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Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher. Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of empirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate governance.
ContributorsLi, Zhan, Ph.D (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
Modern Americans ignorantly live under a blanket of unread terms, conditions, and binding contracts. Often, these contracts (mostly associated with products and services) come and go with little effect. Periodically, the products or services cause the consumer harm, leading them to seek repair. The consumer then realizes that all the fine print they failed to read makes an impactful legal difference. This paper analyzes the work of Professor Radin through her book, Boilerplate. It goes on to explore many other arguments presented by contract theorists and makes substantial claims regarding the dangers of boilerplate (unread terms and conditions).
ContributorsBecker, Alexander Daniel (Author) / Koretz, Lora (Thesis director) / Calleros, Charles (Committee member) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor) / W. P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / Department of English (Contributor)
Created2015-05
Description
Family economics uses economic concepts such as productions and decision making to understand family behavior. Economists place emphasis on the rule of families on labor supply, human capital investment, and consumption. In a household, the members choose the optimal time allocations between working, housework and leisure, and money between consumption of different members and savings. One-Child policy and strong inter-generational connections cause unique family structure in China. Households of different generations provide income transfer and labor support to each other. Households consider these connections in their savings, labor supply, human capital investment, fertility and marriage decisions. Especially, strong intergenerational relationships in China are one cause of the high level of young female labor supply and high saving rate. I will investigate the rules of intergenerational relationships on household economic behavior.
Affirmative Action allocates college seats to a separate group. To evaluate the distribution effects of AA on discrete groups, we need to study household's strategic reactions on the rule of college seats allocation. The admission system of National College Entrance Examination in China is a type of AA. That distributes college seats by regions. I will use the rapid expansion of Chinese college enrollment as a natural experiment to check the households' reaction on AA and college expansion.
Media economics utilizes economic empirical and theoretical tools to figure out the social, cultural, and economic issues in media industries. The impact of online piracy on genuine products sales is under debate, because people cannot find representing proxies to evaluate piracy levels. I will use Chinese data to study the effects of online piracy on theater revenue.
Affirmative Action allocates college seats to a separate group. To evaluate the distribution effects of AA on discrete groups, we need to study household's strategic reactions on the rule of college seats allocation. The admission system of National College Entrance Examination in China is a type of AA. That distributes college seats by regions. I will use the rapid expansion of Chinese college enrollment as a natural experiment to check the households' reaction on AA and college expansion.
Media economics utilizes economic empirical and theoretical tools to figure out the social, cultural, and economic issues in media industries. The impact of online piracy on genuine products sales is under debate, because people cannot find representing proxies to evaluate piracy levels. I will use Chinese data to study the effects of online piracy on theater revenue.
ContributorsYue, Yang (Author) / Silverman, Daniel (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Veramendi, Gregory (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description
This collection of essays attempts to address the question: how does recent technological progress shape inequality in the labor market? In the first chapter, I document and investigate life-cycle profiles of skill premiums across cohorts. My empirical analysis shows that younger cohorts have steeper growth in the skill premium before age 40 but flatter growth after 40. I use a human capital investment model to account for the cross-cohort variation in skill premium profiles. The results indicate that the flattened growth after age 40 is caused by the drop in human capital (of high-skill workers) near the end of the life cycle. Besides, the magnitude of life-cycle growth in the skill premium is mainly driven by the relative skill price. In chapter two and three, I study how technology usage affects earnings growth and earnings inequality over the life-cycle. In chapter 2, I construct a novel index to identify technology usage at the individual level using occupations as the proxy. I document technology usage patterns over the life-cycle and investigate its empirical relationship with labor earnings. I find that technology usage accounts for more than one-third of the growth in life-cycle inequality. In chapter 3, I develop a life-cycle model with endogenous human capital investments and technology choices to quantify the relative importance of technology usage. The model features rich interactions between technology and human capital such that workers with high human capital are more likely to work with advanced technologies and vice versa. I find that technology usage contributes 31% of the growth in mean earnings and 46% of the growth in life-cycle inequality. I also evaluate policy implications of non-linear taxation on labor earnings. When tax progressivity on labor earnings is changed from US to European levels, the college attainment rate drops by 7 percentage points, and the growth in mean earnings decreases by 23%.
ContributorsShi, Siyu (Author) / Ventura, Gustavo (Thesis advisor) / Bick, Alexander (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2023
Description
In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the
following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market
over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A
form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can
manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In
such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one
matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one
market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second,
I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior"
to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side
to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide
a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US)
medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor.
Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions.
Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form,
and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the
literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there
is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that
the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This
paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital
from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability
introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups
is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.
following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market
over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A
form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can
manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In
such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one
matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one
market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second,
I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior"
to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side
to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide
a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US)
medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor.
Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions.
Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form,
and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the
literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there
is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that
the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This
paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital
from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability
introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups
is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.
ContributorsAltinok, Ahmet (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
Description
This dissertation consists of two essays related to dynamic debt contracting and financial economics. The first chapter studies key determinants of inclusion of a financial covenant in corporate loans from theoretical and empirical angles. Using a novel manually collected loan dataset of small to medium-sized publicly-listed U.S. firms, I find that firms that issue loans without financial covenants tend to have (i) lower accounting quality, (ii) lower assets, and (iii) are experiencing faster growth in profitability relative to firms that issue loans with financial covenants. I build a theoretical model of project financing in which there is noisy public information about the project’s profitability, and the lender can privately monitor to improve the information quality. I show that if the signal precision without monitoring is sufficiently low (high), the equilibrium contract does not include (includes) a covenant. Covenant inclusion plays a key role in providing incentives to the lender to monitor. I show that the lender monitors less often relative to the first best. Insufficient monitoring leads to “excessive risk-taking,” namely, bad quality firms continuing with the project too often. Relatedly, I also show that covenants are used less often in equilibrium relative to the first best. The second chapter examines equilibrium consequences of litigation by holdout creditors in sovereign debt renegotiation. I show that given a sufficiently high probability of winning the litigation case against the borrowing country and/or a high enough defaulted sovereign debt, the presence of the holdout creditors increases the expected debt recovery rate, which makes the default option less attractive, and decreases the country’s default probability and the interest rate on the country’s debt. The country responds by borrowing more but defaults less often along the equilibrium path as it wants to avoid default and facing holdout creditors. Having a non-zero probability of successful litigation is welfare improving for the country as it sustains higher debt and defaults less frequently.
ContributorsKim, Yong (Author) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Thesis advisor) / Mehra, Rajnish (Committee member) / Tserlukevich, Yuri (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021