Matching Items (6)

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International students at ASU and how they handle stress

Description

This paper will highlight the ways that Chinese students handle stress due to different reasons and how they solve their stress. The main reasons include different education styles, cultural differences

This paper will highlight the ways that Chinese students handle stress due to different reasons and how they solve their stress. The main reasons include different education styles, cultural differences between the US and China, food, language, entertainment ways and religious. Chinese students have many methods to solve stress that include both positive and negative ways. I will provide more details about the ways in the third part in which I report the findings of my survey. My study is relevant because of the large numbers of Chinese students who are studying internationally.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2018-12

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Depletion in the Accounting World

Description

Depletion can be a common occurrence in today’s world where a rapid pace is the norm. Depletion is the using of a person’s self-monitoring resources that can erode one’s decision

Depletion can be a common occurrence in today’s world where a rapid pace is the norm. Depletion is the using of a person’s self-monitoring resources that can erode one’s decision making ability. Depletion affects people in their day-to-day personal and professional lives and can especially be problematic when it compromises career prospects. Professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants, all make important decisions daily and in pursuit of quality decision-making must exert self-control and avoid impulsive reactions to environmental events. Many studies have been conducted providing evidence of the harmful effects of cognitive depletion; an extensive literature focuses on the medical profession where poor decision-making has life-and-death consequences. This thesis reflects on the effect of depletion on accounting professionals. To that extent, behavioral experiments were conducted using student participants: students that will be future accountants. This study found that accounting students’ performance on a subsequent task was influenced if they had completed a difficult first task. Accountants, along with all professionals, need to be made aware of this circumstance to ensure that those who may be more susceptible to their resources being depleted can find ways to be aware of their self-control levels.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2019-05

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Do Disclosure Choices and Use of Specialists Reduce Perceptions of Auditor Liability?

Description

Auditors are required to communicate significant risks and audit strategy to the audit committee. However, the effect on perceived auditor liability of auditor disclosures to the audit committee has been

Auditors are required to communicate significant risks and audit strategy to the audit committee. However, the effect on perceived auditor liability of auditor disclosures to the audit committee has been ignored for the most part in the accounting literature. In an experiment, I examine how the auditor’s choice to disclose a significant risk to the audit committee affects jurors’ negligence assessments of the auditor. Secondarily, I examine whether assessments of auditor negligence vary with the auditor’s use of a specialist. I find that disclosing a risk to the audit committee reduces jurors’ negligence verdicts against the auditor. However, auditor efforts to improve audit quality through use of a specialist do not differentially affect negligence assessments, individually or interactively with disclosure choices. My results further reveal that there is no reduction of negligence assessments by disclosing risks to the audit committee if jurors do not have a pre-existing favorable view of the auditing profession and do not understand the limitations of an audit. Through mediation analysis, I show that these findings are consistent with expectations derived from psychology research examining responsibility attributions in settings with multiple causative agents, where jurors’ diffuse responsibility away from the auditor and toward the audit committee. My results contribute to practice, addressing one cost/benefit consideration related to disclosures to audit committees and the use of specialists, and to accounting research examining the legal ramifications of disclosing identified audit risks.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2017

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Federal Lobbying by Audit Firms: Does It Confer Competitive Advantage?

Description

Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I

Given that lobbying activity by audit firms constitutes a potential advocacy threat to auditor independence, this paper seeks to provide an economic rationale for audit firm lobbying behavior. Specifically, I examine whether federal lobbying activity by audit firms contributes to their ability to retain existing clients and attract new clients. Consequently, I predict and find that greater lobbying activity is associated with a lower probability of auditor switching behavior as well longer auditor tenure when the client is in an industry with high interest in lobbying. I also find that, when switching audit firms, clients tend to choose audit firms with greater lobbying activity and that companies in industries with high interest in lobbying are more likely to choose an audit firm with greater lobbying activity than their previous auditor.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2017

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Anchoring and motivated reasoning in managers' review of accounting estimates

Description

Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However,

Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created by reporting incentives.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2016

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Dual-class firms' choice of performance measures in CEO stock compensation contracts

Description

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2014