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The purpose of this paper will be to show that the 'merge' model of mental files is to be preferred to the 'link' model of mental files because some of the problems that arise for the 'merge' model also arise for the 'link' model, and because the problems for the

The purpose of this paper will be to show that the 'merge' model of mental files is to be preferred to the 'link' model of mental files because some of the problems that arise for the 'merge' model also arise for the 'link' model, and because the problems for the 'merge' model can be argued against via counterexamples or explained away. This will be shown by giving a detailed description of what both the link model and the merge model of mental files entail. The flaws of the mental file merge model will be presented, followed by the advantages of the link model, ending with several arguments as to why the merge model is better suited to explain our intuitions about identity than the link model.
ContributorsZimmerman, Thomas Scott (Author) / Pinillos, N. Angel (Thesis director) / Kobes, Bernard (Committee member) / Reynolds, Steven (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2015-05
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Description
Many philosophers have attempted to define what it is to be rational. Yet, each attempt faces insurmountable objections, throwing it away in place of another. This lack of success has motivated some authors to seek a deflationary theory of rationality, particularly Sinan Dogramaci and his epistemic communism, hoping that reducing

Many philosophers have attempted to define what it is to be rational. Yet, each attempt faces insurmountable objections, throwing it away in place of another. This lack of success has motivated some authors to seek a deflationary theory of rationality, particularly Sinan Dogramaci and his epistemic communism, hoping that reducing the breadth and obligation of the theory lessens the obstacles. This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I highlight previous attempts to define rationality. In the second part, epistemic communism is explained. In the third part, I argue that the answer of the virtue epistemologist Ernest Sosa to the knowledge-related “value problem” can parallel to show that rationality has intrinsic value. And if rationality has intrinsic value, then rationality is not fully accounted for in epistemic communism.
ContributorsPierce, Nathanael David (Author) / Reynolds, Steven (Thesis director) / Nestor, Pinillos (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor, Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2019-05