This brief article, written for a symposium on "Collaboration and the Colorado River," evaluates the U.S. Department of the Interior's Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program ("AMP"). The AMP has been advanced as a pioneering collaborative and adaptive approach for both decreasing scientific uncertainty in support of regulatory decision-making and helping manage contentious resource disputes -- in this case, the increasingly thorny conflict over the Colorado River's finite natural resources. Though encouraging in some respects, the AMP serves as a valuable illustration of the flaws of existing regulatory processes purporting to incorporate collaboration and regulatory adaptation into the decision-making process. Born in the shadow of the law and improvised with too little thought as to its structure, the AMP demonstrates the need to attend to the design of the regulatory process and integrate mechanisms that compel systematic program evaluation and adaptation. As such, the AMP provides vital information on how future collaborative experiments might be modified to enhance their prospects of success.

With a focus on resources of the Colorado River ecosystem below Glen Canyon Dam, the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program has included a variety of experimental policy tests, ranging from manipulation of water releases from the dam to removal of non-native fish within Grand Canyon National Park. None of these field-scale experiments has yet produced unambiguous results in terms of management prescriptions. But there has been adaptive learning, mostly from unanticipated or surprising resource responses relative to predictions from ecosystem modeling. Surprise learning opportunities may often be viewed with dismay by some stakeholders who might not be clear about the purpose of science and modeling in adaptive management. However, the experimental results from the Glen Canyon Dam program actually represent scientific successes in terms of revealing new opportunities for developing better river management policies. A new long-term experimental management planning process for Glen Canyon Dam operations, started in 2011 by the U.S. Department of the Interior, provides an opportunity to refocus management objectives, identify and evaluate key uncertainties about the influence of dam releases, and refine monitoring for learning over the next several decades. Adaptive learning since 1995 is critical input to this long-term planning effort. Embracing uncertainty and surprise outcomes revealed by monitoring and ecosystem modeling will likely continue the advancement of resource objectives below the dam, and may also promote efficient learning in other complex programs.

The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (AMP) has been identified as a model for natural resource management. We challenge that assertion, citing the lack of progress toward a long-term management plan for the dam, sustained extra-programmatic conflict, and a downriver ecology that is still in jeopardy, despite over ten years of meetings and an expensive research program. We have examined the primary and secondary sources available on the AMP’s design and operation in light of best practices identified in the literature on adaptive management and collaborative decision-making. We have identified six shortcomings: (1) an inadequate approach to identifying stakeholders; (2) a failure to provide clear goals and involve stakeholders in establishing the operating procedures that guide the collaborative process; (3) inappropriate use of professional neutrals and a failure to cultivate consensus; (4) a failure to establish and follow clear joint fact-finding procedures; (5) a failure to produce functional written agreements; and (6) a failure to manage the AMP adaptively and cultivate long-term problem-solving capacity.

Adaptive management can be an effective approach for addressing complex ecosystem-related processes like the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam, particularly in the face of substantial complexity, uncertainty, and political contentiousness. However, the Glen Canyon Dam AMP shows that a stated commitment to collaboration and adaptive management is insufficient. Effective management of natural resources can only be realized through careful attention to the collaborative design and implementation of appropriate problem-solving and adaptive-management procedures. It also requires the development of an appropriate organizational infrastructure that promotes stakeholder dialogue and agency learning. Though the experimental Glen Canyon Dam AMP is far from a success of collaborative adaptive management, the lessons from its shortcomings can foster more effective collaborative adaptive management in the future by Congress, federal agencies, and local and state authorities.

This report is an important milestone in the effort by the Secretary of the Interior to implement the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (GCPA; title XVIII, secs. 1801-1809, of Public Law 102-575), the most recent authorizing legislation for Federal efforts to protect resources downstream from Glen Canyon Dam. The chapters that follow are intended to provide decision makers and the American public with relevant scientific information about the status and recent trends of the natural, cultural, and recreational resources of those portions of Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area affected by Glen Canyon Dam operations. Glen Canyon Dam is one of the last major dams that was built on the Colorado River and is located just south of the Arizona-Utah border in the lower reaches of Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, approximately 15 mi (24 km) upriver from Grand Canyon National Park (fig. 1). The information presented here is a product of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (GCDAMP), a federally authorized initiative to ensure that the primary mandate of the GCPA is met through advances in information and resource management. The U.S. Geological Survey`s (USGS) Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center (GCMRC) has responsibility for the scientific monitoring and research efforts for the program, including the preparation of reports such as this one.

The year 2005 marked the 10th anniversary of the completion of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the Operation of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, USA. A decade of research and monitoring provides an important milestone to evaluate the effects of dam operations on resources of concern and determine whether or not the desired outcomes are being achieved, or if they are even compatible with one another or not. A comprehensive effort was undertaken to assess the scientific state of knowledge of resources of concern, as identified in the EIS. The result was the first systematic attempt by scientists to conduct an assessment of the changing state of Colorado River ecosystem resources in Grand Canyon over a decadal timeframe. In the EIS, 30 resource attributes are listed along with predictions for how those resources would respond under the Secretary of the Interior’s 1996 Record of Decision, an operating prescription based on the preferred alternative of Modified Low-Fluctuating Flows (MLFF).

Because of a lack of data or subsequent analyses to confirm whether some predictions stated in the EIS were correct, or not, 14 or 47 percent of the outcomes, are essentially unknown. Excluding outcomes that are unclear, then the remaining predictions in the EIS were correct in 7 out of 16 outcomes, or 44 percent of the categories listed. Mixed outcomes occur in 4 out of 16, or 25 percent of the categories, and failed predictions, occur in 5 out of 16, or 31 percent of the categories. As such, less than 50 percent of the outcomes were predicted correctly, underscoring the uncertainties associated with working in a large complex system with few to no long-term data sets. Similar uncertainties are faced by all resource managers charged with ecosystem restoration globally. The acceptability of this kind of uncertainty is influenced by interpretation, societal values, agency missions and mandates, and other factors. However, failure to correctly predict the future, in and of itself, is not deleterious under the paradigm of adaptive management where large uncertainties provide opportunities for learning and adjustment through an iterative process of “learning-by- doing” (Walters and Holling, 1990). Although recent science has documented a continued decline of environmental resources of the Colorado River below Glen Canyon Dam, it has also identified options that might still be implemented by managers to achieved desired future conditions in Grand Canyon.