Matching Items (52)
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I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large,

I show that firms' ability to adjust variable capital in response to productivity shocks has important implications for the interpretation of the widely documented investment-cash flow sensitivities. The variable capital adjustment is sufficient for firms to capture small variations in profitability, but when the revision in profitability is relatively large, limited substitutability between the factors of production may call for fixed capital investment. Hence, firms with lower substitutability are more likely to invest in both factors together and have larger sensitivities of fixed capital investment to cash flow. By building a frictionless capital markets model that allows firms to optimize over fixed capital and inventories as substitutable factors, I establish the significance of the substitutability channel in explaining cross-sectional differences in cash flow sensitivities. Moreover, incorporating variable capital into firms' investment decisions helps explain the sharp decrease in cash flow sensitivities over the past decades. Empirical evidence confirms the model's predictions.
ContributorsKim, Kirak (Author) / Bates, Thomas (Thesis advisor) / Babenko, Ilona (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2013
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I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the

I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D; spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents.
ContributorsBennett, Benjamin (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenka, Ilona (Committee member) / Custodio, Claudia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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This study investigates the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, I investigate the effect of the disclosure requirements that take effect when an investment company's assets exceed $100 million; when that occurs, a fund is required by the SEC to submit form 13F

This study investigates the impact of portfolio disclosure on hedge fund performance. Using a regression discontinuity design, I investigate the effect of the disclosure requirements that take effect when an investment company's assets exceed $100 million; when that occurs, a fund is required by the SEC to submit form 13F disclosing its portfolio holdings. Consistent with the argument that portfolio disclosure reveals "trade secrets" and also raises front running costs thus harms the funds that disclose, I find that there is a drop in fund performance (about 4% annually) after a fund begins filing form 13F, as well as an increase in return correlations with other hedge funds in the same investment style. The drop in performance cannot be explained by a change in the assets under management or a mean reversion in returns. Consistent with the idea that funds with illiquid holdings tend to employ sequential trading strategies, which increase the likelihood of being taken advantage of by free riders and front runners, the drop in performance is more dramatic for funds that have more illiquid holdings. In addition, I find that the incentive fees paid to fund managers are 1% higher when portfolio disclosure is required, which supports the hypothesis that investors' monitoring of portfolio holdings disciplines adverse risk-taking by fund managers and allows for higher convexity in the optimal compensation structure. Finally, there is a drop in flows into funds that file 13F, which suggests that hedge fund investors negatively value 13F disclosure. Overall, this study suggests that the cost of portfolio disclosure is economically large. It contributes to the policy debate over what constitutes optimal disclosure.
ContributorsShi, Zhen (Author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis advisor) / Aragon, Georges (Thesis advisor) / Coles, Jeffrey (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
This dissertation analyzes the reliability of reported employee stock option (ESO) expense, the determination of expected life of ESOs, motivations to manipulate ESO expense, and the impact of noise in ESO expense on subsequent stock price returns. Based on unique data, this is the first paper to measure average historical

This dissertation analyzes the reliability of reported employee stock option (ESO) expense, the determination of expected life of ESOs, motivations to manipulate ESO expense, and the impact of noise in ESO expense on subsequent stock price returns. Based on unique data, this is the first paper to measure average historical ESO life for all employees of a broad set of firms. I find average life has a mean of 4.12 years. Average life is reduced by 0.38 years per 10 percentage point increase in volatility, and industry effects explain an additional 7% of the variation. Reported expected life increases 0.37 years per year of historical life and an additional 0.16 years per year of age of the outstanding options. Deviations of reported volatility and life from benchmarks have positive correlations with deviations from own reporting history. Using stated assumptions rather than benchmark assumptions drops (increases) ESO expense by 8.3% (17.6%) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. The change in earnings per share decreases (increases) by $0.019 ($0.007) for the 25th (75th) percentile firm. Tests for motivations to manipulate stock option expense downward have mixed results. Absolute values of deviations from benchmarks have a positive relationship with subsequent stock price volatility suggesting noise in reported stock option expense results in stock price noise. Deviations from benchmarks and subsequent cumulative abnormal returns have statistically significant results but are difficult to interpret.
ContributorsYoung, Brian (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate

In this dissertation, I examine the source of some of the anomalous capital market outcomes that have been documented for firms with high accruals. Chapter 2 develops and implements a methodology that decomposes a firm's discretionary accruals into a firm-specific and an industry-specific component. I use this decomposition to investigate which component drives the subsequent negative returns associated with firms with high discretionary accruals. My results suggest that these abnormal returns are driven by the firm-specific component of discretionary accruals. Moreover, although industry-specific discretionary accruals do not directly contribute towards this anomaly, I find that it is precisely when industry-specific discretionary accruals are high that firms with high firm-specific discretionary accruals subsequently earn these negative returns. While consistent with irrational mispricing or a rational risk premium associated with high discretionary accruals, these findings also support a transactions-cost based explanation for the accruals anomaly whereby search costs associated with distinguishing between value-relevant and manipulative discretionary accruals can induce investors to overlook potential earnings manipulation. Chapter 3 extends the decomposition to examine the role of firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining the subsequent market underperformance and negative analysts' forecast errors documented for firms issuing equity. I examine the post-issue market returns and analysts' forecast errors for a sample of seasoned equity issues between 1975 and 2004 and find that offering-year firm-specific discretionary accruals can partially explain these anomalous capital market outcomes. Nonetheless, I find this predictive power of firm-specific accruals to be more pronounced for issues that occur during 1975 - 1989 compared to issues taking place between 1990 and 2004. Additionally, I find no evidence that investors and analysts are more overoptimistic about the prospects of issuers that have both high firm-specific and industry-specific discretionary accruals (compared to firms with high discretionary accruals in general). The results indicate no role for industry-specific discretionary accruals in explaining overoptimistic expectations from seasoned equity issues and suggest the importance of firm-specific factors in inducing earnings manipulation surrounding equity issues.
ContributorsIkram, Atif (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number 2 executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin's Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance or CEO incentive alignment, with stronger incentives for the No. 2 executives to monitor, and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; (3) such mutual monitoring reduces the CEO's ability to pursue the "quiet life" but has no effect on "empire building;" and (4) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring by a No. 2 executive provides checks and balances on CEO power.
ContributorsLi, Zhichuan (Author) / Coles, Jeffrey (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Bharath, Sreedhar (Committee member) / Babenko, Ilona (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost

This paper investigates the role of top management and board interlocks between acquirers and targets. I hypothesize that an interlock may exacerbate agency problems due to conflicting interests and lead to value-decreasing acquisition. An interlock may also serve as a conduit of information and personal experience, and reduce the cost of information gathering for both firms. I find supporting evidence for these two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. Consistent with the agency hypothesis, interlocked acquirers underperform non-interlocked acquirers by 2% during the announcement period. However, well-governed acquirers receive higher announcement returns and have better post-acquisition performance in interlocked deals. The proportional surplus accrued to an acquirer is positively correlated with the interlocking agent's ownership in the acquirer relative to her ownership in the target. Consistent with the information hypothesis, when the target's firm value is opaque, interlocks improve acquirer announcement returns and long-term performance. Interlocked acquirers are also more likely to use equity as payment, especially when the acquirer's stock value is opaque. Target announcement returns are not influenced by the existence of interlock. Finally, I find acquisitions are more likely to occur between two interlocked firms and such deals have a higher completion rate.
ContributorsWu, Qingqing (Author) / Bates, Thomas W. (Thesis advisor) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Lindsey, Laura (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2012
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The purpose of our research was to develop recommendations and/or strategies for Company A's data center group in the context of the server CPU chip industry. We used data collected from the International Data Corporation (IDC) that was provided by our team coaches, and data that is accessible on the

The purpose of our research was to develop recommendations and/or strategies for Company A's data center group in the context of the server CPU chip industry. We used data collected from the International Data Corporation (IDC) that was provided by our team coaches, and data that is accessible on the internet. As the server CPU industry expands and transitions to cloud computing, Company A's Data Center Group will need to expand their server CPU chip product mix to meet new demands of the cloud industry and to maintain high market share. Company A boasts leading performance with their x86 server chips and 95% market segment share. The cloud industry is dominated by seven companies Company A calls "The Super 7." These seven companies include: Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. In the long run, the growing market share of the Super 7 could give them substantial buying power over Company A, which could lead to discounts and margin compression for Company A's main growth engine. Additionally, in the long-run, the substantial growth of the Super 7 could fuel the development of their own design teams and work towards making their own server chips internally, which would be detrimental to Company A's data center revenue. We first researched the server industry and key terminology relevant to our project. We narrowed our scope by focusing most on the cloud computing aspect of the server industry. We then researched what Company A has already been doing in the context of cloud computing and what they are currently doing to address the problem. Next, using our market analysis, we identified key areas we think Company A's data center group should focus on. Using the information available to us, we developed our strategies and recommendations that we think will help Company A's Data Center Group position themselves well in an extremely fast growing cloud computing industry.
ContributorsJurgenson, Alex (Co-author) / Nguyen, Duy (Co-author) / Kolder, Sean (Co-author) / Wang, Chenxi (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Management (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05
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This thesis looks into the current method a particular company uses to value its inventory carrying costs (ICC). By identifying costs incurred during all stages of production, along with incorporating industry standards and academic research while avoiding the shortcomings of the company's current method, this thesis was able to derive

This thesis looks into the current method a particular company uses to value its inventory carrying costs (ICC). By identifying costs incurred during all stages of production, along with incorporating industry standards and academic research while avoiding the shortcomings of the company's current method, this thesis was able to derive a more comprehensive and manageable tool for measuring ICC. Our findings led to concrete recommendations, which will provide real value to company managers by improving the accuracy of project finance calculations, supply chain optimization modeling, and numerous other decisions relying on accurate inventory data inputs.
ContributorsDougherty, Mitch (Co-author) / Marshall, Jeffrey (Co-author) / Zieler, Jason (Co-author) / Gilmore, Eric (Co-author) / Hertzel, Michael (Thesis director) / Simonson, Mark (Committee member) / Yarn, James (Committee member) / Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2014-05
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Description
As the IoT (Internet of Things) market continues to grow, Company X needs to find a way to penetrate the market and establish larger market share. The problem with Company X's current strategy and cost structure lies in the fact that the fastest growing portion of the IoT market is

As the IoT (Internet of Things) market continues to grow, Company X needs to find a way to penetrate the market and establish larger market share. The problem with Company X's current strategy and cost structure lies in the fact that the fastest growing portion of the IoT market is microcontrollers (MCUs). As Company X currently holds its focus in manufacturing microprocessors (MPUs), the current manufacturing strategy is not optimal for entering competitively into the MCU space. Within the MCU space, the companies that are competing the best do not utilize such high level manufacturing processes because these low cost products do not demand them. Given that the MCU market is largely untested by Company X and its products would need to be manufactured at increasingly lower costs, it runs the risk of over producing and holding obsolete inventory that is either scrapped or sold at or below cost. In order to eliminate that risk, we will explore alternative manufacturing strategies for Company X's MCU products specifically, which will allow for a more optimal cost structure and ultimately a more profitable Internet of Things Group (IoTG). The IoT MCU ecosystem does not require the high powered technology Company X is currently manufacturing and therefore, Company X loses large margins due to its unnecessary leading technology. Since cash is king, pursuing a fully external model for MCU design and manufacturing processes will generate the highest NPV for Company X. It also will increase Company X's market share, which is extremely important given that every tech company in the world is trying to get its hands into the IoT market. It is possible that in ten to thirty years down the road, Company X can manufacture enough units to keep its products in-house, but this is not feasible in the foreseeable future. For now, Company X should focus on the cost market of MCUs by driving its prices down while maintaining low costs due to the variables of COGS and R&D given in our fully external strategy.
ContributorsKadi, Bengimen (Co-author) / Peterson, Tyler (Co-author) / Langmack, Haley (Co-author) / Quintana, Vince (Co-author) / Simonson, Mark (Thesis director) / Hertzel, Michael (Committee member) / Department of Supply Chain Management (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor) / Department of Marketing (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2016-05