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One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following

One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature.
ContributorsWu, Zhenhua (Author) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Thesis advisor) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly determined by the voters' electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parliamentary characteristics and

This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament, called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly determined by the voters' electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parliamentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government and government outcomes. The composition of the Government reflects the size and ideological make-up of the Government. Government outcomes reflect the length the Government survives and the policy consequences of the Government. The literature focuses on the former criterion. The view is that, in parliamentary democracies, longer Government duration should be associated with stability and better policies. The latter is important from the perspective of directly evaluating whether Governments make good or bad decisions from the perspective of voters. The first chapter of this dissertation develop a model of the government formation process, where parties care about and bargain over both policy and office benefits. The model generate predictions that matches important features of the data. The second chapter uses data from western European parliamentary democracies to estimate the parameters of the model in chapter one. The estimation results suggest that coalitions care about both ideology and office benefits, but more about office benefits. The third chapter studies which (existing) institutional environments lead to `good' government outcomes. The results have a number of important implications for constitutional design.
ContributorsHu, Lin, Ph.D (Author) / Hu, Lin (Thesis advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Silverman, Dan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2014
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Description
This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be

This dissertation presents three essays in economics. Firstly, I study the problem of allocating an indivisible good between two agents under incomplete information. I provide a characterization of mechanisms that maximize the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms: Any optimal mechanism must be a convex combination of two fixed price mechanisms and two option mechanisms. Secondly, I study the problem of allocating a non-excludable public good between two agents under incomplete information. An equal-cost sharing mechanism which maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of the agents among all feasible strategy-proof mechanisms is proved to be optimal. Under the equal-cost sharing mechanism, when the built cost is low, the public good is provided whenever one of the agents is willing to fund it at half cost; when the cost is high, the public good is provided only if both agents are willing to fund it. Thirdly, I analyze the problem of matching two heterogeneous populations. If the payoff from a match exhibits complementarities, it is well known that absent any friction positive assortative matching is optimal. Coarse matching refers to a situation in which the populations into a finite number of classes, then randomly matched within these classes. The focus of this essay is the performance of coarse matching schemes with a finite number of classes. The main results of this essay are the following ones. First, assuming a multiplicative match payoff function, I derive a lower bound on the performance of n-class coarse matching under mild conditions on the distributions of agents' characteristics. Second, I prove that this result generalizes to a large class of match payoff functions. Third, I show that these results are applicable to a broad class of applications, including a monopoly pricing problem with incomplete information, as well as to a cost-sharing problem with incomplete information. In these problems, standard models predict that optimal contracts sort types completely. The third result implies that a monopolist can capture a large fraction of the second-best profits by offering pooling contracts with a small number of qualities.
ContributorsShao, Ran (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Schlee, Edward (Committee member) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2011
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Description
This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative

This paper discusses the matching between CEOs of different talent and firms of different size, by considering boards' costly monitoring of CEOs who have private information about firm output. By incorporating a costly state verification model into a matching model, we have a number of novel findings. First, positive assortative matching (PAM) breaks down as larger firms match with less talented CEOs when monitoring is sufficiently costly despite of complementarity in firms' production technology. More importantly, PAM can be the equilibrium sorting pattern for large firms and high talent CEOs even it fails for small firms and low talent CEOs, which implies that empirical applications relying on PAM are more robust by using samples of large firms. Second, under positive assortative matching, CEO compensation can be decomposed into frictionless competitive market pay and information rent. More talented CEOs extract more rent, which makes their wage even higher. Third, firm-level corporate governance depends on aggregate market characteristics such as the scarcity and allocation of CEO talent. Weak corporate governance can be optimal when CEO talent is sufficiently scarce. My analysis yields a number of empirical predictions on equilibrium sorting pattern, CEO compensation, and corporate governance.
ContributorsLi, Zhan, Ph.D (Author) / Chade, Hector (Thesis advisor) / Kovrijnykh, Natalia (Committee member) / Manelli, Alejandro (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In

I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications

of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning

students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction

where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders

suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to

evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable.

In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue

from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments.
ContributorsHernandez Chanto, Allan Roberto (Author) / Manelli, Alejandro (Thesis advisor) / Friedenberg, Amanda (Committee member) / Chade, Hector (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2017
Description

Human Papillomavirus, or HPV, is a viral pathogen that most commonly spreads through sexual contact. HPV strains 6 and 11 normally cause genital warts, while HPV strains 16 and 18 commonly cause cervical cancer, which causes cancerous cells to spread in the cervix. Physicians can detect those HPV strains, using

Human Papillomavirus, or HPV, is a viral pathogen that most commonly spreads through sexual contact. HPV strains 6 and 11 normally cause genital warts, while HPV strains 16 and 18 commonly cause cervical cancer, which causes cancerous cells to spread in the cervix. Physicians can detect those HPV strains, using a Pap smear, which is a diagnostic test that collects cells from the female cervix.

Created2021-04-06
Description

Johann Gregor Mendel studied patterns of trait inheritance in plants during the nineteenth century. Mendel, an Augustinian monk, conducted experiments on pea plants at St. Thomas’ Abbey in what is now Brno, Czech Republic. Twentieth century scientists used Mendel’s recorded observations to create theories about genetics.

Created2022-01-13
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Description

In the 1930s, George Beadle and Boris Ephrussi discovered factors that affect eye colors in developing fruit flies. They did so while working at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California. (1) They took optic discs (colored fuchsia in the image) from fruit fly larvae in the third instar

In the 1930s, George Beadle and Boris Ephrussi discovered factors that affect eye colors in developing fruit flies. They did so while working at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena, California. (1) They took optic discs (colored fuchsia in the image) from fruit fly larvae in the third instar stage of development. Had the flies not been manipulated, they would have developed into adults with vermilion eyes. (2) Beadle and Ephrussi transplanted the donor optic discs into the bodies of several types of larvae, including those that would develop with normal colored eyes (brick red), and those that would develop eyes with other shades of red, such as claret, carmine, peach, and ruby (grouped together and colored black in the image). (3a) When implanted into normal hosts that would develop brick red eyes, the transplanted optic disc developed into an eye that also was brick red. (3b) When implanted into abnormal hosts that would develop eyes of some other shade of red, the transplanted optic discs developed into eyes that were vermilion. Beadle and Ephrussi concluded that there was a factor, such as an enzyme or some other protein, produced outside of the optic disc that influenced the color of the eye that developed from the disc.

Created2016-10-11
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Description

This illustration shows George Beadle and Edward Tatum's experiments with Neurospora crassa that indicated that single genes produce single enzymes. The pair conducted the experiments at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. Enzymes are types of proteins that can catalyze reactions inside cells, reactions that produce a number of things,

This illustration shows George Beadle and Edward Tatum's experiments with Neurospora crassa that indicated that single genes produce single enzymes. The pair conducted the experiments at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. Enzymes are types of proteins that can catalyze reactions inside cells, reactions that produce a number of things, including nutrients that the cell needs. Neurospora crassa is a species of mold that grows on bread. In the early 1940s, Beadle and Tatum conducted an experiment to discover the abnormal genes in Neurospora mutants, which failed to produce specific nutrients needed to survive. (1) Beadle and Tatum used X-rays to cause mutations in the DNA of Neurospora, and then they grew the mutated Neurospora cells in glassware. (2) They grew several strains, represented in four groups of paired test tubes. For each group, Neurospora was grown in one of two types of growth media. One medium contained all the essential nutrients that the Neurospora needed to survive, which Beadle and Tatum called a complete medium. The second medium was a minimal medium and lacked nutrients that Neurospora needed to survive. If functioning normally and in the right conditions, however, Neurospora can produce these absent nutrients. (3) When Beadle and Tatum grew the mutated mold strains on both the complete and on the minimal media, all of the molds survived on the complete media, but not all of the molds survived on the minimal media (strain highlighted in yellow). (4) For the next step, the researchers added nutrients to the minimal media such that some glassware received an amino acid mixture (represented as colored squares) and other glassware received a vitamin mixture (represented as colored triangles) in an attempt to figure out which kind of nutrients the mutated molds needed. The researchers then took mold from the mutant mold strain that had survived on a complete medium and added that mold to the supplemented minimal media. They found that in some cases the mutated mold grew on media supplemented only with vitamins but not on media supplemented only with amino acids. (5) To discover which vitamins the mutant molds needed, Beadle and Tatum used several tubes with the minimal media, supplementing each one with a different vitamin, and then they attempted to grow the mutant mold in each tube. They found that different mutant strains of the mold grew only on media supplemented with different kinds of vitamins, for instance vitamin B6 for one strain, and vitamin B1 for another. In experiments not pictured, Beadle and Tatum found in step (4) that other strains of mutant mold grew on minimal media supplemented only with amino acids but not on minimal media supplemented only with vitamins. When they repeated step (5) on those strains and with specific kinds of amino acids in the different test tubes, they found that the some mutated mold strains grew on minimal media supplemented solely with one kind of amino acid, and others strains grew only on minimal media supplemented with other kinds of amino acids. For both the vitamins and amino acid cases, Beadle and Tatum concluded that the X-rays had mutated different genes in Neurospora, resulting in different mutant strains of Neurospora cells. In a cell of a given strain, the X-rays had changed the gene normally responsible for producing an enzyme that catalyzed a vitamin or an amino acid. As a result, the Neurospora cell could no longer produce that enzyme, and thus couldn't catalyze a specific nutrient.

Created2016-10-12