Soliman et al. (2013) set out to demonstrate how the bodily level of analysis can unify explanations in psychology. Our argument was that common sensorimotor mechanisms underlie many of the behavioral phenomena that are currently segregated as cognitive, social, or cultural. Toward that end, we re-characterized a cultural construct—self-construal along the dimension of independence and interdependence (Markus and Kitayama, 1991)—as reflecting degree of interaction with ethnically diverse others.

At least since the late nineteenth century, researchers have sought an explanation for infantile amnesia (IA)—the lack of autobiographical memories dating from early childhood—and childhood amnesia (CA), faster forgetting of events up until the age of about seven. Evidence suggests that IA occurs across altricial species, and a number of studies using animal models have converged on the hypothesis that maturation of the hippocampus is an important factor. But why does the hippocampus mature at one time and not another, and how does that maturation relate to memory? Our hypothesis is rooted in theories of embodied cognition, and it provides an explanation both for hippocampal development and the end of IA. Specifically, the onset of locomotion prompts the alignment of hippocampal place cells and grid cells to the environment, which in turn facilitates the ontogeny of long-term episodic memory and the end of IA. That is, because the animal can now reliably discriminate locations, location becomes a stable cue for memories. Furthermore, as the mode of human locomotion shifts from crawling to walking, there is an additional shift in the alignment of the hippocampus that marks the beginning of adult-like episodic memory and the end of CA. Finally, given a reduction in self-locomotion and exploration with aging, the hypothesis suggests a partial explanation for cognitive decline with aging.

Science has changed many of our dearly held and commonsensical (but incorrect) beliefs. For example, few still believe the world is flat, and few still believe the sun orbits the earth. Few still believe humans are unrelated to the rest of the animal kingdom, and soon few will believe human thinking is computer-like. Instead, as with all animals, our thoughts are based on bodily experiences, and our thoughts and behaviors are controlled by bodily and neural systems of perception, action, and emotion interacting with the physical and social environments. We are embodied; nothing more. Embodied cognition is about cognition formatted in sensorimotor experience, and sensorimotor systems make those thoughts dynamic. Even processes that seem abstract, such as language comprehension and goal understanding are embodied. Thus, embodied cognition is not limited to one type of thought or another: It is cognition.

Is the mirror neuron system (MNS) used in language understanding? According to embodied accounts of language comprehension, understanding sentences describing actions makes use of neural mechanisms of action control, including the MNS. Consequently, repeatedly comprehending sentences describing similar actions should induce adaptation of the MNS thereby warping its use in other cognitive processes such as action recognition and prediction. To test this prediction, participants read blocks of multiple sentences where each sentence in the block described transfer of objects in a direction away or toward the reader. Following each block, adaptation was measured by having participants predict the end-point of videotaped actions. The adapting sentences disrupted prediction of actions in the same direction, but (a) only for videos of biological motion, and (b) only when the effector implied by the language (e.g., the hand) matched the videos. These findings are signatures of the MNS.

Sensorimotor mechanisms can unify explanations at cognitive, social, and cultural levels. As an example, we review how anticipated motor effort is used by individuals and groups to judge distance: the greater the anticipated effort the greater the perceived distance. Anticipated motor effort can also be used to understand cultural differences. People with interdependent self- construals interact almost exclusively with in-group members, and hence there is little opportunity to tune their sensorimotor systems for interaction with out-group members. The result is that interactions with out-group members are expected to be difficult and out-group members are perceived as literally more distant. In two experiments we show (a) interdependent Americans, compared to independent Americans, see American confederates (in-group) as closer; (b) interdependent Arabs, compared to independent Arabs, perceive Arab confederates (in- group) as closer, whereas interdependent Americans perceive Arab confederates (out-group) as farther. These results demonstrate how the same embodied mechanism can seamlessly contribute to explanations at the cognitive, social, and cultural levels.