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- Creators: Barrett, The Honors College
Description
One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature.
ContributorsWu, Zhenhua (Author) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly determined by the voters' electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and government outcomes. The composition of the Government reflects the size and ideological make-up of the Government. Government outcomes reflect the length the Government survives and the policy consequences of the Government. The literature focuses on the former criterion. The view is that, in parliamentary democracies, longer Government duration should be associated with stability and better policies. The latter is important from the perspective of directly evaluating whether Governments make good or bad decisions from the perspective of voters. The first chapter of this dissertation develop a model of the government formation process, where parties care about and bargain over both policy and office benefits. The model generate predictions that matches important features of the data. The second chapter uses data from western European parliamentary democracies to estimate the parameters of the model in chapter one. The estimation results suggest that coalitions care about both ideology and office benefits, but more about office benefits. The third chapter studies which (existing) institutional environments lead to `good' government outcomes. The results have a number of important implications for constitutional design.
ContributorsHu, Lin, Ph.D (Author) / Hu, Lin (Thesis advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Silverman, Dan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
Buyers have private information on auctioning divisible goods. Linearity could be a useful property on measuring their marginal utility on those goods or on their bidding strategies under such a share auction environment. This paper establishes an auction model with independent private-values paradigm (IPVP) where bidders have linear demand. A mechanism design approach is applied to explore the optimal share auction in this model. I discuss the most popular auction formats in practice, including Vickrey auction (VA), uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory price auction (DPA). The ex-post equilibriums on explicit solutions are achieved. I found VA does not generally constitute an optimal mechanism as expected even in a symmetric scenario. Furthermore, I rank the different auction formats in terms of revenue and social efficiency. The more private information bidders keep, the lower revenue VA generates to seller, and it could be even inferior to UPA or DPA. My study aggregates dispersed private information with linearity and is robust to distributional assumption.
ContributorsWang, Mian (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
Description
Geology and its tangential studies, collectively known and referred to in this thesis as geosciences, have been paramount to the transformation and advancement of society, fundamentally changing the way we view, interact and live with the surrounding natural and built environment. It is important to recognize the value and importance of this interdisciplinary scientific field while reconciling its ties to imperial and colonizing extractive systems which have led to harmful and invasive endeavors. This intersection among geosciences, (environmental) justice studies, and decolonization is intended to promote inclusive pedagogical models through just and equitable methodologies and frameworks as to prevent further injustices and promote recognition and healing of old wounds. By utilizing decolonial frameworks and highlighting the voices of peoples from colonized and exploited landscapes, this annotated syllabus tackles the issues previously described while proposing solutions involving place-based education and the recentering of land within geoscience pedagogical models. (abstract)
ContributorsReed, Cameron E (Author) / Richter, Jennifer (Thesis director) / Semken, Steven (Committee member) / School of Earth and Space Exploration (Contributor, Contributor) / School of Sustainability (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
The ASU COVID-19 testing lab process was developed to operate as the primary testing site for all ASU staff, students, and specified external individuals. Tests are collected at various collection sites, including a walk-in site at the SDFC and various drive-up sites on campus; analysis is conducted on ASU campus and results are distributed virtually to all patients via the Health Services patient portal. The following is a literature review on past implementations of various process improvement techniques and how they can be applied to the ABCTL testing process to achieve laboratory goals. (abstract)
ContributorsKrell, Abby Elizabeth (Co-author) / Bruner, Ashley (Co-author) / Ramesh, Frankincense (Co-author) / Lewis, Gabriel (Co-author) / Barwey, Ishna (Co-author) / Myers, Jack (Co-author) / Hymer, William (Co-author) / Reagan, Sage (Co-author) / Compton, Carolyn (Thesis director) / McCarville, Daniel R. (Committee member) / Industrial, Systems & Operations Engineering Prgm (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2021-05
Description
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher. Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of empirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate governance.
ContributorsLi, Zhan, Ph.D (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
Description
For as long as humans have been working, they have been looking for ways to get that work done better, faster, and more efficient. Over the course of human history, mankind has created innumerable spectacular inventions, all with the goal of making the economy and daily life more efficient. Today, innovations and technological advancements are happening at a pace like never seen before, and technology like automation and artificial intelligence are poised to once again fundamentally alter the way people live and work in society. Whether society is prepared or not, robots are coming to replace human labor, and they are coming fast. In many areas artificial intelligence has disrupted entire industries of the economy. As people continue to make advancements in artificial intelligence, more industries will be disturbed, more jobs will be lost, and entirely new industries and professions will be created in their wake. The future of the economy and society will be determined by how humans adapt to the rapid innovations that are taking place every single day. In this paper I will examine the extent to which automation will take the place of human labor in the future, project the potential effect of automation to future unemployment, and what individuals and society will need to do to adapt to keep pace with rapidly advancing technology. I will also look at the history of automation in the economy. For centuries humans have been advancing technology to make their everyday work more productive and efficient, and for centuries this has forced humans to adapt to the modern technology through things like training and education. The thesis will additionally examine the ways in which the U.S. education system will have to adapt to meet the demands of the advancing economy, and how job retraining programs must be modernized to prepare workers for the changing economy.
ContributorsCunningham, Reed P. (Author) / DeSerpa, Allan (Thesis director) / Haglin, Brett (Committee member) / School of International Letters and Cultures (Contributor) / Department of Finance (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
Businesses stand to face many uncertainties from the moment they start up to every moment in between. A business can try to recognize them and plan ahead, react to them as they occur, or be rocked by a black swan they never saw coming. How a business deals with unforeseen events can increase its potential for success or failure. With this in mind, there is no better bridge between the here and now and the future than planning for change in order to move a company toward preparing for change, adapting to change and achieving optimal results. Interested in taking a step toward the digital age, Alpha Homes Management, Inc. (Alpha Homes) sought our help to explore ideas and options to take their company to a new level. This Barrett Creative Project was centered on designing a system for Alpha Homes that will replace their outdated paper-based system with a more digital one. This aligns with the project also featured as a capstone project as required by the information technology degree expectations. In supplement to the capstone, and for the Barrett Creative Project, the final product was presented to the owners of Alpha Homes Management, Inc. to be utilized by the business. The end goal is to provide a platform which provides a paperless environment for documentation and bring the company a step closer to having a robust internet presence. Now that the web-based application product has been created and presented, the testing phase can now begin to evaluate its efficacy.
ContributorsBrice-Nash, Tristan (Co-author) / Alfawzan, Mohammad (Co-author) / Doheny, Damien (Thesis director) / Rodriguez, Carlos (Committee member) / Information Technology (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05
Description
An ethical dilemma is not a matter of “right” versus “wrong,” but rather it is a situation of conflicting values. A common ethical dilemma is that of honesty versus loyalty—is it better to tell the truth, or remain loyal to the company? In the Japanese culture, truth is circumstantial and can vary with different situations. In a way, the Japanese idea of honesty reflects how highly they value loyalty. This overlap of values results in the lack of an ethical dilemma for the Japanese, which creates a new risk for fraud. Without this struggle, a Japanese employee does not have strong justification against committing fraud if it aligns with his values of honesty and loyalty.
This paper looks at the Japanese values relating to honesty and loyalty to show how much these ideas overlap. The lack of a conflict of values creates a risk for fraud, which will be shown through an analysis of the scandals of two Japanese companies, Toshiba and Olympus. These scandals shine light on the complexity of the ethical dilemma for the Japanese employees; since their sense of circumstantial honesty encourages them to lie if it maintains the harmony of the group, there is little stopping them from committing the fraud that their superiors asked them to commit.
In a global economy, understanding the ways that values impact business and decisions is important for both interacting with others and anticipating potential conflicts, including those that may result in or indicate potential red flags for fraud.
This paper looks at the Japanese values relating to honesty and loyalty to show how much these ideas overlap. The lack of a conflict of values creates a risk for fraud, which will be shown through an analysis of the scandals of two Japanese companies, Toshiba and Olympus. These scandals shine light on the complexity of the ethical dilemma for the Japanese employees; since their sense of circumstantial honesty encourages them to lie if it maintains the harmony of the group, there is little stopping them from committing the fraud that their superiors asked them to commit.
In a global economy, understanding the ways that values impact business and decisions is important for both interacting with others and anticipating potential conflicts, including those that may result in or indicate potential red flags for fraud.
ContributorsTabar, Kelly Ann (Author) / Samuelson, Melissa (Thesis director) / Goldman, Alan (Committee member) / WPC Graduate Programs (Contributor) / W.P. Carey School of Business (Contributor) / School of Accountancy (Contributor) / Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Created2018-05