Matching Items (20)
Description
In a world in which technologies proliferate at a rapid rate, it is no surprise that the medical device industry has grown in leaps and bounds. This surge in medical technology, especially implantable medical technology, has altered the modern operating room, transforming surgery from a technique-driven activity into a technology-driven profession. This reliance upon technologies has fostered close ties between physicians and the medical device industry and within this relationship, medical device representatives play an integral role. This paper will investigate the relationship that exists between physicians and the medical device industry along with the potential conflicts of interest that may result due to this relationship. I will focus in particular on orthopedic medical devices due to media attention as a result of a 2007 Department of Justice settlement involving the leading orthopedic companies. This case proved instrumental in highlighting previously unknown instances in which conflicts of interest were occurring in the medical device industry.
ContributorsLove, Kailey (Author) / Robert, Jason (Thesis director) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Buchholtz, Stephanie (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor) / School for the Science of Health Care Delivery (Contributor)
Created2014-05
Description
In 2004, the South Korean geneticist Woo-Suk Hwang published what was widely regarded as the most important research result in biotechnology of the year. In the prestigious American journal Science, he claimed that he had succeeded in cloning a human blastocyst, an embryo in its early stages (Hwang et al. 2004). A year later, in a second Science article, he made the earth-shattering announcement that he had derived eleven embryonic stem cell lines using his cloning technique (Hwang et al. 2005). The international scientific community was stunned. American scientists publicly fretted that President George W. Bush‘s 2001 executive order limiting federal funding for stem-cell research in the United States had put American bioscience behind the Koreans‘ (Paarlberg 2005). These breakthroughs offered potential solutions to immune system rejection of transplanted organs and possible cures for diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis, Parkinson‘s, Down‘s syndrome, and paralysis (Svenaeus 2007). However, within a year, Hwang was exposed as a fraud who had faked his results and pressured his female colleagues to donate eggs without informed consent. Despite protests against his methods from Korean religious and nongovernmental organizations, Hwang had used his prestige to ignore his ethical obligations. The Korean government, too, was slow to investigate Hwang and to subject his work to appropriate regulation.
ContributorsClay, Anne (Author) / Hurlbut, James (Thesis director) / Maienschein, Jane (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / School of Life Sciences (Contributor)
Created2012-12
Description
This study analyzed currently existing statute at the state, federal, and international level to ultimately build a criteria of recommendations for policymakers to consider when building regulations for facial recognition technology usage by law enforcement agencies within the United States.
ContributorsHong, Susan Suggi (Author) / Royal, K (Thesis director) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies (Contributor) / School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor, Contributor) / Historical, Philosophical & Religious Studies, Sch (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
To mitigate climate change, carbon needs to be removed from the atmosphere and stored for thousands of years. Currently, carbon removal and storage are voluntarily procured, and longevity of storage is inconsistently defined and regulated. Clauses can be added to procurement contracts to require long-term management and increase the durability of storage. Well-designed and properly enforced contracts can pave the way to future regulation for long-term carbon management.
ContributorsHagood, Emily (Author) / Lackner, Klaus (Thesis director) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Materials Science and Engineering Program (Contributor) / School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor) / School of Sustainability (Contributor)
Created2023-05
Description
The 1973 Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade was a significant event in the story of fetal personhood—the story of whether embryos and fetuses are legal persons. Roe legalized abortion care in the United States (US). However, the story of fetal personhood began long before the 1970s. People have been talking about embryos, fetuses, and their status in science, the law, and society for centuries. I studied the history of fetal personhood in the United States, tracing its origins from Ancient Rome and Medieval England to its first appearance in a US courtroom in 1884 and then to the Supreme Court’s decision in 1973.
But this isn’t a history of events—of names and dates and typical details. This is a history of words. In the twenty-first century, words used to discuss embryos and fetuses are split. Some people use humanizing language like “unborn children” and “human life.” Others use technical words like “embryos” and “fetuses.” I studied what words people used historically. I charted how words moved from science to the public to the law, and how they impacted court rulings on fetal personhood.
The use of certain words nudged courts to grant additional rights to embryos and fetuses. In the 1960s, writers began describing the science of development, using words like “unborn child” and humanizing descriptions to make embryos and fetuses seem like people already born. That helped build an idea of embryos and fetuses as having “life” before birth. When people began asking courts to legalize abortion care in the 1970s, attorneys on the opposite side argued that embryos and fetuses were “human life,” and that that “life” began at conception.
In those cases, “life” was biologically defined as when sperm fertilized egg, but it was on that biological definition “life” that judges improperly rested their legal rulings that embryos and fetuses were “potential human life” states had a duty to protect. It wasn’t legal personhood, but it was a legal status that let states pass laws restricting abortion care and punishing pregnant people for their behavior, trends that threaten people’s lives and autonomy in the twenty-first century.
But this isn’t a history of events—of names and dates and typical details. This is a history of words. In the twenty-first century, words used to discuss embryos and fetuses are split. Some people use humanizing language like “unborn children” and “human life.” Others use technical words like “embryos” and “fetuses.” I studied what words people used historically. I charted how words moved from science to the public to the law, and how they impacted court rulings on fetal personhood.
The use of certain words nudged courts to grant additional rights to embryos and fetuses. In the 1960s, writers began describing the science of development, using words like “unborn child” and humanizing descriptions to make embryos and fetuses seem like people already born. That helped build an idea of embryos and fetuses as having “life” before birth. When people began asking courts to legalize abortion care in the 1970s, attorneys on the opposite side argued that embryos and fetuses were “human life,” and that that “life” began at conception.
In those cases, “life” was biologically defined as when sperm fertilized egg, but it was on that biological definition “life” that judges improperly rested their legal rulings that embryos and fetuses were “potential human life” states had a duty to protect. It wasn’t legal personhood, but it was a legal status that let states pass laws restricting abortion care and punishing pregnant people for their behavior, trends that threaten people’s lives and autonomy in the twenty-first century.
ContributorsAbboud, Carolina (Author) / Maienschein, Jane (Thesis advisor) / Justice, George (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Pyne, Stephen (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
This thesis seeks to investigate the use of Artificial Intelligence when reviewing STEM job applications and the human biases that are present in AI system training datasets. Further, it proposes to gender neutralize training dataset terms to evaluate job applications based on merit and qualifications, promoting the inclusivity of women in STEM jobs and seeking to eliminate job application system bias from a Utilitarian perspective.
ContributorsMannenbach, Kelly (Author) / Sopha, Matthew (Thesis director) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Department of Information Systems (Contributor)
Created2023-05
Description
This dissertation engages with the philosophical, psychological, and scientific literature on two important topics: empathy and human enhancement. My two broad goals are to clarify the role of empathy in ascriptions of responsibility and to consider how enhanced empathy might alter those ascriptions.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
First, I argue that empathy is best thought of as a two-component process. The first component is what I call the rational component of empathy (RCE). RCE is necessary for moral responsibility as it allows us to put ourselves in another's shoes and to realize that we would want help (or not to be harmed) if we were in the other's place. The second component is what I call the emotive component of empathy (ECE). ECE is usually an automatic response to witnessing others in distress. Expanding on Michael Slote's view that moral distinctions track degrees of empathy, I argue that it is ECE that varies in strength depending on our relationship to specific people.
Second, I argue that in order to achieve Peter Singer's goal an "expanding circle" of care for all human beings, it will be necessary to use some form of artificial empathy enhancement. Within this context, I try to show that empathy enhancement is 1) a reasonably foreseeable possibility within the next decade or so, and 2) morally defensible.
Third, I argue that philosophers who argue that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions are mistaken. As I see it, these philosophers have erred in treating empathy as a singular concept and concluding that because psychopaths lack empathy they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. The distinction between RCE and ECE allows us to say that psychopaths lack one component of empathy, ECE, but are still responsible for their actions because they clearly have a functional RCE.
Fourth, I paint a portrait of the landscape of responsibility with respect to the enhanced empath. I argue that the enhanced empath would be subject to an expanded sphere of special obligations such that acts that were previously supererogatory become, prima facie, morally obligatory.
ContributorsGurney, David (Author) / McGregor, Joan (Thesis advisor) / Brake, Elizabeth (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Tsosie, Rebecca (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2016
Description
Many researchers have seen the value blockchain can add to the field of voting and many protocols have been proposed to allow voting to be conducted in a way that takes advantage of blockchains distributed and immutable structure. While blockchains immutable structure can take the place of paper records in preventing tampering it by itself is insufficient to construct a trustworthy voting system with eligibility, privacy, verifiability, and fairness requirements. Many of the protocols which strive to keep voters votes confidential, but also allow for verifiability and eligibility requirements rely on either a blind signature provided by a central authority to provide compliance with these requirements or ring signatures to prove membership in the set of voters. A blind signature issued by a central authority introduces a potential vulnerability as it allows a corrupt central authority to pass a large number of forged ballots into the mix without any detection. Ring signatures on the other hand tend to be overly resource intensive to allow for practical usage in large voting sets. The research in this thesis focuses on improving the trustworthiness of electronic voting systems by providing possible ways of avoiding or detecting corrupt central authorities while still relying upon the benefits of efficiency the blind signature provides.
ContributorsAnderson, Brandon David (Author) / Yau, Stephen S. (Thesis advisor) / Dasgupta, Partha (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
In 2014, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees the federal Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments (CLIA) program, issued guidance that the CLIA requirements apply when researchers seek to return individual-level research findings to study participants or their physician (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2014). The present study explores the stance of U.S. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) toward the applicability of and compliance with the CLIA regulations when studies plan to return individual research results (RIRR). I performed a document content analysis of 73 IRB policies and supporting documents from 30 United States (U.S.) institutions funded for biomedical research by the National Institutes of Health in 2017. Documents analyzed included policies, procedures, guidance, protocol and consent templates, and miscellaneous documents (such as IRB presentations) found to address the RIRR to study participants. I used qualitative content and document analysis to identify themes across institutions related to the CLIA regulations and the RIRR. Basic descriptive statistics were used to represent the data quantitatively. The study found that 96.67% (n=29) of institutions had documents that addressed the RIRR to participants. The majority of the institutions had at least one document that referenced the CLIA regulations when discussing the practice of disclosing participant-specific results [76.67% (n=23)]. The majority of institutions [56.67% (n=17)] indicated that they require compliance with the CLIA regulations for returning individual study findings to participants, while 13.33% (n=4) recommended compliance. The intent of two (6.67%) institutions was vague or unclear, while seven (26.67%) institutions were silent on the topic altogether. Of the 23 institutions that referenced “CLIA” in their documents, 52.17% only mentioned CLIA in a one or two-sentence blurb, providing very little guidance to investigators. The study results provide evidence that the majority of U.S. biomedical institutions require or recommend compliance with CLIA stipulations when investigators intend to return individual research results to study participants. However, the data indicates there is heterogeneity and variation in the quality of the guidance provided.
ContributorsBuchholtz, Stephanie (Author) / Robert, Jason S. (Thesis advisor) / Ellison, Karin D. (Committee member) / Carpten, John D. (Committee member) / Craig, David W. (Committee member) / Marchant, Gary E. (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021
Description
My honors thesis focuses on the technological aspects and the legal impacts of prosthetics and advanced prosthetics. There is a lot of case law dealing with early prosthetics when it comes to worker’s compensation, airport security, prisons and sports. However, there has been little case law that has dealt with advanced prosthetics. As prosthetic limbs become more technologically advanced and intertwined with one’s identity, it is crucial that laws are made to draw a new line between person and property. The innovation of prosthetic limbs has just begun and will surely face setbacks along the way, but the benefits will be worth it once the law catches up with the rapidly advancing technology.
ContributorsRogers, Madison (Author) / Marchant, Gary (Thesis director) / Schaefer, Sydney (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / Harrington Bioengineering Program (Contributor)
Created2022-05