Previous studies about the effects of regulatory institutions on the outcomes of regulation have resulted in a lack of consensus on the nature of these impacts. This paper seeks to resolve some of this ambiguity by analyzing two dimension of electric utility regulatory outcomes, prices and reliability, with a broader panel of explanatory variables and with a Hausman-Taylor regression technique. The results suggest that elected regulators and deregulated electricity markets result in worse reliability outcomes for consumers without strong evidence that either institution secures lower electricity prices. Incorporating these insights into a theoretical model of regulation could give more detailed insight into how to create regulatory institutions that can optimize the outcomes of governance.

Sanctuary jurisdictions are jurisdictions that do not enforce one or more aspects of federal immigration policy in regards to unauthorized immigrants. Some states maintain state-wide sanctuary policies while others are adamantly against them. Estimates of taxes that unauthorized immigrants pay and estimates of the amount of state funding that unauthorized immigrants can access (education, financial aid, corrections, and welfare) reveal that regardless of sanctuary status, unauthorized immigrants may “pay in” more than they “take out” from the system. The status of “sanctuary jurisdiction” does not appear to have much if any effect on the net state budget. However, unauthorized immigrants are able to access more welfare programs in sanctuary states.