In the first chapter, I focus on a key challenge faced by tax reforms: their short-run
welfare consequences. I examine a consumption-based tax reform that, despite the long-run welfare gains it generates, causes the welfare for some groups such as retirees or the working poor to fall during transition between steady states. Using a life-cycle model with heterogeneous households, I show how to devise a transition path from the current U.S. federal tax system to a consumption-based tax system that improves the welfare of current generations as well as those who are born in the long-run steady state. In a nutshell, all households alive at the time of the policy change can choose when they want to switch to the new tax system, or whether they want to switch at all. I find that implementing a tax reform with this feature improves the welfare of 95% of the population in the short run, compared to less than 25% of population in the conventional case with no choice. It takes about 20 years for half of the population to pay their taxes under the new tax code.
In the second chapter, I study the aggregate consequences of the differential tax treatments of U.S. businesses focusing on the role of legal forms of organization. I develop an industry equilibrium model in which the organizational form is an endogenous choice.
This model incorporates the key trade-off that businesses face when choosing their legal forms: the tax treatment of the business income; the access to external capital, and the potential level and evolution of productivity over time.
The model is matched to the firm dynamic features of U.S. businesses and the contributing share of each legal form in total output. Using the model, I study revenue-neutral tax reforms in which legal forms receive the same tax treatments, and
I find that the incentives induced by tax structure for organizational form and external finance are both large. Relative to the benchmark economy, unifying the tax code for all legal forms, can lead to 8% increase in the aggregate output.
The first chapter is motivated by the fact that a prominent feature of cities in developing countries is the existence of slums: locations with low housing-quality and informal property rights. This paper focuses on the allocation of land across slums and formal housing, and emphasizes the role of living in central urban areas for the formation of slums. I build a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model to study the aggregate effects of anti-slum policies and use microdata from India for the quantitative implementation. According to my findings, demolishing slums in central urban areas leads to a decrease in welfare, aggregate labor productivity, and urban population. In contrast, decreasing formal housing distortions in India to the U.S. level increases the urban population share by 20% and labor productivity by 2.4%, and reduces the share of the urban population living in slums by 19%.
The second chapter is motivated by the fact that labor productivity gaps between rich and poor countries are much larger for agriculture than for non-agriculture. Using detailed data from Mexican farms, this paper shows that value added per worker is frequently over two times larger in cash crops than in staple crops, yet most farmers choose to produce staples. These findings imply that the agricultural productivity gap is actually a staple productivity gap and understanding production decisions of farmers is crucial to explain why labor productivity is so low in poor countries. This paper develops a general equilibrium framework in which subsistence consumption and interregional trade costs determine the efficient selection of farmers into types of crops. The quantitative results of the model imply that decreasing trade costs in Mexico to the U.S. level reduces the ratio of employment in staple to cash crops by 17% and increases agricultural labor productivity by 14%.
The first chapter documents that intergenerational occupational persistence is significantly higher in poor countries even after controlling for cross-country differences in occupational structures. Based on this empirical fact, I posit that high occupational persistence in poor countries is symptomatic of underlying talent misallocation. Constraints on education financing force sons to choose fathers' occupations over the occupations of their comparative advantage. A version of Roy (1951) model of occupational choice is developed to quantify the impact of occupational misallocation on aggregate productivity. I find that output per worker reduces to a third of the benchmark US economy for the country with the highest level of occupational persistence.
In the second chapter, I use occupational prestige as a proxy of social status to estimate intergenerational occupational mobility for 50 countries spanning the breadth of world's income distribution for both sons and daughters. I find that although relative mobility varies significantly across countries, the correlation between relative mobility and GDP per capita is only mildly positive for sons and is close to zero for daughters. I also consider two measures of absolute mobility: the propensity to move across quartiles and the propensity to move relative to father's occupational prestige. Similar to relative mobility, the first measure of absolute mobility is uncorrelated with GDP per capita. The second measure, however, is positively correlated with GDP per capita with correlations being significantly higher for sons compared to daughters.
The third chapter analyses to what extent the growth in productivity witnessed by India during 1983--2004 can be explained by a better allocation of workers across occupations. I first document that the propensity to work in high-skilled occupations relative to high-caste men increased manifold for high-caste women, low-caste men and low-caste women during this period. Given that innate talent in these occupations is likely to be independent across groups, the chapter argues that the occupational distribution in the 1980s represented talent misallocation in which workers from many groups faced significant barriers to practice an occupation of their comparative advantage. I find that these barriers can explain 15--21\% of the observed growth in output per worker during the period from 1983--2004.
The first chapter studies the aggregate consequences of misallocation in a firm dynamics model with multi-establishment firms. I calibrate my model to the US firm size distribution with respect to both the number of employees and the number of establishments, and use it to study distortions that are correlated with establishment size, or so-called size-dependent distortions to establishments, which are modeled as implicit output taxes. In contrast to previous studies, I find that size-dependent distortions are not more damaging to aggregate productivity and output than size-independent distortions, while the implicit tax revenue approximately summarizes the effects on aggregate output. I also use the model to compare the effects of size-dependent distortions to establishments and to firms, and find that they have different effects on firm size distribution, but have similar effects on aggregate output.
The second chapter studies the effects of product market frictions on firm size distribution and their implications for industrial pollution in China. Using a unique micro-level manufacturing census, I find that larger firms generate and emit less pollutants per unit of production. I also provide evidence suggesting the existence of size-dependent product market frictions that disproportionately affect larger firms. Using a model with firms heterogeneous in productivity and an endogenous choice of pollution treatment technology, I show that these frictions result in lower adoption rate of clean technology, higher pollution and lower aggregate output. I use the model to evaluate policies that eliminate size-dependent frictions, and those that increase environmental regulation. Quantitative results show that eliminating size-dependent frictions increases output by 30%. Meanwhile, the fraction of firms using clean technology increases by 27% and aggregate pollution decreases by 20%. In contrast, a regulatory policy which increases the clean technology adoption rate by the same 27%, has no effect on aggregate output and leads to only 10% reduction in aggregate pollution.
Chapter two studies macroeconomic implications of a higher cost of health services faced by the unemployed which arise because 1) workers lose access to ESHI when they leave their jobs and 2) the uninsured face inflated health care prices. First, I provide evidence suggesting that the cost of health services for the privately insured is about 50% lower than for the uninsured. Second, I quantify the effects of higher cost of health services for the unemployed in the Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model extended to allow the workers to pay an extra cost of health services contingent on their employment status. Calibration procedure uses the differences between costs of health services for the privately insured and uninsured inferred from the data as a gap between costs of health services for the employed and unemployed. Quantitative results show that equalizing these costs across workers increases labor productivity by 1.2% and unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points. The increased unemployment dominates quantitatively leading to a decrease in aggregate output by 0.26%.
The first chapter develops a model of charity’s choice of fundraising method under two dimensions of asymmetric information, quality and purpose. The main implication is a separating equilibrium where higher-quality charities choose to distinguish themselves by using a traditional fundraising method, while lower-quality ones exploit a low-stakes, take-it- or leave-it, ``checkout’’ method. An empirical application reinforced that charities of lower quality are more likely to adopt the checkout method. Despite this, consumers still choose to give in the equilibrium, due to the small requested amount of checkout donations, which disincentivizes serious thinking. Although exploited by lower-quality charities, the checkout method, along with purpose uncertainty, has the potential to alleviate the free-riding problem associated with public good provision and is, therefore, welfare improving.
The second chapter studies why corporations donate to charities and
how their donations affect social welfare. I propose that firms make donations out of an image reason. In a model where two firms compete with each other, charitable donation could attract consumers and also signal firm overall social responsibility. I show that there exists an equilibrium where the high responsibility firm overdonates,
resulting in a donation level closer to the socially optimal
one. This leads to higher consumer welfare due to higher private good
consumption as well as higher public good consumption when overdonation is prominent. Overall social welfare is enhanced. Empirical results support social image as an incentive for firms to donate.
The third chapter examines people's marginal willingness to pay for a change in local public good provision. We use a fixed effects hedonic model with MSA level data to study the effect of crime on local housing price. We explore the 1990s crime drop and use abortion data in 1970s and 1980s as an instrumental variable based on \citet*{donohue2001impact}. One result we find is that a decrease in murder of 100 cases per 10,000 people increases housing price by 70\%. We further translate this result into a value of a statistical case of homicide, which is around 0.4 million in 1999 dollars.
Sanctuary jurisdictions are jurisdictions that do not enforce one or more aspects of federal immigration policy in regards to unauthorized immigrants. Some states maintain state-wide sanctuary policies while others are adamantly against them. Estimates of taxes that unauthorized immigrants pay and estimates of the amount of state funding that unauthorized immigrants can access (education, financial aid, corrections, and welfare) reveal that regardless of sanctuary status, unauthorized immigrants may “pay in” more than they “take out” from the system. The status of “sanctuary jurisdiction” does not appear to have much if any effect on the net state budget. However, unauthorized immigrants are able to access more welfare programs in sanctuary states.