Matching Items (10)
Description
This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the agent's action, understood from an internal perspective, along with the agent's motivations, her actual beliefs about the action, and the beliefs she ought to have had about the action. This approach to responsibility has a number of surprising implications. First, blameworthiness can come apart from wrongness, and praiseworthiness from rightness. This is because responsibility is an internal notion and rightness and wrongness are external notions. Furthermore, agents can only be responsible for their QOW. It follows that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences of their actions. I further argue that one's QOW is determined by what one cares about. And the fact that we react to the QOW of others with morally reactive emotions, such as resentment and gratitude, shows that we care about QOW. The reactive attitudes can therefore be understood as ways in which we care about what others care about. Responsibility can be assessed by comparing one's actual QOW to the QOW one ought to have had.
ContributorsKhoury, Andrew (Author) / French, Peter A. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Societies seeking sustainability are transitioning from fossil fuels to clean, renewable energy sources to mitigate dangerous climate change. Energy transitions involve ethically controversial decisions that affect current and future generations’ well-being. As energy systems in the United States transition towards renewable energy, American Indian reservations with abundant energy sources are some of the most significantly impacted communities. Strikingly, energy ethicists have not yet developed a systematic approach for prescribing ethical action within the context of energy decisions. This dissertation reinvents energy ethics as a distinct sub-discipline of applied ethics, integrating virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism with Sioux, Navajo, and Hopi ethical perspectives. On this new account, applied energy ethics is the analysis of questions of right and wrong using a framework for prescribing action and proper policies within private and public energy decisions. To demonstrate the usefulness of applied energy ethics, this dissertation analyzes two case studies situated on American Indian reservations: the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Navajo Generating Station.
ContributorsBethem, Jacob (Author) / DesRoches, Tyler (Thesis advisor) / Pasqualetti, Martin J (Committee member) / Graffy, Elisabeth (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is impermissive or not: For any total evidence E, is there a unique doxastic state that any possible agent with that total evidence E should take (Uniqueness), or not (Permissivism)?
“Conservatism and Uniqueness”: Conservatism is the idea that an agent’s beliefs should be stable as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness is the idea that any given body of total evidence uniquely determines what it is rational to believe. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that you should not give special treatment to your beliefs solely because they are yours. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. Then I show that if Epistemic Impartiality is correct, Conservatism and Uniqueness go together; each implies the other.
“Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality”: In recent epistemology, philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic norms. A family of such accounts is known as Cognitive Decision Theory. According to Cognitive Decision Theory, rational beliefs are those with maximum expected epistemic value. How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over permissive rationality? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess an argument against Cognitive Decision Theory.
“Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality”: Recently, Benjamin Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this chapter, I show that both arguments fail. This result supports the following claim: we should treat steadfast attitudes and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the discussion about several types of Permissivism, because they are compatible with any type of Permissivism.
“Conservatism and Uniqueness”: Conservatism is the idea that an agent’s beliefs should be stable as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness is the idea that any given body of total evidence uniquely determines what it is rational to believe. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that you should not give special treatment to your beliefs solely because they are yours. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. Then I show that if Epistemic Impartiality is correct, Conservatism and Uniqueness go together; each implies the other.
“Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality”: In recent epistemology, philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic norms. A family of such accounts is known as Cognitive Decision Theory. According to Cognitive Decision Theory, rational beliefs are those with maximum expected epistemic value. How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over permissive rationality? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess an argument against Cognitive Decision Theory.
“Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality”: Recently, Benjamin Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this chapter, I show that both arguments fail. This result supports the following claim: we should treat steadfast attitudes and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the discussion about several types of Permissivism, because they are compatible with any type of Permissivism.
ContributorsJung, Jaemin (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Committee member) / Pinillos, Angel (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Tools designed to help match people with behaviors they identify as likely to lead to a successful behavioral outcome remain under-researched. This study assessed the effect of a participant-driven behavior-matching intervention on 1) the adoption of a new behavior related to fruit and vegetable (F&V) consumption, 2) study attrition, and 3) changes in F&V consumption. In this two-arm randomized controlled trial, 64 adults who did not meet standard F&V recommendations were allocated to an intervention (n=33) or control group (n=31). Participants in the intervention group ranked 20 F&V-related behaviors according to their perceived likelihood of engagement in the behavior and their perception of the behavior’s efficacy in increasing F&V consumption. Participants in the intervention group were subsequently shown the list of 20 behaviors in order of their provided rankings, with the highest-ranked behaviors at the top, and were asked to choose a behavior they would like to perform daily for 4 weeks. The control group chose from a random-order list of the same 20 behaviors to adopt daily for 4 weeks. During the study period, text messages were sent to all participants 90 minutes before their reported bedtime to collect Yes/No data reflecting successful behavior engagement each day. The binary repeated-measures data collected from the text messages was analyzed using mixed-effects logistic regression, differences in attrition were assessed using log-rank analysis, and change scores in F&V consumption were compared between the two groups using the Man-Whitney U test. P<0.05 indicated significance. The rate of successful behavior adoption did not differ significantly between the two groups (b=0.09, 95%CI= -0.81, 0.98, p=0.85). The log rank test results indicated that there was no significant difference in attrition between the two groups (χ2=2.68, df=1, p=0.10). F&V consumption increased significantly over the 4 weeks in the total sample (Z=-5.86, p<0.001), but no differences in F&V change scores were identified between the control and intervention groups (Z=-0.21, p=0.84). The behavior-matching tool assessed in this study did not significantly improve behavior adoption, study attrition, or F&V intake over 4 weeks.
ContributorsCosgrove, Kelly Sarah (Author) / Wharton, Christopher (Thesis advisor) / Adams, Marc (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Grebitus, Carola (Committee member) / Johnston, Carol (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
For over a century, it has been commonly observed that the pace-of-life in modern society appears to be significantly faster than in non-modern societies, but exactly what forces drive these differences continue to be both hotly debated and difficult to study. While prior studies on pace-of-life have focused on population-level correlations between these factors and pace-of-life, they provide few details about how changes to pace-of-life associated with modernity actually occur in context. This study addresses the issue from a historical perspective, attempting to identify what factors are relevant to a change of pace-of-life in a non-modern to modern lifestyle transition over a single lifetime. This study performs a historical analysis, examining changes in pace-of-life experienced by students of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, an Indian residential school operating in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as compared to the non-modern lifestyle of the Plains Indian Cultures from the same time period. This study finds that the pace-of-life experienced by students at Carlisle were consistently faster, more intense and more regimented than in non-modern lifestyles. Such changes in pace-of-life were driven in large part by efforts of the school to transform the students behavior into a model the administration considered more suited to life in a modern society, chiefly, time-disciplined, individualistic, future oriented and competitive laborers. This case highlights that the role of individual behavioral manipulation by large-scale institutions is an underappreciated force in changes to pace-of-life in modern society.
ContributorsCoffey, Michael (Author) / Connor, Dylan (Thesis advisor) / Turner, Billie L (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
The paper reviews some of the models of consequentialist justice, the nature of social contracts, and the social coordination of behaviors through social norms.
The challenge with actualizing justice in many contemporary societies is the broad and often conflicting individual beliefs on rights and responsibilities that each member of a society maintains to describe the opportunities and compensations they attribute to themselves and others. This obscurity is compounded through a lack of academic or political alignment on the definition and tenets of justice.
The result of the deficiency of commonality of the definition and tenants of justice often result in myopic decisions by individuals and discontinuity within a society that reduce the available rights, obligations, opportunities, and/or compensations that could be available through alternative modalities.
The paper begins by assessing the challenge of establishing mutual trust in order to achieve cooperation. I then examine utility enhancement strategies available through cooperation. Next, I turn to models that describe natural and artificial sources of social contacts, game theory, and evolutionary fitness to produce beneficial results. I then examine social norms, including the dual inheritance theory, as models which can selectively reinforce certain cooperative behaviors and reduce others. In conclusion, a possible connection among these models to improve the overall fitness of society as defined by the net average increase in available utility, rights, opportunities, and compensations is offered.
Through an examination of concepts that inform individual choice and coordination with others, concepts within social coordination, the nature of social contracts, and consequentialist justice to coordinate behaviors through social norms may illustrate an integrated perspective and, through additional examination, produce a comprehensive model to describe how societies could identify and foster just human coordination.
The challenge with actualizing justice in many contemporary societies is the broad and often conflicting individual beliefs on rights and responsibilities that each member of a society maintains to describe the opportunities and compensations they attribute to themselves and others. This obscurity is compounded through a lack of academic or political alignment on the definition and tenets of justice.
The result of the deficiency of commonality of the definition and tenants of justice often result in myopic decisions by individuals and discontinuity within a society that reduce the available rights, obligations, opportunities, and/or compensations that could be available through alternative modalities.
The paper begins by assessing the challenge of establishing mutual trust in order to achieve cooperation. I then examine utility enhancement strategies available through cooperation. Next, I turn to models that describe natural and artificial sources of social contacts, game theory, and evolutionary fitness to produce beneficial results. I then examine social norms, including the dual inheritance theory, as models which can selectively reinforce certain cooperative behaviors and reduce others. In conclusion, a possible connection among these models to improve the overall fitness of society as defined by the net average increase in available utility, rights, opportunities, and compensations is offered.
Through an examination of concepts that inform individual choice and coordination with others, concepts within social coordination, the nature of social contracts, and consequentialist justice to coordinate behaviors through social norms may illustrate an integrated perspective and, through additional examination, produce a comprehensive model to describe how societies could identify and foster just human coordination.
ContributorsHerro, C. R (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis advisor) / McGregor, Joan (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2019
Description
According to hedonism about happiness, all and only enjoyable experiences are the basic constituents of one’s happiness, and these experiences contribute to one’s happiness just to the extent that they have a greater intensity or duration. After defending this view, I show that it must be amended to count as an equally plausible theory of what constitutes one’s well-being. I then present two such amended versions of hedonism about well-being. The first, which I call objective hedonism, adds the claim that the objective worth of the things one enjoys also makes a difference to the extent to which an enjoyable experience contributes to one’s well-being. The second, which I call reliabilist hedonism, adds the claim that one’s evaluative intuitions about which things are good for one track which things have proven themselves to one to reliably lead to enjoyable experience. I conclude that reliabilist hedonism constitutes a revival of hedonism about well-being.
ContributorsFanciullo, James (Author) / Portmore, Douglas W. (Thesis advisor) / Calhoun, Cheshire (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
Studies suggest that graduate students experience higher rates of anxiety and depression than their peers outside of academia. Studies also show exercise is correlated with lower levels of anxiety and depression among graduate students. However, despite this evidence, nearly half of graduate students do not exercise regularly. Accordingly, I suggest universities consider adding an exercise requirement to promote graduate student well-being. One potential objection to this recommendation is that an exercise requirement is objectionably paternalistic. I answer this objection with two possible replies. First, there are reasons why the exercise requirement might not be paternalistic, and there may be sufficient non-paternalistic reasons to justify the policy. Second, there are reasons why even if the policy is paternalistic, it is not objectionably paternalistic, and may still be justified. I will offer reasons to consider paternalism in a positive light and why the exercise requirement may be an example of a good paternalistic policy. Because the exercise requirement might be justified on paternalistic grounds, there are reasons to consider other paternalistic policies to promote graduate student well-being.
ContributorsArthur, Philip (Author) / de Marneffe, Peter (Thesis advisor) / Portmore, Doug (Committee member) / DesRoches, Tyler (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
Eating meat leads to several environmental threats, hence reducing one’s consumption can be a direct way to avoid environmental degradation. While sustainability scientists know about the environmental degradation due to meat consumption, many of them still choose to eat meat. It is questionable whether a broader societal transformation towards sustainable consumption is likely if people with the necessary knowledge and values already struggle and fail to implement a sustainable behavior. How can they expect others to change if they do not change themselves? This paper addresses the knowledge-action gap that is prevalent among sustainability scientists regarding their meat consumption and how they deal with it. Qualitative semi-structured interviews and thematic content analysis are applied to analyze the main internal barriers to pro environmental behavior sustainability scientists face as well as what narratives and rationalizations they use to overcome the dissonance between their knowledge and actions. The internal barriers they demonstrated were emotional non-involvement and a perceived lack of power of the individual. The strategies used to overcome the dissonance were conscious consumption narratives and rationalizing the value of meat consumption, specifically its perceived sustainable dimensions. This paper also highlights that sustainability scientists do feel responsible to lead by example in the context of societal transformation, but do not always follow through with behavior change. This study concludes it is necessary that sustainability scientists do so more consequently to embrace their role as trendsetters and change agents for a sustainable transformation.
ContributorsFalkenstein, Anna (Author) / Upham, Paul (Contributor) / DesRoches, Tyler (Contributor) / von Wehrden, Henrik (Contributor)
Created2018-07-02
Description
Globally we are struggling to match the need for development with the available resources. Kate Raworth’s (2012) developed the idea of a “safe and just space” as a balance between the planetary boundary approach and ensuring a level of basic needs satisfaction for everyone. O’Neill et al. (2018) argue that countries are currently not able to provide their populations with basic needs without concurrently exceeding planetary boundary measures. While attempts have been made to get people to change their habits through moral self-sacrifice, this has not been successful. Kate Soper (2008) argues that a change towards sustainability will only be possible if an alternative to high consumption is offered, without trade-offs in well-being. Technological improvements are often thought to end up providing solutions to the problem of overconsumption, but as Jackson (2005) shows convincingly, this is highly unlikely due to the overwhelming scale of changes required.
‘Alternative hedonism’ (Soper 2008) is a philosophical approach that has been proposed to solve this dilemma. By changing what humanity pursues to be less focused on consumption and more linked to community interaction and living healthy, fulfilling lives, we would simultaneously reduce stress on the globally limited resources and sinks. By developing and understanding satiation points – the point beyond which well-being no longer increases because of increased consumption - affluence that wastes resources without improving well-being could be reduced. This paper explores how ‘alternative hedonism’ and the development of ‘satiation points’ could be helpful in getting humanity closer to the ‘safe and just space’. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the challenges that taking up of ‘alternative hedonism’ would entail.
ContributorsLilje, Markus (Author) / Abson, David (Contributor) / DesRoches, Tyler (Contributor) / Aggarwal, Rimjhim (Contributor)
Created2018-07-04