Matching Items (13)

132697-Thumbnail Image.png

HOW MANUFACTURING LOCATION DECISIONS CORRELATE WITH STATE BUSINESS CLIMATE FACTORS

Description

This paper analyzes the correlation between unionization, corporate income taxes, and educational attainment with manufacturing firm locations at the state level across the USA. The paper analyzes the factors that

This paper analyzes the correlation between unionization, corporate income taxes, and educational attainment with manufacturing firm locations at the state level across the USA. The paper analyzes the factors that influence firms per capita in a state using the Ordinary Least Squares regression model, with panel data, and fixed effects. The regression takes data from 2012 through 2016 and shows the correlation between unionization, educational attainment, and taxes on firm location. The paper cites Timothy Bartik’s findings (1985) and addresses reasons for changes in results for today’s economy.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2019-05

131132-Thumbnail Image.png

Analysis of the Apartments Surrounding Arizona State University: How Much Does the Distance to Campus Affect the Rental Price of Apartments?

Description

With the ongoing student debt crisis and the continuing increase in the cost of attending a college or university, there has been an increasing conversation regarding the price of room

With the ongoing student debt crisis and the continuing increase in the cost of attending a college or university, there has been an increasing conversation regarding the price of room and board. Prior studies have shown the presence of a relationship between the distance to a location of interest, but few have been done with college campuses in mind. To answer this question, we used the Hedonic Pricing Model in order to isolate the effect that the distance to campus has on the rental price of apartments. Our results showed a clear positive nonlinear relationship between distance to campus and the price of apartment rentals in the area surrounding Arizona State University.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2020-05

149987-Thumbnail Image.png

Three essays in economics

Description

This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that

This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2011

152442-Thumbnail Image.png

Share auctions with linear demands

Description

Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a

Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA). The ex-post equilibriums on explicit solutions are achieved. I found VA does not generally constitute an optimal mechanism as expected even in a symmetric scenario. Furthermore, I rank the different auction formats in terms of revenue and social efficiency. The more private information bidders keep, the lower revenue VA generates to seller, and it could be even inferior to UPA or DPA. My study aggregates dispersed private information with linearity and is robust to distributional assumption.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2014

158316-Thumbnail Image.png

Essays in Mechanism Design

Description

I study split-pie bargaining problems between two agents. In chapter two, the types of both agents determine the value of outside options -- I refer to these as interdependent outside

I study split-pie bargaining problems between two agents. In chapter two, the types of both agents determine the value of outside options -- I refer to these as interdependent outside options. Since a direct mechanism stipulates outcomes as functions of agents' types, a player can update beliefs about another player’s type upon receiving a recommended outcome. I term this phenomenon as information leakage. I discuss binding arbitration, where players must stay with a recommended outcome, and non-binding arbitration, where players are not obliged to stay with an allocation. The total pie is reduced if the outcome is an outside option. With respect to efficiency, I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for first best mechanisms. These are mechanisms that assign zero probability to outside options for every report received. The condition describes balanced forces in conflict (outside options) and is the same in the cases of binding and non-binding arbitration. I also show a strong link between conflict and information: when conflict exists, information leakage occurs. Hence, non-binding arbitration may seem more restrictive than binding arbitration. To analyze why this is the case, I solve for second best mechanisms with binding arbitration and find a condition under which they can be implemented under non-binding arbitration. Thus, I show that non-binding arbitration can be as effective as binding arbitration in terms of efficiency. I also examine whether the equivalence between binding and non-binding arbitration can cease to hold, and provide analysis of why this happens. In chapter three, the bargaining problem entails no uncertainty but rather envy. Players can feel envy about the allocation of the other player. The Nash Bargaining solution is obtained in this context and some comparative statics are shown. The introduction of envy makes the more envious party a tougher negotiator.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2020

158257-Thumbnail Image.png

Essays in Matching Theory

Description

In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the

following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market

over time, each agent is restricted by a

In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the

following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market

over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A

form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can

manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In

such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one

matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one

market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second,

I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior"

to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side

to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide

a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US)

medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.

Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor.

Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions.

Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form,

and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the

literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there

is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that

the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This

paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital

from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability

introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups

is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2020

153809-Thumbnail Image.png

Information frictions, monitoring costs and the market for CEOs

Description

This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By

This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher. Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of empirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate governance.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2015

152837-Thumbnail Image.png

Essays in organizational economics: information sharing and organizational behavior

Description

One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research

One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2014

155639-Thumbnail Image.png

Essays in Market Design

Description

I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized

I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to

evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.

In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue

from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2017

153005-Thumbnail Image.png

Essays on political economy

Description

This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature

This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly determined by the voters' electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and government outcomes. The composition of the Government reflects the size and ideological make-up of the Government. Government outcomes reflect the length the Government survives and the policy consequences of the Government. The literature focuses on the former criterion. The view is that, in parliamentary democracies, longer Government duration should be associated with stability and better policies. The latter is important from the perspective of directly evaluating whether Governments make good or bad decisions from the perspective of voters. The first chapter of this dissertation develop a model of the government formation process, where parties care about and bargain over both policy and office benefits. The model generate predictions that matches important features of the data. The second chapter uses data from western European parliamentary democracies to estimate the parameters of the model in chapter one. The estimation results suggest that coalitions care about both ideology and office benefits, but more about office benefits. The third chapter studies which (existing) institutional environments lead to `good' government outcomes. The results have a number of important implications for constitutional design.

Contributors

Agent

Created

Date Created
  • 2014