This dissertation explores the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) perquisites, i.e., nonmonetary compensation offered to particular employees and not essential to the accomplishment of a CEO’s duties. While the current CEO perquisite literature has focused on understanding the economic determinants of CEO perquisites, I study the social-psychological determinants of perquisites. Specifically, I propose that organizational status is positively associated with CEO perquisites. The status literature suggests that high-status organizations derive benefits from status and status signals, while agency theory proposes that perquisites are a way for CEOs to extract private rents. Therefore, I posit that for high-status organizations, the benefits derived from certain CEO perquisites may negate the costs associated with those perquisites. I examine a specific CEO perquisite: the mandatory use of corporate aircraft for personal travel. Prior research and the popular press suggest that this perquisite is often seen not only as a status signal but also as an agency cost. Accordingly, I hypothesize that higher status organizations and organizations with higher status directors are more likely than lower status organizations or organizations with lower status directors to mandate their CEOs to use corporate aircraft for personal travel. I also propose that the effect is stronger for low- or high-status organizations than for middle-status organizations. In addition, I hypothesize five contingencies moderating the above relationships. I examine hypothesized relationships using a sample of S&P 500 organizations, and I find support for many of my hypotheses. This dissertation contributes to both status and executive compensation literature.