Matching Items (983)
Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
With the new independence of adulthood, college students are a group susceptible to adopting unsupported, if not harmful, health practices. A survey of Arizona State University undergraduate students (N=200) was conducted to evaluate supplement use, trust in information sources, and beliefs about supplement regulation. Of those who reported using supplements, college students most frequently received information from friends and family. STEM majors in fields unrelated to health who were taking a supplement were found to be less likely to receive information about the supplement from a medical practitioner than those in health fields or those in non-STEM majors (-26.9%, p=0.018). STEM majors in health-related fields were 15.0% more likely to treat colds and/or cold symptoms with research-supported methods identified from reliable sources, while non-health STEM and non-STEM majors were more likely to take unsupported cold treatments (p=0.010). Surveyed students, regardless of major, also stated they would trust a medical practitioner for supplement advice above other sources (88.0%), and the majority expressed a belief that dietary supplements are approved/regulated by the government (59.8%).
ContributorsPerez, Jacob Tanner (Author) / Hendrickson, Kirstin (Thesis director) / Lefler, Scott (Committee member) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor) / School of Molecular Sciences (Contributor) / Department of Physics (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
ContributorsChandler, N. Kayla (Author) / Neisewander, Janet (Thesis director) / Sanabria, Federico (Committee member) / Olive, M. Foster (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
I propose that norms regulate behaviors that negatively impact an individual's survival and reproduction. But because monitoring and enforcing of norms can be costly, individuals should be selective about which norms they police and under what circumstances they should do so. Two studies tested this idea by experimentally activating fitness-relevant motives and having participants answer questions about the policing of norms. The first study examined a norm prescribing respect for status and another proscribing sexual coercion. Results from Study 1 failed to support the hypotheses; activating a status-seeking motive did not have the predicted effects on policing of the respect-status norm nor did activating a mating motive have the predicted effects on policing of the respect-status norm or anti-coercion norm. Study 2 examined two new norms, one prescribing that people stay home when sick and the other proscribing people from having sex with another person's partners. Study 2 also manipulated whether self or others were the target of the policing. Study 2 failed to provide support; a disease avoidance motive failed to have effects on policing of the stay home when sick norm. Individuals in a relationship under a mating motive wanted less policing of others for violation of the mate poaching norm than those in a baseline condition, opposite of the predicted effects.
ContributorsSmith, M. Kristopher (Author) / Neuberg, L. Steven (Thesis director) / Presson, Clark (Committee member) / Hruschka, J. Daniel (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
Literature in public administration emphasizes a growing dissatisfaction with government on the part of residents. Where there tends to be a lack in the literature is in terms of solutions to this problem. We would like to argue that the engagement process itself has the power to foster a profound attitudinal shift on the part of both residents and government. This paper explores the structural and cultural barriers to satisfactory public engagement both from literature and a combination of policy analysis, semi-structured interviews and participatory observation within the City of Tempe. We then provide recommendations to the City of Tempe on how to overcome these barriers and effect authentic public engagement practices. With these new suggested practices and mindsets, we provide a way that people can have the power to create their own community.
ContributorsRiffle, Morgan (Co-author) / Tchida, Celina (Co-author) / Ingram-Waters, Mary (Thesis director) / Grzanka, Patrick (Committee member) / King, Cheryl (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
This thesis examines the relationship between unofficial, official, and parallel Islam in Uzbekistan following the end of the Soviet Union. Key touchstone moments in Uzbekistan during the twentieth-century show the history between unofficial and official Islam and the resulting precedents set for Muslims gathering against the government. This historical analysis shows how President Karimov and the Uzbek government view and approach Islam in the country following independence.
ContributorsTieslink, Evan (Author) / Batalden, Stephen (Thesis director) / Kefeli, Agnes (Committee member) / Saikia, Yasmin (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2013-05
Description
Economists, political philosophers, and others have often characterized social preferences regarding inequality by imagining a hypothetical choice of distributions behind "a veil of ignorance". Recent behavioral economics work has shown that subjects care about equality of outcomes, and are willing to sacrifice, in experimental contexts, some amount of personal gain in order to achieve greater equality. We review some of this literature and then conduct an experiment of our own, comparing subjects' choices in two risky situations, one being a choice for a purely individualized lottery for themselves, and the other a choice among possible distributions to members of a randomly selected group. We find that choosing in the group situation makes subjects significantly more risk averse than when choosing an individual lottery. This supports the hypothesis that an additional preference for equality exists alongside ordinary risk aversion, and that in a hypothetical "veil of ignorance" scenario, such preferences may make subjects significantly more averse to unequal distributions of rewards than can be explained by risk aversion alone.
ContributorsTheisen, Alexander Scott (Co-author) / McMullin, Caitlin (Co-author) / Li, Marilyn (Co-author) / DeSerpa, Allan (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Baldwin, Marjorie (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Economics (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
One decision procedure dominates a given one if it performs well on the entire class of problems the given decision procedure performs well on, and then goes on to perform well on other problems that the given decision procedure does badly on. Performing well will be defined as generating higher expected utility before entering a problem. In this paper it will be argued that the timeless decision procedure dominates the causal
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
and evidential decision procedures. It will also be argued in turn that the updateless decision procedure dominates the timeless decision procedure. The difficulties of formalizing a modern variant of the ”smoking gene” problem will then be briefly examined.
ContributorsHintze, Daniel Edward (Author) / Armendt, Brad (Thesis director) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / DeSerpa, Allan (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
Through this creative project, I executed a Distracted Driving Awareness Campaign at Arizona State University to raise awareness about the dangers of distracted driving, specifically texting while driving. As an Undergraduate Student Government Senator, my priority is the safety and success of students, both in and out of the classroom. By partnering with State Farm and AT&T, we were able to raise awareness about the dangers of distracted driving and collected over 200 pledges from students to never text and drive.
ContributorsHibbs, Jordan Ashley (Author) / Miller, Clark (Thesis director) / Parmentier, Mary Jane (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor) / Department of Psychology (Contributor) / Graduate College (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
I conduct a two-fold study on the relationship between adverse selection and nonlinear pricing in competitive insurance markets. First, I reassess empirical evidence of adverse selection in life insurance with the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data used by Cawley and Philipson (1999). Specifically, I evaluate the shape of the premium schedule and present indications of quantity premia beyond a certain coverage level. The observed pricing schedule appears like the "backward-S-shaped" curve described by Chade and Schlee (2012); I discuss why this result cannot be entirely explained by fixed costs of underwriting. Second, I critique the arguments against adverse selection in existing literature by modifying the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model of competitive insurance markets. I present several existing models and a new framework to explain how adverse selection and quantity discounts can coexist in equilibrium. These modifications deviate from the standard models of competitive insurance, but produce plausible hypotheses with conclusions contrary to conventional theoretical results.
ContributorsMahan, Scott Alexander (Author) / Schlee, Edward (Thesis director) / Silverman, Daniel (Committee member) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2017-05