
To be effective, web applications must perform actions quickly while avoiding unexpected interruptions. However, dynamically linked libraries can cause delays and thus downtime, because dynamically linked code must load multiple files, often from disk. As loading is one of the slowest operations a computer performs, seeking from disk can have a negative impact on performance which causes the server to feel less responsive for users. Dynamically linked code can also break when the underlying library is updated. Normally, when trying to update a server, developers will use test servers. However, if the developer accidentally updates a library in a dynamically linked system, it may be incompatible with another portion of the program.
Statically linking code makes it more reliable and faster (to load) than dynamically linking code. The static linking process varies by programming language. Therefore, different static linkers need to be developed for different languages. This thesis describes the creation of a static linker, called FrozenNode, for the popular back-end web application language, Node.js. FrozenNode resolves Node.js applications into a single file that does not rely on dynamic libraries. FrozenNode was built on top of Closure Compiler to accurately process JavaScript. We found that the resolved application was faster and self-contained yielding significant advantages over the dynamically loaded application. Furthermore, both had the same output.
Vulnerabilities in web applications can be found using static analysis tools, however static analysis tools must reason about dynamically linked application. FrozenNode can be used to statically link a Node.js application before being used by a JavaScript static analysis tool.


Even though Secure World can monitor the Normal World, attackers can attempt to bypass the security measures to retain control of a compromised system. CacheKit is a new type of rootkit that exploits such a vulnerability in the ARM architecture to hide in Normal World cache from memory introspection tools running in Secure World by exploiting cache locking mechanisms. If left unchecked, ARM processors that provide hardware assisted cache locking for performance and time-critical applications in real-time and embedded systems would be completely vulnerable to this undetectable and untraceable attack. Therefore, a new approach is needed to ensure the correct use of such mechanisms and prevent malicious code from being hidden in the cache.
CacheLight is a lightweight approach that leverages the TrustZone and Virtualization extensions of the ARM architecture to allow the system to continue to securely provide these hardware facilities to users while preventing attackers from exploiting them. CacheLight restricts the ability to lock the cache to the Secure World of the processor such that the Normal World can still request certain memory to be locked into the cache by the secure operating system (OS) through a Secure Monitor Call (SMC). This grants the secure OS the power to verify and validate the information that will be locked in the requested cache way thereby ensuring that any data that remains in the cache will not be inconsistent with what exists in main memory for inspection. Malicious attempts to hide data can be prevented and recovered for analysis while legitimate requests can still generate valid entries in the cache.

In this thesis, I identify several vulnerabilities in the widely used critical infrastructures which leverage the NMDA design. Software Defined Networking (SDN), a proponent of NMDA, heavily relies on its datastores to program and manage the network. I base my research on the security challenges put forth by the existing datastore’s design as implemented by the SDN controllers. The vulnerabilities identified in this work have a direct impact on the controllers like OpenDayLight, Open Network Operating System and their proprietary implementations (by CISCO, Ericsson, RedHat, Brocade, Juniper, etc). Using the threat detection methodology, I demonstrate how the NMDA-based implementations are vulnerable to attacks which compromise availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the network. I finally propose defense measures to address the security threats in the existing design and discuss the challenges faced while employing these countermeasures.




Cryptojacking is a process in which a program utilizes a user’s CPU to mine cryptocurrencies unknown to the user. Since cryptojacking is a relatively new problem and its impact is still limited, very little has been done to combat it. Multiple studies have been conducted where a cryptojacking detection system is implemented, but none of these systems have truly solved the problem. This thesis surveys existing studies and provides a classification and evaluation of each detection system with the aim of determining their pros and cons. The result of the evaluation indicates that it might be possible to bypass detection of existing systems by modifying the cryptojacking code. In addition to this classification, I developed an automatic code instrumentation program that replaces specific instructions with functionally similar sequences as a way to show how easy it is to implement simple obfuscation to bypass detection by existing systems.
Fuzzing is currently a thriving research area in the cybersecurity field. This work begins by introducing code that brings partial replayability capabilities to AFL++ in an attempt to solve the challenge of the highly random nature of fuzzing that comes from the large amount of random mutations on input seeds. The code addresses two of the three sources of nondeterminism described in this work. Furthermore, this work introduces Fuzzing Debugger (FDB), a highly configurable framework to facilitate the debugging of fuzzing by interfacing with GDB. Three debugging modes are described which attempt to tackle two use cases of FDB: (1) pinpointing nondeterminism in fuzz runs, therefore paving the way for replayable fuzz runs and (2) systematically finding preferable stopping points seed analysis.
