Chromatin proteins have expanded the mammalian synthetic biology toolbox by enabling control of active and silenced states at endogenous genes. Others have reported synthetic proteins that bind DNA and regulate genes by altering chromatin marks, such as histone modifications. Previously, we reported the first synthetic transcriptional activator, the “Polycomb-based transcription factor” (PcTF) that reads histone modifications through a protein–protein interaction between the polycomb chromodomain motif and trimethylated lysine 27 of histone H3 (H3K27me3). Here, we describe the genome-wide behavior of the polycomb-based transcription factor fusion protein. Transcriptome and chromatin profiling revealed several polycomb-based transcription factor-sensitive promoter regions marked by distal H3K27me3 and proximal fusion protein binding. These results illuminate a mechanism in which polycomb-based transcription factor interactions bridge epigenomic marks with the transcription initiation complex at target genes. In three cancer-derived human cell lines tested here, some target genes encode developmental regulators and tumor suppressors. Thus, the polycomb-based transcription factor represents a powerful new fusion protein-based method for cancer research and treatment where silencing marks are translated into direct gene activation.

Synthetic Biology promises low-cost, exponentially scalable products and global health solutions in the form of self-replicating organisms, or “living devices.” As these promises are realized, proof-of-concept systems will gradually migrate from tightly regulated laboratory or industrial environments into private spaces as, for instance, probiotic health products, food, and even do-it-yourself bioengineered systems. What additional steps, if any, should be taken before releasing engineered self-replicating organisms into a broader user space? In this review, we explain how studies of genetically modified organisms lay groundwork for the future landscape of biosafety. Early in the design process, biological engineers are anticipating potential hazards and developing innovative tools to mitigate risk. Here, we survey lessons learned, ongoing efforts to engineer intrinsic biocontainment, and how different stakeholders in synthetic biology can act to accomplish best practices for biosafety.