% of men initiated a negotiation. To determine whether these rates of negotiating were significantly different between women and men, a Fisher's exact test was conducted. Fisher's exact tests are used to determine if there are significant differences in one dichotomous variable as a function of another dichotomous variable. Fisher's exact tests are particularly appropriate for testing equality of proportions when the sample sizes are small (Agresti, 1990). In the present study, the Fisher's exact test was used to examine if there are gender differences (female, male) in the propensity to initiate a negotiation (negotiate, no negotiation).

Results of the Fisher's exact test were non-significant and suggest no gender differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation, [Fisher's (1, 86) = .08, $p = .58$]. In other words, there are no significant differences between women and men in the rate of initiating a negotiation (ask, no ask). During data collection it was also recorded which participants complained about the \$3 amount they paid and also those who asked how their score was calculated. Thus, an additional Fisher's exact test was conducted to determine whether there were gender differences in to examine whether there were gender differences in the four asking conditions: ask, don't ask, complain, and asked how score was calculated. Again, results suggest there were no gender differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation using the four categories [Fisher's (3, 86) = 2.32, $p = .57$]. Taken together, H1 was not supported by the quantitative data.

Qualitative Results

Research question 1 aimed to qualitatively examine whether there were gender differences in the explanations for initiating or avoiding a negotiation. Specifically, by examining qualitative data, with the use of PI theory and sensemaking, a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of gender and the propensity to negotiate can be examined.

The first objective was to examine the underlying reasons individuals did and did not initiate a negotiation. Interestingly, most participants offered multiple explanations for why they chose to negotiate or not negotiate. It seems likely that the interview allowed participants to reflect and make sense of their behavior, causing their explanations to expand or shift. For example, throughout one interview, a participant offered multiple reasons he did not negotiate for more money. The participant explained

that at first he did not think to ask, but then went on to say he was confused and did not understand what the money was for, would have felt greedy, didn't deserve \$3 because he didn't do very much, could have been offensive, rude, and possibly "taken [the researcher] back." Therefore, participant explanations for their behavior were often fluid and copious.

Reasons FOR Negotiating

Four participants initiated a negotiation for more money and each was paid the exact amount they requested. Specifically, participants requested and were paid \$5, \$7, \$10, and \$10. The explanations offered by the four participants who chose to initiate a negotiation are valuable in that they provide insight into the motivations that stimulate negotiating. If one adopts the perspective that negotiating is laudatory, then these individual 'success stories' can serve as examples of behavior that can be replicated. Table 2 lists the verbal requests each participant made for more money. This table was compiled using audio recordings of the requests, confederate notes, and reflections the participant provided in the interview.

One common reason individuals initiated a negotiation is that they felt they **deserved more** money. Some participants believed they deserved more because they worked hard or exerted a large amount of effort. One participant was visibly irritated when he arrived to the study, and he complained that the time slots available for the research study were inconvenient and forced him to wait around campus for a significant amount of time. The participant said that this inconvenience is what motivated him to ask for more money. The participant claimed, "I paid a lot to participate in this study, and I think I deserve \$5." Thus, this participant determined that he deserved more money

because the effort he exerted was worth more than the baseline \$3. Another reason individuals felt they deserved more is that they performed well on the Boggle game. One female asked for \$7 because her longest word, hairnet, was a seven-letter word. This participant proclaimed herself a “Good Boggler” and said, “You told us that words must be a minimum of three letters long, and \$3 was the minimum payment amount. So I figured since I made a seven-letter word then I deserved seven dollars.” In the absence of a payment protocol this participant constructed her own payment guide and determined that she deserved \$7, not the \$3 she was given.

Another reason participants initiated a negotiation, particularly both female negotiators, is that they had **learned to negotiate**. These two female participants said that they learned that negotiating is not only acceptable but also lucrative. These life lessons about the importance of negotiating came to them through either through parental modeling or work experiences. The first female negotiator related that she commonly negotiates and had learned from her Polish mother that negotiating is a fundamental part of life.

“My mom is from Poland and so that's what they do, they haggle. Oh my gosh, I've learned so much from her. When we go shopping she'll say, ‘Oh there's a little thread missing, can I just get a little 10% discount or something.’ She always did that, so when I was little I just watched her. So you just have to ask.” While this participant had been taught to negotiate early in life, the second female negotiator had only recently learned the importance of negotiating. Specifically, the second female negotiator learned through her professional experiences that negotiating is a valuable endeavor. When asked if she always negotiates for things in life, she expounded on a lesson she learned at work:

No, just recently [I've started negotiating]. Because my job told me to start keeping metrics of what I do, and how I ... like... I plan trips for researchers, and so, they want me to like, that way if I ever go to another job, this is exactly how many trips I've planned, the is the dollar amount, this is what I've done so this is what my pay should be.

These experiences recounted by the female negotiators demonstrate that they were taught or encouraged to pursue negotiating endeavors. Interestingly, neither of the two male participants referenced memorable life lessons as influential in their choice to initiate a negotiation. While the sample of negotiators is too small to confidently declare gender differences exist, the finding that female negotiators had been taught or encouraged to negotiate is worth noting.

Finally, one participant decided to initiate a negotiation because he **had higher expectations**. The male negotiator expected to get \$10 because he thought everyone received \$10 for participation. Clearly this negotiator misinterpreted the pay allocation in the study; however, this misunderstanding proved to be advantageous. As a result, this participant was visibly surprised when he received \$3. When given the \$3, he asked, "Isn't it \$10? Can I get \$7 in the next phase?" Thus, the participant's expectations of \$10 caused a negative reaction when \$3 was awarded, and this discomfort resulted in the initiation of a negotiation.

Table 2

Verbal Requests Made by Participants Who Initiated Negotiations

Amount	Gender	Race	Response
\$5	M	Asian	“Only \$3? The sheet said \$3 to \$10, and I waited a long time, so maybe I could get \$5?”
\$10	M	White	"Isn't it \$10? Can I get \$7 in the next phase?"
\$10	F	White	“What about \$10? I’ll take \$10 if I can get it.”
\$7	F	White	"I wrote a 7-letter word, shouldn't I get \$7?"

Reasons for NOT Negotiating

One of the first questions asked of participants is whether they considered asking for more money. The majority of participants indicated they did not think to ask for more than the \$3, and thus clearly did not **recognize the opportunity** to negotiate. A few participants offered this as the main reason they did not initiate a negotiation. While most participants did not recognize the opportunity, many suggested one or more additional reasons as to why they did not initiate a negotiation.

The reasons participants indicated they did not negotiate include: they mainly came for the extra credit, did not earn the money, performed poorly, did not care about the money, the margin between \$3 to \$10 is narrow, they were volunteering, one should take what you’re given, negotiating would be rude/inappropriate, and lastly negotiating would be unlike them/out of character. Each of these reasons will be described next.

Not on the radar. One common reason participants did not initiate a negotiation was that they came to the study for **extra credit**, not for money (32.2%). In fact, many further rationalized that the money was not their **main purpose** or primary goal (16.3%). For example, one participant described, “I just wanted extra credit, money wasn’t the

primary reason I came.” The narrow objective of pursuing extra credit seemed to constrict the possibilities to participants, causing most people to disregard the monetary payment.

In fact, some participants said they were **surprised** when they received the money and explained they had not thought about the money until it was handed to them. For example one participant stated, “I wasn’t even aware that I was even getting money in the first place.” Another participant described feeling stunned when given the money: “I didn’t know if I should take it or not. I just looked at the table and wondered if I should take it.” Early in the study we recognized this recurring trend that participants were surprised that there was money being given for participation. To address this issue, numerous measures were taken to remind participants about the payment. First, reminder e-mails for the study included large bolded words that read “Earn \$3-\$10 AND extra credit.” Secondly, a large sign was placed outside of the research room that read, “Earn \$3 to \$10.” Lastly, once participants entered the lab they were reminded that they would be paid after their Boggle scores were calculated. Despite the reminders of payment throughout the various stages of the study, some participants were still surprised by the money, which likely hampered their ability to construct probabilistic or evaluative orientations.

One participant described being surprised that he was handed payment in the form of dollar bills. “I feel like it was like, loose change. It was kinda informal. I thought it would be like, you know, you’d send it off to my student account or something.” This account highlights that paper money has become somewhat obsolete, is less frequently exchanged, and thus lends to an awkward interpersonal exchange.

Did not earn the money. A hefty portion of participants (17.4%) claimed that they **did not earn the money**. Many said that they did not do much or did not exert much effort. One participant stated, “I don’t feel I’m giving up much that’s worth more than \$3.” In fact, eight participants described the joy they experienced while playing the game. One participant went so far as to express thanks for allowing him to participate in the study, saying that he really appreciated the time to de-stress from the exams he had that week. Another claimed “the goal of the game is to make myself happy.” Some expressed guilt for receiving money; people felt bad for taking money that they did not perceive was rightly theirs. A few participants tried to return the money, both males and females. One participant described, “I felt guilty, I was just going to leave it on the table.”

Participants also did not initiate a negotiation because they perceived they **performed poorly** (6%). One participant said he did not negotiate “because I know I was doing bad, so.... \$3 is the most I can get, I guess.” A subset of these self-proclaimed ‘poor performers’ included Asian students who perceived that their subpar English skills hindered their performance, which ultimately kept them from asking for more money. One Asian male was asked if he thought about asking for more money and replied “No, because I know like...my... language barrier. And I know a lot of words that I wrote is like... really simple and some like childish words.” Thus, for many, the act of initiating a negotiation seemed unreasonable without a defensible justification for their request.

Indifferent to the money. Another reason individuals did not initiate a negotiation is a proclaimed **indifference to the money** (16.3%). In particular, participants either described that they did not care about the money or did not need the money. A conversation with one participant revealed his immense indifference to money:

Casey: How did you feel about the \$3 that you did receive?

Male: What do you mean?

Casey: Well he gave you money, right? Or did he run away with your money?

Male: I don't feel how much money that I get... yeah... I don't care about how much money that I get. I just care about the extra credit.

Casey: Would you be sad if we took the money back?

Male: No, I can give it back

Casey: No, no, no! We don't want the money, it's for you; we want you to keep it.

Male: I don't care about how much money I get.

Casey: How would you feel if you got \$10?

Male: If you give me \$10, I will donate for the homeless people.

Casey: Really? You just don't care about money.

Male: I don't care about money.

Another common claim by participants was that the difference between \$3 and \$10 was a **narrow margin** (5.8%), one that isn't worth the effort. One participant described, "It doesn't really matter. It's just \$7, so it wouldn't make or break me." Another participant reiterated the small margin when he said, "It isn't that much money; I'm not gonna make a big deal about it." A few participants considered the dollar amount that would provoke them to negotiate. For example, one participant explained, "If it was like five dollars versus a hundred dollars I probably would have been like okay, why didn't I get more than that?" It seems that many of the participants perceived \$7 as a meager amount that was enough to prompt them to initiate a negotiation.

Take what you're given. Another main reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is that they perceived they were **helping research** (24.4%). Many understood research participation to be a type of volunteer activity and “helping out” research is something they should do without payment. Research participation was almost described as a type of charity work. Participants explained that research studies rarely, if ever, offer any type of remuneration. “I’ve never been in a study for money.” As such, being given money in this study struck participants as an unusual practice. A few people expressed concern over the source of funding and said they felt bad about taking money from a graduate student. For example, one participant described, “I would feel like I’m kind of taking from I don’t know, college students, almost. You know? Like you don’t know who’s funding it.” Taken together, participants perceived that in the setting of a research study it would not be appropriate or necessary to ask for more money.

Along these lines, another common reason for not negotiating is that individuals expressed the belief that when given money you should simply **obey the process** and take what you’re given (14%). For example, one participant described “what you... what you give me I will accept.” A few participants relayed a sense of trust in how the payment and score were calculated. In a sense, participants bestowed a great deal of trust in the system and payment procedures. One participant claimed, “I figured you had a scoring system.” Participants described that they trusted how the researchers calculated and distributed money. “It stated the amount would be given between \$3 and \$10, and I feel like well, you’ve earned this amount or you’re selected to have this amount.”

Many participants alluded to a type of obedience to authority as a reason for not negotiating, commonly alluding to the confederates and the researcher in a way that

implied power. “[The confederate] said my score would come in a report; I guess I won’t have questions after that.” The participants were not the only ones to recognize power as a factor in this study. On the first day of the study, I took note of how one female confederate maintained a commanding presence and appeared comfortable in a position of power. On the second day, I noticed the male confederate was also embodying a “commanding presence.” This same male confederate noted that the participants were simply accepting what was given to them, reiterating the prominence of obedience to authority. About midway through the study, I asked one of the male confederates how he was enjoying his role as a confederate. The male confederate responded that his role in this study made him feel as though he were important, and he was enjoying being in a position of power over classmates that were similar to his age. One of the female confederates concurred and said she too enjoyed the power and respect she was getting from people in her own age group. Clearly, the participants perceived themselves as powerless, and the confederates perceived themselves as powerful. For some, this lopsided division of power kept them from negotiating for more money.

Maintaining face. A final reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is they believed it would be **rude** or **inappropriate** (10.5%). Negotiating for more money would either disrespect the person they would be asking or would make themselves feel embarrassed. Participants said “It’s just not respectful” and “Money is one of those things where I feel like it can be a social boundary that you don’t really want to cross.” A few participants (4.7%) claimed that negotiating would be **out of character**, and negotiating or asking for things is not like them. In other words, initiating a negotiation could result in a loss of face or threaten the face of others.

Gender differences in reasons for not negotiating. Gender differences in the reasons for not initiating a negotiation were examined using chi-square analyses and frequency counts. A series of chi-square analyses were conducted to determine if there were statistically significant gender differences in the reasons participants did not initiate a negotiation. Results suggest there were statistically significant differences between the proportion of women and men who perceived that negotiating would be rude or inappropriate. Specifically, 16.3% of women indicated negotiating would be rude or inappropriate in comparison to 2.7% of men [$\chi^2 (85) = 2.0, p = .04$].

Frequency counts of the data reveal a few notable patterns of variance between women and men in the reasons for not initiating a negotiation. First, men more frequently devalued the money in comparison to women. A large portion of men (24.3%) indicated they did not care about the money while fewer women (10.2%) provided the same reason. In addition, 10.8% of men indicated that \$3 to \$10 was a narrow margin while only 2% of women implicated the small margin as a reason they did not initiate a negotiation. Women, however, more frequently indicated that they did not initiate a negotiation because it would be rude or inappropriate. Specifically, nine females (16.3%) and only one male (2.7%) indicated they were concerned that negotiating would be rude or inappropriate. See figure 1 for a bar chart listing the reasons women and men did not initiate a negotiation.




Figure 1. Bar chart of the reasons women and men did not initiate a negotiation.

Sensemaking

Sensemaking was pervasive in this study. This research study was rife with uncertainty, triggered instances of information seeking, and encouraged participant sensemaking through retrospection and intersubjective understanding.

Uncertainty. Participants noted numerous indications of uncertainty throughout the study. One of the confederates astutely described the uncertainty in the study: “People are usually nervous dealing with uncertainty; people they don't know, unfamiliar rooms, and unfamiliar situations. My role is to facilitate a more comfortable experience.” While the confederate was blind to the study, she observed that participants were provided with little information.

Participants also acknowledged the uncertainty in this study. Specifically, participants described there was uncertainty with regard to a) their personal Boggle performance b) others' performance/earnings, c) how the score/payment was determined, d) the purpose of the money, and e) the overall premise of the study. In fact, most participants described uncertainty in more than one of these areas. For example, one participant describes uncertainty with regards to both the premise of the study and the determination of payment:

I was trying to figure out what the study was about the whole time. I was thinking, "maybe they're looking for who negotiates or, who um... just goes with it"...I was wondering like, how are they, uh, doing the score because usually when you play Boggle you play against somebody and you start, like, start crossing each others' words out. So yeah, I was like "How is she gonna do the score?" And then, how do you they pay you off that score?"

Information seeking. By and large, there were few attempts by the participants to seek information throughout this study. Throughout my field notes, there were many instances in which I was astonished at how little individuals questioned the process. For example, I noted, "None of the participants seemed curious about the large cameras in the room or the double-sided mirror. I thought they would have asked more questions."

Two participants sought information before coming to the study. Both individuals knew people who had already completed the study and had asked their friends what the study entailed. One participant was denied additional information from their friend and was informed that it was a "secret study." The second participant asked a friend about the study, and she told him that she knew how he could get the \$10. He retorted that he did

not want to know and bragged that he would be able to get the \$10 without her help. He was confident he could figure out the study on his own. Despite his confidence, this participant did not figure out how to get \$10, and received \$3 just as his friend did.

None of the participants sought **additional** information before or during the Boggle game regarding the task or payment. One female participant did, however, question the amount of extra credit she would be given. This participant noticed the informed consent form listed five points of extra credit would be awarded while she understood she would be getting six points of extra credit. She strongly asserted that it was important for her to get six points and it was these terms that she felt were fair. Upon payment, a few participants sought additional information including “why did I get \$3?” and “how was the payment determined.” To be specific, nine participants asked how the payment was determined, four females and five males. In response, confederates had been instructed to say “Is \$3 not okay?” Participants then acquiesced and expressed complacency with the \$3 payment.

More commonly, participants sought information during the interview. These additional inquiries were related to a variety of topics regarding the study. Some participants asked what the premise of the study was: “what were you studying?” “Will you tell me soon?” and “When will I get my score?” A series of inquiries followed the revelation of the premise of the study. Once participants discovered that the study was exploring the likelihood of negotiating for more money, many asked questions such as “Did anybody ask for more [money]? ...And did they get it?” A few participants went on to ask “can I get the money now?”

The isolated nature of the Boggle game contributed to a situation in which participants had **difficulty making sense**. While sensemaking can take place in isolation, sensemaking is often a collective, social process, and we don't know what we know until it is discussed collectively (Weick, 1995). In the relatively isolated environment of the study, many participants expressed the difficulty of making sense of the situation without other people to make sense with. "It was hard to know how I did, comparatively." Many participants described that without referent others, it was difficult to make sense of the situation. For example: "I wish I could compare mine to how other people have done;" and "I don't know how you guys are scoring it either, but I dunno." Participants were asked what would have made them negotiate or ask for more money in this situation. A large portion of people said that they would have negotiated for more had they known how other people performed or knew what others were being paid. While sensemaking did not take place before or during the study, participants did begin to make sense during the follow-up interview.

Extracting cues. A few participants were able to pull cues from the environment and attempted to make sense of their situation or surroundings. One participant described that he was intrigued by the location of the study. This male participant said that he found it peculiar that the study took place in the geology building rather than the communication building since it was the communication department that advertised the study. Another participant, a Caucasian female, noticed that one of the other participants was paid \$3, and he was Asian. Based on these observations, the female believed that with her English speaking abilities she would be more likely to receive a higher payment on the word game. Consequently, when the female participant received her \$3, a value

below her expectations, she was disappointed with her payment. Interestingly, this participant did not negotiate for more money.

Retrospection. Central to sensemaking is the idea of retrospective understanding, which describes that often we often understand our environment by removing ourselves from the experience and then reflecting (Weick, 1979, 2001). The present study lent itself well to the process of retrospective sensemaking. Following the Boggle game and payment procedure, participants had an opportunity to reflect upon their behavior when they transitioned to the interview room to discuss the payment interaction.

There was a discernible shift in perspective throughout the course of the study. First, participants shifted their understanding of the premise of the study and the way in which pay was distributed. One participant described coming to understand the pay distribution by saying, “I’m getting the impression that you gave everyone \$3.” Another participant began to understand that negotiating was a central premise of our investigation: “Like, now looking back you gave me \$3 but looking back I could have gotten \$10.” Finally, one participant was asked if he thought it would be inappropriate to negotiate for more money and responded “Well, now I don’t.” In sum, while participants did not get much of an opportunity to collectively make sense prior to payment, information exchanged during the follow-up interview provided a space for interpersonal sensemaking.

Transformation through talk. The follow-up interviews provided a space for valuable interpersonal sensemaking, which can trigger a transformation of one’s beliefs. Tracy and Rivera (2010) note that through conversation individuals are given the opportunity to explore and alter one’s personal perspective. In fact, talk often times leads

to transformation. Indeed, throughout the interviews, participants identified contradictions between their beliefs and their actions regarding negotiation. Specifically, when participants were asked what they thought about people who don't negotiate, they often proposed that these people miss opportunities, and then they realized that they had missed an opportunity. Here is one instance of a participant recognizing she should have acted differently:

Casey: What do you think about people who never negotiate?

Female: I think they should ask more, because there is no harm in asking. The worst thing that could happen is you would know and you are exactly where you were before. So maybe I should have asked for the \$10.

Another participant was asked the same question, and described people who never negotiate "Ummm.... I think that they miss out on a lot of chances, just like today. If I would have known that... then obviously...they miss out on a lot of chances." In sum, the follow-up interviews proved to be a valuable opportunity for participants to better understand their beliefs and their actions. As a result, these transformations in perspective could be retained as scripts for use in future negotiation exchanges.

Problematic Integration

The qualitative data were also examined through the lens of problematic integration theory. Specifically, the data were examined to ascertain the extent to which participants constructed probabilities and evaluations toward the possible outcomes. First, probabilities were analyzed by examining the way participants believed pay was determined in addition to the participant's perceived probability of attaining \$10. Next, evaluations of the money were analyzed by examining participant's assigned value to the

\$3 payment and assigned value to the \$10 payment. Finally, problematic dilemmas were examined by comparing each participant's perceived probability to their perceived value.

While all transcripts were analyzed for probabilities and evaluations, not all interviews included both of these elements. For some of the interviews, questions regarding probability or value were either not asked or they were not adequately answered. For example, one participant was asked about their odds of receiving \$10 and responded, "Umm...that would be great!" Therefore, the total number of probabilities, evaluations, or problematic dilemmas did not total 86 instances. Nonetheless, the qualitative responses provided insight into value and probability that participants assigned to the outcomes of money in the present negotiation.

Probabilistic orientations. Research question 2a probed to what extent women and men construct outcome probabilities. Probabilities encompass the likelihood of an event or outcome occurring, and this concept is foundational to the theory of PI. To examine the probabilities formulated by participants, the data were first examined for general probabilities regarding how payment was determined and then examined for the participant's perceived probability of attaining the maximum \$10 amount.

General pay determination. To assess the basic payment process in this study, all participants were asked how they believed the \$3 payment was determined. Most participants perceived that their payment was affected by their **performance** on the Boggle game. They thought that either the number of words, the length of the words, or the overall score were determinants of their \$3 payment. Another common explanation was that pay distribution was **standardized**, with all participants being given the minimum or a fixed amount. For example, one participant said "I thought it was

something they just assigned to you,” and another participant said, “It’s probably just a fixed amount.”

A few participants described their understanding of the pay range, and typically they explained that the minimum amount on the range was awarded. For example, one participant said “I feel like, people like, would just write like three to ten dollars, but like, most likely obviously they’re always gonna give out the lowest.” A few participants believed that it is exceedingly **difficult to get 10** and that it is necessary to perform extremely well to get this amount. One participant explained that this standard minimum payment was necessary because of the many participants in the study. The other ways participants understood pay determination was that it was **randomized** or you could **get more if you ask**. Lastly a few participants simply **did not know** how payment was determined. Generally, participants perceived that the \$3 payment was either a function of their performance or was an amount predetermined by the researchers.

Probability of \$10. The data were then examined to determine the ways individuals perceived their personal probability of attaining the maximum \$10 payment. Overwhelmingly, most participants in this study expressed a negative probabilistic orientation meaning that they perceived they had a low probability that they would attain \$10. Twenty-six participants expressed a negative probability, eight participants indicated they were uncertain or unclear of the probability of attaining \$10, and six participants indicated a positive probability they would attain \$10.

First, most participants reported that they had a **slim chance** of receiving the maximum amount of money. Some went on to attribute their slim chance to their **poor performance**. One participant stated, “I thought I would probably get the bare minimum

amount of money, ‘cause I knew my words were not that great.’ A few of the Asian participants mentioned that their lack of facility with English presented a barrier and that they had a difficult time forming English words, so they did not expect to earn the top rate.

A number of people **did not know** the probability that they would receive \$10. Specifically, participants either did not know how to estimate this probability or they did not consider the probability because they did not expect to receive money. One participant said, “To be honest, I didn’t know I could get money.” Only a handful of participants believed they had an **average probability** of attaining \$10, and even fewer reported a **high probability** of attaining \$10. These positive probabilities were often the result of either previous experiences with Boggle or a belief that higher pay for this game was normative. One participant said, “I assumed I was in the \$5 range because that’s what I kinda performed on that game before.”

Gender and probabilities. An intriguing question is whether there are gender differences in the perceived probability of attaining \$10. Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine if there were statistically significant differences between women and men in probabilities. Results suggest no significant gender differences in probabilities. However, the data suggests a slight pattern of variation in the probabilistic orientations of women and men. Specifically, a higher percentage of men (10.8%) perceived a high probability of attaining \$10, in comparison to women (4.1%). Additionally, a higher percentage of women (34.7%) perceived a low probability of attaining \$10, in comparison to men (24.32%). In other words, men more commonly reported a high or positive likelihood of receiving \$10.

Gender, probabilities, and propensity. Research question 2b sought to determine the extent to which women's and men's constructed outcome probabilities influenced their propensity to negotiate. This question is most appropriately explored by examining the probabilities of those who decided to initiate a negotiation for more money. However, this research question cannot be adequately answered given that only four participants initiated a negotiation.

In sum, most participants in this study described a low or negative probability of attaining \$10. While probabilities assigned to the outcome are useful in understanding motivation to acquire that object, PI theory emphasizes that probabilities do not function in isolation. Consequently, to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the propensity to negotiate it is also important to account for value assigned to the outcome.

Evaluative orientations. Research question 2c asked to what extent women and men assign value to the outcome of a negotiation. According to PI theory, individuals maintain evaluative orientations regarding outcomes or events. In the present study, the value participants assigned to the baseline \$3 and the upper end of \$10 were both examined.

The value of \$3. When asked how they felt about the \$3 payment, 55 participants referred to the money in positive terms, nine participants referenced the money in terms of indifference, and three participants referenced to the money in negative terms. Of the participants who described the money **positively**, words were used such as “happy”, “excited,” “good,” and “glad,” One participant described the value of \$3 by saying “I’m very happy with it, I had none to come, now I have \$3.” There were nine participants that described an **indifferent evaluation** of the money and indicated that they did not care

about the \$3. This evaluation of ‘indifference’ is a concept that has yet to be introduced into the PI literature. That is, according to PI theory, individuals assign positive or negative value to an outcome. PI theory has yet to address an instance of value in which the individual does not care about the given outcome. In the present study, the term indifference describes when an individual does not care if they attain or do not attain the outcome. The three participants who described the \$3 **negatively** argued that they deserved more, wanted more, or were disappointed with their performance. For example, one participant described, “I’m a little bummed. Being at the lower end of the range bugs me. I thought I’d come out a little better.”

Overall, the majority of participants maintained a positive evaluation of the \$3 they were given while some referenced the \$3 in negative or indifferent terms. Certainly, this value assigned to the baseline dollar amount is important to understanding one’s level of satisfaction with their situation and potentially their motivation for initiating or not initiating a negotiation. Additionally, it is important to consider the value assigned to the \$10 incentive.

The value of \$10. After participants described how they felt about \$3, they were asked how they would have felt had they been given \$10 in order to determine the value they assigned to the \$10 incentive. Similar to their evaluations of \$3, participants overwhelmingly described the \$10 in positive terms. Specifically, 44 participants described the value of \$10 in positive terms, 16 indicated that they were indifferent or did not care about the value of \$10, and one participant indicated a negative evaluation of the \$10. First, most participants described \$10 in **positive** terms and said it would have been better than \$3, great, or fine/good. Interestingly, the value of \$10 was also described in

terms of what the money would have meant for their performance. That is, a \$10 payment would imply successful performance on the Boggle task. Another compelling finding was that many participants who viewed the \$10 positively also interpreted the money in terms of what they could **purchase with the money**. All of the 12 participants who framed the \$10 by means of what they could purchase described a type of food or a drink item that they could now pay for. For example, participants described they could buy lunch, dinner, Panda Express, three Starbucks coffee drinks, or three bags of candy.

Sixteen participants stated that they **did not care** or **did not think** about the \$10. Participants made comments such as “I wasn’t overly concerned about it,” or “It’s maybe a two or three on the scale. It’s not that important.” Finally, one participant assigned **negative** value to the money and said if given \$10 they “Would have felt guilty, that would be too much.” This participant was a female.

In sum, if we are to examine value alone, participants assigned positive value to both \$3 and \$10. That is, while many participants perceived that it would be great or nice to get \$10, they also positively valued the baseline \$3 they were given. As previously described, participants often described the relative difference between \$3 and \$10 as marginal, simply an extra bag of candy, an extra Starbucks, a \$7 difference that one person described wouldn’t “make or break” them. Thus, while many of the participants assigned positive value to the \$10, this positive value alone was not enough to motivate them to initiate a negotiation. These findings suggest that evaluative orientations are complex. In this study, evaluative orientations proved to be a function of the value assigned to the baseline pay, the top pay, and the margin between the two.

Gender and evaluations. Gender differences in evaluative orientations were examined in relation to value assigned to both the \$3 payment and the \$10 incentive. Gender differences in evaluative orientations were examined using chi-square analyses and frequency counts.

For the \$3 payment, women (57.1%) tended to assign more positive value than (48.7%). In addition, a higher proportion of men (13.5%) reported feeling indifferent about the \$3 baseline pay in comparison to the proportion of women (8.2%). Despite the pattern of gender and \$3 value, this trend was not statistically significant. For the \$10 payment, a higher proportion of women expressed positive value (74.4%) in comparison to the proportion of men (40.5%). In other words, women viewed the \$10 payment more positively than men. Results of a chi-square test demonstrate that these proportions are statistically significant [$\chi^2(85) = 3.2, p < .001$]; thus, women are more likely to assign positive value to \$10 in comparison to men. Taken together, a greater proportion of women assigned positive value to \$3 and significantly more value to the \$10 payment. At the same time, men were more frequently indifferent to the \$3 and \$10 payment, relative to women. See table 3 for number and percentages of all probabilities and evaluations. See figure 2 for a bar chart of the probabilities and evaluations of women and men.

Table 3

Gender Comparisons for Reasons, Probabilities, and Evaluations

Code	Women		Men		Difference	p-value
	N	%	N	%		
Reasons for NOT Negotiating						
Extra Credit	15	30.61%	8	21.62%	8.99%	0.35
Helping Research	12	24.49%	9	24.32%	0.17%	0.98
Take What You're Given	7	14.29%	5	13.51%	0.77%	0.92
Don't Care About the Money	5	10.20%	9	24.32%	14.12%	0.08
Small Margin	1	2.04%	4	10.81%	8.77%	0.23
Already Being Given Something	4	8.16%	0	0.00%	8.16%	0.07
Rude or Inappropriate	8	16.33%	1	2.70%	13.62%	0.04*
Out of Character	3	6.12%	1	2.70%	3.42%	0.46
Didn't Think About It	0	0.00%	2	5.41%	5.41%	0.10
Risks	0	0.00%	1	2.70%	2.70%	0.25
Probability of \$10						
Positive Probability	2	4.08%	4	10.81%	6.73%	0.23
Negative Probability	17	34.69%	9	24.32%	10.37%	0.30
Uncertain Probability	6	12.24%	2	5.41%	6.84%	0.28
VALUE of \$3						
Positive Value	28	57.14%	18	48.65%	8.49%	0.44
Negative Value	2	4.08%	1	2.70%	1.38%	0.23
Indifferent Evaluation	4	8.16%	5	13.51%	5.35%	0.43
Value of \$10						
Positive Value	29	74.36%	15	40.54%	33.82%	0.002**
Negative Value	1	2.04%	0	0%	2.04%	0.38
Indifferent Value	10	20.41%	6	16.22%	4.19%	0.62
Means High Performance	4	8.16%	2	5.41%	2.76%	0.62
<i>*Significant effects have a two-tailed alpha level below .05</i>						
<i>**Significant effects have a two-tailed alpha level below .01</i>						




Figure 2. Bar chart of the probabilities and evaluations of women and men.

Gender, evaluations, and propensity. Research question 2d asks how the value assigned by women and men influences the decision to initiate a negotiation. This question is most appropriately addressed by examining the evaluative orientations held by the individuals who negotiated for more money. However, this research question cannot be adequately answered given that only four participants initiated a negotiation for more money.

Problematic dilemmas. Research question 2e asked the question to what extent do participants indicate that problematic dilemmas are the reason they avoid negotiations (i.e., divergence, ambiguity, ambivalence, and impossibility). According to PI theory, probabilities and evaluations are intertwined and can result in problematic dilemmas. Problematic dilemmas are instances “when expectations and desires diverge, when we are uncertain about something valuable, when we experience ambivalence, and when we face

impossible desires” (Matthias & Babrow, 2007, p. 788). It is under these problematic circumstances that people might opt to *increase* uncertainty, because these problematic dilemmas have the potential to instigate negative feelings (Babrow, 2001). Problematic integration theory describes that probabilistic and evaluative orientations can take four problematic forms. All four problematic dilemmas occurred in the data.

Ambiguity involves situations with either multiple meanings or where the odds are unclear or hazy. In essence, the individual does not know the probability of an event occurring because of a lack of information or contradictory information (Babrow, 2001). As noted previously, there were many occasions in which participants did not know the likelihood that they would be able to attain the maximum \$10. In total, there were 27 participants who described feeling uncertain about the score determination. In addition, eight participants did not know their likelihood of attaining \$10. Thus, ambiguity was also a frequent dilemma for participants in this study.

Divergence was a problematic dilemma commonly experienced by participants. Divergence is a situation in which probabilities and evaluations diverge from one another. That is, the outcome is valued but the probability of obtaining that object is low. In this study, divergence came in the form of a low perceived probability of obtaining \$10 and a positive evaluation of that \$10 payment. In other words, most participants did not perceive they had a chance of earning \$10 but would have been happy to receive \$10. There were 13 instances of divergence found in the data. For example, one participant said his probability of earning \$10 was “Not very likely, I’m really tired and I didn’t know I would have to make words.” This participant also said indicated that he would have highly valued \$10, “It would be awesome, but beggars can’t be choosers.” Thus, the

high value of the \$10 and the negative probability expressed by this participant would be considered as divergence by PI theory. Babrow (2001) notes that these situations can potentially trigger emotions such as sorrow, embarrassment, shame, disappointment or frustration.

Impossibility occurs when one perceives something is not attainable. Again, 25 participants perceived that there was a slim chance that they would receive the \$10. Of these, there were 11 that described their slim chances as an 'impossibility' meaning that there was no way that they would earn \$10 for their performance in the game. For example, one participant said, "I don't think anyone had a chance of getting \$10. I think everyone was just given \$3" and another participant said "I'd have to say my chances are really, really low." So there were many participants that perceived a low probability and a subset of these indicated that earning \$10 would be a near 'impossibility.'

Ambivalence is a problematic dilemma that occurs when the available options are mutually attractive or unattractive. For example, one might hesitate to negotiate when one desires money but also desires to maintain a harmony in the relationship. There were a few situations that depict the experience of ambivalence. First, ambivalence was experienced by the 11 participants that perceived negotiating would be rude or inappropriate, many of whom were women. Ambivalence was also experienced by the nine participants that indicated negotiating would be a risky social endeavor. Another instance of ambivalence was clearly experienced by one participant who described that he did not negotiate because he would risk losing the money he had been given. This ambivalent participant explained, "I have extra credit riding on it. I wouldn't want to mess it up by asking for more money."

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The present research study adds to the literature on the propensity to initiate negotiations by adopting an underused methodological approach: mixed methods. The aim of this study was to partially replicate previous research (Small et al., 2007) and to re-examine the role of gender in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Results of the quantitative phase of this study contradict previous findings (Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007) and suggest that no gender differences exist in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. As an extension to the study by Small et al. (2007), follow-up interviews were conducted to explore the reasons why participants chose to negotiate or not. Results from the qualitative phase help explain the absence of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate, and at the same time, support and expand the known explanations for why individuals do not initiate negotiations.

The present study also explored the extent to which the theoretical frameworks of sensemaking and PI were implicated by women and men in their decisions to initiate a negotiation. Indeed, sensemaking was prominent in this negotiation scenario and exuded instances of uncertainty, information seeking, retrospection, and transformation through conversation. Furthermore, PI theory provided insight into the way probabilities and evaluations relate to the propensity to negotiate. Moreover, the patterns of responses in the PI data suggest slight variance in the way women and men construct probabilities and evaluations. This chapter will discuss each of these findings and explain how findings are consistent or discordant with current literature.

Interpretation of Findings

Gender differences in the propensity to negotiate were absent in the quantitative data. These findings diverge from the findings by Small et al. (2007) who demonstrated that women were less likely to negotiate than men. In fact, the rate of negotiating was lower in this study than in the study by Small et al. (2007). In the present study, 4.7% of participants initiated a negotiation compared to 12.2% of participants in the study by Small et al. (2007). The current study may have had lower negotiating rates foremost because this study included the added incentive of course extra credit. Participants approached this study as an opportunity to increase their course standing and anything beyond that, such as money, was of minimal interest. Second, the rate of negotiating in this study might have been rather low due to the many participants that indicated they were Asian (41% Asian) and many expressed a reverence for collectivist values. Additionally, the low rate of negotiating could have been because participants were financially secure (42.2% reported parental income exceeding \$80,000). The interviews in the qualitative phase support and elaborate on these findings. At the same time, the qualitative interviews provide new insight as to why participants did not initiate a negotiation.

The qualitative interviews allowed participants to reveal the reasons why they did not initiate a negotiation. Many of the reasons are consistent with previous research findings on the reasons individuals do not negotiate: it was not the main objective, participants did not care about the money, and they performed poorly. The present results also broaden these reasons to include novel reasons for not initiating a negotiation: participants were volunteering/helping research, did not earn it, and that one should take

what one is given. One final reason for the avoidance of a negotiation revealed significant gender differences: women were more likely than men to not negotiate because they were concerned with being rude or inappropriate. The explanations participants provided for why they did not initiate a negotiation were compelling and have practical significance in that they can help us to understand some of the reasons individuals, particularly women, might hesitate to initiate negotiations.

Explanations for the Avoidance of a Negotiation

One of the main reasons participants did not initiate a negotiation is that they were not interested in the money. A number of participants indicated they simply did not care about the money, which aligns with demographic data indicating high parental income. Additionally, participants indicated that the difference between \$3 and \$10 was too small to motivate them to initiate a negotiation. The propensity literature has suggested that an important motivating factor in the propensity to negotiate is the desirability of the given outcome (Volkema, 2006). Therefore, without much interest in the \$10 incentive, participants had little reason to initiate a negotiation.

Another reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is that money was not their purpose/objective, but rather they were strictly interested in attaining extra credit. While many did not care about or need money, it also seems that money was not the purpose/objective of many of the participants as they were too narrowly focused on the extra credit that they overlooked the additional money available on the negotiation table. With two incentives offered in exchange for participation, this negotiation could be classified as a multi-issue negotiation. Negotiation scholars have argued that multi-issue negotiations diminish the clarity of purpose for the negotiator; therefore they are more

likely to leave value on the negotiation table (Volkema, 2006). In other words, as the number of objectives in a negotiation increases, so does the likelihood that the negotiator will hesitate to negotiate or abandon the negotiation altogether. Thus, the rate of negotiating may have been partly diminished by participants' inability to pursue multiple objectives.

The next reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is because they framed the situation as an opportunity to volunteer or help research. According to Weick (1995), social context is central to the construction of meaning. In the context of this research study, participants' behavior was guided by the rules/scripts of a research study rather than a wage negotiation. The perception of this study as a volunteer activity speaks to the external validity of this research design. This "volunteer" activity was understood as a situation that should not be reciprocated with payment, nonetheless a negotiated payment. As such, the practicality or external validity of this study may have been tenuous and the situation may have inadequately paralleled an actual wage negotiation. These findings are noteworthy because they might help to explain the rather lower rate of negotiating in this study and similar laboratory experiments (Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007). The rate of negotiating might have been largely diminished by the academic setting and might be more common in a professional environment.

The next explanation, that money should be earned, was both a reason for not negotiating and a common theme throughout the data. Participants indicated they would prefer to negotiate their salary after they have started working for a company and they have had the chance to prove themselves. In addition, participants reported negative perceptions of people who always negotiate and people who never negotiate. In fact,

many participants suggested there is a “happy medium” in negotiating which involves asking for things that are deserved or desired but not asking too much all of the time. Literature has demonstrated that reciprocity, repaying what is given, is a virtue that is valued by communities across the globe (Cialdini, 2001). Thus, the avoidance of a negotiation because it has not been earned might be considered as a laudable response. Clearly the norm of reciprocity is valued by many of our participants who believe it is important to prove one’s self before requesting money. This idea of proving oneself before negotiating provides some insight as to why many individuals might choose to avoid negotiating a starting salary. While the idea that money should be earned seems intuitive, it has yet to be addressed by the propensity literature.

The notion that ‘money should be earned’ by proving oneself is logical, but it has the potential to be problematic. Negotiations often take place before the value of the object has been conveyed. For example, starting salary is settled before employees have had the opportunity to demonstrate their ability and their value at that particular organization, unless the newly hired employee was promoted internally. It is important for employees to assess their knowledge, skills and abilities and then negotiate for a wage that is commensurate with those qualifications (Babcock & Laschever, 2009). Waiting to prove one’s qualifications to each new employer will result in a stunted starting salary and lower lifetime earnings. Heedful consideration of one’s starting salary offer is considered to be paramount since these initial wages have been shown to strongly relate to lifetime earnings (Gerhart, 1990). Thus, it is imperative that new employees have a thorough understanding of their worth and compare this with the salary they have been offered, then if necessary, initiate a negotiation for a higher and more reasonable wage.

Experts advise that goals should be set as high as you can justify (Shell, 2001), and this is true of a starting salary negotiation in which your worth has yet to be validated.

Participants also expressed that they did not initiate a negotiation because they thought they should take what they were given and trust the procedures for payment. This alludes to the influence of power in negotiation, a factor discussed by Small et al. (2007). They demonstrated that those who perceive they have greater power are more likely to initiate negotiations. This concept of taking what you are given can also be likened to another predictor of negotiation propensity: locus of control. According to Rotter, (1966), those with an external locus of control perceive that others are in control of their life circumstances, and therefore they are less motivated to exert effort towards these ends. Early scholarship suggested that women were less likely to negotiate because they were more likely to have an external locus of control and did not perceive their actions would be influential in attaining negotiation outcomes (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). In fact, women are essentially correct in assuming their actions are counterproductive since women are more often punished for asking (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007).

While gender differences in locus of control were not detected, this study found that many did not initiate a negotiation because they perceived that the confederate and researcher controlled the pay allocation. While the acceptance of payment is somewhat similar to findings on power and locus of control, the present findings provides more context as to how these factors affect propensity in an actual negotiation situation. The claim that locus of control relates to propensity has been demonstrated with correlational data from quantitative surveys (Babcock et al., 2006). The argument that power relates to

propensity was demonstrated in an experimental design that demonstrated that individuals primed to perceive themselves as powerful are more likely to initiate a negotiation (Small et al., 2007). In this study, participants recounted their understanding of why they did not negotiate and they explained that one should do as they are told and take what they are given. Therefore, the findings presented here demonstrate how obedience to payment procedures can result in a missed opportunity to negotiate.

For many, the notion of taking what you are given in the context of this study served as a parallel for actual wage negotiations. The incentive payment in this study was advertised in the form of a range: from \$3 to \$10. Similarly, job advertisements often list a salary in the form of a range from the lowest to the maximum amount that can be earned. Participants detected this parallel and described that the minimum amount in a salary range is typically the amount that is allocated. Taken together, adhering to a system of payment and not questioning pay determination can prove to be problematic and could result in significant lost wages over an extended period of time (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991).

One final reason that participants did not initiate a negotiation is that it was considered to be rude or out of character. Interestingly, this explanation was more likely to be reported by women than men, a finding which was also outlined in chapter four. Another question in the interview asked participants about the specific risks they perceived in negotiating. Results support that women frequently expressed concerns over being judged or denied, more frequently than men. Thus, social consequences in this study were more commonly a concern for women in comparison to men.

Furthermore, the scholarly literature supports their concerns are potentially warranted. Research has demonstrated that women are more commonly penalized for negotiating job offers in comparison to men. It is suggested that the self-interestedness and assertion implied by the act of a negotiating is a violation of traditional female gender norms (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Moreover, women understand these social risks and expect to be judged and possibly penalized for negotiating (Bowles et al., 2007). While this study did not examine the extent that participants were actually perceived as rude, results do suggest that the concern for propriety more commonly deterred women from negotiating than men.

Communication Theory and the Propensity to Negotiate

A notable contribution of this study is that it draws from two communication theories, sensemaking and PI theory, to explain how individuals respond to negotiating opportunities. Sensemaking serves as a frame to explore the experience of uncertainty and one's response to this uncertainty as well as provides insight into the essential social processes used during negotiation interactions. In addition, PI theory serves as a useful theoretical foundation to examine the probabilities, evaluations, and problematic dilemmas constructed by participants as they made decisions about negotiating. Taken together, sensemaking and PI theory shed new light on the propensity to initiate a negotiation.

Sensemaking and propensity. Sensemaking proved to be a prominent process in this ambiguous negotiation scenario. Two prominent benchmarks of social life as well as sensemaking theory are that meaning is co-created and is invigorated by moments of transformation. In the absence of others in this study, participants struggled to make

sense of what was happening and had difficulty determining what they should do. However, through conversation participants were able to retrospectively make sense of their actions. Thus, sensemaking helps to explain individual thoughts and actions and also suggests that one of the most valuable assets in a negotiation is collective social knowledge.

Sense is often made with others. Social resources help us to understand our environment and determine an appropriate course of action (Weick, 1995). In the absence of information and with few social resources, participants had difficulty determining the appropriate norms to guide their behavior. It was not clear whether negotiating would be an appropriate course of action. Participants acknowledged this lack of social information by stating it would have been helpful to know how other participants performed.

Access to social resources is considered an asset in negotiations. Scholars have acknowledged that comparative data is invaluable for negotiation success (Volkema, 2009). In their model of propensity to negotiate, Volkema and Fleck (2012) consider vicarious experience to be a predictor of initiating a negotiation. The authors acknowledge that we learn from our own experiences in life but we also learn from the experiences of others. Not only does social information divulge whether negotiation is possible, but it also details the range of what is negotiable. It has been demonstrated that knowing the specific standards of pay for a specific job or industry can be exceedingly advantageous. Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated that comparative salary data increases the rate of negotiating and results in more equitable pay, which is particularly important for women who are traditionally underpaid.

Much of the negotiation literature emphasizes the importance of research and preparation to fully understand the scope of what is negotiable and the norms and standards for the situation (Fisher, & Ertel, 1995; Shell, 2001). Wheeler (2012) suggests that information is power in a negotiation, and whichever negotiator has a clearer sense of what is possible has the advantage. This study broadens these suggestions by stressing the importance of seeking information in all situations, even those that are not immediately perceived as negotiable opportunities. Indeed, the few participants in this study who negotiated all engaged in future-oriented thought by closely determining their worth in this study prior to the exchange of money. They recognized that preparation is critical.

While forethought is important, retrospect proved to be similarly valuable. The sensemaking concept of retrospect was evident in the follow-up interviews. Retrospect, according to Weick, suggests that action is often preceded by thought and reflection (2005). Indeed, participants often took action without prudent calculation of the consequences of their actions. For many participants, it was only through the interviews that they came to understand their environment, the consequences of their actions, and themselves. For example, participants came to understand that payment was negotiable and perhaps they should have negotiated given the few risks involved. Taken together, findings suggest how sensemaking can be invaluable in a negotiation, particularly when the prospect of a negotiation is not imminent.

Problematic integration and propensity. Problematic integration theory maintains that a given outcome is viewed in terms of the probability of this event, the evaluation of this event, and the integration of these two orientations. First, the evaluation

or allure of a given outcome is influential in the decision to pursue this outcome, both generally (Babrow, 2001) and in the context of a negotiation (Volkema, 2006, 2009). In other words, when an outcome is desired, it is then pursued. While participants in this study assigned positive value to the \$10 incentive, participants also assigned positive value to the \$3 payment they had already been given. Furthermore, PI theory maintains that evaluations do not function in isolation. Participants in this study perceived a negative or low probability of attaining the \$10 incentive. Taken together, while participants were enticed by the \$10 incentive, they may not have negotiated because of two other factors: they were satisfied with their baseline \$3, and they perceived a low probability of attaining the \$10. Thus, the way in which probabilities and evaluations are interconnected has meaningful implications for one's propensity to initiate a negotiation. As such, it is also important to consider the way probabilities and evaluations collide by examining problematic dilemmas.

The integration of probabilities and evaluations. The nonexperimental design of this study is such that the relationship between probabilities and evaluations can only be inferred as correlational relationships and not as causal relationships. Though the influence of problematic dilemmas, when probabilities and values diverge (Babrow, 2001), is purely speculative, these dilemmas provide insight into the way probabilities and evaluations collided in the propensity to initiate negotiations. The dilemmas experienced by participants in this study reflect ambiguity, impossibility, and divergence. Divergence, the desire for an outcome that is improbable (Babrow, 2001), may help to explain why participants in this study did not seek information to reduce uncertainty. That is, while participants often desired the \$10, they were also unsure or pessimistic

regarding whether or not they were able to attain the desired outcome. The absence of certainty seemed to contribute to the inertia exhibited by participants in the propensity to negotiate.

Another important property worth noting about probabilities and evaluations is that they are interrelated (Babrow, 2001). Again while only speculative, it is certainly possible that participants adjusted their evaluations or probabilities to mitigate negative emotions that result from problematic dilemmas. For example, to combat the negative probability or poor odds of earning \$10, it seems that participants bolstered their evaluation of the \$3 payment to frame the situation more optimistically. For example, one participant indicated his odds of \$10 were “probably not that high, I didn’t make that many words.” This participant then was asked about the value of money and he indicated “\$10 probably would have been better, but \$3 is fine.” Thus, positive value was assigned to the baseline payment possibly due to the low probability of attaining the higher \$10 payment. While the specific way in which probabilities and evaluations integrate is not easily discernable from this study, theory suggests that probabilities and evaluations are interconnected and do not function in isolation (McPhee & Zaug, 2001). Interestingly, the probabilistic and evaluative orientations of women and men demonstrated slight variance.

Gender and problematic integration. From the perspective of PI theory, there is some evidence to suggest that women and men vary in the way they construct probabilities and evaluative orientations. First, probabilistic orientations tend to be formulated somewhat inversely by women and men in the context of a negotiation. Though marginal and not statistically significant, a larger percentage of men perceived a high probability of earning the maximum \$10 payment while a higher percentage of

women perceived their probability of attaining \$10 was low. Negotiation scholars would liken these probabilities to expectations, which are believed to affect behavior during negotiations. High or positive expectations cause individuals to be committed and persistent in a negotiation (Shell, 2001) while negative expectations can become disappointingly self-fulfilling (Wheeler, 2013).

The present findings regarding gender differences in probabilities are consistent with much of the literature regarding gender and expectations. Research has consistently demonstrated that men tend to maintain expectations that are inflated in comparison to women. For example, one survey of college students demonstrated that male students had higher expectations for their future salary in comparison to their female classmates (Martin, 1989), perhaps because of the abundant evidence supporting that men earn more money (Gerhart, 1990; Hegewisch, et al., 2010; Hegewisch, et al., 2012). In negotiation scenarios, women tend to set lower aspirations and are willing to accept lower payment than are men (Eckel, de Oliveira, & Grossman, 2008; O'Connor & Arnold, 2006). Thus, the finding that women did not perceive a high likelihood of attaining \$10 is not surprising, despite the quantitative evidence that women and men performed similarly in this study in the Boggle game.

Second, the evaluative orientations or value assigned by women and men demonstrate patterns of variation. Findings suggest that women tended to assign positive value to both the \$3 and \$10 payment, while men exuded less excitement over either of the payment amounts. Examining this evaluative data suggests that women might not have negotiated because they were satisfied with the initial \$3 they were given. Crosby (1984) detailed the paradox of the female worker is that she tends to earn less and tends

to be happier with less, and this claim has been supported by empirical research (Jost, 1997). Conversely, men might not have initiated a negotiation because they were not enticed by the \$10 incentive. Another reason men might not have negotiated is that they were attempting to maintain face after being told that they missed an opportunity to negotiate. One study by Bryans (1999) asked professionals to recount mistakes they had made in the workplace. Interestingly, men took longer to report making a mistake and were more likely to shift the blame of their mistakes to others. Conversely, women more quickly acknowledged mistakes and were more accountable and apologetic for their mistakes. Therefore, the variation between women and men in value assigned to the money might be authentic beliefs about the money or might be an attempt to maintain face or make sense of the outcome of their performance. Taken together, results of this study suggest women were satisfied with whatever payment they were given while men tended to express a sentiment of indifference to the money.

An interesting finding within the data is that women were significantly more likely than men to assign positive value to the \$10 incentive. At first blush, the evaluative orientations uncovered in this study contradict the stereotypical values of women and men. Considerable literature suggests that women tend to value and privilege relationships while men privilege monetary gains (Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996; Kray & Gelfand, 2009). However, the evaluative orientations revealed here suggest that women do value money but are happier with less, which is consistent with theoretical arguments regarding gender and money. For example, it has been argued that women have lower pay expectations as they have a lower internal standard with which they

evaluate money (Sausser & York, 1978). At the same time, with a higher standard of pay expectations, men need a higher dollar amount to be motivated to take action.

In sum, through the lens of PI theory, there is some evidence to suggest that women and men vary in the way they construct probabilities and evaluative orientations. These findings provide new insight into the underlying inclinations and motivations held by women and men in the propensity to negotiate. According to PI theory, women's decision to avoid a negotiation could have occurred because while they found the \$10 incentive appealing, they perceived they were not likely to attain this money. Additionally, women were satisfied with the \$3 baseline pay they had already been given. For men, the decision to avoid a negotiation could have been be a function of the indifference assigned to the \$10 incentive, despite their perceived high probability of attaining the \$10. Thus, to fully grasp the decision to avoid a negotiation it is important to consider the juxtaposition of both probabilistic and evaluative orientations.

Theoretical Extension

According to Babrow (2001) Problematic Integration theory suggests that individuals construct probabilistic and evaluative orientations to a given event or outcome. The theory further states that these orientations, probabilistic and evaluative, are either positive or negative. However, the present exploration suggests that the bifurcation of positive and negative orientations does not fully encompass all potential orientations that can be constructed by individuals. Firstly, results in this study suggest that many participants maintained 'uncertain' probabilistic orientations towards the outcome -- receiving \$10. Participants either gave little consideration to the probability of getting \$10 or did not know how to go about determining their probability of earning \$10.

Secondly, a number of participants maintained an evaluative orientation of ‘indifference’ in that they did not care about the \$10 incentive in this study. Thus, there were some individuals who did not assign positive or negative value toward the \$10 payment, but their orientations were somewhere in between these two extremes. Phillips (1990) argues that theory should aim to comprehensively explain the phenomenon under scientific investigation. Consequently, PI theory would benefit from an expansion of the bifurcated positive and negative orientations to include additional categorizations of uncertainty and indifference.

Contributions of the Present Study

The present study broadens the negotiation literature to adopt two underused epistemological approaches: qualitative methods and mixed methods. The bulk of the work on the propensity to negotiate has been quantitative in nature (e.g., Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al., 2007; Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007; Volkema & Fleck, 2012), likely because this previous work has been conducted in the fields of psychology and business -- fields which have been dominated by quantitative approaches since their inception (Danziger, 1985). While quantitative methods have proved useful for theory testing, this approach is fairly inflexible. This study has demonstrated the flexibility of qualitative research in that it offers an opportunity to ask open-ended questions and explore the rich, descriptive, and wide-ranging participant responses that are often unanticipated by the researcher (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005). Indeed, there were countless surprises revealed by participants in their explanations of why they decided to avoid initiating a negotiation, and these surprises yield constructive avenues for future research.

A second contribution of this study is that it furthers the application of theory to the literature on the propensity to negotiate. Moreover, it is the first known study to use a communicative approach to investigate the propensity to negotiate. While communication is described as an essential skill that is central to the negotiation process (Glenn & Susskind, 2010; Putnam, 2010; Putnam & Kolb, 2000; Putnam & Roloff, 1992; Schoop, Köhne, & Ostertag, 2010), little attention has been given to the role of communication in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The present study is guided by two communication theories, sensemaking and problematic integration, to specifically consider the role of communication in responding to uncertainty. Communication theory provides valuable insight how the absence or presence of communicative knowledge informs our understanding of who is propelled to negotiate and who is not.

In sum, the present investigation is among the first to investigate the propensity to negotiate from a qualitative/mixed-method approach and also with the guidance of communication theory. Taken together, these unique contributions make the present study one that adopts a fresh approach to exploring gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation.

Implications

The findings of this study have important implications for a variety of potential negotiators. Foremost, the information revealed through the 86 interviews in this study suggest that participants did not recognize the opportunity to negotiate. During the study, participants were noticeably disinterested in their surroundings. Participants were mostly unclear about the study and gave minimal forethought to what would be happening. Recognizing negotiable opportunities is a critical step in the process of negotiating

(Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007; Volkema & Fleck, 2012), and both women and men in this study missed the opportunity. One approach for augmenting the rate of recognizing opportunities is by drawing from the knowledge and experience of mentors and contacts in one's social network (Burt, 1992; Forret & Sullivan, 2002). Exchanges with others can provide information regarding what is negotiable and strategies for optimizing those requests (Bowles et al., 2005); a social process akin to sensemaking.

There is also value in preparing for social exchanges, like a negotiable opportunity such as this one. While it would have been difficult to know this opportunity was negotiable it would have been useful to research the parameters of the experiment, either by asking questions of peers or the researchers. Relationships or situations that are demarcated by the exchange of value should be well prepared for and participants should maintain vigilance throughout. Ubiquitously, scholars argue that a willingness to prepare is one of the most important negotiation techniques that results in superior outcomes for all parties (Cialdini, 2001; Shell, 2001). In fact, Fisher and Ertel (1995) have argued that a lack of preparation is one of the most serious handicaps in a negotiation. Indeed, an important finding from this study is that recognizing opportunities and preparedness often prove to be invaluable efforts.

The discovery of cultural differences in the propensity to negotiate has important implications. Though not a focal investigation of this study, the differences between Asian and Caucasian participants was undeniable and suggests that culture has a profound effect on the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Many of the Asian participants portrayed negotiating as an inappropriate social gaffe, but Caucasians less frequently expressed this sentiment. While a few women in this study did express that negotiating

would be a rude violation of social rules, these reactions were less frequent than the Asian participants and were of scant concern for Caucasian men. Indeed there is a wealth of literature suggesting that collectivist cultures, such as East Asian countries and Latin American countries, value the collective good, unity, and social cohesion. In contrast, individualistic cultures, such as the United States and Australia, value independence, self-reliance, and thus the pursuit of individual goals, such as the pursuit of negotiation outcomes (Acuff, 2006; Hofstede, 2001; Volkema, 2012; Volkema & Fleck, 2012). These findings related to cultural differences caution that perhaps we should be giving greater consideration to the way cultural values affect one's decision to engage or avoid a negotiation.

Limitations and Future Directions

A few limitations of this study warrant acknowledgement. Foremost, this study was only a partial replication study and did not precisely replicate the procedures undergone by Small et al. (2007). The present study differed with the inclusion of an extra credit incentive. This additional incentive seemed to minimize the rate of negotiating in a way that complicated the identification of gender differences. It likely would have been simpler to parse out gender differences had the extra incentive been removed from the study. However, in the absence of extra credit, it would have been rather difficult to stimulate participation from a college population, a suspicion of ours that was reinforced by similar comments from participants.

Another limitation is that generalizability is not perfect with lab studies. This study was conducted in a college laboratory in comparison to a professional work environment. In the context of an actual work environment the act of negotiating would

likely be a more realistic and routine social activity. Indeed, comments from participants suggested that they perceived this artificiality in the way they framed their participation as a helping or volunteer activity. As such, the artificiality of the setting limits the number of parallels that can be drawn between this study and actual wage negotiations.

The sample population presents another limitation in this study. While any sample population will have drawbacks and there are a few notable limitations of the present sample. First, this sample consisted of a large portion of Asian international students and this population was less inclined to negotiate for a few reasons. The Asian sample generally had lower Boggle scores, reported subpar personal performance, acknowledged a language barrier, and perceived negotiating would be an inappropriate behavior. The large number of Asian participants confounds the ability to draw straightforward gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. A second limitation of this sample is that the sample was solely comprised of college students, thus generalizability to other samples is tenuous. College samples are critiqued with claims that this group tells us little about how the rest of the 'real world' operates. However, methodologists refute this argument by suggesting that college students inform us of whether a phenomenon *can* happen or if a phenomenon *ought* to happen under certain conditions (Bordens & Abbott, 2002; Mook, 1983). On one hand, this sample of college students has had limited exposure to actual work experiences. However, research on the socialization of work demonstrates that young people have an elaborate understanding of work prior to attaining a 'real job' (Clair, 1999). Further, the previous work on the propensity to initiate negotiations exclusively relied on college samples (Eriksson & Sanders, 2012; Small et

al., 2007). Therefore, this sample of college students was perhaps more appropriate and advantageous than not.

The propensity scholarship is in early stages of development, thus there are many possible directions for future research. Thus far, the research that has been conducted related to gender and propensity has been homogenous, and has largely focused on one-time negotiations amongst strangers (Kray & Thompson, 2005). While this literature is valuable in that it offers increased experimental control (Bendersky & McGinn 2008), one-time negotiations are only a small range of human interactions and diminish the number of relational concerns that could arise. In fact, negotiations are often conducted amidst established relationships and can occur across a number of meetings. Moreover, women and men tend to reap social benefits differently; social dominance is advantageous for men yet unfavorable for women (Campbell, 1999; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Maccoby, 1990). It is likely that in narrowing on one-time negotiations researchers are overlooking the value women can access in long-term negotiation relationships. Future research on propensity would benefit from examining a broader range of relationships, particularly given gender differences in norms and roles.

Another significantly underdeveloped area is the literature related to multi-issue negotiations. First, while some have theorized the way multi-issue negotiations affect the propensity to initiate these exchanges (Volkema, 2009), few have conducted actual multi-issue negotiation experiments. Further, the role of gender in multi-issue negotiations has yet to be explored. The study by Small et al. (2007) was a single-issue negotiation while the present study included two issues, and it remains an unanswered question of whether the additional incentive caused gender differences to be extinguished. In other words, this

study found that gender differences in the rate of negotiating were nonexistent and this might have been the result of research design and the context of this dual-issue negotiation.

A controversial and continuously developing body of research has been examining gender differences in brain connectivity and therefore differences in the ability to perform with multiple tasks. Scholars have recently suggested that that the neural wiring of women and men is different which leads to differences in performance depending on the number of issues or tasks. “On average, men are more likely better at learning and performing a single task at hand, like cycling or navigating directions, whereas women have superior memory and social cognition skills, making them more equipped for multitasking and creating solutions that work for a group” (Ingahalikar, et al., 2014). Thus, future research related to the number of issues in a negotiation could prove to be an invigorating new area of research, and particularly invaluable for gender research.

Conclusion

While the aim of the present project is not to encourage the widespread initiation of negotiations, it remains important to explore whether the reasons for negotiating are conscious, cogent, and unique for women and men. On the surface, there were no gender differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation nor were there vast differences in the reasons for negotiation. In fact, it seems women do not negotiate for many of the same reasons men do not negotiate. However, upon further examination, our findings present significant gender differences in evaluative orientation and a pattern of variance in probabilistic orientations. In other words, women and men behaved similarly in this study

but their underlying orientations toward money in this study were largely dissimilar. Furthermore, culture proved to have a profound effect on the propensity to negotiate. Findings presented in this dissertation suggest that the role of gender in the propensity to negotiate is more nuanced than the simple declaration that “women don’t ask.”

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APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What is your age? _____ years

2. What is your ethnic background?
 - o White/Caucasian
 - o African-American
 - o Latin American/Hispanic
 - o Asian
 - o Native American
 - o Other _____

3. Please indicate your year in college:
 - o Freshman
 - o Sophomore
 - o Junior
 - o Senior
 - o Graduate Student

4. How many years of full-time work experience do you have? _____

5. What is your current employment status?
 - o Full-time
 - o Part-time
 - o Self-employed
 - o Unemployed

APPENDIX B

PROPENSITY TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION SCALE (M-PINS)

Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn (2006)

1. I feel anxious when I have to ask for something I want
2. It always takes me a long time to work up the courage to ask for things I want
3. I feel nervous when I am in situations in which I have to persuade others to give me things that I want
4. I experience a lot of stress when I think about asking for something I want
5. It always feels so unpleasant to have to ask for things for myself

APPENDIX C
PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

1. How did you first hear about this study?
2. Did you know what would happen in the study before you came here today?
3. What do you think was the purpose of this study?

Reasons for Initiating or Avoiding Negotiation

4. Today you were paid \$3 for your performance. Did you think about asking for more money?
 - a. Why/why not?
5. Was there anything that held you back from asking?
6. Would you have asked for more if you thought you could get it?

Probabilistic Orientation

7. How do you think the payment was determined for the Boggle game?
8. What did you think were your chances of getting the maximum amount?

Evaluative Orientation

9. How do you feel about the \$[amount of money] that you did received?
10. How desirable was the \$10 incentive to you?

REVEAL

In this experiment we gave everyone \$3 to see who would negotiate for more money.

Sensemaking

11. Is there anything about this situation that would have made you ask for more money?
12. Do you think you tend to be a person who likes to ask for things or one who doesn't?

13. If you were given an offer for a job you really wanted but you didn't think it paid enough, what would you do?
14. What do you think about people who always ask or negotiate for a better deal?
15. What do you think about people who never ask or never negotiate?
16. If you were selling something like a car and someone offered to buy it for a much lower price than you preferred, what would you think about that person?

Gender and Negotiation

17. There is some evidence that men are more likely to negotiate for more things and women are less likely. What do you think about this?
18. What advice would you give to women who want to be earning more money but don't feel comfortable asking for more?