Since it was officially established, China’s stock market has witnessed rapid cultural, social, economic, and legal transformations during the last two decades. But the development of China’s stock market brought with it the frequent occurrence of securities crimes and other types of white-collar crimes that harmed vast numbers of public retail stockholders.
This study reviews sociolegal theories, especially law and finance theories, to shed light on the construction of regulatory mechanisms for the Chinese stock market. The critical point for stock market regulation is to curb securities irregularities and protect investors. This study applies white-collar criminological theories, especially crime-as-choice theories, to link the theoretical analyses of the causes of securities crimes to the laws, policies and practices governing the Chinese stock market. Historical, documentary and policy analyses, case analyses, and analysis of interviews, and observations of weibos and blogs are employed in this study. The data sources consist of: (1) historical information on the development of China’s stock market and its regulation, both in terms of legislation and practice; (2) interviews with 40 retail stockholders, each of whom has more than ten years of experiences in stock trading, in two Chinese cities, Shenzhen and Haikou; and (3) online statements and comments of 30 well known Chinese economists, law scholars, financial commentators, lawyers, and securities experts in Sina weibos (microblogs) and blogs.
Based on the analyses, this study suggests revising relevant laws and establishing supporting mechanisms to reduce securities irregularities and crimes in China’s stock market and strength the protection of stock investors. My study also draws attention to the growth of rights consciousness of public retail stockholders, which has potential to propel political and legal reform for the development of the Chinese stock market.